Studies in Intelligence, Vol 5, No. 1, Winter 1961

Regrettably the *Handbook* has neither index nor bibliography

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND: A Military-Political History, 1918-41. By *John Erickson*. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1962. 889 pp. $15.)

When he submitted his manuscript for publication, the author of this book could not know that approaching events would give it a unique timeliness. One of his principal themes is the basic and continuing conflict between the Soviet armed services and the power complex centering on the state security service. This struggle first developed in the days of Trotskiy. It reached dramatic intensity when Marshal Tukhachevskiy fell. Since the second World War the rise and fall of military personalities has revealed discontent in the armed services. Now the treason of Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy has thrown an embarrassing light on the struggle between these forces. Erickson's book permits intelligence officers to study the background and development of this conflict.

The author, who did his research while a Fellow of St Anthony's College, Oxford discusses the history of the Soviet army between the outbreak of the Revolution and the German invasion of 1941. This is not a history of Soviet military institutions, but rather a discussion of the impact on the Soviet armed forces of internal politics, international developments, and leading Soviet personalities. Two lengthy chapters are devoted to the military purges of 1937, their immediate causes, and their complex effects on Soviet and world affairs. Indeed, the theme of the purges, their origins, and their effect on Soviet military policy are a major element of the book. Although he cannot fully explain the military holocaust (no one can in the present state of our knowledge), Erickson performs a useful service in summarizing the events of 1937-1938, stripping away some of the more improbable interpretations of events, and placing the purge in the perspective of its time. This perspective helps us to understand the developments of the Penkovskiy affair.

Approved for Release
Date
5 OCT 1990

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [redacted]
TO INFO [redacted]		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. Unknown
FROM [redacted]		DATE 30 December 1960
SUBJECT Operational/ [redacted] Reported Provocation Attempt		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) X MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED FYI		
REFERENCE(S)		

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1. On Wednesday, 21 December, a Dr. A.D. *MERRIMAN contacted the London Embassy by telephone and somewhat guardedly reported the basic elements of what appeared to be a provocation attempt during a recent business trip he had made to Moscow. The message was reported to the KUBARK Station by the Embassy, and it was agreed that London Station would check into the report.

2. [redacted] was asked if they had any information concerning Subject. After checking, they advised that they could confirm that an individual by this name had made a trip to Moscow in early December but knew nothing about him. [redacted] also advised that he had checked with the Foreign Office who also knew nothing about the individual; but in view of the fact that MERRIMAN had stated in his telephone call to the American Embassy that he had already reported the incident to the British Ambassador in Moscow at the time, the Foreign Office was most interested since they had not received any such report from Moscow as yet. [redacted] stated, however, that the Foreign Office apparently expected that the Embassy would advise them if they planned to contact MERRIMAN directly. The Foreign Office was contacted and so advised.

1.3(a)(4)

3. [redacted] then telephoned MERRIMAN and arranged to see him at 1500 hours at his home, 59 Streatham Close, London S.W. 16. His telephone number is STR-0411.

POB USA(?)
DOB ca 1896 c.f.: US

4. (Colonel (Ret.) Dr.) A.D. MERRIMAN is approximately 65 years of age. He is a metallurgist (graduate of Cambridge) and formerly taught this subject in a technical university. He is also the author of an imposing-looking technical tome entitled: "A Dictionary of Metallurgy." During the war, he was chief Scientific Advisor attached to the Eighth Army. After the war, he went into private business, and now he is a "Technical Advisor" to the Steel Industry.

Attempted Intel Provocation

5. [redacted] called upon him at his apartment. He appeared to be completely stable and sincere, and [redacted] has no doubt that he was telling the story essentially as it happened although he was, at times, vague concerning dates and times. As he will probably be returning to Moscow again in the course of his profession, he was most anxious that his identity be protected and that no action be taken which might be traceable to him.

1.3(a)(4)

6. He lived in Moscow for about a year after the war and has since returned on business trips "several times." This last trip was at the invitation of the Soviet "State Scientific and Technical Commission." He arrived in Moscow circa 8 December and stated that he made the usual rounds of industry and talked to various people but nothing was new. On Thursday, 15 December, (maybe Wednesday) he was the principal speaker at a Scientific and Technical Commission meeting and dinner. His talk concerned the "Thermodynamic Process" in steelmaking, and he was rather surprised at the questions raised after the talk because it was quite apparent that few, if any, of the experts there really understood what he was talking about.

[redacted]

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FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION [redacted]	X CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

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the efforts of foreign countries, particularly the United States, to obtain Russian state secrets. There are long and numerous case histories, usually involving CIA, and much emphasis on the U-2 and Penkovskiy cases. The author concludes that "Subversive actions against the socialist countries and various types of encroachments on the external security of the USSR have now been raised by the United States of America to the rank of a state policy."

There is a particularly interesting implication for intelligence in the author's consideration of the theory of territorial inviolability, which he stresses time and again as one of the most important conditions for the independent sovereign existence of the USSR. He defines this inviolability as forbidding encroachment on the territory of the Soviet Union, including its land, its territorial waters, its air space, and ships under its flag. His apparently deliberate omission of outer space from this definition, in view of other Russian positions on the law of outer space, could have very important connotations for the legality of advanced reconnaissance.

The book is difficult and turgid, but it is important to students of the Russian legal system and Russian social concepts.

Lawrence R. Houston

Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 13, No. 2
[redacted]
Spring 1969

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

ŠTA JE CIA? (WHAT IS CIA?) By *Milovoje J. Levkov.* (Belgrade; Sedma Sila. Dokumenti Današnjice, Issue No. 178. 1967. 78 pp. 2 n. din).

The author of this pamphlet received his law degree from the University of Belgrade in 1956 and his doctorate in 1965, choosing as his thesis topic international law as it pertains to espionage, with special attention to the espionage practices of various countries following World War II. The publishers mention that Mr. Levkov has previously contributed several articles to the same journal on espionage and international law.

The present article contains no startling revelations about CIA. The author's sources are basically overt, ranging from Allen Dulles' "The Craft of Intelligence," (the dust jacket of which the author or publisher has reproduced on the cover of this book) to numerous quotations from "The Invisible Government." The author also refers to other foreign authors such as Soviet Brigadier General V. A. Viktorov, who wrote "Espionage Under the Mask of Tourism" in 1963; G. Zhukov's "Plan of Cosmic Espionage and International Law" in 1960, and F. N. Chistyakov's "The Secret Front War" in 1965, to name but a few. Levkov claims that some of his information comes from "other sources" not further identified.

What Levkov writes is in fact much less interesting than the question of why he (or we should say the Yugoslav government) wanted to publish at all, unless mainly for internal consumption in connection with the revelations made at the time concerning the plans and activities of Alexander Rankovich. The author's major object, it appears, is to attempt to prove that espionage is contrary to all forms of international law. The reader is supposed to infer from his slanted statements that *only* CIA is engaged in international espionage.

Levkov delves into the history of CIA and mentions its early beginnings, including the role of the OSS, which he says was engaged in a variety of special intelligence missions and supported underground anti-Nazi groups deep in occupied territory. In addition, the author comments on the role of OSS in the invasions of Normandy and North Africa. For reasons best known to himself, the

[redacted]
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author chose to ignore the fact that OSS was in the mountains of Yugoslavia helping Marshal Tito in his struggle against the Axis powers.

Levkov refers to most of the other US intelligence agencies, all of which we are to understand are under the control of CIA. He believes that CIA has some 20,000 staff employees and approximately 200,000 agents throughout the world. As far as he is concerned, the US government cannot do anything in the realm of global strategy and politics without the approval of CIA. He pictures CIA as an organization beyond any real control. He apparently wishes to amuse his readers by giving a literal translation of the Watchdog Committee, i.e., that they are "dog watchers," implying that CIA is an organization of dogs that must be watched carefully. He attempts to explain the role of the National Security Agency (CIA-controlled) mostly from excerpts of the 1960 press conference given in Moscow by defectors Martin and Mitchell. In presenting the readers with an idea of how CIA operates (against international law), he makes references to the Berlin tunnel of 1956, CIA's activities in Iran (1952), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Cambodia (1960), Laos, Vietnam, the U-2 affair, the use of Samos and Midas as spy satellites, the Bay of Pigs episode, British Gulana (1963), the National Students Association, penetration of Western European labor unions, purchases of news media, political assassinations, psychological warfare in Vietnam, Camelot, Svetlana Alliluyeva, and Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy.

Despite the western literature presumably available in Yugoslavia, the author chooses to side with the Soviets in the Penkovskiy case. He makes no reference to Penkovskiy's having been a GRU officer and points out that Penkovskiy was a mere reserve officer in the Red Army. He debunks the information given by Penkovskiy and implies that he became an agent for money and no other reason. It is interesting to note that the author, who, we have been told, is an expert at international law, defends the right of the Soviets to arrest Greville Wynne in Budapest "due to a legal agreement between the USSR and Hungary." Then we learn that Wynne was "traded for Gordon Lonsdale (alias Konon Molody), a Soviet citizen arrested in Great Britain for espionage.

Levkov depicts the defection of Stalin's daughter as a CIA operation timed to embarrass the USSR during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution. According to Levkov, Svetlana Al-

[redacted]

Iliuyeva is "two million dollars richer thanks to the actions of CIA." Levkov claims that CIA prepared her book of 80,000 words from CIA archives in Frankfurt. Levkov refuses to believe that she wrote her book three years prior to her defection, apparently because he does not believe her story that she found little difficulty getting her manuscript out of the Soviet Union.

Levkov seeks to leave the reader with the impression that the US government revolves around the CIA. He presents a chart showing all US intelligence agencies (CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Department of State's INR) as being under the control of CIA. When the author comments on psychological warfare, the reader is to understand that the numerous organizations overseas he refers to are really CIA organizations, including the Voice of America.

The author appears to be very frustrated because international law does not seem to be able to cope or curtail espionage, i.e., CIA activities. In his final paragraph he warns nations to look after their individual security and to defend themselves from the "dangerous acts of CIA." In order to strengthen his point, the publishers have a cartoon (drawn by D. Savich but of the type usually found in Soviet periodicals) on the back cover showing a man with CIA written on his chest and sitting on the globe so that he can cover the entire world. In addition to the usual capitalistic cigar in his mouth, the CIA operator has six hands. They hold a telephone, microphone, hand grenade, pistol, and dollar bills.

Unfortunately, Mr. Levkov does not give us any references to his doctoral work in which he allegedly wrote about more than one country. In this article he appears to accept the fact that no country has admitted to being engaged in international espionage and he, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the US is the only country involved because CIA admitted to such activity in 1960 during the U-2 affair.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Titles of Articles and CS Report Numbers for Issues of "The Special Collection of Military Thought" Provided by Penkovskiy

(Top Secret) 1960 Issues 1-3

	CSDB Report Numbers
"Editorial Notes: Tables of Contents"	[redacted]
"The Theory of Military Art Needs Review", Colonel General (Combined Arms) Anton Iosifovich Gastilovich.	[redacted]
"Some Problems of Modern Operations", by Lieutenant General (Combined Arms) Illarion Avksentcyevich Tolkonyuk.	[redacted]
"New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics", by Lieutenant General V. Baskakov.	[redacted]
"The Suitability of Modern Means and Methods in the Conduct of Operations", by Major General I. Zavyalov.	[redacted]
"Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov.	[redacted]
"Questions of the Control of Missile Units in an Offensive Operations", by Major General S. Kuznetsov and Major General A. Tikhomirov.	[redacted]

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31 MAR 1992

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[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1960 Second Issue)

"The Nature of Modern Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces", by General of the Army (Combined Arms), Pavel Alekseandrovich Kurochkin. [redacted]

"Some Factors Affecting the Planning of Modern Offensive Operation", by Colonel General (Combined Arms?) Ye. (Yevgeniy Vasilevich) Ivanov. [redacted]

"A Front Offensive Operation Conducted Under the Condition of the Initial Period of a Nuclear/Missile War", by Colonel General (Combined Arms) Georgi Ivanovich Khetagurov. [redacted]

"Some Conclusions on the NATO Armed Forces' Exercise Side Step", by Colonel General S. Ivanov. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Period of a War", by Admiral V. Kasatonov. [redacted]

"Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel General F. Kalyzhin. [redacted]

"Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of Military Doctrine", by Major General of the Engineering Technical Service Nikar Fedrovich Goryainov. [redacted]

"Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence", by Lieutenant General M. Kochetkov. [redacted]

"Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs", by Major General M. Ivanov and Lieutenant General P. Chirkov. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1960 Third Issue

"The Nature of Modern Armed Combat", by General of the Army (Combined Arms) Aleksandr Vasilevich Gorbatov. [redacted]

"Some Questions on the Theory of Military Art", by Colonel General (Tank Troops) Iosif Irakhiyevich Gusakovskiy. [redacted]

"To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", by Admiral Vladimir Filippovich Tributs. [redacted]

"The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on the Principles of the Offensive Operations of a Front", by General of the Army V. Kurasov. [redacted]

"The Strike Groupings of a Front", By Major General of Tank Troops A. Shevchenko. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"The Air Forces in the New Stage of Development of the New Soviet Armed Forces", by Lieutenant General of Aviation S. Sinipkov and Major-General of Aviation M. Kozhevnikov. [redacted]

"The Role of Aviation in Ministry Operations at Sea" by Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov. [redacted]

"Rear Services Support of Missile Troops in an Offensive Operation of a Front", by Lieutenant General M. Novikov. [redacted]

"The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare", by Lieutenant General of Technical Troops I. Kovalevy, Colonel General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and Colonel K. Pavlovich. [redacted]

"Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", comment by Lieutenant General of Aviation P. Dankevich on Marshal Chuykov's article - same Title. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1961 First Issue

"The Initial Period of a Future War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During This Period", by Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy. [redacted]

"The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army," by Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov. [redacted]

"The Nature of Modern Warfare," by Colonel General (Armor) Amazasp Khachaturovich Babadzhanyan. [redacted]

"Ways of Further Increasing the Combat Readiness of Troops," by Major General G. Semenov. [redacted]

"Certain Problems in the Organization and Conduct of Modern Operational Defense", by Lieutenant General P. Igolkin and Major General S. Buryak. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"Increasing the Stability of Control of The Troops of a Front (Army)", by Major General M. Ivanov. [redacted]

"The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a Missile/Nuclear War", by Rear Admiral V. Lisyutin. [redacted]

"Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Demands", by Major General Ya. Malakhov. [redacted]

"The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel and of Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military District Staffs," by Major General A. Kryukanov. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1951 Second Issue

"Trends in the Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by General of the Army A. Zhadov. [redacted]

"Perspectives of the Development of Missile Armament of Ground Troops," by (Chief) Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov. [redacted]

"A Turning Point in the Development of Soviet Military Art", by Colonel General Ye. (Yevgeniy Vasilevich) Ivanov. [redacted]

"The Deployment and Forward Movement of a Combined-Arms Army of a Border Military District in the Initial Period of a War," by Lieutenant General S. Andryuchchenko. [redacted]

"Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front," by Lieutenant General V. Mikhaylov. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"Certain Questions of the Control of Troops in Modern Operations," by Major General A. Morozov, Lieutenant General N. Lyashchenko, and Lieutenant General of Tank Troops V. Arkhipov. [redacted]

"The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them Out", by Admiral V. Platonov. [redacted]

"The Use of Surface Vessels in Modern Naval Warfare", by Rear Admiral N. Zvyagin. [redacted]

"Rear Area Support of Missile Troops in Front Offensive Operations," by Colonel General of Artillery G.F. Odintsov. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1961 Third Issue

"Support of the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect to Transport," by Major General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepannikov. [redacted]

"The Question of Increasing the Stability of Troop Control", by Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh and Lieutenant General of Communications Troops Pavel Aleksandrovich Kurochkin. [redacted]

"Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance Under Modern Conditions", by Colonel General of Aviation S. Mironov and Major-General of Aviation M. Mukhin. [redacted]

"Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in a Front Offensive Operation". by V. Chizh. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"Some Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensive Operations", by Colonel General (Armor) Amazasp Khachaturovich Babadzhanyan. [redacted]

"Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvement of the Ground Troops", by Colonel General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov. [redacted]

"Utilization of the Missile Troops of a Front (Army) in an Offensive Operation", by Colonel General P. Koshevoy. [redacted]

"The Submarine Operation of the Navy - the Naval Operation of the Future", by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev. [redacted]

"The Organizational Structure of Field Command of a Front", by Colonel K. Pashuk. [redacted]

"The Fundamental Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation", by Lieutenant General V. Baskakov. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1961 Fourth Issue

"Editorial Note; Table of Contents". [redacted]

"The Question of the Organization of the Organs of Troop Control", by Major General N. Rout. [redacted]

"The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Field Commands", by Lieutenant General N. Volodin. [redacted]

"The Prospects of Development of Armored Combat Vehicles", by Major General of Engineer Technical Services L. Sergeyev. [redacted]

"A New Combat Vehicle", by Lieutenant General A. Schevchenko. [redacted]

"Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tank Troops", by Major General of Tank Troops G. Zavizion. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"Some Problems in Destroying Targets with Nuclear Warheads", by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov. [redacted]

"The FALLEX-60" Maneuvers of the Armed Forces of the NATO Aggressive Bloc", by Colonel General S. Ivanov. [redacted]

"Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel General (Combined Arms) Georgi Ivanovich Khetagurov. [redacted]

"Combat Against Enemy Missile Submarine", by Rear Admiral O. Zhukovskiy. [redacted]

"On the Problem of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishing Them", by Admiral V. Kasatonov. [redacted]

"Classical Military Art and Nuclear/Missile Warfare", by Major General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Top Secret) 1962 First Issue

"Editorial Notes; Table of Contents." [redacted]

"Some Thoughts on the Development of the Soviet Army Tank Troops", by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovsky. [redacted]

"The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel General of Aviation I. Podgornyy. [redacted]

"The Organization of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel N. Makarov, and Colonel V. Savko. [redacted]

"Several Questions on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Basic Means of Antiair Defense of a Front, and Its Organizational Structure", by Colonel General of Aviation S. Mironov. [redacted]

"The Tasks of the Navy and the Methods of Performing Them", by Admiral N. Kharlamov. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"The Questions of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation", by Major General of Artillery M. Glushkov. [redacted]

"Defense of the Operational Rear", by Major General Yu. Novikov. [redacted]

"The Role of Space Weapons in a Future War", by Lieutenant General N. Korenovskiy. [redacted]

"American Military Technical Means of Combat in Space", by Major General of the Engineer Technical Service P. Vysotskiy. [redacted]

"On the Question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military Scientific Work", by Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov. [redacted]

"Problems of the Strategic Development of Armed Forces in Modern Warfare", by Major General Kh. Dzhelaukhov. [redacted]

"Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them", by Colonel V. Zemskov. [redacted]

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: Declassification of Special Collection of Soviet Military Thought

1. We consider the publication of The Penkovskiy Papers has done a rather creditable job of inviting world-wide attention to Soviet subversions and KGB activities and that we have, for a change, the initiative in a major segment of the propaganda field. The climate is favorable for trying to maintain the momentum that The Penkovskiy Papers has achieved. The next step should be one related to the book. We feel this is logical because the name, Penkovskiy, is now a familiar one, it is news and therefore can get into print without undue effort, and any subsequent and related efforts will help keep the book an active and saleable item.

2. A reasonable way of utilizing these factors would be to declassify the Special Collection of Soviet Military Thought and related items obtained from Penkovskiy on Soviet strategic thinking. As you know this comprises about 5,000 pages, which have been published in 130 clandestine service reports of which 89 have been released to NATO services. Placing this material in the public domain would serve, we believe, a variety of purposes, none of them immediate and spectacular but all of them significant for the long term.

A. Firstly, the mass of the material, its subject matter and the level of its classification totally dispel the charge that Penkovskiy was a minor agent of limited access. For the same reasons, the charge that The Papers were fabricated in the West would be mitigated, we believe. To have the whole collection available for open research would incline skeptics to grant that certainly Penkovskiy's channels to the West permitted a high rate of flow for information and, furthermore, that the source materials supplied by Penkovskiy were substantial and, consequently, adequate to fill a book like The Papers without resort to other sources or to the author's imagination. Note that this argument deals only with the question of the authenticity of the work, not with the identity of the editor. We grant that making these articles available to the public would not strengthen the CIA disclaimer of sponsorship for The Papers. We doubt, however, that the rift in that would be at all

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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impaired. Declassification would, some half a year after the storm of controversy in the press, be a welcome if quiet fanfare and it would only emphasize a point already alleged in the book, (I have sent the entire Special Collection to my intelligence contacts. (P. 267, Doubleday Edition) Naturally, no official attribution to any source or overall praise would be made at the time of declassification. As noted in paragraph one, above, we would expect the collection to be ignored in the press with Penkovskiy of course, but would expect that the controversy of the fall would not revive. Stale news rarely attracts editors.

b. Secondly, the corpus as a whole should have a growing influence on the understanding of Soviet military plans among scholars, journalists, disarmament negotiators and so on. The simple lack of anything more repugnant than the Sokolovskiy book from the Soviet side in comparison with the enormous Western literature on the subject has influenced many people to assume that only Western planners deal in such concepts as pre-emptive war.

c. Thirdly, among the mass of material there are some particular articles that can be especially exploited; these would be best introduced into the public domain accompanied by the full collection.

d. Fourthly, we believe that the product of scholarly research into this material would probably be of intelligence value in other fields, some of them remote from military strategy, such as sociology and internal Soviet politics.

3. As an explanation for declassification of the materials, it could be said by an official of the Agency overtly releasing the materials that not privately, the documents in question are known to the Soviets and are in Western hands by duplication from Penkovskiy's [redacted] from the specific statements in the Penkovskiy Papers.

4. If your service is amenable to the proposal, we would proceed along the following lines:

a. Prepare a complete set of the collection in English and in Russian in a format devoid of [redacted] service references, numbers, etc. The Russian copy would be

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[redacted]

Page Three

photographic copy of [redacted]

[redacted] Normally the [redacted] intention according to ordinary procedures and [redacted]

[redacted] Assuming that the [redacted] concurs announce the availability of the material according to their customary procedures. We anticipate that this will contain an [redacted] respectability of the document and will [redacted] the basis for [redacted]

[redacted] In making this proposal we have considered many factors, including the [redacted] that such a move will help the [redacted] and that several liaison services will become aware that we did not pass all the reports [redacted]. We do not consider those problems as persuasive enough to abandon the proposal. We still have on hand sufficient numbers of copies of the reports of this type that were not passed to liaison services to complete the distribution [redacted] if deemed necessary. We doubt that there would be much interest in them for liaison, however, and are therefore reluctant to undertake the job, but we have no objection in principle to doing so.

6. The concurrence of your service in the proposal outlined in paragraph four above is requested as soon as possible. Should your service prefer to [redacted] material and surface it, we should be happy to support you in any way we can.

7. An early reply will be appreciated.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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DOCUMENT DATE: 30 Dec 60

DOCUMENT NUMBER [redacted]

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#
12
Orig. 2

1.3(a)(4)

Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1966

OTVETSTVENNOST' ZA IZMENU RODINE I SHPIONAZH (Liability for Treason and Espionage). By *Grigoriy Zakharovich Anashkin.* (Moscow, 1964. 198 pp.)

This treatise on the Soviet law of treason and espionage is by the Chairman of the Collegium for Criminal Cases, USSR Supreme Court, so there can be little doubt that its views are authoritative. The book appears to be one of the numerous efforts to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Soviet legal system and its protection of the rights of individuals. It recounts the injustices of the Stalin era made possible by the looseness of the criminal laws and the failure to develop a specific philosophy of the crimes of treason and espionage. It then attempts to demonstrate that these weaknesses have been overcome and that the contemporary law of treason and espionage is precise and requires proof of the violations alleged.

To the Western mind the case is not fully made, although there is no doubt some progress and definition have been achieved. At one point, for instance, the author indicates that it is not the nature of the information that makes seeking it an act of espionage but the fact that it is collected on behalf of foreign intelligence in accordance with an assignment. This concept and the territorial sensitivity it reflects account for such bizarre things as the charges against Professor Barghoorn and the more recent tragedy of Newcomb Mott.

The main intelligence interest of this volume is its extensive justification for stringent espionage and treason laws, a justification based on

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7. A rather friendly Russian type named fnu PENKOVSKY took him in hand after the meeting and returned with him to his hotel (the Leningradskaya) along with another Britisher. The three had a drink in the bar, and the British companion left for bed. PENKOVSKY asked MERRIMAN if he had any spare cigarettes, and they proceeded to his hotel room so he could get some packs that he had in his suitcase. Once in the room, the Soviet locked the doors, turned the radio up as loud as it would go and produced from his coat pocket a folded pack of paper wrapped in cellophane. He stated that they were secret documents he wanted to be put in the hands of the American Embassy but that he could not turn them over to MERRIMAN but only to an American officer personally. He asked MERRIMAN to telephone the American Embassy and ask for an officer to come to his hotel room. MERRIMAN refused to make the call or to even touch the papers; and the Soviet, after pleading with him for a little while, put the papers away and departed. He was not angry and was around again and underfoot for the remainder of his visit and did not mention the matter again. MERRIMAN at first felt that he should advise the American Embassy about the occurrence but then felt that this, his visit to the American Embassy, might be observed by the Soviets; so he told the British Ambassador about the affair on the following day.

8. He was subsequently advised by two of his British colleagues that they had noticed that he was under close surveillance. MERRIMAN stated that he himself did not bother about this or even try to spot them as he was indifferent to it--having lived in Moscow in more difficult times.

9. Nothing else happened until Sunday at the airport when he was leaving to return to the U.K. PENKOVSKY showed up at the airport about five minutes before departure time. He called MERRIMAN aside and stated that he realized that MERRIMAN was reluctant to become involved, but it was really most important that he establish contact with someone in the American Embassy and asked if MERRIMAN could advise the Americans (presumably upon his return to the U.K.) that PENKOVSKY would be waiting by his home telephone (717184) every Sunday at 10 a.m. for the call and that all the American had to do was to call that number and he would give him further instructions. MERRIMAN was non-committal but asked PENKOVSKY where his "home" was, and PENKOVSKY stated that he lived at 11 Gorki Street. MERRIMAN stated that this was, in fact, the Office of the Scientific and Technical Commission.

10. MERRIMAN stated that there was nothing outstanding about PENKOVSKY that could be used to identify him. He was about 55 years of age, of average height, average build for a Russian, and had no outstanding features. He spoke English well but with the usual heavy Russian accent. He had a pleasant and engaging personality which made it a pleasure to be with him. PENKOVSKY attended the dinner and the speech, and he had seen him around once or twice before at official functions during the trip. He stated that he was an engineer, but MERRIMAN felt that he did not have any real knowledge of engineering other than some of the terminology.

11. MERRIMAN is, understandably, anxious that no one take advantage of the telephone number and attempt to call it because this might get him involved and prevent further trips on his part. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) assured him that KUBARK would take no action of any kind, that his confidences would be carefully protected and that his bringing this incident to our attention was deeply appreciated. Mr. MERRIMAN has [redacted] name and office telephone number and stated that he would immediately advise [redacted] if he hears anything further from this or if, on subsequent trips, he again becomes involved with anything which might affect U.S. interests.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Distribution:

[redacted]

(48)

[redacted]

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Outgoing Letter No. 1 to [redacted] 27 September 1960	2. RI FILE NO.				
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE		
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION		
ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE		
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			

1.3(a)(4)

PERTINENT INFORMATION

2. WHEEL is forwarding the enclosed packet for COMPASS' earliest perusal. CHISEL has been requested to pass on the materials for COMPASS to study in the manner in which he deems most secure and practical.

4. Re CHALK. WHEEL is enclosing the necessary briefing guides including original site diagrams, paint specimens, and map of locale. COMPASS should, of course, expedite the casing as muchas possible, but not at the expense of his security or the quality of the casing. It is proposed that COMPASS first stroll past the drop site for external observations, and later, at an interval of several days, enter the site area and place a telephone call to a pre-arranged contact (preferably CHISEL) or absenteed SQUARE acquaintance--whose absence has previously been ascertained. After a thorough casing examination of the proposed dead drop site, COMPASS should case the proposed signal site. This casing can be done simultaneously with the casing of the dead drop site. It is believed that it is unnecessary to physically enter the signal site proper. A passing, external inspection should be sufficient. With regard to the American House drop site, WHEEL tentatively proposes to have CHALK proceed down the right-hand side of Turchanin Ulitsa (toward the Moscow River) at a specified date and time (2300 hours on four consequtive Saturdays until drop is effected). COMPASS will be on the other side of the wall to effect the recovery. The afore-mentioned plan is contingent upon COMPASS' casing of the area and recommendations for implementation of the plan. If pictures can be taken of Turchanin Ulitsa and from inside the American House courtyard of the wall and area, it would be appreciated. However, COMPASS should determine the practicality of this in terms of security.

Attachments:

1. Color samples
2. Map
3. Dead drop and signal sites
4. Casing Plan

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FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. → [redacted] Support

1.3(a)(4)

FORM 57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. [redacted] (7-46)

(53)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
Incoming [redacted] Letter No. 3	2. RI FILE NO.				
16 October 1960	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE		

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] on straight line to Sokol'niki instead of Great Circle Route. At end of line got off, visited old church to left on direct line from Sokol'niki Metro Station, then proceeded to Sokol'niki Park and strolled about. Saw Amer. Exhib. Fuller building which fenced off, then returned to Sokol'niki Metro Station for trip back to town. After studying map on subway car, decided to get off at Okhotniy Ryad and on exiting had choice of Pushkinskaya St. or Smolenskaya Ploshchad. Went out on former, stopped men's room just up street from subway and went on.

2. COMPASS hasn't a map so can't retrace his steps on paper. It shouldn't be too difficult to trace. Up Pushkinskaya--this wasn't planned as my last letter should indicate--subway errors and the choice put me on Pushkinskaya--and the stores are as indicated by our friend. Didn't spot the doorway but the meat store has an entrance on Pushkinskaya (P. from now on). It isn't used, so far as a quick glance would tell. The ladies' shoe store is there on P. Across from the meat store is a book store where COMPASS looked around for [redacted] line on the sidewalk into the meat [redacted]

Page 3 Sketch



4. COMPASS continued on [redacted] up in a square where the Gorol station is [redacted] put me on the road to the Embassy on, COMPASS thinks, Arbatskaya. Passed Sudanese and Hungarian Embassies on the route--by the way, this is all on foot!--and a check with a second Militiaman sent COMPASS straight ahead to the end of the street to take left towards the Embassy.

5. Taking left then, passing the Embassy, COMPASS entered a barber shop on a corner but it was too crowded so exited to continue on to America House. Stayed on left side of street in direction [redacted]

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. →	[redacted]/Operations	1.3(a)(4)

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

[redacted]

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[redacted]

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Outgoing Letter No. 3 to [redacted] 20 October 1960	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

1.3(a)(4)

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14. **2. Re CHALK: WHEEL notes in Letter No. 1 that COMPASS states that CHALK will "have had it at night" if he throws a package over the wall. SLEDGE requests that COMPASS detail the reasons why COMPASS feels that the wall site would be bad or unsuitable. Is there 24 hour DRILL on Turchanin Ulitsa? Is the DRILL mobile or fixed? If there is 24 hour DRILL on Turchanin Ulitsa, then, presumably, the window site would also be compromised. SLEDGE remembers the basement window site, but wonders how CHALK could pass a packet through the closed window or can they be opened so that the packet could be pushed directly into the dining room? Could, as COMPASS states, CHALK actually toss a package through the window from the sidewalk or would CHALK have to step off the sidewalk to approach the window, bend down, and insert the package through the bars and window? This window site sounds as though it might have possibilities. COMPASS should case and study in detail this site and compare and make a careful evaluation of whether the window or wall would be the better drop site for CHALK'S security and for COMPASS'. Moreover, if COMPASS holds that both neither site is suitable, he should not hesitate to state such together with detailed reasons for rejecting the proposed site. If the JIG site is rejected, it will be incumbent upon COMPASS to locate and detail an alternate site filing the measurements requested by chalk; i.e., 8 1/2" x 5 1/2" x 1/4". WHEEL would appreciate sketches and inside photographs (if possible) of the window area. COMPASS should be able to borrow CHISEL's or a friend's camera over night for use in taking some inside shots. WHEEL would also be desirous of having photos taken (from inside the courtyard) of the proposed wall area and immediate courtyard vicinity. COMPASS could use the puppy as an ostensible subject and reasons for photographing this outside area. As soon as possible, COMPASS should, after dark, attempt to walk down Turchanin Ulitsa toward the river and try to ascertain the presence of fixed or mobile DRILL--especially in place in front of him along Turchanin Ulitsa. If possible, this should be done several times, and since COMPASS resides at JIG it will be viewed as a normal route to JIG from SQUARE.**

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. →	[redacted]/Operations

1.3(a)(4)

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

[redacted]

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[redacted]

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
[redacted] Incoming Letter No. 4 24 October 1960	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

1.3(a)(4)

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14.

[redacted] 13. On the one big problem will try to get back to arrest span. Bel'skoi tomorrow evening with American secretary from office then dinner somewhere maybe. When can develop method learn "COMPASS" words by heart will use but presently have too little time with CHISEL. Understand your [redacted] all right.

[redacted] 14. Re clock-dangerous (re time of [redacted] meetings, [redacted] day of meet might turn out to be difficult, as suggest radio, which do not yet have, or TV which in JIG library room and which COMPASS listens to occasionally. Room available on closed JIG nights. Few JIG people use it, although it does happen.

[redacted] 17. General observation: Sketches will improve, as compass gets more experience with different places; local employees usually out of JIG at 2300 but sometimes are at movies on closed nights. Window idea still better than wall, but access to dining room while frequent, at almost every meal, controlled by waitresses--two locals who on alternate days, and social situation of joining people at meals. Local also sleeps in room in basement but will check that out. Think it is an old existing woman who here for years.

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1.3(a)(4)

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(57)

[redacted]

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
[redacted] Letter dated 6 Dec 1960	2. RI FILE NO. [redacted] Correspondence 1.3(a)(4)
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

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14.

3. To more important matters. Two observations have been made of the drop site and one more of the signal site with some gain. Tosca were afoot. One observation was made by chance in a taxi on the way to the Bolshoi, Kash in turn, as I consult my notes.

6. On Friday, Nov. 25, at 2100 hours Compass walked by the Pushkin St. site. See attached map number 1. The walky was made from the direction of the Kremlin and along Theatre Street to Gorkiy after giving the Kremlin Square and the GUM store a complete walk around. The lights in the shoe store were still on and reflected brightly on the street. There was much foot traffic. There were lights still on in the meat store but few customers. It was closing time. Hours are from - another note - 0800 to 1900 hours with lunch from 1300 to 1400. The paper goods shop was closed, so it may be that it is closed on Friday, although Monday is the usual closing day for such shops. Must check that later. As the map indicates there are repairs going on across the street and there is a crane servicing the lifting problems. As I've already mentioned, Compass believes, any spot could be permanent surveillance but there is no way to know. It is very easy to establish if they want. After going up Gorkiy from observation of the drop site, Compass noted that there was a continuous stream on foot traffic and trucks making food delivery on Kuznetsky. Regarding both directions as comprising the foot traffic.

[redacted]

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15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. → [redacted]/Operations 1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Incoming [redacted] Letter 2 February 1961	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION

1.3(a)(4)

1. COMPASS hopes the report requested to come [illegible] in pouch of that date was received. The cable reply to your cable request was sent on the assumption Jan. 27 report was in D.C. and that it had just not gotten to your office. It was assumed further that if anything had gone wrong with the pouch CHISEL would have been one of the first to know, and as of Feb. 1 afternoon he had heard nothing.

2. COMPASS will try to fill out the basic dead drop and signal site report on Feb. 4, and follow instructions of Letter No. 8 on Feb. 5. COMPASS told CHISEL the Letter No. 8 consisted of personal financial problems so that COMPASS had an excuse to kepp the letter in his possession--to permit him to memorize telephone message to be given to CHALK on on Feb. 5 at 1000 hours after 0900 Mass at Fr. Dion's. COMPASS still has the letter for reference, but will destroy it before he goes out on Feb. 5, 1961, to telephone. It will all be memorized by that time.

3. COMPASS will destroy Letter No. 8 himself instead of putting it in CHISEL's burn bag, after it has served its purpose. In future, please, when letter contains specific "EYES ONLY" instructions, avoid putting "SECRET EYES ONLY" stamps on the letter. They add nothing to COMPASS control of his mail.

4. COMPASS hopes the following amendments to your instructions of Letter No. 8 will be acceptable. They are based on his experience here and use of public telephones. First, even if a male answers the phone on Feb. 5, COMPASS will use familiar Russian for "Hi, Oleg!" /

_/ If the answer is "Yes!" /Da!/ COMPASS will reply, "Reply only in Russian. This is your intimate friend!" /

_/ Then COMPASS will continue in English. If CHALK tries to insist on knowing who is calling, COMPASS will insist "Listen!" in English and go on as instructed. CHALK must have some guide to a cover story in case he is not alone when COMPASS calls and, in the event the number is wrong, or a male answers who is not CHALK, the use of the familiar Russian should allay suspicion.

5. Other instructions in Letter No. 8 will be followed "to the letter" insofar as faulty memory may preclude. A cable would be sent saying "Contact established." except that CHISEL would have to send it and [illegible]

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [redacted]-Operations

1.3(a)(4)

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and COMPASS worries about such transmission under rules as established in Letter No. 8. Better that COMPASS should get his report out by sealed pouch on Feb. 7 which you should have by Feb. 10. That would avoid any awkward cover story to CHISEL, particularly since COMPASS will not be returning Letter No. 8 but will have destroyed it--most securely, by burn, crush, and flush method!--and CHISEL may be concerned about COMPASS' handling of letters from you.

11. re JIG: COMPASS would be happy if this report could be a definitive review of all reporting re JIG but the evening is passing swiftly. It was a rough day physically and tomorrow will also be a rough day in the same way. This GSA job is no "lark," particularly as I have more responsibility as a Bldg. Super, than as GSA. U.S. buildings in Moscow are held together by by paint and mutch is required of the GSA become Bldg. Super. (Nerve wracking, too!)

12. JIG description as forwarded as thought to be complete, particularly as missing details as requested, when not specifically answered, were assumed to have been accepted as resolved. When COMPASS stated he would be in place when, where, and as how requested, it was assumed you understood it was all thought out and COMPASS could handle the situation. Every detail can't be reported because too many things happen too fast. COMPASS has run into the latest complicationsthis past six weeks as concerns "JIG."

13. BUROBIN, in response to a year old request of the Embassy, is going--was going--to tear down storehouses in the backyard of JIG. (The Sketch on rear of this page crossed out and put on last page of this report plus plans of JIG previously forwarded should give you the idea!) To date, BUROBIN still has not come through and COMPASS personally isstuck with the problem. Essentially, they are to tear down deteriorated storehouses and install brick wall, where it does not exist, in JIG compound. Six weeks have passed and they still are not here to do the job. That, however, is a detail, for, under any type of surveillance observation COMPASS still has many excuses to be in JIG's rear yard. Visit storehouses; play with dog; clear snow off skating rink; walk for fresh air--anything, and all legitimate.

14. COMPASS would need a full three hours to give the same time he has given to this report in general, to a report on all the ramifications of JIG as a "dropsite" as planned. He doesn't have the time now if he is to handle cover job tomorrow.

15. Next report--phone call to CHAIOS. After that--or pertaining with it--detailed report on JIG.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

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OF FEB 2, 61

Krimskty Most

Internat. School

Gate

Areaway!

Skating Rink

Open Area

Wooden Fence

Park

Heated Swimming Pool

Apt House

Bus Stop

NOT TO SCALE

Gate

Gate

Lift

Compressor

Wood Fence

Iron Fence

Urbanik

Cement Factory

Pool

Corpound

Storehouse to be constructed on existing wall.

Storehouses to be built (2) to match existing brick wall.

Pole & Bulb (ca 200 Watt) Lights

Break well one foot high twelve feet thick.

Мой, дорогой Господин!

Прошу довести до соответствующих компетентных лиц Соединенных Штатов Америки следующее.

К Вам обращается Ваш большой друг, ставший теперь уже и Вашим солдатом-бойцом за дело П р а в д ы, за идеалы истинного свободного Мира и Демократии для Человека, которым Ваш /а, теперь и мой/ ПРЕЗИДЕНТ, ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВО и НАРОД отдают так много сил.

На этот путь борьбы я стал сознательно. Этому способствовало многое. Последние три года явились в моей жизни очень переломными, как в образе мышления, так и в других вопросах, о чем доложу после.

Я долго и много думал. В настоящее время принял зрелое и для себя окончательное и правильное решение, которое и побудило меня обратиться к Вам.

Прошу поверить в искренность моих мыслей и желаний быть полезным Вам. Я хочу внести свой, может быть скромный, но, на мой взгляд важный вклад в наше общее Дело, и впредь, как Ваш солдат, выполнять все, что мне будет поручено.

Можете не сомневаться - этому новому долгу я буду отдавать все свои силы, знания, жизнь.

Обращаясь с вышеизложенным, хочу сказать, что работу за новое Дело я начинаю не с пустыми руками. Я отлично понимаю и полностью отдаю себе отчет в том, что к правильным словам и мыслям необходимо приложить и конкретные доказательства, подтверждающие эти слова. Определенные возможности для этого у меня были и есть.

В настоящее время я располагаю очень ценными материалами по ряду вопросов, предстовляющих исключительно большой интерес и государственную важность.

Эти материалы я хочу срочно передать Вам для их изучения, анализа и последующего использования. Сделать это необходимо как можно быстрее. Форму передачи этих материалов определите Вы сами. Желательно передачу осуществить не через личный контакт, а через тайник.

Еще раз прошу - как можно скорее "освободите" меня от подготовленных материалов; это целесообразно сделать по многим деловым соображениям.

Ваш ответ: о порядке, форме, времени и месте передачи указанных материалов прошу сообщить мне /желательно на русском языке/ через мой тайник №1 - /см.его описание и порядок использования/.

Если Вы определите мне для передачи свой тайник, то прошу учесть, чтобы размеры последнего позволяли вместить материалы, размером с книгу - "Вэн Клайберн"-С.Хентова,1959 года издания.

После того, как Вы получите от меня материалы, желательно организовать во второй половине августа с/г личную встречу с Вашим представителем. Нужно подробно поговорить о многом. Прошу для этого 4-6 часов. Для меня удобно с субботы на воскресенье. Место и порядок проведения этого мероприятия определите Вы сами.

По всем поднятым вопросам жду Ваших указаний через тайник №1 начиная с 9 /девятого/ августа 1960 г. /- с 9 /девятого/ августа/.

Прошу в работе со мною проявлять полную конспиративность, осторожность и не допускать никаких условностей. Берегите меня.

Да помогут нам в будущей совместной работе справедливые идеи и цели, которым я и посвящаю отныне себя.

Всегда Ваш .....

19.7.60.

P.S. Большой, большой привет моему первому, хорошему другу - полковнику Charles Morgan Peter и его жене. Мысленно шлю приветы моим знакомым: Colby, Koehler, Ditta, Beckett, Daniel, Glazebrook и пр.

Я с чувством большого удовлетворения вспоминаю время, проведенное с ними.

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Планировал до 9.8.60. встретить Вашего представителя и вручить настоящее письмо, но из этого ничего не вышло.
Приходится пока сделать перенос на 15 августа.

Translated from Russian

My dear Sir!

I request that you pass the following to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America.

It is your good friend who is turning to you, a friend who has already become your soldier-warrior for the cause of Truth, for the ideals of a truly free world and of Democracy for Mankind, to which ideals your (and now my) President, government, and people are sacrificing so much effort.

I have consciously embarked upon this path of struggle. Many things have contributed to this. In my life, the last three years have been very critical, both in my way of thinking and in other things, about which I will report later.

I have thought long and hard. Now I have taken a mature and for me, a correct final decision which has impelled me to approach you.

I ask that you believe the sincerity of my thoughts and desires to be of service to you. I wish to make my contribution, perhaps a modest one but in my view an important one, to our mutual cause, and henceforth as your soldier to carry out everything which is entrusted to me.

You need not doubt that I will give all my strength, knowledge, and my life to this new obligation.

In presenting the above, I want to say that I am not beginning my work for my new cause with empty hands. I understand perfectly well and take into full consideration that to correct words and thoughts must be added concrete proof confriming these words. I have had, and do have now, a definite capability to do this.

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At the present time I have at my disposal very important materials on many subjects of exceptionally great interest and importance to your government.

I wish to pass these materials to you immediately for study, analysis, and subsequent utilization. This must be done as quickly as possible. You will determine the manner of transmittal of this material yourself. It is desirable that the transfer be effected not through personal contact, but through a dead drop.

Again I request that you "relieve" me as quickly as possible of this material which I have prepared; this should be done for many valid reasons.

Your reply: Please inform me (preferably in the Russian language) through my dead drop No. 1 (see its description and manner of use) concerning the manner, form, time, and place for passing of the indicated material.

If you designate your own dead drop for my passing the material, please tkae into consideration that your drop should be able to contain material equivalent in size to the book, Ven Klaybern, by S. Khentov, published in 1959.

After you receive the material from me, it would be desirable to arrange a personal meeting with your representative during the second half of August of this year. We must discuss many things in detail. I request four to six hours for this. Saturdays and Sundays are convenient for me. You decide upon the place and manner of setting this up.

I will wait for your orders regarding the questions raised above, through Drop Number 1 starting from 15 August 1960.

I ask that in working with me you observe all the rules of tradecraft and security, and not permit any slipups. Protect me.

May the justice of the ideas and goals to which I am

devoting myself from this day forward aid us in our future collaboration.

Always your .....

19 July 1960

P. S. My best, best greetings to my first good friend, Colonel Charles MacLean Peeke and his wife. Mentally I send greetings to my friends: Cotter, Koehler, Ditta, Beckett, Daniel, Glassbrook and others. I remember with great pleasure the time I spent with them.

I had planned to meet your representative and pass him hhis letter before 9 August 1960, but it did not work out.

Now, this must be postponed to 15 August.

(3)

My dear sir!

I request that you pass the following to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America.

It is your good friend who is turning to you, a friend who has already become your soldier-warrior for the cause of Truth, for the ideals of a truly free world and of Democracy for Mankind, to which ideals your (an now my) President, government, and people are sacrificing so much effort.

I have consciously embarked upon this path of struggle. Many things have contributed to this. In my life, the last three years have been very critical, both in my way of thinking and in other things, about which I will report later.

I have thought long and hard. Now I have taken a mature and for me, a correct final decision which has impelled me to approach you.

I ask that you believe the sincerity of my thoughts and desires to be of service to you. I wish to make my contribution, perhaps a modest one but in my view an important one, to our mutual cause, and henceforth as your soldier to carry out everything which is entrusted to me.

You need not doubt that I will give all my strength, knowledge, and my life to this new obligation.

In presenting the above, I want to say that I am not beginning my work for my new cause with empty hands. I understand perfectly well and take into full consideration that to correct words and thoughts must be added concrete proof confirming these words. I have had, and do have now, a definite capability to do this.

At the present time I have at my disposal very important materials on many subjects of exceptionally great interest and importance to your government.

I wish to pass these materials to you immediately for study, analysis, and subsequent utilisation. This must be done as quickly as possible. You will determine the manner of transmittal of this material yourself. It is desirable that the transfer be effected not through personal contact, but through a dead drop.

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I ask that in working with me you observe all the rules of tradecraft and security, and not permit any slipups. Protect me.

May the justice of the ideas and goals to which I am devoting myself from this day forward aid us in our future collaboration.

Always your . . . . . .

19 July 1960

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I had planned to meet your representative and pass him this letter before 9 August 1960, but it did not work out.

Now, this must be postponed to 15 August.

*Subject typed the letter on a Cyrillic typewriter. He wrote in the American names.

(8)

Translated from Russian

My dear President,

In my first letter of 19th July 1960, I have already told you that I have reappraised my place in life and about my decision and readiness to devote myself to the Cause of a struggle for a true, just and free world for humanity. For this Cause I will fight to the end.

I ask you to consider me as your soldier. Henceforth the ranks of your Armed Forces are increased by one man.

You can have no doubts about my devotion, steadfastness, selflessness and resolution in the battle for your Cause (which is also mine). You will always be satisfied with me, you will always remember me with a good word. Your acknowledgement - I will earn it. For this a great deal of time will not be necessary.

I have certain personal requests

(1) I request you to look into the question of granting me from this moment citizenship of the U.S.A. (or of Great Britain.) I also ask you to grant me at your discretion a military rank in the Army of the U.S.A. I have sufficient knowledge and experience and not only now but also in the future I will be able to bring you most definite benefit working in the U.S.A. itself, a prospect of which I dream a lot.

(2) I ask that you should give instructions on the careful, deliberate and conspiratorial work with me on the part of your workers.

(3) At the present moment I am handing over a series of materials which I have gathered during the last year. I ask for your directions about their assessment and about a decision on a fixed sum for this work since I have no special savings and money will be necessary in the future. I ask you to put the sum which is granted to me in an American bank.

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These are my personal requests.

Once again I assure you of my boundless love and respect for you, for the American people and for all those who find themselves under your Banner. I believe in your Cause. I am ready to fulfill any of your orders. I await them.

I remain,

Always yours,

14th August 1960
9th April 1961

(57)

[redacted] Letter No. 1 [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

1 October 1960

1. COMPASS arrived in city 1 October from Helsinki and settled into Japanese House in corner room [redacted] with large ** window facing on corner. Will be here three [redacted] My interpreter returned only last night at 1800 from a trip to [redacted] unable to write. He left on an internal trip 4 or 5 October. This will be short for not being written at lunch hour at America House and [redacted] give some perspective since I'll ride back with a group [redacted] country in winter months, I'll have to destroy it for I have no safe keeping facility. The Moscow is good but [redacted]

2. Surveillance coverage so far rated is light. Have made no checks for it but even then it is obvious. October 9 made tour from America House to church with a friend to church on old [redacted] Recognized one of the military men and he said we have two cars on us. From house went to plumbing supply store behind Ukraine Hotel and spotted no coverage, but there is an easy area for discreet coverage. Went into Ukraine buy guide book and map and then walked to Embassy, Chaikovski and down Gorkiy. Crowded sidewalks and spotted only one man who entered bookstore with me. Bookstore was mobbed so went to GUM where impossible to detect coverage. Walked to Kremlin, mausoleum closed, and on into St. Basil's. One young man, 25, 26--and two older ones--35-40--on my tail and close. From St. Basils down to Naberezhnaye along river and I'm positive man at end of street at wall along river was my friend covering me for the three in St. Basils. I made no attempt at any time to look behind me.

3. Reaching the large heated swimming pool in a park on the same road along the river to America House, I strolled in, and there were two new ones, undoubtedly on me. Not my imagination, and there were no repeats spotted in any of my coverage.

4. Back to the river border and on to America House where I strolled around the side along the House to the swimming pool in back, through there checking the hours it was open and I spotted four or five possible "friends" and one positive as I strolled down the block across from the bridge and the bus stop. The positive was a girl about 25 strolling ahead of me who foolishly turned about half way down the block to gesture twice to whoever was behind me that they should hold off. She then crossed the street to go under the bridge and make sure from there that I returned to America House. Lord, how they communicate I don't know but the area is simple to cover.

- 2 -

[redacted]

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[redacted]

5. I'm sure they have coverage from the building facing down over the [redacted] but it doesn't cover the corner wall we discussed for GRUNION. I have official day-time access--can't detail now--and can have official evening access to back yard [redacted] I can't give my position as building superintendent too far in advance (don't want to jeopardize my job) but I'm getting very well acquainted without it.

6. The wall itself is about [redacted] high on the inside. I don't think I'd have a package going into America House compound. However, I could have jumper over that wall and, by detail, all concerned might seem to have legit coverage. On the way in today I noted [redacted] on each corner--one stop side and cement factory side. The militia, of course, gives us complete front of building service.

7. It's almost possible, in my present estimate, and unless I spoil [redacted] routine, rather heavily regimented routing pays off on [redacted] buildings--five in all--that GRUNION landing [redacted] will be a one-time thing. He'll have hands [redacted] the evening [redacted] judgment during the day. No. If this party [redacted] cement factory and foot traffic is heavy, including militia [redacted] it is probably as deadly. Sorry. We'll have to wait until I can give more specific information on my cooling off.

8. Please give my intermediary instructions that he has to get [redacted] to me regularly and I will hand him a blank envelope, which, unless otherwise specified, goes directly to you. [redacted]

9. Didn't dare go down side streets as desired for GRUNION, since, as it turned out I'm the "hottest" thing in town.

10. I may repeat some of this but I'll write another letter as soon as I know I can get it to my intermediary without a delay.

COMPASS

NO COPY RETAINED. GOT TO KEEP IT IN MY HEAD. [illegible]

[redacted] 1 Copy [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

(52)

[redacted] letter No. 2 is a closed gummed envelope. Messages direct 1.3(a)(4)
13 October 1960 [illegible] envelope with scotch tape on the gummed edges.

1. CHISEL remarked on reading COMPASS No. 1 that COMPASS was disturbed at the situation. The word to be used is COMPASS was astounded and somewhat concerned, but not about himself. The America House site for a delivery over the wall is bad but not impossible. The corner of the building across from the cement factory has a window on the basement level facing into the House dining room and COMPASS thinks out of sight of the man at the front door and any other surveillance which might be on the street between the cement factory and the House. There are 3/4 inch bars spaced about six inches apart over the window but it is about three feet from the sidewalk and tossing a package with COMPASS waiting inside is not difficult. [illegible] for [illegible] a few days [illegible] there.

2. COMPASS has not had time or freedom to case either the outside of the house or coverage by our maids and house servants inside. There is the job itself which keeps me occupied because of my fellow worker's lack of coordination. COMPASS is trying to develop organization without stepping on people's feet--coverage by nosy people, vigilant types, and the pros.

3. Oct. 15, 1960. COMPASS will explore stores for housekeeping supplies and will try to get somewhere near the downtown sites even if only for a quick look. COMPASS hopes the weather will be good. If the coverage is as heavy as last Sunday, COMPASS will stay away.


4. Will try to get plans of America House but this is a rough sketch.

5. There is heavy pedestrian traffic in the morning from about seven to eight. They get off the No. 17 bus and walk down the street to take a left to some type of printing and typography shop. I saw it Sunday but have forgotten the details such as names.

6. COMPASS gives the same story of his life to Russ., Amer., and everyone else he meets. His Russian is improving rapidly which may be good or bad. No attempt is made to conceal this at any time, and further all efforts are being made both to Americans and Russ. as to COMPASS' devotion to his work for its own sake and desire to learn to speak Russ. No known problems here.

7. CHISEL delivered your message and is keeping all the material for COMPASS. Access to CHISEL by COMPASS is good. Messages to

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3 1 MAR 1992


[redacted]
1.3(a)(4)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

ACT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
already provided, but that is your choice. 16. Just up the street from the drop site is the Militia Station #20 towards Sadovaya Circle, and there are [illegible] around. You can look up their information in the telephone book. That gives the addresses.	
17. Following notes as they come to hand - it has been mentioned that I see and talk wit h more or less [illegible] than most other people in the Embassy. The carpenters, plumbers, electricians, laborers, European people, subway and streetcar conductors, since I am making maximum use of them, and passing people on the street - also when I cannot get transportation because I'm outranked I walk to the school on Ulitsa Chaykovskogo [illegible] - that has become an important location - [illegible] is not too far from the JIC or to the Embassy which if you streeters are also within reach. Landmarks: [illegible]	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(56)

[redacted]

Letter No. 5
18 November 1960

Dear COMPASS,

1. Re CHALK. For COMPASS' guidance, SLEDGE is forwarding an operational guide so that COMPASS may benefit from seeing the most important factors inherent in this operation. As COMPASS can well imagine, SLEDGE's shop is under considerable pressure from the top echelons here to get this job done well and very soon. Perhaps, most important, is the necessity for COMPASS to expedite his assigned tasks in order to prevent CHALK from lapsing into dispair and giving up his daily check of the proposed site. As COMPASS is undoubtedly aware, CHALK has been checking the site for over three (3) months and it is possible that his patience and hopes are at low ebb. In addition, SLEDGE's shop must coordinate operational phase II with Ops Phase I, direct AZTEC to a particular city and brief him--all of which must be closely timed with a projected completion date for Ops Phase I. SLEDGE is not criticizing COMPASS' performance but simply is trying to give COMPASS the feel of the situation here--as would be done in our bull sessions were COMPASS here. Therefore, with regard to Operational Phase I, please give this case COMPASS' priority attention, time, brains, imagination, and whatever else it takes. WHEEL must not lose CHALK. If WHEEL does this one well, not only will the wearing of a feather in our hats feel good, but it can have quite an impact in terms of future staffing.

2. With regard to Operational Phase I, enumerated points 1 and 2 are self-explanatory and COMPASS has the detailed casing requirements of these sites included as attachment to WHEEL Letter No. 1. These requirements (in as much detail as possible) should be forwarded at COMPASS' earliest possible time for study and planning at WHEEL. SLEDGE urges COMPASS to make call and case inside of CHALK site as soon as possible.

3. Point 3 of Ops Phase I pertains to the JIG site (or alternate if COMPASS rejects JIG site). SLEDGE appreciates COMPASS' suggestion (bag and string ploy) for use at JIG. However, SLEDGE and company feel that this plan must be rejected because of the psychological effect it more than likely would have on CHALK; the possibility of a citizen strolling along the Naberezhnaya observing CHALK emplacing the packet and the bag being pulled into COMPASS' window; the possible pinpointing of COMPASS as the recipient, and the proximity of COMPASS' room to the Naberezhnaya. With regard to the JIG wall, COMPASS mentioned that the lights usually go on when COMPASS walks into the yard. Does COMPASS turn them on himself or are they turned on by someone else, or do they burn continually at night? Please examine all possibilities of using the wall or window at JIG (or any other JIG possibilities) on a priority basis. With regard to timing, (if JIG site is used) COMPASS should advise as to which evening hour and day of the week he feels is most practical and secure for both COMPASS and CHALK. Also SLEDGE would appreciate receiving from COMPASS an estimated deadline of when COMPASS believes that he can complete all tasks assigned to COMPASS in Operational Phase I. This is necessary so that WHEEL can have lead time to coordinate AZTEC's movements. If COMPASS honestly feels that JIG drops should not be

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[redacted]

used for security or other reasons, please explain fully the reasons for rejection. WHEEL will abide by COMPASS' decision since he is on the spot and can most accurately gauge the operational situation. If COMPASS rejects the JIG site, then he should, again on a priority basis, locate another drop for CHALK's No. 1 outgoing to WHEEL. Please remember that the reason the wall at JIG was suggested as a site was that, in WHEEL's view, it afforded MAXIMUM SECURITY AND PROTECTION to COMPASS. Therefore, if the JIG site is rejected, COMPASS should keep in mind that his alternate choice should afford maximum security to the unloader (who may be COMPASS).

4. Point 4 of Operational Phase I refers to a drop which COMPASS must locate, sketch and describe so that WHEEL (in letter No. 1) can immediately assign it to CHALK. This will insure a continuity of future commo. In conjunction with this drop, COMPASS should locate a suitable signal site for CHALK to indicate that the drop is loaded and for the unloader to make a counter-signal to assure CHALK that the material has been recovered.

5. Operational Phases II and III are forwarded for COMPASS' information and to round out the total picture of the scope of the operation in its first round.

6. Re dacha area as possible CHALK drop area: WHEEL feels, on the basis of past and current information, that the dacha site and area has little potential for CHALK. It would, of course, take CHALK out of his own locale and possibly expose him as an outsider in a heavily surveilled area. Also the village of Tarasovskaya should not be considered for CHALK since in this small village the residents would immediately recognize him as an outsider and possibly wonder what business brought him to their small village and church. WHEEL will, however, retain and file this drop.

7. Re WHEEL commo to COMPASS and from COMPASS: SLEDGE fully realizes the commo hardships with which COMPASS is confronted and, therefore, previously recommended that, at every secure opportunity, COMPASS refresh his memory with the incoming file held by CHISEL. In addition, to simplify understanding, SLEDGE would prefer to have COMPASS write his letters as succinctly and plainly as possible avoiding any double-talk. SLEDGE has had some initial difficulty in deciphering past correspondence and feels that straight reporting through the secure channel is preferable. Contrarily, if COMPASS is finding difficulty in reading or interpreting WHEEL letters or has any suggestions or criticisms, please let WHEEL know.

8. If SLEDGE and Company can render any support or services of any nature to COMPASS, please do not hesitate to make suggestions.

[redacted]

[redacted]

9. SLEDGE has just received COMPASS' letter of 13 November in which COMPASS made the external casing of CHALK's drop and signal sites. The report is well done and fills a part of points 1 and 2 of Ops Phase I. Keep up the good work, COMPASS!

With best personal wishes,

SLEDGE

P. S. SLEDGE is aware that this letter is rather long and will necessitate COMPASS' concentration. Therefore, SLEDGE suggests that COMPASS might possibly take the letter to JIG for study in the seclusion of his room and return to CHISEL after careful study. COMPASS, of course, can best make this decision.

[redacted]

Copy - [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment to WHEEL Letter No 5

OPERATIONAL PHASE I

1. Case CHALK drop site per attachments to Letter No. 1. (COMPASS)*

2. Case CHALK signal site per attachments to Letter No. 1 (COMPASS)

3. Locate and/or case JIC site (or alternate) for CHALK's initial comms to us per attachments to Letter No. 1. (COMPASS)

4. Locate drop and signal site for future CHALK comms. (COMPASS) (To be assigned in our outgoing No. 1 message.)

*Indicates ACTION.

[redacted]

[redacted]

OPERATIONAL PHASE II

1. Prepare drop packet and message. (HQS)*

2. Coordinate AZZEC's movements with [redacted] (HQS) 1.3(a)(4)

3. Brief and train AZZEC abroad. (HQS)

4. Deliver packet and dispatch AZZEC. (HQS)

*Indicates ACTION.

[redacted]

[redacted]

OPERATIONAL PHASE III

1. [redacted] to load pre-selected drop site and make signal. ([redacted])*
2. CHALK to unload drop and make counter signal. (CHALK)
3. CHALK to pass material at JIG or (alternate site.) (CHALK)
4. Unloader to forward materials to HQS. (COMPASS or ?)

*Indicates ACTION.

[redacted]

(60)

[redacted] Vol I

1.3(a)(4)

Letter No. 7
10 January 1961

Dear COMPASS:

This letter is from SLEDGE personally.

In terms of cleaning up the CHALK problem, the following questions must repeat must be answered in order that this operation can get off the ground. WHEEL is considerably concerned that with the passage of time CHALK may get discouraged and discontinue looking for indication from us that we are willing and prepared to cooperate.

1. As concerns the Drop Site that CHALK gave to us to load: COMPASS must actually enter the site area and describe it accurately with narrative and description. Please refer to Letter No. 1 attachments to refresh your memory.

   a. Is the radiator between the two sets of doors or behind the second (inner) set of doors?

   b. How far is the radiator from the doors?

   c. What is the size and shape of the hook? Its thickness and color? How far would the loader have to reach in to fasten the dead drop package on the the hook? Or would it have to be loaded from above rather than from the side?

   d. Is the inside of the building and drop site identical with CHALK's details? If not, where are the discrepancies?

2. As concerns the Signal Site that CHALK gave to us:

   Please review the description as CHALK gave to us; prepare some pretext to actually use the telephone and on one of COMPASS' walks through the area, stop in, make the call, and study the internal set-up to determine if it is actually as CHALK described.

3. As concerns the drop site that WHEEL is to get to CHALK:

   JIG: I still do not understand why specifically COMPASS does not like the wall as a site for CHALK to toss a package over. COMPASS mentioned earlier that the lights in the courtyard go on. Who turns them on? Are they on all night every night? What is the story? If COMPASS has solid objections to using the wall of JIG, then please detail all objections. If COMPASS is determined that JIG cannot be used, then COMPASS must come up with an alternate dead drop site for CHALK to load (which we would unload). Is there any indication that the recent JIG incidents have altered PRESS "protective" and security procedures?

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4. In order to keep this operation going once initial contact is established, COMPASS must find yet another drop site for CHALK. So please find another drop site which CHALK would lead for another go-around which would afford maximum accessibility and security both to him and to the unloader (probably a diplomatic type or a Redskinner). In connection with this, locate a signal site which CHALK would use to signal and which you would observe on a daily basis while looking for his signal. Both these sites must be fully described in narrative and sketches.

We are truly on the spot as far as the CHALK operation is concerned. I have no alternative now but to ask COMPASS to fulfill the above request within two weeks after receipt, otherwise I shall have to find someone else to do the job. This I would hate to do but will be forced to do unless we have the full package in our hands within two weeks.

I, personally, find reading your letters a little difficult. I, therefore, request that, with our secure means of comms, you avoid double-talk and make your letters as clear and complete as possible. Please prepare them as if they were official despatches. We have found that on some things COMPASS has written, there were several interpretations of what you meant depending on who read the letter.

I wish COMPASS success in this and all future endeavors.

(80)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

No 2709

10 April 1962

14

The following is a translation of the letter which [redacted] passed [redacted] on 28 March 1962, together with 11 rolls of minox film. 1.3(a)(4)

1. 5 January 62, after completing the meeting with [redacted], I turned my attention toward an auto entering the pereulok; violating the traffic regulations, the auto swung around, and one of the men (in the car) was intently looking out. [redacted] had already left. Having waited a couple of minutes, the auto moved off of the pereulok onto Arbatskaya street (the main part) and went to the side of Arbatskaya Ploshchad. In any case I remembered that car. 1.3(a)(4)

12 January 62. I observed no surveillance whatsoever, neither up to, nor after.

19 January 62. After the meeting [redacted] went along Arbatskiy Pereulok down to the side of the Arbat, and, convinced that all was in order with her, I turned from the Pereulok onto Bolshoy Molchanovka and went toward the Arbatskaya Ploshchad. Immediately, as I exited onto Molchanovka, I observed the same car, in which was one man (in a black overcoat). I left without looking for surveillance on me. 1.3(a)(4)

This car: brown colored, No. M Shch - 61-45.

Conclusion:
- Surveillance is being conducted on [redacted], perhaps periodically. 1.3(a)(4)
- It is advisable stop meetings on the street for three or four months,
- [redacted] should continue to behave naturally and at the same time should continue frequenting the shops and the same streets and pereuloks, as in the past, 1.3(a)(4)
- [redacted] should not come out on the street with operational materials - "hooligans" might grab her purse, 1.3(a)(4)
- once or twice a month invite me to small receptions; at American, English or Canadian representatives',
- If something should be important and urgent, then I will transmit it via the dead drop.

2. 19 April. I take off for the U.S.A. for the exhibition "21st Century."

3. Perhaps sometime from the 20th to the end of February I will take off with Gvishiyani to Italy for two weeks, or it is possible that

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

on 14 March I will be in Geneva at the Auto Exhibition.

4. I request that a reception be organized for between 10 and 20 February, at which I will inform [redacted] more concretely of all future plans. 1.3(a)(4)

5. In the future at receptions with whom will I be able to talk and pass material, when [redacted] will be absent because of pregnancy? 1.3(a)(4)

6. [redacted] made a good impression, but KRO (Counterintelligence) does not like him and are watching him carefully. 1.3(a)(4)

With warm greetings

Until we meet soon my dear friends

26 January 1962

1. 27 January 1962. - [redacted] was not at [redacted] reception and therefore I have retained all of this until this time.

2. The trip to Italy was postponed until summer, and visit to Geneva in March was cancelled for M.O. (presumably, "by Ministry of Defense") 1.3(a)(4)

3. If all is well then I will take off for the U.S.A. on 19 April. But at the present it's going badly as the KRO are rummaging around concerning my father (kopat'sya vokrug moego ottsa) - they are continually searching for my father's burial place, they cannot find it and therefore they are conjecturing that perhaps my father is alive, and therefore that in the future it would not be suitable to send me on overseas assignments. My command considers these fears meaningless and they are defending me from all these conjectures of the "neighbors." Everything must be decided soon.

4. In March I must meet with [redacted] at a reception and I will pass detailed information about myself and plans for the future depending upon the situation which is in turmoil about me. 1.3(a)(4)

5 March 1962

1. I plan to fly to the U.S.A. on 18 April. Everything is already submitted concerning the visas. The KGB will have its say on the 15th of April. My superiors in the Committee and in the M.O. have made all

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

the arrangements for my trip to the exhibition - "21st Century." If I make the trip, then everything will be alright.

2. If they do not give me permission to make the trip, then my situation will change sharply and become complicated. It will be necessary to leave the Committee, and in the fall of this year, having fulfilled 25 years of service in the army, I will be discharged. We must plan our future work on all of these contingencies of life.

3. If I do not come to the U.S.A., then after the 20th of April it will be necessary to arrange a reception at which I will be able to pass my plans for the future.

28 March 1962

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

(63)

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

List of Materials and Documents to be sent

1.	A list of intelligence officers entering the "Military Diplomatic Academy" [senior intelligence school] in 1960	3 pages
2.	Operating code [Intelligence terminology]	2 pages
3.	Description of rocket "3R1"	2 pages
4.	Rockets "3R2" and "3R3"	2 pages
5.	Rocket "3R7"	1 page
6.	Construction of launching installation "2P2"...	6 pages and 4 photocopies
7.	Construction of launching installation "2P5" ..	2 pages
8.	Construction of launching installation "2P6" .. details	4 pages
9.	Various/about the T.R.A.	2 pages
10.	Description of rocket "R-1"	3 pages (not complete)
11.	Description of rocket "R-2"	11 pages
12.	Description of rocket "R-11"	7 pages
13.	Description of rocket "V-75"	8 pages
14.	Ground equipment of guided rockets	12 pages
15.	Various details about guided rockets	6 pages
16.	Certain facts about the improper activities of KHRUSHCHEV (5 pages altogether, including two supplementary pages about MELEKH)	Dated 5 Dec 60 15 Sept 60 5 Feb 61
17.	Personal letter of 25th December 1960	1 page
18.	Present letter	1 page

78 pp + 4 photos
less papers taken by Wyman

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31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

(47)

[redacted]

31 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Mr. Helms, DDP/COP on New Case

1. This afternoon at 3:30 p.m., Mr. Maury, [redacted] and I saw Mr. Helms on a number of matters. One of them, the new lead from Moscow, was the subject of discussion. I showed him the [redacted] cable from the Ambassador to Hugh Cumming, the letter and contents of the material received from the new lead, and told him of some of the preliminary traces and information about the subject regarding his stay in Turkey and views held by some of his colleagues about him. Also mentioned his selling of jewelry because he needed money and the abortive attempt to sell a camera. 1.3(a)(4)

2. Mr. Helms seemed quite interested in this new lead. He asked what we planned to do. I asked if he would consider utilizing the American Embassy as a point of contact with the Soviet. Mr. Helms replied that it would be a waste of time to negotiate with the Department and the Ambassador, that not only would their response be negative but that many precious weeks would elapse. In the meantime, we could seek another approach to the subject. I suggested then that we could use either a Third National or an American citizen, and asked what his views were in regard to either, [redacted]. Mr. Helms responded that in this particular case, it was worth the risk using either and said if this flapped, we could stand such a flap from the [redacted] He gave me latitude in getting to the subject in any possible way except through the Embassy.

3. Mr. Maury then proceeded to speculate that this new lead might indeed be a provocation, following from the [redacted] case. Before he had gotten too far, Mr. Helms stopped him with a remark that in this point in the Agency's history, we cannot afford but to follow up such a lead.

4. Mr. Helms then inquired if we had informed the WH as yet in regard to the Illegals alleged to be coming to the USA. I said we had not, that we had plenty of time since the particular class in which the Illegals were located would not be graduated until 1963. Mr. Helms said that despite this and on the possibility that a tour at the FDA might be shortened, we must inform the WH immediately. He said further that at this time, the political

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considerations were such that it might do us some good as an Agency to inform the FBI of such leads. I replied that I would prefer to give the FBI a complete package including all the traces on the Illegals. He agreed, but warned me that this should be done within one month and not in six months. I said "Yes Sir".

5. Mr. Helms further raised the question as to what should be done about the other Illegals going to other countries and then answered his own question that we should not do anything at this time. He warned me however about establishing a tickler system on these leads so that appropriate action could be taken at the appropriate time. I said this would be done.

Joseph J. Bulik

JOSEPH J. BULIK

(49)

[redacted]

28 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Contact and Debriefing of Henry Lee COBB on his Meeting with [redacted] in the USSR

JOE BULIK

1. From 1100 to 1500 hours, Sunday, 11 September 1960, [redacted] and the undersigned met with Henry Lee COBB at the SR/9 safehouse for the purpose of debriefing COBB on his contact with [redacted] while in the USSR.

2. COBB stated that he and his friend, COX, left Kiev on Monday evening, 8 August, and arrived in Moscow the morning of 9 August 1960. On Saturday night, 13 August, COBB and COX, who were staying at the BALCHUG Hotel, went to a nearby movie and then walked from the theater to the MOSCOW Restaurant. After eating at the restaurant, the two friends walked through Red Square toward MOSKVORETSKIY MOST. As they were walking on the bridge, and in the dark of the evening, a man [redacted] approached COBB and COX and stated in Russian, "I was on the train with you three or four nights ago from Kiev. You were in a student group in the same car that I was in. There was an agent assigned to watch you. I did not approach you at that time because of the presence of the agent." Continuing along the bridge, accompanied by [redacted] COBB and COX listened intently as he further stated, "At one time I worked in Turkey with the Soviet Embassy. I had a very good friend in the American Embassy, and I have wondered many times what has become of him." COBB characterized [redacted] as being extremely cautious and guarded in his speech and actions. The three walked around the BALCHUG Hotel area and along the Moscow River. When Soviet citizens passed by or approached the group, [redacted] would initiate conversation on innocuous subjects. As they were walking along the Moscow River embankment, [redacted] stated, "I have tried to get in touch with other Americans but so few of them speak Russian. I recognize you as intelligent Americans. I have some information which I wish to give directly to the American Embassy. As a result of this information and our future cooperation, I hope some day to come to the West. I have been carrying this letter with me for about a month. It is only for Mr. FREERS or the Military Attache. Do not open it and don't keep it over-night in your hotel. Go immediately to the American Embassy with this letter. Your Government will be grateful for this information and I may be able to come to the West. I will not give you my name."

[redacted]

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[redacted]

3. With regard to the U-2, [redacted] stated that it was not shot down at the high altitude that the Soviets claimed. According to COBB, he further said, "Our Air Force was desperate to get the U-2. They tracked it all the way from the frontier, and there were many attempts to bring the U-2 down. We used ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles; even MIG planes were sent out to intercept the U-2. Finally the plane was shot down at a low altitude. In the process we destroyed one of our own MIG planes with ground-to-air missiles." The man urged killing the pilot COX to take this information to the Embassy by word-of-mouth.

4. [redacted] also stated that the RB-47 was not over Soviet territory when shot down. He stated that the RB-47 was definitely over international waters when attacked and crippled. The RB-47 then drifted to "land" and crashed. The walk and conversation with [redacted] lasted from approximately 2300 until 0030. The group broke up two or three blocks from the BALCHUG Hotel and COBB asked COX to take the letter immediately to the Embassy because he did not want to be connected with the incident. According to COX there was but one letter in a plain white envelope. COBB did not then know and does not know now the contents of the letter. 1.3(a)(4)

5. COBB then returned to the BALCHUG Hotel and was asleep when COX returned from the Embassy. COBB believes that COX told him he gave the information and letter to the Military Attache.

6. In describing [redacted] COBB was very uncertain as to his precise physical appearance and felt that he would not be able to identify him if he saw his picture. COBB described the unknown man as being reasonably well dressed, approximately 5' 9", and depicted him as quite nervous. COBB thought that [redacted] said that he was at one time a Communist (or believer), but not now.

7. Even though COBB was most doubtful as to whether he would be able to identify [redacted], [redacted] exhibited a series of Soviet personalities and asked COBB if any of these people were identical with Subject. COBB quickly leafed through the fifteen or so pictures with no apparent success. He then began to study each personality. Upon seeing the 1955 photo of [redacted], he stated immediately that this was the man who had approached them. He was able to make a positive identification.

8. COBB stated that COX had occasion to visit the Embassy on three separate occasions. The first time COX went to have a document notarized. The second time he reported the [redacted] incident in Leningrad. The third time was early Sunday morning, 14 August, in order to deposit [redacted]'s letter at the Embassy as requested.

[redacted]

[redacted]

9. After this incident in Moscow neither COBB nor COX saw [redacted] again nor were they subjected to any unusual provocations or incidents. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Distribution:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Vladimir I. Toumanoff re [redacted]

1. Through the courtesy of Mr. Boster, I had the opportunity of debriefing Toumanoff on 4 October 1960 re his connection with the [redacted] case. Toumanoff said that Bob Owen, who was Acting Chief of Chancery and is normally 1st Secretary and Chief of the Internal Section at the Embassy gave him the two [redacted] envelopes, asked him to read them and be prepared to brief Ed Freers on the contents. Toumanoff said the envelopes were not sealed and they did not have the appearance, as he recalls, of having been torn open. Freers took Toumanoff into the secure room where Toumanoff began briefing him on the contents of the envelopes. Freers interrupted and called [redacted] who came in for the briefing. After Toumanoff gave them a free translation and his comments on the matter, Freers told [redacted] to "take it from there".

2. As far as Toumanoff knows the details of the case, some Soviet military officer gave the envelopes to some tourist with the request that they be taken to the Embassy. He did not know to whom the envelopes were given in the Embassy. He did not know if Bob Owen read the contents. It must be assumed he either did or that he may have been told by Freers of the contents. He said that as far as he knew the Military Attaches in Moscow did not know of the existence of these envelopes.

3. Toumanoff said that he thinks the case could be clean. If the letter had been written six months ago, there would have been no doubt in his mind that they were clean but he feels the time now is ripe for many provocations. On the other hand, he said, because of the disillusionment inside the USSR due to Khrushchev's dumping of the Summit that some people could turn to the USA.

4. He said that a reading of the letter left him with these impressions: that they were written under emotional strain by an able and disciplined mind. The letter does not

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31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

have the sound of the work of the Soviet police. It had a ring of genuineness. Regarding the technical aspects of the dead drop site and signal site, he said it was a fancy piece of work. He said the author worked out a drop which is inconspicuous and which he feels would be safe to use. He had praise for the neat piece of work.

5. Initially, Toumanoff could not remember any other items in the envelopes beyond the letter and the sites. Then after some recollection he mentioned the photograph; then after more recollection and some prompting he remembered the list of names. He said he did not really study the list -- just noted that the names sounded genuine rather than sounding like pseudonyms adopted for that purpose -- such as Kirov or others which some Soviets like to use. He is of the opinion that this was the listing of military officers going to an espionage school and that possibly they could show up in various Soviet embassies as military attaches.

6. I briefed Toumanoff on the fact that only one officer in the Department, namely Dick Davis, was briefed by us on this matter and I requested that he not speak to anyone about this case without our approval. This he said he understood and would be glad to oblige. I queried him on other leads, which are written separately.

Joseph J. Bulik

JOSEPH J. BULIK

[redacted]

style of readiness to renew contact with the guerrilla unit so that it may serve as a reception committee for another more distant unit.

Immediately after being infiltrated into Cuba, the unit will proceed to conduct numerous recon patrols of the area in which it plans to conduct future operations. Among the numerous objectives of the recon patrols is intelligence relating to:

(1) Enemy methods of operation
(2) Attitude of local inhabitants
(3) Infiltration of the terrain
(4) Current political situation
(5) Current economic conditions
(6) Geographical sketches of enemy lookouts
(7) Enemy capabilities
(8) Presence of friendly guerrilla forces and resistance movements
(9) Health and sanitation data
(10) Natural geographical boundaries
(11) Modes of communication

Once the unit has prepared a working operations map of it's area, it will proceed to gather, prepare, and forward intelligence to the agency concerned.

The unit will continue conducting as many recon patrols or security alerts or until all personnel are completely familiar with the unit's area of operations. If possible, all available local radio sites will be plotted and an airdrop or landing will be made essential prior to conducting local resistance elements. This is to allow the unit to stockpile recon supplies that couldn't be brought in when initially infiltrated. Then, if contact with resistance elements results in betrayal, the unit will have sufficient material if forced to operate as a purely guerrilla column. The duties of the unit when detached as a mobile reception committee are numerous. Primary is the evaluation of the guerrilla unit in question, determine its potential, operational effectiveness, ability to use the supplies requested, and insure their having the receiving factors concerning selection of cadres.

The personnel involved in this operation are native to the area in which they

[redacted] (S NF [redacted]) [redacted]

are to operate. The primary factors being developed concerning this mission are

(1) Transportation and security of the unit while infiltrating Cuba.
(2) The support of this unit once inside Cuba, and the tactical support once they are engaged in decisive operations.

Attached are the following

(1) Detailed list of the materiel that will be used to maintain the unit in operational status.
(2) Detailed description of the training site.
(3) Description of the area in which the unit will operate.
(4) List of the personnel involved in the operation.

[redacted]

The personnel selected for operational training will be transferred by vehicle or aircraft to the [redacted] AIR FORCE BOMBING RANGE, Avon Park, Florida. This area is located approximately 110 air miles South Southwest of the city of Miami, Florida.

Though the entire area is considered a bombing range and under U.S. Government control, only the South Southwest sector of the reservation is used as such. The personnel involved would, of course, be restricted from entering the danger area.

As this is U.S. Government property, civilian personnel do not frequent the area. U.S. Air Force personnel merely tour the sectors not included in the bombing, rocket target area at the S.W. corner of the site. They are restricted from entering that the other sectors due to the lack of even a single footpath. The area is completely inaccessible by motor vehicles.

This area is exceptionally suitable and highly desirable due to the following pertinent factors:

(1) [redacted]
(2) [redacted]
(3) [redacted]

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MISSION (CONTINUED) [illegible]

(e) Close proximity of civilians.
(f) The area is under control of the U.S. Government, thus anyone observing our personnel in training will assume that they are U.S. Air Force elements undergoing survival training.

Due to the character of this mission, the training site must be secure from civilian observation and it's existence must be maintained [illegible] from all other organizations. To insure secrecy, all personnel will be strictly prohibited from exiting the training area.

Respectfully submitted,

[illegible]
Military Security Officer [illegible]

[illegible]
Capt[illegible] (Retired)
C/I Instructor for Aviation

[illegible]
Major [illegible] (Ret)
C/I Instructor for Aviation

Approved by:

[illegible]
Military Coordinator [illegible]

[illegible]
Acting Consular Section [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

LV/hm

FBI-0428/1

[redacted]


MATERIAL REQUIREMENT, ITEMS (Continued)

60 ea	Pistol, automatic, caliber .45 ball, M1911A1
60 ea	Holster, pistol, U.S. Army
120 ea	Belt, pistol, caliber .45, individual
60 ea	Knife, hunting, 12" w/ case
60 ea	Knife, fighting (trench) w/ case
60 ea	Rifle, pistol, .45 cal. w/ bayonet, letter
6,000 ft	Line, parachute suspension, nylon, O.D.

CAMOUFLAGE EQUIPMENT

70 ea	Paint, O.D.
8 ea	Pot, 5 gallon, cooking
4 ea	Can, mixing, 5 gallon
15 ea	Net, camouflage, cargo, military, Infantry Unit
15 ea	Net, camouflage, cargo, military, radius of each previous, Infantry Unit
15 ea	Distributor, net, O.D.
2 ea	Kit, camouflage, painting, field, 2 man (camouflage, complete
120 ea	Netting, cargo, large leaf type
2 ea	Infantry, camouflage, screen, 6 man type, pulley, complete
12 ea	Padding, camouflage, camouflage
120 ea	Net, cargo, individual, cotton 6 x 6 type, 12 knots per side
50 ea	Tent, fly, camouflage, combat range type
800 ft	Rope, nylon, 1 inch diam.
3 ea	Jack, screw, w/ bolts, 24 to 44 size
40 ea	Crosscut saw, 5 ft., (Collapsible type)
1 ea	Boat, rubber, air inflatable, (Standard)
12 ea	Saddle, wood (Army type)
6 ea	Hammer, sledge w/ wood handle, head
1 ea	Axe, hand, w/ wood handle
200 ft	Line, parachute, synthetic, nylon, O.D. color
10 ea	Saw, hand, O.D. color, 1 gallon size
1 ea	Blackboard, 4 ft X 6 ft
500 sq	Grill, white, in 3 inch pieces
100 ea	Chalk, assorted colors, in 3 inch pieces
1 ea	Pump, hose, portable type
1 ea	Axe, chop, steel, 100 lb. type
1 ea	Kit, first, Army regular, complete
100 yd	Netting, fish mesh, camouflage type (square yards)
100 ea	Grinder, hand, wheel type
24 ea	Whistle, brass, police type
3 ea	Flashlight, 2 cell, 3 cell, belt type, O.D. issue, O.D.
60 pr	Gloves, leather, heavy duty, black or brown color
40 pr	Goggles, plastic, industrial type
40 ea	Bag, plastic, personal effects, small
40 ea	Kit, snake bite, suction type, w/ syringe, w/ case

F82-0428/1



[redacted]

DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL (continued)

10 ea Manual, field, explosives and demolitions FM 5 25
100 lbs Explosive, Composition C4
500 lbs Explosive, TNT, 1 1/4 lbs blocks in boxes
25 ea Tools, electric, EE 33, complete, w/case
50 ea Spools, wire, 2 pole, steel
5 lbs Compound, waterproofing
2000 ft Cord, detonating, (Primacord)
100 ea Firing device, pull, M1, standard base and non electric cap
100 ea Firing device, pressure, M1A1, complete
100 ea Firing device, pressure release, M2, complete
100 ea Firing device, pull release, M3, complete
100 ea Firing device, pull friction, M4, complete
100 ea Fuze assembly, combination mine, M1A1, complete

HEADQUARTERS, ORGANIZATIONAL

4 ea Field manual, FM 27 10, Rules of Land Warfare
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 5, Military Intelligence; combat intelligence
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 10, Military Intelligence; observation
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 15, Field Interrogation of enemy personnel
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 30, Military Intelligence Military maps
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 52, Military Intelligence Foreign Countries
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 60, Military Intelligence Counterintelligence
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 30, Recognition, pictorial manual, Aircraft
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 40, Recognition, pictorial manual, Armored vehicles
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 50, Recognition, pictorial manual, Naval Vessels
4 ea Field manual, FM 31 21, Special Forces Operations
4 ea Field manual, FM 31 80, Operations against Guerrilla Forces
4 ea Field manual, FM 31 15, Operations against Airborne Attack, G/T action & Raids
4 ea Field manual, FM 5 15, Field Fortifications
4 ea Field manual, FM 7 10, Rifle Company, Infantry Regiment
4 ea Field manual, FM 31 35, Air/Ground Operations
4 ea Field manual, FM 31 5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations
4 ea Field manual, FM 57 30, Airborne Operations
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 75, Survival
4 ea Field manual, FM 5 20, Camouflage, Basic principles
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 11, First Aid for Soldiers
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 76, Survival at Sea
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 77, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling
4 ea Field manual, FM 72 20, Jungle Operations
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 73, Mountain Operations
4 ea Field manual, FM 1 101, Army Aviation
4 ea Field manual, FM 3 5, C, B, R Warfare
4 ea Field manual, FM 5 31, Use and Installation of Boobytraps
4 ea Field manual, FM 7 20, Organization in Infantry and Airborne Division
4 ea Field manual, FM 7 40, Infantry Regiment
4 ea Field manual, FM 8 10, Medical Service, Theater of Operations

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[illegible] Army, [illegible] Material (continued)

4 ea Field manual, FM 11 5, Field Radio Relay Techniques
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 5, Military Training
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 6, Techniques of Military Instruction
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 10, Military Sanitation
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 11, First Aid
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 45, Infantry against Air Attack
6 ea Field manual, FM 21 60, Visual Signals
4 ea Field manual, FM 24 [illegible] Signal Communications
4 ea Field manual, FM 24 18, Field Radio Techniques
4 ea Field manual, FM 30 [illegible], Combat Intelligence, Public Enemy, Combat Guns,
4 ea Field manual, FM 31 50, Combat in Fortified Areas with Gas
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 [illegible], Bayonet Training Manual, Cal. .30 M1, M8
4 ea Field manual, FM [illegible] 5, Bandaging and Splinting
4 ea Field manual, FM 21 18, The Soldier's Guide
4 ea Field manual, FM 29 100, Manual and Instructions for the Small Unit Leader
4 ea Field manual, FM 27 5, U.S. Army & Navy Manual of Civ. Affs Military Gov't.
4 ea Field manual, FM 100 5, Field Service Regulations, Operations
2 ea Technical manual, TM 11 [illegible], Radio Sets AN/VRC 3
2 ea Technical manual, TM 11 [illegible], Frequency Meter Sets BC 221
2 ea Technical manual, TM 9 [illegible], Signals
2 ea Technical manual, TM 8 [illegible], Medical and Surgical Technicians
1 ea Technical manual, TM 55 [illegible], Landing Craft Operator's Handbook
2 ea Technical manual, TM 9 [illegible], Minor and Major Overhaul
2 ea Technical manual, TM 9 [illegible], Minor and Major Overhaul
2 ea Technical manual, TM 9 [illegible], Minor and Major Overhaul
2 ea Technical manual, TM 9 [illegible], Maintenance and Operation
2 ea Technical manual, TM 5 [illegible], Explosives and Demolition
2 ea Technical manual, TM 5 [illegible], Land Mine Warfare
2 ea Technical manual, TM 5 [illegible], Service Mine Warfare
2 ea Technical manual, TM 5 [illegible], Firing of Materials other than Mine Fields
4 ea Pamphlet, Dept. of Army, FM 20 [illegible], Service Mine Warfare
4 ea Pamphlet, Dept. of Army, FM 20 [illegible], Service Mine Warfare
4 ea Pamphlet, Dept. of Army, FM 20 [illegible], Service Mine Warfare
4 ea Pamphlet, Dept. of Army, FM 20 [illegible], Enemy Mine Warfare
4 ea Pamphlet, Dept. of Army, FM 20 [illegible], General Mine Warfare

Respectfully submitted,

Approved by

Carlos Rodriguez Quesada
Course Coordinator MI 30 11

Luis del Valle Vega
Military Coordinator MI 30 11

Reynold F. Manning Jr. (Infantry)
C/I Instructor for Infantry

Manuel G. Davis (Navy)
C/I Instructor for Infantry

FS2-0828/1

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(61)

FW 16+ 17

Copy 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, January 13, 1961.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Copies to: Charge d'Affaires, Canadian Embassy, Moscow.

Chief, European Division, I.T.R.B., OTTAWA.

Meetings with Mr. Pankovski, State Scientific and Technical Committee

1. Dr. Harrison, Canadian Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, mentioned to the Charge d'Affaires that Mr. Pankovski, of the State Scientific and Technical Committee wished to meet me. Mr. Pankovski replaced Mr. Farmokovsky in mid-November as the "Expert" liaison officer dealing with Canada on matters of exchange of technical missions. As this is our only direct entry and principal contact with this Committee, I was interested to make Mr. Pankovski's acquaintance and arranged that he and Dr. Harrison come to my hotel after work on Monday, January 10. cf — Jck

2. The conversation was quite a general one, ranging over the field of interests between the Committee and Canada and each of our types of work, during which Mr. Pankovski mentioned that for two years (I believe 1956-1958) he had been Assistant and then Military Attache in Turkey, and had been demobilized some eight months ago.

3. On behalf of Mr. Wheeler, President of Ontario Building Materials Ltd., who visited the Soviet Union in 1960, I had officially requested a publication. Mr. Pankovski gave me this publication, at the same time asking that I pass a letter he handed me to a person in the American Embassy. I took the letter thinking it was some innocuous personal note arising out of acquaintance in Turkey, and that the name of the person would be on it.

4. Our meeting was short as Dr. Harrison and Mr. Pankovski had a dinner engagement, and, at Mr. Pankovski's suggestion, arranged that he would come to my hotel for a drink after work on Wednesday, January 11.

5. When I looked at the letter received from Mr. Pankovski it turned out to be a bulky envelope, doubly sealed with tape and without the name of the addressee. I decided to return the envelope to Mr. Pankovski at first opportunity with the explanation that I was in no position to pass over unknown contents to unidentified Americans.

6. On Wednesday at 7 P.M. Mr. Pankovski dropped in and I offered him a drink and a chair, he taking the former, but declining the latter as it faced onto the door, and instead asked if he might sit on a divan on the opposite side of the room. I happened to have the record player on, and in view of this start of proceedings kept it on during Mr. Pankovski's stay.

7. I started the conversation on topics of our mutual interests vis-a-vis the State Scientific and Technical Committee. Mr. Pankovski almost immediately asked whether I had delivered the letter, to which I replied that I had not since I was in no position to deliver unknown contents on behalf of Soviet citizens. He took the letter.

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8. Mr. Pankovski appeared somewhat agitated upon first entrance and never seemed to regain full composure. I tried to cut the trend of conversation and discuss only those matters which came strictly within the realm of his normal liaison function on behalf of the State Scientific and Technical Committee. This was to no avail and Mr. Pankovski persistently reverted to the theme of the importance for him to meet with someone from the U.S. Embassy. I prompted none of his subsequent conversation and throughout tried to emphasize the importance to my position on commercial matters of developing normal relations with the State Scientific and Technical Committee.

9. He said that although he could perhaps understand my action in not undertaking to be a go-between with the Americans, his fate was now in my hands - he hoped I would not inform anyone, (presumably the Soviets). He said he had been trying desperately the last six months to find some way of approaching the Americans, and thought that with his present position in the State Scientific and Technical Committee, Canadian officials would make this possible. He offered to show me the contents of the original letter, which I declined, and said that additional to a document on ballistic missiles, it contained his personal letters to each of President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy. He said he had hoped to pass on more documents, thereupon taking out of his pocket a large thickly packed envelope.

10. His determination remained, he said, to contact the Americans to whom he wanted to pass valuable information and that a final objective was to get out of the Soviet Union with his wife and daughter. Almost in passing he mentioned that he was experiencing financial problems.

11. Again he asked that I arrange for him to meet someone from the U.S. Embassy, either through an invitation to the Canadian Embassy, or a luncheon invitation, and if neither of these, that at least I inform the Americans of his interest. He explained his inability to go directly to the U.S. Embassy because of the Soviet police guards, and that even at the State Scientific and Technical Committee it was an almost invariable rule that two Soviets must be present when a foreigner calls. He offered me his home phone number, which I expressed myself willing to have, but suggesting that I would be able to reach him at his office.

12. I declined everything resulting from this one-sided gushing flow, mentioning only that I would hope to be in touch with him at the State Scientific and Technical Committee on our continuing commercial interests. I invited him to stay for dinner but he said he just didn't feel up to it and so ended our 40 minute conversation in English.

13. I am somewhat at a loss to assess the motivations behind these meetings. Mr. Pankovski is about 47, has a pleasant personality and would appear to have reasonable capacity. The rush of events in our brief meetings certainly instilled me with deepest caution. He apparently is the type that has little hesitancy to ask for personal favours as evidenced by his requests to Dr. Harrison for various items from Canada such as salve for eczema, etc., which he assumes Dr. Harrison will send to the Embassy to be passed over. He certainly went into uncalled for detail in our conversations in commenting on matters such as having the record player on, the hazards of phoning his office, repeating that his fate was in my hands, specifically mentioning documents and letters, expressing his regret that apparently I was not quite convinced of his sincerity of purpose in wishing to contact the U.S. Embassy, etc; a partial explanation might be the melodramtic of his previous position as military attache.

. . . . . /3

14. Very obviously his position with the State Scientific and Technical Committee is a minor one, with low salary, and a great come-down from his military career. It is likely that he is a disgruntled citizen.

15. If he is honest in his professed desire to pass information of value to the Americans and have he and his family leave the Soviet Union, he is dangerously talkative. If these are not the motivations, association of Canadian personnel with him, except at the strictest official level, is highly undesirable.

William Van Vliet.

(74)

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Copy 13 For b

7 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Conversations with Messrs. Ed Proctor and Jack Smith Re Use of CHICKADEE Material in NIE 11-8-61

1. Today Mr. Proctor informed me that USIB, in discussing NIE 11-8-61, did not mention the CHICKADEE report on the Soviet ICBM program. Although the paper had a brief reference to the report in a footnote, it was not mentioned,or even reflected, in the body of the Estimate, and none of the participants at the meeting referred to it. Proctor said he believed this was because even though they probably accepted the CS evaluation of the initial source, they were unwilling to put any weight in the subsource, about whom they knew nothing. Proctor's argument was that no matter how good the source was, since the subsource was unknown to the consumers and was given no evaluation in the dissemination, he would have to be considered "F". The community was unwilling to accord an "F" source any consideration in changing an existing National Estimate.

2. Later in the day I discussed the same matter with Jack Smith who expressed somewhat the same views as Proctor, adding that another factor was simply that the CHICKADEE report did not exactly fit the views of anyone at the meeting.

JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

JMM/r

[redacted]

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1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

[redacted] / Operations, Volume

(67)

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1.3(a)(4)

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~~C-37~~

13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Assessment of [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. This afternoon Mr. Helms called a meeting of Messrs. Timm, Angleton, and me to consider the [redacted] evaluation of [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) which we received today.

2. We began by showing Mr. Angleton the Berlin report, about which he expressed skepticism. Mr. Helms said he thought we had to be very cautious about "going bail" for any material of such a controversial and significant nature. He said he did not subscribe to the British statement that [redacted] bona fides were clearly established "beyond any reasonable doubt". Mr. Timm expressed similar views. 1.3(a)(4)

3. I said that I agreed we should not go quite as far as the British had gone, but that deception up to now was virtually out of the question. I said the main danger, as I saw it, was that at some point in time, which we could not identify, [redacted] might be apprehended and played back, as [redacted] was. 1.3(a)(4)

4. Mr. Helms said that one of his main concerns was [redacted] personal bias and the possible danger of his "overreading" things he picked up through hearsay. 1.3(a)(4)

5. In conclusion, it was agreed that we would advise Mr. Wisner that we did not go quite as far as the British in accepting [redacted] at face value but had every confidence in him. 1.3(a)(4)

6. Later in the day, Mr. Helms, Angleton, and I went to the Director's office to discuss the [redacted] matter. While we were waiting, we again reviewed the assessment we had made of [redacted] and I showed Mr. Angleton, for the first time, the "source comment" on our dissemination and asked him, in view of his suspicion of deception, how he thought this might serve Soviet purposes. After reading the source comment, he confessed that he could see no way in which it would be to the Soviet interest to give us this line. However, Angleton then took off on the notion that [redacted] was an anarchist or a crank and for some obscure reason was trying to get us in war with the Russians. I frankly do not know what Angleton was talking about 1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

in this regard and doubt very much that he did.

7. Mr. Angleton left before the Director arrived back from the White House, but Mr. Helms and I reviewed with the Director the British assessment and Wisner's request to brief Ambassador Bruce. The Director agreed that our assessment should be a bit more cautious than the British assessment and authorized us to instruct Wisner to brief Bruce.

JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

JMM/r

[redacted]

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[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

(70)

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[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

25 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Conversations with Mr. Helms by CSR, SR/COP and ACSR/9

1. At noon on 25 July [redacted] were discussed with Mr. Helms. In the ensuing conversation it was pointed out that [redacted] could not be considered for the proposed action task because of his unreliable performance to date and the fact that his judgment and actions appear to be seriously affected by a fear complex. Accordingly it was recommended that [redacted] be utilized for the proposed action task because of his past training, motivation, awareness of surveillance and sound judgment. It was further pointed out that contrary to Mr. Harry S Houston's assumption that [redacted] was under heavy surveillance because he occupied a blown slot, that in fact [redacted] has been reporting very spotty surveillance on only rare occasions. The use of the Doctor for the proposed action task was given secondary preference to the use of [redacted] because the Doctor experiences more surveillance activity, would require extensive training and briefing, might be out of the city on official travel requirements at a crucial moment, and, if utilized, the proposal would require coordination with the Department of Air Force and the Senior Air Attache at the Post.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

2. Against this background Mr. Helms directed Mr. Maury to see the appropriate Department of State personnel and show them [redacted] and present reasons for our preference for utilizing [redacted] services.

1.3(a)(4)

3. In connection with [redacted] Mr. Helms voiced his considerable displeasure over the fact that [redacted] had been over-sold to him and that henceforth no Agency personnel could be assigned to the Post until a very thorough psychological assessment of them had been made and personally reviewed by Mr. Helms. SR/COP pointed out that just such a program was currently in effect and ACSR/9 commented that wives were to participate in the same assessment program wherever so far possible. CSR asked how far Mr. Helms thought the Agency could go in

1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

this regard. Mr. Helms replied, "We could not force a wife to undergo psychological assessment." He would certainly want to know of any compelling reasons why this could not be done and would evaluate the entire assignment situation should this situation occur. He re-emphasized that every officer regardless of grade or position was to be required to pass a psychological assessment as one of the prerequisites of a Moscow assignment.

4. Mr. Helms directed that [redacted] be recalled from Moscow at the earliest practicable time and stated that he should be separated from the Agency. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

ACSR/9

Addendum:

Mr. Helms' recommendation concerning [redacted] was subsequently discussed with SR/COP who stated that he had already discussed the matter with CSR and that he agreed that termination of [redacted] was indeed too harsh but that he did not feel the matter could be profitably discussed with Mr. Helms during the meeting and that appropriate recommendations and action would be taken subsequently to retain [redacted]. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

(71)

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 3 August 1961 FN 41+42 Enc. 10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Developments re [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Set forth chronologically below are several developments re [redacted] some of which will require follow-up action on the part of addressees: 1.3(a)(4)

1. Yesterday (2 August 1961) I authorized ACSI to disseminate certain [redacted] material to EUCOM and USAREUR. I had previously consulted Timm, and we had agreed that we could not dodge this. Today I informed Helms, and he approved. 1.3(a)(4)

2. I talked to [redacted] about the pros and cons of cutting Bohlen in more deeply in the [redacted] case -- in view of the obvious advantage of getting his cooperation in the matter of internal support after [redacted] returns to Moscow. We agreed that if [redacted] comes out again, there might be some advantage in having Bohlen actually meet him, since [redacted] would be flattered by such attention. However, if [redacted] is ever picked up, his having met Bohlen would certainly be an embarrassment to the Department. I later mentioned this possibility to Helms, and he said let's defer consideration of it for the present. 1.3(a)(4)

3. Yesterday afternoon Mr. Helms and I showed Bohlen the [redacted] material of the Vienna meetings. Bohlen reacted enthusiastically, saying it was "terribly exciting" and "the real thing beyond any shadow of a doubt." Bohlen went on to say that the significance of the material lay in: 1.3(a)(4)

a. The extent to which Khrushchev had disseminated it abroad, especially among underdeveloped nations, and

b. The extent to which this dissemination constituted a commitment by Khrushchev from which it would be hard for him to back down.

4. Immediately after reading the material, Bohlen said the Secretary should be informed and went to the Secretary's office to do so. At

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31 MAR 1992

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] * [redacted]

Helms' instructions, I hurried to intercept the Director before the Secretary was informed. However, I missed connections since the Director was at that moment in the White House. As a result, the Director went to a meeting with the Secretary at four o'clock still unbriefed on the Vienna material, and at the meeting the Secretary mentioned the material to him.

5. Later when the Director met and talked to me, he was incensed and threatened to fire Bissell, Helms, and me. I explained how the situation had come about, assuring him that the Secretary had not gotten a piece of paper, but had only been told briefly of the existence of the material by Bohlen. I also explained to him our fervent efforts to get him before Bohlen got to the Secretary. The Director was entirely pacified and asked for a write-up of the material which he could show the President this morning.

6. When we talked to Bohlen, we obtained from him the very closely held American version of the Vienna talks to aid our translation. I assured him it would be used by only one officer and would be returned promptly.

7. Bohlen also informed Roger Hilsman of the existence of the Vienna material. This morning the Director briefed the President and showed him the Vienna material.

8. The Director later told me that the President was most enthusiastic and would like to be informed, after the transcript is completed, of the extent to which it varies from the American version.

9. This morning I delivered to Bohlen a translation of the decree calling for circulation of the Vienna material among the Communist Parties and the underdeveloped nations. He was pleased, and he said he would also like to have a copy of the Russian text, which we provided him this afternoon. In delivering it, [redacted] strongly emphasized the security aspects of this material. 1.3(a)(4)

10. I also talked to Bohlen today about the British aspect, explaining that the British had the Russian transcripts and were awaiting word from us as to how to handle them. Bohlen said that since the President, Secretary, and top Agency and Department officials have

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

now seen the material, he thought we could tell the British that for obvious reasons it was being very closely held in Washington, and we would appreciate their treating it with maximum safeguards on a most limited possible basis. I have asked [redacted] to include this instruction in a cable to London tomorrow. 1.3(a)(4)

11. The Director told me this afternoon he had given one copy of the material on an "eyes only" basis to Sheldon and would show the Director's own copy to Kent. The Director asked what we should do about getting the material to the Defense Department. I suggested that he consult Helms on this and later informed Helms of the foregoing.

12. [redacted] who has been in charge of pulling together for Bissell problems we have had with State Department ambassadors, and has been talking to Roger Hilsman in this connection, tells me that Hilsman has thrown at him [redacted] Thompson's recent agreement for the use of Abidjan. Hilsman argues that this proved that the State Department is always ready to cooperate if we have a legitimate need. I informed Helms of the resulting security implications of this discussion, but he and I agreed that there was nothing we could do about it at this stage. 1.3(a)(4)

13. I received from Oldfield and turned over to [redacted] interesting material from [redacted] about GRU use of a specially equipped automobile. [redacted] will examine this material and recommend the best way of getting it to the Bureau. 1.3(a)(4)

JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

JMM/r

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165

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

49

1.3(a)(4)

25 AUG 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "Rear Area Support of Missile Troops in Front Offensive Operations", by Col. Gen. of Artillery G. F. Odintsov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Rear Area Support of Missile Troops in Front Offensive Operations" by Col. Gen. of Artillery G. F. Odintsov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] Rear Area Support of Missile Troops in Front Offensive Operations", by Col. Gen. of Artillery G. F. Odintsov

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Rear Area Support of Missile Troops in Front Offensive Operations", written by Col. Gen. of Artillery Georgiy F. Odintsov, Chief of the Military Engineering-Artillery Academy i/n Dzerzhinskiy.

The article appeared in the 1961 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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REAR AREA SUPPORT OF MISSILE TROOPS IN FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

by Colonel General of Artillery

G. Odintsov

As is known, timely and thorough rear area supply of missile troops is the most important condition for achieving success in an operation. But the recently adopted system for supplying missiles and missile fuel to troops does not yet completely fit the nature of modern operations. It requires further improvement. From this point of view the article by Lieutenant General M. Novikov is of great and practical interest, and the questions upon which it touched required the most serious attention.

It is difficult, however, to agree with the author's assertion that under present-day conditions the principal organizer of the supply of troops with missiles and .....

[one-half page missing]

The experience of having service of artillery armament subordinate to the deputy commander of troops for the rear area did not prove itself during World War II when the conditions and volume of rear area work were considerably simpler. And it is doubtful that such subordination will be acceptable under present-day conditions. The resubordination (perepodchineniye) of the *service of missile and artillery armament not only increases the volume of work of the rear area chief, but also requires the rear area staff to spend considerable time coordinating both the very important and the routine problems with the directorate or department of missile and artillery armament, the HQ of missile troops and artillery, and also with the departments of the PVO troops of the front (army). It is difficult at this time to state whether it is expedient to have the service of missile and artillery

* sluzhba raketnogo i artilleriyskogo vooruzheniya

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armament subordinate to the chief of missile troops and artillery, even though such subordination was completely justified in the years of World War II. At that time all of the field and antiaircraft artillery was under the commander of artillery. He organized the combat activity of all artillery, and only he was able to direct the work of the service of artillery armament.

At the present time only units (chast) and large units (soyedineniye) of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, as well as units and large units of field artillery, are subordinate to the chief of missile troops and artillery. Antiaircraft weapons (antiaircraft artillery, troop and army missiles of the class "surface-air") have gone over to the control of the chief of PVO troops of the front (army). The dual control of the combat activity of missile troops and artillery leaves its mark on the conditions of work of the service of missile and artillery armament. It is compelled to execute the instructions and requirements of two chiefs: the chief of missile troops and artillery and the chief of PVO troops. Besides this, the further equipping of combined arms large units and operational groupings (obedineniye) with tanks increased significantly the need for tank ammunition, the expenditure of which is planned and determined to some extent by the staff of the front (army). Consequently, the service of missile armament also has to coordinate its activities with the staff of the front (army). In essence, therefore, three senior officers have an influence on the work of the service of missile and artillery armament in the resolution of basic problems. This is obviously an abnormal situation. In order to eliminate it, it is advisable to transfer the subordination of the service of missile and artillery armament directly to the commander of troops of a front (army).

To some extent this proposal evolves from the real interrelationship of the chief of service with the staff and the commander of troops of a front, since he very frequently is the chief advisor to the command on questions of supplying troops with nuclear weapons and missiles of all types. Also, this proposed resubordination of service brings it nearer to those elements of control where the basic questions of the combat employment of missile troops and other arms of service are decided.

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Let us examine some of the author's personal proposals.

The complex utilization of rail, road, and air transport in the operational rear area undoubtedly is necessary, but the possibilities of using them for missile troops are extremely limited. As can be seen in Diagram 1, missiles, component parts, (komplektuyushcheye imushchestvo) and nose sections (golovnaya chast) are delivered from the zone of interior (tyl strany) to the rear area missile bases of the front principally by rail and air. The principal organizer of the loading and dispatch of this freight is the Chief Artillery Directorate and the 12th Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. The responsibilities of the front rear area are limited to dispatching these transports, upon arrival, to the various front rear area missile bases or their sections (otdeleniye). It is unlikely that missiles will be transported within the front area by rail under the existing system of supply because of the extremely limited number of rear area missile installations (uchrezhdeniye) capable of handling missile components and because of the comparatively slow pace of reconstruction of rail lines behind the advancing troops. Besides this, transportation within the front area is also limited, to a certain extent, by the lack of an adequate number of temperature-controlled (izotermicheskiy) railroad cars, specially equipped railroad cars, and gondola cars (poluvagon) at the front.

In the operational rear area the basic method of supplying troops most of the missiles which have undergone preliminary technical preparation is by special cross-country carriers (gruntovaya telezhka) and not just automotive transport. It is practically impossible to use them for other purposes, just as it is not possible in practice to use truck motor pools for transporting missiles. That is why the author's proposal of giving the chief of the rear area the responsibility of transporting missiles to the troops by complex utilization of the transport in the front rear area is impractical; for it does not reflect true capabilities and is not supported from the materiel viewpoint. The only other means that the chief of the rear area will be able to use for transporting missiles is helicopters. But up to the present time they are still considered as resources of the commander of troops of a front and of an army.

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We come to the same conclusions when we analyze the conditions for transporting special fuel and for fueling missiles. It is known that the fueling of missiles is carried out in preliminary preparation areas by forces of the front rear area missile bases. At these preliminary preparation areas the fueling facilities are used both for the transporting of missile fuel and for the fueling of missiles. These same fueling facilities are incorporated in the plan of service of missile and artillery armament for transporting missile fuel elements from the depots of the front. Therefore the principal of function of the service of supply of fuel must be the [one word missing] development of depots and ....

[One-half page missing..]

.... armament, and no other should be responsible for the organization of the delivery of missiles.

The correct deployment and timely movement of rear area missile units of the front and army depend not only on the prepared network of railroad lines and military roads, but also on the groupings of missile troops and on their combat operations. The timely movement of troops is determined by the front troop commander with the active participation of the chief of missile troops and artillery, as well as by the chief of PVO troops. It is evident that these chiefs will not be inactive regarding the deployment and movement of the missile bases of the front rear area. Their thoughts on this subject will be more sound than the proposals of the chief of the rear area. We do not deny the need for a close working relationship among all the above-mentioned senior officers, but we do not see the need to levy this responsibility on the chief of the rear area. The last word concerning this matter will obviously belong to the commander of the troops of a front (army). There is even less need to include the rear area apparatus in the planning of supplying the troops with missiles, when the matters being decided relate not only to the work of rear area missile installations but also to the feasibility of using the transport equipment of units for delivery of missiles. The latter depends, basically, on the missions of the missile units. In other words, the feasibility of using troop transport for delivery of missiles depends on the times of their launching. It appears to us that it is in the interests of this matter to have constant contact between the chief of the rear area

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and the chief of missile and artillery armament. Regarding coordination, the directorate of missile and artillery armament is required to coordinate with the rear area staff and with the fuel supply service: the areas where front rear area missile bases and missile fuel depots are to be set up; the distribution of the missile fuel received to its destinations; and, the time required to establish *OSG depots and the road network at the front. Under the circumstances the chief of the rear area, although not responsible for supplying the troops with missiles, must give all possible assistance to the service of missile and artillery armament.

We fully share Lt. Gen. M. Novikov's opinion that the new system of supplying troops with missiles has a number of serious shortcomings. In our opinion, to these shortcomings should be added: the narrow specialization of the rear area missile bases of the front and their inadequate ability to withstand enemy action; the difficulty in organizing nose section crews (otdeleniye); the comparatively great distances over which ready (gotovaya) missiles have to be transported; and the difficulty of relocating bases.

According to the data from the troop exercise "Don" the new system provides that each front have one front technical missile base and one front technical ZUR base (Diagram 1). The front technical missile base, which is intended for the preparation of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, includes one transport battalion (parkovyy divizion), one technical, and several mobile technical repair bases. The front technical ZUR base is intended for the preparation of antiaircraft missiles and may be composed of one or two transport battalions and three or four technical battalions. From the front missile bases it is possible to detach two nose section crews comprising a very small personnel force (from the ~~FRTB~~ -- one mobile technical repair base and a transport and technical battery; from the FTB ZUR -- a technical battalion and several transport batteries (batareya).) Because of this, even during a period of preparation for an operation, all missile troops operating in a zone of 150-200 km are obliged to depend on each nose section crew of the rear area base: during the operation all missile troops of a front must depend on each nose section crew of the rear area base. The distances that ready missiles must be transported during different periods of an

* OSG - possibly otdeleniye spetsialnogo goryuchego - special fuel section

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operation may be 150-200 km, or more. The transporting of ready missiles over such great distances adversely affects their reliability. While retaining the concept of centralized preparation of missiles, it is more advantageous to have two bases with a broad profile but capable of preparing all types of missiles (see Diagram 2), instead of two specialized bases. In this way the distances of transport are reduced by two times and the stability of work at the bases is increased. By organizing the rear area missile bases in this manner, if one directorate of the base is put out of commission it will not affect the work of all sections. In order to reduce the distances that ready missiles are transported and in order to increase the maneuverability of the bases, it is advisable that each base, instead of having specialized sub-units (podrazdeleniye), have small complex rear area installations designed to receive, to relocate, to carry out the preliminary preparation of missiles, and to bring the nose section components (golovnaya chast) to the final stage of readiness. We propose that each rear area missile base have at least two installations for the preparation of operational-tactical missiles and the nose sections of tactical missiles, and also two or three installations for the preparation of army antiaircraft missiles. In our opinion, the proposed organizational structure of the rear area missile bases removes, to a certain extent, the shortcomings of existing bases and insures a wide dispersal of missile resources at all levels of supply. Besides this, it sharply reduces transportation distances, increases maneuverability, simplifies the organization of redeployment, and also increases the stability of the entire system of supplying troops with missiles.

In our opinion, an offensive operation can be started when the missile resources of the front reach 70 - 80 percent of its requirements. The remaining missiles can be on their way to the rear area of the front. Also, it is definitely more advantageous that the troops have in their possession a considerable portion of the missile resources. However, Lt. Gen. M. Novikov's proposal that at least 50 percent of the missiles required for an operation be delivered to the troops before initiating an operation is apparently not altogether correct. This proposal is applicable to a certain extent for tactical and operational-tactical missiles, when the transport capabilities of troop units are fully commensurate with the existing rates of expenditure. Antiaircraft missiles,

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especially those of the army, are expended in much larger quantities than missiles of the surface-to-surface class. Therefore it is doubtful that it will be possible to supply the antiaircraft missile units with 50 percent of the missiles required for the operation in advance of the operation, because the transport facilities of the units are not calculated to handle so great a volume of freight. We think that it would be best to create supplies in the units adequate for two days' needs. Such supplies will become the norms for the mobile reserves of the missile units. The amount calculated for one launching installation (puskovaya ustanovka) may be:

-- Tactical and operational-tactical -- three missiles;

-- Troop antiaircraft (voyskovaya zenitnaya) -- six missiles;

-- Troop army (voyskovaya armeyskaya) -- eight missiles.

Lt. Gen. M. Novikov proposes that small mobile sub-units for storing and transporting missiles be added to the rear of motorized rifle and tank divisions. But why burden the rear of a division if the division will get not more than four to six tactical missiles for the entire operation. The rate of use will be somewhat higher in an antiaircraft missile battalion, but through the joint efforts of the missile and army transport battalions if will be possible to supplement the supply successfully. The addition of a small missile delivery and storage sub-unit to the division rear at once necessitates the addition of at least one lifting crane for trans-loading missiles, and teams to make adjustments (reglamentnaya rabota) on the missile and nuclear nose section. It is clear that this will not increase the maneuverability of the division rear.


Having stated our proposals, we would like to note that the questions mentioned in the article by Lt. Gen. M. Novikov need further serious study, consideration, and testing in troop field exercises.

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Diagram 1*

Support of Troops of a Front with Missiles According to Data of Exercise "Don"

1. Iz tyla strany -- From the zone of interior
2. Parkovyy divizion -- Transport battalion
3. FRTB -- Frontovaya raketnaya tekhnicheskaya baza -- Front missile technical base
4. Tekhnicheskiy divizion iz 4 PRTB* -- Technical battalion of 4 mobile repair -- technical batteries (podvizhnaya remontnaya tekhnicheskaya batareya)
5. FSRT* -- Frontovoy sklad raketnogo topliva -- Front storage area for missile fuel
6. Tekhnicheskiye diviziony -- Technical battalions
7. FTB ZUR -- Frontovaya tekhnicheskaya baza Zenitnykh upravlyayemykh raket -- Front technical base for surface-to-air missiles
8. Puskovyye diviziony -- Launching battalions
9. Otdeleniye FRTB -- Section of the FRTB
10. Otdeleniye FSRT - Section of the FSRT
11. Otdeleniye FTB ZUR -- Section of the FTB ZUR
12. frbr* -- frontovaya brigada -- Front brigade
13. Armeyskiy parkovyy divizion -- Army transport battalion
14. fzenrap* -- frontovoy zenitnyy raketnyy i artilleriyskiy polk -- Front antiaircraft missile and artillery regiment
15. arbr* -- armeyskaya brigada -- Army brigade

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16. msd -- motostrelkovaya diviziya -- Motorized rifle division

17. td -- tankovaya diviziya -- Tank division

18. Armiya -- army

* Abbreviations which are marked above with an asterisk were not expanded in the text of the article.


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Diagram 2*

Suggested Variation for Deployment and Movement of Rear Area Missile Units of a Front and Army in an Offensive Operation

Conventional Signs

1. FSR -- Frontovoy sklad raket -- Front missile warehouse
2. APD -- Armeyskiy parkovyy divizion -- Army transport battalion
3. Golovnoye otdeleniye APD -- Nose cone section of the APD
4. NR -- Sborochn. tsentr nazemnykh raket -- Assembly center for surface-to-surface missiles
5. ZR -- Sborochn. tsentr zenitnykh raket -- Assembly center for surface-to-air missiles
6. 1st FTRB -- Frontovaya tylovaya raketnaya baza -- Front rear area missile base
7. 2nd FTRB
8. PBF* -- Peremeshchennaya baza fronta [illegible] -- Transloading base of the front
9. S/S* -- Stantsiya snabzheniya -- Railhead
10. AK* -- Armeyskiy korpus -- Army corps
11. AK rezerv -- AK reserve
12. pd (rez.)* -- pekhotnaya diviziya (rezerv) -- Infantry division, reserve
13. brtd* -- bronetankovaya diviziya -- Armored division

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14. Blizhayshaya zadacha -- Immediate mission

15. Dalneyshaya zadacha -- Followup mission

* Abbreviations which are followed by an asterisk were not expanded in the text of the article.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

30 AUG 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front"
by Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front" by Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] "Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front", by Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front", written by Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front

by

Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov

It is known that at the present time our potential enemies consider missiles as the basic means of delivering nuclear charges to targets. In recent years appropriations in the USA for work in the field of missile technology have increased by fivefold. The success of operations conducted by our front operational groupings (obedineniye) will depend to a significant degree on the number of available means for combating enemy nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including ballistic missiles.

Combat against ballistic missiles is conducted on the ground and in the air. This article will not take up combat against missiles on the ground. The purpose of this article is to examine the characteristics of ballistic missiles as air targets and to indicate methods of creating appropriate armament and military equipment, and to present a number of principles of organization of anti-missile defense in front operations. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that initially anti-missile weapons will supplement the existing PVO system of the front; subsequently, depending on the extent to which the potential enemy increases his use of ballistic missiles in operations, it will become necessary to create a system of anti-missile defense which is supplemented by the weapons for combat against piloted aircraft.

As is known, the term ballistic missile is given to a flying object which is controlled only in the initial sector of the trajectory (up to 10 percent of D), which has the appearance of a ballistic curve. Ballistic missiles possess supersonic speeds, various ranges, high trajectories, and different weights of warheads (boyevaya chast). This permits them to be used in strikes against objectives at tactical, operational, and strategic depths. Missiles can carry nuclear charges of different magnitudes (in TNT equivalents of from several thousand to several million tons).

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It should be assumed that operational - tactical designation ballistic missiles can be used against troops and objectives in the front zone. The use of strategic-designation missiles in the front zone can be expected when objectives of a strategic nature are deployed at operational depth or when the conditions of the situation compel the enemy to carry out strikes with these missiles against front targets.

Combat against ballistic missiles can be carried out in the areas of their launch, in the flight trajectory, and also in the sector of their stabilization on entering the dense layers of the atmosphere. Success in combatting ballistic missiles will depend on the tactical-technical data of the anti-missile defense weapons, the system of anti-missile defense created, and the quality of the automated system of control of the anti-missile weapons.

It is known that the employment of means of air attack by the enemy, including ballistic missiles, will be influenced by: the stage of the war, the importance of the theater of combat operations, the enemy capability to use missiles, and the nature of the operations being conducted by the front in a given theater of combat operations.

We shall try to examine, by a concrete example, the quantity and types of missiles the enemy can be expected to use in a front offensive operation in the Western TVD /teatr voyennykh deystviy - theater of combat/.

Let us assume that opposing the front is a group of armies comprising two field armies and a tactical air army. Each field army is reinforced with one group of the URS /upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad - guided missile/ "Redstone", two to three battalions (divizion) of the URS "Corporal", and six to nine battalions of "Honest John". In the interest of defensive operations for the group of armies one squadron (eskadrilya) of "Thor" missiles carries out one launching by all its installations (ustanovka). Let us also assume that the missile weapons of neighboring field armies are not called upon in the strike against the troops and objectives in the front which we are studying. In this situation the following quantity of ballistic missiles can be employed by the enemy in the front offensive zone (Table 1).

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Table 1

Type of Missile	Number of Sub-Units	Number of Launch Sites per Battery, per Battalion	Number of Missiles in One Launching	Time Required for Reload
Redstone	4 batteries	1	4	5-8 hours
Corporal	4 battalions	2	8	4-6 hours
Honest John	12 battalions reinforced	4	48	0.5-1 hour
	8 mixed battalions from divisions of the first echelon	2	16	up to 3-4 hours
Thor	1 squadron	15	15	8-10 hours
	TOTAL		91 missiles	

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As can be seen from the table, 91 missiles can be fired simultaneously, of which up to 76 are operational-tactical and up to 15 missiles are of strategic designation. The second firing of ballistic missiles is possible after 3-8 hours, taking into consideration the need to prepare the next firing, to define the targets better, and to change the launching sites (startovaya pozitsiya) for the operational-tactical missiles.

In the event of missile firing at irregular intervals (deliberate firing), which can take place in an operation conducted in a subsequent stage of the war, the number of missiles in a front zone that can be fired in a 24-hour period is only 30-45, of which 25-40 will be directed against objectives in the tactical depth.

Considering the limited number of ballistic missiles at the disposal of a group of armies, it is possible to assume that the strikes of the operational-tactical missiles will be directed against the main formations of front troops, assembly bases for nuclear and missile weapons, and missile large unit and unit positions, control centers, airfields where the frontal air support is based, main railroad junctions, and crossings; the strikes of strategic designation missiles will be directed against the most important rear-area objectives of the front. Strikes by ballistic missiles will be made in conjunction with sorties of piloted aircraft, the launching of balloons, and strikes by winged missiles.

In a defensive operation, the front can repel an attack of a group of armies made up of three field armies and a tactical air army, reinforced with a large quantity of missiles for use in offensive actions. In the zone of defense of a front, as an alternate, the enemy may employ the following number of ballistic missiles (Table 2).

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Table 2

Type of Missile	Number of Sub-Units	Number of Launch Sites per Battery (Battalion)	Number of Missiles in One Launching	Time Required for Reload
Redstone	4 batteries	1	4	5-8 hours
Corporal	6 battalions	2	12	4-6 hours
Honest John	18 battalions reinforced	4	72	from 0.5-one hour
	12 mixed battalions from divisions of the first echelon	2	24	up to 3-4 hours
	Total		112 Missiles	

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We can see that in a defensive operation a front can expect a greater number of missiles to be launched simultaneously by the enemy than in an offensive operation. The use of nuclear warheads (yadernyye boyepripasy) in all missiles makes it possible to knock out 112 objectives in the defense zone of the front in one launching, 96 of these being within the limits of the tactical zone. Such a strike, naturally, can sharply reduce the defensive stability of the troops, especially in the tactical depth.

In the case of deliberate missile firing, 35 to 55 missiles can be expected in a 24-hour period, of which 30 to 50 will be directed against the most important objectives in the tactical depth of the defense.

The means for anti-missile warfare must be capable of destroying both ballistic missiles with a relatively short range (up to 30 km) and ballistic missiles with a range of from 160 - 300 up to 3,000 km. It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the short-range missiles will comprise up to 70 percent of all the missiles the enemy will use in the frontal zone.

It is known that the existing PVO means of a front do not have the tactical-technical characteristics to cope with the ballistic missiles of the potential enemies. A radical change is needed in these weapons, especially in the surface-to-air (zenitnaya) guided missiles.

Combat against ballistic missiles in the air requires: an increase in the distance and altitude at which the missile can be detected and tracked by radar; the creation of a guidance system for anti-missiles (sistema navedeniya antiraket), combined with a system of long-range reconnaissance of enemy ballistic missiles and with a system for automatically computing the required data, to insure the interception of enemy ballistic missiles at specified distances and altitudes; the creation of anti-missiles which possess appropriate tactical-technical characteristics; the development of new radiotechnical sets (stantsiya) to jam the guidance and the homing systems (apparatura samonavedeniya) of the ballistic missiles of the enemy.

The combat employment of all these means will be more effective upon the creation of an automated guidance system

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(avtomatizirovannaya sistema upravleniya) which is based on electronic computing machines (elektronno-vychislitelnaya mashina) and which insures the continuous automatic evaluation of the air situation and the working out of the problem of committing appropriate forces and means of anti-missile combat.

Thus, we view anti-missile combat as a complex system of measures which includes the reconnaissance and assured tracking of ballistic missiles in the air; the automatic computation of the necessary data which will insure the interception of ballistic missiles in the air at specified parameters of the objectives (areas) being covered; the launching of anti-missiles in order to destroy the enemy missiles in the air; radio countermeasures (radioprotivodeystviye) assuring the generation of jamming of the missile guidance system and their homing devices.

In order to effect the timely detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, radar reconnaissance must insure a detection range of not less than 250-500 km in combat with missiles of operational-tactical designation and 2,000 - 2,500 km in combat with missiles of strategic designation.

From the point of view of anti-missile combat, the detection range for missiles should exceed, or at least be equal to, the missile range. However, it is known that any radar station acts only in the limits of direct line of sight. The maximum range of intercept of a radar station located near an objective (group of objectives) being defended, with optimum trajectories, for ballistic missiles with a range of 3,200 km is 2,000 km, and for missiles with a range of 1,600 km it is 1,400 km.

Increasing the height of the antenna does not result in an increase in the detection range. In order to attain an increase in the detection range, it is necessary to move the radar stations away from the objectives (groups of objectives) being defended toward the directions from which strikes by strategic missiles are expected to come. In addition, in order to insure the timely detection of ballistic missiles it is advisable to exploit the new principle of radar-- coherent integration (kogerentnoye integrirovaniye) (random summation) (vyborochnoye summirovaniye), which consists of amplifying the strength of the useful signal (poleznyy signal)

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against the background of fluctuating (local) noises. A radar station, working on this principle, can quickly and correctly determine the distance, speed, and angular coordinates of a moving target within the limits of the line of sight.

According to our calculations, in order to insure the effective use of appropriate weapons (anti-missile), the minimum distance of the boundary of detection of ballistic missiles of operational-tactical designation, with the exception of missiles of the type of Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water, must be within the limits of 370-620 km, and for missiles of strategic designation, within the limits of 1,420-- 2,100 km.

Taking into consideration the range of ballistic missiles of the Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water types, as well as the distance of their launching positions from the main line of resistance, it can be assumed that existing radar stations for reconnaissance and target indication will detect these missiles in good time after they are launched. This pertains to missiles having a height of flight trajectory of not less than 4,000--5,000 m. It is imperative that the data obtained be processed automatically and transmitted to the anti-missile weapons in no later than 10-15 sec. for missiles of the Honest John type, and one to two min. for missiles of the Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water type.

The necessity for receiving data on the flight of ballistic missiles of operational-tactical designation (such as Pershing and Redstone) with ranges of 370-620 km and on missiles of strategic designation with ranges of 1,420--2,100 km requires that radar stations for reconnaissance have a detection range of up to 500 and 1,000 to 1,500 km, and an altitude capability up to 200 to 800 km. In connection with this, the system of anti-missile combat must have two types of radar stations for reconnaissance in order to assure the system's effectiveness in combating both the operational-tactical and the strategic missiles of the potential enemies.

From the radar stations for reconnaissance of operational-tactical missiles there should be formed: detection centers (uzel obnaruzheniya) consisting of four to six stations with ranges up to 500 km and altitude capabilities up to 300 km; and interception centers (uzel perekhvata) consisting of three to four stations

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with operational ranges up to 200 km and altitude capabilities up to 150 km. The number of centers will depend on the number of important objectives (groups of objectives) to be defended. The missile detection centers should be connected with the interception centers in a manner which will insure the automatic computation of data necessary for interception and the synchronous transmission of these data to the anti-missile launching sub-units (podrazdeleniye)

The detection and tracking of ballistic missiles of strategic designation should be carried out by special long-range detection centers, having radar stations with an operational range of up to 1,500 km, an altitude capability up to 800 km, and synchronous connections with missile interception centers which have stations with an operational range of up to 300 km and an altitude capability of up to 200 km.

It must be noted that early warning (dalneye obnaruzheniye) of enemy ballistic missiles can be carried out not only during the trajectory of their flight by radar stations with a great range, but also by picking up and amplifying the radio signals which are emitted by the powerful missile engines at the time of their firing. However, this method should only be supplementary (dubliruyushchiy) in the anti-missile combat system organized in a front.

For the detection and interception of strategic missiles the Americans are developing two interconnected systems-- a system of early warning (raneye obnaruzheniye) and a system of interception. The mission of the early warning system is the detection and identification of enemy ballistic missiles, the determination of the approximate trajectory data, and the transmittal of these data to the anti-missile combat means. The mission of the intercept system is the interception and destruction of enemy ballistic missiles at a safe distance from the objectives being defended.

Under simultaneous development are several systems for the interception and destruction of ballistic missiles (Nike-Zeus, Plato, and Wizard). The main system is Nike-Zeus. This system has three types of radar stations: scanning, determination of trajectory, and tracking; the system also includes computers, a tactical control center of the defense area, communication lines, and launching installations (startovaya ustanovka) with Nike-Zeus anti-missiles. The operational procedure of the system is as

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follows: after receiving the signal from the early warning center, the scanning radar station goes into action first; having a detection range of 1,600 km, it continuously scans (swings) in the direction of the expected attack within a 30° sector. After the target is detected, the station which determines the trajectory goes into operation; this station picks up the target at a distance up to 960 km and tracks it until it obtains precise trajectory data. Each anti-missile battery (batareya) has two radar tracking stations with an operating range up to 320 km; these stations go into operation upon a command from the radar station which determines trajectory. Both stations continuously feed target and anti-missile location data into a computer which, by means of radio commands, guides the anti-missile to the target. During the final phase (uchastok) of the anti-missile flight, the homing system goes into operation and insures the interception of the target.

In order to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in the air, both during the trajectory and as it begins to zero in on the target, anti-missiles are needed which have the tactical-technical characteristics for the reliable interception and destruction of enemy missiles at specified distances in relation to the objectives (troops) being defended. The system of anti-missile launching devices must assure the necessary acceleration before the sustainer engines (marshevyy dvigatel) are ignited, the timely ignition of the sustainer engines, and the accurate guidance and homing of the anti-missiles on the ballistic missiles of the enemy.

It is imperative to have such anti-missiles as would assure the destruction of enemy ballistic missiles regardless of their range, altitude, or speed of flight.

It seems to us that in order to destroy ballistic missiles of the Honest John type it is advisable to employ the troop surface-to-air (zenitnaya) missiles which have been developed. The effectiveness of such missiles has been shown by their range tests (poligonnoye ispytaniye) abroad, particularly in the USA. The deployment of an automated system of interception and its synchronization with the launching system of the troop surface-to-air missiles will provide the combat system needed against missiles of the Honest John type.

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For the destruction of operational-tactical missiles of the Corporal and Pershing type, it is necessary to have an anti-missile with a range of 100-150 km, a speed of not less than 1,000 m/sec, and an altitude capability of 50--100 km. It is advisable that a launching sub-unit for such anti-missiles have 8-10 launching mounts, a duration of firing cycle (tsikl strelby) of three to five minutes, and a preparation time for a repeat firing of not more than 10-15 min. The systems of reconnaissance, of interception, and of the launching of the anti-missiles should be interconnected by means of an automated system based on electronic computers.

To combat enemy ballistic missiles of strategic designation, it is necessary to have anti-missiles with a range on the order of 200-300 km, an altitude capability of not less than 100-200 km, and a speed of 3,000--5,000 m/sec and more. It is desirable that a launching sub-unit of such anti-missiles have not less than 8-10 launching mounts, a duration of firing cycle of not more than 5 min., and a preparation time for a repeat firing of 20-30 minutes. In order to increase the mobility of anti-missile launching installations, it is desirable to install them on railroad mounts, barges, ships, and prime movers with a high degree of roadability.

For anti-missile warheads it is desirable to have both a fragmentation-high explosive type to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in a vacuum (while in free flight trajectory), as well as a type capable of carrying a nuclear charge in order to insure the destruction of missiles during their flight through the dense layers or at the time of entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere (during the phase of stabilization).

Combat against enemy ballistic missiles can be made more effective by creating radio-jamming directed against the missile guidance systems in the initial phase of the trajectory and against the homing device during the final phase of the trajectory. Radio-jamming of the guidance systems of ballistic missiles in the initial phase should prevent the missile from entering its specified trajectory; the radio-jamming of the homing device should deflect the missile from its specified target, but with sufficient deflection to insure the safety of the objective being defended from the explosion of a high-yield nuclear charge. Radio-jamming can be created by special radio-technical jamming sets operating in the same frequency ranges as the guidance and homing systems of ballistic missiles.

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Objectives may also be protected from strikes by enemy ballistic missiles by concealing them with radar camouflage (protivo-radiolokatsionnaya maskirovka).

Under present-day conditions, a front, as a rule, will carry out operations in a theater of combat operations in coordination with operational groupings (obedineniye) of other branches of the armed forces. We have already pointed out above that in the front zone of operations we must be ready to combat ballistic missiles of operational-tactical and strategic designation, which will be used by the enemy against objectives in the front zone and against objectives in the deep interior of the country. Within the boundaries of the TVD (teatr voyennykh deystviy - theater of military operations) there should be a single system for the destruction of missiles in the air by the troops in that theater. It appears that the anti-missile defense system in a TVD will consist of the PRO (protivoraketnaya oborona - anti-missile defense) systems of the front and of operational groupings of other branches of the armed forces (the navy, long-range aviation - DA) which are deployed within the boundaries of a given TVD. The anti-missile defense of the zone of interior (tyl strany) will most likely operate in coordination with this system of anti-missile defense.

The anti-missile defense of a front can represent the first echelon of anti-missile defense organized in a given TVD, which, in turn, will be the first echelon of anti-missile defense of the country as a whole.

The task of the front anti-missile defense is to prevent strikes by enemy ballistic missiles against the troops and rear area objectives. As we have indicated above, the front anti-missile defense must include an operational system of special forces and means, intended specifically for combatting enemy ballistic missiles in the air.

Anti-missile defense must be continuous, active, and capable of repelling strikes by enemy ballistic missiles under all circumstances and at any season of the year or time of day.

Anti-missile defense in front operations can be set up according to the principle of defending the most important objectives. This is explained by the fact that at the present time the relatively small amount of ballistic missiles in the enemy's possession limit his use of them to particular objectives (formations of troops). In

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addition, the process of working out the necessary data for anti-missile launchings is relatively simpler when it is related to separate sub-units defending specific objectives. Hence it is possible to set up suitable equipment without a considerable expenditure of materiel.

At the same time, the anti-missile systems being formed on the basis of range for the defense of individual objectives will permit, as we see it, the defense of groups of important objectives (individual zones) in the front zone of action, if the distances between the targets do not exceed the operational range of the anti-missiles, i.e., anti-missile defense can be formed according to a zonal principle.

A front anti-missile defense is organized in close coordination with the anti-missile defense of adjacent fronts (fleets) and of the zone of interior. In organizing a front anti-missile defense, consideration should be given to the character of the operation being carried out by the front; and it should be in conformance with the concept of the operation and with the operational deployment of the troops.

Anti-missile defense can reach its goal when its forces and resources are combined with the measures for the direct protection of troop formations and objectives in the rear area of the front from strikes by ballistic missiles.

In the interests of PRO, all types of reconnaissance should be used to carry out continuous reconnaissance against enemy military industrial plants, supply depots, missile bases, and site locations for missile weapons. This reconnaissance should be organized in the theater of combat operations as well as in the front, both during the planning and the execution of the operation.

During the execution of an operation, the front radar centers for the detection and tracking of enemy ballistic missiles can be located outside the tactical zone, at a distance of not less than 60-80 km from the main line of resistance. Frequently the location of these radar centers may be designated by directives of the High Command (Verkhovnoye glavnokomandovaniye) for the purpose of using the data of these centers for the anti-missile defense of adjacent fronts and the zone of interior in a given theater of combat operations, and, in coastal areas, for the anti-missile defense of the fleet.

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The radar posts for control and assurance of intercept by anti-missiles are synchronously connected with the anti-missile launching system and should be located in the areas of the launching sites of the latter.

To protect the more important objectives in the front zone, it will be necessary to detach several anti-missile launching sub-units. The number of these sub-units will be determined by the importance of the objective, its nature and size, and the possible density and duration of the enemy missile strikes.

In defending an objective the anti-missile sub-units can be deployed in a sector (whence the missile attack is expected) in such a manner that their zones of fire will overlap in order to insure the concentration of fire of several anti-missile sub-units in repelling strikes of greater density. The distances between the anti-missile launching sub-units must not exceed the optimum distance needed for the firing of, let us say, three or four anti-missiles on the border of the zones of fire of adjacent sub-units (assuming that the enemy ballistic missile will be destroyed by this number of anti-missiles).

It is advisable to deploy the detached anti-missile sub-units around an objective at a distance which insures the effective interception of ballistic missiles and the control of the anti-missile sub-units by the control points of the anti-missile defense. It cannot be excluded that the anti-missile launching sub-units can be deployed at a distance of 50 - 100 km and more from the objective being defended, which may be determined by the distance of the approach of the missile to the objective, by the dimensions of the internal borders of the zone of fire of the anti-missile sub-unit, and the feasible distance from the control point of anti-missile defense (depending on the range of radiosynchronous transmission).

If several important objectives within the limits of a theater of combat operations are in close proximity to each other, a zonal defense can be created for their protection.

It would be advisable to deploy those anti-missile launching sub-units detached for zonal defense purposes in a sector from which the enemy ballistic missile strike is most likely to come; and they should be deployed in several rows (two or three) in such

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a manner that the zones of fire of these sub-units will overlap. The dense overlapping of the zones of fire of these anti-missile sub-units creates conditions for repelling a concentrated missile attack from the most likely direction, and it allows for the destruction of enemy missiles in the dead zones of adjacent anti-missile sub-units.

The total number of anti-missile launching sub-units needed by a front will depend, on the one hand, on the number of ballistic missiles which the enemy is able to use against objectives within the front zone and, on the other hand, on the probability of destruction of each missile by the weapons of the PRO. We must also take into consideration the maximum number of missiles the enemy can fire in a simultaneous launching. There should be a sufficient number of anti-missile launching sub-units in a front to insure the certain destruction of all ballistic missiles launched simultaneously by the enemy against front objectives or those flying over the front zone in the direction of the zone of interior.

If we calculate that four or five anti-missiles are needed to destroy one ballistic missile (according to American data 8-10 anti-missiles are needed to destroy one ballistic missile), then a front, according to our previously stated examples (see Tables 1 and 2), may have to launch the following in a 24-hour period:

-- in an offensive operation, up to (4-5) X (15-27) = 60-135 anti-missiles (combat against ballistic missiles of the Honest John type will be conducted principally by carrying out strikes against enemy site locations and assembly bases; in the air it will be conducted by surface-to-air missile units of the PVO system).

-- in defensive operations, up to (4-5) X 16 = 64-80 anti-missiles.

The indicated number of anti-missiles used in rapid fire by anti-missile sub-units, 15-20 launchings in a 24-hour period, can be launched by four to seven launching sub-units in an offensive operation and by four or five in a defensive operation. This number of anti-missile launching sub-units thereby makes up the necessary strength of a front.

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In view of the fact that a front system of anti-missile defense will be coordinated with the anti-missile defense systems of adjacent fronts and of the zone of interior, the number of anti-missile launching sub-units in a front can be decreased accordingly.

In the event that the missile strikes against objectives in the front zone are carried out in greater density, it will be necessary to increase the number of anti-missile sub-units.

The system of anti-missile defense in front operations initially can consist of several formations of the means of anti-missile combat:

-- formations of the means of combat against missiles of operational-tactical designation with a range of 50 to 100 km and speeds up to 1,000 m/sec; in our opinion, this formation can consist of PVO surface-to-air missile units which have new missile systems capable of destroying the above-mentioned missiles of the enemy;

-- formations of means of combat against missiles of operational-tactical designation with a range of 100 to 1,000 km and speeds of 3,000 m/sec and above;

-- formations of means of combat against missiles of strategic designation.

The development and refinement of missile and electronic technology will, evidently, increase the possibilities for the creation of a universal defense system which will insure effective combat against missiles of the most varied designations. Furthermore, this system will actually encompass combat against all enemy means of air attack, including piloted aircraft.

The successful combat against ballistic missiles in a front requires the organization of close communication between the means of reconnaissance and tracking of enemy missiles and the systems of anti-missile launching. The best way to achieve this close communication is to combine them into a single troop entity.

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In our opinion, it would be desirable for a front to have an anti-missile brigade or regiment comprising several sub-units (three or four) for the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, several anti-missile sub-units (five or seven), and several sub-units for radio-countermeasures [radioprotivodeystviye] (four -- five); all of these sub-units would be interconnected during combat by an automated system based on electronic computers. This brigade or regiment should be subordinate to the commander of front air defense troops.

As we have already indicated above, as the number of anti-missile units of a front increases, the existing PVO system will gradually grow into a system of PRO, headed by the chief of PRO troops.

Inasmuch as it is too difficult for a front to organize reconnaissance of the guidance systems of ballistic missiles of strategic designation during the initial phase of their trajectory, it would be advantageous, during front operations, to set up jamming principally directed against the homing devices of enemy missiles, in order to prevent them from homing in on their programmed objectives. It is advisable to locate the jamming sub-units in the directions of the probable flight of enemy ballistic missiles, on the approaches to the more important targets of the front zone, at distances which would assure reliable detection and the subsequent neutralization of the homing devices of the ballistic missiles.

The anti-missile defense system in front operations can be effective only if there is developed an expedient control system for the means which participate in combating enemy ballistic missiles. We believe that the control of the means of anti-missile defense can be centralized on the scale of a theater of combat operations for the destruction of missiles of strategic designation, on the scale of a front for the destruction of missiles of operational-tactical designation with ranges up to 1,000 km, and on the scale of an army for the destruction of missiles with ranges up to 50--100 km.

Thus, in order to insure success in combatting enemy ballistic missiles, it is necessary:

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-- to work out the following technical means of combat in a short period of time: radar stations for the early warning and tracking of ballistic missiles in the air; radar stations for controlling the anti-missiles; a system of automated control of all the means of anti-missile combat; various types of anti-missiles and stations for jamming the guidance systems and homing devices of ballistic missiles.

-- to supplement the present PVO system with means of combating enemy ballistic missiles and subordinating these means to the chief of front PVO troops; subsequently, to work out a unified system of combating the air enemy, which would include combating ballistic and cruise missiles (krylataya) and piloted aircraft on the scale of a front and which would operate in coordination with similar systems in adjacent fronts and in the zone of interior; considering that the principal means of air attack in the future will be missiles of various designations, such a system of combat can be called an anti-missile defense system;

-- to control the means of anti-missile combat from a control point of front PVO whenever these means are supplementing a front PVO system; upon the creation of an anti-missile defense system, it will be possible to control the means of this system from special control points organized in a front and, sometimes, in a theater of combat operations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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5 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT (75) "The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them Out", by Admiral V. Platonov
1961 Second Edition

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them Out" by Admiral V. Platonov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : "The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them Out", by Admiral V. Platonov

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Missions of the Navy and Methods of Carrying Them Out", written by Admiral Vasiliy I. Platonov.

The article appeared in the 1961 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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The Missions of the Navy and The Methods of Carrying Them Out

by

Admiral V. Platonov

New weapons quite naturally compel a review of the paths of development of the types of armed forces and the methods of using these types of armed forces in a war. At present, obsolete combat equipment and armament is being vigorously forced out by new types of weapons and military technology. Tube artillery on the sea, bomber aviation, and large surface vessels have irrevocably lost their former significance. However, all this does not provide any basis for reducing the missions of our Navy merely to the destruction of vessels carrying missile-nuclear weapns (raketno-yadernoye oruzhiye) at sea, as proposed by Colonel General Gastilovich in his article (Spetsialnyy sbornik statey zhurnala "Voyennaya Mysl", First Edition, 1960).

If we proceed from the fact that a modern war will not be a blitzkrieg, but will be lengthy in nature, we unavoidably come to the conclusion that there will be a wider scale of combat operations by naval forces. It is necessary to assume that the known forms of combat at sea will undergo changes, and that new methods of naval operational art and tactics will be introduced, while accomplishing both the old and the completely new missions of the Navy.

The destruction of aircraft carrier attack large units (avianosnoye udarnoye soyedineniye) is one of the most important missions of the Navy. Since aircraft carriers are for the present still the main delivery vehicles of enemy missile-nuclear weapons at sea, naturally they must be sunk first. Unfortunately, the means and methods of accomplishing such a highly difficult mission are often oversimplified. It is reckoned that, having decided to put our bases out of operation or destroy our industrial centers, an enemy aircraft carrier attack large unit would sail out into the open sea, approach Soviet shores to the distance of the radius of its aviation, and launch its planes,

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which would deliver the attack. Meanwhile, our submarines, deployed in advance in the area of operation of the aircraft carriers, and aided by reconnaissance and attack aviation, would sally forth to the attack and, using massed actions, would sink the enemy vessels. The training exercise carried out by the Pacific Fleet in October 1959 was conceived and oversimplified just this artlessly and sketchily.

It should be assumed that even the most untrained fleet will not act in such a primitive and imprudent manner. Where it is permitted by the conditions of the theater, the enemy will use, in the first instance, aviation from his coastal airfields and land missile units for attacks on objectives of our seacoast. In the areas where aircraft carrier attack large units will operate, they will use for their concealment and protection suitable anchorages of bays and straits, equipped with naval bases. Such possibilities actually exist in all of our sea theaters. Furthermore, if the situation forces the enemy to sally forth into the open sea to deliver an attack, the aircraft carrier attack large unit will see to it that a thorough search is carried out and the area of its maneuvering is cleared of enemy submarines.

Consequently, an encounter and battle of our forces at sea with a freely maneuvering aircraft carrier attack large unit in sight of our seacoast must be considered unlikely, and the mastering of such a simple mission must be considered as not achieving training goals.

The matter is even more complicated in remote areas of the ocean, on the lines of communication of the enemy. There, aircraft carrier attack large units can act solely as protective forces for convoys or as antisubmarine (PLO) hunter-killer groups (poiskovo-udarnaya gruppa). They will persistently hunt our submarines and attack them first. The strikes of the submarines will have the character of counterattacks and will follow only after warding off the active operations by the forces and weapons of the enemy PLO, after breaking through or bypassing the immediate protection of the aircraft carriers. This means that no matter what formations and combat order the submarines adopt, all of them will be intermingled at the moment of delivering the strike on the main objective.

Thus, combat against aircraft carrier attack large units at sea is only part, albeit the most difficult part, of the mission of destroying the ocean communications lines of the enemy.

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Thus, the operational-strategic command-staff training exercise conducted by several of our fleets in the Atlantic in August 1960, in which submarines operated similarly against a freely maneuvering aircraft carrier attack large unit, can be justified, if only as a first endeavor at breaking out into the ocean.

The complexity of preparing and carrying out operations designed to destroy aircraft carrier attack large units urgently requires the correct selection of the main forces for accomplishing this mission. An over-all appraisal of the various qualities of all of the combat means of the Navy shows that only submarines, employed in coordination with aviation, can serve as such forces. And just when it seemed that this course of action had become potently clear to everyone, Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov comes out in print with (Spetsialnyy sbornik statey zhurnala "Voyennaya Mysl", Third Edition, 1960), the unfounded assertion that the main force in combating aircraft carrier attack large units is aviation.

Without burrowing into the details to prove the unsoundness of this strange conclusion, we point out only that means of combat are usually chosen not on the basis of their monetary cost, as Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov does, but on the basis of their degree of reliability in accomplishing a mission assigned to the armed forces. It is self-evident that aviation supplied with missile weapons is a powerful means of carrying out combat operations at sea. However, it should be taken into account that before it can carry out combat missions it must fly to the Atlantic Ocean for a look at the enemy. While aviation is considerably more maneuverable than submarines, it is inferior to submarines in radius of operation, in concealment of deployment and approach to the enemy, in endurance or duration of staying in position, in capability for repeated attacks, in viability, in potential for self-defense and evasion of enemy attacks, and in ability to operate irrespective of weather conditons and the time of day. On the basis of exactly these qualities of firmly insuring reliable fulfillment of the basic missions of combat at sea, submarines are indeed in the category of the main forces of the Navy. Naval long-range aviation is the combat assistant to submarine forces. It protects their operations at sea and coordinates with them in strikes.

Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov predicts a great future for atomic aviation in operations at sea. One should not give oneself up to illusions. Even though it may be too soon to argue about what the atomic engine will do for the airplane, it is still possible to say

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now with certainty that such a plane will be shot down by the weapons of antiaircraft defense (PVO) just like all its piston-engine and jet predecessors. As for new speeds and unlimited radius of operation, it seems that these factors have been exhausted by pre-atomic piloted aviation and will be limited in the future not so much by technical improvements in aircraft engines as by the endurance of the human organism.

Speaking of the future of aircraft carrier attack large units, it should be noted that, in general, they have had their day. This is so as a consequence of the fact that the aircraft carrier has become too easy a target for missile weapons. Its loss creates a large gap in the combat formations of the navy. The aviation carried by an aircraft carrier is easily shot down by surface-to-air (zenitnaya) guided missiles, and is no longer capable of discovering submarines at sea so long as they do not appear on the surface. Aircraft carrier attack aviation is more and more being replaced by missiles, and hunter aircraft by antisubmarine vessels. Aircraft carriers are clearly being supplanted by missile-carrying submarines, PLO submarines, and corvettes having good means of search, antiaircraft missiles, depth charges, and antisubmarine missiles (protivolodochnaya raketa).

Combat against missile-carrying submarines. The unwieldy structure of combat formations of aircraft carrier attack forces, the great vulnerability of aircraft carriers, the impossibility of concealing their movement, and the unreliability of aerial attacks against coastal objectives, is forcing the navies of the NATO countries to shift the task of operations against the coasts from aircraft carriers to missile-carrying submarines.

The advantages of missile-carrying submarines over surface aircraft carriers is so obvious and overwhelming, and the rate of construction of submarines by our potential enemies so serious, that the danger of missile attacks from under the sea is becoming quite real. The threat of missile-carrying submarines is marked by the peculiarity that it concerns not only our naval bases, ports, and seacoast, but also industrial centers deep inside the country. Therefore, combat against enemy submarines and their missiles goes beyond the bounds of the missions and capabilities of the Navy and must be carried out by both the forces of the fleets and troops of the PVO of the Country.

Many people assume that with the start of a war it will be sufficient to deliver a strike by intercontinental (mezhkontinentalnaya) missiles upon the submarine bases and shipyards of the aggressor in

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order to put an end to his Polaris carriers. However, our enemies are assuredly considering such a possibility. They are making preparations to move their submarines out from under a nuclear strike, deploy them at sea beforehand, and then to repair and supply them at temporary basing points concealed in unequipped bays or located on surface or submarine tenders, and at mobile rear area stations mounted on automotive vehicles. Missile-carrying submarines are capable not only of delivering the first nuclear strike, but also of continuing the war until they are all destroyed.

A careful analysis of our existing methods of combating missile-carrying submarines shows that their means is not notable for its originality. In one case these methods proceed from the assumption that enemy missile carriers (raketonosets) will come into our closed seas and that then the tactics of destroying them will in no way differ from the long-known methods of combating the old submarines operating near the seacoast. Some comrades think that missile-carrying submarines will approach our coasts from the spacious open sea to a point within range of their Polaris missiles and open fire upon the continent. In this case, combating them will differ from the usual methods of protecting our communications lines only in the degree of remoteness of the operations from bases. Sometimes the combating of missile-carrying submarines is related to the missions of the PLO of a protected area of a base, the methods of which have not changed from the time of World War II (Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna).

Strictly speaking, we do not yet have finalized methods for combating missile-carrying submarines. Even the main forces for accomplishing this mission have not been defined. Rear Admiral V. Bogolepov, for example, in analyzing historical experience, tries to prove that, not only in the past, but also in the forseeable future, the main force for combating submarines is aviation.

Combat against submarines really has its own history. In World War I, submarines possessed insignificant endurance, causing them to operate mainly near the seacoast and on the approaches to ports and bases, where the sea supply routes meet. At that time aviation had just been born; therefore, the only means of combating the submarine threat was the surface vessel. The enemy was detected with the naked eye and sunk by ramming, with artillery shells, and with depth charges. During World War II, in spite of a sharp increase in their endurance, submarines continued to travel on the surface, to surface for charging batteries, and to carry out attacks at periscope depth. In essence

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the submarine remained a semi-surface vessel as previously and was observed visually. This circumstance facilitated the hunting of submarines by aviation, which, possessing a large apparent horizon and high maneuverability, soon became the main PLO force, the grave-digger of submarines.

The modern atomic submarine is another matter. In general, it can stay below the surface of the water for the entire duration of an operation. Hidden in the ice of the Arctic, in the fiords of Norway, or among the islands of the Aegean Sea, atomic submarines will deliver missile fire on our territory. Possessing underwater speeds which are not inferior to the speeds of the fastest surface vessels, they are capable of escaping from the attacks by PLO weapons at great depths and of evading pursuit. Under these conditions one asks what results can be expected of hunter-killer antisubmarine groups composed of aviation and surface vessels? None. And helicopters, with their insignificant radii of operations and their inability to fly over the sea in poor visibility, at night, and in bad weather, will also be completely useless here.

Antisubmarine submarines armed with the most improved sonar (gidrolokatsionnaya) and hydroacoustic (gidroakusticheskaya) equipment can be the only real forces for combating missile-carrying submarines. Underwater sonar search, underwater patrolling, and underwater patrols and ambushes must become their tactical methods. Active combating of missile-carrying submarines and all maneuvering connected with hunting and destroying them must now be carried on deeply underwater instead of on the surface. There is no other way.

Unfortunately, our military press has not yet devoted much attention to working out methods of combating missile-carrying submarines. In those few articles in which these problems are treated, PLO submarines are assigned the limited mission of detecting the enemy in narrows and at the exits from his bases.

Combat against ocean shipping. Without touching upon the well-known questions of the importance and significance to the European countries and to the United States of ocean lines of communications, we will only point out that this shipping will not cease even after all the naval bases and commercial ports of the warring nations have been destroyed by missile-nuclear weapons strikes. The landing of the Allies in Normandy in June 1944 has already shown in what short periods of time it is possible to create immense temporary port

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installations from sunken ships. The new capabilities of industry and construction technology now make it possible in the course of one night to install towed and self-propelled pontoon wharves on an unequipped shore, to build artificial harbors, and to carry out roadstead loading of tankers and dry cargo vessels. Consequently, the destruction of ports can cause only a temporary delay of shipping and nothing more. The main burden of the operations for the destruction of shipping, particularly the destruction of convoys, must be transferred to the open ocean.

The content of the combat preparedness of the navies of the countries of the aggressive military blocs shows that in the waging of combat by our forces against ocean lines of communications, the first question that should be examined is that of the main strike and the primary objective of the attacks. If, previously, the main strike against convoys was directed against cargo transports and large surface vessels, such a course of action is now unacceptable. The combat formations of aircraft carrier strike forces have come to be formed in such a manner that it is impossible for either our submarines or aviation to approach the transports without a fight. Not many forces will succeed in circumventing the dense PLO screens and the circular lines of protection. Therefore, it becomes necessary to choose the aircraft carriers as the main objective in combat against enemy shipping. Transports must become the objective of attacks during the successful development of the operation for the destruction of convoys. Naturally, the new missile-nuclear weapons should be used in the main strike and old weapons can be used to exploit the success of the strike.

One cannot assume that the existing system of convoys will remain unchanged. As soon as this system ceases to satisfy the requirements of security and reliability for shipping, it will be replaced by a new system. What form the protection of transports on the ocean may take will depend on many factors, but to some extent World War II has already provided a new structure of convoys. In the Northern Theater, German transports with little advance protection moved along the Norwegian coast, covering one side by staying close to the shore and protecting the other side with an antisubmarine mine barrier. It must be said that such an unexpected measure introduced great difficulties into the operations of our submariners. It should be assumed that the complexity of combating atomic submarines with maneuverable forces will lead to the wide use against them of fixed means of combat facilities (pozitsionnoye sredstvo borby) and of jamming of their observation and control /facilities/.

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One may often hear arguments that the movements of personnel and urgently needed cargoes will be effected by aircraft, naval vessels, and even submarines. All this has had its place in the past, and possibly may have its place in the future, but such shipments can only be incidental in nature. They will neither replace nor eliminate the need for large-scale use of maritime cargo transports.

An important and still unresolved problem in combat operations on the lines of communication is the question of the attacking submarines' obtaining accurate data on the movements of the target. The gap between the means of target indication, paralyzed to a virtual standstill, and the technology of submarine construction, which has moved far forward, existed even earlier and is constantly increasing. The submarine long ago became capable of firing from underwater, but in order to obtain firing data it must come to the surface as before or must approach submerged to within risky distances of the enemy. Such use of new large atomic submarines is intolerable. Without waiting for the time when accurate data on the location of the enemy may be obtained by means of artificial earth satellites, our scientific research establishments must take steps at once to eliminate this lag which was permitted to develop, and achieve an increase in the distance of underwater observation (nablyudeniye) and in the accuracy of underwater direction finding (pelengovaniye).

In delivering strikes against enemy convoys, submarines can use missiles and torpedoes. In attacks against aircraft carriers, one must obviously give preference to guided missiles, since they are superior to torpedoes in both range and speed. Even though a missile salvo from an underwater launching reveals the missile-carrying submarine, whereas a bearing cannot be taken on the path of a torpedo, it is necessary none the less to disregard that advantage of the old, slow-moving weapon.

There is no need to expend missiles against transports, since one or two ordinary torpedoes are sufficient to sink a merchant vessel.

An analysis of the conditions of modern naval combat shows that it will apparently be difficult to find a use for torpedoes with atomic warheads, including even long-range torpedoes.

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As can be seen, the existing missiles and torpedoes have shortcomings in their use against vessels by submarines. Therefore, it is necessary to make greater efforts in perfecting a submarine missile (podvodnaya raketa), from which there is every reason to expect hopeful results.

Combined operations. The predominately continental character of our country has always determined the relatively unimportant place which combined operations of the Navy with other types of armed forces have previously occupied in the wars of the Soviet Union. At the present time, the situation in this respect is changing.

We shall dwell briefly on the problems of repelling and of debarking strategic landing forces and on the participation of submarines in delivering strikes against enemy coastal objectives.

The debarking of large landing forces for the purpose of opening a new combat front or of transferring combat operations to other continents has been practiced sufficiently often in past wars. As a rule, debarking operations have succeeded, since the initiative in the selection of the time, place, and forces belonged to the attackers. However, the success of the operations of the landing forces on shore depended on the quality of preparedness of the forces, the weapons of the anti-landing defense (protivodesantnaya oborona), and the ability of the defending side to bring reserves to the area of the initial attack and to mobilize internal resources. The latter have always existed in a country well prepared for war. Thus, the well-known, successfully initiated Dardanelles landing operation of the British and French in 1915 was not exploited on shore, and the brilliantly executed debarking at Normandy in 1944 nearly ended in catastrophe when the Germans broke through the front of the Allies with their tank armies in the Ardennes in December 1944, and that happened when fascist Germany was barely able to stand on its feet, only a few months before its downfall! Considering the above, one must regard the debarking of significant forces by our potential enemies on the territory of the Soviet Union as unlikely at the present time.

The possibility and necessity of the debarking of strategic landing forces by our Navy evolves from the liberating mission which the Soviet armed forces are called upon to serve. It is naive to expect that the third world war will be limited to the European continent, that the liberation of Europe alone will lead to the downfall of the entire imperialist camp and that it will only be

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necessary to drop some hydrogen bombs on it with no need to land troops on the shores of island or transoceanic countries. On the basis of the experience of World War II, it is known that it is only possible to deal the final blow to an aggressor in his own den. Inasmuch as aggression in a modern war is likely to be from beyond the sea or ocean, it is only possible to reach its nest for the final blow by means of a naval landing operation. It is natural to assume that such a landing must be composed of several armies, that thousands of ships and naval vessels will be needed for its landing, supply, and reinforcement, and that it will be necessary to precede the operation itself by successful operations to achieve air and sea superiority. But it is certainly necessary to prepare for such an operation, the more so because recently we have completely, and without reason, lost interst in the debarking of landing forces.

Colonel General A. Gastilovich writes in his article that it is now scarcely feasible to conceive of a large naval landing force, since it is possible to destroy it with missile-nuclear weapons while they are still at their bases and at sea. Of course, if we expose our forces to the enemy, he will destroy not only the landing force but everything else as well. To prevent this from happening, the forces carry out measures of protection, defense, and forestalling the enemy in his operations. As in all other naval operations, modern methods of debarking landing forces take into consideration the possible employment of missile-nuclear weapons by the enemy.

Not very long ago our submarines, armed with ballistic (ballisticheskaya) missiles, participated in strikes by missile troops of strategic designation against deep enemy objectives. Now, with the appearance in our armament of intercontinental ballistic missiles which can reach any point on earth, missile submarines have been freed from these missions. It seems to us that such a step is premature.

It is known that our potential enemies are working on the interception of ballistic missiles. At the beginning of last year, the interception of an Honest John missile by a Hawk missile was demonstrated in the United States; now they are placing some reliance on the Nike-Zeus and Bloodhound missiles. One must believe that sooner or later everyone will learn to intercept ballistic missiles. Then, missiles launched from submarines will have advantages over intercontinental missiles because of their shorter range and lower trajectory. It will be more difficult to intercept submarine missiles,

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and their floating launching position (plavayushchiy start) provides more favorable conditions than do fixed land launching installations (ustanovka).

The control of naval forces is now going through a crisis. This was particularly noticeable during the above-mentioned exercise in the Atlantic. The forces of two fleets participated in the exercise. The commanders took turns commanding them, not unlike the consuls of the early period of the Roman Republic. As the fleets move from north to south, the Commander of the Northern Fleet commands them as far as the 50th parallel. At this boundary he transfers the forces to his Baltic colleague, and then observes what is done with his vessels by the other commander. When the fleets move in the opposite direction, the change of commanders is repeated. Is it necessary to prove that this compulsory method is a half measure and that this is no way to command fleets? If, engaged in battle on the boundary of 50° North and, under the impact of a new situation, the forces changed the plans of operation of the large units as mentioned earlier, what confusion would ensue. Various vessels of the same large unit would report on their operations to various addresses and receive contradictory decisions from two staffs. Under these conditions it is also not quite clear which of the two commanders should bear the responsibility for the outcome of the entire operation.

The transfer of forces during the course of an operation, and at a great distance from shore at that, is intolerable. Zonal command is a remnant, a vestige of habit, left over from the territorial nature of the missions of the fleets in the recent past. Here is an attempt to combine new missions and new methods of combat operations, brought to life by new weapons, with the old forms of organization of the control organs of the forces. Earlier, when the missions of our fleets were tied to a limited territory and did not go outside the bounds of their naval theater, commanders of fleets were able to cope with the control of both the active operations at sea and the operations for the defense of bases and the seacoast. They also directed all of the types of combat and materiel-technical support. Now, when vessels of the fleet go out into the ocean, abandoning their bases for a long time, the commander is unable to control both without detriment, even if he is an absolute genius. The commander inevitable faces a gloomy prospect; he must either tear himself away from his theater and bury himself in the control of forces in the ocean far beyond the bounds of his theater, or transfer his ocean operations to a neighbor and command the defense of the theater himself.

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The only possible way out of the complicated situation which has been created is through scrapping old forms of organization. In fact, such a scrapping has already been noted in places.

Each fleet assigned to operate in an ocean must have two independent commanders, subordinate to a center. One of these would be strictly the commander of the fleet, composed of submarines and long-range aviation. The other would be the commander of the naval district (morskoy voyennyy okrug), composed of all remaining forces. He would be responsible for the defense of the theater and all types of support of the operations of the ocean fleet.

Of course, the commander of the fleet must be a submariner, and his submarine command must bear the character of a field staff, capable of commanding forces at sea from a command post (KP) located wherever it is advisable according to the situation. In number of personnel, this staff would be half the size of the present staff of the submarine forces.

The proposed reform would not only remove our commanders of fleets from their dual positions but it would also increase the role of the commanders of submarine forces, who in point of fact only formally bear such a title at the present time, while in reality they play a passive role in the carrying out of operations and are removed from the command of their operational groupings (operativnoye obedineniye) at sea. In an alert, the commander of submarine forces usually abandons his command post and the forces subordinate to him and transfers to the fleet command post (FKP) of the commander of the fleet. There, he commands nothing. His lot is to be an assistant and help prepare correct decisions for the staff of the fleet.

It would be appropriate to note here that even the Main Naval Staff, on which there is not as yet one submariner admiral, is not free from that ailment.

The separation of the missions of the fleet into two groups, and the strict delineation of the functions of the two independent commanders and their staffs would finally unravel the knot of contradictions in the command of the forces, and introduce clarity into its organization. It goes without saying that in this case the need for the maintenance of a command of submarine forces disappears. The fleet commander alone, with his staff, would prepare and carry out operations at sea from start to finish.

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When the unified efforts of several fleets are needed, a unified command should be appointed.

Differing opinions give rise to several methods of command for submarines in the ocean. Debatable are the questions of the necessity of massing forces, the superiority of group operations over individual operations, the advantages of forcing submarine barriers with large units over the successive overcoming of the barriers without adhering to strict formations, and the delivering of strikes by large units in correct lines or by flexible waves (lava) free from formations.

When submarines did not have nuclear weapons, it was necessary to hit a battleship or aircraft carrier with eight to ten torpedoes to sink it. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to mass or group forces not only for delivering strikes against a large unit but even for destroying one vessel. The new weapons are capable of sinking a vessel of any class and displacement with one shot, and therefore it is no longer necessary to unite the efforts of several submarines to accomplish such a mission. However, this by no means excludes the massing of forces.

In spite of the opinion of Rear Admiral K. Stalbo (Morskoy Sbornik, No. 1, 1961), when delivering a strike, for example, against an aircraft carrier large unit, it is necessary to mass forces in order to attack it from various directions and disperse the attention of the defense forces of large vessels and their immediate protection. Massing is also necessary to insure uninterrupted (during short periods of time) delivery of strikes, from which the enemy will not succeed in rallying, and his damage and confusion from the first strike can be exploited by followup strikes. The firing of missile-nuclear weapons against vessels still must always be aimed.

Obviously, even when massing is necessary, atomic submarines must not be bound by line formations, correct close order, and geometrically measured combat arrays. All that is fine for games on maps. At sea, though, as experience shows, such formations can be maintained with difficulty only until the encounter with the enemy, after which the commander of the group (gruppa) or large unit loses control, and the complete independence of the submarine commanders ensues.

Even with the existence of ideal underwater communications, there is no need for atomic submarines to maintain squadron formations, no need for observance of the feeling of fellowship.

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New underwater speeds of submarines, and the range and accuracy of missile weapons, permit modern submarines to display more independence, initiative, and freedom of maneuver than before. Such ideal conditions, as in the past, such range (poligonnyy) support, as earlier, are not required now for successful attacks by them. The basis of the organization of atomic submarines must be waves (lava) or packs (stay), delivering massed strikes against a detected enemy large unit at an appointed time or a designated place.

The gathering of submarines in groups or large units during the stage of deployment, and outside of a battle or operation in general, does not give them any advantage in self-defense and only increases non-combat losses. Therefore, it cannot be justified.

Paths of development of forces. If mistakes in the determination of the main danger and most important missions of the Navy and miscalculations in the selection of the direction of the main strike and the main forces were not reflected in the determination of the paths of development of the Navy, then theoretical arguments of these matters would not go beyond the framework of academic discussions. However, basic mistakes in the orientation of the construction of vessels have already been permitted once in the Navy; so there is cause for sailors to argue, and they should be particularly thoughtful in approaching the selection of the paths of development of forces.

New technology and new weapons deservedly raise atomic submarines to the level of the main forces. With equal success, these submarines are capable of combating the main enemy nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (nositel) - the aircraft carrier attack large units - and of operating against the ocean communications lines and against objectives on the enemy coast. Therefore, it is understandable that primary attention has now been given to the construction of exactly this type of vessel . Considering that the existing danger from enemy missile-carrying submarines is no less serious than from aircraft carriers, the bearers of nuclear weapons, it seems to us that the same degree of attention should also be given to the construction of PLO submarines. However, that is not how matters stand here. Judging by information in the naval press (Sbornik statey zhurnala "Morskoy Sbornik", Special Issue, 1960, page 4), the construction of this only real means for combating atomic submarines carrying Polaris missiles is placed in the same rank with the construction of PVO vessels, landing vessels, and minesweepers.

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Experience shows that in the construction of forces it is detrimental to be carried away by vessels of narrowly assigned purpose, such as, for example, submarine chasers or PVO vessels. The combining of a number of missions in one vessel noticeably reduces expenditures for construction. Therefore, it is necessary to strive for good designs (proyekt) of a universal submarine capable of accomplishing both attack missions and antisubmarine defense missions, a corvette with equally powerful PVO and PLO weapons.

The benefits that the combining of missions promises may be judged by the appearance in our armament of missiles suitable both for attacks against a coast and for firing against vessels. In the place of two designs of attack submarines, it is now possible to limit oneself to one.

The paths of development of the Navy and the degree of participation of its forces in a modern war will be determined not only by the decisive role of missile troops and the continental nature of the countries of the socialist camp, but also by the geographic position of the aggressor countries. Studying the composition and behavior of the members of the NATO military bloc, it is not hard to see that they are preparing aggression not only in Europe but also outside its borders.

In case of defeat, our enemies will evacuate their troops across the ocean, and, as was already pointed out above, the landing of our armies on other continents from the sea will be indispensable. It would seem that such a circumstance should have given rise long ago to the intensive construction of landing vessels. However, this did not occur, and in point of fact there are now no landing forces in the Navy.

The construction of landing equipment is facilitated by the fact that in peacetime landing vessels can be operated with success by all civil maritime and river departments, which can order the construction of these vessels in the quantities needed for defense. It is sufficient for the fleets to maintain one to two divisions (diviziya) for combat training.

It should be observed that the fleets prematurely denied themselves the services of the naval infantry, whose training for landing was undeservedly cast aside. The naval infantry were always the bearers of the heritage of naval landing operations, the arm of forces which was well trained in the art of those most crucial and dangerous

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first assaults upon the shore. Even now, naval infantry has not yet lost its importance.

The experience of the work of naval organs of shipbuilding and armament shows that their predominately engineering management is weakened by the lack of managerial personnel with an operational backgrtound, knowing the nature of war. In the final analysis, the foundation of shipbuilding and armament lies, not in technology, but in tactics and operational skill. Therefore, to present to industry the correct and rigid requirements called for by modern war, it is necessary to have within the management of the organs of shipbuilding and armament, admirals who have personally experienced war in the past and understand well what is required for a war in the future.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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12 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "Trends in the Development of Tank Forces of the Soviet Army", by General of the Army A. Zhadov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Trends in the Development of Tank Forces of the Soviet Army", by General of the Army A. Zhadov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] "Trends in the Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by Army General A. Zhadov

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Trends in the Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", written by General of the Army Aleksey S. Zhadov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of Ground Troops.

The article appeared in the 1961 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Trends in the Development of the Tank Troops

of the Soviet Army

by

Army General A. Zhadov

Historically, Soviet military theoretical thought has responded actively and sharply to all problems of military science which have arisen with the appearance of new means of armed combat, technical equipment of armies, change in the organizational structure of the troops, and the methods of employing them in battle and operations.

Recently the pages of our journals on military theory and special research works have carried different opinions on the outlook for the further development of armor technology and on the organizational forms of tank groupings (obedineniye) and large units (soyedineniye) in the composition of the ground forces.

In this respect the article by Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov, "Paths for the Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army" (Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Voyennaya Mysl", First Issue, 1961) merits attention. In this article a series of recommendations are made concerning the outlook for Soviet tank construction and the organization of the principal large units of the ground forces which have a definite practical interest.

At the same time it must be confessed that the formulation of several questions and the way in which they are elaborated are not convincing.

Marshal of Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov gives primary attention in his article to the conditions which determine the further development of tanks, the role of armor protection of tanks in connection with the development of antitank weapons, the significance of heavy tanks, and several questions dealing with the organization of tank troops.

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Let us examine these questions in the same order in which they have been formulated and give our point of view, without claiming to furnish a full exposition of the problems connected with the contemporary development of tanks and the organization of tank troops.

At the present time the basic trends in the development of anti-tank technology have been determined above all by the availability of missile-nuclear weapons and by the nature of a future war as a highly maneuverable one with the broad application of the means of mass destruction. Comrade Rotmistrov speaks about this point correctly in his article.

However, it is impossible to agree with his statement that "the tank troops, in close cooperation with missile troops and aviation, will be the deciding power in the ground forces". (p.26)

In our opinion, such a point of view is mistaken.

It is well known that large units of combined arms (tank and motorized rifle divisions), other arms of troops, and aviation will, as a rule, successfully carry out their tasks only if the results of missile-nuclear strikes are ably utilized. Specifically, during battles and engagements these strikes will be the main means of destroying the enemy. There is no need to prove the truth of this statement.

The role of tank troops in achieving the goals of a battle, an operation, and of the war as a whole will be great, but this role should be examined from the point of view of effectively utilizing the results of missile-nuclear strikes, for these in the final analysis constitute the principal force for the destruction of the enemy.

At the beginning of his article Comrade Rotmistrov correctly observes that the tank combines three basic combat characteristics: firepower, armor protection, and mobility. However, in the subsequent account, instead of examining all of these questions from the point of view of the nature of a future war, and determining the further paths for perfecting the combat characteristics of tanks, and above all of their armament, he first and foremost promotes the concept of heavy armor plating of tanks.

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Tank armament. The tank is a combat vehicle and its existence is justified if it possesses powerful armament.

It is well known that during World War II (The Great Patriotic War) the maneuverability of our medium and heavy tanks was significantly superior to the German "Tiger" and "Panther" tanks, but until the middle of 1943 they were inferior in armament. These tanks, which had guns of 75-88 mm., higher muzzle velocity, and greater grazing range, caused great damage to our tanks. However, when our tanks and assault guns (SU) received guns of 85-152 mm. this superiority was practically eliminated.

In the postwar period, with respect to the perfection of tank armament, we have paid more attention to raising the accuracy of fire in motion, armor-piercing capability, and the feasibility of delivering fire at night even under conditions of poor visibility. However, the artillery systems with which our tanks are now armed are not much more powerful than those on our tanks at the end of World War II.

It is true that we have recently developed artillery systems with a muzzle velocity for armor-piercing shells on the order of 1,000 m/sec and greater for rifled guns, and 1,600 m/sec for smoothbore guns. But even these artillery systems, provided for the armament of medium tanks, are only transitional.

An analysis of combat operations and some experience shows that a modern tank should be armed with the most modern (perspektivnoye) missile weapons, which will enable effective destruction at a great distance of any enemy tanks, either moving or stationary. Under contemporary conditions on the field of battle there will also be many other targets, such as self-propelled artillery, protected by armor, armored carriers, armored prime movers, and various targets with light cover which must be annihilated from great distances without expending heavy-caliber artillery shells or missiles in the process. For the destruction of these targets, tanks should have, besides guns or missile systems, other powerful armament, such as heavy-caliber machine guns or small-caliber guns, since the machine guns now on tanks do not enable the destruction of varied and numerous lightly armored and other targets at a distance of 1,500-2,000 m. and more.

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The antiatomic protection of tanks. Together with powerful armament, modern tanks should afford dependable biological protection of the crew from the contaminating elements of nuclear weapons, and mainly from penetrating radiation. Solving this problem only by increasing the thickness of the armor has not proven feasible. The steel armor should guarantee the necessary strength of the hull of the tank against the effects of the blast wave. Dependable biological protection of the crew may be achieved by using a special "lining", which will stop the stream of neutrons, or by building special structures inside the tank into which the crew must be put. The latter require structural changes in the tank, the reduction of the crew to 2-3 men, and the automatization of all processes of the conduct of fire, driving, and communications. The necessary work in this direction is already being carried out.

The armor protection of tanks. In discussing the role of armor protection of tanks, the author strongly attacks those who promote the idea of increasing the maneuverability and transportability of ground forces large units by decreasing the weight and overall dimensions of tracked and other combat vehicles.

Nor do we propose increasing the maneuverability of ground forces large units and units (chast) by sharply weakening the armor protection of tanks and other combat vehicles.

However, in deciding this question there cannot be yet another extreme, which, as a matter of fact, Comrade Rotmistrov advances, defending the necessity of retaining heavy tanks having thick armor.

Ever since tanks became a massive weapon on the field of battle, they inevitably called for the creation of new means of combating them. The competition of armor with projectiles has continued over a period of forty years. In this single combat between armor and antitank fire, as of today the latter has retained the advantage.

Incidentally, this is conceded even in the works of the Academy of Armored Troops which have appeared under the editorship of Marshal of the Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov. Thus, in the Collection of the Works of the Academy No. 177, which appeared last year, it is candidly pointed out that the armor protection of tanks lags behind the development of the means of its destruction, and in connection with the appearance of antitank guided missiles, this lag

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has become even greater.

Defending the concept of powerfully armored tanks, Comrade Rotmistrov casts doubt upon the effectiveness of modern antitank guided missiles (upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad - PTURS). Presenting the tactical-technical data of these missiles, which our potential enemies have, he categorically asserts "that their appearance in the family of weapons of mass destruction and tanks does not for the present afford sufficient basis for concluding that it is inexpedient to provide our basic types of tanks with powerful armor protection". (p. 30.)

It is well known that every weapon has its positive and negative sides. For the present even antitank guided missiles have their negative side. However, in appraising these means of combat, Comrade Rotmistrov emphasizes primarily their deficiencies. But this does not detract from the effectiveness of antitank missiles and the broad prospects for their development. They are becoming more and more universal and can be used not only for all types of ground combat vehicles, including tanks, but even against helicopters. It is inconceivable not to reckon with this possibility.

The development of the PTURS, of course, does not mean that tanks have been repudiated. This merely presents us with the problem of searching out new ways of defending tanks from antitank weapons.

It is well known that the KV heavy tank was developed by us before World War II for breaching fortified areas, defense zones, and also for combat with enemy tanks. But in the course of the war our troops usually bypassed fortified areas. Therefore, heavy tanks were used as a means of close support of infantry in breaching strong position defenses, and especially for combat with enemy tanks. As a result of the large amount of metal consumption, the high cost, and their insufficient maneuverability, a very limited number of these tanks were produced during the war. Instead of heavy tanks for combat with assault guns (shturmovoye orudiye) and tanks of the enemy, we began to produce a large number of assault guns (SAU) on the chassis of medium and heavy tanks.

Therefore, our self-propelled and ordinary artillery, and also our heavy tanks, bore the main brunt of combat with enemy "Tiger" tanks and "Ferdinand" assault guns. By virtue of the great weight

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and slight mobility of these enemy vehicles on the field of battle, and in spite of their heavy armor, they were successfully shot up even by our medium tanks armed with 85 mm. guns.

Under modern conditions the problem of breaching enemy defenses will be solved mainly by atomic weapons. And, in general, the type of defense in place used in the last war will rarely occur.

It may now be asked, is there a need for heavy tanks to solve the problem of breaching defenses? Of course not.

Knowing this, Marshal of Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov tries to analyze heavy tanks as a means of qualitatively strengthening medium tanks, reckoning that the latter are inferior in power and armor protection to the medium tanks of our probable adversaries. For this purpose, the American medium tank M-60, the basic tank of the U. S. Army, is compared with our T-55 tank. But the parameters used in this comparison do not give a correct conception of the combat qualities of these vehicles. Nor is it easy to compare an American tank with our T-10M, insofar as the latter is considered a means of qualitative reinforcement of our T-55 tank.

In the case in point, comparisons are made of parameters such as armor protection, unit of fire, engine horsepower, fuel capacity, caliber of gun, and muzzle velocity. For example, the horsepower of the T-55 engine is 580, while the M-60 has a 750 hp engine. However, taking into consideration the relative weights of the two vehicles, the unit power ratings are identical. The fuel capacity of the American tank is twice as great as ours, but the rated cruising range of both tanks is practically identical. As far as the armor protection of our medium tank is concerned, the armor on the turret is significantly thicker than that of the M-60, while the armor protection of the hulls is almost the same.

Despite the somewhat greater caliber and muzzle velocity of the armor-piercing shell of the American tank, in comparison with the armor-piercing shell of the gun on our medium tank it does not enjoy any particular advantage with respect to effectiveness.

In comparing our T-10M heavy tank with the M-60, we see that the armor protection of their hulls is the same, with the exception of the armor on the turrets, where our tank has much thicker armor. In terms of armament, the muzzle velocity of the armor-piercing shells of both

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tanks is identical, and differ only in their caliber. But the presence in the unit of fire of the American tank of a subcaliber projectile (and possibly a shaped-charge shell too) renders it a sufficiently strong weapon for combating our heavy tank. The cruising range of the M-60 is almost twice that of our tank. Both tanks have power plants of identical unit power rating. Consequently, their mobility on the field of battle in moderately rugged terrain is about equal.

As is evident, it is hardly proper to speak of specific advantages of our T-10M heavy tank over the American medium and heavy tanks.

The necessity for having heavy tanks is also based on the fact that the Americans have at their disposal different systems of artillery of 150-240 mm. on tracked chassis, which is a means of reinforcing their medium tanks. Combat with this artillery is supposed to be waged by heavy tanks with the thickest armor protection, as though our medium tanks were not capable of carrying out this combat over great distances. Such claims have hardly any basis.

It seems to us that in order to achieve superiority over the enemy we do not require the production of heavy tanks, which are three times more expensive than the medium tanks and only slightly superior, but rather a sharp improvement of the combat qualities of our medium tanks, primarily the power of their armament.

As we pointed out above, this problem in tank construction has basically been solved successfully already. We now have a medium tank which is not inferior to, and even surpasses, the modern heavy tank in terms of armament, armor protection, and protection against the contaminating elements of nuclear blasts. Moreover, it has a higher rated cruising range and greater maneuverability. New models of such tanks will be armed with artillery systems with a muzzle velocity for armor-piercing projectiles of 1,015 - 1,600 m/sec, which will be capable of piercing the front armor on the American M-60 tank at a range of more than 1,000 m, and the side armor at a distance of 3,000 m.

These tanks are not only not inferior to, but significantly outclass, all known models of foreign tanks with respect to the parameters of rated cruising range, maneuverability, armor protection, and weight.

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Therefore, there is no reason to fear that the repudiation of heavy tanks may entail the loss of our present qualitative superiority over enemy tanks.

But this certainly does not mean that we should immediately remove our modern heavy tanks from the arsenal and have them melted down. In case war should break out, they can be used successfully for filfilling many combat tasks.

Having called for a scientific approach to the solution of the question of heavy tanks, as we have seen, Comrade Rotmistrov does not propose anything new in the field of tank construction to correspond with the requirements of a possible war, but merely defends the old trend in the development of tanks, leaning solely on the experience of World War II.

Considering exclusively the mobile nature of a future war, the increased role of airborne troops, and the necessity of transferring motorized rifle divisions by air over significant distances for fulfilling combat missions which may arise in the course of an operation, we will require, besides a basic type of medium tank, a light tank with powerful conventional and missile armament.

Our present light tank, the PT-76, has for the present only one quality - it is amphibious. But this tank has such weak armament and large dimensions that it cannot be transported by air. Therefore our efforts should be directed toward designing a light tank which would be powerfully armed and whose weight and dimensions would allow it to be transported by air. At the same time, such a tank should possess tactical mobility which would enable it to cross water barriers afloat, and high speed on the field of battle. Such a tank is highly necessary both for fulfilling reconnaissance tasks and for other types of combat support.

Under modern conditions, a high and reliable degree of destruction of the enemy with missile-nuclear weapons will often permit an attack to be carried out without the infantry having to dismount. This circumstance means that we must have a highly maneuverable armored carrier with a powerful antitank missile weapon and a small-caliber gun or large-caliber machine gun. The design of such an armored carrier should have the necessary antiatomic resistance and should assure biological protection of the personnel inside. Its dimensions should afford the simultaneous transportation of a 10-12 man rifle squad. In connection with this, it is advisable at the

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present time to have a rifle platoon consisting of two squads so that its organizational structure will not be disrupted in movement by armored carriers. It should be emphasized that even in peacetime such a squad would be more spunky and lively.

Marshal of Armored Troops Comrade Rotmistrov very sharply criticizes those comrades who propose new organizational forms of the basic large units of the ground forces. In particular, those comrades who propose the creation of a unified organization of the basic large units of the ground forces are just about viewed as dangerous people who have encroached on such concepts as "tank troops", "tank formations" (gruppirovka), tank armies, and tank divisions. It seems to us that it is incorrect to speak from such positions about people who propose new forms of organization of our troops. Life itself raises problems of perfecting the organization of the troops.

Alluding to the experience of the Second World War, Comrade Rotmistrov declares "that not rifle divisions, reinforced by tanks, decided the success of an operation, as French military theorists thought, but rather tank divisions, tank corps, and tank armies" (p. 34).

It must be stated that Soviet military theorists and practitioners have never propounded the role of tank and combined arms large units during the past war in such a way.

Everyone knows that during the Second World War the success of offensive and defensive operations was decided by precise coordination of rifle large units and groupings, reinforced by artillery and tanks, with tank corps and armies, along with the massive utilization and support of artillery and aviation, and also the constant support of operations by special branches of troops and by the rear area.

Incidentally, neither the Germans nor the Americans, and the French even less so, ever succeeded in achieving such harmonious coordination. On the whole, German reliance on tank troops and aviation proved to be unsound.

Unfortunately Comrade Rotmistrov's discussions of the experience gained in World War II neglect this side of the question. Ascribing an exclusive role to the tank troops, he introduces as an example the meeting engagement at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.

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In his opinion, during this engagement the strikes of the German tank forces were countered only by our tank troops, and specifically by the Fifth Guards Tank Army under the command of Comrade Rotmistrov. The Fifth Guards Army, as he writes, not only did not follow the order of the commander of the Voronezh Front on the joint delivery of a counterthrust, but did not withstand the enemy onslaught, and left the line being held.

It is impossible to agree with such an appraisal of the events. For the delivery of a powerful counterthrust at Prokhorovka, General Headquarters (Stavka) had reinforced the Voronezh Front significantly at the expense of the strategic reserves. In this counterthrust there participated powerful forces of all branches of the troops composing this front, and by their joint efforts (and not merely by the Fifth Guards Tank Army) halted and then threw back to their original position the tank corps of the enemy. We render due credit to the performance of the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which played an important role in delivering the counterthrust. But other armies of the front also played an important role in the execution of this action. To ignore this fact will lead to excessive exaggeration of the role of the tank troops and, in particular, of the Fifth Guards Tank Army.

It is well known that the forces on the Voronezh Front were not able to develop a counterthrust on 12 July because of the extremely complicated situation on the southern face of the Kursk Arc. And in this respect, the task posed to the troop commanders of the front was not fulfilled. Among those who did not fulfill their mission of 12 July was the Fifth Guards Tank Army. Therefore, a one-sided accusation of only the Fifth Guards Army for non-fulfillment of the order sounds clearly unconvincing and unobjective.

As far as the performance of the left flank corps of the Fifth Guards Army is concerned, which Comrade Rotmistrov writes about, it must be stated that on 12 July large units of this corps repelled the blows of superior enemy forces from the line being held. Only towards evening did the enemy succeed, by employing its superiority in tanks, in forcing back one division of the corps a fairly short distance.

In his article Comrade Rotmistrov time and again emphasized the necessity for a scientific approach to the utilization of the experience gained in the last war. At the same time, in disucssing the

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events at Prokhorovka, he definitely digresses from this criterion and attempts to compare incomparable quantitites. It is well known that the Fifth Guards Army in the engagement at Prokhorovka did not have tanks and that this substantially limited their combat capability in a battle with a strong tank formation of the enemy. Quite different was the situation of the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which had (together with the attached tank corps) around 850 tanks and assault guns. In evaluating the role of tank corps and armies in operations during the last war, it is impossible to compare mechanically their combat capability with the combat capabilities of rifle divisions, corps, and combined arms armies. Every comparison which lays claim to being scientific should be based on a deep analysis of these and other large units and groupings of troops.

It is generally necessary to state that it is impossible to take isolated examples from the experience of combat operations of the troops during World War II and on the basis of these to draw conclusions about the organization as of the present and the possibilities of basic large units and groupings of the ground forces.

It is quite clear that the most serious and dangerous error which can be committed in using examples from military history for the development of military theory is to attempt to transfer mechanically the experience of the past to the present. In spite of his great experience in military-theoretical research, it seems to us that Comrade Rotmistrov has committed just such an error.

Modern trends in the development of the ground forces consist of continuously equipping them with new technical means of combat. In this respect the relative preponderance of tanks is growing particularly fast. Under these conditions there can be no question of diminishing the role of the tank troops. We can merely consider their most purposeful organizational development.

At the present time we have two types of divisions - motorized rifle and tank - and these afford the requisite maneuverability and the introduction of vigorous and decisive actions into battles and operations. Tank divisions possess great penetrating power which increases their independence in conducting combat operations. They are more mobile and maneuverable and have very high cross-country ability off roads, better resistance against nuclear weapons, and less cumbersome organization than motorized rifle divisions.

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However, the experience of many exercises shows that the presence of heavy tank regiments in these divisions reduces their operational maneuverability and complicates the supply problem in the course of battle. Therefore, army tank commanders have made what we belive to be correct proposals on replacing these regiments with medium tank regiments. Heavy tanks would then be placed most purposefully in heavy tank divisions or in separate tank regiments.

Our motorized rifle divisions have fewer tanks than tank divisions, but are superior to them in artillery, and particularly in antitank weapons. Therefore a question arises regarding further perfecting of the organizational forms of both divisions in order to achieve a successful combination of the positive qualities in both.

Nor is it possible to agree with Comrade Rotmistrov concerning the advisability of creating a light motorized rifle division. Judging by the type of missions which are assigned it, and also by its technical equipment, such a division would not differ particularly from the present airborne division.

And now several words about our armies. We do not know who has raised the question of abolishing our present tank armies, as Comrade Rotmistrov conjectures. At the same time, an analysis of the combat capabilities of modern armies and the experience derived from large command staff and army exercises show that a combined-arms army with a composition of two tank and three or four motorized rifle divisions with appropriate missile and special weapons (considering that this army operates in the direction of the main efforts of a front) is not inferior in the number of tanks to a tank army composed of four divisions, and in other factors will be significantly stronger.

A tank army has great penetrating power and great mobility and maneuverability, particularly in operations in areas with a limited number of roads. But under modern conditions the development of an attack at a high tempo creates an extremely difficult situation with respect to the deployment and introduction into an engagement of a tank army. Often a tank army cannot break away from a combined arms army, which also has tremendous mobility. Moreover, the enemy, knowing of the presence of a tank army in a front, searches it out, and having detected it will attempt to destroy or weaken the army principally by strikes of missile-nuclear weapons. This is why we should seriously study the organization and means of combat employment of modern armies in operations. Owing to these and other circumstances,

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we should study profoundly the organizational forms of modern armies.

It is incomprehensible why Comrade Rotmistrov places the necessity for the existence of the tank division, when no one doubts this, in direct dependence on the existence of the tank army. These are two different questions and should not be confused.

There is no doubt that in the last war tank armies and tank corps basically played a fundamental role in the development of operations at high tempos. Under modern conditions high tempos of development of operations will depend mainly on the skillful utilization of nuclear weapons and missile troops. In this respect, not only tank, but also combined-arms armies, must develop high rates of advance. In a number of cases, the latter will have more, not less, tanks than tank armies of four divisions.

In meeting engagements, principally nuclear weapons will play the major role. The success of operations by tank and motorized rifle large units will depend on the skillful utilization of these weapons. Therefore, there is no need to speak of some special exception of tank large units and groupings.

Life goes forward, and our armies are being equipped more and more with the latest means of armed conflict, which requires corresponding organizational development, and we should welcome all generals and officers who work at the solution of this complicated and serious problem.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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15 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Period of a War", by Admiral V. Kasatonov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Period of a War" by Admiral V. Kasatonov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] "The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Period of a War", by Admiral V. Kasatonov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

. . . Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters in the Initial Period of a War", written by Admiral Vladimir A. Kasatonov, now Commander of the Black Sea Fleet and formerly Commander of the Baltic Fleet.

The article appeared in the 1960 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. The month of publication of the 1960 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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The Use of Naval Forces in Closed Sea Theaters

in the

Initial Period of War

by

Admiral V. Kasatonov

The qualitative leap in the development of the means of armed combat on the sea, which has occurred in an unprecedentedly short period of time, has placed before the art of naval warfare a series of problems connected with the development of methods of operations ensuring the fullest realization of the potentialities of new weapons for effective accomplishment of the missions of the fleets.

In recent years a considerable amount of work has been done in the Navy both in the field of construction and the development of forces and in training for the conduct of combat operations under new conditions. At the present time, the development of new weapons and the tempo of equipping the Navy with them has reached a level which urgently demands that the main attention be given to methods of using these weapons. It is becoming entirely obvious that even at the current stage the most important missions will be accomplished by strike forces of the Navy with missile and nuclear armament. We have in mind, first of all, submarines armed with cruise (krylataya) and ballistic missiles or long-range torpedoes with nuclear warheads, missile aviation, (raketnaya aviatsiya), coastal missile units, and, to a certain extent, missile surface ships and boats (kater), capable even under current conditions of accomplishing a number of combat missions in sea theaters.

The high combat qualities of the strike forces create new potentialities for the Navy as a whole, make it possible to accomplish missions in a new way, and set up goals which were impossible to achieve not long ago. It is necessary to consider

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the employment of these forces under concrete military-geographic conditions of this or that theater of military operations. It is well known that the missions and methods for accomplishing them will be considerably different for the fleets in open sea theaters, such as the Northern and Pacific Fleets, and for the fleets in closed sea theaters such as the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets. However, it must be kept in mind that at present the conception of "the closed sea theater" does not reflect completely accurately the nature of the conditions for operations of the forces of the fleet in it. The point is that the activity of the fleets in the closed sea theaters is not at all limited by the closed seas such as the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, as it was several years ago, but must be carried out to a large extent beyond the limits of these seas to accomplish the most important missions. The characteristics of the new weapons make it possible for the fleets to carry out such missions. However, for this it is necessary that part of the forces afloat, above all, submarines, be deployed beyond the limits of the closed seas even before the beginning of military operations, and that these forces be built up during the course of a war through movements from other sea theaters or after the seizure of straits zones by the ground forces. The operation of aviation beyond the limits of the closed seas is linked with the necessity, while flying over enemy territory, of overcoming the powerful countermeasures of the PVO system which has evolved. These circumstances constitute one of the most important features of closed sea theaters.

Characteristic of closed sea theaters is the presence of three large zones in which the conditions of conducting combat operations are substantially different. To such zones belong: the closed sea (for example, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea), the zone of the straits with the adjacent narrows and islands, and the more open and extensive sea (for example, the Mediterranean Sea or the North Sea).

Among the most important missions of the Navy in closed sea theaters in the initial period of a war, it is possible to name two fundamental missions. One of these is the defense of one's own seacoast and the adjacent territory against attacks from the sea. The main element of this mission is

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combating enemy aircraft carrier large units (soyedineniye) operating in a given operational direction, with the goal of warding off the nuclear strikes of the aircraft carrier aviation forces against the coastal and immediate rear area economic and administrative-political objectives of the country, the forces of the Navy, and the maritime fronts. Thus, in substance, this mission is similar to an analogous mission accomplished by fleets in open sea theaters. However, in the conditions of operations of forces and the methods of their accomplishment, the mission in closed sea theaters has substantial peculiarities, as we shall show below.

The second fundamental mission is support (sodeystviye) of the ground forces in attack and defense, including support in the operation for seizing the straits zones, with the subsequent exit of submarine forces through the straits for operations in more open areas of the sea theater. To accomplish this mission it is also necessary to combat aircraft carrier and missile vessel (raketonosnoye) large units and prevent the entry of naval forces of the enemy through the straits into the closed sea, or disrupt their combat activity in the straits zone and in the area just outside the straits.

On behalf of a maritime front it may be necessary to accomplish other missions, such as support of the ground forces in forcing the straits and in seizing islands of the straits zone, disruption of the sea transport of the enemy, protecting one's own transport, etc. Furthermore, under current conditions it is possible to examine anew the problem of fire support for the maritime flank of the ground forces. Now, of course, there can be no talk of the delivery of fire strikes against the flank of enemy ground forces by tube artillery of surface vessels. At the present time, such a mission is clearly unrealistic. The problem is the employment of the missile forces of the Navy for delivering strikes against enemy ground forces from distances of several hundred kilometers with nuclear warheads. In spite of the fact that the activity of the Navy must be directed, first of all, toward combat with the naval forces of the enemy, on a number of occasions, when it is required by the situation on land and permitted by the situation at sea, it is advisable

to bring in missile forces of the Navy, mainly submarines and coastal missile units, to deliver nuclear strikes against objectives on land for the benefit of the troops of a front. However these operations may not be conducted to the detriment of the accomplishment by the Navy of its basic tasks at sea.

A few words about the operations of the Navy on the sea communications lines of the enemy. In our opinion, during the first days of the initial period of a war in closed sea theaters, this mission will not have important independent significance, since during that period the main forces of the Navy must be directed toward the fastest possible destruction of the strike forces of the enemy fleet - the bearers of nuclear weapons. The mission of disrupting military sea supply during the first days of a war must be accomplished only to the extent necessary as one of the special missions for support of the ground forces. During the subsequent period, the importance of this mission may increase sharply in conjunction with the fact that after delivery of the first missile (airborne missile - vozdushno-raketnyy - on the part of our enemies) strikes, replenishment and regrouping of forces will be required for the development of further military operations. It should be expected that by this time a convoy service in sea theaters of military operations will have been organized by both sides. The most favorable conditions for combat against the sea communications lines will be created after the seizure of the straits zones by our troops, the exit of submarine forces out through the straits into the more extensive areas of the sea theater, and the organization of basing for units of the strike forces and the bulk of the support forces for seized enemy bases.

To determine correctly what forces of the Navy are needed in closed sea theaters for successful accomplishment of the missions enumerated above, one must consider the fact that the accomplishment of each of the missions is linked with definite geographic areas to a considerably greater degree than in open sea theaters. Thus, the mission of destroying the aircraft carrier attack large unit (AUS) must be accomplished beyond the limits of the closed sea, since the possibility of aircraft carriers entering into that part of the sea theater is practically out of the question. Operations for disruption of the entry of the forces of the enemy fleet through the straits and disruption of their combat activity in the straits zone must also be accomplished beyond the

limits of the closed sea. In a number of instances this will require the concentration of main efforts in the straits zone itself. At the same time the mission of fire support for the maritime flank of the ground forces and a number of other missions for support of a front will be accomplished during the first days of war within the limits of the closed sea. Thus, in closed theaters it is necessary to have strike and support forces with a composition capable of accomplishing missions in all three basic zones of the sea theater.

Of all the arms of forces of the Navy, only submarines and aviation are capable of carrying out combat operations in the open part of a theater at the present time.

The main mission of these forces must be the destruction of enemy naval vessels already at sea; it is advisable to entrust the destruction of enemy naval vessels at their bases to the missile troops of the Supreme High Command (VGK), which can accomplish such missions more effectively.

Speaking of the use of submarines, it should be pointed out that their penetration into the above-mentioned areas of a sea theater, their conduct of combat operations there, and also their materiel and technical support (replenishment of ammunition, fuel, and relief of personnel) is linked with the necessity of overcoming the anti-submarine defense developed by the enemy. At the same time, having penetrated into the area of combat operations, the submarine must carry out combat operations for as long a period of time as possible with maximum effectiveness. This requirement is met to the greatest degree by fast submarines with atomic engines, armed with long-range torpedoes with nuclear warheads (with the condition that the depth of the sea permits atomic submarines to run at maximum diving depth as, for example, in the Mediterranean Sea).

Being able to stay at sea for a practically unlimited period of time, atomic submarines can be in waiting areas sufficiently remote from the zones most densely saturated by the forces and facilities of anti-submarine defense (PLO), execute a swift movement to deliver nuclear strikes against detected enemy naval vessels, and subsequently break away from pursuit by the anti-submarine forces. Beyond the limits of a closed sea it is also advisable to use missile submarines (with the condition that they use cruise - krylataya - missiles with homing - samonavedeniye). However, for this, the execution of special measures for the

organization of accurate target designation and subsequent replenishment of expended missiles will be required.

Besides the destruction of naval vessels, special submarines must carry out reconnaissance of enemy naval vessel large units and convoys for the delivery of strikes against them by the forces of missile aviation and attack submarines. They must also combat enemy submarines, including missile-carrying submarines, the possible use of which is highly probable even in the immediate future.

To accomplish the missions of destroying highly maneuverable enemy formations in relatively extensive areas of a sea theater, it is necessary to have at the disposal of the fleet missile aviation capable of delivering strikes against enemy naval vessels with cruise missiles, both independently and in coordination with submarines, at a distance of up to 3,000-4,000 kilometers from their airfields. To carry out aerial reconnaissance for these forces, there must be long-range reconnaissance planes in the composition of the reconnaissance aviation of the Navy.

A quite unique area for carrying out combat operations is the straits zone, within which the operation of submarines and surface vessels is practically out of the question, and the operation of missile aviation is hampered by the small dimensions and intricate configurations of the reaches and straits among the islands. In view of the large number of islands, the detection of enemy vessels in the straits zone by any means of technical surveillance is considerably hampered. Not long ago the only arm of forces of the Navy capable of carrying out combat operations in such areas was mine - torpedo and fighter aviation. Such operations were unavoidably coupled with large losses, since straits zones are saturated to the greatest degree by the forces and facilities of antiaircraft defense.

The situation changed with the introduction of nuclear-missile weapons into the armament of the Navy. For strikes against points of basing and clusters of vessels detected in anchorages, missiles from submarines and the launching installations of coastal missile units of the Navy can be used, independently and in coordination with units and large units of the operational (operativnaya) missiles of the ground forces. The submarines can deliver strikes from firing positions located in a closed sea at distances of 400 to 500 kilometers, and the coastal missile units, from firing

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positions on the seacoast.

Nuclear-missile means of destruction can also destroy formations of vessels during their passage of the straits. Since narrow straits are accurately determined zones, it is possible to use missiles effectively against areas calculated in advance in any sector of a strait. Using nuclear warheads of suitable force, it is possible to achieve the required destruction of an enemy formation forcing the straits with a limited number of missiles. At the same time one should take into account that for the destruction of small groups or individual small vessels in a heavily interrupted area of a sea theater, and also for the destruction of small targets at sea and on the coast, the use of nuclear-missile weapons will, in a number of cases, prove to be inadvisable. Therefore, supporting the opinion of a number of authors (for example, Colonel General A. Gastilovich[1] in the first [1960] issue of Spetsial'nyy sbornik statey zhurnala "Voyennaya Mysl") that the fighter-bomber should be considered the basic aircraft of front aviation, we are convinced that just such a plane is also essential to the Navy for combating vessels and aviation of the antisubmarine defense in the interests of the support of the combat operations of submarines, the destruction of the facilities of coastal technical surveillance, and the execution of other missions.

In the immediate future coastal missile units must become the main strike force of the fleets in combating enemy naval vessels within the limits of the closed sea (and partially even in the straits zone). These units, armed with cruise missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometers, with inertial guidance (avtonomnoye upravleniye) for firing against areas, and with a homing device (ustroystvo samonavedeniya) for destruction of vessels at sea, will be able to cover with their fire the entire waters (akvatoriya) of a closed sea and make enemy combat activity and the operation of enemy naval vessels and transports within its limits practically out of the question. The limited dimensions of closed seas make it possible to use to the fullest extent modern radio navigation and hydroacoustic navigation systems of high accuracy to provide orientational support to reconnaissance vessels and planes, which in turn makes it possible to provide accurate target designation for coastal

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missile units. Target designation can also be effectively provided by long-range coastal radar stations.

However, the high combat potentialities of coastal missile units do not eliminate the need for a small formation of missile submarines in the composition of a fleet operating in a closed sea theater. These submarines are needed both for delivering strikes against enemy vessels and objectives in the straits zone and for the fire support of the maritime flank of the ground forces. In the near future submarines will be armed with cruise missiles with a homing device for the final portion of their trajectory and will also be able to be used for the destruction of vessels at sea, particularly after these (missile submarines) have exited through the straits into the open part of a sea theater.

Taking these considerations into account, it is advisable to have in the composition of a fleet in a closed sea theater, submarines armed, not with ballistic missiles, but with cruise missiles, assuring the possibility of multipurpose use of the same submarines. To the credit of cruise missiles there is one more circumstance of no small importance, that with their launch from submarines the enemy does not have the opportunity of getting a fix on the missiles in flight to determine the trajectory and the point of launch, and consequently, the location of the submarine. With the use of ballistic missiles such a task is accomplished fairly easily under modern conditions, particularly within the limits of a closed sea with small dimensions. Having determined the location of a missile submarine, the enemy would be able to direct his antisubmarine forces in pursuit of her.

In addition to missile submarines, it is necessary to have in the composition of the fleet a numerically larger formation of torpedo submarines designated for the destruction of enemy vessels and transports at sea, carrying out reconnaissance at the exits of the straits and bases, and accomplishing a number of other missions. One of the most important missions of the torpedo submarines will be the prevention of secret infiltration of enemy submarines through the straits into a closed sea, and the destruction of submarines detected within the limits of this sea.

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Finally, surface missile vessels (particularly missile boats) must occupy a definite place in the composition of the strike forces of the Navy in closed sea theaters. In our view, the main mission of surface missile vessels will be combating surface vessels of the antisubmarine defense, carrying out combat operations against the sea communications lines of the enemy in order to protect our own sea supply, and also combating enemy vessel forces in the island areas while supporting the ground forces in seizing the straits zone and in support of the exiting of submarines through the straits.

The combat durability of surface missile vessels can be increased primarily by providing them with reliable antiaircraft defense, especially by arming these vessels with antiaircraft missiles and including special PVO vessels in the battle order of missile formations. The conditions of closed theaters make it possible to provide PVO for surface vessels to a considerable extent by use of the forces and facilities of the maritime large units of the troops of the PVO of the Country.

Side by side with its strike forces, a fleet must have in its composition perfected forces of antisubmarine defense: antisubmarine vessels, antisubmarine aviation, fixed antisubmarine facilities, and also forces and facilities of antimine defense, the basis of which are minesweepers. To provide timely data on low-flying aerial targets to the strike forces of a fleet and the troops of the PVO of the Country, it is necessary to have in the composition of a fleet radar patrol submarines and surface vessels. Because of the aim of our enemies to use low altitudes to the maximum degree for the flights of their aviation, it is impossible under current conditions to ensure timely and effective use of the forces and facilities of the PVO to repel an air attack without a sufficient number of these vessels.

The conduct of aerial reconnaissance in closed sea theaters is highly complicated because of the necessity of carrying out flights over enemy territory having a powerful antiaircraft defense system organized in advance. Therefore, the presence in a fleet of a sufficient number of modern reconnaissance aircraft for carrying out short-range and long-range reconnaissance is a primary necessity.

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Finally, the fleet must have at its disposal potentialities for accomplishing yet another of its missions. We are talking about tactical naval landing operations (desant). In the course of the execution of operations by the ground forces for the purpose of seizing straits zones and also individual islands and groups of islands, it may be necessary for a fleet to debark small tactical landing forces in coordination with airborne and tank landing forces (desant). A fleet may also be given the mission of supporting troops of a front in forcing the straits, using its means to carry out the ferrying of units of troops and combat materiel.

To fulfill these missions, a fleet will require from the initiation of military operations a certain amount of fast and small amphibious transport means. To avoid wasteful expenditures on the composition of these means in peacetime, it is advisable to have them under the authority of civil maritime organizations, rather than in a fleet, and to use them in the national economy for internal sea and river transport. The experience of operating landing craft left over from World War II proved that they are a suitable and economic means for short hauls, particularly when loading and unloading cargo on a seacoast not equipped with wharves.

Thus, the nature of the missions of the fleets and the military-geographic conditions of the closed sea theaters require, in general, the following forces within the composition of these fleets:

- submarines: missile, with cruise missiles; torpedo, with nuclear and conventional torpedoes of different designation; and also radar and hydroacoustic patrol submarines;

- aviation: missile, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine;

- coastal missile units, armed with cruise missiles with an inertial (avtonomnaya) guidance system and homing;

- surface vessels (and boats): missile, antisubmarine, PVO, landing (only in wartime), radar patrol, and other special vessels.

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It is quite obvious that for the support of the basic forces enumerated it is necessary to have an auxiliary fleet corresponding in size and purpose, including submarine tenders, supply ships, emergency rescue ships, repair ships, etc.

Now let us examine some problems pertaining to the accomplishment of typical naval missions, using the forces and weapons mentioned.

Destruction of aircraft carrier attack large units. The mission of destroying aircraft carrier attack large units in closed sea theaters is no less real than in open sea theaters. For example, in the Mediterranean Sea, constantly being redeployed and maintained in high combat readiness, is a big aircraft carrier large unit, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, having in its composition two heavy aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. The Sixth Fleet is the main strike formation of the naval forces of NATO in the southern direction which is actually ready to deliver strikes against coastal objectives and accomplish missions in support of the ground forces. The aircraft carriers and missile vessels of the aircraft carrier attack large unit (AUS) must be evaluated as primary objectives, the destruction of which has independent operational consequences and, in addition, decisively affects the accomplishment of missions of a fleet in the support of the ground forces. In general, the mission of destroying an aircraft carrier attack large unit requires the execution of an independent operation of a fleet in coordination with long-range aviation, missile troops, and forces of the neighboring front.

As we have already noted, the accomplishment of the mission of destroying an aircraft carrier attack large unit in closed sea theaters has a number of intrinsic peculiarities. The military-geographic conditions make it possible not only to defend the aircraft carriers with the forces of the aircraft carrier attack large unit itself, but also to use for this, in full measure, the entire antiaircraft defense system of the member countries of NATO, as well as the system of antisubmarine defense created in advance, based on the equipment of the fixed facilities of the border and of the mobile forces. The heavily interrupted nature of a theater (the presence of island and reef areas) facilitates the massing of enemy vessels and hampers

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their detection. All this makes it possible for the enemy, without particular risk, to concentrate aircraft carriers at considerably shorter distances from our seacoast and to deliver sudden strikes against considerably more distant (by 400 to 500 kilometers) rear area objectives than in open sea theaters. This thesis is borne out by the experience of the exercises of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

Thus, in closed sea theaters it is necessary to consider two possible alternatives of aircraft carrier attack large unit opeations: first, when an aircraft carrier large unit is concentrated before the initiation of combat operations in island areas which are at a distance of 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers (in certain cases perhaps even less) from our seacoast, and second, when an aircraft carrier attack large unit moves up from remote areas of a sea theater to deliver an attack at the operating radius of its aviation.

In the first case, the possibility of delivering a strike against the aircraft carriers before they launch their aviation is unlikely. The main mission of a fleet will be to deliver a counterstrike within the shortest possible period of time for the purpose of destroying the aircraft carriers and preventing repeated use of the aircraft carrier aviation.

In the second case, i.e., when an aircraft carrier attack large unit moves up from remote areas of the sea to the boundary of launch of its aviation, the mission is to deliver a strike against the aircraft carriers before the initial launching of the strike aviation. In spite of the fact that the conditions of closed sea theaters provide ample opportunity to employ refueling of aircraft carrier aviation in flight or at airfields on land, one must conclude that the most advantageous alternative for the enemy, ensuring the secrecy of operations, is to launch his planes from distances which allow them to fly to the objective of a strike without intermediate refueling.

The possible launching limit of aircraft carrier aviation for delivering attacks against probable objectives without intermediate refueling must be considered as the nearest boundary of that area in which it is necessary to concentrate

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the main efforts to destroy the aircraft carrier attack large unit (to deliver the main strike). The far boundary of that area can be defined as the maximum distance at which it is possible to deliver a massed strike by the most powerful forces against the aircraft carrier attack large unit. We support the opinion, expressed by many writers, that the most advantageous method of operations against an aircraft carrier attack large unit, considering its high mobility, is the delivery of a single strike which is as powerful as possible, primarily with nuclear-missile weapons, within the shortest possible period of time after the detection of the aircraft carrier attack large unit by reconnaissance.

Since, as a rule, aircraft carrier attack large units in closed sea theaters operate as separate strike groups (AUG), against which attacks can be delivered either simultaneously, or in sequence over short intervals of time, or, finally, with a considerable gap in time and place, the goal of each strike must be the destruction of one aircraft carrier. Consequently, the goal of the operation can be achieved by the delivery of at least two strikes, ensuring the destruction of both aircraft carriers.

The mission of destroying aircraft carriers can be accomplished by the joint efforts of missile aviation (the air forces - VVS - of the Navy and long-range aviation) and submarines. The missile troops of the Supreme High Command (VGK) can be used mainly for the destruction of aircraft carriers and servicing forces at bases. The forces of a front (missiles of tactical - takticheskoye - designation, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance aviation) can be enlisted to support the combat operations of missile aviation and submarines.

For the conduct of combat operations against aircraft carrier attack large units at sea during the first days of a war, aviation will have the greatest use. Later on, as nuclear torpedo or missile submarines enter a sea theater, the role of submarine forces in the destruction of aircraft carrier attack large units will increase to a level of equal importance with missile aviation. To destroy an aircraft carrier attack large unit having a powerful antiaircraft defense which is echeloned

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in depth, it is necessary to deliver concentrated strikes by missile aviation forces using cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (snaryazheniye). Since the explosion of only one missile with a nuclear warhead hitting the calculated point is sufficient to destroy any class of vessel, the expenditure of such missiles will be only one fifth or one sixth of the expenditure of missiles with conventional warheads.

Considering the vulnerability of cruise missiles to antiaircraft artillery (ZA) and antiaircraft guided missile (ZURS) fire, it is advisable to employ salvo launching of missiles in delivering strikes against a strongly defended objective. In view of this, the invulnerability to jamming of cruise missiles has great importance, permitting the use of a large number of them in each salvo. According to calculations, the destruction of one aircraft carrier operating as a component of an aircraft carrier attack group (allowing for the opposition of the antiaircraft artillery of the vessels and four two-missile salvos of antiaircraft guided missiles) can be accomplished by one salvo of six airborne (aviatsionnaya) cruise missiles with nuclear warheads launched at a distance of 200 to 220 kilometers from the aircraft carrier attack group. With a strike by six-missile salvos from two directions simultaneously, the destruction of two large vessels (an aircraft carrier and a cruiser) of an aircraft carrier attack group can be accomplished. In this case, of the twelve missiles launched in the two salvos, it is sufficient to have only six or seven missiles with nuclear warheads, and the other five or six missiles can have conventional warheads without causing substantial degradation of the results of the strike (the loss of delivery aircraft en route is not allowed for here).

A somewhat different picture is presented with the use of "Komet" missiles, which are vulnerable to jamming. In this case, in view of the impossibility of a salvo launching of the required number of missiles from one direction, increasing the density and reducing the depth of the combat formation of the delivery aircraft is achieved by organizing it into several parallel columns (waves), and also by launching two or more missiles on the beam (v luche) of one leading delivery aircraft. An indispensable condition for increasing the density of the strike is to attack from several directions. The experience of combat training confirms practically

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the feasibility of launching "Komet" missiles from several directions, 45 to 60 degrees apart. Calculations show that in an attack from three or more directions the probability of the "Komet" missiles reaching the target increases to 25 percent, as against 10 percent in an attack from one direction.

To deliver strikes beyond the limits of a closed sea, missile-carrying aviation must overcome the antiaircraft defense while flying over enemy territory. Considering this, it is necessary to select flight routes over areas which are less saturated by the forces and facilities of the antiaircraft defense and to neutralize these forces and facilities in the zone of flight to the extent possible. However, considerable forces and facilities are required to neutralize the antiaircraft defense, so it can only be fully accomplished by the joint efforts of a fleet and a front. Along with the use of front missiles and fighter-bomber aviation, the facilities of radio countermeasures (radioprotivodeystviye) have primary importance in overcoming the antiaircraft defense, particularly in neutralizing the system of radiotechnical surveillance of aircraft (vozdushnoye radio-tekhnicheskoye nablyudeniye) and the control facilities of the enemy.

In addition to carrying out the supporting measures mentioned above, in order to overcome the enemy antiaircraft defense system (both the land antiaircraft defense system and the antiaircraft defense system of the aircraft carrier attack large unit itself), it is necessary that all branches of aviation make maximum use of low flight altitudes, right down to hedgehopping. We believe that flight at minimum altitudes must be maintained by strike groups of aircraft both over the sea and over enemy territory, insofar as local terrain permits. Taking on altitude should be done only when the objective of the strike has been approached to within limits ensuring the possibility of launching and guiding (navedeniye) airborne cruise missiles.

Regardless of the limited number of submarines which can be counted on beyond the limits of a closed sea during the first days of a war, they must be used not only for strikes against enemy vessels but also for carrying out reconnaissance. From the beginning of combat operations, when reconnaissance information

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will be particularly needed for the delivery of an immediate counterstrike against the enemy, submarines may turn out to be the only reliable means of reconnaissance beyond the limits of a closed sea. At the same time, after detecting an aircraft carrier attack large unit and reporting it, submarines must use every opportunity to deliver nuclear strikes against the enemy aircraft carriers. Considering this and the complexity of resupplying ammunition, the maximum possible number of torpedoes on submarines should have nuclear warheads (with the exception of a certain number of antisubmarine torpedoes and torpedoes for firing at antisubmarine vessels).

In addition to the submarines deployed on the approaches to narrows, it is advisable to deploy the remaining submarines in small groups (two to three submarines each) along a wide front on the approaches to the probable combat maneuvering areas of the aircraft carriers. Such a disposition of submarines (PL) makes it possible to direct one to two groups of submarines of a brigade of submarines against the enemy in practically any direction he moves. Of course, in this case, only a small number of submarines sally forth to the attack, but the use of long-range torpedoes with nuclear charges compensates to a certain extent for the small number of attacking submarines.

It is advisable to use atomic submarines armed with torpedoes only for strikes against large enemy vessels. It is advisable to assign to them waiting positions outside the limits of the zone of probable movement of the aircraft carrier attack large unit, because the forces of the enemy antisubmarine defense (PLO) will carry out their most intensive search for submarines in that zone. In delivering strikes, atomic submarines, using their great underwater speed (50 to 60 kilometers per hour), approach the aircraft carrier attack large unit (AUS) on the basis of reconnaissance information, with the design of delivering the strike from the bow angles (nosovoy kursovoy ugol) of the enemy. In this case submarines can launch nuclear torpedoes against the vessels of the aircraft carrier attack large unit from distances of 15 to 20 kilometers, without penetrating the curtains of distant and close vessel protection of the aircraft carriers. On the other hand, when delivering

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attacks from astern, a submarine must approach to within a distance of 4 to 5 kilometers of the enemy vessels. Both for self-defense and in the interest of combating enemy missile-carrying submarines, atomic submarines must destroy every enemy submarine detected, and to do this they must have reliable antisubmarine weapons and equipment for the detection of submarines.

The positions for missile submarines must be chosen with the design of carrying out a shift (manevr) of trajectories of the cruise missiles which will cover the largest number of probable directions of enemy movement. Considering the necessity of salvo firing, missile submarines are most advisably employed in groups, ensuring the launching of six to eight cruise missiles in one salvo. According to calculations, in this case, in the delivery of a strike against an aircraft carrier attack group (AUG) of typical composition, it can be guaranteed that one of the missiles with a nuclear warhead will reach the target.

The most crucial problem in organizing such a strike is providing the missile submarines with accurate data on the location and factors of movement of the enemy for calculating an aiming point which ensures the lock-on (zakhvat) of the enemy vessels by the homing system of the missile. With clear-cut organization of the control of submarines and aviation, this task can be accomplished by aviation carrying out a thorough reconnaissance (dorazvedka) of the enemy. Also exerting great influence on the success of the firing is the accuracy with which the submarines determine their own position; this can be ensured by the use of radio navigation systems of high accuracy and by further improvement of the navigational instruments on submarines.

As basic measures for the support of combat operations of submarines beyond the limits of a closed sea, the following must be provided for: strikes by missiles against the coastal centers of the antisubmarine defense, destruction of aircraft carrier antisubmarine hunter-killer groups at sea by the forces of aviation, and measures for self-defense by the submarines.

Obviously, in operations for the destruction of enemy forces at sea, the greatest effect can be achieved if there is

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tactical coordination between submarines and aviation. However, considering the high mobility of aircraft carrier and missile vessel formations, as well as the complexity of achieving tactical coordination, delay in the delivery of strikes, for the purpose of assemblying all forces at assigned positions or by a specific time, cannot be tolerated. The power of each strike group enables it to inflict defeat upon the enemy even when the planned sequence is not observed.

What has been said does not signify a denial of the necessity of coordination. The point is only that under the conditions of the employment of missile-nuclear weapons, the most important thing is to anticipate the enemy. If the situation allows, i.e., the enemy operates in accordance with an alternative which was allowed for in planning, or close to it, then, undoubtedly, the best results will be obtained by combat operations carried out in the most expedient order. Specifically, the following sequence of strikes against an aircraft carrier attack large unit can be recommended as one of the advisable alternatives. First, missile submarines deliver a strike, since these forces ensure the greatest surprise of a strike because of the low flight altitudes of cruise missiles. After this, exploiting the weakening of the antiaircraft defense of the enemy large unit as a result of the strike of the submarines, missile aviation delivers a strike. Torpedo submarines attack last, getting a chance to use their weapon most effectively against a disorganized enemy. In a particular case, the strikes of aviation and torpedo submarines may coincide in time. In such a case, to ensure mutual safety, aviation must use only nuclear airbursts and submarines must use only underwater bursts.

It is quite obvious that success in combatting an aircraft carrier attack large unit depends entirely on reconnaissance, especially aerial.

For the fulfilment of the missions of aerial reconnaissance, it is necessary, in our opinion, to enlist simultaneously considerable groups of aircraft, which must, in a narrow sector and at low altitudes, surmount the zone least saturated with the forces and facilities of antiaircraft defenses and then disperse in accordance with their assigned reconnaissance routes. For the detection of an aircraft carrier large unit, not only the forces

of naval reconnaissance must be used, but also the reconnaissance of the missile troops of the Supreme High Command and of long-range aviation.

Support of the ground forces in a maritime area. Without examining all of the above-mentioned missions which might be accomplished on behalf of a maritime front, we shall dwell briefly only on the fundamentals of accomplishing the task of disrupting the entry of enemy naval forces through the straits.

As is well known, the operational situation in closed seas depends to a considerable degree on the possibility of the entry of enemy naval forces from outside. In view of this, fleets in closed theaters have always had the mission of interdicting or disrupting the entry of forces of an enemy fleet through the straits. The importance of this mission rests in the fact that its accomplishment supports to the greatest degree the success of the operations of the ground forces in maritime areas, and creates favorable conditions for the opeations of the forces of a fleet in fulfilling other missions in the closed seas.

The essence of the mission under examination is defined by the requirement that the enemy formation be destroyed before its passage through the straits, and that individual groups penetrating through the straits be destroyed in the area adjacent to the straits, i.e., before the accomplishment of their missions. Depending on the general situation and the composition of the enemy forces, this mission can be considered as one of the individual missions of support of the ground forces, and be accomplished in the course of daily operational activities, or it can be considered as a fundamental mission of support and be accomplished by carrying out an offensive operation for the destruction of the forces of the enemy fleet.

We believe that, in a number of instances, it will be impossible to differentiate sharply the mission of disrupting the entry of enemy naval forces through the straits and the mission of destroying his forces in the straits zone and beyond its limits, since it will not always be possible to determine what the enemy will elect to do, to send his forces through the straits or to operate them on behalf of his ground forces located outside the closed sea. Obviously, there will be instances when one will

occur and instances where the other will occur. Therefore, the conduct of an offensive operation for the destruction of the enemy forces, and not a defensive operation, is in order. This fits the conditions of the initial period of a war, during which, as is known, in addition to pursuing the immediate goals of this or that operation, one must always pursue the goal of seizing the initiative, which has a decisive influence on the entire course of combat operations during that period.

In the final analysis, in determining the conditions for mounting a given operation during the initial period of a war, we do not see the necessity for detecting without fail concrete indications of the intentions of the enemy to send his forces through the straits. Moreover, it is not always possible to do this sufficiently ahead of time. It seems to us that the operation under examination should be carried out from the very start of combat operations and should have the character of a counterstrike for the purpose of destroying the main enemy strike (or landing) formations, detected even before the start of combat operations. In this case, irrespective of the intentions of the enemy for the use of his forces, the goal of the operation is attained by their destruction.

In general, to achieve the goal of the operation, accomplishment of the following particular tasks must be provided for:

- the destruction or weakening of an enemy formation detected at its bases;

- the destruction of the main enemy forces at sea, including in the straits zone;

- the destruction of units of forces which have penetrated through the straits in the area adjacent to the straits.

In setting forth the particular tasks in such a sequence, we do not mean that it is required to fulfill all of them without fail. The point is that they must be considered during the planning of the operation. It is not difficult to imagine various alternative situations in which it will be unnecessary to accomplish this or that particular task.

Speaking of the destruction of enemy vessels at their bases, we have in mind those bases and points of basing which are located within the limits of the straits zone or in the area just outside the straits. In accomplishing this mission in closed sea theaters, the main role belongs to large units of ballistic missiles of operational designation of the ground forces, missile submarines, and coastal missile units of the Navy. Each of these arms of forces can deliver strikes against vessels at their bases either independently or in coordination with each other. By this, not only are the enemy vessels at the bases destroyed, but also the naval base or point of basing itself is either destroyed or put out of operation for a long time.

The use of ballistic missiles provides a number of advantages because they are less subject to dispersion (rasseivaniye) in comparison with cruise missiles and are invulnerable to the forces and facilities of the enemy antiaircraft defense. Therefore, in fulfilling the mission by joint efforts it is expedient to plan the delivery of the first strike by ballistic missiles, pursuing the goal of not only delivering destruction to the enemy vessels and the installations of a base, but also of neutralizing the forces and facilities of the enemy antiaircraft defense, thus decreasing significantly the counteraction to the subsequent employment of cruise missiles from submarines and coastal launchers.

In using cruise missiles, it is necessary to allow for the fact that because of their low flight altitudes their use for strikes against objectives remote from the seacoast is limited by the nature of the local topography. Specifically, the altitude of the terrain in the zone of flight of cruise missiles must not exceed 200 to 300 meters above sea level. In this respect, coastal missile units of the Navy are more limited in the selection of possible directions and distances of fire than submarines, which can select the most advantageous direction of fire by changing the launching position. On the other hand, submarines are inferior to coastal missile units in accuracy of fire, since the error in determination of the location of the submarine is added to the dispersion of the missiles. In closed seas, with the existing means of supporting the navigation of submarines, this error in location may amount to one to four kilometers. Considering

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these circumstances, it is necessary to use ballistic missiles for the destruction of objectives more remote from the coast, and cruise missiles for the destruction of coastal objectives.

In planning combat operations for the destruction of vessels at sea, it is necessary to distinguish between two cases. If the vessels are effecting movement in long and narrow straits, then cruise and ballistic missiles can be used successfully for the destruction of the vessels. If the enemy vessels are located outside the straits and have freedom of maneuver, then it is not advisable to use either cruise or ballistic missiles with inertial (avtonomnoye) guidance, since during the time of preparing the missiles for launching, the vessels can change the factors of their movement sharply, and by the moment of the strike be beyond the limits of the radius of destruction. In this case, the vessels can be destroyed by naval attack aviation, using missiles and nuclear bombs.

The delivery of joint missile strikes against enemy vessels forcing the straits requires very careful organization, especially the organization of reliable reconnaissance, and timely preparation and precise direction of fire. The organization of missile strikes in the straits zone must provide for determination of the limits for detection of the enemy (with consideration of the readiness of the missiles for launching) and for designation of the positions and time for delivering the strikes. During successive strikes, to avoid mutual interference (pomekh) during the flight of the missiles, each strike group must be assigned aiming points and a time of attack, i.e., a moment of firing (vzryv) the missiles. The time of launch for the missiles is calculated on the basis of the assigned time periods of a strike, with allowance for their flight time to the target.

Considering the substantial differences in the nature of the preparation and methods of fire of forces participating in a strike, it is impossible during the course of a strike to shift the aiming points and introduce some sort of adjustments requiring changes in the initial data for firing. This leads unavoidably to disruption of a strike. Thus, the calculated area of a strike, positions, and aiming points, and consequently all of the initial data for firing, remain unchanged. As a rule, the conditions of straits make it possible to control the forces precisely, changing only the time of the strikes in accordance with the

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speed of movement of the enemy. These conditions also determine the paramount role of reconnaissance, as the success of a strike depends primarily on the trustworthiness and accuracy of its information.

Shifting the area of a strike is possible and necessary only in case the enemy breaks off forcing the straits and puts into his bases (into his roadsteads). It is to be supposed that in this case there will be sufficient time for shifting fire, especially if the probable holding points of the enemy are taken into account in advance and specified to the commanders of large units and units as alternate strike objectives.

Successful operations of our forces beyond the limits of a closed sea do not exclude the possibility of a penetration through the straits by individual enemy groups, for the destruction of which a special formation of forces must be deployed in advance. In the composition of this formation, coastal missile units of the Navy can be effectively used; they would deliver the first strikes against the enemy formation while it is still in the straits, and then destroy the enemy vessels which have penetrated into the area adjacent to the straits. An important advantage of coastal missile units is the ability of the duty sub-units (dezhurnoye podrazdeleniye) to deliver strikes against an enemy appearing unexpectedly in shorter periods of time than can any other naval forces. For carrying out combat operations for the destruction of enemy forces which have penetrated through the straits, other naval forces must also be enlisted, especially submarines and surface missile vessels. Of primary importance for the successful accomplishment of the mission by submarines is their deployment in advance in the area adjacent to the straits, ensuring their timely maneuver for the interception of the enemy suddenly sallying forth from the straits.

It should be noted that the conditions of a closed theater, primarily the feasibility of carrying out overlapping reconnaissance by various forces, and also the possibility for ample utilization of coastal facilities of surveillance, facilitate the organization and practical accomplishment of coordination of all forces, and make it possible to deliver strikes against the enemy in the most advantageous sequence.

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Such are some of the elements of the accomplishment of the mission of disrupting the entry through the straits of the naval forces of the enemy. The growing operational-tactical potential of the forces, based on the power of missile-nuclear weapons, makes it possible to accomplish such a mission, not by blockading the straits from the side of the closed part of the theater, but by destroying the enemy forces at their bases and at sea beyond the limits of the closed part of the theater.

In the present article, methods of using naval forces in closed sea theaters in the initial period of war have been examined only in general outline and inconformity with the situation in these theaters at the present time, with consideration of the prospects for the next few years. In conclusion, it should be noted that the special complexity of this situation, caused by the limited dimensions of the closed sea theaters and the presence in the immediate proximity of bases for aggression prepared in advance on the territories of the member countries of NATO, urgently requires all possible automatization of the control of naval forces, above all, the automatization of the collection and processing of information.

1. Headquarters Comment: Colonel General Anton Iosipovich Gastilovich is on the faculty of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

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19 SEP 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces", by General of the Army P. Kurochkin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces", by General of the Army P. Kurochkin which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces", by General of the Army P. Kurochkin

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces", written by General of the Army Pavel A. Kurochkin, Chief of the Military Academy i/n Frunze.

The article appeared in the 1960 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. The month of publication of the 1960 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces

by

General of the Army P. Kurochkin

The concept of creating a special Collection of articles of the journal Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl), for the purpose of presenting an opportunity to the leaders of the Armed Forces to exchange ideas freely and to discuss the most important problems of modern (military) art is timely and unquestionably useful. This is confirmed, at least, by the worthy and keen analysis of questions, and the decisiveness, with which the first authors of the Collection are coming forward. A discussion that starts in this fashion is headed for sharp and fundamental disputes, promising a fruitful denouement.

In the articles found in the first Collection, many new positions on the nature of modern warfare are brought up, as well as methods and forms of conducting armed combat, and regarding the employment of the branches of the armed forces in it. We shall dwell upon individual questions brought up by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich in his article, and also in the articles of Lieutenant-Generals I. Tolkonyuk and V. Baskakov that touch upon the same questions in many ways.[1]

Is Soviet Military Art Undergoing a Crisis?

Common to the articles of Generals Gastilovich, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov is their position that there is a discrepancy between our military art and the new conditions of nuclear warfare; regarding this, they state that it is necessary to make a bold reappraisal of our entire military doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics in particular. The authors of the

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article speak unequivocally of a crisis which they claim Soviet military science and military art are undergoing.

"We", says General Gastilovich, "are undoubtedly trying to squeeze missile-nuclear weapons into the framework of the old, habitual position of our military doctrine, only modernizing the latter slightly, and we forget that this doctrine was formulated on the basis of the employment of means of armed combat that are basically different from present-day means and cannot be compared with them" (page 6). "The matter does not go beyond the adaptation of the old forms and methods to the new conditions, while it should be a matter of completely new categories in military affairs. Apparently the time has come to sacrifice, boldly, many of the positions on which the basic principles of operational art and tactics are based" - in this way, General Tolkonyuk supports Gastilovich. "This is a clear contradiction of the theory of operational art and can be called a crisis without exaggeration", - thus General Baskakov would summarize the matter.

These are not just words; the posing of the question is sharp and, at first glance, basic. However, upon deeper examination one finds that the authors put things on the agenda that have been raised already and even partially settled. In our opinion, there is no basis for speaking of a fundamental reassessment of Soviet military doctrine, nor of a crisis in military art. For our military doctrine has already been reexamined with the introduction of atomic weapons, and that which is viewed as a "crisis" in military art is nothing more than the natural expression of the contradictory and surging development of military affairs.

Indeed, of which attempts to squeeze missile-nuclear weapons into the framework of the old positions of our military doctrine, of what "slight" modernization of this doctrine, are they talking about, when the very opportunity for the statement of Comrade Gastilovich arose only as a result of the formulation of new doctrine, completely different from the old one. It is paradoxical that Comrade Gastilovich bases his judgements on the re-examination of doctrine on the positions of the new doctrine formulated in addresses and speeches of N. S. Khrushchev, and in the speeches and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovskiy,

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and other government and military leaders.

Soviet military-scientific thought did, for a certain period of time, follow the path of partial modernization of the old doctrine, in order to lessen to some extent the impact of nuclear weapons on the established forms and methods of armed combat. But this evolved naturally from the objective conditions prevailing at the time, determining the possibilities of military-scientific thought. However, it should be stated that, to a certain extent, everything that was done during this period helped to develop Soviet military science and military art, and laid the groundwork for going on to the next higher step of their development for the creation of a new military doctrine.

The establishment of a completely new doctrine based on the employment of missile-nuclear weapons in armed combat was a comparatively long and complicated process. The final formulation of this doctrine could be put on the agenda only after the creation of the actual materiel prerequisites, which determined not only the development of the axes of the use of missile-nuclear weapons, but also the assurance of qualitative advances in its development, in the form of achieving unlimited range and accuracy in the destruction of targets, as well as the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.

The stockpiling of nuclear-missile weapons in adequate quantities affected the characteristics, methods, and forms of modern armed combat profoundly. This was reflected in the new Soviet military doctrine and "the novelty of modern warfare and its dissimilarity with past wars".

Led by the new military doctrine and corresponding directives of the Party, the Government, and the higher military command, Soviet military-scientific thought began to clarify and define the laws and principles which have to be incorporated into the basis of armed combat at its present stage, and to search for new methods and forms of this combat, taking into consideration the nature of the political goals of the opposition's coalitions and the existing materiel base.

This process is nothing more than a re-examination of the theoretical views that have accumulated regarding the conduct

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of a war and military actions of all dimensions, training, organization, and equipping of the armed forces. But this is not a bald and pointless repudiation of all previously accumulated experience of armed combat. In Lenin's philosophical notebooks the dialectical nature of repudiation is brought out as follows: "Not a bald repudiation, not a random repudiation...is characteristic and essential in dialectics...but a repudiation, as a feature of communication, as a feature of development, with the retention of the positive...." (V. I. Lenin. Filosofskiye tetradi, 1947, page 197).

To speak of a crisis of military art in these circumstances--willingly or unwillingly, signifies the downgrading of the importance of a huge amount of work already carried out in this direction, and closing one's eyes to the actual situation, in other words, misunderstanding the crux of the process which is going on.

Without a doubt, the completion of a new qualitative advance, and the elevation of Soviet military science to a new level of development which answers modern requirements, involve certain "growing pains". What is required is a reappraisal of the old with a decisive rejection of everything that is of no value, and the blazing of new trails. All this is connected with overcoming the occasionally stiff resistance of various kinds of conservatives, who actually are inclined to substitute the renewal and modernization of old experiences, above all the experience of World War II, for a decisive turn to new endeavors.

The problem before the leading representatives of Soviet military-scientific thought is to clarify the new military doctrine and mobilize all our forces to fulfill the programmed directives of the Party, the Government, and the Minister of Defense to assure a new advance in the development of military science. This problem is within reason and, without a doubt, will be fulfilled in a very short time. During this struggle unprincipled conservatism will be defeated, as will harmful talk of many kinds about stagnation and crisis in Soviet military science.

Against a One-Sided Approach to the Solution of the Question of the Nature and Forms of Modern Armed Combat.

The basic thesis of the articles of Generals Gastilovich, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov is the affirmation of the paramount

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role of nuclear-missile weapons in all aspects of the combat activity of the armed forces. General Gastilovich writes: "Under modern conditions, groupings (obedineniye) of missile troops of the Supreme High Command (VGK) with their unlimited range of action and the tremendous force of their firepower have become the main and decisive branch of the armed forces... The efforts of all other branches of the armed forces...have to be directed towards the most rapid and effective utilization of strikes by the missile groupings of the VGK. Besides, the basis for planning the actions of each branch of the forces is also based on their use of their own missile-nuclear weapons, and not on the number of divisions, ships, aircraft, etc." (page 7). On page 11 he comes to the conclusion that in his "concept, the main, leading role belongs to the operations of the missile groupings of the VGK, but not for the purposes that we usually visualize them now. This is not combat with the nuclear means of the enemy, nor the weakening of his economic potential, nor combat against the reserves, etc., but the complete destruction of the enemy with nuclear weapons of megaton range against a vast territory, eliminating entire countries from the war."

I. Tolkonyuk states: "There is good reason to believe that often the will of the enemy to resist can be suppressed only by strikes of nuclear-missile weapons" (page 21). We find this in General Baskakov's article: "Nuclear weapons should be considered and employed as independent and decisive means for destroying the enemy" (page 32). It should be noted that the statements of the first two authors refer largely to the general strategic aspect, and the third--to the field of operational art. But this does not change the substance of the formulation of the question.

If we follow the concepts developed by the authors of the articles mentioned, and doubtless agree that nuclear-missile weapons should have the decisive role in assuring the possibility "of conquering in a short time", in a way, on the whole, or to achieve success in any operation, everything else seems relatively simple. It is only necessary to supply the missile troops with adequate means, provide the necessary nuclear-missile means to the ground forces and other branches of the armed forces, review certain aspects of our military strategy and operational art, and thus are created the conditions for successful resolution of the course and outcome of all armed combat.

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Guided by this premise, General Gastilovich offers a fairly simple plan of action (a variation of the concept for the European theater). In this plan a countering nuclear-missile strike is made against two or three NATO countries with the purpose of "total destruction of the enemy" and the elimination of these countries from the war. In order to utilize the results of this strike, the ground forces are put into operation; thirty to forty various ground forces division quickly "finish off" the remaining forces of the enemy in the border area, and at a rapid rate they conquer the zones that have to various degrees been destroyed and contaminated by radiation produced by the massive strike of the strategic missiles, and occupy the country.

Besides, "if after the conquering of the territory of the countries that were subjected to the first massive nuclear strike, the enemy does not capitulate, then a similar all-destroying blow may be repeated against the next country." The substance of the variations of actions proposed by the author amounts on the one hand, to the complete destruction of the enemy and withdrawal of a country from the war, and on the other hand, to the conduct of operations of the ground forces in order to overrun the destroyed and contaminated zones, the suppression of any remaining resistance, and the occupation of the country.

In our opinion, the concept presented has many contradictory features. In the first place, the concepts "total destruction of the enemy" and "eliminate a country from the war" mean the end of all resistance, and capitulation of the countries. But once this is so, what major operations by significant elements of the ground forces can we talk about under these conditions? Why throw in thirty to forty divisions with the purpose "mainly of conquering rapidly the zones that, invarying degrees, have been destroyed and contaminated by radiation"? One does not need much of a flair for fantasy to imagine what these troops will encounter in a country that has been subjected to a nuclear-missile strike "for complete annihilation". Panic, chaos, masses of dead and mutilated persons, and the ruins of the destroyed cities will exert a deleterious influence on the troops. The same conditions will oblige the troops to undertake the incredibly complicated tasks of establishing order, carrying out rescue - rehabilitation (spasatelno - vosstanovitelnaya) work, organizing relocation, rendering medical assistance, and providing rations for large

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masses of people. At the same time, the troops themselves will be exposed to irradiation and contagion and many complicated problems affecting them can arise, which will not be so simple to solve. The questions of billeting, supply, medical and sanitation services, and others will become extremely complicated, and sometimes they will simply be insoluble.

Having taken the concept proposed by the authors as a basis, we cannot avoid falling into an insoluble argument concerning the place they assign to nuclear-missile weapons, and the role of the ground forces and the other branches of the armed forces. This conception leads to the repudiation of any significant place for the ground forces, and in fact abolishes all branches of the armed forces except missiles; it abolishes strategy, operational art and tactics, and joint actions by the branches of the armed forces and the arms of troops composing them which have been studied and established.

What are the reasons why the conception developed by Generals Gastilovich and Tolkonyuk is groundless?

First of all, it is impossible to combine the incompatible. One cannot speak of the possibility of "total destruction of the enemy", of the possibility "of crushing his capability and will to resist", of the elimination of entire countries from a war by nuclear-missile weapons alone, on the one hand, and the necessity and possibility of conducting on the territory of these countries large-scale and vigorous operations of the ground forces on the other hand.

Second, and most important, the solution of the problem must be sought only through a thorough evaluation of the situation, which is possible only by taking the political factors into account along with the materiel factors. The content of the new Soviet military doctrine orients our military thought towards exactly this kind of approach to the solution of questions.

In fact, our new military doctrine is based on the paramount role of nuclear-missile troops and provides for the carrying out of decisive nuclear-missile operations. Our nuclear-missile troops are capable of erasing from the face of the earth any country or countries attacking us or other Socialist states.

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However, this basic premise stems only from the possibility of such a destructive war being unleashed by a frantic clique of imperialist lunatics who are in power. In this case, we have to be ready to deliver the most destructive blows against the instigators of the war.

Herein we cannot escape the fact that the bastion of those who inspire this policy of playing with fire is beyond the confines of the European continent; so, in the event of the unleashing of a war, the main efforts of our Armed Forces, first and foremost of the chief component - the missile troops - will be directed primarily against the decisive element of the enemy coalition. Here too, however, the question can only lie in the plan to defeat the enemy quickly and completely and eliminate his capability to continue active military operations. This is the basic and the most complicated task facing our missile troops. It has to be solved in the shortest possible time, with maximum use of the effectiveness of nuclear-missile weapons.

The success of the outcome of this operation (operations) of the missile troops will depend on a series of circumstances, above all, on the selection of the proper moment to inflict a strike on the most vitally important enemy centers, primarily on his centers of nuclear-missile weapon production and inter-continental-missile launching bases. The result of the operation must be the ruination of the military and governmental machines of the aggressor. A blow of exactly this type can also cause other partners of the enemy coalition to give very careful thought to the advisability of entering the war. But an indispensable condition of complete victory must be the readiness of the missile troops to carry out one or more operations against some of the countries of Europe and other continents. We have in mind the countries that will undertake to follow their senior partner into the war. The intensity of the reaction must fluctuate, depending on the nature of the actions of the armed forces of one country or another.

In the determination of the degree of reaction it is necessary to consider that nuclear-missile weapons must be used in a decisive and purposeful way, but only within the limits of expediency. The forsaking of this requirement can lead to a situation wherein a war unleashed by aggressors will involve such

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large human and material losses on both sides that the consequences may be catastrophic for mankind.

In one case it may be necessary to conduct operations for the complete destruction of the means of retaliation, and in another--to destroy the strategic nuclear weapons bases. It is clear that in a strategic situation of this type it may be possible to find a place for the utilization of the other branches of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, and of the forces of other countries of the Socialist camp.

We are also inclined to think that, in some cases and in some directions, the primary role will belong to ground forces equipped with nuclear-missile weapons. This can occur in the unfolding of events when, after execution of the countering nuclear-missile operation against the main bulwark of the imperialist bloc, or simultaneously with it, a strike is delivered against a group of objectives in the countries which allowed the use of their territory by their senior partner for the launching of the first blow. This strike will not have the purpose of "complete annihilation of the enemy" in the sense that General Gastilovich uses it. The strike is calculated to disorganize the governmental control and destroy the main strategic and operational nuclear weapons bases, as well as the main formations of enemy troops. In order to achieve the results desired of the operation, the ground forces will carry out joint operations with the air forces and the navy for the complete destruction of the armed forces of the enemy and the achievement of the ultimate goals of the war. The ground forces, with their mobility and tremendous firepower, are aiming in decisive directions - the seizure of key positions of a country, possession of which will decide the outcome of the campaign in a given theater.

The directions of troop actions are stipulated in the overall scheme of a campaign. In addition, an effort should be made to avoid troop operations in areas where the terrain is highly contaminated by radioactivity arising as a result of our own strategic nuclear-missile strikes. The troops should use their own nuclear-missile weapon capabilities to support their operations. The expenditure of these means should be strictly limited and aimed at the destruction of enemy formations capable of disrupting or slowing down the successful development of attack in decisive

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directions.

When necessary for the assurance of a correlation of forces favorable to our troops, the forces and means of VGK missile large units (soyedineniye) may carry out strikes upon receipt of requests for fire from a front and an army.

Thus, we consider that the dominant role in an operational-tactical plan will quite often belong to the ground forces, by dint of their being equipped with nuclear-missile weapons, and above all, to the highly mobile motorized rifle and tank large units.

In regard to the size of the Armed Forces, we consider that a large part of the adult population, capable of active participation, will be mobilized and used as needed to guard and defend the entire territory of the country. Among the special organizations, the rescue-rehabilitation detachments will play an important role.

Obviously, self-defense and guard units and large units, as well as rescue-rehabilitation detachments, have to be created in accordance with territorial criteria and be prepared in advance to fulfill their tasks.

However, the size of the regular ground forces will undoubtedly be large; in other words, without a massive army it is impossible to have rapid and definitive victory in a future war. It is particularly necessary to consider the colossal losses that the ground forces will suffer, which will require sizeable reserves trained for operations.

In connection with the great probability that under certain conditions of the situation it will be necessary for the troops to fulfill the tasks of occupation, we consider it necessary to give special emphasis to the importance and responsibility of this function of the troops and to the advisability of carrying out at least the most elementary training of the troops in this sphere. In the past there have been serious difficulties in this regard. Now, under the conditions of the wide use of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to surmount the serious complexities of the situation. The command of field troops is confronted with the necessity not

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only of maintaining order among the troops themselves, but also of implementing measures for the organization and supervision of huge masses of people in a state of panic. It will be necessary to clear roads, to organize the evacuation of people from contaminated areas, and to provide huge masses of people with medical aid and food. To ignore these measures may lead to very drastic consequences.

Several Aspects of Operational Art

A new assessment of a number of questions of operational art by the authors of the special Collection is indicated, timely, and necessary. In the vanguard of these stands the solution of such questions as the place, role, and conduct of nuclear-missile operations in modern warfare, questions about the scale of modern front and army operations, regarding new principles of planning offensive operations, regarding the principle of concentrating the main efforts to destroy the enemy's nuclear means and main troop formations, regarding the creation of rescue-rehabilitation troops, and the working out of operations within military districts. A profound elaboration of these questions, on the basis of mass employment of nuclear weapons, will be a resounding contribution to the development of Soviet military science.

In this connection, it must be noted that the formulation of some of the questions, especially in the articles of Generals Gastilovich and Baskakov, in our opinion, are faulty. This applies particularly to the question of operational offense and operational defense, which we shall dwell upon.

The substance of the statements of Generals Gastilovich and Baskakov on this question amounts to the following: nuclear weapons eliminate the boundaries between operational offense and operational defense (page 37); in modern conditions offensive and defensive operations will be distinguished from one another mainly by the number of nuclear weapons allotted them (pages 12 and 15), in these operations the methods of troop operations will be identical (pages 15 and 37); defense, in the former meaning of the term, can only occur on a tactical scale (pages 14 and 37); the creation of defensive zones is impractical--any large unit executing defense in place will be destroyed by nuclear strikes by the enemy or will merely be bypassed by him (page 15); on an operational scale,

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defense cannot be stable (page 15).

Can we agree with such assertions? We feel that we cannot, primarily because these assertions do not conform with, and at times clearly contradict, Marxist dialectics in general, and the new conditions of conducting armed combat in particular.

In actuality, mass employment of nuclear weapons does change the nature of modern offensive and defensive operations radically. Large-scale maneuvering, aggressiveness, and decisiveness are now inherent to both an offensive and a defensive operation. Under modern conditions, an offensive operation will have more elements of defense and the defensive operation will have more elements of an offense. However, this has not made, and will not make, a defensive operation an offensive operation.

It does not follow that we turn our main attention to the similarity of offense and defense if we want to understand the substance of this contradictory phenomenon, but to their differences, to the study of the specific peculiarities of the opposing aspects, to the exposition and study of the major and minor aspects of this contradiction, without which it is impossible to develop the correct approach either to operational art or to tactics.

Obviously, we should not speak here of erasing the dividing line between operational offense and operational defense, but of the new nature of these conflicting aspects of armed combat, caused by the mass employment of nuclear weapons, and of the need to develop qualitatively new methods of conducting modern offensive and defensive operations. Talk of "erasing the dividing line" only leads us away from the solution of urgent problems of modern offense and defense.

It is likewise impossible to agree with the authors' declaration that modern offensive and defensive operations will be distinguished from one another primarily by the number of nuclear weapons allotted them.

The forces and means of the sides, whatever their quantity and quality, cannot in themselves determine the specific peculiarities of one or another type of combat operation. It is one thing to have plenty of forces and means (including nuclear weapons), but

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quite another to defend oneself and, on the other hand, to start offensive actions when these forces and means are considerably less. An example of this is the battle at Kursk, where we had plenty of forces and means but were on the defensive, while on other fronts, where the forces and means were significantly less, we were taking the offensive.

The offense, as a rule, usually has comparatively greater forces and means than the defense. But who would say that in modern conditions it is impossible to attack and win with equal or even smaller forces?! Nuclear weapons indeed create more favorable conditions for the triumph of this concept of military art. But if this is so, the quantity of forces and means in general, and of nuclear weapons in particular, cannot serve as a criterion of the type of operation, because it cannot determine the characteristic and specific traits of one or another type of combat operation.

In our opinion, it is not the quantity of nuclear weapons which is the factor determining the identifying features of operations, but the targets and the nature of the combat operations, and the methods and ways in which they are carried out, insofar as they alone allow us to see the specific peculiarities of attack and defense, their substance. The authors ignored these factors and took as a foundation the incidental and transient, which led them to incorrect conclusions.

General Gastilovich, alluding to the fact that part of the forces of an army or front may take the offensive during a defensive operation, declares that defensive operations of a front and an army will resemble an offensive operation in their operational methods. General Baskakov adheres to more or less the same opinion, asserting that "the difference between the conduct of an offense and a defense....remains in the tactics alone" (page 37).

It is impossible to agree with such assertions. We always had elements of offense in our defense, but we never considered the operational methods of troops on offense and defense as a sign of equality. This must not be done now, as this will lead unavoidably to the glossing over of the specific traits of offense and defense, and to a one-sided and superficial scrutiny

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of the complex phenomena of armed combat, with all the consequences that arise therefrom.

Defense has a clearly defined goal--to disrupt or stop (hold up) the enemy offensive, inflict sizeable losses on him, and create favorable conditions for going over to the offensive. And if it does not succeed in withstanding the offensive, it does not achieve this goal. The question arises as to why we have a defense which is incapable of stalling an enemy offensive, inflicting losses upon him, and effecting favorable conditions for our troops to go over to the offensive?!

Consequently, the defense has to be stable if we wish to achieve the goals; nuclear weapons cannot alter this requirement. It is a different matter that the stability of the defense under modern conditions need not be bound rigidly to holding whatever has become of the main line of resistance and the forward area. But this is a question of the development of new methods for conducting a defensive battle and operation.

The fact that the enemy, having nuclear weapons, is able to destroy the defense, break through the defensive line, or bypass the troops that occupy it, does not mean that defensive lines or areas are not needed, or that the defense cannot be stable under modern conditions. To speak of defense without defensive lines or areas is like talking about an offensive without an attack, without forward progress. If we approach this from the standpoint of the possibilities of nuclear weapons, it will be even easier for the offense to destroy or bypass enemy troops if they are in assembly areas.

Obviously, we should speak of another thing: what defense should be like under modern conditions, what the characteristics of a defensive line or area should be; how, where, and in what time periods defensive installations must be created, how to ensure the stability of the defense, how to safeguard personnel and combat equipment in the defense, and what methods of conducting a defensive battle and operation should be adopted in order to attain the goals of the defense.

In his article, "Mountain Warfare Then and Now," F. Engels, pointing out the validity of views on the impregnability of the so-called Swiss mountain redoubt, wrote: "Does this mean that

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the defense of a mountainous country is completely useless? Of course not. It means only that the defense must not be merely passive, but should draw on its power and mobility, and operate offensively whenever an opportunity arises" (F. Engels Selected Military Works, Voyenizdat, 1957. page 99).

In other words, in conditions when the offense becomes stronger than the defense, the problems of the latter must be solved, not by abolishing the defense, but by developing new, more advanced methods of conducting it. Nuclear armament gives us every opportunity for doing this. In the hands of the defense it increases the stability of the defense immeasurably. Of course this will be a real defense, not one backed by some sort of thin defensive line of troops under cover, as General Baskakov recommends. It stands to reason that neither this line nor the defensive zone is capable of containing an enemy that is equipped with powerful nuclear weapons. Modern defensive battles and engagements will take place in large areas, along the front and in depth, and often in separate directions. For this reason, operational defense must be deep, and capable of resisting the powerful, dispersed strikes of the offense. This can be achieved by creating a system of defensive areas echeloned in depth, and also by dispersed disposition of the reserves along the front and in depth.

The basis of modern defense will apparently consist of holding defensive areas firmly in conjunction with obstacles, operating offensively wherever the slightest opportunity presents itself, and anticipating the enemy in the delivery of strikes. It is not difficult to imagine the gravity of the situation of the offense if the defense is able to stop it. Even a small number of nuclear strikes, against fairly dense, openly deployed combat arrays of the offense, can inflict such losses that the offense will not be able to win even by large-scale nuclear strikes against the defense. This is an important advantage of modern defense, the basis of which has to be a combination of holding firmly defensive areas which are separate, not clearly defined, but interrelated from the standpoint of firepower by decisive counterattacks from different directions by the reserves and the defending troops, carried out right after the delivery of nuclear strikes.

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Proceeding from this, we consider it possible to indicate the fundamental directions in which, in our opinion, problems of modern defense must be solved.

1. Increase the firepower of the defense, the basis of which will be nuclear weapons and the firepower of antitank means; these means must permit the defense to win the battle of firepower against the offense and force the latter to give up the attack or delay it. The solution of this problem must follow the path of extensive shifts of trajectories of nuclear-missile weapons, as well as the path of creating in the defense, areas of resistance by fire, based on the utilization of systems of long-range control of antitank and rifle fire. The creation of areas of resistance by fire has very great significance in increasing the stability of the defense, as these areas are capable of resisting the nuclear strikes of the enemy much better than the conventional defensive areas can, and they can operate practically without limitations in an area that has been contaminated by radioactive materials.

2. Increasing the mobile capabilities of the defense and its aggressiveness, in order to stop an enemy drive by building up troops quickly in the threatened areas, and to destroy him by nuclear strikes, and bold counterattacks and counterblows. The solution of this problem must take the path of creating powerful mobile reserves dispersed along the front and in depth, and of developing new methods of conducting a defensive battle and operation, as well as the path of widespread use of portable obstacles, especially proximity-controlled minefields. A well thought-out system of quickly installed obstacles is capable of inducing confusion in the offense and inhibiting its progress at a point which is favorable for delivering nuclear strikes and executing counter-attacks.

3. Increase the capabilities of the defense for protection against the nuclear blows of the offense by means of a system of improving and developing new, high-efficiency engineer apparatus, of creating compact, portable designs of defensive installations that can be assembled and dismantled, of providing apparatus with hinges for entrenchment, of developing explosive devices for making individual foxholes and of carrying out other measures, directed at the fulfillment of tasks of engineer support of anti-atomic protection (PAZ) for several hours of units and large units, as well as the improvement of individual means of anti-chemical protection and of the protective qualities of combat equipment, directed

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toward the assurance of the feasibility of conducting defensive operations in an area contaminated by radioactive materials.

The solution of these problems will be a qualitative advance in the organization and conduct of a defensive battle and operation, a new stage in the creative development of modern defense.

* * *

We have touched upon only a few questions of strategy and operational art, the correct interpretation of which, in our opinion, has profoundly important meaning for the solution of all other questions of military art. Not claiming that our judgements are infallible, we hope that a wide exchange of opinions in the pages of the special Collection regarding these questions will help to find their best solutions.

1. Headquarters Comment: According to [redacted], 1.3(a)(4) Col. Gen. Anton I. Gastilovich, who is on the faculty of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, wrote an article in the first issue of Spetsialnyy Sbornik Statey Zhurnala "Voyennaya Mysl" (Special Collection of the Journal Voyennaya Mysl). Conceivably such a collection was initiated in 1960, beginning with the 1960 First Edition.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence", by Lt. Gen. M. Kochetkov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence" by Lt. Gen. M. Kochetkov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted]limination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence", by Lt. General M. Kochetkov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Technical Intelligence", written by Lieutenant General Mikhail A. Kochetkov, who has long been associated with the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and in 1958 was Chief of its Operations (Transborder) Directorate (see also Headquarters Comment No. 2).

The article appeared in the 1960 Second Edition of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET and is issued irregularly. The month of publication of the 1960 Second Edition is unknown. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Elimination of the Lag

in

Operational and Tactical Intelligence[1]

by

Lieutenant General M. Kochetkov

Vast changes in the nature of armed combat, caused by the appearance of weapons of mass destruction and, especially, of missiles of varying designation, necessitate the development of new intelligence (razvedyvatelnaya) techniques and their introduction into large units (soyedineniye) and groupings (obedineniye) of the branches of the armed forces and arms of troops, a re-examination of the organizational structure of operational and tactical intelligence from top to bottom, and the development of new forms and methods of combat activity of operational and tactical intelligence in peacetime and wartime. Naturally, the solving of all these questions must take into account the nature of a future war.

There is no need to prove the importance of operational and tactical intelligence. Its importance is adequately stated in the article of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov in the first issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" (Voyennaya Mysl) for 1960. It would be useful to refer to the statement of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, made by him at the 6 July 1956 critique. He pointed out: "Under modern conditions intelligence takes on extraordinary significance; it has never been as important as it is now and will be in the near future. It is impossible to count on victory if one does not have reliable information about the enemy. If we talk about operational intelligence - its importance is simply enormous. To know the plans of the enemy, the concentration of his forces, means, and formations (gruppirovka) and react to them accordingly - this is half the victory over the enemy."

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It is known that the missile troops have moved up to assume first place among the other branches of the armed forces. There are missile troops of strategic designation which are the means of the Supreme High Command (VGK). On the successful operations of the latter depend the seizure of the strategic initiative in the initial period of a war and its retention during the war until the enemy is completely destroyed.

The missile troops of the VGK are capable of solving tasks at great strategic depth for eliminating from a war entire countries and other great strategic objectives, as well as destroying, in coordination with the ground forces, enemy targets in the theater of military operations (TVD) in the operational depth, beyond the range limits of the missile means of a front.

The operations of other branches of the armed forces - antiaircraft (PVO) troops of the country, the ground forces, the air forces (VVS) and the naval forces, are dependent on successful operations of the missile troops, which create conditions favorable for the operations of the others in the theater of military operations.

In examining the role and place of the branches of the armed forces in a future war, with the purpose of establishing their interrelationship and degree of independence, we come to the conclusion that even in peacetime the missile troops have to be provided with exhaustive, precise data on all objectives subject to destruction in the first counterblow of the missile troops against the aggressor. Naturally the missile troops must be targeted against these objectives in advance and be in a state of maximum readiness for an instantaneous counter-blow.

In connection with this, we feel that, on behalf of the missile troops of the VGK and fronts, an appropriate body composed of operatives (operator) and intelligence officers (razvedchik) should be created in the General Staff. Its task must include the collation of intelligence data on strategic and operational objectives of the countries of the imperialist camp, and the determination, depending on the importance of these objectives and their influence on the course of a war, of the order in which they will be subjected to nuclear strikes.

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This body should have an accurately worked out card index encompassing all strategic and operational objectives in both the strategic and the operational depth. The cards for each objective should specify: its characteristics, precise geodetic and topographic location (privyazka), the size of the nuclear charge, the type of burst (ground, air), the method of delivering the nuclear charge to the target, the amount of time needed to deliver the strike after the command is given, and other new data on the listed objectives, and reports on newly appeared objectives.

The first priority targets will be the individual, most aggressive, and dangerous countries, large political, economic, and administrative centers, military-industrial objectives, and mainly the depots with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, industry for the production of nuclear weapons delivery, air and naval bases, and the means of control and command of the missile troops and armed forces in the theaters of military operations.

Thus, it seems to us that only as a result of a successful, welltimed strike by the missile troops of the VGK can one count on an entree to the large-scale operational employment of all the other branches of the armed forces.

In peacetime conditions, strategic intelligence provides the VGK with the necessary intelligence data on the above-mentioned objectives. It should be pointed out, however, that these objectives are on the whole stationary, non-mobile, and, in place for a long time, which affords the opportunity for their exhaustive reconnaissance and study. Operational intelligence participates in these efforts to a limited extent.

As soon as the first atomic strike is inflicted and a war is unleashed, the situation, above all for intelligence, will undergo a tremendous change. The armed forces of the enemy will start moving, their large-scale movements will unfold, as well as dispersal to the theaters of military operations, and the nuclear-missile troops of the enemy, and other delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons, including aviation, aircraft carriers, and the missile-carrying fleet, will start maneuvering in the theaters of combat operations.

Under these circumstances new tasks will arise for intelligence, the significance of which is hard to overestimate.

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First of all, it will be necessary to clarify the results of our nuclear counterblow delivered by the missile troops, to continue intelligence operations against the nuclear weapons preserved by the enemy, the means of control and command, nuclear industry, the nature of the formations of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations and their plans and intentions. All new, mobile objectives must be discovered quickly by intelligence operations, so that a blow can be inflicted at once, and thus keep the strategic initiative in our hands.

In such a situation it is unlikely that we can count on the volume and timeliness of receipt of intelligence data as in the peacetime network, and it is all the more unlikely that it will be possible to avoid multistages in the levying of these tasks on the appropriate organs of intelligence. The time element will acquire extraordinary significance.

It appears to us that the missile troops of the VGK must now have their own means of long-range intelligence (manned and unmanned reconnaissance planes, radiotechnical reconnaissance, and other means) in order to carry out independent reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance of objectives, and react to any changes in the situation immediately.

Our armed forces, and mainly our missile troops, have first-class equipment, while operational and tactical intelligence and their technical equipment lag seriously. A certain gap between the means of destruction and the means of intelligence has developed.

Our intelligence does not have dependable technical means of detection of weapons of mass destruction. Reconnaissance planes are not yet able to find the launching pads of nuclear weapons and transmit the information acquired from aboard the aircraft directly to a control point. Aerial photography and the processing of photographs are done extremely slowly and are late in providing their results.

The technical means of radiotechnical reconnaissance also lag in their development. We still do not have dependable ultra-shortwave (UKV) hand direction finders, communications intercept equipment is poorly developed, troop reconnaissance still does not have television equipment, there are a few infrared

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reconnaissance instruments, and photographic reconnaissance has not been perfected. The technical means of artillery and engineer reconnaissance have limited depth of operation, in that they can be used only in the tactical zone, which excludes the possibility of reconnaissance of the atomic means of divisions and corps of the potential enemies.

The time has come for a thorough investigation of the technical equipment of operational and tactical intelligence and to bring about the order needed. We consider that the serious fault which led to the lag in the technical equipment of operational and tactical intelligence is the absence of one central organ for operational and tactical intelligence in the General Staff which would occupy itself with questions of developing and providing technical equipment to intelligence units (chast) and subunits (podrazdeleniye) of all branches of the armed forces, just as it did at the end of the last war and during the period of existence of the reconnaissance corps (korpus razvedki). The Chief Intelligence Directorate does not deal with these matters at the present time, because it has been relieved of such work.

To the extent that their powers and capabilities permit, the staffs of the branches of the armed forces and their intelligence departments (otdel) are dealing with these matters. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a lack of unity of views concerning the development and supply of intelligence equipment that in many cases there is parallelism and duplication, and that requirements of the General Staff and the Armed Forces as a whole for technical means of intelligence are not taken into account for appropriate orders to industry and planners. Every branch of the armed forces looks out for itself in the field of technical equipping of intelligence.

In order to close the gap between the means of destruction and the technical means of operational and tactical intelligence, it would be advisable to create an appropriate body in the structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate capable of coordinating and planning the development of technical intelligence means on behalf of all the armed forces, working in close cooperation with the Scientific-Technical Committee of the General Staff and the Operational Directorate.[2]

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The organizational structure of military intelligence from regiment through front needs serious re-examination.

The question of bringing order to the organizational structure and technical equipping of military intelligence, and increasing its penetrating capability, ties in directly with the decision of our government to reduce the Armed Forces without jeopardizing the overall security of the country. Obviously, the smaller the Armed Forces, the stronger and better organized must be the organs and means of intelligence, which is called upon to provide essential information to the VGK and to the command of all levels, both in peacetime and wartime.

It seems to us that the fundamental principle which should be used as the basis for the organizational structure of operational and tactical intelligence must be the creation of greater intelligence independence of divisions and armies from the higher staffs. The divisions and armies must provide themselves independently with the required intelligence information in the entire depth of an operation (battle), using their own means.

To be sure, in modern operations the army and division will be operating in much wider zones and at greater depth. Under the conditions of enemy employment of powerful nuclear and termo-nuclear (vodorodnyy) charges, divisions, with gaps of 20-40 km or more between them, whereupon large units that are moving ahead successfully are always obligated to be ready to assist a neighbor who has encountered a stronger enemy, which can cause a change in the direction of an offensive.

Besides, it is scarcely likely that, in the next war, one can expect to carry out classical offensive operations with break-throughs of a previously prepared defense or the conduct of defensive engagements under conditions similar to the previous ones. The meeting battle (engagement) will probably become the basic form of combat operation, and it will begin with the approach, and not upon direct contact with the enemy. Consequently, the intelligence operations of large units, using their own means, must ensure the collection, analysis, and collation of the intelligence data required by the commanders (komandir) of large units and the commanders (komanduyushchiy) of groupings in order for them to make decisions, with these units leaning primarily upon their own forces and means.

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Thus, the intelligence forces and means of large units must provide intelligence to a depth on the order of 50-60 km, and groupings up to 300 km. In regard to a front, intelligence must embrace a depth of at least two front operations, so that at the end of the current operation, excluding any operational pauses, it would be ready to report full information about the enemy, his plans and intentions, for making a decision on the follow-up operation.

Along with the conduct of intelligence operations for themselves, the large units and operational groupings must perform a series of very important intelligence tasks on behalf of the higher staff, operational groupings, and the General Staff; in return, the General Staff and the staffs of the higher groupings, using their intelligence means, are obligated to service the lower intelligence organs and staffs.

Therefore, the next principle of organizational structure of operational and tactical intelligence must be the centralization of operational and tactical intelligence of the branches and arms of the armed forces, and the subordination of intelligence organs of lower combined-arms staffs to the higher ones, from the intelligence standpoint, with the General Staff playing the dominant role. In turn the intelligence organs of combined-arms staffs consolidate in themselves the intelligence operations of the arms of the armed forces.

The higher intelligence organs must direct, supervise, and assist their subordinates with the organization and conduct of intelligence operations, with the provision of intelligence equipment, with selection of personnel, and with the combat training of intelligence units and subunits, always maintaining the combat preparedness of the latter.

It is necessary to examine the questions of organizational structure along two lines: the structure of the intelligence organs proper, from the Center down to the regiment, and the structure of intelligence units, subunits, large units, and groupings subordinate to these organs.

The following structure of operational and tactical intelligence seems most expedient to us.

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In the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff there should be a Directorate of Operational Intelligence. This directorate should be assigned the following tasks:

--Unifying the coordinating the intelligence operations of all branches and arms of troops;

--Planning and conducting intelligence activities of the intelligence departments of the branches and arms of troops on behalf of the large units and groupings of the branches and arms of troops and the General Staff (concentrating the intelligence efforts of the armed forces in a theater of military operations in the main directions);

--Working out the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concerning the status of operational and tactical intelligence, and the direction of its development;

--Guiding the intelligence work of the intelligence directorates of the staffs of military districts, especially the border districts, and the fleets, by all types and means of intelligence as a whole, not separating the latter for subordination according to the various echelons of command (air, agent, naval, radiotechnical);[3]

--Working out, for design bureaus and scientific-research institutes, the tactical-technical data of the technical means of intelligence for all branches of the armed forces in order to eliminate duplication and parallelism in the work, coordinating this work with the intelligence departments of the branches of the armed forces;

--Publishing bulletins about current questions of operational and tactical intelligence of the branches of the armed forces, and also manuals and instructions on operational and tactical intelligence;

--Direct participation of the Directorate in working out large exercises and maneuvers carried out by the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the staffs of the branches of the armed forces, in order to accumulate experience in intelligence, and to study and work out questions in its planning and conduct, collect intelligence data for use by the troops, and also to develop informational work in all elements of the intelligence organs;

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--Participating in tests of appropriate intelligence and special equipment;

--Carrying out experimental and demonstration exercises in intelligence;

--Participating in the instruction, posting, and training of intelligence personnel from divisions of all branches of the armed forces up to chiefs of intelligence directorates of military districts (fronts); and other questions.

It is known that operational intelligence was not prepared at the beginning of the last war. Therefore, while the war was in progress, a search was made for organizational forms and working methods, and not until 1943, 23 months after the start of the war, did operational intelligence acquire an acceptable organizational structure in troop units and in the General Staff, in which was created the Reconnaissance Directorate.[4]

Under modern conditions we consider it impractical to create such an independent directorate, but it is quite necessary in the structure of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff. It is unlikely that, in the next war, we shall have as long (23 months) for working out the structure of operational intelligence as a whole, and in the General Staff in particular, and for the accumulation of experience in the combat activity of operational intelligence. All this work should be carried out long before the war. The lessons of history must be taken into consideration. In the postwar period, when the reconnaissance corps was in existence, there was such a directorate in the GRU of the General Staff and it did a lot of work, but then, instead of developing it and improving operational intelligence, it began to lose its importance and then ceased to exist. This deficiency should be eliminated quickly. This will not require a large number of personnel.

It is advisable to enlarge somewhat the intelligence departments of the branches of the armed forces. These departments must fully guide the operational and tactical intelligence of their branch of the armed forces and organize and carry out combat training of intelligence subunits and units, in accordance with the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, with the coordination and guiding role in this

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work performed by the GRU of the General Staff.

It is necessary to restore to duty the chiefs of intelligence of the arms of troops, providing them with a small organization, 2 or 3 persons, and giving them the responsibility for carrying out the guidance of intelligence in their arm of troops.

It is necessary to examine the intelligence directorates of military districts and fleets, and bring them into line with modern requirements, taking into account the fact that in the first operations of the initial period of a war, the border military districts will have to operate with the forces and means on hand. Therefore, it is advisable for the intelligence organs, units, and sub-units of these military districts to be close to the wartime table of organization and equipment even in peacetime.

It is advisable to strengthen the intelligence departments of armies so that they can fulfill the tasks facing them. It is necessary to do the same regarding the intelligence sections (otdeleniye) of divisions (large units).

It is absolutely necessary to raise the authority of intelligence and the chiefs of intelligence at all levels, in fact, not just paying the latter lip service as deputies to the chiefs of staff, and to relate them more closely to the chiefs of the operational sections, departments, and directorates, and demand that they perform creative and active work. In regard to the structure of units and subunits of intelligence, supplying them with intelligence equipment, as well as the question of what means, units, and subunits the large units and groupings of the ground forces should have at their disposal, we have at this time nothing to add to that which is stated in the article of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov. The implementation of his proposals will permit a sharp improvement of operational and tactical intelligence.

We have touched upon only a few of the important questions. Obviously, in the future it will be necessary to discuss these problems of operational and tactical intelligence more fully in the pages of this Collection.

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Headquarters Comments:

1. According to other reliable sources, the GRU is charged with the collection of strategic intelligence (strategicheskaya razvedka), so-called operational intelligence (operativnaya razvedka, information bearing on opposing armed forces in one theater of operations), and so-called military intelligence (voyskovaya razvedka, information supporting unit commanders in the furtherance of immediate, localized combat missions). Apparently the term tactical intelligence (takticheskaya razvedka) has supplanted the term military intelligence.

2. This is the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, concerned with military operations, and should not be confused with the now-defunct Operations Directorate of the GRU. Many of the functions proposed by Kochetkov for the "Operational Intelligence Directorate" (see page 9, first paragraph) were formerly performed by the GRU Operations Directorate.

3. The responsibilities for both agent operations and radio-technical (communications and electronics intelligence) activities are known to have been held by the Intelligence Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) as of 1958.

4. This term (Razvedyvaltelnoye upravleniye) can also be translated as Intelligence Directorate, but from the context Reconnaissance Directorate appears more accurate. It is not clear how the GRU is able to distinguish between the two designative concepts, intelligence and reconnaissance.

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26 September 1961

C-48

For P Sept. 13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Conversation with Mr. Helms Re [redacted] Report on Large-Scale Soviet Military Preparations 1.3(a)(4)

1. When Mr. Osborn and I were discussing the above report with Mr. Helms, upon its receipt yesterday afternoon, I told Mr. Helms we should expect renewed consumer questions about the possibility of deception. I pointed out that the [redacted] material had not only been accepted by most of our consumers, but that the material was: a) extremely costly in terms of Soviet security; and b) apparently inconsistent with any discernible Soviet policy purposes. However, I said we must face up to the fact that [redacted] was now in a key positionto give us information vitally affecting our own reaction to recent Soviet moves. For example, [redacted] could assure us that all the preparations we would be seeing over the next few weeks were, indeed, part of the maneuvers already described, in which case the Soviets would beable to take aggressive military action without alerting our indications mechanism. On the other hand, at some critical juncture, [redacted] might tell us that the Soviets were now ready to strike unless we made significant concessions, even though, in fact, the entire Soviet effort was bluff. 1.3(a)(4)

2. Mr. Helms agreed that such questions would probably arise, but that we should take the position that the consumers themselves would have to make up their minds as to the answer. He said all we could vouch for was that, from strictly an operational standpoint, we had been unable to fault [redacted] and could see nothing in the operational and CE aspects of the case which would cause us to question the validity of the information being supplied. 1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

JOHN J. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

JJM/r

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

2 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

SUBJECT : "The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. This article was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", by Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov

DATE OF INFO: Early 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: Reliable Soviet source (B) who has access to this type of document.

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Paths of Further Development of the Tank Troops of the Soviet Army", written by Marshal of Armored Troops Pavel A. Rotmistrov, Chief of the Military Academy of Armored Troops i/n Stalin.

The article appeared in the 1961 First Edition of The Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Voyennaya Mysl" (Military Thought), instituted in 1960, which is classified TOP SECRET and is published irregularly. According to the preface, this edition contains articles never before published and some speeches which have been delivered prior to being published in this form. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

Many points in Rotmistrov's article are challenged in an article by General of the Army A. S. Zhadov in the 1961 Second Edition of this Special Collection. (Cf. [redacted] dated 12 September 1961.) 1.3(a)(4)

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The Paths of Further Development of the

Tank Troops of the Soviet Army

by

Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov

There have been pronouncements of late on many questions connected with the development of tank technology and the organization of tank troops. One can hear the opinion that it is pointless to have strong armor plating on tanks in view of the appearance of new, highly effective antitank means (above all of guided antitank missiles - snaryad), and also because of difficulties related to the production and use of heavy, tracked combat vehicles.

In connection with the probable re-arming of tanks with guided missiles (upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad) instead of tube artillery armament, it is also said that it is necessary to re-examine the design of tanks. In particular, proposals are advanced that the production of heavy tanks and the development of prototypes be stopped. In this case there will be only two types of tanks with which our tank troops can be equipped: medium (the basic type) and light (amphibious), instead of the three that now exist.

It is impossible not to admit that the pronouncements and proposals cited touch upon fundamental questions of the further development of armored technology, organizational structure, and of the combat use of tank troops.

A proposal that is no less important, which is also widely discussed and which has its supporters, is the elimination of tank armies and divisions and conversion to mixed organization of an army and a unified division.

We do not share the views of the "innovators", since they are not scientifically founded and are not supported by the experience of the last war. Inasmuch as there are no official decisions concerning these questions as yet, we shall permit ourselves to express our viewpoint.

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Conditions that determine the directions of the further development of tanks. A tank is a tracked combat vehicle of high cross-country ability incorporating three basic combat qualities: firepower, armor protection, and mobility. During the existence of the tank these qualities have constantly been improved as regards achievements in the development of armament, armor protection, power transmission, and running gear, as well as by changes in operational-tactical views on the employment of tank troops.

The choice of the directions of development of the basic combat qualities of our modern tanks was made on the basis of the experience of the last war. During recent years further development has been mainly concerned with increasing the accuracy of fire when in motion (stabilizers), of broadening the scope of combat utilization (firing at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the surmounting of water obstacles by floating or by moving along the bottom of the water), and of increasing the reliability of operation of separate assemblies and of the vehicle as a whole.

The correct determination of basic combat characteristics ensured the superiority of our tanks over the comparable types of tanks of the capitalist countries during the last war and in the postwar period.

At the present time the development of new types of weapons, and above all of the means of mass destruction, makes it necessary to determine the paths for the further improvement of the combat qualities of tanks which are applicable to the newly arising conditions of a possible war.

The present period of tank development is characterized by the fact that the decisive factor for further improvement is not so much past combat experience, with all its value, but a scientific forecast of the nature of a future war, the role of tank troops in it, and the methods of their combat employment. In other words, the basic trends in the development of armor technology should be determined now, above all, by the presence of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and by the development of tank technology and of the means of defense against tanks.

Proceeding from a thorough analysis of the nature of a future war, it must be considered that the decisive force in the ground troops will be tank troops, in cooperation with

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missile troops and aviation. The basic assignment of tanks in modern combat operations will obviously be: combat with the tanks of the enemy, destruction of missile launchers on the launch sites, suppression and destruction of the various other firing means, the means of control, reconnaissance, and supply, as well as the personnel of the enemy, including those in armored carriers and in shelters. Proceeding from this, it is essential to lay special stress on the multi-purpose assignments of tanks and their armament not only at the present stage, but also in the near future. From the conditions of highly mobile troop operations and of great independence in the employment of tank units (chast), sub-units (podrazdeleniye), and individual tanks, dictated by the use of weapons of mass destruction in a battle and an engagement, arises the need to include in the armament of our troops tanks with high resistance to all the destructive (porazhayushchiy) factors of a nuclear explosion, with great cruising range, and which are also powerfully armed and carrying a significant supply of ammunition for various missions, above all of shells (snaryad) effective against the tanks of the enemy.

The armor protection of tanks. As was mentioned before, one hears nowadays the opinion that, owing to the appearance of new antitank combat weapons, there is no longer a requirement for tanks with thick armor. Among others, a proponent of this viewpoint is Colonel-General A. I. Gastilovich, who writes literally in his article ("The Theory of Military Art Requires Review", Spetsialnyy sbornik statey zhurnala Voyennaya Mysl, First Issue, 1960.) that the ground troops as a whole should be made air-transportable with lightly armored (oblegchennyy) tanks, as any armor can be penetrated anyway.

In this article we do not have the opportunity to examine other questions raised by General Gastilovich. At the same time, it is impossible to bypass the question cited without drawing the attention of the author to the fact that not only are light tanks incapable of engaging independently in battles with tanks of the enemy (General Gastilovich, it should be said, calls upon our tank divisions to do this, on page 13 of the Special Collection), but they will also suffer heavy losses from nuclear strikes by the enemy, and thus our tanks and tank troops as a whole will only lose by these "innovations". Consequently, it is impossible to reject, so rashly, reliable armor protection of modern tanks.

The complexity of creating proper armor protection for tanks under modern conditions, in relation to the development of powerful means of destruction, is further conditioned by the fact that this

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protection must be over-all, i.e., that it is called upon to protect personnel against destruction by various types of weapons that operate on different principles.

Thus, the armor-piercing shell with high muzzle velocity which is used against tanks presents one requirement to the armor material.

Nuclear weapons have introduced other requirements, namely, the need to protect tanks against the shock wave of a nuclear explosion and against penetrating radiation (gamma rays and neutron flux).

In this connection, it must be kept in mind that while steel armor offers good protection against the shock wave of a nuclear explosion (here we take into consideration the strength of the hull and turret) and successfully resists gamma-radiation, which is connected with the heavy specific gravity of steel, it affords slight resistance to the flow of fast neutrons. In regard to radiation of light waves it should be said that the existing armor of tanks eliminates this danger to the crew.

Finally, the use of shaped-charge (kumulyativnyy) shells, as is known, is based upon a different principle of destruction, which is most effective against steel armor. We recall that the first attempts to use shaped charges in combat occurred during the period of the Spanish Civil War (1936). During World War II shaped-charge antitank means were greatly improved (panzerfaust, bazooka, and others) and were quite widely used.

In the postwar period the sphere of employment of shaped charges as a means of combating tanks has widened even more; this is evidenced by the further improvement of shaped-charge shells in conventional tube artillery, the creation of recoilless weapons with shaped-charge shells, and, finally, the appearance of guided missiles with shaped charges.

The highly effective action of shaped charges against steel armor, the widespread possibilities of their use, and also the appearance during the last few years, in many countries, for example, France, England, the USA, West Germany and Switzerland, of various models of antitank guided missiles (PTURS) (See Table 1), have introduced the problem of providing protection for tanks from destruction by shaped charges, which should be gone into in more detail.

Some foreign military experts think that the appearance of PTURS with shaped charges opens a new era in combat with tanks and leads to a fundamental change in the equipment (tekhnika) and tactics of armored troops.

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TABLE 1

Various Tactical-Technical Data of Antitank Guided Missiles of Foreign Countries:

	France				USA		England	Switzerland
Characteristics	SS-10 1950	SS-11 1955	"ENTAC"	"LUTIN"	DART 1956	RED EYE	VICKERS - 891 1958	COBRA-4
Guidance (Type) System	Remote control by wire	Remote control by wire and radio	By wire	By radio	Remote control by wire	Homing (samonavedeniye) by infrared ray	Remote control by wire	Remote control by wire
Caliber, mm	164	160	150	130	254	This missile can be used against planes flying at low level as well as against tanks.	114	100
Overall Length of Missile, mm	860	1070	1000	1300	2100		838	870
Launch Weight, kg	15	28	17	18.6	110		18	11
Weight of Warhead, kg*	4.2	5.8	4.8	4	---		3.5	4
Velocity, meters/sec*	80	195	80	125	270		90	80
Distance of Guided Flight, m	1600	3500	1350	5000	4800		1600	1500
Armor-piercing Ability, mm	400	400	450	---	400		400	300

* Collection of Articles "Artillery Journal" (artilleriyskiy zhurnal), No. 43/10 for 1959, pages 46,47.

Note: The date on missiles SS-10, SS-11, "Dart", "Vickers-891" and "Cobra-4" are from the book, "Missile Weapons and Their Combat Use", Part I, Voyenizdat 1960, page 186. Data on "Entac" and "Lutin" -- from the collection of articles, "Artillery Journal", No. 43/10 1959, pages 46, 47. On Red Eye, from the collection of articles of the journal "Tankist", No. 47, 1959, pages 36, 37.

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With all the diversity of known PTURS, they can be differentiated basically by the type of rocket engine (solid - porokhovoy - or liquid) and by the system of guidance (navedeniye) to the target. Guidance (upravleniye) is by wire, radio, or by means of an infrared homing head.

The firing of antitank guided missiles is done from ground launching mounts (puskovaya ustanovka) installed on vehicles, armored carriers, and other mobile means.

In comparison with other antitank means, these missiles have a number of advantages. They are easy to handle and, being guided in trajectory, display great accuracy in tests. Unlike conventional antitank weapons, the operator does not have to determine distance to the target and its rate of movement when firing a guided missile. And finally, the main thing, which allowed some experts to speak of the onset of a new era in combat against tanks, is the great depth of penetration of steel armor, equal to 400-450 mm or more for a normal hit.

These positive qualities of antitank guided missiles predetermine their widespread use in battle. But one must not go to extremes and draw hasty conclusions, which often happens when technical achievements are evaluated from only one standpoint.

Our creation of antitank guided missiles, of which the tactical-technical characteristics are on a level with foreign models, apparently served as one of the main grounds for the pronouncements on the inexpediency of using heavy armor on tanks, inasmuch as it is allegedly practically impossible to install armor protection of tanks that could withstand the modern means for their destruction.

The mistake in such reasoning lies in its one-sidedness, and arises from an inadequate appraisal of many factors connected with the conditions of employment of these means, and also from forgetting the powerful combat characteristics of tanks.

The launching mounts of antitank guided missiles are basically a means of defense; they cannot be used in a tank meeting engagement and have absolutely no protection from the effects of nuclear weapons, which seriously limits the possibilities for their combat employment. Even in the defense these launching mounts are easily destroyed by tactical nuclear weapons. Besides, they will be unable to move over contaminated terrain right after a nuclear explosion, while tanks will operate without delay, exploiting the success after the use of a nuclear weapon against the enemy.

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Data on the great firing accuracy of PTURS were obtained under firing range conditions, in other words, without interference by the enemy.

The receiving apparatus of an antitank guided missile is highly sensitive to the signals of the operator. It is enough to force the operator, who works under conditions of direct contact with the enemy, to commit any unintentional movement of the binocular sight (visor) at the instant the missile is being laid on, even to start at the explosion of a hostile shell, and the PTURS will change its flight course and miss the target.

PTURS mobile launching mounts on light transport equipment can be suppressed effectively by modern means of mass destruction.

Besides this, the known models of antitank guided missiles have the following substantial faults:

- during the intitial stage of flight, for a sizeable part of the trajectory (up to 500 meters), they are still unguided, i. e., they have a sizeable "dead" (mertvaya) zone in which they present no danger to tanks; for the same reason they are of little use for combat operations under city conditions;

- when firing from launching mounts, located on the ground, or on vehicles, they have a limited shift of fire;

- with instantaneous-action fuses, if the missiles meet even the slightest resistance in their trajectory (bushes, fences, etc.) they may explode before reaching the target;

- they have a low velocity, so that it takes 15-30 seconds for them to travel 2-3 km; during this time the enemy can destroy the operator or his guidance instruments with counterfire, after which the missile becomes unguided.

For wire, radio, and infrared ray guidance it is necessary for the operator to see the target during the entire flight time of the missile in order to keep the missile on the line of sighting. As a rule, in cases when the target is lost for a few seconds, the missile will also be lost.

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Firing by tanks at guided missile launching mounts, the laying of smoke screens, and also the utilization by tanks of folds in the ground, features and structures, trees, and bushes when approaching the enemy will lead to a considerable reduction in the effectiveness of guided missiles used against tanks.

The analysis of the qualities, possibilities, and conditions of combat use of recently developed models of antitank guided missiles with shaped charges, possessing high armor-piercing capability, allows us to state with full responsibility that their appearance in the presence of means of mass destruction and tanks does not give us sufficient basis to conclude that it is inexpedient to use a strong armor protection on the basic types of Soviet tanks. Besides, it should not be forgotten that a tank with strong armor, moving rapidly over the battlefield and firing simultaneously, has always had superiority over antitank weapons. Of course, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the antitank weapons mentioned may be improved or that new, more effective ones will appear. However, tanks will not remain at their present stage of development either.

In examining the question of the necessary armor protection of the basic types of tanks, we consider that it must be over-all, i.e., capable of giving the tank great resistance, protecting the crew from weapons of mass destruction and enemy tanks, and also from various modern antitank weapons.

Therefore, we must not slacken our efforts to perfect the strong armor protection of the basic types of tanks, which must be strengthened supplementarily for the biological protection of the tank crew from penetrating radiation by the use of special "linings" (podboy) which inhibit the flow of neutrons. But, again, it must be remembered that the "lining" will be of use only in conjunction with dependable armor.

Improvement of the armor protection of tanks from all types of shaped-charge weapons (and not only from PTURS) must be carried out by using large angles of inclination of the armor details, the differential distribution of armor in relation to the probability of damage to the tank on the battlefield, the use of shields of various designs to induce activation of the fuse of the missile before it reaches the main armor, and, finally, by creating a combined armor consisting of armor steel and glass plastic (stekloplastik) which resists the shaped-charge effect well.

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Nor should it be forgotten that the presence of weaker armor protection on tanks on one belligerent side puts the tank troops of that side at a disadvantage in advance, especially in carrying out a meeting battle and engagement. But this type of combat action will be basic, as we know, especially in the initial period of a war.

As regards the position taken on the need to increase the armor protection of the basic types of tanks, one must not conclude that it is inevitable that their weight will be increased thereby. Even now we should strive to reduce the weight of tracked combat vehicles, but not at the expense of their combat qualities, because weight still adds to their great resistance to a nuclear explosion, which leads to the broadening of the sphere of their combat utilization.

When we speak of resistance, we mean not only resistance to overturning, but also the ability to withstand all the other factors of a nuclear explosion.

The possibility of increasing the armor and still retaining the same weight of a tank can be illustrated by an example of Soviet tank construction.

Thus, the T-34 tank, which was the best tank of its day, has been replaced by the T-55 medium tank, which has armor and armament more than twice as powerful, with only a 12 percent increase in the weight of the vehicle.

Even now there are certain opportunities to increase further the combat qualities of tanks under conditions of their use in a war employing nuclear weapons without increasing their weight. At the same time, however we strive to reduce the weight of tanks, we should not do so under any circumstances at the cost of weakening the hull of a tank.

The heavy tank: Up to the present some comrades have expressed the thought that it is pointless to produce heavy tanks. We hold a different opinion indeed.

First of all it should be noted that the concept of a "heavy tank" is quite relative. Our T-10 and T-10M tanks with a weight of 50 tons are called heavy, while the American tank M60 that weighs 47 tons is medium. The British 50-ton "Centurion" tanks are also considered medium. The latest models of American and British heavy

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tanks weigh 57 tons and 65 tons, respectively, and the well-known heavy "Tiger-B" tank of the former German-Fascist army weighed 68 tons.

Therefore, it seems to us that it is not a question of the name, but of whether we need a type of combat vehicle such as our T-10M tank, or not?

When this question is examined it is helpful to recall the relationship between our tank types during the last war. Statistics show that during World War II we had about 55 percent medium tanks and assault guns (SAU), up to 25 percent light tanks and SAU, and about 20 percent heavy tanks and SAU. Of course, such a high percentage of light tanks existed because of the well-known conditions, and, in particular, because it was possible to build them in ordinary automobile plants.

So far as the production of heavy tanks is concerned, they were produced only out of necessity, because of the harsh demands of war. They were produced despite all wartime difficulties and, as the experience of the last war showed, their production was fully justified.

In our opinion, it is impossible to go only on economic considerations in evaluating the significance of heavy tanks under the new conditions. It is really hard to produce heavy tanks; they require a lot of metal, but for defeating an enemy one cannot skimp with metal. Apparently, in this case, when examining the question of heavy tank production, it is necessary to approach it not only, and not mainly, from a purely economic standpoint, but above all by evaluating military necessity and expediency.

Let us note here that at the present time the percentile relationship of heavy tanks to medium ones (if we consider only the T-10 and T-10M tanks) is in all only about 4 percent. In other words, we actually have only one type of tracked combat vehicle, since the light, reconnaissance amphibious tank is not suitable, it seems to us, for conducting tank battles, and in reality we have so few heavy tanks that any restrictions on their production will reduce their significance in our troops to zero.

The question arises: Do we actually have to limit ourselves to one type of tank and to consider this a normal phenomenon in the development of armored technology?

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In our opinion, this must not be done, not only from considerations of ensuring qualitative superiority over the enemy, but also on the grounds that it is essential to broaden the development of designs of tracked combat vehicles.

It is known that the U.S. Army, our probable enemy, has accepted the M60 tank into its armament, and it not only concedes nothing to our medium tank in most respects, but is even superior to the latter in some. For example, the armor protection of the frontal (lobovaya) armor of our T-55 tank hull is 100 mm, and of the American M60 tank, 120 mm. Our tank is armed with a 100 mm gun, and theirs with a 105-mm gun. The muzzle velocity of an armor-piercing shell from our gun is 900 m/sec, and from theirs - 975 m/sec. Our unit of fire is 43 rounds, and theirs - 57. The engine power of the T-55 tank is 580 h.p., and the M60 - 750 h.p. The capacity of our main fuel tanks is 680 liters, and theirs - 1,300 liters.

Our T-55 tank has an advantage over the M60 tank, for example, in the dimensions and weight of the vehicle. This, however, does not give us the right to disregard the definite progress attained by the USA in the construction of medium tanks.

At the same time our T-10M heavy tank is superior to the latest models of foreign medium tanks, including the M60, in a number of basic combat features, especially in firepower and armor, and is equal to them in maneuverability.

Consequently, if we reject the T-10M tank at the present time it can lead to the loss of our qualitative superiority over the tanks of the enemy. Therefore, we should not reject heavy tanks at the present time, particularly the T-10M tank, but on the contrary, it is necessary to arrive at a decision that would again ensure our superiority over the tank technology of the enemy, especially in tank battles and engagements.

It follows that an incorrect selection of the necessary types of tanks will do serious damage to the army. This problem assumes special significance at certain stages in the development of tanks, as the result of general technical progress and the appearance of new methods of conducting combat operations.

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We consider that the main purpose and meaning of the existence of heavy tanks in our army consists of the fact that, having stronger combat characteristics than medium tanks, especially in

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firepower and armor protection, they ensure our qualitative superiority over the tanks of the enemy, which is impossible to achieve with medium tanks alone.

The M60 tank that the U.S. Army has adopted is called the "basic combat tank". At the same time, despite its extremely powerful armament and armor, the Americans, as a reinforcing measure, have created numerous tracked assault guns of large calibers (from 155 to 240 mm), with armor giving full protection from bullets and with a special system of anti-atomic defense.

The armament of the newest models of these assault guns is installed in revolving turrets: it has mechanized loading and a fairly large unit of fire. Some of them are so adapted that they can cross water obstacles afloat.

Consequently the American "basic combat tanks" have various and powerful means of reinforcement which have great mobility and cross-country ability, adapted for crossing terrain that is contaminated with radioactive substances. However, the weak armor of the assault guns limits their use in certain types of combat.

Under prevailing conditions our basic (medium) tanks also need means of reinforcement that would be capable of destroying the enemy's tanks at great distances, firing by direct laying and without reducing the maneuverability of the tank troops.

These methods for the qualitative reinforcement of medium tanks can be:

- heavy tanks, greatly superior to medium tanks in firepower and armor;
- assault guns, created both on special chassis and on the chassis of a medium tank, which would have more powerful armament than the latter.

The first way is preferable. The presence of strong armor protection on the heavy tanks increases the possibilities for their combat utilization, compared to the SAU mounted on the chassis of medium tanks, not to mention the assault guns with only bullet-proof armor, especially in a meeting engagement.

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Besides, if the final design of a heavy tank exists, new combat vehicles for various purposes can be created on this basis in a relatively short time if the need arises (missile carriers, powerful assault guns, including those using nuclear weapons and others).

Thus, bearing in mind that the enemy has the 47-ton M60 tank and various reinforcing means, we come to the conclusion that in order to ensure superiority over the tanks of the enemy and to strengthen our medium tanks qualitatively, it is necessary for us to have heavy tanks or some other vehicles which have firepower superior to that of the basic tank of the enemy.

The aspiration to reject heavy tanks and to reduce the weight of tanks by reducing the thickness of the armor, will lead inevitably to a sharp decrease in the combat capabilities of tanks and will place our tank personnel in an unequal position in the conduct of a battle with the tanks of the enemy. As has already been pointed out, the weakening of tank armor does not conform with the requirements for anti-atomic protection.

In consequence, if we examine the heavy tank question scientifically, it is essential to study many conditions. Therefore, the decision which is adopted has to be deeply founded to eliminate any possibility of making a mistake in this important question.

Some questions of the organization of tank troops: Lately, as we have already mentioned, there have been statements on the necessity of reviewing the organizational structure of the tank troops. More than that, there are even suggestions that we should reject the concept of "tank troops".

The supporters of the views indicated consider that the mechanization of modern ground troops and their saturation with tanks has somehow led to the fact that there is little difference in the ground troops between motorized rifle divisions and tank divisions, with the result that tank troops nowadays lose their independent significance. For this reason there are proposals to abolish tank divisions, tank armies and the concept of "tank formations".

In stating the concept of creating unified divisions as the basic tactical large unit (soyedineniye) of the ground troops, its proponents have foremost in mind the rejection of tank divisions.

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In examining this question the experience of the last war and the economy of the country must be taken into consideration. It appears to us that unified divisions, saturated with tanks, will not be needed everywhere. In many cases, in some theaters of military operations, and in many areas of the West European theater, it will also be possible to have standard motorized rifle divisions with a limited number of tanks, or even without them. If all the divisions are thoroughly saturated with tanks, the economy of the country will be unable to support such a huge tank park. Moreover, the opportunity to mass tanks where it is deemed to be operationally expedient always remains, without their organizational disintegration.

These concepts oblige us to have at least two types of divisions.

It is well known that nuclear weapons have brought about many corrections, not only in combat tactics, but also in military art as a whole. Under conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction, war will be more mobile with higher rates of advance than formerly, and operations will attain a large scale. All this will call for more frequent and more intensive troop movements than before.

Proceeding from this, some comrades consider that tank divisions do not fully meet specified requirements, and that they are inferior to the motorized rifle divisions in mobility except on the battlefield. In particular, they assert that the motorized rifle division is superior to the tank division on the march, because it is necessary to have strong bridges, heavy ferries, and pontoon bridges for tanks to cross a water barrier, and tanks are supposedly slower than wheeled vehicles and armored carriers, etc. Therefore, in their opinion, all the advantages remain with the motorized rifle division, in a given case.

It is entirely obvious that none of these conclusions is sound. On the march the motorized rifle division has no advantages, and cannot have any, over the tank division, because it has tanks of its own and moves at the speed of the tanks. Because of the presence of tanks in the motorized rifle division it needs bridges just like the tank division, so even in this sphere the motorized rifle division has no advantages of any kind.

Indeed, in battle, as soon as the motorized infantry (motopekhota) leaves the armored carriers, the motorized rifle division will be forced to advance at the speed of infantry (this will sharply curtail its maneuverability and rate of advance), while tank units and sub-units

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will have to operate without infantry, because on the battlefield it is impossible to combine the speed of tanks -- 20 km/hr -- with the speed of infantry -- 4 km/hr -- and the power of a protected engine -- 500 hp -- with the strength of a man without any protection.

All combat experience of World War II points to the fact that it was not rifle divisions reinforced with tanks that determined the success of operations, as, for example, French military theoreticians believed, but tank divisions, tank corps, and tank armies.

All those who maintain that the organization of a unified division is more progressive than the organization of our tank divisions, are, in our opinion, bearers of old-fashioned ideas.

The tank division fully justified itself in the last war, and it will justify itself even more under the conditions of a war conducted with the use of nuclear weapons. In examining current problems, one should proceed first of all from the effects of the employment of nuclear weapons. This must be taken as the basis of the organization of the troops. If this is so, and if it seems that no one takes issue with this thesis, then we have to create an organization that will meet all the modern requirements.

Upon thorough examination of this question, one may assert that the inadequacy of the proposed organization of a unified division will be proven by every nuclear explosion. A nuclear explosion will put everything that is on the battlefield out of commission, except the tank crews, who are covered by thick armor. It might be asked, why build illusions and create an organization of troops that is known beforehand not to meet the requirements of modern warfare?

More than once, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, pointed out that in the next war, as never before, there will be an increase in the number of tank meeting engagements and battles. He did not forget to remind us of this during this year's critique of exercises, by pointing out that "meeting battles and engagements will be the most common phenomenon". This is understandable. These battles and engagements will have to be carried out, above all, by our tank troops against the tank troops of the enemy; this is borne out by the fact that they are best adapted for the conduct of battles under nuclear warfare conditions, and that they can engage, most successfully, the enemy tanks. This thesis is upheld by the entire course of World War II, and especially during the engagement at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.

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During this meeting engagement the blows of the German tank troops were sustained only by our tank troops. It is a fact that the fresh, battle-tested 5th Guards Combined Arms Army under the command of such an experienced warrior as Lieutenant General A. S.Zhadov, not only did not fulfill the order of the Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N. F. Vatutin, and member of the Military Council N. S. Khrushchev to carry out a joint counter attack with the 5th Guards Tank Army, but did not even hold the lines being occupied. Its corps on the left flank, unable to sustain the onslaught of the German tanks, withdrew quite a distance to the east, and exposed the right flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which was already in a difficult situation without this. Despite the conditions that arose, the 5th Guards Tank Army not only closed the right flank with its own tank units, but also detached one brigade to the assistance of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army. How can we forget these lessons of history now, and propose without foundation or due analysis a new universal division whose combat value appears highly dubious, and reject the tank division which proved itself throughout all of World War II and has not compromised itself yet?

It is perfectly apparent that the conversion to a universal division will lead to the rejection, not only of the tank division, but also of the tank army, and this will lead inevitably to the extensive dispersal of tanks and to the loss of all the advantages which they possess when they are organizationally massed.

In this respect, we consider it quite proper that a lot of attention is directed to the question of a new organization of the troops.

In modern conditions military art does not at all presuppose a universal organization of the basic large units of the ground troops, for it would be hard to combine the combat qualities of the various new types of weapons and combat equipment. On the contrary, it is necessary to create an organizational structure which will provide the most effective ulitization of combat equipment.

Thus, it seems advisable to us to have not one universal type of division, but three types of divisions:

First - a tank division to conduct combat operations under conditions when nuclear weapons are used, to conduct meeting battles with enemy tanks, and as the basic means for carrying out deep strikes on the offensive and repelling enemy strikes on the defensive. Its

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organizational development must tend toward the further reduction of personnel not protected by armor and saturation with heavily armored tanks.

Second - a motorized rifle division which should be more or less the same as it is now, maybe even with some reduction in the number of tanks, or else in wartime we may not be able to maintain all motorized rifle divisions at TOE strength in tanks. Besides its general missions that were pointed out in the order of the Minister of Defense for 1961, it can be used to secure general success in the main direction, for performing basic missions in minor directions, and for effecting a firm defense.

Third - a light motorized rifle division without tanks. In our opinion, a division of this type could carry out fast marches in armored carriers over light bridges and crossings, cross contaminated zones without engagement, move by air into the enemy rear or into an area of our strong tank formations to consolidate their successes, conduct stubborn defense of terrain that tanks cannot reach easily, etc. If a division of this type is armed with modern antitank weapons, under favorable conditions it will be able to hold an area or line securely and repel enemy tank attacks. In cases when a division of this type is thrown into an area where we have strong tank formations it can be reinforced with tanks if the necessity arises.

It seems to us that the presence of three types of divisions in the organization of the ground troops will fulfill the requirements presented by modern warfare better than one unified division.

The pronouncements of some of our military leaders that the tank army has outlived itself, and that the time has come to shift to an army of unified organization, are not new. Such conclusions are a direct consequence of the rejection of the tank division and the creation of a single, unified division.

In this connection, it is pertinent to remember that in the history of the development of armored troops there was a sad day when the tank and mechanized corps found themselves disbanded. Everyone knows what consequences this led to.

At the root of such views on the modern tank army is the assertion that it does not differ in any way now from the combined arms army, that in operations, exercise experience shows, it cannot break away from the other forces of a front, and its existence is, therefore,

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supposedly not justified in any way.

Such pronouncements are, to say the least, unfounded. The experience of World War II testifies to the fact that all of the most successful operations, not only offensive but also defensive, were won by our troops largely with the participation of tank armies. Tank armies provided the front with wide mobility, power, and depth of strike, developing operations at high tempo.

It is permissible to pose this question to all comrades who espouse the concept of abolishing tank armies: Do they now reject the concept of massed strikes, or is this method of defeating the enemy also obsolete?

If we consider that even now, in the age of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to fight with the fist, then how can we come out against the tank army if its organization already incorporates the principle of massing tanks. We do not wish to go into this question further and introduce other arguments of the superiority of the tank army over the combined arms army in offensive operations, but it seems to us that, to any person capable of objective evaluation, it must be clear that if tank armies played a leading role in the success of operations carried out during the last war, then their role in a future war, more mobile than the last, will increase more and more. The tank army was and will remain the most menacing force to the enemy, especially in a meeting engagement against his tank formations.

The experience of World War II teaches that the utilization of tank troops differed, and will continue to differ, from the use of rifle troops reinforced with tanks. Therefore, the various proposals directed, in actuality, toward abolishing tank troops in their present organization, do not strengthen the ground troops in any way, but push us towards the French tactics which failed completely in the last war. We need powerful and well-organized tank troops - all the experience of the last war speaks eloquently of this, and it is demanded by modern conditions of carrying out combat operations arising as a result of the appearance and development of missile troops and nuclear weapons.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Establishment of the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") by the Ministry of Defense, USSR

Enclosed is a verbatim translation of the editors' preface to the initial issue of the above publication, released in early 1960. The Tables of Contents of the first five issues of this Special Collection are also included.

This material was acquired by a Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past. We request that it be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Arrangements for utilizing any part of this document in any other form must be cleared with the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : Establishment of the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") by the Ministry of Defense, USSR

DATE OF INFO: 1960-1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable Soviet source (B)

The following is a verbatim translation of remarks by the Voyennaya Mysl editors which appeared in the initial issue of the Special Collection of this publication, released in early 1960. Also included are verbatim translations of an editorial note which appears at the beginning of each issue (see page 6) and the Tables of Contents of the first five issues of this Special Collection.

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From the Editor

With a view to activating theoretical discussions of the most important and pressing problems of Soviet military science, and above all of military art, according to the decision of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, in addition to the Secret Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" which is being published at present, a Special Collection stamped "Top Secret" is being initiated.

The leading personnel of our Armed Forces, from the troops, military academies, the chief and central directorates, and the General Staff, are invited to write articles for this Collection. Obviously the leading personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy, who have the best theoretical preparation, the greatest practical experience, and the widest horizons, can contribute most to the development of Soviet military theory in the light of the requirements of modern warfare.

This Collection will be sent to a limited circle of officials, from army commander upward according to a special list.

The creation of a new Collection was dictated by the desire to ensure responsible authors of an opportunity to express their ideas, proposals, and critical remarks on all immediate problems of military theory in a more restricted circle, which would be difficult to do in other printed organs.

The Collection should be regarded as a continuing forum for articles, in its way, a military-theoretical conference by correspondence.

The fundamental methodology of articles on the pages of the Collection should be sharp, controversial, and forcefully argued formulation of the most vital theoretical problems and a creative discussion of them. Depending on the elaboration and clarity of the various matters discussed, there will be published conclusive articles which we propose to invite the most competent individuals, collectives of creative authors, and, when necessary, official organs, to write.

The most urgent task of our military-theoretical thought is to overcome certain antiquated views, and to scrutinize boldly, on the basis of a feeling for new developments, the changes taking place in military affairs. Such an approach will assure the clear understanding of realistic courses of the further development of Soviet military

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science, and vigorous, creative elaboration of pressing, new problems of military art as regards strategy, operational art, and tactics, as well as problems regarding the structure and organization of the Armed Forces and of the development of military equipment.

Military-theoretical thought should look ahead boldly, vigorously pave the way to the new and progressive, refute decisively preconceived points of view, and evaluate critically the experience of the past.

As N. S. Khrushchev emphasized, "Under modern conditions, wars will not be waged as before and they will hardly be comparable to former wars." These new aspects of modern warfare, and their dissimilarity to previous wars, indicate with conclusive force the necessity which has arisen of examining from all aspects the qualitative changes which have occurred in military affairs. It is necessary to define the trends of their further development, to subject to a serious and decisive review the established theoretical viewpoints regarding questions of the conduct of war and military operations of all scales, of training, organization, equipping of the Armed Forces, and the gamut of other similar questions, the understanding of which has been predicated up to now to a significant degree on the experience of the last war.

It is envisaged that the theme of the Collection will be to examine problems relative to the nature of modern warfare, methods and forms of conducting armed combat, the use in it of all modern scientific - technical potentialities and means, of the types of Armed Forces individually and in coordination, and the employment of various means of mass destruction.

Particular attention should be paid to the examination of the nature, preparation, and conduct of operations of all types, particularly missile, under the various conditions of the probable theaters of war (TVD), and the strategic, operational, and combat employment of missile large units and units. It is necessary to elaborate on offensive and defensive operations of formations of the ground forces, air forces, the navy, troops of the PVO, and airborne troops, with exposition of those features and peculiarities which the use of the means of mass destruction and the conduct of missile operations inject into modern armed combat.

It is necessary to have an over-all analysis of the problem of modern combat with due regard to that particular influence which will be exerted on it by modern means of combat which will be employed by the higher command in the interest of conducting operations and the war as a whole.

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Particularly worthy of serious study and detailed elaboration are the problems of operational and combat support, among others, intelligence, protection of troops from the means of mass destruction, and radio countermeasures.

A large part of the pages of the Collection should be taken up by questions regarding the control of troops throughout all elements and echelons. Problems related to these questions are particularly important because the greater independence of action of strategic groupings in the TVD, operational formations, and tactical large units and units, complicates to a great degree, and gives special features to, the control of troops. Also entering into the framework of these questions is elaboration on the best forms of organizing the organs of control in all areas, the methods of their work, equipping and outfitting, using various means of automation, and problems of planning military operations.

It is very important to analyze as carefully as possible, and to elaborate, problems relative to the organization of the modern Armed Forces rear, of the field army and operational and tactical groupings of troops, from the point of view of maintaining uninterrupted supply to the troops of all necessary support for combat and life under conditions of continuous and powerful action against the rear by the combat means of the enemy; and the related problems of defense and protection of the rear and the coordination of operations in this area between the Armed Forces and civilian organizations. Also belonging to this group of questions is the problem of the preparation of the theaters of war and material reserves of all types and designations.

It is necessary, on the basis of profound analysis of the methods and forms of modern military warfare, to study and develop proposals for the future make-up of the Armed Forces and their organizational structure at all levels, and questions of the organization and methodology of training troops and command cadres.

Great importance may be attributed to proposals for further development of military technology, weapons systems, correlation of various types of weapons, vehicles, and mechanisms, and recommendations for further improvement of the old, and designs of new, models, based on the trends of development of technology.

The editors turn to the readers of the Collection, who should actually be its authors, with the request to participate widely and actively in the work of this publication and to submit articles which pose important problems and which propose realistic solutions. 1.3(a)(4)

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Taking into account the limited size of the Collection, the editors request the authors to make the articles as short as possible, to avoid redundancies and the commonplace, and at the same time, to argue convincingly their stated positions.

The Collection, with a volume of 8 to 10 quires, will be issued periodically. In the current year, it is proposed to publish 4-5 issues. In this first issue of the Collection are included articles which are most suited to the goals of this publication , chosen from articles received previously by the editors.

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From the Editor

Articles of the Special Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" (Voyennaya Mysl) are published as a discussion and express only the opinion of the authors on the subjects which are broached.

All articles for the Collection, as well as inquiries regarding its publication, comments on published materials, and remarks regarding them, should be sent to the chief editor of the journal "Military Thought," following the rules for transmittal of Secret materials.

The present issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" is being distributed to army commanders and higher, according to a special list.

Chief Editor General-Leytenant Radetskiy, N.A.

This Collection contains __ pages

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Ministry of Defense of The Union of SSR's

Special Collection

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MILITARY THOUGHT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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4 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : "The Organizational Structure of Field Command of a Front", by Colonel K. Pashuk

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Organizational Structure of Field Command of a Front", by Colonel K. Pashuk, which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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The Joint Staff

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Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : "The Organizational Structure of Field Command of a Front", by Colonel K. Pashuk

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE: A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Organizational Structure of Field Command of a Front", written by Colonel K. Pashuk, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of a Military District.

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Edition of a special version of VOYENNAYA MYSL (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. The 1961 Third Edition went to press in July 1961.

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The Organizational Structure

of

Field Command of a Front

by

Colonel K. Pashuk, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of a Military District

The very great changes which have been taking place in the postwar period in the means and methods of armed conflict and, under the influence of these, in the organizational structure of troops have not, in fact, affected command elements (organ upravleniya). The organization of field command of an army and of a front has remained essentially the same as it was in the years of World War II. Certain additions and changes which have taken place in recent years have brought nothing basically new to the organization of field commands.

The organizational structure and equipment of operational staffs (shtab) which exist at the present time have resulted in a certain contradiction with modern requirements. They limit the combat capabilities of troops, and they are in fact a brake on the achievement by the troops of high speeds in the conduct of operations. This is evident if only from the following.

The presence of nuclear-missile weapons in a front permits the fulfillment of operational tasks, not to mention tactical tasks, in a matter of minutes. Yet to collect and collate the facts of the situation in the headquarters of the front takes several hours, and is even then an excessive strain on its officers.

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At the present time, combined-arms large units (soyedineniye) are at constant combat readiness, determined by the time necessary for the assembly of a large unit when the alert is received and for its movement out from its permanent disposition (dislokatsiya) points. Army headquarters (shtab) however do not possess such a degree of readiness and, in general, are insufficiently adapted to work under field conditions, which, naturally, limits the combat capabilities of army formations (obyedineniye).

The most important conditions for ensuring firm control of troops are high mobility, the maneuverability of headquarters (shtab), and their effective anti-atomic protection. But how can there be talk of anti-atomic protection, of mobility, or of the maneuverability of the headquarters (shtab) of a front and an army if they are billetted in a tent camp on exercise? This situation is considered normal, for during critiques of exercises one can hear observations and objections only to the fact that there are very many tents and that they are not in the right order.

A broad discussion of the questions of organization and equipping of the elements for the control of troops and of the organization and equipping of control points (punkty upravleniya) is necessary. It seems to us that without the correct solution of these questions it is impossible to achieve a significant increase of the combat readiness of troops.

In our article we deal with several questions of the organizational structure of a field of a front. First of all, we will attempt to define the basic principles upon which this structure must be based.

In our view, the organizational structure of a field command of a front must proceed from the release of the commander of troops of a front, to the maximum extent, from the decision of questions which are not directly connected with the combat activity of the troops.

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The commander must have sufficient time for study and for the choice of the best methods of deciding the basic current and future (perspektivnyy) tasks of the operation.

With the existing organization, this requirement is not met. In the front field command there are 18 independent directorates, staffs (shtab), and departments (otdel) subordinated directly to the troop commander. Under such an organization, the troop commander is compelled to cut himself off systematically from the immediate direction of operations and to decide a mass of questions of secondary importance. It is completely understandable that he is not in a position to listen to all those making reports and to give them exhaustive and concrete instructions. Besides this, with the existence of such a quantity of departments in the front field command, the solution of any question by one of the departments requires its coordination with numerous other departments, which leads to a great waste of time and effort. In consequence, the front field command works for a considerable time not for the troops but for itself, which does not help the operational efficiency of the direction in any way.

In order to ensure stable and continuous control of troops, given the present means and methods of combat, the front field command must be streamlined to the maximum. The large and unwieldy headquarters (shtab), with the complements we use at present, would be unequal to the tasks of firm control of troops in the first serious test. Clumsy and immobile, they provide a system of no more than superficial and seeming control of troops, to say nothing of their vulnerability, and of their consequent short tenure of life. How can one talk of the operational efficiency and mobility of the front field command, if its composition, not counting servicing personnel, considerably exceeds 1000 men? In our view, the strength of the command of a front should be reduced by at least 3-4 times. However, this will be possible only if the maximum use is made in the

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front field command of the various means of automation. Without this, under present conditions, it is, in general, difficult to achieve real operational efficiency in the work of headquarters and to eliminate multiplicity in the control of troops.

In speaking of the means of automation, we have in view, first of all, those means whose introduction is already entirely possible at the present time; selector communications (selektornaya svyaz), portable recording equipment, facsimile telegraphy, television communications, speech secrecy apparatus, duplicating apparatus, the simplest computing apparatus, etc.

Let us take one of the duties of the headquarters of a front - the collection and collation of facts about a situation. How many channels do one and the same set of facts pass through before they reach the troop commander of the front, and how much effort does the gathering of these facts cost? The troop commander of the front hears the reports of the army commanders (komandarm) or of the commanding officers of large units by high-frequency (VCh) telephone or other communications means. The chief of staff of the front hears the reports of the respective chiefs of staff by telephone (normally also by VCh) or, more rarely, by radio. The operational department (otdel) collects the facts of the situation through chiefs of directions (nachalnik napravleniya) and their assistants by telephone, radio, and telegraph, with the help of the communications officers. Commanders and officers of troop arms are engaged in the collection of the facts of the situation through their channels of communication. All these people receive the data at various times, in varying completeness, and with varying authenticity; the obtaining of the complete facts wastes too much time. It goes without saying that such methods of operation do not correspond to present-day requirements. The facts of the situation should pass from the troops to the front headquarters by the shortest possible route, and all work on collection and collation of these facts should occupy a minimum of time.

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The organizational structure of a front field command should reflect the specific nature of the functions of this control link (zveno). As is known, the front troop commander, the army commander, and the corps commander decide questions which are essentially different from one another.

The corps commander is interested in the progress of combat operations directly on the field of battle; he is concerned primarily with changes in the progress of these operations. The army commander is interested in the ways in which combat operations are likely to develop over several days. Using the resources of operational intelligence (razvedka), he follows the movement of the enemy's reserves and means for nuclear attack and thus comes to understand the situation more deeply.

The front troop commander has available intelligence resources which allow him to follow the situation in the entire depth of a strategic direction or of a theater of military operations. His fundamental efforts are directed to the solution of long-term questions which will ensure the successful development of the whole operation. In conjunction with this, in the command of the front, the questions of the use of nuclear-missile weapons and of rear support of the operation are decided in their full scope, demanding of the staff and command of the front, as a whole, long-term planning, foresight, and, consequently, work of a completely different scope and content from that of an army headquarters.

At the same time a front headquarters cannot limit itself to a purely general knowledge of the operational situation. It should ensure that the front troop commander is constantly provided with facts about the entire current situation in the area of the front, because the front commander has at his disposal nuclear-missile resources which enable him to influence vigorously the successful decision not

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only of operational but also of tactical problems at any time.

The organizational structure of a front field command must reflect completely the decisive role of nuclear-missile weapons in the achievement of the aim of an operation. The front troop commander should have an element which concerns itself both with the solution of questions of the use of missile troops in an operation and with the assurance of direct control or command of units and large units of these troops.

Besides this, since nuclear warheads (boyepripas) are at present delivered to the target not only by missiles but also by aircraft and by other means, and also in view of the fact that the radiation situation will exercise a considerable influence on the progress of combat operations, the front field command should include an element which is concerned with the general and specific planning of the use of nuclear weapons, with careful study of the radiation situation in the area of the front and of its influence on the progress of the operation.

In the interests of stability of control of troops, the organizational structure of the front field command should ensure its division into several echelons (echelon), the real independence of each echelon in the control of troops, rear units, and establishments, and the ability of the second echelon if necessary to take upon itself the control of the troops of the front and to exercise this control, even if only for a short time.

The front field command should be able to detach a small operational group of officers with means of control, which could ensure control for the troop commander during his movement to an advanced or auxiliary control point. This operational group should be constantly welding itself together even while performing its district (okrug) command functions,

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and should have special field headquarters equipment and corresponding means of communication.

It is clear to everyone that the existing structure of the front field command does not fully meet the requirements enumerated above and needs considerable improvement. Which are the main changes which need to be introduced into this structure?

First of all, the organization of a front headquarters as the basic nucleus of field command must be changed. The new organization of the headquarters should ensure anew the solution of such problems as the collection, collation, and recording of all data on the operational situation. In our view, a special element should be set up for this, which would be free from all other commitments. This can be the operational center of the operational directorate of the front headquarters. Only this center must be concerned with collection and collation of all the facts on the situation and with their uninterrupted transmission to the commander, to the chief of staff of the front and also to other interested persons and establishments, about which we will speak later. All remaining directorates, departments, and services are freed from carrying out this function and concern themselves with their particular questions. The operational center should be equipped with modern means of communication, with radio speech-secrecy apparatus, facsimile telegraphy sets, receiving and transmitting sets (teleustanovka), sound-recording apparatus, and selector communications. In the future it must have electronic computing machines which would automate such processes as:

- the collection and storage of facts on the position, state, and actions of enemy troops, and about the enemy's nuclear resources and their capabilities;

- the collection and storage of facts on the position and state of friendly troops;

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- the systemization and collation of information on the operational situation for reports to the command and the higher staff;

- the processing of data on the radiation situation, the determination of areas contaminated by radiation, and of the levels of radiation for a given time.

The facts received by the operational center about the position of the troops (friendly and enemy) should be disseminated continuously by television sets or by telephones with visual presentation (videotelefonnaya svyaz) to the troop commander, chief of staff, and the department of operational planning. If necessary, the front troop commander or the front chief of staff can be at the operational center personally for the detailed solution of the most important questions of control of the troops.

Regular information about the position of the troops in the detail necessary for the solution of questions by the arms of troops must be passed by a special relay network for the remaining directorates (departments).

The operational center must have at its disposal several shifts (smena) of trained officer-operators. Each shift should also include an officer of engineer troops, one from the chemical troops, one from the hydrometeorological service, and representatives of the VVS and PVO control points. The shift should be headed by a responsible officer-operator (chief of the operational department) who can make an evaluation of the operational situation and pass it on at the proper time to the chief of staff or to the commander so that a decision can be made. With three working shifts and one reserve (for the forward command post-PKP, or auxiliary control point-VPU) there may be no more than 25 officers on the staff of the operational center.

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The operational center cannot concern itself with questions of planning an operation; for this a special element is necessary - an operational planning department. Receiving systematic data about the current position of the troops from the operational center, the operational planning department analyzes and checks the fulfillment of tasks by the troops of the front, prepares suggestions for the command on the conduct of combat operations, and passes on the necessary operational tasks to the troops. In the future, the department of operational planning should also be equipped with an electronic computer, which would lighten the performance of such tasks as:

- the production of estimates related to determining the relative balance of forces and the regrouping of troops;

- the determination of the requirements for combat means either for a complete operation or for part of one and the distribution of these means to directions;

- the distribution of nuclear means by targets, the determination of the best alternatives for destroying enemy targets with the means available, and others.

When modern means of control are available, the execution of the functions entrusted to the department does not call for a large number of officer-operators. The staff of the department can be within the limits of 10-12 men.

The operational center and the department of operational planning should be united in a single element - the operational directorate, which would ensure unity in the work of these two bodies.

The intelligence directorate does not lose its significance, but remains a component part of the headquarters of the front. But since a part of its functions (the collection, collation, recording, and storage of data about the enemy which comes from the troops) is carried out by the operational center,

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the complement of the intelligence directorate may be reduced and its structure changed. At the same time it is necessary to bear in mind that data about the enemy reaches the front headquarters not only from the troops but also from other sources: from the Chief Intelligence Directorate, from the intelligence directorates of neighboring fronts, from agent intelligence, from special diversionary-reconnaissance groups, from front radio and radio-technical intelligence, etc. This data should be checked, compared, and evaluated by the intelligence directorate before being passed on to the operational center, and for this it is expedient to have a special element - a control point for operational intelligence.

This control point, like the operational center, should work round the clock, and should therefore have three duty shifts and one reserve shift. Each operational shift should include two operational intelligence officers, concerned with the collation and analysis of all intelligence data, one officer from agent intelligence, one officer of radiotechnical intelligence, one aerial-reconnaissance officer, and one special communications officer.

To direct combined-arms reconnaissance and the planning and control of all types of intelligence activity in the intelligence directorate, besides the control point for operational intelligence, it is necessary to have another department for planning and control, with a staff of officers of combined-arms and operational intelligence, agent-intelligence officers, and radiotechnical intelligence officers.

We see no need for basic changes in the structure of the other departments of a front headquarters (replacement, communications, or topographical). However, the strength of each can be reduced considerably in connection with the possibility of automating and mechanizing their work. The role of the cipher department obviously will decrease with the introduction

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of apparatus for ensuring the secrecy of radio, telephone, and telegraph conversations and, consequently, its strength, too, can be reduced.

The questions of the control of artillery in a front should be decided anew. The trend of development of combat means shows that the role of artillery in the solution of operational tasks is decreasing. Clearly, artillery will perform only tactical tasks. As a consequence, the need for the presence in the front field command of an element which would concern itself specially with the operational use of artillery is disappearing. Questions of the combat use of artillery can be settled successfully at the tactical level (zveno). Clearly these questions will be decided in exceptional cases in the front command.

At the same time, the ever-increasing role of missile troops in the resolution of operational tasks requires the presence in the front field command of a special element, which would concern itself with their direct command, not only operational, but also tactical control. Furthermore, we believe that this element must concern itself with the direct command of missile large units and units. Such an element can be the control point of the missile troops of the front. It should have direct radio, telephone, and telegraph communications with all missile large units and units of the front, and also selector and visual telephonic communication with the operational center and the operational intelligence control point.

The personnel of the control point of missile troops must ensure its unbroken work round the clock and also the detachment, when necessary, of a small but harmonious group of officers for the control of the missile troops during trips by the chief (nachalnik) of the missile troops to the PKP or VPU with the front troop commander. Hence, the control point of the missile troops can consist of three duty and one reserve operational shift. Each shift would consist of two

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operators for the preparation of data and two control officers. The work of each shift can be headed either simultaneously or in turn by the chief of missile troops, the chief of staff of the missile troops, and by the deputy chief of staff of the missile troops (he is the chief of the control point and chief of the operational department).

The operational department of the staff of the missile troops has the functions of planning the utilization of the missile troops, of supporting them, of organizing reconnaissance, and of overseeing their combat activity. In view of this, besides the chief of the department, the operational department needs a deputy chief of department (he is the chief of reconnaissance), three senior planning and control officers, two senior intelligence officers, the chief of communications, and his deputy.

It is clear that no one will doubt the need for the presence in the front field command of an element which is concerned with questions of antiaircraft defense. However, its organizational structure must also be changed somewhat. The development in the capabilities of antiaircraft missiles and of radio-technical troops and the use of nuclear weapons to combat means of air attack, call for still more centralization of the control of the forces and means of PVO at front level. The need is growing continuously for their direct command by the front PVO commander. Hence, we consider it expedient to have a PVO control point in the front field command, equipped with modern means of control, which performs all tasks, beginning with the planning of air defense and ending with the direct control of PVO troops in battle. This point must be commanded by the chief of PVO troops of the front or by his deputy and should be set up on the principle of continuous operation by three shifts and should have a reserve shift for the control of PVO troops during trips to the PKP or VPU.

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The controlling bodies of the engineer and chemical troops must, in our view, remain in the front field command. Their numerical strength can be reduced considerably since a part of the functions which previously belonged to these departments will be performed by the operational center, and also because of the possibility of equipping these departments with means of automation. However, there is no need to have these departments in direct subordination to the front troop commander. They decide questions of support of the combat operations of the troops, and their work should be more closely linked with that of the operational and intelligence directorates of the front headquarters. The operational center will concern itself with the collection, collation, and recording of data on the position, bringing up to strength, and condition of the engineer and chemical troops and of engineering and chemical equipment, and the front headquarters will also deal with the preparation and delivery to the troops of orders concerned with the combat use of engineer and chemical troops. All this points to the expediency of including engineer and chemical departments in the make-up of the front headquarters.

It is expedient that the unification in a single directorate of the elements dealing with questions of automotive servicing and of tank armament which has now taken place in the command of a district (okrug) should also be retained in the front field command with direct subordination to the troop commander.

It is expedient to concentrate all questions of the organization and structure of the rear, and of the material and medical support of the combat operations of the troops in one body - the directorate of the front rear services, headed by the deputy commander of troops for the rear services. The organizational structure and numerical composition of the directorate of the rear services should be examined with a view to cutting them down considerably. The nucleus of the directorate of the front rear services should be the rear-services operational center organized in

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a manner similar to the operational center of the front headquarters. The rear operational center must decide all questions of collection, collation, and recording of data on the position and state of rear units and establishments, supplies of equipment, support to the troops, the structure of the operational and troop rear areas, and others.

It should be constantly ready to pass this data to the chief of the rear services and also to the operational center and to the chief of staff of the front. The chief of the front rear services is the person who reports to the front troop commander on questions about the rear services. In the future the rear-services operational center should be equipped with means of automation, which would facilitate the solution of such questions as:

- recording the availability and movement of material-technical means and the compilation of estimates of the requirements of the troops for these;

- planning supply and evacuation of all types, using the various types of transport present in the front, armies, and large units;

- recording medical losses, the degree of fullness of the medical establishments, the movements of wounded and sick, and others.

The strength of the political directorate of a front, whose subordination should remain as before, can be reduced because of the transfer of the functions of supply to the chief of the front rear services and of the functions of recording, appointing, and moving Party-political worker cadres to the chief of the directorate of cadres of the front. The strength of the directorate of cadres can also be reduced considerably because of the availability of computers which allow the automation of work on the registration of the cadres by the officer complement.

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Such, in our opinion, are the changes which it is necessary to introduce into the organizational structure of the front field command.

Proceeding from this structure, it is by now already possible to define in its general outlines the composition of the command post of a front. It, obviously, will consist of two basic groups and one reserve group.

The first group: the commander of troops and the chief of staff of the front, the operational center, the department of operational planning of the operational directorate, the operational intelligence control point, the department of planning and control of intelligence, and the 8th department.

The second group: the headquarters of the missile troops, the control point of the PVO, the department of engineer troops, the chemical department, and the signals department.

The reserve group of the command post includes - the reserve shift from the operational center, the reserve shift from the control point of missile troops, the reserve shift from the intelligence control point, and the reserve shift from the PVO control point.

The reserve group serves to man the PKP or VPU. It can serve as the nucleus for a new front field command, if the command post goes out of action as the result of a nuclear strike by the enemy.

In conclusion, we shall dwell briefly on the organization and movement of the control points.

The organization, disposition, and movement of the control points must meet the requirements for stable and uninterrupted control of the troops under any enemy coercion. However, the present material base of our operational headquarters does not allow these requirements to be met. The experience of

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exercises shows that even if the control of troops is maintained on a sufficiently high level in the period of preparation of an operation, it very often breaks down during the course of the operation. As soon as the troops of the front are set in motion, control over them becomes insufficiently stable and the control points become helpless.

The relief of control points is carried out by old methods, by the dispatch forward of operational groups to organize control points in a new place, because, since they are on the move, operational headquarters are not in a position to control the troops. Consequently, when an operation is moving at high speed, headquarters fall behind the troops already by the second day.

In modern operations, the headquarters of a front should assure the commander reliable control of the troops irrespective of whether it is stationary or on the move. The control resources of a front headquarters must ensure reliable communications and the conditions necessary for the work of officers on the move, and its staff and material base should ensure the rapid establishing, closing down, and movement of control points.

Unfortunately, questions of working convenience and of rest for the officers of the operational headquarters have not yet been solved by us. Even the experimental models of radio trucks which are being developed for operational headquarters at present do not allow officers to work in them with a map. In consequence, there can be no talk of any control on the move or during a short halt. We have not one acceptable production model of a staff vehicle for operational headquarters. Attempts by the headquarters of districts and armies to get out of this situation by their own efforts and resources lead to the unreasonable waste of considerable sums and to the weakening of other links of the military machine.

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In our opinion it is advisable to perform the task of developing a staff vehicle in a centralized way. The design bureau of any automobile plant could do this successfully within a few months. The establishment of normal conditions for the work of officers of operational headquarters will raise the quality and operational efficiency of their work and, consequently, will improve the control of troops as a whole.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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7 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "A Turning Point in the Development of Soviet Military Art", by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article titled "A Turning Point in the Development of Soviet Military Art", by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov, which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought).

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "A Turning Point in the Development of Soviet Military Art", by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "A Turning Point in the Development of Soviet Military Art", written by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Issue of a special version of Military Thought which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. The 1961 Third Issue went to press in July 1961.

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A TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY ART

Colonel-General Ye. IVANOV.

The discussion which has unfolded in the pages of the special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" concerning the most important questions of military theory, is a notable and, in its significance, a very important, event in the military-scientific life of the Armed Forces.

This article also intends to present certain considerations on the essence of a series of questions, the examination of which, in our view, provides interesting topics for further broadening the discussion.

A CRISIS IN MILITARY ART OR A TURNING POINT IN ITS DEVELOPMENT?

In the recently published articles of certain authors, the question is posed that there have been no serious changes whatsoever in Soviet military science since the end of World War II, and that in essence it is undergoing a crisis.

"Dropping curtsies in the direction of missiles and introducing some minor corrections in the theory of military art, we still hold in practice to the old positions existing at the end of World War II. Past experience, traditions, and habits taught to us for decades, tenaciously hold us back and prevent the same kind of revolution in military art which nuclear weapons and missiles created in the sphere of armament"[1], - states Colonel-General Gastilovich. He, like certain

[1]Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", first issue, 1960, page 6.

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other authors of articles published in the Collection, adheres to the view that the question is no more than one of adapting old forms and methods to new conditions.

It is quite obvious that such a presentation of the question is far from an objective evaluation of the state of development of Soviet military art.

Military art, being a category of history, is subject in its development to the general laws of Marxist dialectic. Therefore, it is subject in the fullest sense to the general dialectical law of development, expressed as a transfer from quantity to quality. It manifests itself in all the processes of nature, society, and thought - everywhere, where the change from old to new is under way, including the development of military affairs.

With the appearance of nuclear weapons, it has been, of course, more or less clear to everyone that they constitute a new and extremely powerful weapon, heralding the beginning of a revolution in the means of armed combat and the ways of conducting it. This revolution is going on gradually and in accordance with the development of the means of combat. It is impossible to accomplish it in a limited period of time.

Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that five or six years ago, when our deliberations on the conduct of operations were based on two or three dozen nuclear weapons which could be delivered to their objectives only by aircraft, the discussion obviously could realistically concern only a partial "modernization" of certain aspects of military art, because many facts which only became known later were lacking for another approach.

The appearance of new means of combat, as the experience of military history testifies, only brings

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about radical changes (a revolution) in military art when these means are introduced into the armament of troops on a mass scale, and when by these means it proves possible to accomplish a majority of the tasks arising during military operations, but this always required time. Fundamental changes in military affairs have never been accomplished with lightning speed.

In this regard it should not be forgotton that throughout the entire history of class society, the equipping of armies with new types of armament and combat equipment has, in all countries, come up against the definite limits of their economic potential, and therefore, notwithstanding the great desire of certain military figures, the process of transformation from old means of combat to new has been accomplished gradually over a definite period of time whose duration depended primarily on the productive potential of the country concerned.

In this connection, along with new means of combat, the old means continued to be used as well, from a necessity dictated not only by combat but also by economic factors.

Therefore, one should not be surprised by the fact that along with newly formulated views of military theory, the old naturally also continue to exist for a definite period. In the postwar period, a constant process of perfection of conventional types of armament, as they have now come to be called, was carried on in our armed forces. The advent of nuclear weapons and the improvement in their combat characteristics, together with the yearly increase in their scale of production, was a constant process of accumulation of qualitative and quantitative changes in the means of armed combat and consequently in the methods of waging it.

This process of development is not only as yet incomplete, but on the contrary, embraces an ever

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growing field and continues to bring about ever-newer situations in military art. Nevertheless, this does not mean that certain views have not already been formulated on specific problems. It should be noted that in recent times, on the basis of theoretical research and general conclusions from the practical experience of troops, we have developed and put into effect new field service regulations, combat regulations for the various arms of troops, and instructions on the combat utilization of special troops. A great deal of work, which has on the whole been a positive contribution, has been done in examining questions of the conduct of combat and operations, especially during the initial period, employing new means of combat. During this time, our industry, on the basis of principles developed scientifically and confirmed by the Party and the Government regarding the future structure of the armed forces, and in accordance with these principles, was given the means to undertake on a mass scale the equipping of troops with missile/nuclear weapons. To ignore all this and to write about a "crisis" is to ignore all those progressive changes which have taken place and are taking place in the development of Soviet military art.

All that has been said, of course, does not mean that our military theory has already fully resolved all questions and that we have avoided all miscalculations.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovskiy, in a speech at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, said: "We must say directly, that in a whole series of questions we have not shown the necessary creative power, scientific daring and boldness, if you will, but have long been marking time".

Therefore, in the interests of the work itself we must talk not of a crisis in military art, which we absolutely do not and cannot have, but of those weak

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points in military theory which are in fact at the turning point in their development.

FOR WHAT TYPE OF WAR MUST WE BE PREPARED?

One of the most important questions raised in the pages of the Collection, is the question of Soviet military doctrine. The increased interest in its development is completely understandable. At the present time our armed forces find themselves at the turning point of their development; therefore, a further intensive analysis of military doctrine naturally assumes paramount significance.

M.V. Frunze, defining the concept of "a unitary military doctrine" pointed out that it is a "syllabus adopted in the army of a given state, which establishes the nature of the structure of the armed forces of that country, the methods of combat training of troops, their leadership on the basis of the predominant views in the state on the nature of the military problems facing them and the means for solving them, and which emanates from the class nature of the state and the computed level of development of the productive forces of the country".[1]

From the definition it is apparent that M. V. Frunze places prime importance on the question of the nature of the structure of the armed forces, which depends above all on the level of development of the productive forces of the country, on its economic potential. The question of the economic potential of our country arouses no doubts in any of us. Our

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[1] M.V. Frunze. Collected Works. Vol. II. Military Publishing House, 1957, page 8.

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socialist state is in a position to provide the armed forces with all presently known means of armed combat.

However, there are examples in military history when economically strong countries, not lagging behind their adversaries with regard to the equipping of their own armed forces with weapons and combat equipment, have yet suffered most devastating defeats.

Why? In a number of cases this occurred because military-theoretical thought in the prewar years could not correctly resolve the question of the type of war for which its armed forces should be prepared.

For example, prior to World War II the armed forces of France and fascist Germany had approximately the same level of equipment in aircraft, tanks, and artillery. However, France suffered a swift defeat in the war. Among the host of reasons which brought about her capitulation to fascist Germany, of no small significance was, as is known, the fact that French military doctrine was based on the principles of defensive strategy, but the German, on offensive. Subsequently, as is known, fascist Germany also suffered defeat, while having as the basis of its military doctrine the adventurist idea of waging a blitzkrieg.

Consequently, to resolve correctly the question of the character of the structure of the armed forces, scientifically based recommendations of military theory are necessary, especially on such questions as the character and possible duration of a future war and also the methods of waging armed combat, which arise from the aims and objects of war as defined by the political leadership.

During the past few years, these very questions have been the subject of heated controversy.

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What conclusions, for example, are to be drawn from the ideas of Colonel-General Gastilovich on the nature of a future war, its duration in general, and its initial period in particular, "There is no need to fear the term 'blitzkrieg' .... Under the conditions of nuclear war only 'blitzkrieg' operations can promise victory." "Under present conditions the possibility of victory must be assured by the readiness, the capacity, and the capability of concluding the war in the shortest possible time. The theory of a prolonged war is more acceptable at present to the monopolistic circles of the West..." "Taking over the border zones and the zones of total destruction and radiation .. will not at all necessitate multi-million man armies". So writes Colonel-General Gastilovich.[1]

In almost the same spirit General Goryainov writes: "The missile/nuclear weapon has become (or can become) a mass weapon and its destructive and in particular its radiological qualities (a reference to megaton bombs - Ye. Ivanov) are actually capable of creating conditions in which the fundamental object of war - the destruction of the enemy - can be accomplished technically in a short period of time and without over-taxing the economy of powerful industrial countries".."just a few hundred powerful nuclear bursts will be the primary and decisive factors affecting the outcome of the war .. the initial period of a war becomes its decisive period."[2]

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", first issue 1960, pages 9,10.

[2] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", second issue 1960, pages 97,101.

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If one were to summarize briefly all the quotations mentioned above, having cast aside certain reservations which the authors occasionally make with regard to ground troops and other types of armed forces, they could be said to be, essentially, exponents of an "atomic blitzkrieg". They consider that a future war will have a rapid, blitzkrieg character; its outcome will be decided by the first missile/nuclear operations for which only some few hundred thermonuclear warheads need be expended; that it is not necessary to have a multi-million man army for waging war, and the basic function of the small number of ground troops in a war should be confined to the occupation of enemy territory.

What would happen if these views were to be legitimized and raised to the status of fundamental principles of our military doctrine? First, our armed forces would be subject to one-sided orientation in their development, with all the consequences resulting from this, and secondly, in essence, we would be forced to abandon that versatile training of the troops which we now conduct, counting on a fierce and relatively extended armed conflict with the powerful coalition of the imperialist countries. Such an approach to the organization of the armed forces and their military training would be one-sided.

A future war in its political essence will be a decisive armed conflict between two world socio-economic systems - capitalist and socialist. A struggle between them will involve two of the most powerful military coalitions, armed as never before and possessing colossal material and manpower resources. Therefore, no matter what losses single governments would suffer in the beginning of the war, serious consideration must be given to the fact that a coalition of nations as a whole can prove capable of waging armed combat over a considerably protracted period.

Without a doubt, massive missile/nuclear strikes of a strategic nature in the very beginning of the war

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will create conditions for the accomplishment, in the initial period, of results that bear no comparison with the results achieved during the initial periods of previous wars. Naturally, this will have a very great influence on the conduct and the general duration of the war.

However, to orient oneself in building the armed forces and preparing the country for a war in which the initial period will be decisive for the achievement of the ultimate goals of the war, would be completely unfounded.

Indeed, Comrade Goryainov admits to the possibility, and with this one cannot disagree, that once a war has begun, the situation could arise where the strategic missile troops of both sides, for a number of reasons, might be only partially successful in their aims and not achieve a decisive effect. For my part I will add: One cannot base one's estimates in war only on the availability of one's own means of destruction and not consider the means of destruction and counteraction open to the enemy, particularly the means of antimissile defense which are now being developed rapidly. We may guess at the enemy's plans, but it is he who carries them out, and his actions, as the experience of all wars can testify, usually introduce substantial changes in our plans. Therefore, in the evaluation of the initial period of a war and consequently of the direction of organization of the armed forces, we should not in principle base our ideas only on the possible decisive role of this period, but must be prepared for the continued conduct of numerous operations with all types of armed forces even in the ensuing periods of the war.

At the same time we certainly must not underestimate the definite role, in the light of known conditions, of the first operations of the initial period of the war and the possibility of destroying the aggressor in a short time.

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To deny this would be to stand out against a fully comprehensive approach to the preparation of our armed forces. In these questions there should be no extreme.

The Minister of Defense points out: Having ensured the security of our Motherland, we must develop and perfect the means and methods of armed combat with a view to achieving victory over the aggressor above all in the shortest possible time, but at the same time we must seriously prepare for an extended war, and this determines the direction of our military organization. Such is the only kind of approach to this question that we too can consider legitimate.

The basic content of the initial period of war can consist of: the disruption and repelling of the first blow of the aggressor on the ground, in the air, and on the sea; the inflicting upon him of a shattering blow designed to disorganize the governmental and military leadership and also the destruction of the most vital economic targets, especially industrial enterprises connected with the production of means for nuclear attack; conducting initial operations with all types of armed forces in close coordination in order to accomplish the most immediate military-strategic tasks and the early seizure of the strategic initiative.

The fulfillment of these tasks will doubtless create the necessary prerequisites for the swift conduct of the war and the achievement of final victory. But the prerequisites are not victory itself. Military history indicates that armed forces which have successfully started a war can in the final analysis end up vanquished, and the first blows suffered by an army at the beginning of a war still do not signify final defeat.

Consequently, it behooves us to take as our starting point the fact that for the successful conduct of, and final victory in, a war, colossal efforts of the armed forces and the entire state as a

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whole may be required. Massive armies and the mobilization of all the moral and physical strength of the people and of the economy of the country will be essential.

A position in which the decisive role for the achievement of the primary objectives of the war is delegated to missile troops of strategic designation certainly does not mean a reduction in the utilization of ground troops, but on the contrary indicates a more important need for them on the basis of their potential capabilities.

It is incorrect to count on their being, as a result of the extensive utilization of missile-nuclear weapons on the field of battle, a completely dead zone, and that there will be nothing left for our troops to do but to move effortlessly into the heart of the enemy countries to carry out occupation functions.

For the final defeat of an enemy and the seizure of his territory following nuclear strikes by missile troops of strategic designation, regardless of how powerful the strikes might be, it will always be necessary to bring in a sufficiently large number of ground troops. Without this, it would be difficult to predict the possibility of concluding any kind of war.

Therefore, a very important role will belong to the ground troops in the attainment of the final aims of a war. They have all that is necessary to carry out this role. Their firepower and striking force, together with their supply of missile weapons with nuclear warheads, the full motorization of troops, and the growth in the relative importance of the tank troops have increased sharply and in consequence their significance in the light of the new conditions of armed combat has not diminished.

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THE USE OF MISSILE TROOPS OF STRATEGIC DESIGNATION

Prior to the placing of missile/nuclear weapons in the hands of the strategic leadership, there existed, in fact, no means by which the progress of a war could be quickly and decisively affected. Even in World War II, although our bomber aircraft could already deliver bombs of rather significant force, these could not be sufficiently powerful to have a swift and direct influence on the outcome of the war. Therefore, strategy achieved its goals through the successive waging of many battles, engagements, and operations, all leading, in the aggregate, to a specific strategic result.

An entirely new factor under present conditions is that such powerful means as various forms of missiles, among them intercontinental ones with hydrogen warheads, are in the hands of the strategic command. With the assistance of such means, the strategic command has the capability to fulfill directly and independently (and not only by protracted engagements and battles between ground troops as was actually the case in the past) in the very shortest period, exceptionally important missions, even to the destruction of a number of countries of our probable enemies, along with their armed forces, in any part of the globe.

Consequently, under present donditions, in order to decide correctly questions about the nature of operations and to determine the methods of combat operations of the troops in an operational element, it is necessary to clarify fundamental principles regarding the use of the strategic striking forces - the missile troops of the VGK (Supreme High Command).

Missile troops of strategic designation are the decisive striking force and the wielders of the strategic power of our armed forces. They will carry out the most important tasks in the disruption of the

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enemy rear, his economy, and systems of governmental control by destroying his strategic means of armed combat.

Given these capabilities, it may be assumed that they can be used suddenly, in mass, against the main enemies, with the intention of achieving a strategic result in a short period. In this sense, the most important objectives for strikes of the strategic missile troops will be the enemy's means of nuclear attack, against which it is primarily necessary to launch missiles of intercontinental and intermediate (srednyaya) range types, and also his strategic aviation, centers of governmental and military control, the most important economic objectives, especially those connected with the production of nuclear weapons, and other important aspects of his war potential.

The decision regarding the question of objectives, the timing and force of the strikes of the missile troops of strategic designation, is entirely and completely the prerogative of the Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme High Command, and will depend on the capabilities of the country to adopt missile/nuclear strategic weapons and also on the concrete conditions of the situation, of which the political factor will be the decisive element.

It is not the intention of this article to analyze the possible role of the High Command with missile troops in the organization and execution of the strikes which have been decided, but we would nevertheless like to emphasize that this role, in our view, should be kept within firmly defined limits, since every such strike is a most important factor of policy and strategy, and accordingly should be carried out in all its details on direct orders of the Supreme High Command.

In our theory, the question frequently arises of the participation of ground troops or their missile large units with the advent of war in "missile operations" of the strategic missile troops and, conversely,

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of the participation of the missile troops of strategic designation in the operations of ground troops. The posing of such questions has no sound basis.

Indeed, military-industrial objectives, the largest administrative-political centers, and the strategic means of nuclear attack of the imperialist governments, all of which are designated for destruction by the missile troops of strategic designation, are deployed over a great expanse of the globe. They are located in Europe, Africa, Asia and America.

In turn, our missile troops of strategic designation are also deployed over an enormous area. Therefore, under these conditions there is hardly any sense in speaking of the concept of direct coordination and execution of joint strikes by the strategic missile troops and missile large units (units) of the ground troops. We can only say that the successful accomplishment of their basic missions by the strategic missile troops will create favorable conditions for vigorous and decisive operations by all the other types of the armed forces, including the ground troops.

It is true that observations have been made to the effect that together with the execution of the missions enumerated above, missile troops of strategic designation will also be used for the accomplishment of such missions as the defeat of groupings of ground troops in a theater of military operations, the destruction of the enemy's operational means of nuclear attack, and other objectives. And in light of this, an attempt is made to analyze the bases of coordination between missile troops of strategic designation and missile large units of ground troops. It appears to us that such a presentation of the question is also devoid of a realistic base.

The efforts of missile troops of strategic designation should not be dissipated over numerous targets, just as in the years of World War II it was

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considered irrational to use long-range aircraft for strikes against operational objectives. If we did so at times, then it was a case of extreme necessity because of a front's lack of aircraft.

To plan beforehand for the execution of operational missions by the strategic missile troops is not expedient. For this reason, the missile troops of the ground troops, continually being supplied with more highly perfected types of missiles, will be able to destroy enemy objectives to a greater depth than is now possible, and this will ensure the successful execution of front operations without the involvement of strategic missile troops.

The strikes of the strategic missile troops must, in the final analysis, predetermine the attainment of the principal goals of the war -- in this lies their fundamental purpose. Their basic efforts must be focused on the attainment of these goals.

ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE BEING OBLITERATED?

If one were to analyze carefully the judgements of General Gastilovich, then it would not be difficult to come to the conclusion that defense as a form of armed combat has disappeared or is on the threshold of disappearing because it has somehow lost its inherent characteristic -- to hold designated lines or areas with the object of inflicting maximum losses upon the advancing enemy and, in doing so, to create the necessary conditions for a transition to a decisive offensive. He sees the distinction between defense and offense only in the number of nuclear weapons, of divisions, and the composition of echelons. As to the means of conducting combat operations, they are, in his way of thinking, the same in offense as in defense.

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"In offensive as in defensive operations of ground troops, the basis of their operations is nuclear strikes, swift maneuvers and short assaults with tanks and manpower".[1]

If one is guided by the materialistic dialectic and also proceeds from the actual relationship of the strength of the opposing military groupings, then it is obviously impossible to agree fully with these assertions.

We all acknowledge that offense will be the basic form of combat operations of our troops in a future war. But in acknowledging offense, we cannot deny the necessity for defense as one of the possible forms of armed combat, because if there is no defense then there is no offense. Offense is so called because it is waged against a defending enemy. Without the presence of a defending enemy the troops would execute a normal march. Offense and defense are two inter-related and interdependent forms of armed combat, and one cannot exist without the other. Such is the dialectic of this question.

In the judgements expressed above, it appears that consideration has not been given to the capabilities of our potential enemies.

Actually, the countries of the Socialist Camp are militarily, politically, and economically strong as never before. However, in preparing for war and exploring new methods of armed combat, we cannot assume that our probable enemies are not technically armed, as they say, to the teeth. They have multi-million man armies, they possess enormous stocks of nuclear weapons and modern means of delivering them to their targets. Therefore, to consider that we will not encounter serious counteraction from their side is a fallacy. Moreover, a new world war can only be unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, primarily by the Anglo-American

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", first issue, 1960, pages 12, 13.

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imperialists and the West German revanchists. Consequently, they will be the first to try to carry out a massive missile-nuclear attack which will be followed by an invasion of ground troops. The effects of a missile-nuclear strike can be very tangible not only for our country but for the entire Socialist Camp as well. The enemy can take the initiative in his hands in specific sectors of a strategic front and compel our troops to resort temporarily to defensive operations. Not to consider this and to reject completely the possibility of such a development in specific directions -- means to close one's eyes to reality, to indulge in "counting one's chickens before they are hatched" (shapkozakidatelstvo).

We maintain that a future war will have not only an all-embracing, but a many-sided character, with varied forms of armed combat. Consequently, our task does not consist of artificially simplifying them but of thoroughly studying currently existing methods of combat, of evaluating them objectively and correctly, and of devising new ones.

The more versatile the preparation of our armed forces from the point of view of their mastery of all possible forms and methods of armed combat, the higher will be their combat readiness and the greater will be our guarantee against any type of surprise or incident in the course of a war. Such is our understanding of this question of the plan for waging war.

But how does this question fare within the framework of an operation? Under modern conditions, defenders who are launching massive missile-nuclear attacks on an advancing force can in a number of cases change decisively the correlation of forces to their own advantage and force it to turn to defensive operations, and sometimes to retreat.

In this connection one of the characteristic features of an offensive operation in depth under conditions of mass use of missile/nuclear weapons is

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the variety of forms and methods of waging it and also the dynamic nature of their change: swift pursuit and solid, vigorous defense, meeting engagements, and retreats, combat under encirclement and disengagement from combat -- such is the possible general picture of development in a modern offensive operation. Every form and method of armed combat has characteristics, peculiarities, and modes of conduct which are inherent to it alone. Therefore, the mission of military art is not confined to the artificial elimination of distinctions among them, nor to the forcible abolition or coalescence of methods but to developing a theory for their organization and conduct under conditions of a missile-nuclear war.

Much attention is devoted by certain authors to an examination of the methods of conducting defense. They consider that to defend oneself now is senseless. Nuclear weapons overwhelm and destroy everyone everywhere; it is unnecessary to hold areas and positions, just as it is impossible to maintain their stability.

In our opinion, defense on an operational as well as a tactical scale must be able to withstand enemy missile/nuclear strikes and the subsequent tank assaults to preserve to the maximum possible degree one's own personnel and equipment, to inflict the greatest destruction upon the enemy, and to create the necessary conditions for going over to the offensive and the final destruction of the enemy, even in a situation where the defending troops employ limited forces and weapons. Such a mission for defense under modern conditions is typical, the more so because the attacker will not always and everywhere have the capability to overcome the defense by massive nuclear strikes.

Can one, under current conditions, argue strongly for a defense based only on maneuver and strikes by forces located in the zone of the interior? Our reply to this is in the negative.

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Defense, with its inherent peculiarities and methods of conduct under modern conditions, must be built on a skillful combination of firm holding of definite areas of terrain together with maneuver and strikes by troops from the zone of the interior. Maneuver must be utilized mainly for the preservation of one's own limited forces and weapons, the creation of a firing line which is invincible to the enemy in the primary directions of his offensive and also for the launching of fire strikes and the execution of counterattacks and counterstrikes.

To relegate "stability of defense to the archives" as General Gastilovich proposes -- means to deny that premise on which is based the modes and methods of operations by troops in defense.

Such an assertion is all the more untrue if one keeps in mind that stability of defense is not exhausted by the creation of defensive positions and zones by the organization of terrain by engineer work. This is just one of the factors upon which stability depends. Stability of defense must be achieved by other factors as well, foremost by missile-nuclear strikes, strikes by troops and an extensive system of obstacles. Even formerly one could not talk about any sort of stability of defense without maneuver, fire strikes, and strikes by troops.

Missile/nuclear weapons in the hands [of defensive troops affords them the possibility of] completely frustrating [the enemy's offensive.][1] But this possibility in no way denies the necessity for the formation of defense according to a definite system. The deployment of troops in tactical as well as in operational elements must be subject to definite requirements and must guarantee not only the accomplishment of maneuver, but also the holding of basic areas in the probable directions of the enemy's offensive.

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[1] Headquarter's Comment: Portion in brackets missing from the original and reconstructed by translator.

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Today there is a series of "weak spots" in our defense. Basing its organization on defensive zones and positions, to a large extent it retains a linear concept. The deployment of forces and weapons along solid frontal positions and zones gives rise in a number of cases, as experience in exercises demonstrates, to the desire to close the gaps and breaches which leads to the linear deployment of forces and the establishment of a continuous front.

As a result of the radical changes which have taken place in the means of armed combat and also in the methods of our probable enemies in conducting an offensive, the necessity for a reappraisal of the forms of organization of a modern defense has obviously arisen.

A defense strip (zone) of an army must obviously have a system of organized areas capable of withstanding massive enemy tank attacks, of disrupting the efforts of his ground troops, and of creating favorable conditions for inflicting on them not only nuclear strikes but also counterstrikes by our own forces from the zone of the interior.

Within a defense strip (zone) of an army, which can reach 150-200 kms and more along the front and 150-200 kms in depth, it is expedient to assign to divisions defense areas which embrace the basic directions of the probable offensive of the enemy.

In the defense strip (zone) of an army the following must be prepared, siting areas for missile large units, areas of defense for divisions; siting areas for units of PVO troops, areas of disposition and lines of deployment of large units of the second echelon and reserves; control points; a road network, and a system of obstacles set up by the engineers.

The area of defense of a division must also be a system of organized areas of defense for units deployed along the front and in depth along the most important directions. The size of the area of defense for a division can vary.

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Within the area of defense of a division there must be organized siting areas for missile and anti-aircraft missile units, areas of defense for regiments and battalions, artillery fire positions, control points, and areas of disposition and lines of deployment of second echelons and reserves.

The area of defense for a regiment under these conditions can reach 10-15 kms along the front and 10 kms in depth, and for a battalion, from 3 to 5 kms along the front and 2.5-3 kms in depth. All areas of defense must be adaptable to perimeter defense.

The basis of organization of areas by engineer work should be primarily construction for fire means, cover for personnel and combat equipment, preparation in the antiatomic sense in combination with obstacles and roads in order to support a troop maneuver, and not the construction of a solid trench system. Sectors of trenches and connecting trenches can be established only in the areas of defense of subunits, and even there only if time is available. The intervals between areas of defense must be covered by fire, obstacles, and, on the most important directions, also by missile/nuclear strikes.

The organization of the defense must be begun with the organization of a system of fire which must guarantee: the destruction of the enemy's means for nuclear attack as they are discovered; the destruction of his troops and areas of deployment at the time of advance, deployment and, transition to the offensive; the repelling of massed attacks by enemy tanks and infantry; destruction of scattered enemy groupings; destruction of control points and his radiotechnical equipment; covering with fire the obstacles and areas of chemical contamination, breaches, open flanks, and areas subjected to nuclear strikes; the support of troops launching counterattacks and counterstrikes; the capability of concentrating fire in a short time in any threatened direction.

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It is essential to plan beforehand the areas of destruction by enemy fire both in the remote approaches and the main line of resistance, and on the flanks and in gaps, and in the depth of the defense, and also to prepare artillery fire for separate sectors.

CONCERNING THE COMPATIBILITY OF MISSILE/NUCLEAR STRIKES AND OPERATIONS OF TROOPS

Nuclear weapons are the main, most powerful, and most effective means of destroying an enemy carrying out any type of combat operations. Naturally, therefore, the results anticipated from their use must be the basis for solution of the question of using combined-arms large units.

However, missile/nuclear strikes in their turn should be carried out with the aim of creating more favorable conditions for troops to accomplish the final crushing of the enemy and to seize those areas and objectives which are designated as the aims of the operation. The troops must be prepared in such a way, and occupy such an operational position, as would permit them to utilize to the greatest extent the results of missile/nuclear strikes.

In this connection, we consider it necessary to dwell on the question of the selection of the direction of a strike by troops and of determining the timing of nuclear strikes.

The main efforts of combined-arms large units under modern conditions need not always focus only in those directions where the main bulk of nuclear weapons is employed. The concentration of the main efforts of the troops in the direction of the employment of the main bulk of nuclear weapons, in many cases, will not permit the speediest and most complete exploitation of the results of the action of all the destructive factors of nuclear strikes and the achievement of the maximum destruction of the enemy.

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Thus, during a breakthrough in the prepared defense of the enemy, with the objectives of achieving the maximum destruction of defensive installations, the destruction of combat equipment and personnel, the creation of high levels of radioactivity to impede the establishment of defense and the introduction of fresh forces, it can be incomparably more advantageous to employ surface or low altitude bursts. Under these conditions, the main efforts of the advancing troops will be more advantageously concentrated by bypassing the areas which have undergone a massive nuclear strike.

The concentration of the main efforts of troops in the direction of nuclear strikes can also prove inexpedient during an offensive through heavily wooded areas. Fires, log obstacles, the retention /two or three words missing/ of the /one word missing/ time of choosing /part of line missing/ of troops in the areas of nuclear bursts. In these cases, if only the possibility of envelopment exists, it is essential to use it decisively, and to effect the destruction of the enemy in the forest with powerful nuclear strikes.

A somewhat similar situation can take place if the attack comes through areas with large cities where the operations of troops after nuclear strikes could prove very difficult.

The direction of the concentration of the main efforts of combined-arms large units and of missile-nuclear weapons can also differ owing to the delineation of the line of the front. When a flanking position has been taken up in relation to the main enemy grouping, it will often be more expedient to concentrate the main efforts of the missile/nuclear weapons directly on this enemy grouping and to launch the strike by troops in an enveloping movement -- on the flank and rear.

There can be other conditions of the situation when the direction of the concentration of the main

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efforts of the troops will not pass through areas of employment of the main bulk of missile/nuclear weapons.

Consequently in this question we are faced with a new law in military art, the essence of which consists of the fact that modern means of combat not only allow but very often obligate the separation, in relation to space, of the strikes launched by nuclear weapons and by troops.

This necessarily applies to considerations of the antiatomic protection of all forces and weapons designated for an offensive, as well as to considerations of the most effective use of all the destructive factors of nuclear weapons.

In determining the timing of launching nuclear strikes, we shall also encounter a new situation which cannot be ignored. As is known, in World War II, we did not usually begin artillery and air preparation if the troops were not completely prepared to advance. And how must we resolve this problem under present conditions?

In principle, it is desirable that the time for the launching of missile/nuclear strikes be determined after a consideration of the operational situation and of the readiness of the troops for the most effective utilization of the results of these strikes. This, however, is only in principle. If there is reason to assume that the enemy can effect a preventive strike, then it is essential to launch one's own nuclear strikes against him without delay, not waiting for the complete readiness of all the troops predesignated for the offensive, because every delay in the missile/nuclear strike in the beginning of the operation is fraught with the danger of its frustrating the offensive.

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In conclusion, we consider it essential to emphasize once again that at the present time it is our deep

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conviction that Soviet military theory is passing not through a period of crisis, but through a turning point in its development.

In the light of this situation, as it appears to us, it is also necessary to conduct a further elaboration of military doctrine, of the theory of military art, and of other questions of military affairs.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

11 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Use of Surface Vessels in Modern Naval Warfare", by Rear-Admiral N. Zvyagin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Use of Surface Vessels in Modern Naval Warfare", by Rear-Admiral N. Zvyagin

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Use of Surface Vessels in Modern Naval Warfare", written by Rear-Admiral N. Zvyagin.

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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"THE USE OF SURFACE VESSELS IN MODERN NAVAL WARFARE"

BY REAR-ADMIRAL N. ZVYAGIN

The important qualitative changes taking place in the armed forces as a result of their being equipped with the newest combat weapons have changed the role and place in war not only of the types of armed forces, but also of the arms of forces and troops. In our Navy these changes are apparent primarily in that the submarine is becoming the basic striking force of the Navy.1

In this connection, various views are expressed as to the role and position to be occupied by surface vessels in modern naval operations. Often opinions are voiced to the effect that surface vessels have lost their significance, that they will be useless in a future war, and are therefore not needed by the Navy. Thus, there is no apparent need to build new vessels; one can still use the vessels of various types which still exist as part of the Navy; later, with the development of submarines, the need for the use of surface vessels in modern naval operations will fall by the wayside.

It is a fact that such large ships as battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, to give them their former designation, have completely lost all combat value and have no prospects of being used as a naval striking force. The role of the latter has been given to the submarines; in foreign navies this role will continue to be borne for some time by aircraft carrier striking large units, although even aircraft carriers no longer represent the force they used to be in the not so distant past (this is why the American high command puts such great emphasis on the development of strike submarines).

But, as is well known, the purpose of surface vessels was not exclusively to resolve combat missions through the use of large

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1. The navies of the large capitalist countries have as their basic striking force large units of aircraft carriers, consisting of surface vessels and deck-based aircraft. In the near future the role of the main striking force will be assigned to the missile-carrying nuclear submarines, which are being built at an accelerated pace. The navies of the secondary naval powers are putting greater emphasis on the development of anti-submarine defense, which consists of surface vessels and anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters.

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vessels. An important role was played by vessels of other types in support of the basing and deployment of naval forces, including submarines, in defense of naval communications and of the coastline from attack by enemy surface vessels, and also in resolving other missions.

Although submarines have become the basic arm of forces, they cannot always be used without the participation of other arms of naval forces. Submarines need support in their basing and deployment and, primarily, must be defended against enemy submarines. Of all the currently available forces and resources, special surface vessels are the most effective solution to these missions. In addition, there are some missions which in effect cannot be solved at all by other naval forces without surface vessels.

Therefore, we feel that although surface vessels no longer have the basic role in the Navy, they still are a very important part of it.

The missions of surface vessels under modern conditions have essentially changed. As already stated, in the near future the basic striking force of our probable enemy's Navy will be missile-carrying nuclear submarines. As the number of such submarines increases, the threat of the infliction of their strikes also increases-not only against our naval objectives, but against important industrial centers situated well inside our territory. Fighting against these enemy forces will be conducted by special submarines of the antisubmarine defense, aviation, and surface vessels.

For the present, as well as in the near future, the most effective solution of the mission of combat against enemy nuclear submarines can be achieved only the complex utilization of all available forces and means. Tracking facilities at present included in the equipment of surface vessels allow search and pursuit of enemy submarines to be conducted with great effectiveness. When surface ships are equipped with antiaircraft missiles and helicopters, their potential in combatting submarines will become even greater. Such an appraisal of the role of surface vessels in combatting enemy submarines is dependent on their ability to remain at sea for long periods of time at a considerable distance from land and to reconnoiter large areas of the sea in short periods of time with the help of helicopters.

The dispersed basing of the naval forces, the use of dispersed antiatomic combat and transit formations, the constant threat from enemy aircraft, submarines, and mines all stipulate the need to give

cover to submarines not only when entering or leaving their bases, but also to cover their deployment for operations in the open sea. Such support will take the form of combat with the antisubmarine submarines of the enemy which are deployed at the points of emergence of our submarines - in the narrows as well as along their probable routes to the open sea - and the detection and destruction of mines along the route of passage. Although the antisubmarine submarines and aircraft will be able to conduct combat with enemy submarines, surface vessels will play an important role in this engagement under cover of antiaircraft missile units of the Navy and the Antiaircraft Defense of the Country. As far as the danger from mines is concerned, it will be effectively conducted both now and in the near future only by surface vessels /part of line missing/... forces of the Navy, it will be necessary to bring in our missile-equipped surface vessels to engage with those enemy surface vessels which are interfering with the deployment of our submarines; for use as protection for vessels of antisubmarine defense, which are engaged in searching for enemy submarines at a considerable distance from shore, and for dealing with the destruction of enemy landing craft and their support ships.

In a future war a significant role in support of ground troop operations will be the providing of sea transport of men and materiel, mounting tactical landing operations and disrupting naval communications between the enemy's coastal groupings and his rear bases. For the solution of these missions it will be necessary to use, along with other forces, surface vessels of small displacement. Only surface vessels of various designation will be able to accomplish such missions as protecting the transport of troops and military equipment, heavy freight, and troop landings.

It will be up to surface vessels equipped with antiaircraft missiles to screen convoys and transports from aerial attack during their passage and in many cases the vessels at their bases.

Surface vessels will have a definite role in the laying of antisubmarine and antilanding minefields.

Such are the basic missions which require the use of surface vessels. It is obvious that complete solution of these missions cannot be accomplished by conventionally armed ships. New classes of vessels with modern weapons will be required.

The composition of the Navy must include special vessels of two basic classes for antisubmarine warfare against enemy submarines;

vessels for short-range operations, and vessels for long-range operation. Both classes must have modern hdro-acoustical equipment, powerful antisubmarine weapons, antiaircraft missile weapons, and antisubmarine helicopters. With such aids they will be able to carry out long-range searches and destroy enemy submarines.

Special vessels such as trawlers, landing craft, and transports will be needed for locating and destroying mines, and transport of landing parties, troops, and equipment.

Vessels equipped with missiles will cover antisubmarine defense (PLO) vessels against attack by enemy surface vessels, primarily from carrier-borne hunter-killer groups of PLO forces, and will escort convoys and landing parties during their ocean passage.

Antiaircraft defense vessels will be needed to screen PLO vessels, convoys, and landing parties during the sea passage and in many cases to protect the bases of submarines and other combat vessels against air attack.

The conditions of the use of surface vessels of various types at the present time are characterized first of all by the fact that it became more difficult for them to defend themselves against enemy air attacks than previously. Aircraft carrying missiles can use their weapons against surface vessels from distances of much greater range than antiaircraft missiles launched from vessels. For this reason surface vessels have practically lost the capacity to defend themselves against air attack and are faced with the necessity of countering airborne missiles of great speeds, equipped with homing guidance and powerful nuclear charges, and having a high probability of hits.

Missile-equipped submarines will present, together with aircraft, a great menace to surface vessels. Missiles launched by these submarines, having the same characteristics as those launched by aircraft, will be able to strike at surface ships under any weather conditions. Fitting missiles with nuclear charges significantly increases the possibility of destroying surface vessels at the time when the vessels will have only a limited opportunity of defense against this weapon.

A particularly dangerous enemy of present-day surface vessels are nuclear-powered submarines equipped with long-range homing torpedoes and missiles capable of carrying nuclear charges. Nuclear submarines, capable of a high degree of concealment, have a speed about equip to that of the fast-moving surface vessels. In addition,

submarines have an advantage over surface vessels in the use of hydroacoustics. A surface vessel can be spotted from a submarine at a much greater range than a submarine from a surface vessel. Because of this, submarines are able to successfully attack surface vessels before being spotted, and can use their weapons more effectively than the surface vessels under attack by submarines. Nowadays submarines will not always strive to avoid encounter with surface vessels but will sometimes even attack PLO vessels.

In many cases, the present-day surface vessels will not be able to emerge victorious from an engagement with submarines. Though if still capable of carrying out independent combat against conventional diesel submarines, their capacity to effectively search, pursue, and destroy, or sometimes even to escape from nuclear submarines, is very limited. These circumstances made it necessary to equip surface vessels with antisubmarine defense helicopters which may help to make up the deficiencies of surface vessels in their combat against missile-equipped nuclear submarines.

The potentialities of the mine as a weapon against surface vessels have also substantially increased. The present day reaction-surfacing (reaktivno-vsplyvayushchiy) mines are equipped with extremely sensitive non-contact detonators; these are based on the principle of exploitation of various physical fields of the vessel, and are adapted for installation within a wide range of depths. These properties make for a considerable increase of the areas considered hazardous for surface vessels. Conducting combat with mines in a theater of operations will take much effort and various combat means will have to be used. This will also limit the possibilities of the use of surface vessels for the solution of combat missions.

The future saturation of all arms of the naval forces with radio-electronic devices, will create conditions which make it impossible for surface vessels to conceal movement, even under the most advantageous weather conditions. Surface vessels can be detected by modern reconnaissance means at any time of day or night and in any part of the operational theater, and are subject to strikes by nuclear/missile weapons whose effectiveness is also independent of the time of day or night, or of weather conditions.

The threat of enemy use of nuclear weapons forces surface vessels to sail in dispersed formations. At the same time, due to the increase in the firing range of submarines, escort vessels must be placed at much greater distance from the escorted forces than in the

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past. In order to create the necessary conditions for surface vessels for their solution of combat missions, it will be necessary to increase considerably the number of escort vessels which will have to be placed along the increased perimeter of the defended area. Practically speaking, however, in an overwhelming majority of cases this will be impossible.

While submarines use cruise missiles against escort vessels and transports, antisubmarine defense vessels will be able at best to use only their antiaircraft missiles. They will not always be able to take direct action against the submarine itself.

The use of improved homing devices will effectively increase the possibilities of destruction of surface vessels by torpedoes launched from submarines and small surface carriers.

The development of radar and the increase in the maximum effective range of coastal defense weapons in large measure impedes the approach by surface vessels, even in a distant approach route to the enemy coast. It has become increasingly difficult to use large vessels in confined theaters of operation; they can be detected by the enemy directly during their departure from their bases. Therefore, in order to utilize surface vessels effectively for the solution of combat missions in the enemy's coastal area, particularly in confined theaters of operations, a set of complex measures for their security will be required.

All of this complicates to a marked degree the utilization of surface vessels, and requires a large expenditure of forces for the support of their operations.

However, surface vessels which have missiles of various types, and radioelectronic apparatus, increase the combat capabilities of their individual classes. Today even small vessels equipped with missiles are capable of combat with large vessels carrying a greater number of missiles. In addition, the vessels' armor and other means of protection against nuclear weapons will have practically no bearing on the outcome of a combat encounter. This entails the complete rejection of a centuries-old principle which maintained that surface vessels can be used only in combat against similar or "equivalent strength" (ravnoznachnyy) vessels. Any vessel, although equipped with the most powerful modern weapons, heavy armor and perfect means of defense, can be destroyed by even a patrol boat capable of launching missiles. More than that, vessels of small displacement

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which are not easily detected by radar and which, for this reason can approach a large vessel to within the range of their missiles, will possess important tactical advantages over the enemy.

The vessles of a striking force equipped with missiles, will not have to execute a complicated maneuver in order to take and hold positions adjusted in relation to the enemy, in order to use their weapons. Approaching and holding the firing position will also depend to a lesser degree on the relative speeds of the vessels engaged in combat, and their relative disposition.

Equipping vessels with antiaircraft missiles will lessen their dependence on constant air cover provided by land-based fighter aircraft, will permit them to resolve missions outside coastal zones of the PVO and to defend themselves from the means of enemy air attack. However, the restricted supply of antiaircraft missiles always will be the reason for the ship's limited time at sea.

In orgsnizing tactical coordination between separate tactical groups of surface vessels, as well as between vessels and aircraft, it will not be necessary to maintain the rigidly prescribed disposition of tactical groups in relation to each other and to the chosen grouping of the enemy. In order to inflict a coordinated, concentrated strike against the enemy, it will be sufficient to have only the exact target designations and a predetermined sequence in the use of weapons by the various tactical groups. Therefore there are wider possibilities of organizing tactical coordination of surface vessels with aircraft in the solution of combat naval actions, in which case the control and guidance of the striking groups of aircraft could be effected from the surface vessels.

The diversity of the missions assigned to surface vessels and the extensiveness of the areas in which armed combat at sea will unfold, dictate the necessity of intensive use of surface vessels throughout the course of the entire war. Furthermore, the intensity of these military operations will vary. It will be highest during the initial phase of the war, and also while supporting the deployment of large forces of submarines for operations at sea, and during their return to bases in the later phases of the war. It will also be augmented considerable while enemy submarines are in action against our naval forces and coastal installations.

In this connection it is important to plan surface vessel operations meticulously and ahead of time and to have the vessels so

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located that they initiate the solution of combat missions immediately upon the outbreak of war. This is particularly true for vessels assigned to operate against enemy missile-carrying submarines and of missile vessels brought in for protection of operations by PLO vessels.

The distribution of effort, as well as the content of the tasks being resolved by surface vessels, will depend in large measure on the nature of the theater of operations and of the anticipated operations of the enemy.

In open theaters of operations the basic content of combat operations by surface vessels will be the screening of submarines during their deployment, and engaging in combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines. A significant part of the surface vessels' efforts will be expended in supporting the passage of convoys.

In confined theaters of operations, surface vessels will perform a limited number of tasks, the basic ones being the defense of naval bases and operations against the enemy's lines of communication.

The qualitative composition of surface vessels in a fleet depends on the nature of the theater of operations. The basic composition of the fleet's surface vessels operating in open theaters of operations, will consist of antisubmarine defense vessels with a wide radius of operation, antiaircraft defense vessels, and missile vessels. In confined theaters of operations, precedence will be given to small PLO vessels, missile patrol boats and small missile vessels. [1]

Let us now examine the methods of combat use of surface vessels in the solution of specific combat missions.

The use of surface vessels to support the deployment of submarines, as stated above, will be more characteristic of open theaters of operation. Surface vessels of various types will have an important role in the solution of this task, especially in their coastal zone, where their basic efforts will be required to be concentrated on the conduct of combat with enemy submarines, and on removing the threat of mines along the routes of deployment of our submarines. Combat operations of surface vessels will be conducted simultaneously with operations of antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters, using at the same time various positional resources of the PLO.

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1. For some time, motor-torpedo boats equipped with long-range homing torpedoes will continue to be of value.

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The basic classes of vessels brought in for operations in coastal waters, will be antisubmarine vessels of short operational range which will be used in tactical coordination with other arms of naval forces, and ships of antimine defense (PMO).

As the submarines being deployed get further away from their bases, the composition and the nature of operations of the enemy's forces in action against our submarines will change and, therefore, there will also be a change in the composition and operations of our forces supporting the deployment. In distant theaters of operations, the basic threat to submarines will come from antisubmarine submarines, carrier-borne hunter-killer groups (APUG-avianosnaya poiskovo-udarnaya gruppa) and antisubmarine aircraft of the enemy. In these areas, in contrast with the coastal zone, it will be necessary to conduct combat not only with the enemy's submarine and air forces, but also with his surface vessels - specifically, the APUG. In this connection, it is imperative to give the antisubmarine hunter-killer groups anti-aircraft support by assigning a certain number of PVO vessels to them, and by bringing in missile vessels to screen the groups.

During the conduct of combat against enemy antisubmarine defense forces in the zone of deployment of submarines, the surface vessels must operate in tactical groups whose number and composition must be such as to ensure the solution of the main mission.

Operations of tactical groups of surface vessels in distant areas are carried out in close coordination with antisubmarine aircraft and antisubmarine submarines, and are supported by missile-vessels and attack aircraft, and, whenever necessary, by units of missile troops.

Missile vessels will primarily be used by independent tactical groups operating in the zone of movement of our submarines, or in the maneuvering area of our surface force grouping which is carrying out search and destruction of the enemy's antisubmarine submarines.

The operations of our antisubmarine vessels supporting the deployment of submarines will result in the detection, destruction, or forced withdrawal of the enemy antisubmarine submarines found in the zone of movement of our submarines to a distance exceeding the range of their weapons. These operations will be planned according to the usual tactics of the hunter-killer groups used for the detection and destruction of the enemy antisubmarine submarines.

In order to limit the possibility of undetected penetration by

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enemy antisubmarine submarines into the secure area in order to attack our submarines, the operations of the vessel hunter-killer groups will have to be supplemented by specially detailed vessels which would set up screens of sonar (radiogidro-akusticheskiy) buoys on the borders of the zone under observation. The operation of these screens, set up at a short distance from the coast, will be by antisubmarine aircraft and vessels, as well as by helicopters based on the coast. At a great distance from our coast, this operation would be done by some of the helicopters carried by antisubmarine vessels, as well as by vessels and aircraft. Enemy submarines detected by the sonar buoys must be attacked and destroyed by the vessels, aircraft, and helicopters detailed for operations in that area.

During support of submarine deployment, simultaneously with the solution of missions of combat against enemy antisubmarine forces, there will have to be a search for and destruction of mines laid along the line of passage of the submarines. Trawlers and helicopters can be used for this purpose. Special groups must be formed from these, capable of destroying mines in those areas which cannot be bypassed by the submarines.

The use of surface vessels in combat against enemy missile submarines will consist of the search and destruction of those submarines, mainly within the boundaries of the possible firing positions for submarines approaching the coast to strike targets situated in the depth of our territory. The use of surface vessels in the outer zone of antisubmarine defense will be limited because of the difficulty in the matter of their support.

Taking into account the disposition of a series of objectives and the capabilities of enemy missile submarines, one can assume that the probable areas of their firing positions will be 300-900 miles (540-1600 kms) from the coast. In these areas, combat against enemy submarines will be carried out primarily by long-range antisubmarine vessels resolving missions in coordination with antisubmarine aircraft and submarines, utilizing the systems of antisubmarine surveillance available in the theater of operations.

In open areas, surface vessels can resolve the missions of location and destruction of enemy submarines only if they use the data on the initial discovery of these submarines obtained by the positional resources, aircraft, and helicopters. The operations of the antisubmarine vessels must be organized in conjunction with the

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operations and disposition of these capabilities.

Unilateral operations by surface vessels in locating enemy missile submarines in open areas will be extremely ineffective, since missile submarines, having a hydroacoustical detection system of wider range than surface vessels and the capability of the same speed, can avoid any encounters. In addition to this, having weapons with an effective firing range equal to the range of detection of the surface vessels, the submarines can destroy them before they themselves are detected.

In this connection, and considering the present capabilities of surface vessels in combat with atomic submarines, which maneuver over wide areas, the former can be counted upon as a real force only if they operate within a unified system of antisubmarine defense for a given theater of operations, as one of its components.

Surface vessels can successfully conduct unilateral combat operations against nuclear submarines when the latter are trying to break through narrows, when the possibility of dispatching forces for detection purposes can realistically be expected to meet with the necessary success, and when the enemy submarines must operate within a limited area.

Inasmuch as the length of stay at sea of the tactical groups of vessels of the PLO is insignificant, due to the limited supply of antiaircraft missiles on their escort vessels, they will for the time being be able to go out into distant areas only periodically, for resolving missions of locating and destroying those enemy missile submarines which have been detected through other means within the limits of the sea zone of antisubmarine defense. As antisubmarine defense vessels are equipped with an increased number of antiaircraft missiles and as more antiaircraft defense vessels join their ranks, their use for operations in distant areas for continuous long periods of time will be increased.

On the whole, the operations of surface vessels far removed from their coast will have an important bearing on the general system of combat with enemy missile submarines. Their use in those areas will increase significantly the effectiveness of antisubmarine defense, and will become a substantial addition to the operations of anti-submarine submarines and antisubmarine defense aircraft.

In the coastal zone (pribrezhnaya zona), small surface vessels

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of PLO will be used to good advantage for locating and destroying enemy submarines. They will fulfil their missions in coordination with aircraft of the antisubmarine defense and shore-based helicopters, and will be supported by a wide-range (razvernvtyy) observation system consisting of various forms of fixed resources.

Operations of the forces of antisubmarine defense in the near zone (blizhnaya zona), in polar areas, and at the edge of ice, will be conducted systematically.

The joint search for enemy submarines by antisubmarine vessels and helicopters can be carried out within the borders of the coastal zone of the PLO by using land-based helicopters. In the Arctic the range of combined operations by vessels and helicopters can be somewhat increased by setting up helicopter bases on the ice.

It is necessary to use helicopter-carrying vessels for locating submarines in distant and open water areas. However, since helicopters have a limited load-lifting capacity and range of operations, they can be fitted only with equipment for finding submarines within a comparatively short range from the parent vessels. As for the destruction of submarines, the solution of this task presents well-known difficulties for helicopters, since they are incapable of carrying the necessary torpedoes or bombs. For this reason, it will be necessary in the near future to use helicopters together with antisubmarine vessels which are capable of carrying large supplies of submarine destruction weapons for long periods of time.

The hunt for enemy submarines can be carried out by groups of surface vessels with special equipment enabling them to detect the position of a submarine by the column of ionized gases at the moment of launching of the ballistic missile. These vessels must have long range antisubmarine missiles in order to be able to destroy the submarine. The groups of vessels set aside for a hunt by the method stated will be deployed in the areas assigned to them in such a way that they can effect an overlap of detection along the entire zone of possible firing positions of the enemy submarines. The distance between groups of vessels must be such that a detected submarine can be destroyed by antisubmarine missiles at any point of the observed area. The operations of vessels conducting a submarine hunt based on detection of the column of ionized exhaust gases of the missiles will be carried on in coordination with shore installations established for the same purpose.

The hunt for enemy missile submarines by ships of the PLO can

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be carried on with the aid of the fixed hydroacoustical observation systems or with sonar buoys set out by vessels and aircraft. Surface vessels, utilizing the information on detected submarines as it comes in through the fixed hydroacoustical means of detection, can then go to the area where the submarines have been detected, and locate and pursue them.

In coastal zone operations, surface vessels can execute the hunt when called upon on the basis of primary data received from the fixed hydroacoustical systems of submarine detection. In addition, surface vessels can be used for patrol searches (kontrolnyy poisk) of those submarines which have penetrated into the coastal zone.

In solving missions concerning the defense of naval communication lines, surface vessels will be used for the protection of moving convoys against attacks from submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, and mines. Various classes of surface vessels will constitute the basis of naval forces assigned to defend communication lines. This is due to their ability to stay at sea for long periods of time, their readiness to repel enemy attacks under difficult weather conditions and their acceptance of a significant part of the effort in carrying out antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and antimine defense of convoys during their sea passage.

Surface vessels assigned for antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and antimine defense will resolve their missions primarily by the method of direct defense of the transports.

The antisubmarine defense of the convoys must be so arranged as to secure their defense from both porpedoes and missile weapons from submarines.

The antiaircraft defense of the convoys in coastal areas, must be effected by the troops of PVO of the Country, aided by vessels of antiaircraft defense. There will be a special need for the use of PVO antiaircraft vessels in the next few years for the protection of convoys moving beyond the areas of responsibility of the troops of PVO of the Country.

The convoys will be able to move away from the coast only in the company of PVO vessels carrying powerful antiaircraft missile weapons. In this connection, the duration of their movement outside the zone of responsibility of the troops of PVO of the Country will depend primarily on the presence of PVO vessels within the composition of the convoys, and on the number of antiaircraft missiles which can

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be used for repelling air attacks.

In operations beyond the coastal zone of PVO, the PVO vessels will be included for the most part in the composition of the convoys, included in the general combat formations with them.

In many cases the PVO vessels, jointly with other PVO forces and resources in a common plan, will be used for defense of the basing and assembly points of the convoys. Specifically, they can be used for radar surveillance in a naval sector, as well as for reinforcing units of troops of PVO of the Country which protect installations of the Navy. This will permit a considerable increase in the depth of the PVO points of basing and communication lines within a naval sector. In newly created basing points where fixed PVO means have not yet been deployed, PVO vessels might be the only means of combatting the enemy in the air.

In open theaters of operations missile vessels will have to be detailed for screening convoys against possible strikes by enemy surface vessels, inasmuch as the convoys make their long distance passages slowly and at a considerable distance from shore. These vessels can be merged into independent groups. When multi-purpose missile vessels are used to reinforce the PVO of convoys part of them can proceed in the same formation with the transports.

In confined theaters of operations, missile vessels will not be used as often for screening the convoys, since this mission can be resolved for the main part by missile troops and naval aviation.

The use of surface vessels in antimine defense will consist of the detection and destruction of mines in the areas of bases and of operations of submarines and surface vessels, as well as along the routes of convoys. Inshore the search for mines will be carried out by search vessels (korabl-iskatel), jointly with the coastal and sea-going resources of PMO. In areas far removed from the coast, this mission can be resolved only by means of vessels.

In their search for mines in coastal areas where the places of mine-laying are determined by shore-based or floating posts of anti-mine detection, the search vessels must move into the places indicated by these posts, and conduct a search for the mines. The destruction of the mines located will be done by special vessels guided by the search vessels.

The use of surface vessels in support of ground troops will

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depend on the missions being performed by the latter. Surface vessels can be used for landing operations and for the protection of flanks and certain installations in the rear of a maritime front, against operations of enemy missile vessels, including patrol boats.

In landing operations the basic mission of surface vessels consists of the transportation and unloading of heavy equipment in the landing sector. This mission is resolved by special landing craft whose operations are supported by missile vessels and vessels of the PLO, PVO, and PMO. The operations of the PVO vessels have an especially important role. As they follow the overall route and combat formations of the landing craft, they give cover from air strikes to the landing parties during sea passage, during the landing operation, and subsequently, until the deployment of antiaircraft missile units on shore; they will also protect the actual points of landing.

Missile vessels, especially patrol boats (kater), will be used extensively to cover the landing force during their transport at sea, from enemy missile vessels. In many cases these vessels can be merged into detachments of fire support vessels (OKOP - otryad korablay ognevoy podderzhki) assigned specific targets on shore, in the interests of the support of the landing operations.

Missile vessels and patrol boats will play an important role in the resolution of missions for the destruction of coastal communication lines serving the enemy's maritime groupings of troops. In addition, missile vessels can be used for the destruction of enemy surface vessels supporting ground troops which are situated outside the range of fire of the coastal, short-range missile complexes.

In resolving missions for the support of troops carrying out a defensive action on shore, missile vessels, especially patrol boats, will participate in the destruction of enemy vessels and landing force transports as they approach the defended coast; they will also participate in the destruction of the vessels protecting the enemy's landing operations, above all the PVO and PLO vessels.

The operations of missile vessels covering the troops on shore who are on the defensive against the enemy strikes from the sea are carried out in coordination with units of missile troops of the Navy. They will consist mainly of periodical patrolling by groups of vessels close inshore in order to detect and destroy enemy missile vessels attempting to penetrate areas not monitored by units of the missile troops of the Navy.

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The use of nuclear/missile weapons has had its direct effect on the development of such arms of naval forces as surface vessels. Having lost their role as the basic naval striking force, surface vessels have become an integral part of the support forces and have retained the capacity to resolve certain other missions.

Equipping surface vessels with cruise and antiaircraft missiles, with modern means of antisubmarine defense and installing new engines-steam-turbine and nuclear-will permit a wider use of surface vessels. New surface vessels will be able to stay away from their bases for a long period of time and, operating at a significantly long range from their coast, they will be able to perform various important combat missions.

In a future war, the use of surface vessels of various classes in coordination with other arms of the naval forces will give reliable support to submarine operations and will result in the more effective performance of combat missions against missile submarines of the enemy, as well as a more successful defense of the basing areas of naval forces.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a Missile/Nuclear War", by Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted]MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a Missile/Nuclear War", by Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin.

DATE OF INFO: January 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy in a Missile/Nuclear War", written by Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin".

This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 First Issue was consigned to the press on 13 January 1961.

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The Utilization of the Forces of the Navy

in a Missile/Nuclear War

by

Rear-Admiral V. Lisyutin

Each type of armed forces has its strong and weak aspects. By combining the strong sides of the different types of armed forces, combat missions can be accomplished in the most effective way under various conditions. There cannot be an absolute weapon, capable of accomplishing every mission in the most effective way under all possible conditions. For this reason the different types of our armed forces are developed according to their combat characteristics and capacity to accomplish the main missions in a war in a concrete historical situation.

One of the main strategic missions in contemporary warfare is the disorganization of the enemy's economy. It is accomplished mainly by missile troops of strategic designation who can take action successfully against stationary economic targets, most of which are known in advance. However, besides the latter, there are also mobile economic objectives, in particular transport ships. It is known that the aggressive capitalist countries have at their disposal about 80 million registered tons of dry cargo-carrying tonnage and more than 20 million registered tons of tankers. It can be surmised, naturally, that the probable enemy, preparing to launch a missile/nuclear war, could have all this tonnage fully loaded in advance and under way at sea or dispersed far away from large economic centers. The economic supplies on these mobile objectives are very considerable and could have a big influence on the course of armed combat, especially in its initial period. Missile troops of strategic designation cannot yet strike at such mobile objectives effectively. This is a mission for aviation and the Navy.

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Another most important mission facing the armed forces - the destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack - is even more complicated as, besides the fact that most of these means will be dispersed, under cover and camouflaged, a considerable part of them will prove to be, at the beginning of a war, not on land, but on the seas and oceans carried on mobile means - aircraft carriers, missile carriers, submarines and in maneuvering supply detachments (manevrennyy otryad snabzheniya).

If one calculates, on the basis of the norms adopted in the United States Navy for supplying vessles with nuclear weapons, intended for operations against shore and sea objectives, then it will turn out that not less than 5 or 6 percent of all available nuclear warheads will be concentrated on vessels. In the seagoing supply bases there will also be not less than one complete unit of fire, so that altogether at the beginning of a war, vessels and supply ships may be carrying up to 10 to 12 percent of all the probable enemy's available nuclear warheads, which cannot be attacked by surface-to-surface (nazemnyy) ballistic missiles, but must be destroyed by the forces of the Navy. Thus, a considerable part of the second basic mission - destruction of the enemy's mobile nuclear means of attack - must also be accomplished by the Navy in cooperation with aviation.

In comparison with other types of armed forces, the Navy has very important combat characteristics and possibilities peculiar to itself. These possibilities are considerably enhanced by the introduction of missile/nuclear weapons and atomic power plants in vessels.

In conditions of a sudden outbreak of a missile/nuclear war, the Navy has greater combat stability than the other types of armed forces, owing to the possibility of being at dispersed bases on a long stretch of coastline, and also of being able to put to sea in advance. Dispersed naval forces will not present an attractive target to an enemy for strikes by the

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enemy's multi-megaton nuclear charges (zaryad), the use of which is most likely at the beginning of a war, at the time when the large units of other types of armed forces, though dispersed over large areas, can be subjected to great destruction as a result of such strikes.

If the problem of withdrawing these or other forces from the enemy's first missile/nuclear strikes has not been solved successfully, their employment in the war is very problematical. The possible dispersion of and partial cover for such forces will not enable them to avoid losses, and consequently, to retain their full combat effectiveness. Even the most mobile type of armed forces - aviation, which, under certain conditions can be withdrawn directly from a strike, will, if deprived of airfields, lose its combat effectiveness to a considerable extent. On the other hand, naval forces deployed at sea, with their main arm - submarines, cruising submerged, can be withdrawn most successfully from a strike, and can, therefore, be used with full combat effectiveness during the first strikes at the enemy.

The most important quality, peculiar to the Navy, is its ability to deliver powerful strikes at moving objectives at sea. The forces of the Navy, armed with modern missile/nuclear weapons, possess a high degree of operational-combat capacity. Thus, the operational-strategic exercise conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in August 1960 showed that even one submarine with an atomic power plant can make repeated attacks on a carrier strike large unit at sea and destroy one or two large vessels. A brigade of such submarines can successfully accomplish the mission of destroying a carrier strike large unit consisting of several aircraft carriers and operating in a definite direction occupying, along the front /two or three words missing/. The destruction of a carrier strike large unit carrying 100-120 nuclear warheads means that the enemy is deprived of these nuclear warheads for use against our installations.

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If one considers the possibility of repeated employment of the carrier strike large units, then their destruction will save us from many hundreds and even thousands of nuclear strikes.

In the near future the United States will have up to 40 atomic submarines, armed with 16, and possibly more, "Polaris" type ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. In the course of one cruise these submarines will be able to use up to 640 and more nuclear warheads against our installations, and if resupplied twice at sea - up to 2,000 nuclear warheads. It is mainly the Navy that can conduct combat against such submarines.

The arming of our submarines with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads makes them a very effective weapons in the accomplishment of the mission of disorganizing the enemy's economy and destroying his means of nuclear attack. It is true that in some respects submarines armed with ballistic missiles are inferior to surface-to-surface ballistic missile installations (lower accuracy of fire, reduced readiness in view of the necessity to deploy and take up firing positions, etc.), but they also have important advantages.

While surface-to-surface missile installations cannot fire a significant number of salvos in present-day conditions from the same position without suffering retaliatory action, a submarine, especially in launching missiles when submerged, can successfully make use of its whole unit of fire of missiles from one position, remaining under way all the time.

Possessing high maneuverability and concealment, a missile-carrying submarine will, in the initial period of war, prove to be the least vulnerable and most stable combat means, capable of delivering sudden and powerful nuclear strikes in important directions.

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In modern conditions all ground means are vulnerable to effective action from enemy nuclear weapons. Moreover, if they are not destroyed, they will be in the zone of radioactive contamination, which will reduce considerably their combat effectiveness. On the other hand, a missile-carrying submarine, being under water, is not vulnerable to radioactive contamination, and can always bypass dangerous zones.

Missile-carrying submarines, being least vulnerable to a sudden missile/nuclear attack by the enemy, can become a special weapon in the hands of the Supreme High Command. It is not mandatory to use them immediately on the outbreak of a war; they can be held in reserve for accomplishing missions directed toward the successful completion of the initial period of war. With the possibility of resupplying missile-carrying submarines at sea, use can be made of them repeatedly (both at the very beginning of a war, as well as during its initial period and subsequently).

Thus, the Navy possesses important operational-combat capabilities and advantageously complements the missile troops of strategic designation in the accomplishment of the most important strategic missions with which the armed forces are faced. However, the methods of using these capabilities of the Navy and the methods of conducting naval operations require, in our opinion, further serious elaboration.

Even during the most important exercises and games, we have hitherto, in essence, considered the operations of the Navy only at the very outbreak of a war, and not during the whole of its initial period, which has afforded possibility for studying only questions connected with delivering the first strike. It is essential to work out the complete accomplishment of the basic missions during the initial period of a war, and foremost in the theoretical field.

Let us examine, briefly, the main missions of the Navy, the possible conditions, and the methods for their accomplishment.

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The destruction of the strike forces of the enemy's Navy, including strike aircraft carriers, missile-carrying vessels, and, in the near future, atomic submarine missile carriers, is one of the priority tasks of the Navy.

At the beginning of a war the probable enemy is able to deploy up to seven carrier strike large units (AUS), each consisting on the average of three aircraft carriers, three cruisers armed with missiles, and 12 to 18 destroyers, armed partly with antiaircraft missiles. It is most probable that these carrier strike large units will be distributed in theaters in the following way: North Atlantic - 3, Pacific Ocean - 2, Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean - 1 each.

Combat with carrier strike large units must be conducted in three directions; destruction of the AUS themselves, destruction of their mobile supply detachments at sea, and destruction of the naval bases at which they are based.

The destruction of the AUS at sea (in the ocean) must be the main mission of submarines, missile aviation, of the Navy and long-range aviation. The destruction of mobile supply detachments at sea, insofar as they are beyond the range of aircraft, will be the mission of submarines. Finally, the destruction of the bases of carrier strike large units (including the shore bases of carrier aircraft) must be accomplished by missile troops of strategic designation. The use of missile-carrying submarines for the latter mission is also not excluded.

Taking into account the striving of the probable enemy to unleash a war suddenly, it may be expected that at its outbreak all strike aircraft carrier and missile-carrier large units will not be at bases, but at sea, at the takeoff lines of deck-based aircraft for strikes. So long as the AUS remain beyond these lines before the beginning of military operations, there would in most cases be no grounds for action against

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them before they approach these lines. Consequently, our forces should be deployed on the probable lines where the enemy's deckbased aircraft will take off. Here, too, should be concentrated the main efforts of atomic and diesel-battery submarines and missile aircraft using nuclear weapons, for the most part.

The complications involved in deploying forces when repelling a sudden nuclear strike by the enemy at the outbreak of a war, and the striving to employ strike aircraft carriers in accordance with the principle of swift approach, strike, and rapid withdrawal, cannot always create conditions for the complete destruction of carrier strike large units with the first strike, which will require continuation of operations until the mission is fully completed. In such circumstances, missile aircraft, after reloading, prepare for a repeated strike at the AUS when the latter makes a new attempt to approach the line for launching deckbased aircrat, while atomic submarines pursue the enemy and inflict repeated blows on him. An especially advantageous time for such strikes will be the period when the vessels are being resupplied and refueled by the mobile supply detachments, which must also be objectives for strikes by atomic submarines.

At the beginning of combat operations, diesel-battery submarines, disregarding the lines of takeoff for deckbased aircraft, should move farther ahead with a view to inflicting preventive strikes on aircraft carriers before the carriers repeat their approach to the line of takeoff for deckbased aircraft. Naturally, after the beginning of combat operations, the lines where the main efforts are to be concentrated should be selected with a view to delivering strikes on the AUS before they approach to within range of deckbased aircraft. Atomic submarines, making use of their great maneuverability, can deliver strikes on AUS in the ocean wherever they overtake them.

Such can be the general scheme for the complete accomplishment of the mission of destroying each AUS.

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Combat with missile-carrying submarines which, on the outbreak of war, will also be deployed in lines from which missiles can be launched, should take form from operations for the destruction of the submarines themselves, their shore bases, and their mobile supply bases at sea.

The most probable areas of deployment of missile-carrying submarines will be the Northern Arctic Zone and the Norwegian Sea, which open up the shortest route to targets which are in the depth of our country, and are for that reason least accessible to the enemy's main carrier of nuclear weapons - aircraft (hence the most important strategic significance of combat with missile-carrying submarines, especially in the Northern Arctic Zone). This is fully confirmed by a study of the operations of United States atomic submarines mainly in the Northern Arctic Zone. At the same time, the possibility of operations by missile-carrying submarines from other important directions is not excluded.

According to the system adopted in the United States for the distribution of targets among the different types of armed forces, targets for the Navy are situated at a depth of up to 1,000 kms from the coast. Taking the maximum range of fire of submarines with ballistic missiles of the "Polaris" type as 2,800 kms, the main efforts against submarines in the initial period of a war must be concentrated on the lines from which they would launch their missiles, i.e., at a distance of 1,800 kms and more (1,000 miles) from the coast.

The main forces that will be involved in accomplishing the mission of destroying submarines in distant areas will be submarines, antisubmarine aircraft, and antisubmarine vessels. As positional means of detecting and destroying submarines cannot be set up in peacetime in neutral waters, reliance should not be placed on their wide use in the initial period of a war.

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Maneuvering antisubmarine forces could be concentrated without hindrance before the beginning of combat operations on the lines of operations of missile-carrying submarines, and after detecting the submarines they could maintain hydroacoustic contact with them until an order for using weapons is received or until they make their first attempt to launch missiles.

Accomplishing the mission of detecting submarines in the extensive areas of seas and oceans demands an excessively large expenditure of existing forces and weapons, which calls for the creation of new means permitting the surveillance of extensive water areas in short periods of time. In this respect, the greatest capabilities are possessed by long-range seaplanes making use of small sonar buoys, and also by antisubmarine vessels carrying antisubmarine helicopters. Armed with antiaircraft missiles, surface antisubmarine vessels could considerably extend their zone of operations.

Combat against missile-carrying submarines can be conducted most successfully by antisubmarine submarines in all conditions, especially in areas of pack and drifting ice. In areas of clear water and broken ice, use can be made to some extent of antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters. An automated system of lines of radio-hydroacoustic stations and cable-hydrophone lines set up on the ice can significantly facilitate the detection of submarines in conditions of ice.

The destruction in the ocean of mobile supply bases for missile-carrying submarines should be carried out by our submarines operating against the mobile supply detachments of carrier strike large units or by specially allocated submarines, if the areas of operations of the missile-carrying submarines and the AUS of the enemy do not coincide.

The destruction of the stationary bases of submarines, as well as of the bases of carrier strike large units, must be accomplished by the missile troops of strategic designation.

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Submarines have now become the principal striking force at sea. In accordance with this, combat against them must inevitably change from being a type of defense to the basic offensive mission of the Navy in destroying the enemy's forces at sea. Combat at sea is going under water. Forces operating against submarines will eventually become the basic strike forces of the Navy.

The existing antisubmarine forces and weapons of the Navy, with the exception of submarines, can in fact carry on combat with enemy submarines only in the coastal zone. This is far from adequate. Antisubmarine forces, as the basic means of combat against the future main strike forces of the enemy Navy, have a great future, and special attention must be paid to their development.

Combat against missile-carrying submarines presents a new problem. Ways of solving it are still under investigation. It is possible that in the future they will turn to some extent into combat between "two of a kind" (between submarines) under water.

The probable enemy, intending to carry on an aggressive war against the countries of the Socialist Camp across the ocean and not relying on holding the bridgeheads now occupied by him on the Eurasian continent, will inevitably attempt to make major landings in order to seize new bridgeheads or to reestablish the situation on them, and also to undertake sea shipping in order to supply the groupings established in these areas. In this connection the question arises: where, how. and with what forces can combat with landing forces (and also with convoys on communication lines) of the enemy be conducted most effectively?

The view is expressed that: "Enemy landing operations, while enroute at sea, do not merit expensive and cumbersome operations against them by the Navy and long-range aviation. The basis of their annihilation can be by missile strikes

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in embarkation and debarkation areas; while enroute at sea, it is again more expedient to annihilate landing forces by strikes with missiles having nuclear charges of several megatons".[1]

There are, of course, many ways in which any mission can be accomplished. In selecting them, the aim should be to accomplish each mission as quickly as possible, using the minimum forces and suffering the smallest losses. In a more detailed examination of the questions of combat against enemy landing forces, we come up against the following circumstances which militate against accomplishing the mission in the way outlined above.

A landing force at embarkation ports cannot as yet be an objective for missiles with nuclear and, even less, with conventional warheads. As experience in the Second World War has shown, landing detachments are formed at many ports which are not even situated on the same continents (Sicilian and Normandy landing operations, landings in northwest Africa, etc.). At present the enemy is working toward a system of operational and combat training of embarking landing troops where there are no ports, and he is building ships adapted for this. Consequently, the embarkation of a landing force will most probably take place on a very wide front on an undeveloped coast. The simplest calculations show that an enormous expenditure of ballistic missiles will be required to achieve even some effect in strikes against a landing force while it is boarding its ships.

It is most probable that a large enemy landing force will proceed in the form of many small detachments from various directions in dispersed combat formations and orders. Therefore, one can hardly consider that a landing force at sea will present a suitable target for missiles with nuclear warheads of several megatons.

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1. "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review", by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960, page 12

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To deliberately rely in all cases on destroying enemy landing forces on our coast after their disembarkation or while they are disembarking, would mean to make it possible for the enemy to accomplish the preliminary mission of his operation unhindered and to put our defense in a very unfavorable situation. Landings have always been made, and apparently will be made, when there is great superiority in forces over the defenders. It must be surmised that in the first place the enemy will aim at ensuring his superiority in nuclear weapons in the landing area. Moreover, a landing will be preceded by a preliminary and direct neutralization in the full depth of our defensive forces. It is, therefore, in our view, manifestly disadvantageous to deliberately postpone combat with the landing forces until this period.

Moreover, another fundamentally important circumstance is involved. Would it be right to transfer the zone of nuclear combat to our territory? We believe not. The course of turning one's own territory into a desolate wilderness can obviously be followed only in certain directions, and then only in the most exceptional cases.

Consequently, it is clearly inexpedient and dangerous to accept the scheme outlined above for our operations in combat with enemy landing forces.

An entirely different situation is created when the Navy operates against the landing force at sea.

Calculations and experience during combat training of recent years show that even one atomic submarine armed with torpedoes can destroy more than 20 ships with troops and supplies (approximately one division of the landing force). One atomic submarine is also capable of destroying one or two large surface vessels of the screening forces, including strike carriers, which carry 60 to 100 nuclear warheads. Is this "expensive" compared with the price we shall pay if the enemy uses the indicated nuclear power against objectives

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on our territory, and after that makes a landing? Other calculations could also be put forward to show that destruction of the enemy forces at sea will always be cheaper and more simple than combat with him when he is already on our territory.

Thus, until missiles attain the capability of destroying mobile sea targets at long ranges, there are no reasons for abandoning action against a landing force at sea, and even less for transferring nuclear combat with it to our territory.

Figures were given above regarding dry cargo-carrying and tanker tonnage which could be loaded by the beginning of a war. If stocks of strategic raw materials are laid down in advance, this transport fleet can be used in the first instance for shipping having military significance. It is known that up to three-quarters of the probable enemy's resources in materiel and personnel are across the ocean. Calculations show that 80 to 100 transports must arrive daily in European ports alone. If one estimates ten days for crossing the North Atlantic and returning in ballast, it can be surmised that on this communication line, 1,500 to 2,000 ships, excluding escort vessels, will be at sea at the same time.

By stopping, holding up, or reducing to the minimum this flow of troops and supplies to the main theater of war, even for a short time, especially during decisive periods of combat, we would put the enemy into a difficult situation and create the most favorable conditions for our own armed forces. This determines the strategic significance of the mission of destroying the enemy's sea communication lines. For the accomplishment of this task the Navy has far greater operational-combat capabilities in comparison with other types of armed forces.

Study of the experience of the operational training of NATO navies, as well as elementary calculations, show that the problem of giving security to such strained

communication lines cannot be fully solved by the probable enemy, owing both to the shortage of existing forces and means as well as to the impossibility of replenishing and restoring them under conditions of the disorganization of the shipbuilding industry.

It is known that besides the system of ordinary convoys, the probable enemy is looking for new ways of accomplishing the mission of protecting communication lines. Thus, he has studied the question of "monster-convoys", which permit a lesser ratio between the screening forces and the escorted transports. It is possible to accomplish the mission of securing the most crowded communication lines by the method of "patrolled zones", with ships moving in them without escorts, which provides not only economy of escort forces but, what is especially important, a quicker turnaround on the part of the transports. This method springs directly from the zonal system of defense in sea theaters adopted by NATO. Single use (without escort) may also be made of fast liners on communication lines, mainly for the transportation of troops (some of them can carry up to 6 to 8 thousand persons), wounded, radio-electronic, medical, and other equipment and other materiel in short supply.

The striving for more reliable security of sea transport can be seen from the proposed new line of development in the building of transports by the main capitalist countries. It finds its expression in the building of container (konteynernoye) and trailer (traylernoye) ships which can be unloaded and loaded quickly, in the building of ships with their own means of loading and unloading /two or three words missing/ capability of loading and unloading without tying up, and with a considerable increase of the speeds of all transport vessels. The use of submarine transport vessels, especially tankers with atomic propulsion, is contemplated in the future. As in the past, great attention is given to the development of transport-landing and debarking means.

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The probable enemy's great dependence on sea and ocean communication lines and the impossibility of securing them reliably during a war give rise not only to the necessity of taking action against his sea and ocean communication lines, but also create favorable conditions for the accomplishment of this mission by the forces of the Navy.

The disruption of sea and ocean communication lines cannot, in our view, be an urgent task immediately on the outbreak of a war, for the enemy apparently counts on ensuring accomplishment of the missions of the initial stage of a war by laying in supplies in advance at the planned bridgeheads. Some time is also required for the organization of communication lines. The forming of convoys and their movement from ports in the United States to Western-European ports will take two to three weeks. There is information that the Anglo-American command is going into the question of sending "monster-convoys" from ports on the eastern coast of the United States to Western-European ports one month after the beginning of a war. It is most probable that the enemy will be faced with the problem of securing communication lines in their entirety during the concluding period of the combat for attaining the objectives of the initial stage of the war, in particular for restoring the situation in important areas, for establishing new bridgeheads, and supplying the appropriate groupings of armed forces there.

In order to fulfil the task of disrupting the enemy's sea and ocean communication lines, it will be necessary to redeploy our submarines, which raises the most important problem of resupplying submarines in the ocean, as one cannot count on doing this at shore bases which have been subjected to destruction, not to mention the fact that there will be no time for this.

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In previous wars, operations on communication lines continued throughout the whole war. The ports where loading and unloading took place were not subjected to significant destruction; the shipbuilding industry succeeded not only in restoring the losses of tonnage, but in increasing it, while the use of conventional weapons against ships at sea did not give decisive results either in economic or military respects.

Present-day conditions have created opportunities for achieving decisive results in combat on communication lines. Any ports where loading and unloading take place, and communication line centers on land, can now be subjected to destruction by missile/nuclear weapons which will often produce far greater results than those attained by the protracted combat on communication lines in previous wars. For instance, the putting-out of action of the Panama Canal would lengthen the sea route from eastern United States ports to western ports from five thousand to thirteen thousand miles, or, in other words, would at once reduce transport possibilities on this communication line threefold. The putting-out of operation of the Suez Canal during the attempted armed intervention in Egypt by the British and French, even for a comparatively short period of time, when oil from the Near East had to be transported partly around Africa, forced the West European countries to ration fuel.

Under conditions of missile/nuclear war, the shipbuilding industry will be the focus of intensive activities. Being based on extensive cooperation among many branches of industry, it is particularly vulnerable to disorganization. Consequently, there can be no question of restoring tonnage on a large scale during a war. At the same time, the operational-combat capabilities of the forces of the Navy, and especially of submarines, in disrupting sea and ocean communication lines, have, as we have already pointed out, increased considerably. All this points to the fact that effective results in the accomplishment of this mission can now be attained more quickly than before.

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Operations for the disruption of sea and ocean communication lines should, under modern conditions, be built, not on the principle of protracted, so-called "systematic operations" with a constant exertion of forces, as was the case heretofore, but on the principle of maximum concentration of forces on decisive axes in a limited time. An interruption in communication lines, even for a month, where the enemy has large-scale personnel and materiel losses in the main theaters of the war, will create favorable conditions for the successful execution of combat by our armed forces on the major axes.

The effective accomplishment by the Navy of the basic tasks examined above demands the carrying out of appropriate measures both in the makeup of the Navy and in the organization of its comprehensive support. What are these measures?

1. In the first place, the forces which will take part in accomplishing the main tasks in a war should be developed in every possible way:

- atomic submarines, armed with missile/nuclear weapons and long-range torpedoes;

- naval strike missile aircraft, not wheeled aircraft which are entirely dependent on airfields, but seaplanes;

- long-range antisubmarine strike forces - submarines, seaplanes, helicopters, and antisubmarine surface vessels.

Increasing autonomy, units of fire of weapons, and radius of operation, must be the main requirement in the development of these forces.

2. Insofar as the operations of our forces, especially of submarines far away from their bases, involve their return to base after using up their units of fire, which leads to a great reduction in their coefficient of combat utilization, the main problem for ensuring that the forces can operate effectively is in supplying them with

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missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes and in resupplying them at sea with material-technical resources.

It would be most expedient to follow the course of creating transport seaplanes capable of operating from bases located on internal waterways in the depth of the country and of delivering the necessary types of ammunition and supplies quickly to any areas of the ocean. The accomplishment of this mission will be made much easier if efforts are made at the same time to reduce the dimensions and weight of missile/nuclear weapons, which would considerably simplify resupply work at sea.

The first reloading of submarines at sea in the initial period of a war could be carried out to some extent by using modified transports and merchant ships sent in advance to designated areas of the ocean which are poorly watched.

We should also follow the course of creating secret depots, especially under water, in specially selected areas situated close to the areas of combat operations of our submarines.

The question of creating new, or reconstructing existing, diesel-battery submarines for service as supply bases also merits attention.

The creation of special floating supply bases, especially for missile/nuclear weapons and torpedoes, which have maneuverability and are less vulnerable than depots located on land, is absolutely essential for supplying our forces away from permanent naval bases which could be subjected to destruction at the very beginning of a war.

3. In view of the vulnerability of the main economic installations and naval bases to missile/nuclear strikes from the very beginning of a war, one cannot count on being able to carry out regular and lengthy repairs to the forces of the Navy. Only the unit method (agregatnyy metod) of repair (replacement of entire mechanisms, assemblies, subassemblies-mekhanizm, uzel, blok) can solve this problem. Repairs by the unit method can be carried out by the crew itself in any conditions, including at

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sea, provided that the appropriate units are delivered there.

It is the task of industry, and not of shipbuilding yards and naval workshops, to support the unit method of carrying out repairs, i.e., to create a working stock (oborotnyy fond) of mechanisms and assemblies in advance.

We have lagged behind in methods of repairing vessels, and if these archaic methods are also followed in wartime then it is doubtful if any of our vessels will be able to put to sea again once their technical norms of maintenance of mechanisms and weapons have run out or they have been damaged in combat.

It is mainly the working stock of units that calls for repairs, and not the vessels themselves. It is necessary to provide the vessels only with the necessary assemblies for replacement. In a future war, a vessel under repair at a base is a casualty vessel.

4. In view of the possibility of destroying basic economic installations at the beginning of a war, one cannot count on being able to produce means of combat on large scales during the course of the war. This applies particularly to the Navy, as the production of its forces and weapons during hostilities is most complicated. In comparison with other types of armed forces, in the construction of submarines and surface vessels we observe the most extensive collaboration between the many branches of industry, and parallel with this, small-series production. The production of each vessel takes very much longer than the production of an airplane, missile, tank, or other types of weapons.

Consequently, for the Navy, the problem of creating and maintaining at a high state of readiness both the forces themselves and all types of supplies arises in an especially acute form. Under present-day conditions it would be rash and dangerous to rely on "ambling along" ("raskachka"), on accumulating reserves in the course of the war and making use of them during pauses of some sort.

The preparation of forces and accumulation of supplies

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in advance will permit a successful solution to the problem, both in the case of a long, as well as of a comparatively short, war. The necessity of accomplishing the main tasks in a war in the shortest possible time must be one of the most important starting points in the reexamination of the operational art of the Navy (and, incidentally, as is obvious, of all the other types of armed forces).

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

18 DEC 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review", by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review", written by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich.

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The Theory of Military Art Needs Review

Colonel-General A. Castilovich

We all admit that nuclear weapons and missiles change the conditions of war, but having said "a", we are afraid to say "b". Dropping curtsies in the direction of missiles and introducing some minor corrections in the theory of military art, we still hold in practice to the old positions existing at the end of World War II. Past experience, traditions, and habits, taught to us for decades, tenaciously hold us back and prevent the same kind of revolution in military art which nuclear weapons and missiles created in the sphere of armament.

We strive unsuccessfully to squeeze missile/nuclear weapons into the framework of the old habitual postulates of our military doctrines only slightly "modernizing" the latter, and we forget that this doctrine was founded on the basis of using weapons of military combat fundamentally different from contemporary ones and not comparable with them.

Speaking of past world wars in a report to the Session of the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, N.S. Khrushchev noted that they formerly began on the borders of the warring countries, where the troops were concentrated. Concerning contemporary conditions he said:

"Nowadays, if war starts, military actions will develop differently, since countries will have at their disposal the means of delivering weapons over thousands of kilometers. War will start first of all in the depths of the warring countries, and every single capital, every single large industrial or administrative center, every single strategic area, will be subject to attack not just during the first days, but during the first minutes of the war. In this manner, war will both begin differently, if it is begun, and develop differently."

In another part of his report N.S. Khrushchev said: "I once more emphasize, that we already have so many nuclear weapons -- atomic and thermonuclear, and appropriate missiles for delivery of these weapons to the territory of a possible aggressor, that if some madman should order an attack against our country, [3 or 4 words missing] then we would be able to wipe such a country, or countries, completely from the face of the earth."

Defining this thought concretely, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya Malinovskiy, in his speech at the same Session, said: "About

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100 such nuclear charges, detonated within a short period of time on an industrially developed country whose territory is approximately 300-500 thousand square kilometers, will be sufficient to convert all of its industrial areas and administrative-political centers into a heap of rubble, and the territory -- into a lifeless desert contaminated with deadly radioactive substances."

It must be clear to everyone that such statements are not made for the sake of rhetoric, but are fully substantiated from the standpoint of the achievement of military technology and of the economic capability of our country.

Under contemporary conditions, the formations of missile troops of the VGK (Supreme High Command), with their unlimited range of action and colossal force of fire strike, have become the primary and decisive form of armed forces. They, rather than any other means of armed conflict "pave the way," if one may use the expression, for all other forms of armed forces, radically changing the strategic situation as a whole and the operational situation in the theaters of military operations.

The efforts of all other forms of the armed forces, which are equipped with nuclear/missile weapons, must be directed toward maximum rapid and effective exploitation of the strikes of missile formations of the VGK. In this connection, the basis for planning operations of each of the types of forces again becomes a question of the use of their own nuclear/missile weapons, and not of the number of divisions, vessels, aircraft, etc.

From these considerations it is already completely apparent that a whole series of established views of our military doctrine must be seriously reexamined, beginning with questions of strategy and operational art and ending with tactics and troop organization.

Some Questions of Strategy

Let us examine some questions concerning the initial period of war. Let us imagine NATO without two-three countries which have been taken out of the war by means of a powerful nuclear/missile strike of formations of the VGK or which have even ceased to exist in the first days of the war. This is, after all, a completely realistic perspective; let us remember incidentally, that the area of each such country is significantly less than 300 thousand square kilometers and several tens of large nuclear missiles are sufficient for its destruction. Naturally, such operations by

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VGK missile troops completely change the nature of operations of ground troops, the navy, and aviation.

It would be naive to think that the enemy will be incapable of delivering similar powerful nuclear strikes against the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp and first and foremost against the territory of the Soviet Union. But such strikes will not be able to knock these countries out of the war.

The superiority of the socialist structure with its economic potentialities and political unity of peoples will enable countries of the Socialist Camp to withstand the first nuclear strikes of the enemy. This is further favored by the enormous territory, the inexhaustible human resources, and a relatively great dispersion of industrial and administrative centers. The imperialist bloc does not have such possibilities. For this reason, in preparing the country for the possible launching of war by aggressors, we must first of all utilize the advantages of our socialist system so as not to give the enemy the possibility of recovering after our retaliatory nuclear strike.

Of course we must take into account the consequences of the first powerful enemy nuclear strikes. As it appears to us, they will make themselves felt first of all, by the fact that in the first operation of the initial period of the war, a substantial reinforcement of troops in theaters of military operations cannot be expected by bringing up forces and equipment from the depth of the country.

Under these conditions, it appears absolutely necessary to us to review seriously certain tenets of our military strategy concerning the length of a contemporary war and the number of armed forces participating in it.

The example of the capitalist countries annihilated in the first days of the war will hardly evoke enthusiasm in the remaining countries for its prolongation. We must take into account the enormous moral shock to peoples, not to speak of the huge material losses and the human victims. It is sufficient to compare figures of human losses in previous wars with expected losses during the course of the first days or even the first hours of a contemporary war for the picture to become clear.

The losses of 33 warring countries during the four years of World War I totaled 10 million persons killed and 34 million persons

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maimed, i.e., an average of 11 million persons per year. The losses of 72 warring countries during the six years of World War II totaled about 34 million persons killed and 28 million persons maimed, or an average also of about 11 million persons per year. According to the data of a special study by the Office of Civil Defense of the USA conducted in 1955, the losses in the course of several hours from the first aerial attack carried out chiefly by atomic and thermonuclear weapons totaled 15 million persons dead and about 24 million persons sick and wounded, altogether up to 40 million in the USA alone. In addition, about 50 to 60 percent of the country's industry was destroyed. It is well to note that in the above-mentioned study only 53 cities were subjected to the pre-arranged attack and that thermonuclear bombs were dropped on only 11 of these cities. The moral fatigue of peoples, which became evident toward the end of World War I as well as of World War II, is well known. It is easy to imagine how great this fatigue and depression will be after the first nuclear strikes in a future war.

It appears to us that after the first nuclear/missile strikes, the basis for all operations on a strategic scale must be a decisive offensive against the as yet unrecovered enemy; the more quickly and energetically that this is accomplished, the more probable that the enemy will be unable to cope with the disruption brought about by the first attack, and to organize stubborn resistance.

Whoever withstands the first enemy attack must conclude the war rapidly.

At present we already consider it possible for the tempo of operations to be 100 km in a 24-hr. period and the duration of a frontal operation to be 10 to 12 24-hr. periods. If this is so, for how many days are we preparing to wage war to achieve decisive strategic results?

At present there is already a deep-seated contradiction between demands to conduct operations on a large scale, at high tempos, without pauses, and the still extant and accepted position regarding the duration of the initial period of the war, which must continue to the end of full mobilization of forces and the beginning of the receipt of material resources and arms from mobilized industry. This is hardly realistic and apparently one must calculate on a short initial period of the war, which will be the decisive period of the entire war.

There is no need to fear the term "blitzkrieg" just because

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this concept was compromised by the experience of past world wars. Under the conditions of nuclear war only "blitz" operations can promise victory. If victory is not achieved in a short time, then peoples will hardly be able to continue it in a slow, drawn-out fashion, especially the peoples of capitalist countries, who have a lower moral - political potential than countries of the Socialist Camp. He who has withstood the first strikes must and can conclude the war rapidly if he prepares his armed forces properly in peacetime.

Strategic art cannot be replaced by urgent demands on the moral fiber of peoples, and neither can one plan strategy on the basis of fear of calculated risk and the sacrifices connected with it.

The enemies of blitzkrieg habitually argue that our World War II losses of 1/3 of all military industry, half of the steel and coal production, 40 percent of petroleum production and output of electric power, more than half of all the rail lines and several tens of millions of the population in territory occupied by the enemy, not counting combat losses, not only did not bring about cessation of prolonged resistance but even permitted the crushing of the German fascist blitzkrieg plan and subsequently the achievement of a brilliant victory.

They forget the fact that the above-noted losses were spread out over a period of almost two years. They were inflicted only along the line of the front and within its limits; in the zone of interior they were almost non-existent. Human losses at the front and in the rear were not afforded the necessary medical and other aid available to millions of the wounded and sick of the local populace. The inhabitants situated behind the line of the front were physically almost unaware of these losses, since life in the rear continued to flow more or less normally. The picture will be entirely different now.

Under present conditions, the possibility of victory must be assured by readiness, the capacity and capability of concluding the war in the shortest possible time. The theory of a prolonged war is more acceptable at present to the monopolistic circles of the West, since the preparation for such a war costs more and consequently promises the manufacturers of arms greater profits. And in the name of profits they may not even consider the expediency of the theory.

The postulates of our military strategy concerning the size of the armed forces are also still based on the experience of past world wars and arise from the necessity of conducting war with mass,

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multi-million-man armies.

Advocates of multi-million-man armies allude to the experience of all twentieth-century wars, which showed that the growth of the destructive force of weapons in armed combat with an enemy of equal strength never brought about a decrease in the armed forces during war, but rather caused their increase. They forget that this experience is based on entirely different means of armed combat and methods of its conduct. For this reason, analogies cannot be made in this matter.

Under current conditions can operations unfold in the old manner? Can they, having begun with a relatively small number of regular combat-ready troops then continually broaden by dint of the arrival of fully mobilized large units, and finally change into engagements of numerous fronts and of multi-million-man armies? Under current conditions this is firstly impossible, and secondly, unnecessary. It is impossible because nothing will arrive from the depth of the country in time, and possibly will never arrive. It is unnecessary because after the first nuclear strikes the remaining forces of the enemy in the border zones also cannot be numerous; it is necessary to crush quickly the remains of these forces and to occupy the enemy country and, for this, operations of a completely different nature will be required from those which we are now studying.

At the present time, of the 61 divisions within the composition of the Allied ground troops of the European military bloc, there are 5 American divisions, 4 British divisions, and 8 West German divisions; the remaining divisions: 14 French, 10 Turkish divisions, and other countries - 20 divisions.

The first obliterating strike by missile formations of the VGK can be directed against the enemy in such a manner that only a border strip with a depth of several tens of kilometers (in the interest of the safety of our troops) will remain undestroyed. The taking of this strip will then become the primary mission of the advancing divisions of the first echelon; it must be accomplished also by their wide use of nuclear missiles of tactical and operational designation.

After taking the border zone, the mission confronting the troops will be chiefly the speedy taking over of zones of a greater or lesser degree of destruction and radiation resulting from the massive strike of strategic missiles. Under these conditions, the mobilizational build-up of the enemy or the approach of his large

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operational, or even strategic, reserves can hardly be expected. It is more likely that it will be necessary to overcome the resistance of enemy troops retreating from the border zone.

To exploit the first powerful missile strike it will be completely unnecessary to deploy a large number of divisions, as was done in past wars.

Taking over the border zone and the zones of total destruction and radiation will necessitate special organization and preparation of troops, but will not, at all, necessitate multi-million-man armies. The execution of this type of mission in the European theater of military operations on a front of 600-700 km, for example, is possible with 20-25 divisions, primarily tank, rushing ahead along separate axes and in separate heated battles, pounding the large units and units of the enemy which offer resistance in the above-mentioned zones. Of course, a significant portion of these troops will suffer from enemy nuclear strikes; relatively frequent replacement of entire large units which have sustained heavy losses will be necessary. For this reason there should be 10-15 more reserve divisions behind them; in all 30-40 divisions, well equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and which will make up the first operational echelon, will be required.

Organizationally, the strike of the first operational echelon in a zone of 600-700 km may be represented by two fronts of 15-20 divisions each, plus a certain number of divisions of airborne forces, (2 or 3 for a front). A front may consist of 2 or 3 armies of 4 or 5 divisions, each acting in a zone of 100 to 200 km, plus a certain number of divisions of the front reserve.

Forces, mobilized in the interior of the country, can arrive gradually in the theater of military operations, probably after the completion of the first operations at the front, and their principal role will consist of occupation of captured territory.

If, after taking over the territory of a country subjected to the first massive nuclear attack, the enemy does not capitulate a similar all-shattering strike may be repeated on the next country.

From the aforementioned, it does not follow of course, that those divisions which will be in action in the first operational echelon of ground troops will be sufficient for the war as a whole. It is apparent that in accordance with the forward movement a significant number of troops which have been designated for carrying out

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occupational functions in the occupied territory will be required. A significant number of forces will also be needed in the zone of interior chiefly for various formations such as local antiaircraft defense (IPVO). Therefore, for the conduct of the war a sufficiently large number of ground troops is needed, but their over-all size, designation and nature of use will of course be different than in past wars.

The number of ground troops engaged directly in combat operations may be, as it appears to us, many times smaller than it was in previous wars.

We have outlined a concept for initial operations under European Theater conditions which is convenient for the activities of all arms of troops. To the same degree, with certain corrections for geographical conditions, it can also be applied in other theaters. In this concept, the principal leading role belongs to the operations of the VGK missile formations, but not with the aims which we now have under general review. This is not combat against enemy nuclear weapons, not the weakening of his economic potential, not combat against his reserves, etc., but the full annihilation of the enemy with nuclear warheads of megaton yield over a vast territory with the aim of knocking entire countries out of the war.

Briefly, if there is a possibility for holding out, then there is also a possibility of victory in a short period of time. Moreover, for direct combat operations at the front such numerous ground armed forces as in previous wars will be needed neither in the beginning of the war nor during its course.

Certain Questions of Operational Art

It is necessary to examine the current operations of ground troops in close connection with the operations of VGK missile formations. It appears to us that among the ranks of the latter, in addition to formations carrying out the missions of knocking entire countries out of the war, there must be formations designated for activities in the interest of several fronts conducting operations on one strategic axis. Such formations, remaining under the jurisdiction and command of General Headquarters (Stavka), could establish favorable conditions for the development of ground troop operations by means of annihilation of enemy nuclear weapons, his reserves, airfields, transportation centers, depots, and other installations located beyond the range of action of front missile weapons; by their strikes they could also reinforce the fire capability of the fronts in those

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instances when the latter, for one reason or another, found themselves without sufficient nuclear/missile weapons. Strikes in the interests of separate fronts could be carried out either on command of the Stavka (or the command of theater forces) or upon requests of the fronts within the range of prescribed limitations.

At the same time, this VGK missile formation can carry out separate tasks assigned by the Stavka which are not directly connected with the activities of the fronts.

In all instances the VGK operational missile formation must have at its disposal its own long-range means of reconnaissance (aviation, radiotechnical, and others), in order to be able to respond rapidly to a change in the situation and to avoid multi-channel coordinations of reconnaissance tasks.

It appears expedient to us to plan the VGK missile operations as special operations for the destruction of enemy nuclear weapons, for undermining his economic potential, for combat against supply, etc. All this must be a constituent part of two types of missile operations: those operations carried out by the VGK missile troop formations with the aim of complete annihilation of an enemy country and knocking it out of the war, or operations in support of ground troops. Missile operations of the first type usually must precede operations of the second type and, subsequently, are also carried out simultaneously. It is obvious that the nature of the targets under attack will be different in each type of operation.

It is absolutely unnecessary to deploy VGK missile formations, in coordinated action with ground troops, directly in the theater of military activities or close to it. On the contrary, their placement in the zone of interior is even preferable, since this makes the work of enemy intelligence more difficult and negates the need to form a separate antiaircraft defense of these formations; their PVO can be combined with the antiaircraft defense of certain areas of the country.

The execution of VGK missile operations, the possibility of similar strikes by the enemy, the repletion of ground troops with their own organic nuclear/missile means, and the possibility of using high-yield nuclear warheads, not only in the zone of interior, but in engagements and even on the field of battle, demands thorough review of certain postulates of our military doctrine in connection with the operations of ground troops.

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Above all, it is time to repudiate the very concept and expression "strike group" (udarnaya gruppirovka) as antiquated and harmful. Any grouping formed with the personnel and material of ground troops threatens to become a good target for an enemy nuclear strike and to bear extra, unwarranted losses.

In place of the creation of "strike groups" in all types of operations, it is necessary to instill the concept of "concentration of the efforts of nuclear/missile weapons". The activities, after all, of ground troops both in the offensive and in defense must take place over broad zones, approximately the same for large units in offense as in defense. This, incidentally, was recently taken into account by our probable enemies.

The bases of contemporary operations are rapid maneuver and swift attacks by small groupings (of division size), from different directions, not shoulder to shoulder, and making use of their own nuclear strikes. Even these little groupings are dispersed after a successful attack. A strike group in contemporary meaning spells death, since it forms a compact and good target for a high-yield nuclear weapon.

Contemporary offensive and defensive operations must differ from one another by the quantity of nuclear warheads alloted to their implementation and not by the number of divisions. Both in offensive and defensive ground troop operations the primary activities are nuclear strikes, swift maneuver, and short assaults with tanks and personnel. The difference rests in the fact that in offensive operations there must be a strong first echelon which permits swift destruction of the opposing enemy; in a defensive operation it is expedient to have a weaker first echelon and to designate it for holding certain transportation centers, important areas or position sectors behind large natural barriers, with the aim of slowing the tempo of the enemy offensive; defense as a whole should be based on maneuver and strikes with forces located in the zone of interior, even with the loss of territory, in order to win time and concentrate essential nuclear/missile weapons.

It appears to us that under current conditions, it is unnecessary to have second echelons, in the previous meaning of this term, either in defense or in offense. They were always thought of as a potential strike group which could be brought into battle in a new direction. At present it is much more expedient to consider everything located behind the first echelon, which is engaged in battle, as reserve, dispersed over the entire field of

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hostilities and designated as reinforcement for the first echelon during an offensive, but on the defensive - for counterattacks and counterstrikes. To overcome enemy opposition during an offensive, there should not be concentration of troops by bringing in the second echelon, but concentration of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (nositel). Only when there is an insufficient quantity of these means can a strike be undertaken by several divisions, and then not with a compact striking group, but rather from several directions.

The possibility of enemy use of high-yield nuclear warheads in the field of hostilities obliges even those small groupings, of division size as we mentioned, to operate at a distance of 20 to 40 or more kilometers from each other or, as we frequently point out, to operate in separate directions.

Moreover, the inclination of each advancing large unit to lend assistance to its neighbor, to wheel rapidly if necessary in a new direction for a strike against the enemy rear is a binding principle of coordinated action.

Therefore, the conduct of offensive operations now requires a significantly lesser operational density but a larger number of tank divisions in the first echelon. Divisions located in the zone of interior and moving up -- are not the second echelon but rather, reserves designated as replacements for decimated divisions of the first echelon and for the circumvention of all types of obstacles.

It is necessary to reject decisively the inclination developed in previous wars toward encirclement of separate groupings and the formation of rings around them. This tendency is very viable and has remained with us as an inheritance from the period when there were no other methods for annihilation of the enemy left in the rear of advancing troops. Nowadays, the enemy left in the rear must be destroyed either in meeting engagements by reserve large units and units or if stationary, they must be annihilated with nuclear strikes. The latter, of course, is preferable.

In the training of troops, it is necessary also to reject decisively the cultivation of the principle of break through the enemy's prepared defenses. It is possible, of course, in individual instances when the enemy defense cannot be bypassed or annihilated by nuclear strike. In the main, however, under conditions not involving solid fronts or heated battles, the breakthrough of an enemy prepared defense has ceased to be the primary form of offensive

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actions, but is yielding to meeting engagements and envelopment.

The taking of radioactively contaminated zones created by the enemy acquires great importance. It must be carried out by large units, depending upon the tasks they are fulfilling, the meteorological situation, and the degree of permissible dosage of radiation received during the period of action. Depending upon these conditions, the contaminated zones are taken either by a rapid forward push or by bypassing, or in the final analysis, the troops continue to carry out their mission in the contaminated zone without regard to possible losses. All discussions regarding the creation of passages into contaminated zones, the surmounting of them in helicopters and others are utopian at the present time.

In planning contemporary offensive operations on the scale of a front and armies, it is impossible to proceed from an single "D" (day). In terms of time, operations will flow in different directions, at different tempos and it is more advisable to plan them by calendar days (except, of course, the initial retaliatory missile strike). Moreover, concrete army and large unit tasks can be established for only 1-2 days and for a longer period it is sufficient to indicate the general direction, the nature of the activities and final goal of the operation. More detailed planning is highly problematical, since sharp changes in the situation are unavoidable as a result of enemy nuclear strikes.

The tempos of contemporary operations may be planned, as already mentioned, up to 80 to 100 and more kilometers during a 24-hr. period but it must be kept in mind that, as a result of enemy nuclear strikes on our deep rear, the front will not be able to rely on systematic delivery from the rear of the country. Everything which is essential must already be stored in the theaters in peacetime and such supplies as POL must, to a significant degree, be sought out from war trophies in the course of the advance.

It is also essential to take into account the cumulative physical tension on tank and truck drivers (it will be necessary to have two reliefs for interchange of crew members) and the large number of vehicles which will go out of commission.

Vigorous maneuver and nuclear strikes must become the basis of contemporary defense. He who sits in place, even in prepared positions, will be knocked out by nuclear weapons or bypassed. Only a relatively small part of the forces can hold separate areas or positions with the aim of slowing the tempo of the enemy advance along axes which

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are convenient for him and, consequently, cluster his battle array and operational formation. In this connection an important role in defense is played by broad utilization of obstacles and terrains presenting natural obstructions for slowing the tempo of the enemy advance. However, the fate of modern defense is decided in the final analysis by the maneuver of missiles, chiefly the shifting of their trajectories, and the availability of nuclear warheads, in conjunction with counterattacks and counterblows of the reserves.

It appears to us that under contemporary conditions defense, in the past meaning of this term, can take place only on a tactical scale. Army and front operational defense, deliberately subordinated to the interests of offensive operations in other directions or dictated by a sharp change in the situation in the enemy's favor, will, of course, also have its place. But it must be based on the same methods of operation as in offensive operations, i.e., on heated meeting battles and engagements. For this, the army and front may have a number of large units and a scale of zones of action equal to those of an army and front carrying out offensive operations. The difference will be in the presence of a smaller quantity of nuclear warheads, which will necessitate loss of a part of the forces and territory in order to win time.

Defensive operations of the front and army, differing from offensive operations in aims of action and quantity of nuclear weapons, will resemble the latter in methods of large unit tactical operations.

In defensive operations, certain armies of the front and certain large units of armies, taking advantage of a convenient local situation which has arisen as a result of swift actions or nuclear strikes, will frequently carry out an offensive with limited goals.

In a contemporary operational defense, the formation of defensive zones is not advisable because they do not justify their designation. Any large unit defending itself in place will be annihilated by nuclear strikes of the enemy or simply bypassed. On the operational scale, the term "stable defense" should be relegated to the archives because under modern conditions it can be neither solid nor stable. Slowing the tempo of the advancing enemy by means of defense is based on counterattacks and counterstrikes carried out from different directions, on skilful and swift disengagements from the enemy, and on broad use of barricades and utilization of natural terrain obstacles, until the time a possibility presents itself to destroy the enemy with a nuclear strike.

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In connection with this it is necessary, evidently, to re-examine our views on the nature of so-called counterpreparation (kontrpodgotovka) in defense and on organization of counterstrikes. In these questions we continue to proceed from the concept of the solid and relatively stable front.

It appears to us that a limited quantity of nuclear weapons in the defense will not permit a breakup of the enemy offensive with one or two massive nuclear strikes, especially since he will not form compact groupings for his offensive. Apparently, instead of counterpreparation, it will be necessary to restrict oneself to daily and rapid annihilation of disclosed enemy means of nuclear attack and to individual (to the extent possible) nuclear strikes at various times on the most dangerous of his tank divisions which have broken through. If, however, the availability of nuclear weapons permits the delivery of a massive strike capable of breaking up the enemy offensive completely, then this is already not counter-preparation but going over to the offensive.

It is more expedient to carry out counterstrikes in operational defense, by means of meeting engagements, not with a compact grouping especially created for this purpose and deployed on a definite line, but with several divisions operating simultaneously, though from different directions.

Anti-debarkation defense along the coast by ground troops can also have no defensive zones either on the coast or in the zone of interior. In ports and in vulnerable landing sectors along the coast there can be separate tank subunits and units designated basically for combat against airborne landings and for initial repulsion of debarkations of the enemy in landing-debarkation craft.

The basis of anti-debarkation defense must be the maneuvering activities of large units which move up from the interior of coastal zones and, in meeting engagements, pound the enemy utilizing nuclear weapons.

Of the now generally accepted means of anti-debarkation defense, only the construction of obstacles, both in the water as well as on the land, can achieve much significance.

Enemy amphibious landing operations, while enroute at sea, do not merit expensive and cumbersome operations against them by the navy and long-range aviation. The basis of their annihilation can

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be missile strikes in embarkation and debarkation areas; while enroute at sea, it is again more expedient to annihilate landing forces by strikes with missiles having nuclear charges of several megatons. After the discovery of the landing forces at sea, these attacks can be calculated on the basis of their passage of a definite point (area).

Certain Questions of the Development and Organization of the Types of Armed Forces

The changing of certain strategic and operational points of view is unavoidably bound up in the review of the programs for development and organization of the different types of armed forces. This development must, first of all, evolve only from the needs of the initial period of the war, since a long, drawn-out nuclear/missile struggle is impossible; secondly, it must develop under the banner of the indubitable priority of nuclear/missile troops. In this respect it is expedient to develop primarily missile troops of the VGK, capable of using missiles of megaton yields.

Missile troops of all types -- VGK, operational, and tactical -- must develop in the directions of:

- increasing their firing rate (skorostrelnost); in this respect the introduction of solid missile fuels has decisive significance; missiles must be per se ready projectiles, fully assembled and requiring only the establishment of the flight program;

- perfection and automation of the process of tying in the launching mounts (carriers) to the terrain;

- perfection of missile guidance systems, not subject to jamming;

- perfection of missile carriers capable of changing the launch area quickly; in this respect an important role must be played principally by "air-surface" type missiles on seaplanes (gidrosamolet), missile-carrying submarines, and missile trains (poyezd) (for strategic missiles);

- perfection of the system of centralized command of launching missiles from widely separated command points.

It must be acknowledged directly that in their present state, missiles of tactical and operational designation are still not sufficiently suitable for the missions assigned to them because of their

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low firing rate conditioned by complex preparations for launching, for retargeting and for changing of firing positions.

The ground troops as a whole must develop in a form transportable by air. Perfection and introduction of lighter type tanks (since any armor is penetrable) suitable for transport by air is essential. The great importance which is attached to the ability of ground troops to take ruined and contaminated zones and water barriers requires significant development of engineering troops; however the most important mission of the engineering troops must not be fortification in the existing meaning of this term, i.e., not the construction of positions and of anti-atomic shelters but the rapid preparation of missile launch sites, establishment of obstacles, road construction, and provisions for the surmounting of large water obstacles.

The air forces, it appears to us, have not yet lost their significance to the degree that they should be ignored. Discussion should concern only the change in their role in warfare and, subsequently, a change in their composition and organization.

Long-range aviation, armed with missiles of the "air-ship" class, is (in conjunction with submarines) a good means of combat with mobile carriers of nuclear weapons at sea and one that is difficult to replace. In view of this, it is apparently advisable to include it in the composition of the navy.

Front air forces (VVS) are also needed, though of a type other than those now available. Certainly, front bomber aviation is departing the scene, since its missions can, to a significant degree, be carried out by missiles. Nevertheless, on the field of modern battle and engagements there will be many important small and mobile targets whose annihilation by missiles is still improbable. An aircraft of the fighter-bomber type is needed which, on its own, could find the target and annihilate it; such an aircraft must be capable of great acceleration, permitting it to appear and depart rapidly (this may be achieved with the aid of rocket boosters): at the same time it must be capable of carrying out combat missions at relatively low speeds as well. An aircraft flying at a speed equal to Mach 1-2 (M-2M), is poorly suited to seek out small and mobile targets, even with the use of radar equipment.

Fighter aviation within the composition of the VVS of a front is essential, as a more maneuverable component of the PVO, as long as aviation remains one of the principal carriers of nuclear weapons

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for the enemy and as long as ground antiaircraft missile systems do not possess a sufficient range of destruction.

In addition, the front needs a manifold troop (army) aviation for observation and reconnaissance, including radiation, for liaison, command, and transport. Such aviation must undoubtedly develop as non airfield-based. It may consist of helicopters and other flying machines, for example the type well known in foreign literature under the term "flying saucers" (ground effect machine-turbolet).

The VVS of the front must have a much greater number of reconnaissance aircraft than they have at present.

Finally, greater-capacity transport aviation is needed as a resource of the Supreme High Command.

The VVS of the front (air army) is not designated under modern conditions for the execution of any independent air operations, and is the means for directly coordinated action with combined-arms armies. For this reason, their composition must include several aircraft divisions of fighter-bombers because only the latter are favorable for combat against mobile carriers of nuclear weapons and the advancing reserves of the enemy. In this connection, however, it is inadvisable to distribute the VVS forces of the front for support of definite armies or divisions; it is better to utilize them centrally, under the jurisdiction of the VVS commander.

The Navy. The future at sea belongs to submarines and to missile-carrying seaplanes which are not bound to airfields and which are capable of long-range operations. These, it would appear, should now be developed.

The basic mission of the fleet -- to annihilate carriers of nuclear/missile weapons at sea which as a consequence of their mobility, have greater survival chances. Such carriers will be missile-carrying aircraft and missile-carrying atomic submarines. As a result of their high radar-image contrast and, consequently, their vulnerability aircraft carriers and other surface vessels apparently will soon depart from the scene.

Under contemporary conditions it is hardly possible to imagine large amphibious landing operations of an operational, and even less, of strategic significance. A landing force is always, at some stage of its activity, a compact group or it does not make sense; but this

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condition spells destruction for the landing force. The possibilities are all in favor of its annihilation by nuclear/missile weapons while it is still at its bases or while it is at sea.

Surface vessels of the fleet will not be able to play a significant role in armed conflict. Their utility will probably be limited to coastal areas under heavy PVO cover for execution of support missions. As far as protection of ocean supply transport is concerned, even now they are of little use for carrying out this mission.

Antiaircraft defense of troops and the country, as it appears to us, is on the correct course of development, chiefly of antimissile resources in the form of the creation of fully automatic systems of antiaircraft missiles.

The age of tube antiaircraft artillery is irrevocably receding into the past and it is only in the antiaircraft defense of troops that small-caliber tube antiaircraft artillery may still have some significance for the protection of small subunits from low-flying aircraft.

The principal antiaircraft defense of troops and the country must be an automatic system of antiaircraft missile installations of various ranges which could cover, not installations, but separate large areas, and could resolve the task of protecting both the troops and the territorial installations of the country (in these areas). Separate antiaircraft defense of troops, except for the self-defense of small subunits mentioned above, appears to us to be an antiquated tradition. Fighter aircraft aviation within the system of antiaircraft defense will also become archaic in the near future. It is needed only until antiaircraft missiles have achieved the necessary technical perfection.

A new type of forces. In addition to existing types of armed forces the necessity has sprung up, in our opinion, for the creation of a new type of force which is not designated for direct conduct of combat operations, but which is extremely important, nonetheless, under conditions of nuclear/missile war. We have in mind troops, possibly called rescue-rehabilition (spasatelno-vosstanovitelnyy), which are designated for operations in the country's interior, in areas subjected to enemy nuclear attack. Their basis should consist of medical service and rehabilation units and large units.

In contrast to other types of forces, these troops must be

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especially massive, organized according to territorial characteristics and trained without being pulled out of production. We have something similar now in the form of civilian formations of the antiaircraft defense (MPVO). But these formations exist mostly on paper, are not supported from a material-technical standpoint, are semi-voluntary organizations, and are not properly directed by anyone. In addition, organs of the MPVO are concerned with a very large number of problems which, in essence, are the prerogatives of governmental authority, such as communications, supplying the population with food, evacuation, etc.

It appears to us that such very important undertakings as medical assistance to the suffering populace and rehabilitative work, i.e., measures permitting the people to withstand enemy nuclear attack, must be implemented by special troops. Their cadres and necessary equipment must be maintained in peacetime and they must be assured mobilizational buildup under the leadership of organs of military control with the initiation of military activities.

Questions of Control. From the standpoint of the nature of control of operations, the new forms of armed conflict do not introduce any basic changes. As in the past there will be need for intelligence and collation of its information, an appraisal of the situation, a decision, and its transmittal to executors, supervision of execution, influence on the course of events by changing the tasks of subordinate troops, or through the influence of the senior commander's means exerted on the enemy, the informing of the commander and of adjacent units. However, the methods of control and the means by which they are implemented experience significant changes.

The method of direct personal contact in operations is of little value today. It can lead only to a waste of the senior commander's time and promote incorrect decisions based upon impressions of one center of combat operations. This method is admissible now only in combat on a subunit level, but not in operations.

The need to see the field of combat along the decisive direction also has little admissibility now. This need arose from crushing the enemy with masses of troops which were in direct contact with him. This will not usually happen, now.

The most important thing in control is quick reaction to a change in the situation, a rapid tempo of control, and, consequently, the well-known need for its mechanization, automation, and reduction of

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the number of its documents.

Even now wire telegraphy and telephone communications should be added to obsolescent means of control as they will not be able to keep pace with the operating tempo of troops.

Apparently even such an attribute of control as the preparation of large unit and army command posts with all types of shelters (dugouts), by the forces and equipment of engineer troops, is becoming obsolete. The rapid tempos of battles and operations require highly mobile command points using available places of cover (cellars, buildings, tunnels, quarries, etc.).

The recording of meteorological conditions and their prediction become a very important factor in operational planning and in daily control. In this connection, the creation of special meteorological units in all staffs from division to front is absolutely essential.

Until automatic systems permitting rapid and accurate determination of coordinates for missile launchers are worked out, it is essential to have in the staffs of armies and fronts a separate topogeodetic service with subordinate special units to support missile units and large units.

* * *

In this article we have only touched upon some of the most topical questions of military art. In connection with the development of nuclear/missile weapons, the total number of postulates in need of review is undoubtedly much greater. Many of the questions touched upon by us are set forth only by way of posing them and bringing them to the attention of military-theoretical thought. Therefore, the judgements of the author cannot lay claim to exhaustive completeness or infallibility.

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19 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Demands", by Major-General Ya. Malakhov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Director of Special Investigation
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Demands", by Major-General Ya. Malakhov

DATE OF INFO: January 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Demands", written by Major-General Ya. Malakhov.

This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. This issue was consigned to the printer on 13 January 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Until some time after 1958, operational and tactical intelligence operations and training reportedly were coordinated by the Operations Directorate of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Ministry of Defense. See also Headquarters Comments 1 and 2 on page 12 of [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Demands

by

Major-General Ya. Malakhov

Lieutenant-General M. Kochetkov's article, "The Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical Intelligence"[1] touches on a series of problems, the practical solution of which has important significance in raising intelligence to the level of modern demands.

While we entirely share the author's opinions on the basic tenets of the article, we should like to state some views on this problem.

Recently, both in the pages of the military press and at the critiques of command-staff exercises and troop exercises, there has been repeated talk about raising the role of intelligence, about its exceptional significance for the achievement of success in combat and in operations, and about the lagging of intelligence means (sredstvo razvedki) behind the means of destruction. Unfortunately, however, in practice, nothing is being done to bring the potentialities of intelligence into accordance with the demands which present themselves and with the tasks which confront it.

In our opinion, this results from the fact that there is no single intelligence organ (razvedyvatelnyy organ) in the Soviet army to direct operational and tactical intelligence in the military forces.

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
"Military Thought", Second Issue, 1960.

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In actual fact, the Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye - GRU) of the General Staff has no such organ, and its guidance is limited to agent and radiotechnical intelligence in border districts and in groups of forces.

The intelligence department of the Main Staff (Glavnyy Shtab) of the Ground Troops does not direct operational intelligence in the districts on a daily basis, but at operational-strategic command-staff exercises and maneuvers the reconnaissance detachment (razvedyvatelnyy otryad - RO) of the Main Staff of the Ground Troops prepares the appropriate materials for critiques and draws conclusions on its state.

This all results in the fact that the supervision of the training of personnel and of the activity of operational and tactical intelligence are carried out at the center by several chiefs, and are in essence uncoordinated by anyone. Thus, for instance, the chiefs of intelligence of border districts receive directives from several chiefs of directorates and departments of the Chief Intelligence Directorate, from the chief of intelligence of the Main Staff of the Ground Troops, from the Chief Directorate of Combat Training and sometimes also from the headquarters of troops of the Antiaircraft Defense (Protivo-Vozdushnaya Oborona - PVO) of the Country. Each is interested, not in the state of intelligence in the district as a whole, but only in individual questions which concern their department (vedomstvo). This seems to be the only way in which one can explain a situation in which the problematical questions of intelligence are not resolved. Moreover, we still have no manual of military intelligence, or technical means for reconnaissance against nuclear/missile weapons, or appropriate means of communication, while the methods of intelligence employed by the troops are extremely primitive and do not ensure the solution of this complicated problem.

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The absence of a single organ for the supervision of operational and tactical intelligence in districts results in the fact that the resolution of even simple problems takes years. For example, combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles (boyevo-razvedochnaya dozornaya mashina - BRDM) began to reach the troops in 1958, but the problem of installing a machine gun and optical observation instruments in them has not been decided to this day.

It is known that no new technical means of intelligence will give good results if there are not well-trained personnel to use them.

The Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov, at the critique of the command-staff exercise "DON", explained: "Equipment in itself, no matter how perfect, will not ensure the radical improvement of the state of intelligence. Commanders and staffs at all levels must learn the correct way of organizing intelligence practically and of directing it continuously".

Meanwhile, intelligence officers, who would know intelligence equipment well and who would know how to organize and carry out intelligence in modern operations, are not being trained properly in the military-educational institutions.

The higher intelligence courses for intelligence officers, the intelligence faculty of the Academy i/n M.V. Frunze, the intelligence sections of the Academy of Armored Troops and of the Air Forces Academy, as well as the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, have been disbanded. It seems that in the existing higher military-educational institutions very little attention is devoted to the training of officers in the intelligence field. There are, therefore, frequent cases of officers who return to the troops after graduating at these institutions without even elementary knowledge, not to mention ability, in the organization of intelligence.

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All of this has resulted in the fact that only a limited number of intelligence officers with specialized academy education remains with the troops. The situation with regard to intelligence officer personnel can be illustrated by the example of the Belorussian Military District. Of all the intelligence officers in the district, starting with the intelligence chief of a unit and higher, only 20 percent have graduated from higher educational institutions. At the same time, in the last three years only one officer has come from an Academy for intelligence duty with the troops of the district. All of this makes it necessary to select for engagement in intelligence duties officers who have neither theoretical training nor practical ability in this work, which in turn affects the quality of the intelligence training of the troops and the combat training of intelligence subunits.

In our view, there is an urgent need for the serious reorganization of the training and advanced training of the intelligence officers of all types of armed forces and of all arms of troops.

In the training of intelligence officers, in our opinion, attention should be given, first of all, to the study of the technical means of intelligence and to their potentialities, to modes and methods of organizing and executing reconnaissance against nuclear/missile weapons, and to knowledge of the organization, armament, tactics, and operational art of the probable enemy. Taking into account the fact that there are almost no well-trained interpreters with the troops, and that the military-educational institutions are not training officers who know foreign languages, it is advisable that the training of officers who are proficient in foreign languages should be organized.

We share completely the opinion of the author of the article on the revival of intelligence in the arms of troops, but the solution of this problem in the sequence of the headquarters of a front-army-division must lie not through the channel of chiefs

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of intelligence of the appropriate commanders of arms of troops, but in the inclusion of such specialists in the intelligence sections, departments, and directorates of the combined-arms headquarters. We consider this method more expedient, firstly, because in the conditions of modern combat time (not in hours but in seconds and minutes) acquires primary significance, and this demands the shortening to the minimum of the channels (instantsiya) along which tasks for, and information from, intelligence organs pass; secondly, because, in order to evaluate the situation properly, all information must flow to a single organ, which would collate, accumulate, and analyze it and draw the appropriate conclusions and thirdly, because, as Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov pointed out at the critique of the exercise "DON", "Only the combined-arms headquarters can plan intelligence activity purposefully and can utilize, for its execution, the various forces and means, taking into account their capabilities and the conditions of the situation".

It is most necessary to review and to strengthen technical equipment as a means of obtaining intelligence data, as well as the organs concerned with their processing. Let us take, for example, radiotechnical intelligence units (OSNAZ). These are of low mobility because of the bulk of the intelligence equipment which they carry and, perhaps, are simply not suitable for operations under field conditions.

As is known, the commanding officers of motorized-rifle and tank divisions, and the commanders of combined-arms and tank armies, have received and have at their disposal long-range missile means of destruction, but so far they possess absolutely no forces or means capable of carrying out intelligence to the possible depth of fire-destruction of targets.

We consider that each commanding officer (commander) must have at his disposal the forces and means necessary to assure continuous and vigorous conduct of intelligence, at least to the depth of the range of fire of the means available in the composition of a given unit, large unit, or formation.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

20 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Questions of the Control of Missile Units in an Offensive Operation"

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Questions of the Control of Missile Units in an Offensive Operation"

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Questions of the Control of Missile Units in an Offensive Operation", written by Major-General S. Kuznetsov and Major-General A. Tikhomirov".

This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1960 First Issue was the initial issue of this publication.

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Questions of the Control of Missile Units in an Offensive Operation

Major-General S. Kuznetsov

Major-General A. Tikhomirov

The organization of the control of missile units employing nuclear warheads continues to remain the subject of special attention for combined-arms commanders as well as for missile specialists (spetsialist-raketchik). A number of articles devoted to this question have already appeared in Collections of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought".

As is known, during the critique of the operational-strategic staff exercise which took place in the Ukraine in September 1959, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Grechko noted the shortcomings uncovered during the exercise in the realm of control of weapons of mass destruction. In particular, it was pointed out that because the most expedient forms and methods of control of these means have not yet been found, the coordination between intelligence organs, the operational command, and the commanders of the artillery and the air army on questions concerning the use of nuclear weapons, involves an intolerable waste of time measured in terms of many (4 to 6) hours. Similar defects were noted during a number of other exercises. In connection with this, there is an imperative necessity to find those methods for the control of weapons utilizing nuclear warheads which would require the least possible time for the destruction of a target (from the moment of its detection to the nuclear strike).

At the present time the organization of the control of missile units and tube artillery employing nuclear ammunition is reflected as follows. For the fulfilment of missions in the interests of the main grouping of army troops, the missile units and units of tube artillery employing nuclear ammunition are brought together in an army special artillery group (ASAG). In an offensive operation the army may be reinforced with missile units allocated for solution of tasks of tactical (range of fire of not more than 35 km) as well as of operational significance (range of fire up to 300 km). Furthermore, it can receive an additional 1 to 2 tube artillery divisions employing nuclear ammunition. Therefore, the composition of the ASAG, as regards its tactical and technical characteristics as a deliverer of nuclear warheads, will be exceptionally varied, and this will greatly impede the achievement of control of this group during preparation

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for and in the course of the operation. Objections to the creation of the ASAG, in connection with the above-mentioned situation, have been stated in detail in print. In addition to these, we would also point out the following.

It is recommended that the ASAG utilize as its staff the staffs of the artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK)[1], which are advancing as reinforcements for the army. Furthermore, the artillery division commander who is appointed as the commander of the ASAG is not relieved of his responsibilities for the activities of his organic large units, which were transferred to reinforce the large units of the army.

The commander of the RVGK artillery division and his staff have organic means of control which permit the organization of control of only their own large units. When appointed as commander of the ASAG, the commander of an RVGK artillery division is obliged to leave to his deputy part of the means of control, exercised by the division headquarters, for ensuring the control of organic large units of the RVGK artillery division allocated to reinforce the army. As a result, the ASAG commander and the deputy commander of the RVGK division will not have sufficient means of control; this will lead to unreliability of control and, in particular, to loss of time in the transmission of various orders and commands and in the receipt of information from below. Therefore, the use of the RVGK artillery division staff in the capacity of the ASAG staff is, obviously, inexpedient. It will in no way promote the speed of delivery of nuclear strikes.

We further consider that one of the causes of delay in the delivery of a nuclear strike on detected, unscheduled targets is the unnecessary centralization of the decision of the question of the allocation of nuclear warheads. Usually this is done in the following manner. Let us assume that the headquarters of artillery of a front (army) has received a report from an aircraft about a detected target (for example, a "Corporal" launcher). The commander of artillery of the front (army), not having the means to destroy the target with firepower of conventional means, reports this to the troop commander and requests permission to use missiles with nuclear charges. The troop commander, having a very limited reserve of nuclear warheads, will first determine the possibility of the destruction of this target by

1. Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov. "Combat Employment of Artillery in Offensive Operations of an Army and Front. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Voyennaya Mysl", 1958, No. 5 (43), page 13 .

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conventional air weapons, and only after this will be give the appropriate instructions to the artillery or air army commander.

Having received the troop commander's decision, the artillery commander gives instructions to the commander of the missile unit (the ASAG commander) to prepare for a strike on the target with a nuclear warhead. Then he will have to be provided with the corrected target coordinates and the order for expenditure of a nuclear warhead. All these conversations and transmissions of commands waste a considerable amount of time which is quite sufficient for the "Corporal" launcher to have carried out the firing of a nuclear warhead or to have changed its location site.

The situation becomes even more complicated in the event one must decide an analogous task in the course of a successfully developing offensive operation, with high tempos of movement, the absence of a continuous front, a high dynamic of operations, and unexpected and sharp changes in the situation. Under these conditions, an imperative need arises to impart the greatest possible autonomy to large units in conducting combat operations, which, of course, must be supported accordingly. The division commanders will not have time to await the army commander's decision regarding the question of destruction by nuclear weapons of targets presenting an immediate threat to the division's units.

On the basis of the above, the conclusion can be drawn that the existing rigid centralization in deciding the question of the use of nuclear warheads against unscheduled targets becomes a factor of a negative order. In order to shorten decisively the time from the detection of the target to its destruction by nuclear warheads, partial decentralization of the use of these warheads is essential. It can be realized only if the division commanders obtain as reinforcement missile units (units of tube artillery employing nuclear ammunition) and receive the right to make decisions regarding destruction of targets with nuclear ammunition within the limits of their expenditure established by the army commander.

Which missile units can be used for reinforcement of the divisions? First of all, of course, units of tactical missiles having a firing range of up to 35 km. Such a range permits the missile support of division units with one shift of siting area during the course of a day's advance. In addition, it guarantees firepower maneuver not only within the limits of the entire width of the division's zone of advance, but also within a considerable part of the zones of advance of neighboring divisions. This situation provides the commander of

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artillery of the army, within definite boundaries, with an opportunity to use the missile units assigned to the division, for fulfilling tasks of army significance.

During preparations for an offensive operation, the combined-arms army may, count on reinforcement by one regiment of tactical missiles. This will permit each division of the first echelon of the army to be strengthened by at least one battalion (divizion) in the direction of its main strike.

As is known, under existing organization missile battalions are uniform: part of them are armed with missiles having firing range of up to 20-25 km, part with a firing range of 30-35 km. These two types of missiles have different magnitudes of probable error (otklonenive), and therefore may not be utilized for the execution of all tasks. Missiles with a range of fire of 20-25 km, having less dispersion, are more suitable for the destruction of targets located in the immediate vicinity of friendly troops. At the same time, the tactical-technical characteristics of missiles having the maximum firing range of 35 km practically exclude the possibility of their use with nuclear charges against targets which are located in the immediate vicinity of friendly troops. Therefore it is desirable to reinforce the division with missile subunits of tactical designation with various tactical-technical characteristics; this would necessitate battalions of mixed composition. With regard to the supply of warheads to such a mixed battalion, there will be no special inconveniences; one workshop can assemble nuclear charges on these and other missiles of tactical designation.

It is inexpedient to include missile subunits, assigned to divisions, in just any artillery group, first of all because of these subunits are designated for resolution of only particularly important tasks, and secondly because they usually have a very limited number of warheads. Missile subunits must remain directly subordinate to the commander of the artillery division.

The commanding officer and staff of a missile regiment (polk), after its battalions are assigned to divisions, will retain the functions of ensuring the timely preparation of the battalions for fulfilment of firing tasks during the period of artillery preparation and artillery support of the offensive, the control of the combat activities of the battalions, assistance to them in organizing meteorological, ballistic, topographical, and technical support; the delivery to battalions of warheads having nuclear, conventional, and chemical charges, and also the control of the maneuver of battalions during regroupings. In addition, they are the ones who will provide direction in supplying the battalions with all kinds of materiel

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items and repair equipment. Therefore, the headquarters of the missile regiment will be used during the preparation for and in the course of the operation in the same manner as the headquarters of the artillery breakthrough division of the RVGK.

For the fulfilment of tasks of army significance, the combined-arms army may be reinforced by several battalions of operational missiles with a firing range of 150-300 km. These battalions will comprise that portion of long-range weapons which it is advisable to leave directly subordinate to the commander of army artillery. If the army is reinforced with two or three battalions, then they will be under the direction of the commander and staff of the missile regiment. If, however, the army is reinforced with only one battalion, then naturally it will be under the direction of the commander of the battalion and his staff.

The proposed distribution of missile units and subunits should not be regarded as a categorical rejection of the centralization of their fire control by the commander of artillery of the army. During the period of artillery preparation of the offensive, it is advisable to centralize at the army level the use of the subunits and units employing nuclear weapons, taking into account the tasks which are fulfiled by divisions. However, for this there is no necessity to withdraw these missile units (subunits) from the divisions and to create an ASAG. It will be sufficient if the army artillery commander will provide the commanders of artillery of divisions with the tasks which, according to army plan, must be fulfiled by missile units and subunits with nuclear shells and shells with conventional charges, i.e., the centralization of fire control of these units and subunits will be carried out on the same bases as the centralization of fire control of tube and rocket artillery employing shells with conventional and chemical charges. The centralization of fire control of units and subunits employing nuclear weapons may also be required during a breakthrough of the enemy's defense zones in the course of an offensive operation, and in some other instances.

A proposal concerning the creation of front special artillery groups (FSAG) was expressed in print. We consider this proposal to be groundless. At the present time the headquarters of artillery of a front does not have the possibility of choosing from among its personnel an artillery staff, with corresponding means of control, which could head the FSAG. And in this regard there is no necessity to create such a group. It is doubtful that there can be more than one or two missile regiments subordinate to a front in the very near future. These regiments will have a very limited quantity (but very

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powerful) of nuclear weapons in connection with which the setting-up of tasks for regiments and the supervision of their fulfilment will not burden the staff of the front artillery.

In those cases where the front has 3 or 4 missile regiments (which apparently, will be a rare exception) the necessity for the creation of an FSAG will arise. But only a specially created staff having the necessary means of control will be able to head such a front group. Such a staff must arrive to reinforce the front concurrently with the arrival of the missile regiments.

A few words about reconnaissance. There is no necessity to prove the exceptional significance which reconnaissance of the enemy has for all units employing nuclear weapons. It is obvious. We wish only to note one circumstance which, to an intense degree, impedes the employment of nuclear weapons. The fact is that the missile units and units of tube artillery employing nuclear warheads, do not at the present time have the reconnaissance means which would permit them to conduct reconnaissance of targets for destruction by nuclear weapons and to maintain control over the results of nuclear strikes. The front aviation conducts reconnaissance for the missile regiments of operational designation; this can be considered normal. Reconnaissance for tactical missile regiments is conducted basically by those means which belong to the army artillery. These are principally the ground artillery reconnaissance means, helicopters, and individual artillery fire-adjusting planes from among the artillery fire-adjusting planes assigned to the army for the operation.

In an overwhelming majority of cases, the enemy's atomic cannon and rocket launchers of the "Honest John" and "Lacrosse" type may be detected only by photography from the air. A great deal of time passes before the data regarding the enemy's atomic cannon (rocket launchers), after its processing and after the decision of the army commander, arrive at the missile battalion (battery) which must destroy this gun with a nuclear warhead.

The situation is no better as regards the detection of enemy forces and combat equipment in the course of an offensive. The basic causes of this situation appear to be the extremely inadequate number of artillery fire-adjusting planes which are usually assigned to the army, and the complete disparity of the tactical-technical characteristics of existing artillery fire-adjusting planes with contemporary requirements, and finally, an exceptionally strict centralization of their use.

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The strict centralization of the use of artillery fire-adjusting planes was justified to some extent by the fact that aerial reconnaissance was conducted basically in the interests of army artillery groups and army special artillery groups. However, when missile subunits are assigned to divisions, the previous procedure for use of artillery fire-adjusting planes, in accordance with the general army plan, obviously becomes obsolete. The time has come to provide the large units with the means of aerial reconnaissance which could also be used for adjustment of fire of tube artillery and for the reconnaissance of the enemy's means of nuclear attack in the tactical depth of his defense. These means of reconnaissance must be aircraft with the appropriate tactical-technical characteristics. The presence of aerial reconnaissance means within the large units will provide for a more rapid reaction to detected targets on the part of the large unit commander, and consequently, will shorten considerably the time between the moment of the detection of the target and the delivery of a nuclear strike against it.

Considerable significance for the rapid implementation of nuclear strikes with missiles on unscheduled targets, is attributed to the correct organization of meteorological support of missile units.

Missiles (raketa) of tactical designation, as is known, have solid fuel. Their readiness for launching is determined by the time necessary for calculations in setting-up the sighting mechanisms, mounts, checkout, and heating (pogrev) of the explosive mechanism. With the possession of the most recent meteorological data, all the aforementioned may require up to 15 minutes from the moment the battery receives the command to open fire to the launching of the missile. In the absence of the most recent meteorological data, twice as much time will be required, since it will be necessary to gather information regarding atmospheric conditions and to prepare a meteorological bulletin.

With the possession of a valid meteorological bulletin and favorable conditions, not more than 30 to 40 minutes is required in order to launch a missile of operational designation which is on a launch pad (puskovoy stol). If the meteorological bulletin is not current, however, an additional 1 to 1½ hours may be required for the launching of the pilot balloon (shara-pilot), the processing of the data obtained, and the compilation of the meteorological bulletin. Furthermore, approximately an additional 15 minutes will be required for the preparation of data for setting up the goniometer (uglomer) and accelerometer (integrator).

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In connection with this, it is expedient to organize meteorological support in such a way that the meteorological bulletins arrive at the missile units and subunits at not less than one-hour intervals. In such circumstances, the launching of the missile after receipt of the command may, in the worst case, be carried out not later than 50 to 60 minutes afterward, in the overwhelming majority of cases - not later than 35 to 45 minutes afterward.

If there is one field artillery meteorological station (PAMS) in a missile battalion, the existing organization mentioned above is impossible to achieve because a PAMS can process the launching data from only 6 or 7 pilot-balloons with radiosondes, in a 24-hour period. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the capability of the PAMS of every battalion 2 to 3 times in order to permit the issue of a meteorological bulletin every hour.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

#8 (135) 1.3(a)(4)

27 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of Military Doctrine", by Major-General of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryainov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

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Richard Helms
RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of Military Doctrine", by Major-General of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryainov

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of Military Doctrine", written by Major-General of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryainov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.

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Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of Military Doctrine

by

Major-General of the Engineering-Technical Service
M. Goryainov

Universal recognition of the enormous and even decisive significance of nuclear/missile armament, as experience shows, does not exclude various opinions nor even radical divergencies in the evaluation of its influence on armed combat. Divergence of views on the principles of preparing for and conducting modern war, as well as on the structure of the armed forces naturally follows from this.

In the history of the development of armed forces there are many known instances when new equipment (tekhnika), despite its universal recognition, continued to be underestimated for a long time, and did not find its true place in the army. In addition, obsolescent equipment was over-evaluated for a prolonged period of time, thus holding back understanding of the new equipment.

Something of the sort is taking place right now in the introduction of the newest types of armament and in the clarification of their role in warfare. A great number of works and official and non-official studies have been published in many countries, in which the new weapons are evaluated and conjectures are made on their use and on the necessary reorganization of armies.

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In this literature it is quite clearly shown that the agonizing process of reorganization is still far from being completed even in rough form, and that there is still insufficient clarity regarding the decisive problems.

Judging by the special literature, everything which is being accomplished in the area of restructuring and reorganization of forces, particularly of ground troops, thus far conforms well with existing, old military doctrines, principles and views on the conduct of battles, of operations and of the war as a whole. Questions regarding the duration of war, its sweep, the enlistment of human masses into the armed forces and the role of the economic potential are all examined in the light of old military theories.

In specific terms, this is expressed in the fact that the new weaponry is for the most part considered as a means of considerably increasing the firepower of the army; therefore, there is basically nothing new from the organizational point of view. A new technical means of combat has appeared - a new arm of troops is created, as was the case with aircraft, tanks, and still earlier, with artillery. The old arms of troops are modernized as much as possible and "assimilate" nuclear charges and missiles. Armies continue to consist of the usual arms of troops (modernized, of course) - plus missile troops.

In other words, the process of assimilating the new means of armament which is now taking place can be characterized as follows: proceeding from the experience of the past and taking into consideration the achievements of the present, armies are adapting nuclear/missile armament to the established views on the preparation and conduct of war.

This is a natural process - blessed by the ages - of an empirical approach to the solution of little-explored problems. Such an approach, which is the

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only possible and normal one for the military science of capitalist countries, is completely unacceptable to the armies of the socialist countries, the military science of which is built on Marxist-Leninist teachings on war. Obviously, we must go faster and further both in the theory of using nuclear/missile weapons and in their production.

However, as is known, there are substantial gaps in our military-theoretical thought - "...in a number of problems we have not shown the necessary creativity, ...scientific boldness and daring, and we have long marked time".[1]

What, in our view, are the reasons why our military-theoretical thought lags behind the practical problem of organizing the army?

The first reason, an organizational-methodological one, lies in the fact that the indispensable minimum of tactical-technical information about the new means - not only ours but also the Americans' - reaches the organizations which carry on military-technical work in extremely scanty amounts. This leads to insufficient understanding of and under-evaluation of nuclear/missile weapons. Together with this, certain technical perfections and modernizations of old types of weapons are more widely known and lead to their over-evaluation under contemporary conditions.

The next reason is more complex. We received our initial information on nuclear means of warfare from American sources. These broadly showed the properties of low-yield nuclear weapons. As far as their potentialities in a full-scale war are concerned, low-yield nuclear weapons (and medium-yield bombs as well)

1. From the speech by R. Ya. Malinovskiy at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations.

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are primarily operational and operational-tactical weapons. In our view, they are legitimately considered as a means of increasing troop firepower, and the use of them conforms well with previous principles of conducting war. Our own military thought has also lingered more than was necessary on the analysis of the potentialities of low-yield nuclear bombs and, in fact, has not approached the study of the potentialities of powerful, multi-megaton nuclear bombs.

It is clear to all that even 20 kt nuclear charges with missiles call for tremendous changes in the conduct of war and for fundamental changes in the conduct of battles and operations. But the question of what changes follow from the use of intercontinental missiles with charges of 2-5 mgt and even more, remains little-explored to the present time. The first widely published positions on these questions were expressed by N.S. Khrushchev and R. Ya. Malinovskiy in speeches at the January session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and later in an address by R. Ya. Malinovskiy to the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Local Party Organizations. In the light of these widely known statements, we consider it necessary to dwell on some of the characteristics of highly powerful nuclear bombs with TNT equivalents in millions of tons (mgt).

We know from publications of the existence of bombs with a force in TNT equivalents of 1,2,3,5,10 and 20 million tons.

Calculations can be found in American reference books of the combat effects of bombs of 40,50, and 100 million t. In order to be able to imagine the military significance of such means of destruction, we will touch in passing on the potentialities of destruction and annihilation of megaton bombs, about which some materials have been published.

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Below is Table 1, which shows the combat effectiveness of megaton bombs in relation to their yield (area is in sq. km.).

TABLE 1

Characteristics	Structures	People			Size of radio-active cloud (sq. km.
Yield in TNT equiv. (thousand tons)	Shock wave partially destr.	Radioactive contamination of terrain			
		up to 500r	up to 300r	up app.100r	
1,000	300	c.1,000	c.2,000	10,000	c.4,000
2,000	-	c.2,000	c.4,000	20,000	c.12,000
5,000	9,000 [sic]	c.5,000	c.10,000	30,000	c.22,000
10,000	1,300	c.10,000	c.20,000	100,000	c.45,000
20,000	3,200	c.20,000	c.40,000	200,000	c.80,000

Note: 1. The table was compiled on the basis of foreign materials.

2. Exposure to a dose of 500r causes death in more than 50 percent of cases; radiation of up to 300r - death of up to 15 percent; the rest lose combat effectiveness for a number of months; doses of 100r cause nausea and vomiting in up to 10 percent of the cases and partial loss of combat effectiveness in the rest.

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It can be seen from the Table that megaton bombs raise thousands and tens of thousands of cubic kilometers of radioactive dust into the atmosphere. This dust settles back to earth quite quickly, contaminating thousands and tens of thousands of square kilometers with a lethal concentration and hundreds of thousands of square kilometers with a combat concentration (boyevaya kontsentratsiya). The flash (svetovoye izlucheniye) and the shock wave are devastating only at the moment of action, but the radiological factor of megaton bombs is hundreds of times more important.

As is well known, various shelters protect well against the shock wave and the flash. No shelters can - in practical terms - protect troops from the radioactive substances of megaton bombs, the action of which lasts for many days and weeks, and extends over tremendous areas.

Table 1 shows convincingly that radioactive contamination of terrain by megaton bombs can become the principal factor of combat.

Let us examine more fully the radiological action of a 20 mgt bomb on the basis of testing carried out by the Americans.

In March 1954, on the atoll of Bikini, in the Pacific Ocean, a bomb was exploded with a TNT equivalent of about 15-20 million t. During the explosion, from 30 million t. to 100 million t. of various radioactive particles of earth were thrown into the atmosphere (for 1 t of conventionally exploded TNT, 1.5 - 5 t of earth is not so very much).

As was reported in publications, as a result of radioactive fallout as early as 36 hours after the blast, the cumulative dosage of radioactive contamination in an area of 15 thousand sq. km. reached 900 r, and in an area of approximately 26 thousand sq. km. it reached 670 r.

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In an operational situation, 26 thousand sq. km. can be considered as the territory occupied by a front (an area 250-300 km. wide and 80-100 km. deep). We imagine that with the correct exploitation of meteorological conditions, the covering of the territory of a front with the radioactive products of the explosion of one 20 mgt bomb would not only lower the combat effectiveness of the troops of the front, but would also necessitate their abandoning a significant portion of, if not the whole of that territory.

If, as a result of meteorological conditions, the radioactive products of the explosion have the possibility of spreading to an even greater area, then it turns out that in an area of 120-130 thousand sq. km. the level of radiation will be about 200 r, and in an area of 200 thousand sq. km. about 100 r.[1]

Perhaps the figures cited here are only the product of theoretical calculations not based on actual testing. Unfortunately not. Preparing for the testing of thermonuclear bombs, the Americans declared a danger zone in the Pacific Ocean of 130 thousand sq. km. before 1 March 1954. But as is known, Japanese fishermen of the vessel "Fukuryu maru", which was 145 km. from the point of detonation, the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands and American military personnel on the atoll of Rungelap, at a distance of 250 miles (about 400 km.) from the epicenter, all suffered as a result of the explosion of 1 March 1954.

These facts forced the Americans during the repeat tests on 19 March and 22 May to extend the danger zone to 780 thousand sq. km., that is, by six times. Japanese expeditionary vessels which were at sea from May to July established that contamination of water took place in an area bounded by 10° to 18° North Latitude

1. These figures were taken from the book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy".

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and 150° to 175° East Longitude, that is, an area of 1,560 thousand sq. km. Two months after the last explosion, the radioactivity of the water at a distance of 1,920 km. from the island of Bikini still exceeded by 20 times the maximum permissible dose for drinking water.

If one takes into consideration the fact that such countries as West Germany and England are about 250 thousand sq. km. in area, the meaning of the residual radiation of one 20 mgt bomb blast becomes clear from all points of view.

In our view, it should be absolutely clear from the above that nuclear bombs of great yield are above all a means of radiological contamination of vast areas with all the resulting consequences.

As was already stated, however, a bomb of 20 mgt is not maximal. If it is found to be advisable, 50 and 100 mgt bombs may be employed.

Before proceeding to further discussion it should be pointed out that usually the characteristics of shock wave and flash are given for optimum conditions. This cannot be said for radiological contamination of terrain. It is known that surface bursts increase the radiological potentialities of bombs, while air bursts decrease them. Nevertheless, test studies indicate that usually 25 to 50 percent of the high-energy particles fall out in the areas of the burst, and the rest, penetrating the high layers of the atmosphere, fall out during the course of many years and cannot have any significance for military purposes.

This means that from the military point of view megaton bombs can be even more effective (by 2-3 times) if optimum conditions for the burst are established from the radiological point of view. In order to do this, it is necessary first of all to know the most advisable heights for bursts. Apparently contact bursts of megaton bombs with a certain digging-in to

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the earth will permit the raising into the air of more radioactive particles, and in such a case more of these will fall out in the area of the burst and fewer will escape into the stratosphere. Besides this, the chemical composition of the ground and soils of the blast areas can also exert a great influence on increasing the effectiveness of the blast products. Such elements as sodium, iron, silicon, and others can substantially increase the radioactive mass of particles which are raised into the air. A firm knowledge of local meteorological conditions in possible strike areas becomes of enormous significance to the proper use of powerful bombs. These conditions should be studied well in advance, and materials should be systematically amassed in such amounts that they would permit a good prediction of the meteorological conditions at any given time.

Let us examine the problem of employing powerful nuclear weapons in operational-tactical situations.

What does radioactive contamination of areas mean to combat formations of troops? As an example, let us examine the effect of bomb strikes in areas which are occupied by combat formations of troops on the defense (Table 2).

Table 2 shows that nuclear bursts will cause death by radioactive contamination for large masses of people dispersed over tremendous areas in the course of a few hours after the bursts. A division which occupies 200 sq. km. is liquidated with one 1-mgt bomb; 4-5 divisions, occupying an area of up to 2,400 sq. km., will lose their combat significance with the strike of two or three 1-mgt bombs or of one or two 2-mgt bombs, during which a large percentage of the personnel may die and the rest will have to be immediately evacuated; a field army (in the USA - up to 350 thousand men) can be liquidated as a military organism with two 10-mgt bombs. At the same time, in addition to contamination, from 4 to 10 percent of the territory (hundreds and thousands of square kilometers) would be devastated by the shock waves and by fires from the flash.

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Quantity of bombs needed to create radioactive contamination of fatal and critical concentrations in areas occupied by combat formations of troops in defense.

TABLE 2

Military Unit	Occupied Area in KM^2	Number of Personnel (Authorized TO)	Number of People Per KM^2	BOMBS REQUIRED													
				20 KT		100 KT		300 KT		1 MGT		2 MGT		10 MGT		20 MGT	
				fatal	critical	fatal	critical	fatal	critical	fatal	critical	fatal	critical	fatal	critical	fatal	critical
Division	200	14,000 - 16,000	75 - 80	20	2	6-7	1	3-4	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-
Corps	2,400	70,000 - 90,000	30 - 35	240	10-15	60	4-5	25	2-3	2-3	1	1-2	1	1	-	1	-
Army	23,000	up to 350,000	20 - 25	2,300	100 - 150	500	20-30	250	10-15	20	2	10	1	2	-	1	-

NOTES: 1) As can be seen from the table, the use of bombs with an equivalent of more than 1-2 MGT is not required against formations of troops.

2) The table is constructed from foreign source materials.

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Approximately the same results would be obtained if the combat formations of troops on the offense were examined.

Analysis of the data in the Table from the point of view of effective use of nuclear bombs shows that bombs of large yield are more advantageous than low-yield bombs, both from a combat and from an economic point of view.

Let us examine an example. In order to force the enemy troops to abandon an area of 2,400 sq. km., it is necessary to carry out 240 strikes with bombs of 20 kt yield in the course of a few hours. To launch such a number of missiles in a few hours, it would be necessary to use up to ten troop missile organizations each with 1,500-2,000 men and with 300-400 vehicles of all types. Working under combat conditions, everything else being equal, such a troop organization will suffer losses proportional to the amount of its personnel and equipment.

The same area can be destroyed with only 2 or 3 bombs of 1 mgt or with 1 bomb of 2 mgt. This will be carried out /one or two words missing/ times faster and, under equivalent conditions, with losses smaller to the degree that the number of people involved are fewer and to the degree that they were in firing positions for less time.

It must also be noted that the production of 240 bombs of 20 kt is apparently considerably more expensive than 2 or 3 bombs of 1 mgt.

Does this mean that small-yield bombs are completely unnecessary? No. If bombs of megaton yield, correctly used, are capable of deciding the fates of nations and the over-all outcome of the war, then kiloton bombs will be completely effective for the destruction and elimination of individual targets, for the most part the delivery vehicles (nositel) of nuclear/missile

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weapons, individual bases, and launching pads. Kiloton bombs will also be needed in operations with strategic goals, particularly when it is necessary to avoid unnecessary victims.

The existing concept that the primary form of using nuclear/missile weapons is the operational-tactical form arose in the army from earlier doctrine on warfare. This form narrows the technical possibilities of nuclear weapons, leads to an inefficient decrease in the yield of nuclear weapons and ultimately makes it necessary to have mass quantities of small-yield nuclear weapons, and hence a large number of ground troop missile units, the effective use of which becomes in itself problematical.

Even today there is a widespread opinion that a nuclear/missile weapon is fabulously expensive, that the basic raw materials used in its construction are obtained with great difficulty and in small quantities. This leads to the conclusion that the economic factor does not permit giving this weapon a sufficiently mass character. In this connection we will briefly examine the following two questions: the understanding of mass quantity (massovost) as applied to nuclear/missile armaments and the cost of nuclear bombs.

What do we mean by mass quantity as concerns missiles and nuclear equipment? This question has fundamental significance in the evaluation of the role of new means of warfare and in the understanding of the nature and peculiarities of nuclear/missile warfare. Nuclear means of warfare are so immensely powerful that a comparatively small number of them can already be considered mass.

If 100-200 atomic bombs can create a turning point in a battle and assure victory, then this number can be considered as mass for a specific goal. If, in order to win a world war, 300-400 thermonuclear bombs are sufficient, then this quantity will also be considered sufficiently mass.

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Therefore, "mass quantity" should be understood not as just any large quantity, but as that quantity which satisfies the requirement or need for it to a definite degree. From this point of view as regards nuclear/missile armaments the concept "mass quantity" will mean that quantity which permits the quality of individual means of armament to be manifested in a decisive manner.

In light of this, the numbers of bombs mentioned above may be considered as "mass" for all practical purposes.

From the speech of Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy it follows that 100 2-mgt bombs will turn a territory of up to 500,000 sq. km. into a desert. To inflict utter defeat on a state or states, it is, of course, unnecessary to completely destroy everything. It is important to destroy the important residential centers whose areas comprise not even ten but only a few percentage points of the over-all territory. It follows that the aforementioned 100 bombs are capable of demoralizing the resistance of a state which occupies not 500,000 sq. km. but a great deal more, for example, all the West European NATO allies. In this sense, 100 2-mgt bombs is a sufficiently mass quantity, since the problem of defeating the enemy in Western Europe is solved with this number.

As a result of exercises in the USA during which strikes were delivered against 50 out of 170 typical city areas, it was calculated that these strikes by powerful bombs threatened to liquidate 25 percent of the entire population, up to 50 percent of the means of transportation and up to 60 percent of American industrial enterprises. By analogy with these figures, it follows that 100-120 20-mgt bombs can incapacitate no less than three-fourths of the industry and more than 50 percent of the population of the USA.

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Therefore, 100-120 20-mgt or 100-150 2-mgt bombs are the quantity which, if used correctly, will decide the outcome of the war.[1] With this figure we exhaust the understanding of mass quantity for bombs of given yields. To use this quantity of powerful bombs we evidently need a small number of strategic missile troop units.

The situation is different as concerns low-yield bombs. In radiological effect, the above-mentioned number of powerful bombs is equivalent to 100-135 thousand 20-kt bombs. It follows that in the case of such bombs, if the principal aims of the war are to be gained primarily by the use of low-yield bombs, the concept of mass quantity will be defined in many tens of thousands.

Now, regarding the cost of nuclear bombs. In 1954-1955 the production of one kilogram of basic nuclear material (uranium 235) cost about 20 thousand dollars. The total cost of a kilogram of natural uranium was about 100 dollars and a kilogram of heavy water, 65 dollars. Based on these prices of raw materials and on the special features of the production of the first nuclear bombs, it was established that one 20-mgt bomb cost about 100 million dollars. In recent years, important research was conducted on the use of natural uranium together with its isotopes and other fissionable materials in nuclear bombs, which would permit lowering the cost of the bomb to 2-10 million dollars.

In technical literature for the years 1958-1959 there is information to the effect that the cost of nuclear materials, and along with them, the cost of the weapons themselves had significantly decreased.

1. It appears that the liquidation of nuclear/missile bases requires a certain number of kiloton bombs of comparatively weak yield /two or three words missing/... atmosphere.../

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This gives a basis for supposing that by 1960 the cost of nuclear bombs is within the limits of from several hundred thousand dollars for low-yield bombs to several million dollars for megaton bombs. In 1959 it was reported that a nuclear charge of 3-mgt yield for the Atlas missile is valued at 2-3 million dollars.

This cost is large, in itself, but in comparison with tanks which come to hundreds of thousand and airplanes which cost millions, some of them even tens of millions of dollars, nuclear weapons are comparatively cheap, particularly if the military effectiveness of the two is compared.

From the above it follows that the budgetary capabilities of the largest countries permit the accumulation of nuclear weapons in mass quantities. As concerns missiles there is obviously no doubt that at the present time the status of industry, the availability of processed special materials, the construction-technical level of missiles and guidance instruments permit the organization of mass production of all types of missiles, including intercontinental.

Judging by the foreign press, the cost of missiles in series production is placed at 2.5-5 million dollars for intercontinental, 1.2-1.5 million dollars for strategic, and several hundred thousand dollars for operational-tactical missiles.

All that has been said above about the effects of megaton bombs, about economic and productive capabilities, permits us to come to the conclusion that the nuclear/missile weapon has become (or can become) a mass weapon, and its destructive, and in particular its radiological characteristics, are actually capable of creating conditions in which the fundamental object of the war - the destruction of the enemy - can be accomplished technically in a short period of time and without overtaxing the economy of powerful industrial countries.

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We believe that a view of contemporary warfare, of prevailing military doctrine and of the principles of organization of the armed forces must differ radically from views of war, not only of the pre-atomic period, but also of a war in which the operational-tactical use of low-yield nuclear/missile weapons plays the leading role. Proceeding from this, we will examine the following questions:

- the time limits (limit of duration) of a nuclear/missile war;

- the nature of the course of the initial period of war and the tasks of the armed forces in a nuclear/missile war;

- the principles of the organization of the armed forces.

The time limits of a nuclear/missile war. The history of mankind recalls wars of various durations, up to hundred-year wars. The duration of wars depends principally on the sharpness of the contradictions and the economic and technical capabilities of the warring sides. The question of the permissible time limits of a war had no decisive significance in the past. The means of warfare, the means of destruction were essentially so small in comparison with the creative capabilities of mankind and of nature that the thought of the possibility of monstrous destruction and mass annihilation of people never arose.

The question is posed differently today. It is clear from the above-mentioned considerations that if the number of nuclear weapons sufficient to liquidate human life on earth has not yet been created, it can be created in the immediate future. In this connection, the most destructive factor is radioactive contamination.

However, the process of radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and the earth's surface cannot be

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instantaneous. This process can take place in a certain span of time. Consequently, the time span from the moment of the beginning of a nuclear world war to the moment of the poisoning of the atmosphere of the globe (or a given zone of it) with a concentration of radioactive substances dangerous to human life on earth can be called the time limits of a war.

The ultimate limit of a war depends on a series of factors, namely:

- the scientifically determined limit of concentration or radioactive substances in the atmosphere;

- the quantity and quality of the nuclear devices detonated;

- the intensity of the nuclear bursts;

- the height of the bursts and their distribution over the surface of the globe, and on certain other factors.

We will not examine the above-mentioned factors in detail. For the goals of this work it is important to show that the scientific solution of the question of the time limits of war is an absolute necessity.

Obviously, the basic solution of this question depends on the definition of the maximum permissible dose of atmospheric contamination. Kissinger's book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", states that a doubling of the natural dose is required to eliminate all life, which can be achieved in the northern hemisphere by 300-800 50-mgt bombs or 750-2,000 20-mgt bombs. This number of bombs can evidently be built by even one state.

What conclusion should be drawn from the arguments on the time limits of a nuclear/missile war, if such a war is thrust on us? There can be only one. The main decisive phase of the war, defined as the complete

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paralyzation of the enemy's nuclear strength, must be achieved in the shortest possible time; this must be much shorter than the time necessary to create a dangerous radioactive concentration. The technical possibilities for such a solution are evidently available.

A protracted nuclear/missile war with a decision in favor of one side is excluded because such a war on the strength of military logic, as past experience teaches, must be waged with increasing severity and with the use of ever more powerful and ever more numerous destructive nuclear weapons. The result of such a course of war would be equally disastrous for all warring sides.

A decision in favor of one side depends on readiness and ability to finish the war in the shortest possible time. A great deal has been said in our press recently concerning the fact that even the bourgeois military ideologists reject the theory of a short-term nuclear-missile war. Such statements have, in fact, been made in the West. But this cannot serve as a serious argument in favor of a prolonged nuclear/missile war.

Prior to the appearance of nuclear armaments, representatives of Western military thought created a large number of theories about short-term war, about blitzkrieg. It is well known that Hitler's military doctrine was based on this. Such blitzkriegs were particularly alluring against countries with inadequately developed industry or with comparatively small territory. Capitalism was deeply interested in such an approach to war because an extended war accompanied by arming of the masses in our time would very probably lead to revolutions. The experience of two world wars has already shown that both wars were prolonged and protracted. The principal reason for this phenomenon could be formulated thus: comparative equality of forces, means and potential capabilities of the warring sides in the course of a certain segment of time under conditions of comparatively weak means of warfare (destruction).

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Is there anything new in this question of nuclear/missile weapons? Evidently, yes. The material base for a war lasting for years may not even exist, considering contemporary means of destruction, which substantially (by a large factor) exceed the means of creation.

How are these new conditions reflected in the interests and the ideology of the warring classes?

First of all, one must keep in mind that no normal man can be interested in the destruction of mankind. The matter is different, however, from the point of view of the ruling classes who are disappearing from the scene of history.

History has shown more than once that a dying class, a dying social order, gives birth to theories and dogmas of human destruction characterized by the phrases "apres moi le deluge" and "better be atomized than communized". For reactionary forces, doomed to perish by dint of historical hopelessness, a long war (like any other war) is not contraindicated, the more so since preparation for such a war is economically advantageous for certain monopolistic circles.

Preparation for an extended war is many times more costly than for a short war and the profits of capitalists many times higher in this case. Preparation for an extended war is conducted on the basis of the theory of maximum application of the country's economy to the needs of war and requires expenditures on all other forms of armament and other requisites of a long war as well as on nuclear/missile weapons. This facilitates an increase in the concentration of capital and in the monopolistic power of certain groups. But from the point of view of the cost of the military machine and its combat effectiveness, the nuclear/missile weapon is the cheapest and a short nuclear/missile war is relatively the most economical in expenditures on the forces of destruction. And if the nuclear/missile

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weapon, in reducing the duration of war, reduces the incomes of the monopolies, then the pertinent groups of monopolists will, of course, be for a long war.

Therefore, as a result of economic reasons and partly because of the aspirations of groups connected with military production to preserve the commanding position which they hold in the economy of a country like the USA, the theory of an extended war receives wide circulation. This theory ties in well with the necessity of keeping colonial and economically weakly developed countries under the threat of war and even to thrust wars upon them.

The interests of the progressive forces of the world dictate a different approach. The material prerequisties for the victory of the socialist world over the capitalist world by peaceful means have already been created. Consequently the progressive forces are keenly interested in avoiding war. But if war becomes inevitable, the new world, naturally, must strive to keep war losses to a minimum and consequently should do all possible to keep the war short and, in any case, to finish the decisive phase of the war prior to substantial atmospheric contamination over large areas.

The nature of the course of the initial period of a war and the tasks of the armed forces in a nuclear/missile war. In examining these questions we start from the proposition that the leading capitalist states are preparing for a nuclear world war, in which they will strive for a decisive result at all costs. In technical times, such a decision means the inevitable use of the most powerful nuclear and other weapons against which the other side must use no less powerful destructive weapons within certain time limits to gain the victory.

Before the age of nuclear/missile armaments it was considered that the direct manifestation of war was armed conflict between two opposing armies of

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peoples, of states, or of social classes. Contemporary technical means of warfare, as N. S. Khrushchev pointed out, dictate a different concept of the physical process of war itself. For a number of economically powerful and heavily populated states which are, however, small in territorial size, the war can end in their complete defeat and even destruction before the main part of the armed forces of these countries can enter into action. For the USA, the situation is somewhat different. The disruption of their potentialies for resistance will require more time and weapons and, obviously, it will be difficult to avoid some strikes from their side. In these circumstances, strikes in the enemy's industrial rear, and on his political and administrative centers acquire an overwhelming significance. Powerful strikes, capable of disrupting (or liquidating) the economy and the organized control of the country and the army, will naturally undermine the base of military activity and the existence of the armed forces.

Concurrently, strikes must be made on the necessary number of strategically active (or potentially active) targets (bases, launching pads, naval vessels) from which the enemy can launch nuclear weapons at our economic and political centers. In these cases, the strikes could be made with bombs of lower yields. Given the selection of the appropriate bomb yields and their technically correct use, it is possible to indicate tentatively the quantity of nuclear weapons required. We realize that defining our views on just this point in concrete terms can be most vulnerable for a number of reasons. But the importance of the problem demands this concrete definition, it requires a point of departure. In our opinion, even a mistake of 2-3 times in this case should not be embarrassing; it is important to show the possible nature of the process based on actual material.

Analysis of data published in foreign literature indicates that for a world war about 200 bombs from 1-2 mgt to 15-20 mgt and about 600-900 bombs from

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10 to 30 kt (for strikes on nuclear weapons targets, if there are 300 as is reported in the press) are needed.[1]

It would seem that a total of 1,000-1,100 nuclear strikes are not many for a world war and all these deliberations may appear to be unfounded. However, it should be remembered that a similar number of strikes (chiefly by hydrogen bombs of the type detonated at Bikini) is capable of creating radioactive contamination (higher than 600 r) of an area of about 2 million sq. km. and contamination of over 50 r of an area of about 20 million sq. km. (This does not allow for the enemy's detonations of nuclear weapons.) Moreover, hundreds of thousands of kilometers will be devastated by shock waves and flash radiation. This fact necessitates a very careful approach to the use of megaton bombs in general, and particularly in Europe, where population density is extraordinarily high.

Apparently, however, the use of nuclear/missile weapons under technically optimum conditions may not require such a quantity of megaton bombs for destruction of the NATO bloc.

Therefore, it appears that just a few hundred powerful nuclear bursts will be the primary and decisive factors affecting the outcome of the war and that they will be made in the first hours and days of the war. It follows that the initial period of a war becomes its decisive period, the period in which the armed forces solve the primary technical problem of the war - to liquidate the enemy's capability to use nuclear/missile weapons, to undermine his will to fight and to weaken decisively his forces and means.

1. If enemy atomic targets are greater in number, or if these targets are specially concealed, then the number of small-yield bombs can be increased somewhat. Such an increase on the radiational situation in the world .../two or three words missing/.

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The second period of war, undoubtedly protracted in time, will evidently consist of liquidating the resistance of military organisms still extant, of rendering immediate all-round aid to victims and of reconstructing the economies and state systems of the appropriate countries.

In this period, considering the scale of destruction, reconstruction work will require extended and enormous efforts by the socialist countries and the enlistment of large masses of peoples, possibly numbering in the millions.

It appears that during this period, the principal role will be played by the ground troops, aviation, and navy.

One can proceed from a different concept, according to which the primary tasks of a future world war will be resolved by ground armies on fronts in coordination with strategic missile troops, aviation, and the navy; to achieve victory it is necessary to destroy the enemy's armies and to occupy his territory; strikes by the strategic missile troops deep in the enemy rear will play an important but subsidiary role. This would mean that we underestimate the potential of powerful multi-megaton nuclear bombs and of long-range missiles, that we will have to create tens of thousands of low-yield nuclear bombs, form a large number of operational-tactical missile units, maintain various mass types of troops and a multi-million man army, and base all plans on an extended war with the inherent consequences of economic overstress and of losses many times greater than the losses of World War II.

A third concept is also possible. Keeping aside, in a technical and practical sense, the principal and decisive role of strategic missile troops, to maintain powerful ground and interacting and inter-dependent air and naval forces, which, like the ground troops would be saturated with operational-tactical missile units and constantly perfecting (by type of troops) their combat and auxiliary equipment.

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This is a cautious concept calculated to finish the war in the shortest possible time, but if unsuccessful in this, to be prepared to wage an extended war with the maximum efforts of all the forces and means of the country and of coalitions of countries.

Past experience teaches us that at the beginning of all great wars, the opponents seriously overestimated their own strength and underestimated the enemy's strength. Moreover, not a single war ever went the way it was planned.

It is possible that in the course of a war a situation can arise in which the strategic missile troops of both sides will turn out, for various technical reasons, to be not entirely reliable, that they will only partially fulfill their tasks, and that the decisive effect will not be achieved. In this instance, during the time period necessary for the restoration of the combat capability of the strategic missile troops for the Eurasian war sector, the role of the ground troops and of aviation will become decisive. The role of the navy will also increase, particularly that of submarines. From this point of view, the third concept appears to be the most acceptable, despite the fact that it leads to a substantial increase in the burden of expenditures prior to the beginning of war and presupposes an even sharper increase with the initiation of war.

At the same time, if war is thrust upon us, we must be so prepared that the strategic missile troops can send sufficiently powerful strikes in the first minutes to paralyze the enemy countries and armies and to deprive him of his nuclear/missile weapons. The operations of the other types of troops during the initial period of war must be coordinated with the operations of the strategic missile troops and be subordinate to them.

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From all that has been said it is obvious that the nuclear/missile weapon is primary and decisive in the present period fo time; for this reason the strategic missile troops have become the primary and decisive type of troops, with all the consequences ensuing from this fact. The situation is somewhat different as concerns the quantitative side of the question. The primary and decisive type of troops need not be and indeed will not be the most numerous. The ground troops and the PVO troops will be more numerous.

The new means of warfare, as was said earlier, bring upon the scene other types of troop formations - medical-sanitation and reconstruction formations - which have every reason to be mass formations, and to be formed and undergo training on territorial principles. In our opinion this question requires very profound investigation.

Until the recent past, ground troops were legitimately considered as the primary type of armed forces, since they carried out the principal tasks of war, which amounted to the total defeat of the enemy's armed forces and the taking of his territory. Now, when the forms of war are changing and its principal tasks will evidently not be decided on fronts in direct engagements of opposing armies, but rather in the interiors of countries, the ground troops cannot carry out the principal task of war independently.

In addition to the usual resources of combat materiel, the ground troops have missile equipment with a limited radius of operation. With these means of armament, the ground troops can neither withstand the strikes of strategic missile troops nor protect the country from these strikes. At the same time, the ground troops must be regarded as forces which, together with the air forces are capable of assuring victory in all circumstances.

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Taking into account the possibility that megaton bombs may be used on the battlefield, it is necessary to make an all-round evaluation of the existing organization and the current combat formations of ground troops and of their suitability for nuclear/missile war.

As history teaches, the combat formations of troops and the corresponding organization of troops change form depending on the means of combat, and primarily on the decisive means, firepower. The more effective the fire means of war, the more profound the changes. Right up to the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons, to the degree of the strength of fire, combat formations have grown more and more deeply.../two or three words missing/.

The tendency to thin out military formations has increased in the past five years under the influence of nuclear/missile operational-tactical weapons, but contemporary organization of troops (preserved from the pre-atomic period) and under-evaluation of the new conditions of conducting war fetter and retard this tendency.

It appears that combat formations of ground troops can become sufficiently vital and combat ready through fulfillment of the following conditions:

- increasing the combat independence (autonomy) of all organizational levels (zveno) of troops, and particularly of the lower - the tactical ones;

- increasing the firepower of tactical elements of units and large units;

- substantial increase in the speed of moving of troops;

- a sharp thinning out of personnel and equipment in combat formations.

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Increasing the combat independence of all levels (zveno) of the troop organism is possible by weakening or eliminating the mutual dependence in combat (but not cooperation) between organizational elements (yedinitsa) of troops. The principles of standardization of the means of combat and auxiliary equipment, of organizational autonomy and of a broad independence in carrying out combat missions, must underlie army structure from the primary cells (yacheyka) through all succeeding levels.

Organizationally, it appears advisable to create units (chast) composed of interchangeable, uniform, primary tactical elements (yedinitsa). The creation of regiments of ground troops composed of elements which have high firepower, are completely mobile, tactically independent, and low in personnel composition, and which in case of loss can be easily replaced by similar ones, must have a positive effect on the viability of combat formations.

An increase in speed of movement can be achieved by full mechanization of troops, which would increase this speed by several times in cross-country, as well as in road, movements. Movements of large combat groups of ground troops by aircraft must become common and be applied in the very broadest dimensions.

* * *

Existing military doctrines are built on the following basic principles:

- a country's entire economy and the country as a whole prepare for war beforehand;

- calculations are based on a protracted war and on mass armies which will enlist the greatest possible number of the healthy male and female population;

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- victory or defeat in war is decided on fronts of opposing armies; the strength of armies is determined in the final analysis by the viability and power of the rear;

- the theaters of military operations are studied from the standpoint of the decisive significance of frontal combat of armies, and in this connection, plans for achieving war aims are worked out which take into account the factors of time, space, forces and means; the capabilities of enemies and allies are studied in this same manner;

- military operations are based on principles of seizure of the initiative, concentration of maximum forces and weapons on the main axis, on the selection of the most advantageous time for initiation of operations and for delivery of the main strike;

- the achievement of the basic goals of war absolutely presupposes the total defeat or destruction of armies and the seizure of the most important parts or all of the enemy's territory.

In light of the new quality of nuclear/missile armament it can be said that the above-listed principles of contemporary military doctrine are subject to radical review. Some of the principles will lose their significance entirely, others will take on a different content.

New doctrines must be built on the basis of the potentialities of mass nuclear/missile and radio-electronic means of warfare. Their principles must reflect a new approach, a new understanding of the dimensions of time, space, destructive forces, and forces of resistance.

The new military doctrines must proceed primarily from the principal and decisive role of nuclear/missile strategic weapons in war, and, consequently, from the principal and decisive role of the type of troops armed with these means of combat.

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Basic principles of the new doctrine could include the following propositions:

- the contemporary power of the forces of destruction is immeasurably greater than that of the forces of creation;

- the nuclear/missile weapon is a mass type of weapon, is relatively economical, and, from the combat point of view, it is the most effective;

- the range of nuclear/missile weapons ensures their reaching any point on the globe; in this connection, their accuracy satisfies practical requirements;

- the theater of military operations is the entire globe;

- the primary task of the armed forces in war (from our point of view) should not be the seizure of territories, but of depriving the enemy of the possibility of using nuclear/missile weapons; in case of necessity, temporary occupation is permissible;

- a nuclear/missile war must be short-lived; its active phase can be measured in days or weeks;

- the time limits of a war must be determined by the power of the nuclear weapons, and the intensity and number of bursts which will not cause a dangerous saturation of the atmosphere and of the surface of the globe or the expanse of our country, or allied and non-combatant countries, with radioactive substances.

In our opinion, investigation of the questions connected with the elaboration of military doctrines and a discussion of them within definite limits must be considered the most vital necessity for contemporary military thought. It is in this light that the present article offers itself as a means of posing the question. Moreover, it seems to us that the time has come not only to exchange views on these questions through articles in journals, but also to cooperate in every way in the creation of fuller works.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

27 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel and of Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military District Staffs", by Major-General A. Klyukanov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
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Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel and of Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military District Staffs", by Major-General A. Klyukanov

DATE OF INFO: 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel and of Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military District Staffs", written by Major-General A. Klyukanov.

This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 First Issue of Military Thought was sent for typesetting on 22 December 1960 and sent to press on 13 January 1961. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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The Most Urgent Problems of Training Command Personnel and of Increasing the Combat Readiness of Border Military District Staffs

by

Major-General A. Klyukanov

Timely proposals have been appearing in the pages of our military press with regard to the improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs. We believe that, in addition to the problems advanced by the authors of a number of articles, the necessity has arisen to examine ways of qualitative improvement of the organization of the training of troop command personnel of border districts with the aim of bringing it even closer to the operational assignment of troops and to the conditions which the generals and officers will meet in a real situation of the initial period of a war.

The maintenance of the constant combat readiness of our Armed Forces in order to strike, if the necessity arises, an immediate and crushing blow on the enemy, demands from generals and officer personnel a continual and comprehensive theoretical elaboration and a practical fulfillment of a whole series of most important measures.

The command personnel of border district troops, who will be the first to engage in battle, must pay particular attention to working out measures for training troops for swift combat action directly out of concentration areas along definite operational axes.

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As is known, the concept of combat readiness of troops includes a number of factors, including the following decisive one - the comprehensive theoretical and practical preparedness of generals and officers and of their organizational ability. The higher the level of the theoretical training and of the professional and political qualities of officers and generals, the higher the degree of combat readiness and combat efficiency of the troops and staffs.

In order to be prepared for immediate combat operations along the probable operational axes envisaged by the plan of operation for the initial period of a war, the basic troop command personnel of border military districts and armies (by the latter we have in mind Military Councils of armies and the command elements of line large units) must know the operational assignment of the formations and large units.

Unfortunately, commanders of large units and commanders of armies do not know the specific combat tasks which they must fulfill in the course of the initial operations. This may lead to a situation similar to the one quite well known from the sad experience of the initial period of World War II, when, as a result of the staffs' loss of control of operational formations, some commanders of large units did not know what to do during the surprise offensive of the German-fascist army.

In modern conditions of warfare, with the widespread use of nuclear/missile weapons, it will be difficult, in the event of a short threat period, to accomplish combat tasks to work out and organize the total sum of measures for repelling the enemy offensive, and it will be completely impossible to implement practical study of the directions designated for the conduct of troop combat operations, of specific lines, and of objectives on them.

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If we assume that there will be no threat period and that the enemy, by sudden massed strikes of nuclear/missile weapons, aviation, and other means of attack, will unleash a war and will disable some higher staffs, then the importance and acuteness of the need for advanced (even in peacetime) transmission of their operational assignments, even if only to commanders of line large units and commanders of border armies will increase many fold, as will also the study of the probable directions of their combat operations.

Undoubtedly, strict secrecy must be observed in the study and elaboration of these important problems which have great State significance. To these ends, it is necessary to think through and carry out a whole series of measures in order that the entire operational plan for the initial period of a war along a given direction remain secret.

We believe that staffs of military districts should organize one or two special exercises a year for commanders of armies and commanders of line divisions, with a view to raising the readiness of the basic troop command personnel of border military districts to assume immediate control of units and large units of first-line readiness in their movement directly out of concentration areas on predesignated axes and in their commitment to battle. In these training exercises and studies, there should be an elaboration of the measures dealing with the organization of troop combat operations in accordance with their real operational assignments.

To these same ends, it is desirable to conduct special tactical rides (polevaya poyezdka) along probable axes and lines of troop movement in initial engagements, both on the territory of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the bordering peoples' democracies. Our border military districts, as is known, are located at various distances from the national borders of capitalist countries. Consequently, the conditions for conducting combat operations during a

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surprise attack by the enemy will be different for the troops of different districts. Some will have to operate independently from the territory or on the territory of the Soviet Union. Others, in all probability, will engage in battle in coordination with armies of the countries of the Socialist Camp either on the territory or from the territory of these states. In our opinion, the above-mentioned circumstances explain the great importance of careful advance study by command personnel of concrete operational axes in their areas.

In recent years, during command-staff exercises on the ground dealing with the initial period of a war, a provisional national border was usually established deep within the territory of our country. Staffs were concentrated and provisional groupings of our troops and of probable enemy troops were created behind this provisional border. The execution of combat operations of the antagonists was carried out in the zone along the provisional national border and then to either side of it (in the direction of the actual border or into the depth of the country), but always on the territory of the Soviet Union. The training goals of these exercises were fulfilled but removed to a certain extent from the actual situation in which troops find themselves in peacetime and from those concrete tasks they will have to fulfill in the first days of a war.

Of course, such exercises are highly useful for the numerous staffs and for the generals and officer personnel participating in them, and it is extremely necessary to conduct them in the future. However, along with such exercises, command-staff exercises under conditions existing in the border territory should be conducted for a limited number of troop command personnel of border military districts.

In accordance with instructions of the Minister of Defense in his directive on operational training for 1961, it would be an extraordinarily useful method of

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training troops and staffs to have a series of exercises and group exercises which would begin with placing staffs on combat alert and with their transfer to the established concentration areas.

In such exercises and group exercises, the possible nature of the combat operations of the probable enemy's army should be studied not only from the point of view of his approach to methods of surprise attack and to the conduct of combat operations in general, but also with regard to those probable tasks which enemy troops may have in the engagements of the initial period of a war. In connection with this, it is necessary to take the grouping of our troops, border armies, and military districts actually existing at the present time with their actual composition, TOE, number of large units, units, and the areas of their actual concentration.

In the plans for these exercises, it is essential to reflect the concrete conditions of the disposition of the troops of a border military district, the probable nature of the operational situation and the tasks of formations and large units, not disclosing by this, of course, the real operational plan.

For example, the troops of the border Odessa Military District are deployed at a distance of 700-1,000 kilometers from the coastal borders of countries of the aggressive military bloc (Turkey, Greece). The probable enemy plans, by means of a surprise launching of nuclear strikes by missiles, aircraft, and naval forces in this direction during the initial period of a war, to destroy or annihilate the vitally important administrative-political, economic, and military centers of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and of the southwestern oblasts of the Soviet Union and, by a simultaneous invasion by ground troop groupings deep into the territory of

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the socialist countries, to seize the most important objectives and to rout the basic army troop groupings of countries friendly to us.

It is to be expected that the enemy will assign his troops the mission of destroying, by means of nuclear/missile strikes, or of capturing, by means of dropping airborne forces and by operations of mobile units of ground troops, the existing crossings over the Danube River and other water barriers and also the basic passages across the Eastern Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps, in order to cut off and isolate the troops of Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania from Soviet troops.

In such conditions, it seems essential to us that the basic command personnel of a district and the personnel of its large units study the following problems in the system of operational and command preparation; the organization and the conduct of marches over long distances; the crossing of water lines, mountain passages and passes under conditions of enemy counteractions; the organization and conduct of meeting engagements as the most typical form of troop combat operations under the conditions of an invasion initiated by the enemy; the organization of capturing and holding advantageous lines until the second troop echelons, mobilized at the beginning of a war, are brought up; the problems of the organization of coordination with the armies of the peoples' democracies; measures for materiel, technical, and medical support, and other problems.

In the example under consideration, district troops may encounter particular difficulty in the organization and conduct of regroupings over considerable distances with an exit, if such is required, for example, into the territory of southern Rumania and Bulgaria. The fact is that during the conduct of a regrouping by combined methods (units move on their own on wheeled transport and tracked equipment is transported by rail), approximately

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twice as much time is demanded for complete concentration of troops than if they had completed the march exclusively under their own power. The difference in width of railroad gauge in the USSR and in Rumania and Bulgaria requires additional time for transloading tanks and other tracked equipment, by dint of which tanks will not be able to take part in combat operations simultaneously with their units and large units which completed the march by motor vehicle. We consider the best method of regrouping under conditions of nuclear/missile war to be the simultaneous movement of units and large units under their own power. To this end units of the Odessa Military District, for example, are conducting appropriate studies to increase the cruising range of wheeled and tracked vehicles to 1,000-1,500 kilometers by adding to the amount of fuel contained in the vehicles.

Measures for combat, engineer, materiel-technical and other types of march support will require the most serious attention, and they need, in our opinion, further study and clarification during the exercises and group exercises proposed by us. It seems necessary to us, in this connection, to solve all problems of the planning of regrouping and of the conduct of our troop combat operations in coordination with the Rumanian and Bulgarian armies.

We have dwelt in detail on one example in order to show how important it will be, in our opinion, to conduct operational training of command personnel of border military districts under conditions as close as possible to the probable nature of military operations in a given operational direction. Such training, carried out in advance in peacetime, will resolve a large number of problems of a theoretical nature and will fulfill practical preparatory measures of organizational and technical procedure.

It is perfectly obvious that with attentive examination in each border military district, a special list of problems, questions, and measures

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will arise which must be solved in accordance with the given conditions of the theater of military operations and with local peculiarities.

The Armed Forces of the USSR have good experience in strengthening friendly contacts and in organization of coordination with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, and also in the study of the general principles of combat operations from the command-staff and other exercises to which command personnel and some staffs of formations of the armies of the peoples' democracies are invited. Unfortunately, this experience is not shared even with a limited number of generals and senior officers of the Soviet troops deployed in the border military districts who, in case of war, must personally direct combat operations of their troops in coordination with the troops, and on or from the territory of the countries of the Socialist Camp.

For example, in the practical conditions of the Odessa Military District, for raising the combat readiness of large unit commanders and of the command element of operational formations, and with the aim of establishing coordination, strengthening friendly ties, and becoming familiar with the armies of Rumania and Bulgaria, for the study of the terrain, probable lines of combat operations, water obstacles, mountain passages and passes, road conditions and other peculiarities of the theater of military operations, it is highly expedient to assign command personnel periodically to exercises of troops and staffs of the peoples' democracies, to organize field and military-historical trips, tourist trips, and excursions, to send generals and senior officers for rest periods to the sanitoria of these countries, and to utilize other possibilities. All this will contribute to the careful study of the theater of military operations and of actual operational axes.

Under modern conditions the small peacetime composition of the ground troops of border military districts will be reinforced, if the situation demands,

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with large units and formations by full mobilization of the latter. These complex and responsible tasks, naturally, must constantly be the cynosure of attention of the command personnel and higher staffs. In light of these demands on the command-staff exercises proposed by us, it is necessary to explore all aspects of the organization of troop control of a border military district connected with the difficulties of simultaneous solution of two problems: the conduct of combat operations and the full mobilization of troops. Thus, in the peacetime composition of troops of a military district there are line divisions (of increased combat readiness) and divisions of reduced strength. The field command of an army, army units, and front units are also kept at reduced strength. It is natural that the line divisions, after concentrating in their areas as a result of combat alert, will initiate a march to fulfill combat tasks, and that divisions of reduced strength, army units and supporting subunits of army headquarters will begin full mobilization.

Therefore, the commander and the field command of an army must assure firm control of large units on the march and of their combat operations in the event of deployment for engagement with the enemy and, simultaneously, to direct the conduct of full mobilization. In this connection, the distance between the large units executing a march or engaged in battle and the areas of full mobilization, will increase continually. This is why it is necessary to work out right now methods by which a reduced strength headquarters with limited means of communication could assure uninterrupted control of troops until the completion of mobilization and the bringing up of fully mobilized units and large units to the area of combat operations of the first echelon of the army.

Therefore, problems of the organization of troop control of border formations in the course of the first operations of the initial period of a war demand urgent study and practical assimilation.

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Without question, the mastery of practical measures for full troop mobilization is connected with the removal of people and equipment from the production of material wealth. This is an expensive measure for the State and it is, therefore, undertaken very rarely. At the same time, the demand for full mobilization of various large units within the shortest time is especially important for the formations of border military districts, because the speed of buildup of first-echelon troop strength, consisting of a limited number of divisions of increased combat readiness, will depend on the period required for fully mobilizing large units and units of reduced strength, of which, as a rule, the second echelons and reserves of armies will be created.

As is known, the military leadership of the imperialist states is planning in advance to launch nuclear strikes in the initial period of war, against the most important administrative-political centers, with the aim of disorganizing control and disrupting the mobilization and buildup of the armed forces of the countries of the Socialist Camp. These intentions of the aggressive circles must be considered in our mobilization preparations and work.

In our opinion, it is necessary to organize joint special exercises of the basic command personnel of the troops and of military commissariats. In these exercises we should work out and investigate a whole series of measures directed primarily at:

- the maximum curtailment of the time required for full mobilization of the troops;

- the protection of the personnel, motor transport and other equipment withdrawn from the national economy for the mobilization and buildup of troops, from nuclear strikes and other enemy means of mass destruction;

- the creation of conditions for stable and uninterrupted control of the process of full mobilization.

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The above-mentioned problems of improving the training of generals, senior officers and of the readiness of the staffs of border military districts for control of troop combat operations do not encompass the whole range of tasks, in support of troop combat operations, which must be fulfilled by operational formations and large units on their entry into engagements of the initial period of a war directly from concentration areas and of full mobilization along designated directions; however, they are, in our opinion, most important in the problem of increasing the combat readiness of our border district troops.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Certain Questions of the Control of Troops in Modern Operations", by Major-General A. Morozov, Lieutenant-General N. Lyashchenko, and Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops V. Arkhipov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Certain Questions of the Control of Troops in Modern Operations", by Major-General A. Morozov, Lieutenant-General N. Lyashchenko, and Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops V. Arkhipov.

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Certain Questions of the Control of Troops in Modern Operations" written by Major-General A. Morozov, Lieutenant-General N. Lyashchenko, and Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops V. Arkhipov".

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Certain Questions of the Control of Troops in Modern Operations

The nuclear/missile weapons and other achievements of science and technology have served as a basis for the further development and improvement of the theory of military affairs, and of the equipping and organizational structure of the troops. As a result of the changes which have taken place in the nature of modern operations, the combat capabilities of the types of armed forces and arms of troops are basically different from the operations and the combat possibilities of troops during the period of World War II. The substance of these changes has already been mentioned in our press.

All this has complicated, to a great degree, the direction of the combat activities of troops and has demanded of the organs of control more precise and coordinated work, ensuring swift reaction, flexibility, and combat efficiency in troop control.

It is evident that under such conditions of armed combat it is of the greatest importance to have more perfected forms and methods of troop control, utilizing all the latest achievements of science and technology, especially those of electronics, telemechanics, and automation. With this purpose in mind it is necessary to improve considerably the organizational structure of staffs and their technical equipment, especially in view of the fact that staffs have undergone virtually no changes in the organizational sense since World War II.

The experiences of World War II and practice in postwar exercises show that the commander's skill in directing troops depends, to a large extent, on his

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ability to find the correct forms and methods of control that would best answer the nature of the armed conflict and would fully conform to the situation. It is considered that the most favorable conditions for uninterrupted and firm control of troops was secured for the commander at the primary command post. However, despite all the positive qualities of this control organ, it was, and continues to be, unwieldy, with a large number of persons directly subordinate to the commander and having many channels in the work.

All this artificially complicated the coordinated and exact work of all elements of the command post, it burdened the commander's activities with secondary, and sometimes insufficiently coordinated, matters and distracted him from thoughtful, well-rounded analysis of the constantly changing situation and making timely decisions. In some commanders this bred indecision, lack of initiative, and the inability to make a courageous and correct decision quickly, based on a thorough knowledge of the developing course of events. As a result the commander was forced to resort to systematic briefing by all his commanders, in the course of which he became familiar with the situation and made a decision.

A similar method of work by commanders and staffs took a lot of time, and often troops did not have time to prepare for impending actions. If in the past this did not lead to appreciable results, then in modern conditions this practice has completely outlived itself and can have a fatal influence on the course and outcome of a battle and an operation.

In searching for more perfect forms and methods of control, wide dissemination was given to the practice of controlling troops by an operational group, small in composition and headed by a commander who guided the activities of the group in accordance with the given situation. The advantages of this method of control consisted of the fact that the exact and

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coordinated activity of a well-trained and efficient operational group which, besides the commander, had only a part of the directing staff immediately connected with control, ensuring flexibility and operational efficiency in making quick decisions, and briefing the troops on their missions in a timely manner, excluding the many stages and loss of time for various coordination. The fact that combat and operational documents were produced in a brief and clear form, without unnecessary details, warrants attention. Often battle orders and instructions were written directly from the commander's words, then were graphically plotted on maps, and less often were put out in the form of written documents. The missions of the troops were given orally with subsequent written confirmation.

The operational group had high mobility and the ability to deploy and redeploy secretly. All these advantages became evident in a clear and obvious form when controling tank and motorized troops during the years of the past war, whose experiences can greatly influence the further improvement of forms and methods of troop control.

However, we consider that the plain transfer of experience in the control of troops with the help of operational groups will not ensure a solution of all the most important problems that confront the organs of control in modern operations. Besides, it should be taken into consideration that often these operational groups replaced the staff as a whole, actually removed it from the direction of combat operations. It seems to us that the principle -- the commander carries out control over the troops personally and through his staff -- should remain unchanged, and that the commander is obligated to rely on his staff to an even greater degree.

The role of the staff, as the basic organ of the commander for ensuring firm and constant control of the troops, has grown significantly. In relation to

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the staffs of the various arms of troops, it is the highest staff, and during the organization of coordinated work its directions must be received for strict execution.

As a result of this the role of the chief of staff also increases. He concentrates in his hands all the results of the many-sided and coordinated activity of the whole staff and must be ready /four or five words missing/ essential information to the commander, for making a quick, well-founded decision and to ensure that the troops are informed of their missions in a timely manner. All this will relieve the commander of the need to listen to a large number of commanders and will immeasurably raise the role of the staff as the only operational organ headed by the chief of staff, who is, at the same time, the deputy commander.

It is apparent that the existing organization of the staff does not fulfill modern requirements, because of its unwieldiness, its many channels, and lack of operational efficiency, and that it is in need of basic improvements. In order to avoid improvisation, which can be observed now in exercises, we propose that a permanent (under combat conditions) organ for direct management of troop combat operations be created on the base of the field command of a front (army), which would have a harmonious organizational structure. It would be limited in composition, flexible, mobile, and adequately operational. The basis of this organ has to be composed of part of the operational and intelligence directorates (departments), of the combined-arms staff and the staffs of the arms of troops and types of armed forces. Such an organ, detached from the field command and called, for example, the control center, can and should appear as the main organ providing the commander with firm and constant management of the combat activity of troops. At the front this organ will be the operational control center; in the army -- the tactical-operational control center, and in the division (corps) - the tactical control center.

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In our opinion, the control center has to be created to fulfill the basic function of providing constant control of the troops -- an operational function -- under the direct leadership of the chief of staff and to actually be the forward command post.

The operational control center (at the front) has to be composed of: the commander of front troops, a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff, the operational directorate of the staff, operational units from the apparatus of the chief of intelligence, of the chief of missile troops and artillery, of the chief of PVO troops, and in some cases operational groups from the staff of the air army of the front and the navy (VMF); also the minimum number of personnel necessary to provide support, servicing, and protection.

The nucleus of the operational control center is made up of the operational unit of the staff of the front with the chief of staff at its head; its basic working apparatus is the operational and intelligence directorates. Besides, in all operational matters the apparatus of the chief of missile troops and artillery, the apparatus of the chief of PVO and the operational groups of the staff of the front air army and VMF, are subordinate to the chief of staff, as the first deputy to the commander of troops. The chief of operational control has to direct all practical, everyday, executive aspects of the work of the operational center, of control and supervision over its quality and timeliness.

The make-up of the operational control center, the principle of its work, and coordination with the system of various control points are shown on Diagram #1.

The immediate work of the operational control center (at the front) is carried out, in our opinion, on a so-called operational plotting board, understood to mean a unified work area of the command, officers, and generals -- who represent the various departments, directorates, and operational groups. Maps (plotting boards), that continually show the situation in an easy-to-follow manner, are located at this work area.

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


Diagram 1: Composition of an Operational Control Center

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In the main, the organization of the work of the operational control center on the operational plotting board appears to be as follows:




Diagram 2: Organization of the Work of An Operational Control Center

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As shown on Diagram #2 all situation information goes to the operational plotting board of the control center. Its location is the basic work area of the front troop commander, the chief of staff, the chief of the operational directorate, the chief of intelligence, and, when necessary, the chiefs of the arms of troops and chiefs of the operational groups of the staff of the front air army and VMF.

The operational plotting board is operated by the operational planning department of the operational directorate. The chief of the operational directorate and the chief of the department of operational planning are responsible for continuous operation of the operational plotting board. In our opinion, all the work is done on three maps: the map with information about the enemy, the general operational-situation map and the radiation situation map. Access of persons to the operational plotting board should be strictly limited.

It would be best to use a light prefabricated building to house the operational plotting board, where all the above-mentioned persons could work together and where there would be facilities to allow for concurrent work of the duty shift of plotting board operators. Specially adapted staff busses, and in individual cases even army supply directorate (USB) and standard medical (UST) tents, can be used for this purpose when necessary.

The special control points (operational units) of the chief of missile troops and artillery, the chief of PVO, and the operational groups of the staff of the front air army and the VMF, and also other departments and groups included in the composition of the operational control center, are located close to the place where the operational plotting board is housed.

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The remaining personnel of the field command, who are not part of the operational control center, will become part of the command post or rear area control point (TPU), in accordance with the functions they fulfill. The interlocking of all three elements of the field command -- control center (the forward command post), the command post, and the rear area control point -- must fulfill the needs for a concealed and dispersed deployment in the terrain, and should be provided with reliable internal communications that would permit the carrying on of conversations in the clear.

The organizational structure of the control centers that we propose gives us the opportunity to relieve the front troop commander (army commander and division commander) of the great loss of time needed to hear the situation reports, and will give him the opportunity to allot more attention to situation analysis and execute purposeful direction of troop combat activities.

The organization of such a control center also gives us the opportunity to eliminate the separation of collection, processing, and reporting of situation data about friendly troops, about the enemy, and especially about the radiation situation, which is very important under modern conditions. All information will be concentrated in one place and is reported directly to the commander.

At the command post there has to be a reserve operational plotting board with a group of plotting board operators, that would duplicate the plotting of the entire situation, in order to provide for the control of troops when the control center (PKP) is moved or in the event it is put out of action, to assume the control of troops.

On an analogous rear area operational plotting board must be entered all the rear area situation data, that is essential to making decisions concerning uninterrupted materiel-technical and medical support. The plotting of the missile rear area situation has to be done with extreme attention to operational use.

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In our opinion, a necessary condition for stability of work at the control center has to be good technical equipment, especially with regard to means of communications and specially adapted staff transport. First of all, we have in mind, the need to organize and maintain dependable communications with all sources (shown on Diagram #1), providing situation data to the operational center. In this, special attention has to be given to the creation of separate communications channels for the command, for chiefs of troop directions (napravleniye), for the chief of missile troops and artillery (only in the channel to subordinate units and large units), the chief of PVO (in the channel of PVO troops), the chief of intelligence, and also special communications links with the general staff, with coordinating large units (formations) and with the staff of the front air army.

Just as important is the internal voice communications net, and also the television equipment which would ensure a free exchange of conversations within, as well as between, every control organ. Besides, a number of monitors (korrespondent) (who are relied on for this) must have the opportunity to determine that conversations on the internal system are in progress, by means of a special indicator (tablo), and when necessary to monitor the conversation in parallel or participate in it.

An important consideration is the need to transmit all reports to the operational plotting board, or the orders (commands) from the operational plotting board, via the internal voice system, to the chiefs of directions or to control points of the chiefs of the arms of troops, by clear text. In turn, they both, in communicating with the troops, must receive and transmit by means of encoding devices or cryptographic security (SUV) documents.

Such control centers already exist at the command posts of large units of PVO of the Country and in the staffs of fleets, and they fully justify their existence. It seems to us that there is a direct need to test, during exercises, a similar system of control in the ground troops.

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Considering our special interest in fulfillment of staff operational functions, we consider that operational control, as the basic function of the apparatus of command and of the staff also has to undergo changes in its organization, that would fully reflect the nature of the work they perform.

It is expedient to have the operational control of the front staff composed as follows: chief of operational control and his deputy, the departments of operational planning, operations (12 to 14 persons, basically direction officers), information (6 persons), radio countermeasures (4 persons), and organization (10 to 12 persons).

The operational planning department, composed of 10 to 12 persons (6 to 8 operations officers, one chemical, one engineer, 1 or 2 nuclear weapons specialists) prepares suggestions for making decisions regarding the use of front troops in an operation, and prepares the decisions of the front troop commander, in graphic or written form. During the course of combat operations, the officers of this department plot all the operational situation data on the operational plotting board /4 or 5 words missing/ reports to the command. They also maintain the radiation situation map, without which it is difficult to determine the degree of safety of friendly troops while they execute any maneuver on the battlefield, and take into account the average doses of radioactivity received by units and large units. The indicated composition of the department can ensure work at the control center in two shifts.

Practice shows that the operational directorate has to solve many organizational problems in addition to the operational ones, and has to utilize the working staff of the basic departments for this. This practice does not justify itself. It seems to us that it is necessary to include a reconnoitering group (2 or 3 persons) in the newly organized organization department, for carrying out reconnoitering of control point areas

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and the placement and relocation of the latter. It should be assigned the duty for the area where the control points, units and subunits of support, servicing, and protection and also the organization of chemical and radiation detection are located; for this purpose it would be expedient to give the group a special observation post. Moreover, the organization department must have an administrative support group (2 or 3 persons) in charge of matters dealing with the organization of food and administrative outfitting of control points, and a group to perform classified work (5 or 6 persons), serving the whole staff of the control center.

The total staff of the operational directorate will be about 50 to 55 officers, enlisted men, and employees.

The diagram of control centers and other views on various questions of troop control, and the organizational structure of the control organs that we propose, are not necessarily without fault. It would be desirable to have other opinions expressed on the respective questions, which will help to solve them correctly.

Major-General A. Morozov

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Planning the use of nuclear weapons in a front offensive operation is the principal question in modern conditions, but it is solved by applying the old methods of planning to the new conditions.

Experience gained from the exercises carried out in the Turkestan Military District brought us to the following conclusion. As a result of the fact that, at the front, nuclear warheads and means of delivering them to the target are found under the subordination of various chiefs (the air army commander and the chief of missile troops and artillery), a lot of time is wasted by the troop commander when making the decision to use these weapons in an operation for the coordination of the questions: with which weapons by whom, where and when must the strike be made. Normally, upon receipt of the operational directive, the chief of staff of the front informed the commanders of arms of troops and the chiefs of directorates and services about the combat mission received and announced the preliminary decision of the front troop commander. After this the plans for using nuclear weapons were prepared simultaneously in the operational directorate, by the chief of missile troops and artillery and in the staff of the air army. Later these plans were coordinated by the chief of staff of the front; in order to do this he listened to the views of the appropriate commanders, which consumed a lot of time. As a result of the limited time, the problems of planning the use of nuclear weapons, recording the rate of use of nuclear weapons, and the radiation situation, its analysis did not achieve the requisite solution.

A conviction arose, as a result of analysis, that the need had arisen for a special organ attached to the troop commander and the chief of staff of the front, for planning the use of modern means of combat, because the content of the questions solved by the staff of the front and the amount of work do not correspond to the existing organizational structure and had exceeded its limits.

When preparing for the front commander-staff exercise that was carried out in April 1960, a special group was created under the operational command of the staff of the front to plan the use of nuclear weapons and was composed of seven persons. The group was headed by the deputy

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chief of the operational directorate. It was composed of the senior officers of the operational directorate, the staff of the chief of missile troops and artillery, the air army staff, the chief of chemical troops, the engineer troops staff, and the front staff intelligence directorate.

The group was assigned the following four basic tasks: preparation of considerations concerning the use of nuclear weapons for the front command, control and recording of the receipt and rate of use of nuclear weapons, recording of the radiation situation, and organization of troop antinuclear protection. Before the start of the exercise the volume and procedure of the work of the group and the functional duties of each officer were delineated. The chief of the group had to prepare and report to the chief of staff, or to the front troop commander, proposals for the most expedient use of nuclear weapons, and during an operation to summarize, analyze, and report all information regarding the use of nuclear weapons by both sides, and in particular, the radiation situation in the areas of combat operations and in the rear area of friendly troops.

It was decided that during the exercise the group would be located at the front command post since, basically, troops are controlled from there. However, experience showed that under the conditions of the Middle-Eastern (sredne-vostochnyy) Theater of Military Operations, when the commander often leaves the command post during the operation, and directs the troops from the forward command post, a group of this type has to be located with the front commander at the forward command post. One staff bus was allocated for the transportation and work of the group.

In the future, in our opinion, with the creation of such a group (department) it is necessary to take into consideration its ability to divide into two parts which have equal capacity for work, so that in case one part is put out of action the other can continue to fulfil the assigned mission.

When, during the exercise, the directives of the Supreme High Command for an offensive operation were

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received, the group began its basic work of planning the use of nuclear weapons. Based on the operational orientation given by the chief of staff of the front, which was attended by the group chief, the group was given its primary assignment -- to plan in detail the use of nuclear weapons in the first strike and during the fulfillment of the immediate and follow-up missions by the front troops.

First of all it was determined that the front would have 48 units of nuclear ammunition available for the start of the operation, ready for use, including 34 missiles, 6 front cruise missiles (krylataya raketa), and 8 atomic bombs. During a thorough analysis of the situation it was determined that it was possible to use only 36 of the 48 units for the first strike, because of the 18 troop missiles, 12 missiles were located in divisions deployed far from the State border, and their use in the operation would be possible only after these divisions were committed to combat. Then enemy targets were evaluated and it was determined that it would be necessary to neutralize and destroy 29 targets with the first strike. However, using its own facilities the front could only carry out a strike against 20 targets and use 25 units of nuclear ammunition. The remaining 9 targets were located far in the rear, and strikes against them could be made more expediently by the means of the Supreme High Command.

After identifying the targets, the coordinates of the epicenter of the explosion, the numbers, yields, types of warheads and the nature of the burst, a chart was drawn up, showing the nuclear strikes to be carried out, with tentative determination of the results expected from the strikes.

In this way the group determined in detail the targets and the number of nuclear warheads for each target in the first strike for fulfilling the immediate and follow-up missions, and also those held in reserve by the front troop commander. All this work was coordinated with the chief of missile troops and artillery and the air army

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commander. The front chief of staff and the front troop commander were forwarded the proposal for the use of nuclear warheads, which became the basic plan for the use of nuclear weapons.

A separate plan for the use of nuclear weapons was not prepared; everything was represented graphically on the plan of the operation, including the targets of the strikes, the yield of the charge, the type of burst, the time of the strikes, and alternate targets were also shown there. The ratio of forces in regard to warheads and means of delivery, and the distribution of nuclear weapons by missions were set out in tables on the map. Unified signals were established to carry out the nuclear strikes and were brought to the attention of the missile units and aviation. Combat orders for antinuclear protection of troops and installations were developed and were coordinated with the chief of chemical troops, chief of the rear, and the staff of the air army. During the planning period of the operation, the group prepared a map showing all the targets slated for neutralization and destruction by nuclear weapons, and the location of friendly troops and rear area installations; later nuclear strikes of both sides and the radiation situation were entered on the map. In this way the first stage of the group's work in planning the use of nuclear weapons ended.

During the combat operations, the group was busy identifying enemy targets, and when the troop commander made the decision, they planned the strikes against them, took into consideration the receipt and rate of use of nuclear weapons, and also kept track of the radiation situation, especially in cases of surface bursts. The results of the enemy strikes were analyzed and conclusions were drawn concerning the radiation situation and the possibilities for friendly troops to operate. Through the staff of the chief of missile troops and artillery and the air army staff the group kept track of the delivery of nuclear strikes and plotted them on the map; the dispositions of the troops were also plotted on the same map.

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The group received information about the enemy through an intelligence officer of the intelligence directorate, from troop reports, and from air army staff reports. Based on this information, targets that had to be destroyed or neutralized by nuclear means were identified and evaluated. Conclusions were reported to the chief of the operational directorate and, more often, to the chief of staff of the front, after which the troop commander made a decision and assigned the mission of carrying out the strike directly to the chief of missile troops and artillery or to the commander of the air army by word of mouth or in writing; in the latter case the orders were prepared by the group.

While working out the proposals to use nuclear weapons the group was in constant contact with the directorate of artillery armament, the air army staff and the front rear area staff, and was informed about the receipt and readiness of nuclear weapons and the provision of the missiles with special fuel. An officer from the chief of missile troops and artillery supervised the deployment of combat formations of missile units and officer-pilot supervised the basing of delivery aircraft; all this information was also plotted on the map.

During the exercise the group tried to keep track of losses inflicted on friendly troops by enemy strikes, but did not fulfill this task because it did not get the necessary summarized data from the troops. They came to the conclusion that the groups can give the losses only for separate strikes and for individual large units, and that the organizational and operations directorates should have the information about general losses as a result of nuclear weapons as well as from other means of destruction.

During the exercise the special group did not have selector communications (selektornaya svyaz) with the other directorates of the front staff. This should be considered to be an abnormal situation. Experience gained from the exercise showed that the group must have

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such communications with the intelligence directorate, the combined command post of aviation and PVO, and also with the troop commander and chief of the front in order that all the information about the enemy that reaches the intelligence directorate and the combined command post be transmitted immediately to the special group and be quickly plotted on the map and reported to the chief of staff and the commander.

As shown by the experience gained from the exercise, it is essential to have a map-screen (karta-ekran) on which all the enemy targets slated for neutralization or destruction are plotted. This will greatly simplify the work of the front troop commander in making a decision about the carrying out of nuclear strikes.

It should be considered a fault that officers -- representatives of staffs and directorates -- were not part of the operations directorate and were constantly overloaded with work in their staffs and directorates which reflected negatively on the work of the group.

Because such a group was organized for the first time in a district, many questions had to be resolved by feel, but during the exercise it played a big role and rendered considerable help to the front command in the timely and purposeful planning of the use of nuclear weapons. In many ways it simplified the work of coordinating strikes between aviation and missile units. At the critique of the exercise, the district troop commander pointed out that the group performed a large, useful task and that in the future it is necessary to create similar groups.

The group was created under the operations directorate of the front staff, but during the exercise it worked under the direct management of the front chief of staff and front troop commander and provided them with information, because in the final analysis, the decision to use nuclear means is made only by the troop commander. In addition /one line missing/ did not fulfill the missions assigned to it.

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In connection with this, the conclusion arises that there should be a similar permanent element directly subordinate to the chief of staff of the front who would work in close contact with the operations directorate. The staff of such a planning organ must be part of the T/O and be prepared in advance.

In our opinion it is necessary even during peacetime to have in the staff of the military district and directly subordinate to the district chief of staff a special department of modern means of combat and troop protection from weapons of mass destruction subordinate directly to the district chief of staff. In peacetime this department has to train the lower staffs in matters of planning the use of nuclear means, develop measures for and manage the protection of the troops from the means of mass destruction. In wartime such a department has to be expanded into a special directorate headed by the deputy chief of staff of the front. It should concern itself with planning the use of new means of combat and measures for protecting troops from weapons of mass destruction.

Lt. General N. Lyashchenko

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We consider it necessary to enumerate a series of suggestions for the improvement of organizational structure of modern staffs, their equipping, and methods of work.

The existing organs of control, as was already mentioned in our press, do not fully conform to modern conditions; they are too cumbersome, have little mobility and their means of movement do not have adequate cross-country ability over the terrain. It is enough to point out that the staff and command of the army have up to 1,500 persons in their composition and up to 350 various motor vehicles, the staff and directorate of a division -- up to 500 persons and more than 100 various motor vehicles. These staffs are tied to the roads and bridges; it is difficult to move them; a lot of time is required for their deployment and redeployment, especially of army staffs. When, during offensive operations, tanks and motorized-rifle divisions move at a speed of 80-110 km per day, the staffs lag behind the troops.

It is also known that under conditions of mass use of nuclear/missile weapons the commander's decision has to be made, relayed to the executors, and carried out in a very short period of time, in many cases calculated in minutes or even seconds. Great command mobility is necessary for the successful control of nuclear/missile weapons. It is possible to have missiles with nuclear charges, tank, and airborne troops and not attain success because of tardiness in the combat use of these means.

It is necessary to review the organization structure of the staffs and sharply reduce the number of personnel and the means of transport in them. Success in the control of troops during modern operations will depend not on the number of generals and officers in the staff, but on the quality of their training, experience, the coordination and operational efficiency of the work, and also on the

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technical equipment of the staffs. The control methods, by small operational groups, used in the tank troops during World War II, can be wholly and fully utilized even under modern conditions. The staffs and directorates of these large units and formations moved up in tanks or motor vehicles with radio sets, were noted for their high mobility and were trained and adapted for troop control in mobile types of combat operations.

In our opinion, instead of an army staff and staffs of the commanders of arms of trooops and services, it is necessary to have a single staff for field command of an army with the chief of staff of the field command as head; at the same time he would also be the first deputy army commander. Organizationally the army field command must contain:

- the army command;

- chief of staff of the field command;

- department of operational and combat management of troops in operations and in battle;

- chiefs of arms of troops and services and their departments;

- the Party-political apparatus;

- army deputy commander for the rear area and control organs for the rear area.

The staff of the army field command must have the necessary combat and technical equipment supply units and subunits subordinate to it.

In our opinion, the army field command, from the operational-tactical standpoint must be divided into a forward command post (PKP) and a rear command post (TKP).

The PKP can be composed approximately as follows:

- army commander;

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- member of the Military Council;

- chief of staff of the army field command;

- a group of officers from the operations, intelligence, and communications departments;

- chief of missile troops and artillery with a group of officers;

- chief of engineer troops with a group of officers;

- chief of chemical troops with a group of officers;

- chief of the PVO with a group of officers;

- deputy commander of the rear area with a group of officers;

- a group of officers, sergeants, and soldiers for combat security and guard duty.

In our opinion the PKP of the army must have altogether 45 to 50 generals and officers, 70 to 75 soldiers and sergeants, six tanks (three T-54 and three PT-76), 15 armored personnel carriers BTR-50P, 10 airplanes or helicopters, and also the necessary means of communications, radio sets, radar sets and television sets mounted in tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and airplanes.

The army rear command post will ensure, on orders from the army commander, the supply of technical equipment to the troops and, at the same time, will be the reserve control point in case the PKP of the army is put out of commission. It is headed by one of the army deputy commanders and can be composed approximately as follows:

- deputy army commander;

- deputy chief of the army political department;

- first deputy chief of the army field command staff;

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- deputy chief of the rear /one or two words missing/;

- a group of officers from the operations, intelligence, chemical, engineering, political, PVO, and communications departments, and the department of the chief of missile troops and artillery;

- rear area officers, specialists in artillery, tank armament, motor vehicles and tractors, quartermaster, and fuel and lubricant (GSM) supply.

Directly subordinate to the army rear area command post will be:

- reserve commands for divisions and regiments;

- troop units and subunits for the elimination of the effects of enemy nuclear attacks and antinuclear and antichemical protection;

- depots and portable repair plants.

The advantage of this organizational structure of the army field command is, in our opinion, that all departments of the presently existing staff, and also the chiefs of arms of troops and services, will be directly subordinate to the chief of staff of the field command, since he is the first deputy commander. This will make it possible to concentrate all planning of an operation (battle) and the control over all forces and weapons in an operation and in a battle, in the hands of one person.

In the division command there should be, in our opinion, 12 to 15 generals and officers, among them a divisional commander, chief of staff of the division command, chiefs of arms of troops and services, and the Party-political apparatus. Analogously we propose that the army unit sub-divide the division command into a forward command post (PKP) and a rear command post (TKP).

The division PKP should have 5 medium tanks, 3 PT-76 light tanks, 3 armored personnel carriers and an air

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flight (zveno) (3 to 5 MI-1 or MI-4 helicopters).

The creation of PKP and TKP as part of the army field command and division command increases, in our opinion, the combat readiness of the staffs, the mobility of command posts and their viability.

The existing cumbersome staffs reveal themselves by the presence of a large number of antennas, radar sets, busses and motor vehicles with high bodies. Besides, these vehicles are easily shot up with automatic weapon fire, and are pierced by mine and shell fragments. Under these circumstances it is difficult to camouflage the staffs and reliably ensure their viability. During combat operations in separate directions, in the presence of gaps and breaks in combat formations, with a sizeable separation of individual units and large units from the main forces, the staffs can be destroyed not only by nuclear weapons and aircraft, but also are subject to tank and infantry attacks, including enemy diversionary groups.

For this very reason the control points which we propose should be in tanks (T-54, PT-76), armored personnel carriers, and armored staff cars, as a result of which they will have cross-country ability to go anywhere, maneuverability, be small in number, have high viability, and will not stand out from the other tank and armored personnel carrier subunits. The presence of airplanes and helicopters in the control points will make them even more mobile and maneuverable.

In line with the change in the organization of the staffs, it is necessary to review the methods of planning operations and combat actions, and also the manner of troop management during the operation. In our opinion the plan of combat and operation under conditions of a nuclear/missile war has to consist of short combat documents. The absence of lengthy operational pauses, during which the planning and preparation for approaching operations was previously carried out, will probably make it necessary to carry out all planning during combat operations. Under these conditions there will not be time to prepare voluminous documents.

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In our opinion the plan for an operation and battle has to indicate the goal of the operation (battle), which enemy grouping will be destroyed by nuclear weapons, which targets or territories are to be taken by combined-arms large units and units, the depth of the mission, the direction of the actions (mainly of the airborne and tank troops), the time for fulfilling the mission, and also the questions of supply of material-technical equipment and control of the troops. All this should be noted on maps.

As soon as we abandon bulky operational plans and other operational documents, and superfluous military bureaucracy, cumbersome staffs will not be needed and there will be more operations and real management of the troops.

Everyone knows that the generals and officers of modern staffs and directorates of armies and divisions waste two-thirds of their time processing various types of documents that often are not needed for their work, and only one-third of their time is used for the direct control of troops, which is also done by only a small group, and not by the overwhelming number of staff generals and officers. To abolish decisively the unnecessary paperwork that has increased 2 or 3 times during the postwar period means the release of a large number of officers for specific control of troops in combat and operations. It would be more useful to employ the released generals and officers for the creation of reserve PKP and TKP which can be used in case the basic control points are put out of commission.

The organizational structure of large units, and units exerts great influence on the firm control of troops.

In our opinion the modern organization of an army, motorized-rifle division, and tank division do not conform to the conditions of modern missile/nuclear war. They are cumbersome, have little mobility, inadequate maneuverability and are difficult to control during combat and battle. This organization has had its day and has become obsolete, the same as the organization of modern staffs.

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Without going into detail, we propose to switch to the brigade principle of structure for the combined-arms formations. Modern ground troops, it seems to us, have to be composed of missile divisions and brigades, of tank, mechanized, and airborne brigades.

The army (possibly, it is better to call it the mobile combat group - BPG) is not constant in its composition. Its composition depends on the combat task to be fulfilled, the depth and width of the offensive zone, nuclear weapon support, and other conditions.

In the makeup of the army (BPG) it is necessary to have about: 5 to 7 tank or mechanized brigades (in any ratio), a missile brigade, two airborne brigades, 1 or 2 engineer brigades, 1 or 2 chemical troop brigades, 3 to 5 medical battalions (detachments), a rear services brigade, and a reserve brigade. For combat security the army (BPG) has to have an aerial reconnaissance regiment, an armored reconnaissance regiment, reconnaissance /6 to 8 words missing/. Besides, it may receive 1 or 2 missile brigades, an air division of fighter-bombers, a river-crossing brigade, and a chemical protection brigade as reinforcements.

The tank brigade must consist of from 3 to 5 tank battalions, and a battalion of organic missiles (voyskovaya raketa). A brigade may have up to 100 tanks, 50 percent of them light; in a mechanized brigade - correspondingly 3 to 5 mechanized battalions, 1 or 2 tank battalions, and a battalion of organic missiles.

All army rear services elements should be combined into a rear services brigade, and the rear services of tank (mechanized) brigades -- into a rear services battalion. The rear services have to be deployed on tracked or other vehicles with high cross-country ability. Helicopters have to play the principal role in the supply of nuclear weapons, for which the army has to have a regiment of helicopters (30 units), and about 10 helicopters in a brigade.

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Tank and mechanized brigades have to receive clear and specific tasks in great depth in order to achieve the final goal of the operation.

Notifying troops of their tasks has to be done by short combat orders through technical means of communication, by personal contact, or by delivery to battalions or brigades by airplane, helicopter, or tanks,of situation maps with the assigned mission.

It seems to us that the methods of control of troops stated above will provide the opportunity to plan a battle and operation in a more efficacious manner, and control the troops in a more concrete manner during them.

Only a few general problems regarding organization of control in modern operations are stated here. They can be resolved in greater detail and checked out only during command-staff and troop exercises. For this reason it would be expedient to carry out a series of exercises for the purpose of detailed study and development of problems of troop control, since the methods of troop control that now exist are in need of fundamental review.

Lt.-General of Tank Troops V. Arkhipov

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

29 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Deployment and Forward Movement of a Combined-Arms Army of a Border Military District in the Initial Period of a War", by Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Deployment and Forward Movement of a Combined-Arms Army of a Border Military District in the Initial Period of a War", by Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko

DATE OF INFO: 1961 (Prior to May)

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Deployment and Forward Movement of a Combined-Arms Army of a Border Military District in the Initial Period of a War", written by Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko.

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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The Deployment and Forward Movement of a Combined-Arms Army of a Border Military District in the Initial Period of a War

Lieutenant-General S. Andryushchenko

In the event of the sudden unleashing of a war by the aggressive imperialistic states, and the absence of a threat period, (ugrozhayemyy period) the combined-arms armies of border military districts may find themselves in a difficult situation. The territory on which the troops of an army are dispersed may be subject to enemy nuclear/missile strikes of various yields, to chemical/missile strikes, and also to the use of bacteriological agents.

We have set the goal of studying theoretically insofar as possible, all aspects of the conditions of deployment and forward movement of a combined-arms army in the area of combat operations, and to check out some of the problems in practical troop and command-staff exercises. In addition, we studied the combined-arms army made up of four or five divisions (two or three of them up to strength and the rest in cadre form, or at reduced strength) with a minimum amount of frontal means of reinforcement. The composition of the enemy was taken to correspond with his actual formation, and the probable methods of conducting combat operations in concrete operational directions were taken into consideration.

In the conditions resulting from a sudden attack by the enemy, the nature and scope of the work of field control of an army and of commanding officers and staffs of large units (units) will seem unique. The basic measures of the commander and the staff of an army in this period should be as follows:

- to evaluate thoroughly and in the quickest possible time the apparently serious and complex radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation evolving in the entire area of army deployment; determine the degree of disruption of control and communications, the condition of the troops, their combat effectiveness, security, and losses, the condition of materiel reserves, and communications routes;

- to clarify, without delay, the decision which was made earlier to move the troops forward from their permanent disposition points into areas of concentration, taking into consideration the possibility that these areas are contaminated; to determine, in compliance with the operational assignment of the army, tentatively, the problems of

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constant combat readiness in future operations of large units and units, to utilize all means and methods for the most expeditious method of notifying the troops of the decision;

- to restore the disrupted control of and communications with the large units, units, and senior commander (nachalnik);

- to reestablish disrupted control and communications with the large units, units, and the senior commander;

- to take measures to eliminate the results of an attack by weapons of mass destruction;

- to organize evacuation, dispersal, and replenishment of materiel supplies;

- to determine the order of entrance on duty and processing of those reservists, draftees, and technicians arriving to join large units in cadre form or at decreased strength, taking into consideration the fact that the terrain in the conscription areas and the routes of movement may be strongly contaminated by radioactive or poisonous chemical substances and by bacteriological agents;

- upon receiving the operational directives from the district headquarters, to clarify and execute the plan worked out previously to commit the army troops in the area of combat operations, or, in the case of an abrupt change of circumstances, to work out a plan for regrouping the troops in a new direction; take measures to conclude quickly the preparation of large units and units for a prolonged march, the reconnoitering of the routes of forward movement, reconstruct sections of roads and road structures that were destroyed, organize the commandant's service, combat security, and material-technical support; order full mobilization of the large units and units designated for the formation of secondary echelons in a limited amount of time, or alter the mobilization plans; make a decision regarding the subsequent forward movement of the mobilized large units and units directly behind the troops of the first echelon;

- maintain constant control of the troops.

All the above-listed measures must be carried out simultaneously, within a short period of time, measured in hours, and even in minutes, apparently under circumstances during which considerable losses may have taken place in command complements.

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Upon completion of the first of the indicated measures - evaluation of the radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological situation - we immediately come up against a series of difficulties; it is impossible to overcome these difficulties with the forces and equipment at the disposal of the army, and even of the front. In case the opponent uses weapons of mass destruction first, it is of primary importance to evaluate the situation not only in the areas subjected to the strikes, but to foresee with sufficient clarity the possible contamination of the entire disposition area of the army troops, due to the spread of radioactive and poisonous substances in the direction of the wind. In order to arrive at a practical decision regarding the regrouping and subsequent troop operations, the army commander must quickly receive precise data regarding the number of enemy nuclear strikes, the coordinates of their centers (ground zero), the type and yield of the explosion, and the direction and velocity of the wind at various altitudes in the area of army troop disposition, and in the adjacent areas. Without this data it is impossible to evaluate the radiation situation, even by the analytical-computer method (raschetno-analiticheskiy metod). The instruments for detection of radiation and chemical contamination which are available to the troops are not capable of forecasting radioactive fallout by tracking the various radioactive clouds, and do not permit the determination of a drop in the level of radiation in the contaminated areas. This is a very important problem, as well as one that is very difficult to solve under present conditions.

As we see it, its solution must be realized on a nation-wide scale if we consider that the above-mentioned data will be essential not only for the ground troops, and the armed forces as a whole, but also for enterprises of the national economy and the civilian population.

Apparently it is necessary to set up automatic intersection points (avtomaticheskiye punkty zasechki) for locating nuclear bursts, capable of determining the parameter of the burst, and determine all, or most of the above-mentioned data. These points should be united by analytical-computer centers, where the incoming data are processed, collated, and relayed to the analytical-computer groups of formations, large units, and the command points of PVO of the Country and of civil defense.

In our opinion it is necessary to create analytical-computer groups in the army and in the military district in peacetime, primarily to process and transmit to the troops the data coming in from the

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analytical-computer centers, and also to determine drops in the levels of radiation after certain periods of time, and transmitting them to the troops. In addition, during forward movement and front and army troop operations in enemy territory, they will naturally need their own organic analytical-computer groups, capable of quick and accurate forecasting, and determination of, the radiation situation, at least within the boundaries of the offensive zone of the front and the army, and the nearest adjacent territory. These very groups, in the event that they are relieved, or leave the specific area, have to transmit in written form (dokumentalno) the latest data about all sectors contaminated by radioactivity to the other large units (units), in the same way as all information on mine-fields was transmitted on a form (formulyar) during the last war. The make-up and equipment of the analytical-computer groups still require some thought. However, it is already quite clear that they must have the most modern detection instruments (pribory razvedki) and special machines for reproducing radiation situation maps for the troops. In our opinion, these groups, which consist of operations officers (ofitser operator), chemists, intelligence officers (razvedchik), and topographers, should be headed by the chief of the chemical troops of the front and the army.

The creation of automatic intersection points for locating nuclear bursts and the analytic-computer centers will apparently fall, of necessity, to the system of PVO of the Country, inasmuch as it embraces the entire territory of the country, and the additional introduction of the indicated points and centers will require only a partial improvement on its part. Corresponding analytic-computer groups should be formed under the operational formations. We are convinced that carelessness in the setting of these posts and centers can lead to excessive human losses.

In addition to evaluating the situation in terms of radiation and chemical contamination, it is also necessary to evaluate the bacteriological aspect. The army has no such capability. It is known that almost all bacterial agents have an incubation period from a few hours to tens of days. In this light the great danger that the troops will be subjected to becomes quite evident if the contaminated areas are not identified immediately and excluded from occupation by large units and units. This problem, in our opinion, should also be resolved on a nation wide scale, by creating special antiepidemic detachments under hospitals, clinics, and medical establishments, by bringing in civilian medical cadres and the local population. The personnel must (4 or 5 words missing) training, and the detachments should be supplied with instruments, equipment,

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and transportation.

It is equally important to secure from destruction, primarily by radiation and poisonous substances, the personnel and equipment which is being mobilized and is arriving from the national economy, especially from industrial centers which have been subjected to strikes. It would seem that the ideal situation would be one where the personnel and equipment are directed to the reception centers of the fully mobilizing large units and units along routes which were ascertained by prior reconnaissance to be uncontaminated. However, the terrain will often be so contaminated that it will be difficult to establish such routes. In these circumstances the personnel and equipment will have to proceed, without the means of radiation reconnaissance and antichemical protection, from areas with very high levels of radiation (concentration of poisonous substances-OV) or cross these sectors en route. Naturally the personnel will join the units unfit for combat, or will have received large doses of radiation (contamination). In addition, the lack of recording devices might result in the inability to determine the degree of radiation received.

The way out of such a situation, as we see it, is that a certain part of the antichemical protection equipment should not remain in the warehouses of the large units and units, but should be handed over to institutions, enterprises, and kolkhozes, so that the latter could then issue the equipment to the reservists subject to call at the time of a threat situation or in case of necessity. The reasoning behind the advance transfer of these means is also justified by the principle of deconcentration of materiel supplies.

From our point of view it is necessary to deconcentrate not only the antichemical protection resources and part of the radiation and chemical detection equipment, but also clothing, by having the institutions, enterprises, and kolkhozes issue the latter directly to those subject to military call-up, with the stipulation that the uniforms be kept in special bags at the place of residence.

There need be no apprehension regarding loss or premature use of part of the clothing. Experience shows that storing such supplies in warehouses (bases), which in turn require the maintenance of a large staff and expenditures for upkeep of the building, costs the government sizeable amounts, even if we rule out the possibility of spoilage. Issuing this equipment to persons subject to call-up, and holding them responsible for it, will cost a great deal less. The management personnel of the enterprises (institutions) and the military

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commissariats will periodically check the issued equipment.

The system of hospitalizing irradiated military personnel also warrants attention. It is known that the army does not have adequate hospital facilities for accepting and taking care of irradiated personnel, as will be required for elimination of the consequences of a sudden enemy attack. Apparently it will be necessary to send the casualties to civilian medical establishments. However, the mass of the civilian population that received combined injuries will also be going there, and there might not be any vacancies. This question must be carefully thought out by specialists, and the necessary decision should be made.

In our opinion, it is essential to examine such matters as the maintenance, even in peacetime, of fully staffed chemical protection sub-units in large units of reduced strength. As is known, during full mobilization a division must set up six or seven reception centers for personnel and equipment, and in each one of these, posts for medical and special treatment. Besides, the division, as it is presently staffed, does not have at its disposal the appropriate sub-units, nor are there any under the subordination of the army commander. Practically speaking, a division is not capable of conducting radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance of its own concentration area, and the army commander cannot carry out these measures in the interests of the field command, army units, and in the interests of the army as a whole. There are no means for setting up dosimetric examination of the arriving personnel and equipment that was mobilized from the national economy. We consider it expedient to propose the following:

- besides a chemical protection company, the divisions at constant readiness should have a special treatment company that would be equipped with all the necessary materiel and equipment as one of the motorized rifle companies; the combat readiness of the division will not be decreased by this, and thus, even in peacetime, the cadres will be ready that will subsequently be the backbone in the formation of special antichemical protection sub-units;

- in divisions of decreased strength a chemical protection company should be maintained, composed of a platoon of radiation and chemical reconnaissance and two special treatment platoons, each of the latter setting up a special treatment post; regiments should maintain radiation and chemical reconnaissance platoons comparable in composition to similar platoons in regiments at full strength;

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- in peacetime the army should have a full-strength separate radiation and chemical reconnaissance company and an army chemical-protection battalion, composed of three special treatment companies.

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The combined-arms army of a border military district, deployed at a distance of 900-1000 km from the probable area of military operations during the initial period of war, can make up the second echelon of the front, since the main blow of the enemy ground forces will be absorbed by the troops located in the zone near the front. Consequently the army will receive simultaneously the tasks of fully mobilizing the large units at decreased strength, and at the same time, have the large units at constant readiness execute a forced march to the area of combat operations, with subsequent immediate engagement from the move (from the march).

Because of the possibility that large railroad centers may be put out of commission, and also because of the difficulty in effecting transport, caused by the difference in the gauge of Soviet and West European railroads, it is impossible to depend on railroads alone for the transport of the troops at constant readiness. The execution of a combined march can be accomplished only under more favorable conditions. There is also a possibility of shifting separate large units, especially from the second echelon, after they are brought to full strength, by air, using military air transport. It is most probable that, as a rule, the army will have to carry out a march of 1000 km on its own.

In our opinion, it would be expedient to assign to the army a zone no less than 100-150 km wide for executing the march. In such a zone it would be possible to use up to six to eight routes (two for each division) for troop movement, and two routes for the field command of the army and large units and units, and also to carry out a maneuver during an abrupt change in the direction of movement or in case of destruction of communications bridges and roads.

The march formation of the first echelon of the army may vary according to the number of divisions and routes in the zone of movement. In the beginning of the march (during the first march periods) it is expedient to have columns made up of similar vehicles. Tanks and artillery drawn by tracked vehicles must travel by independent routes. At the end of the march, possibly during the last day's march, depending upon circumstances, the march columns should be formed in such a way that the troops would be ready for instant deployment and commitment to battle. In our opinion, the missile [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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units should follow the forward regiments; they should be moved to the front during the last day's march with suitable protection, and should then follow the advance guard of the forward regiments.

As a result of experience gained from training, we have concluded that a series of prescribed norms is subject to review appropriate to the demands of the initial phase of the war. Thus, a march of 900-1000 km, using our existing vehicles, equipped with additional fuel capacity, can be executed in four march periods: the first of 300-350 km, the second of 200-250 km, the third up to 250 km, the fourth up to 150 km. It would be expedient to execute the last march period at night.

In the situation under review, we feel that it would be expedient to call halts as follows: short (up to one hour long) - after every 4 to 5 hours of movement, long (not over 3 hours long) - after 8 to 10 hours of movement. During the last march period (at night) there should be a short halt only - of 1 to 2 hours' duration. Personnel should have a rest period after each march period of 8 to 10 hours.

In order to maintain minimum vulnerability to destruction by nuclear weapons, to insure maximum speed of movement and execution of maneuvers when bypassing contaminated sectors and various obstacles, it is expedient to maintain a distance of 50 m. between vehicles, 3 to 4 km. between battalions, and 5 to 7 km between regiments. Distances between companies (batteries) should be the same as between vehicles, because the prescribed distance of 100 m. only increases the total depth of the column, and as a rule is not maintained in actual troop movements.

Traffic control lines should be set up after 4 to 5 hours of movement, i.e., to have no more than two in each day's march. Setting up a greater number of control lines is not advantageous, because this limits, up to a point, the initiative of the commanders of large units and units, and eliminates the possibility of moving the column at increased rates of speed in sectors where the roads are of better quality, even if the routes of march are made available to the army for definite periods of time.

The commandant's service has the leading role in ensuring organized and timely transfer of troops. Careful study shows that during long marches the organization of the commandant's service presents certain difficulties, and the recommendations contained in the Manual of Commandant's Service, published back in 1953, does not completely fulfil modern requirements. The situation is made worse

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by the fact that the army actually has no personnel or equipment in the table of organization for setting up a commandant's service, and the district commandant's service will not be deployed yet by the beginning of a march. In our opinion the tasks that the commandant's service is responsible for during a march by the troops in the initial stages of war, far exceed those in the above-mentioned Manual.

We fully share the viewpoint of Marshal of the Soviet Union M.S. Zakharov, expressed by him in the article "The Traffic Control Support of Modern Operations"[1] (O dorozhnom obespechenii sovremennykh operatsiy) for the organization of traffic control areas, their problems, and the forces and equipment that can be brought in.

However, we consider that it is possible to examine this matter in greater detail, under conditions of the execution of a long march by the army immediately after a sudden attack by the enemy. In our opinion, the commandant's service is confronted by the following problems in these circumstances: to maintain the established order during the movement of troops, to protect them from enemy air attack, to prepare bypasses and alternate routes for carrying out the maneuver, to assist in the elimination of the effects of an enemy nuclear or chemical attack (evacuation and deactivation of equipment and weapons; special treatment of personnel; repair damaged sections of roads and road structures) and to ensure troop control.

The composition of the army commandant's areas and the division commandant sectors should include motorized-rifle units and sub-units, antiaircraft defense, engineering, chemical, communications, special treatment and medical sub-units, and means for evacuating equipment.

The establishing of army commandant's areas and sectors eliminates the dispersal of forces and equipment along the entire route, and permits their concentration in sectors of special importance, depending on the presence of natural barriers. It would be expedient to set up individual, radio-equipped commandant's posts along the remaining sectors of the routes.

It is best to set up army commandant's areas in the more dangerous and difficult sections of the routes, where natural barriers block the entire forward movement zone of the army. The area commandant must be given a wide range of authority. All the commanders,

1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"... /remainder of footnote missing/. Headquarters Comment: This journal is not identical with the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought".

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staffs, and troops passing through the commandant's area must execute the commandant's orders implicitly, and he, in turn, has full responsibility for the successful passage of the troops through a given sector of the route. In connection with this, one of the army deputy commanders should be appointed commandant of the army area, and the commandant of the division sectors should be one of the deputy division commanders.

The organization of a service in a commandant's sector of a division requires varying amounts of forces and equipment in each case. Generally speaking, for the movement route of a division, a total of up to three motorized-rifle battalions can be activated; these will be reinforced by the necessary engineering, chemical, and other sub-units, which are relieved of commandant's service duties when the division approaches the area of combat operations, or when they are replaced by forces-and equipment of the front.

Briefly, on the organization of control and communications during the march. In our opinion, in order to ensure troop control during a combat alert, it is necessary to set up, in the army, a forward command post (PKP), a command post (KP), and a reserve command post (ZKP) - the second echelon of the field command. It is not advisable to set up a rear area control point (TPU) before the field command and communications units are set up according to the wartime T/O. The officers of the rear services are located at the command post and the reserve command post. In the divisions at constant readiness, forward command posts, command posts, and rear area control points are set up; only command posts and rear area control points are set up in divisions that need further mobilization.

The forward command post, with the chief of the operations department in charge, must begin an immediate forward movement to the army departure line (into the area where the division at constant readiness is deployed), where he will control troop commitment. The command post and the reserve command post remain in the concentration areas where they were at the time of the alert. During the period when the forward command post moves forward, communications with the troops and the district staff are carried on from the command post. The army commander, with a group of generals and officers from the forward command post staff (four or five persons), remains at the command post in order to make decisions and assign tasks to the troops, but by the time that the troops of the first echelon begin to march he must be at the forward command post. The command post begins the forward movement from the concentration area during an alert only after the troops have been assigned their tasks. The reserve command post supervises mobilization and formation of new units from its

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concentration area at the alert.

En route the forward command post moves along with the main forces of the division, deploys and sets up communications with the troops, the command post, and the headquarters of the front during halts and in rest areas. The command post of the army moves by bounds and deploys in spots that ensure the use of permanent lines of communications with the headquarters of the front, the forward command post, and the troops. The duration of the halts will be determined in each case by the time necessary to receive a situation report from the troops, transmitting orders to the latter, and reporting to the higher headquarters. Shifting the command post of the army in this manner may result in its lagging as much as 100 km. behind the troops and the forward command post. In order to avoid this during a march made in separate sectors, the command post and the forward command post must be on the move simultaneously, but for periods not to exceed 2 hours, due to the necessity of maintaining constant communications with the higher headquarters and the troops. After each march period the control points are placed in the area of dispoeition of the troops.

It is also expedient to have a forward command post and a command post within divisions on the march. They must move along separate routes and at a distance which ensures stable communications with each other.

Certain difficulties are encountered in ensuring communications during long marches. In order to conceal the troop movements, the radio nets of the marching troops cannot be used, and the permanent communications lines, even those on the territory of the Socialist Camp countries, may not be entirely familiar to the communication units of the army. These circumstances compel the use of commandant's service radiocommunications and mobile means, above all, helicopters. Radio stations of the commandant's service network are set up along specific lines. These stations operate by means of rebroadcast or relay of radio signals. As each unit passes a line, a pre-arranged signal is transmitted over the radio, which is duplicated by all the other stations and is received simultaneously by the control points of the division and army. The signals must be of a one-way type, without call letters or coded service phrases. During the first 24-hour march, radio communications of the commandant's service are organized using shortwave stations, during the second and third, ultra-short wave is used, and for the last day's march, communications are carried on with the assistance of radio-relay stations.

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In carrying out a long march it must also be taken into consideration that the troops may suffer losses from the enemy weapons of mass destruction, and in some cases entire sub-units and even units may be put out of action. This is particularly pertinent in cases when the personnel receive large doses of radiation. In these conditions a new problem arises - replacement of personnel losses right during the march. The equipment not affected by the shockwave which belongs to the radiation-contaminated sub-units and units, can be used after decontamination. It would seem that in peacetime plans, provisions should be made to provide for the formation of sub-units and units (of the march company and battalion type) at the district level that could be shifted by air to the formations carrying out the march, and which could be used later as replacements for losses sustained during combat conditions.

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The conditions under which a combined-arms army of a border military district that is moving forward from the depth is committed to combat, will always be determined by the nature of the combat operations carried out by the first-echelon troops of the front during the first days of the war, and it is rather difficult to predetermine them in advance. It is most probable that the army will be committed to combat directly from the march, and this is always attended by great difficulties and a series of peculiarities which require detailed study.

First of all, about the work of commanders and staffs in these conditions. It is apparent that the commander and the staff of the army will get the order from the front to commit the army to combat while moving (marching) at a distance of 250 km, or more, from the front line. Therefore the clarification of the mission, evaluation of the situation, making of the decision, planning, and informing the large units of the tasks will all be done in a very limited period of time, en route, without halting. Otherwise the commanders and the staffs may straggle behind the troops and lose control.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that at the present time the staff field equipment does not ensure operation on the march. Even the T/O of the commander of an army does not have an equipped mobile control point capable of ensuring operation and control of troops in a movement over a long distance. The creation from the forces and equipment of the troops of improvised mobile command posts, and the equipping of buses and GAZ-69 vehicles for operating in field conditions has indeed helped consfderably in cutting down the amount

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of cumbersome equipment at the control points, and has made them more mobile, but it involves great expenditures, and does not basically solve the problem. The means of radio communication remain the same, and the cross-country ability of the automobile chassis does not conform to modern requirements.

While planning the commitment of the army to combat, and the carrying out of offensive operations in the entire depth, commanders and staffs must simultaneously define in detail the remaining segment of the march, taking into consideration the commitment of large units into combat and the conduct by them of an offensive, to inform the troops of the change in the plan of march, to control the troops continuously, to organize and maintain constantly coordination with the large units operating ahead, ensure replenishment of materiel supplies and fuel expended in the march, and to carry out reconnaissance of the enemy.

According to experience gained from the war games carried out in our army, it would be expedient to organize the work of the commanders and staffs in similar situations in the following manner:

Beforehand, when the army commander receives the district operational directive to march, he sends out an operational group to one of the headquarters operating ahead of the troops in the direction that the army is moving forward; their mission is to constantly provide information about the situation in the area of combat operations. The group should consist of five or six persons (officer-operator, intelligence officer, artilleryman, communications officer, chemical officer) and also a squad of radiation and chemical reconnaissance. It follows [one line missing] of operations and methods of transmitting information must be planned beforehand, in peacetime.

Inasmuch as the army does not have an air transport capability for distances of 900-1000 km, the operational group must move in motor vehicles, and the latter must move at a speed of up to 60 km per hour. Moving twice as fast as the army troops, the operational group will transmit the first information about the situation from the area of combat operations, at the time when the troops moving forward will be halfway to the concentration area, or the line of deployment. Moving along one of the basic routes, the operational group will be able to determine the condition of the route, and after arriving at the destination - can fully reconnoiter the area of command post disposition, and determine the presence of radioactive and poisonous substances and bacteriological agents. The

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organization of communications with the operational group must be thought out in detail, utilizing intermediate radio stations, communications of the front, of the commandant's service, and, with the approach of the troops, mobile equipment.

When he receives directives to commit the army to combat, the army commander will make his decision by consulting the map. The army command post, headed by the chief of staff, must transmit the missions to the large units and control the forward movement of the troops, and with the forward command post the commander and the commanders of the large units move forward to the line of commitment to battle, in order to clarify the situation, organize coordination with the troops operating ahead, resolve the questions of support of commitment to battle, and possibly to change the original decision. The forward command post of the army must plan the operation quickly, resolve the questions of coordination and supply, and together with the forward command posts of the large units, assume control of the arriving troops. In connection with this, the forward command post must be very efficient, small in number, highly mobile, and must have adequate numbers of means of communications with the troops, the headquarters of the front, and of adjacent units.

The scope of work of the commanders and staffs under similar conditions requires detailed study, and a unified method of supervision and control must be worked out. Many are of the opinion that all these problematical questions should be formalized by the General Staff in official instructions or in a manual. We are of a different opinion. It is impossible to foresee all cases and possible variants under which the army may be committed to combat from the second echelon of a front, and to incorporate operating procedures in one official manual. It would be more beneficial to study similar problems constantly, check them out as much as possible during training exercises, and publish them as discussions. This method develops deep thinking and increases the general military outlook of the commanders and staffs.

It is another matter to resolve in a centralized manner questions regarding establishing a materiel base for command, communications, and technical support of commanders, staffs, and troops, with modern means of control. For instance, the critical need arises for the commanders of armies and large units to have mobile control points equipped with the newest, small, long-range radio stations, ensuring secure conversations without resorting to numerous conversation and signal codes. In the operations department of the army there should be a computer capable of quickly producing the data needed for the

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evaluation of the situation (above all the radiation situation) and arrive at a decision. A squadron of helicopters should be made a part of the army field command T/O, to implement troop control, for conducting radiation, chemical, and engineer reconnaissance, and for fulfilling other important tasks.

Another problem which needs to be solved is the method of recording the degree of radioactive contamination of the personnel. The commanding officer of a sub-unit cannot keep a written record for each soldier, especially during the frequent transfer of personnel from one sub-unit to another, and especially after hospitalization. It is apparently necessary to issue to personnel, individual, miniaturized devices of the "pencil" type, with coded indicators; this will exclude the possibility of independent reading of the radiation dosage received by the personnel themselves, but will permit the commanding officers to determine the true meaning of these doses with the aid of a corresponding decoding device (one to a company).

It is known that modern conditions for conducting a battle and an operation demand exceptional speed and maneuverability by commanders and staffs. Therefore it is necessary, even now, to change radically their style of work. Up to this time the staffs are producing many combat documents. Even though in the past few years they have eliminated some of the written documents, these same documents are now being worked out on maps, and often duplicate each other; this takes even more of the staff officers' time than before. Frequently the work of a staff is judged by the number of documents produced. This explains the fact that in all exercises a large number of additional officers is taken from the troops for work in the staff. As yet the troops do not have staff field service instructions which fulfil modern requirements. This also appears to be one of the reasons for a series of shortcomings in staff work.

The questions that we have raised call for thorough study during command-staff exercises, war games, and during the buildup of large units to wartime strength.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions on the Theory of Military Art", by Colonel-General I. Gusakovskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions on the Theory of Military Art", by Colonel-General I. Gusakovskiy

DATE OF INFO: October 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Documentary

SOURCE: A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Some Questions on the Theory of Military Art", by Colonel-General I. Gusakovskiy.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article referred to on page 2 was disseminated as [redacted] and the article referred to on page 6 was disseminated as [redacted] The first article referred to on page 9 was disseminated as [redacted] and the second article referred to on page 9 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4)

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Some Questions on the Theory of Military Art

by

Colonel-General I. Gusakovskiy

In the pages of the first and second issues of the Special Collection, a sharp and fundamental controversy has developed concerning the most important questions of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Of particular interest are the contributions of those authors who raise new problems relating to the nature of modern warfare, the methods of conducting armed combat, the use in it of the various types of armed forces, etc. As a matter for discussion, we consider it necessary to express our opinion on a number of questions raised in the article of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich.[1]

The first question concerns the length of a future war. As is known, General A. Gastilovich advocates the idea of a "blitzkrieg", determining the direction of our military development in accordance with this. In his opinion we have "no need to fear the term 'blitzkrieg' just because this concept was compromised by the experience of past world wars. Under the conditions of nuclear war only 'blitz' operations can promise victory." With this basic argument in defense of the theory of "blitzkrieg", General A. Gastilovich cites the availability in the armament of modern armies of nuclear/missile weapons, by means of which entire countries can be put out of a war in its first days. This situation, as the article indicates, "will hardly evoke enthusiasm in the remaining countries for its prolongation." Therefore, the author concludes, "he who has withstood the first strikes, must and can conclude the war rapidly if he prepares his armed forces properly in peacetime."

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", /First Issue, 1960/

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Proceeding from the considerations cited above, General A. Gastilovich suggests a rather simple "concept of conducting initial operations under conditions of the European Theater". According to this concept a powerful retaliatory nuclear strike with weapons of megaton yield is launched at the beginning with the aim of putting two or three NATO countries out of the war. Following this, ground troop operations are developed which mop up the remaining enemy forces and occupy enemy countries. To conduct such operations, in the opinion of the author, not more than 30 to 40 divisions will be required. The concept indicated, "to the same degree, with certain corrections for geographical conditions, can also be applied in other theaters". In short, the substance of war in the concept of General A. Gastilovich boils down to border engagements of the opposing sides with a subsequent unimpeded advance of our troops onto the territory of the enemy.

In our opinion, such a point of view on the nature of armed combat does not conform to modern reality. We realize perfectly clearly that a future war unleashed by an aggressor against the Soviet Union will inevitably become a world war between the two contending social systems of the world. The basic means of waging the war will undoubtedly be nuclear/missile weapons, and the theater of military operations will be the entire globe. Therefore, it would be naive to think that such a war between coalitions of countries possessing tremendous military-economic power can be concluded by a "blitzkrieg", with one strike. It will be, without doubt, an intense, hard, and exceptionally fierce war with decisive political and military objectives. This is the kind of war for which we must prepare our armed forces in order to ensure the security of our Homeland.

One may ask, is it correct under these conditions to orient the military leadership toward a "blitzkrieg"? In our opinion, it is not correct. The theory of a "blitzkrieg" is calculated for a weak enemy, incapable of withstanding nuclear/missile strikes and continuing the war after huge materiel losses and human casualties. One cannot approach the evaluation of our probable enemy with such a yardstick. We must proceed, first of all, from the fact that in a future world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, we will have to fight against the coalition of a strong enemy who has at his disposal all the modern means

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of combat and who is capable of recovering after the first nuclear/missile strikes are inflicted on him. To count on victory over such an enemy by a "blitzkrieg" is not to take into account the real relative strengths and potentialities of the opposing sides, but is to underestimate the aggressor. This is very dangerous. The stern lessons of history oblige us to prepare in the most serious manner for a hard and long war against a strong and crafty enemy. This, of course, does not mean that the third world war will necessarily assume a protracted character. Modern means of combat permit gaining victory over the aggressor in relatively short periods of time, for which we will strive. It may be that this war will in fact assume a fast-moving "blitz" character. However, this is improbable. The interests of assuring the security of our Homeland demand from us that in building the Soviet Armed Forces, we do not go to extremes and do not nourish the illusion of victory by "blitzkrieg" operations, but that we prepare in earnest for a protracted and hard war.

As is known, the theory of "blitzkrieg" is not new. It failed completely in the Second World War. Today it is advocated by various Western military figures who threaten to destroy the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries in a few hours. In this, these theoreticians rely basically on a sudden strike by nuclear/missile weapons. However, they do not allow for the fact that the Socialist Camp cannot only withstand the initial nuclear strikes of the aggressor, but can also give him the necessary reply. N. S. Khrushchev stated this well in his speech at the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

"Let us assume, however, that some country or group of countries could successfully prepare and execute a surprise attack on a power possessing nuclear and missile weapons. But, even supposing for a minute that the attacking side could successfully execute a surprise strike, could it really immediately put out of action all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and all missile equipment installations of the power suffering the attack? Of course not. The country suffering the surprise attack, if it is understood that the discussion concerns a sufficiently large country, will always have the potential to duly repulse the aggressor".

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It is perfectly clear to us which countries N. S. Khrushchev had in mind. Apparently our enemies are also taking this situation into account, since in their camp voices are heard more and more persistently denouncing 'blitzkrieg", demanding a renunciation of the strategy of so-called "massive retaliation" and a switch to the creation and preparation of reserves of all types for the possible conduct of a long and protracted war.

On what basis must we glorify the idea of "blitzkrieg", which has been condemned by history, and elevate it to the rank of a theory which points the way of further development of the armed forces? In our opinion, the presence in armament of strategic nuclear/missile weapons still does not give us a sufficient basis to assert that the third world war will have the character of a "blitzkrieg." To propagate the idea of "blitzkrieg" under our conditions is not only dangerous but is also harmful, insofar as it disorients the military leadership in the building of the armed forces and in securing the defensive capability of our Homeland.

The second question concerns the numerical strength of the armed forces. The thought runs through the article of General A. Gastilovich that "for direct combat operations at the front neither in the beginning of the war nor during its course will such numerous ground armed forces be needed as was the case in previous wars?" The author believes that in a future war engagements of multimillion-man armed forces are excluded, and that victorious war can be waged with the forces of small, technically highly equipped armies.

To support his statements, the author advances the following arguments: 1) In modern war "nothing will arrive from the depth of the country in time", so it is impossible to build up forces in initial operations with fully mobilized large units. 2) The forces of the enemy remaining after the first nuclear strikes are inflicted cannot be numerous, and a numerically large army is not needed to crush them. Proceeding from these considerations, General A. Gastilovich proposes, for the conduct of initial operations in the European theater of military operations, to have a small number of various divisions (within the bounds of 30 to 40), organizationally represented by two fronts of 15 to 20 divisions each.

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We cannot agree with such conclusions of the author on the numerical strength of armed forces in modern war. Their unsoundness is convincingly shown by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov in his article (Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" /Second Issue, 1960/), with which we are in complete agreement on this question. It seems to us that the judgments of General A. Gastilovich on the numerical strength of armed forces are an attempt to revive the well-known theory of waging war by the forces of small armies. Similar ideas have often been expressed in the foreign press, but they have not found practical application in the past, and do not find it today. Our enemies, as is known, are preparing for the deployment of rather significant ground, air, and naval forces in a future war and it would be a grave error for us to orient ourselves on waging war with small armies.

A future war, as we have already emphasized, is a world war between two powerful coalitions of states hostile to each other because of their social structures, it is a war of multi-million-man armies with numerous and complex combat equipment. As opposed to previous wars, a nuclear/missile war will be characterized by a still greater spatial scope, when in the literal sense of the word there will be no difference between the front and rear of a country, when the territory of countries will be turned into theaters of military operations. For conducting such a war, massive armed forces will be required, still larger than was the case in past wars. And this is completely natural, because the involvement in war of a large number of countries, the hugh spatial scope of armed combat, and also the necessity for recovering from heavy losses will inescapably lead to the quantitative growth of the warring armies, to a still greater degree than was the case in the past.

In our opinion, we should prepare our armed forces for just such a war. This, of course, does not mean that we must increase our army in peacetime. The defensive power of our country, N. S. Khrushchev indicated, is determined not by how many soldiers we have under arms or by how many people wear soldiers' overcoats, but by the firepower of our armed forces. At present, the Soviet Army possesses such combat means as to permit not only withstanding the probable enemy in case of attack, but also to strike back as

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necessary. Under these conditions, a reduction in the numerical strength of the army will not prevent us from maintaining the defensive capability of our Homeland at the necessary level. Therefore, guided by the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union is significantly reducing its armed forces on a unilateral basis, paving the way for an easing of the international situation and the strengthening of peace in the entire world. N. S. Khrushchev spoke of the reasons for the further reductions in our armed forces sufficiently convincingly at the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. However, in reducing the numerical strength of the army, we do not at all count on waging war with small armies in the event that we are attacked. For conducting a victorious war, a significant increase in the armed forces and the deployment of a multimillion-man army will undoubtedly be needed. From these positions it is necessary to decide the questions of our further military development.

The third question concerns the methods of conducting military operations. The high degree to which troops are technically equipped, and the appearance in the armament of armies of nuclear/missile weapons undoubtedly introduces much that is new into the methods of conducting war. First of all, the role and assignment of various types of armed forces and arms of troops in wartime is substantially changed. A decisive role in modern war will be played by the missile troops, especially those armed with strategic missiles, and also by missile weapons of the other types of armed forces. At the same time, conventional types of armament will find wide application in war. Only by the combined efforts of all types of armed forces and means of combat can the assigned goals of a war be attained.

It is perfectly obvious that nuclear/missile weapons dictate a new approach to the conduct of both offense and defense. However, in the investigation of this question, one should not go to extremes for the sake of trying to find something new in military affairs. Thus, General A. Gastilovich asserts that "in the training of troops, it is necessary to reject decisively the cultivation of the principle of breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defenses" insofar as this "has ceased

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to be the primary form of offensive actions, having yielded to meeting engagements and envelopment." We cannot agree with this assertion of the author.

In our view, breakthrough of the enemy's defenses remains as a type of offensive action under conditions of a nuclear/missile war, although it will not be executed in the same manner as in World War II. While in the past it was essential to concentrate a large number of forces and weapons to execute the breakthrough from a position of direct contact, and to conduct the offensive itself on the entire front and in close formations, in order to effect a breakthrough of prepared defenses under modern conditions this question will be solved differently. The primary means of breakthrough is now nuclear/missile weapons, with which the enemy's defenses can be broken to the entire depth in short periods of time and by subsequent swift operations of troops from the rear they can be broken through with a rush and the rout of the opposing grouping completed. In our opinion, the swift breakthrough of defense subsequent to nuclear strikes will be the basic content of offensive operations. Moreover, the offensive itself, as opposed to past wars, will be conducted in separate areas, at high tempos and with wide use of airborne troops and transport of troops by air.

It is quite clear that under conditions of a war of maneuver, meeting battles (engagements) with the enemy's reserves will occur very often, and also the execution of enveloping maneuver of troops with the aim of emerging at a considerable depth in the enemy's positions and capturing his most important areas (installations). Therefore, in training troops in peacetime it is essential to prepare them both for the precipitous breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defenses and for meeting engagements. To reject the mastering of the methods of breakthrough of the enemy's prepared defenses in the training of troops, as General A. Gastilovich proposes, means to consciously ruin the field training of troops and to lower their combat readiness.

Advancing the thesis that meeting engagements are the basic form of offensive operations, the author proceeds from the considerations that modern defense must be based "on the same methods of

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operation as offensive operations, i. e., on heated meeting battles and engagements." In other words, in the opinion of General A. Gastilovich, the operational methods of troops in both defensive and offensive operations will be identical. Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov arrives at approximately the same conclusion, declaring that under conditions of nuclear/missile warfare the distinctions between an operational offensive and operational defense are obliterated.[1] Consequently, says General A. Gastilovich, in the formation of operational defense one must reject the creation of defensive zones "because they do not justify their designation" and relegate the very term "stable defense" to the archives.

We cannot agree with such a definition of operational defense and operational offense: On this question we completely share the opinion of General of the Army P. Kurochkin, as stated in his article.[2]

Without doubt, linear defense along entire fronts has departed to the realm of the past. Its place will be taken, apparently, by highly maneuvered, swift defensive battles and engagements of a heated nature. The decisive role in defense will be played by nuclear/missile weapons which permit the defenders to disrupt completely the enemy's offensive and to assume the offensive quickly in their turn with the aim of completely routing the enemy. In this case, troop operations will most closely resemble an offensive against an enemy who has hastily turned to the defense, and in some cases also meeting battles (engagements).

The rejection of positional forms of combat in defense does not at all signify a denial of the firm retention of important areas and installations in the direction in which the enemy's offensive is

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

[2] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Second Issue, 1960.

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expected. It appears to us that under the conditions of nuclear/missile war, also, the structure of the defense, and accordingly, of groupings of troops, must answer the problem of retaining the basic areas of terrain in the probable directions of the enemy's offensive. In the interests of fulfilling this mission, nuclear strikes, troop maneuver and counterattacks and counterstrikes must be planned. We apply this proposition to tactical as well as to operational defense. Therefore, it seems to us that it is still too early to relegate the term "stable defense" to the archives. On the contrary, nuclear/missile weapons give it a new content, directed at attaining important results in defense that neither artillery nor aviation could give in the past. In this connection, neither is it possible to equate defense and offense. These two types of combat operations of troops differ in principle from one another not by the amount of nuclear weapons, as General A. Gastilovich stated, but by their goals and methods.

A few words about the planning of missile operations. General A. Gastilovich proposes the conduct of two types of missile operations by the missile formations of the VGK (Supreme High Command): operations with the aim of completely destroying the enemy's country and putting it out of the war, and operations in support of the ground troops. Missile operations of the first type must precede operations of the second type and subsequently be conducted parallel to them. In accordance with this, in the opinion of the author, among the missile formations of the VGK it is essential to have missile formations to carry out the mission of putting entire countries out of the war, and formations designated for operations in support of several fronts conducting operations in one strategic axis.

It appears to us that there is no necessity to plan the above-named two types of missile operations and, by the same token, there is no need to create corresponding missile formations for this. In our opinion, one missile operation must already be planned and prepared in peacetime with the mission of destroying the enemy's nuclear weapons, damaging his economic potential, disrupting the various types of transportation, and crushing his grouping of ground troops in the theater of impending operations of our troops. This mission

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can be fulfilled simultaneously by one and the same missile formations of the VGK, together with the missile means of the fronts conducting operations on a given strategic axis. It is possible that under certain conditions it will be necessary to conduct an independent missile operation with the aim of completely destroying the economic potential of one of the enemy countries and putting it out of the war. But for this, the same VGK missile formations which will subsequently conduct operations in support of ground troops can be used. It is therefore inadvisable to separate the missile formations of the VGK artificially into two groups.

In conclusion, we wish to note that we welcome with great interest the publication of the Special Collection and the participation in it of authors who express their thoughts and proposals freely on extremely important problems of military theory. There is no doubt that the creation of this Collection will promote the further development of Soviet military art.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops of a Front (Army)", by Major-General M. Ivanov
(1961 1st Issue)

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops of a Front (Army)", by Major-General M. Ivanov

DATE OF INFO: Early 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops of a Front (Army)", by Major-General M. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops of a Front (Army)

by

Major-General M. Ivanov

The first issues of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" correctly state the problem concerning a review of the postulates of the theory of strategy, operational art, and tactics in light of the revolutionary changes which have come about in the realm of armament from the moment when nuclear weapons and missiles appeared on the scene. In the interests of the further development of military theory, we must decisively reject attempts to adapt old forms and methods of conducting military operations to new conditions, and we must work out comprehensively and profoundly the problems of modern combat and operations and the structure of the organizations pertaining to them, including the control organs.

As is known, the organizational structure of staffs is directly dependent upon methods of conducting combat operations and of equipping troops with the means of combat. At the present time, significant changes have taken place in armament, combat equipment, the nature of operations, and the methods of their conduct. Consequently, there should have been a corresponding change in the organization of staffs. However, this has not come about and in fact our operational organs of control, from the organizational standpoint, still remain at the level of the staffs of the World War II period.

In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of troop direction, the organization of operational staffs must, in our view, at least correspond to the following requirements:

--to ensure a capability for constant control of the readiness of missiles, aircraft, and nuclear warheads and of the location and movement of all objectives of nuclear attack;

--to preclude any lack of coordination in the actions of commanders of arms of troops and services; commanders of troops of the front (army) must work jointly with their immediate

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subordinates in one place, controlling and coordinating their actions; chiefs of directorates and services must decide all problems together, and not in isolation from one another;

--to eliminate disunity in the processing of data concerning a situation; all information must be concentrated in one place, in one organ so that it can be immediately available to the commander of troops of the front (army);

--to unify control of the weapons of destruction;

--to promote sufficient viability in the control organs.

At the present time, the organizational structure of operational staffs is based on the same division of labor and distribution of functions in the staff as existed many years ago. In this connection, now as in the past, a great number of elements takes part in implementing control of the troops of a front: combined-arms staff with many independent directorates (departments), the artillery staff, the air army staff, the PVO staff, the engineer directorate and others. In their work, all these elements depend upon one another and are constantly forced to coordinate their actions. If these organs are located at separate control points, coordination of their actions, even in accomplishing simple tasks, seriously hampers the work of the front (army) staff and leads to an extremely great loss of time.

Consider, for example, the planning of operations. As is known, the staffs of all the arms of troops, special troops, and services take part in this process together with the staff of the front (army), and the planning is carried out on a broad scale. But despite this, it still is a single, centralized process. Although they act on behalf of the common goal of the operation, all services and arms of troops work disconnectedly. As a consequence, planning breaks down: the operational plan is worked out in one place by one organ, the plan for the combat use of missiles and the artillery is worked out by another organ in another place, the plan for the combat use of aviation is worked out by a third organ in a third place, etc. Because all these plans are closely tied in with one another and require constant coordination during their working out, the planning of operations extends over a long period of time.

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This principle of planning was tolerable as long as the factor of time did not play such a decisive role in the control of troops as it does at the present time.

The dynamic nature of operations and the striving of the opposing sides to seize the initiative will lead to one form of combat operations rapidly transforming into another without significant pauses. Those prolonged periods of preparation of operations, which now take place in our conduct of all types of training exercises, will vanish. Under these conditions, it is natural that staffs will be required to coordinate and execute an entire complex of complicated measures, which must be planned in short periods of time. Decisions must be implemented on a broad coordinated front, and very rapidly. Consequently, an urgent need arises to speed up and improve the process of planning. It seems to us, that in order to resolve this problem, it is advisable to have a single planning center in the composition of the field command of a front (army).

We carry out the direction of troops and the control of weapons of destruction in much the same manner as the planning of operations. At present, on the scale of a front, the combat operations of combined-arms large units (tank and motorized rifle troops) are under the immediate direction of the staff of the front (army), while the weapons of destruction are in the hands of the chief of the missile troops and artillery and his staff, of the commander and staff of the air army, of the chief of the PVO troops, and of the chief of the chemical troops. This situation also leads to great inconvenience in the control of troops and does not promote increased effectiveness in the work of the control organs.

We consider that unification of the functions of the direction of troops and the control of the weapons of destruction may prove to be not only beneficial but even extremely necessary.

In the work of the staffs, the rapid collection, processing and transmission of information materials to command echelons and troops become especially important. Today, it is extremely important to know at all times the exact location of all forces and weapons and their condition and readiness to fulfil combat tasks. For this reason, it is necessary that the staffs sharply reduce the time for processing information.

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However, the existing system for the collection of data on a situation is multi-staged. Information material, as formerly, is transmitted successively from one echelon to another: the regimental staff transmits information to the division staff, which transmits it to the army staff; it is only the army staff which informs the front staff of the situation. All directorates (departments), services and arms of troops engage in the collection of information at the scale of the front (army). Therefore, information on the situation is scattered among them. After reaching the front command post, the data on a situation are first studied and collated in the staffs of the arms of troops and the services, then they are reported and re-reported to various chiefs, and only after this are they reported to the commander. In order to have a complete picture of a situation, the front (army) staff and particularly the operations directorate (department), in addition to receiving information directly from subordinate staffs, is obliged to collect situation data from the staffs of arms of troops and from the services. Coming from various sources, many of these data are incomplete and contradictory, do not coincide in time, and require rechecking and clarification.

All this creates excessive red tape within the staff and finally leads to the fact that the collected and processed situation data do not correspond to the true troop situation at any given moment. In the army staff, the data lag behind by 1 or 2 hours, and in the front staff by 2 or 3 hours. The commander is deprived of the capability to influence the course of an operation in time, and often makes decisions according to a situation which, in reality, no longer exists.

In addition, the content of the information received by each service and arm of troops has much in common, and the requests for these data by various consumers create an extremely heavy load on subordinate staffs, upset them, and tear them away from the solution of other important and complex problems unnecessarily.

The necessity for all services and all staffs of arms of troops to collect information, which stems directly from the organization of the control organs, leads to the overloading of lines of communication, necessitates supplementary channels, and involves an increase in the expenditure of communications resources at control points; this in turn makes the staffs more cumbersome and less mobile. It should also be noted that all inquiries and reports on the situation and the operations of the troops are still made by means of message and radio signal codes, which greatly delays the collection and processing of information.

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It is perfectly obvious that such an information system has completely outlived its usefulness. In order to ensure rapid reactions by the command echelon and the staffs to a situation, it is necessary to centralize the collection and processing of information data. All information must be concentrated in one organ and be put on an overall map or screen. However, this can be done only after an appropriate reorganization of the control organs.

Intelligence should be considered separately. New demands are also being made on it, particularly on the process of collecting and processing data on the enemy. Carefully organized and unceasing intelligence work has become the guarantee of timely detection of enemy preparations for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Today, as never before, the combat readiness of troops and their ability to conduct successfully combat operations depend on intelligence operations. The fulfilment of all the tasks assigned to intelligence demands an even greater centralization of its resources, single control, and firmer direction. Without this, intelligence organs will hardly be able to play their part.

Even though this is obvious, the intelligence organs and their forces and means are still disconnected from the organizational standpoint. On the scale of a front, not only the intelligence directorate, but also the artillery staff, the air army staff, the engineer directorate, the chemical staff and others are engaged in intelligence. A similar situation exists in the staff of the army and in the staffs of large units. All these intelligence organs frequently work on their own, on behalf of only that arm of troops which they are called upon to serve, and if some of the information obtained by them does become the property of all the troops, it reaches them only after a very great delay.

It is completely understandable that such an organization of intelligence organs cannot, under modern conditions, ensure a high degree of effectiveness in the receipt of intelligence data. The role of this service has grown to such an extent that there is a direct necessity to combine all these organs into a single independent intelligence center, directly subordinate to the commander of troops of the front, and having all the means of intelligence at its disposal.

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Therefore, under the existing organization of the field command of a front (army), the efforts of all its elements are disunited; this gives rise to frequent confusion in the operations of various arms of troops, complicates coordination of the efforts of the various means of combat, and creates great difficulty in the rapid assignment of their combat missions.

In order to eliminate these shortcomings, and to ensure stable control of troops on the scale of a front (army), it is necessary to centralize drastically the direction of troop combat operations. The organizational structure of operational staffs must be changed correspondingly.

It appears to us that from the standpoint of centralization of the control of troops and weapons of destruction, the reorganization of control organs must proceed by way of unification of all the directorates (departments) and staffs of the arms of troops and services which are concerned with the direction of troops into single control centers.

In accordance with this, it is advisable, in our opinion, to have within the composition of the field command of a front (army):

--a main command-planning center;

--a nuclear/missile center;

--an operations center;

--an intelligence center;

--a PVO control center.

The main command-planning center must be the basic working organ of the commander of troops of the front. Here must be united all the currently existing control organs of the staffs of arms of troops and the services which are concerned with the planning of operations and the direction of troops. All the planning of an operation must take place in this center only. Centralized control of all means of combat, including ground troops, missile weapons, PVO, and aviation, will also be carried out from here simultaneously. The complement of

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this center will include generals and officers from all arms of troops and specialties. When located at the command post, the chief of staff of the front and all chiefs who are directly responsible for the direction of the operation must be located in this center together with the commander. For rapid analysis of the situation and decision-making, a single map of the operational and radiation situation, the aerial situation, and the situation of the PVO, and a map of the grouping and combat readiness of our missile weapons must be constantly maintained here. These maps should be mounted in a vertical position for observation, in the manner of the PVO screen.

In relation to the remaining echelons of the field command of the front (army), this center will be the directing organ. It should direct their activity in order to ensure rapid reaction of the command echelon to all changes in the situation.

The nuclear/missile center will be a united organ for controlling the weapons of destruction of the front. All the weapons of nuclear attack must be concentrated in the hands of the chief of this center, i.e. missiles of all types, bomber aircraft and others, which will undoubtedly improve and expedite their use.

Inasmuch as the overall plan for the use of nuclear/missile weapons will be implemented by the main command-planning center, the functions of the nuclear/missile center in this respect will consist of making all the essential calculations for the use of nuclear/missile weapons, calculations of the possibilities for neutralizing various targets, of the safe removal of our troops from the ground zeros of bursts, of the probable degree of destruction of the objectives, etc. In addition, it must keep track of the movement and readiness of the missile weapons of the front, maintain an operational record of the availability and receipt of missiles and the special charges for them, and maintain a graphic chart of their readiness.

The nuclear/missile center must have direct communications with all the weapons of nuclear attack and must coordinate all its work closely with the operations and intelligence centers which are the sources of information.

The operations center should engage in the collection and processing of data on the operational and radiation situation, decide questions of combat support, implement the transmission of combat tasks to the troops and control their fulfilment.

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All information on the location and operations of our troops and on the results of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides will be concentrated, summarized, and thoroughly analyzed in this center. This will permit the creation of the conditions for the uninterrupted processing of all data on the ground and aerial situations and will bring about completeness and a high degree of effectiveness in the collection and preparation of data, permitting decisions to be made rapidly by the commander of troops of the front (army). In order to achieve rapid processing of information, the operations center must have direct communications with all the formations of the front.

The activities of this center will be conducted through the chiefs of axes, who must process the data on the position of their troops on the appropriate operational axes and transmit commands received from the main command-planning center to the staffs of the appropriate formations (large units) for implementation.

Since our proposed organization of field command of a front (army) assumes the abolition of a number of currently existing services and directorates (engineer, chemical, and others) and the transfer of decisions on their problems to the operations center, the functions of this organ will be much broader than those carried out by the operations directorate. In connection with this, the operations center, as well as the main command-planning center, must have a complement of highly trained generals and officers from the appropriate arms of troops and specialties.

The intelligence center is assigned the collection and processing of all intelligence information. All the intelligence resources of the front are concentrated in the hands of this single organ; it must conduct intelligence work on behalf of all arms of troops and disseminate information concerning the enemy to all centers. For the nuclear/missile center, the intelligence center must keep an account of targets (objectives for nuclear attack), make an evaluation and general description of them, keep track of the movement of primary targets, calculate the most advantageous time and place for the delivery of nuclear strikes, pinpoint the coordinates of the targets and prepare the initial topographic and geodetic data. The chief of intelligence of the front should be the head of the intelligence center.

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This center must have direct communications with reconnaissance aircraft aloft, with radio reconnaissance means and with other important sources of intelligence information.

The PVO control center is designated for control of the PVO weapons, including the fighter aircraft of the front. Its mission will include directing the repulse of massed enemy aircraft and missile strikes. This center must have direct communications with all PVO weapons, with the staffs of aviation large units and with the intelligence center. It should be headed by the chief of PVO of the front.

We shall not stop to consider materiel, technical and other support. It appears to us that their organization must also be set up in accordance with the same principle.

This organizational structure of the field command of a front (army), will undoubtedly permit all its echelons to decide more effectively all the complex problems of troop control which are concerned with a common goal and a single concept. In addition, such an organizational structure of the operational staffs will correspond to a greater degree to modern methods of controlling troops, which are based on the use of the latest control equipment.

In our opinion, the organization of all subordinate staffs must also be built in accordance with this same principle.

In order to increase the flexibility of control, along with the proposed changes in the organizational structure of the field command of a front (army), it is necessary to review the means and methods of work of the staffs in the area of collection, analysis and transmission of information data.

Without going into a detailed description of this problem, we believe that the information system must ensure that all interested elements receive the data on a situation as the events occur. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to make some changes in the procedure for sending reports at the level of the division, army and front. Along with a periodic presentation, say 1 or 2 times a day, of the more substantial reports with a description of the positions and operations of the two sides which are now presented, it is essential to organize the transmission of short signals to indicate only the

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lines attained by the units of the first echelon and the nature of their combat operations ("I am advancing", "I am defending", "I am withdrawing", etc.). These signals must be transmitted by the staffs of large units every 30 to 40 minutes according to a strictly established schedule. In order to send these signals, the division staffs could take data from the battalions which come in automatically through the use of course-plotters (kursoprokladchik) and determine for every given moment only the precise location of the battalion command post (the center of the combat formation).

It must be supposed that this simplification of reporting and elimination of intermediate elements will permit the staff of the front to have precise data on the position of the first echelon troops 30 minutes after the units reach any line. Experience from wars and exercises indicates that these data, especially under complex situational conditions, are sufficient to enable the commander to react instantaneously to the course of events.

In this connection, reality requires the establishment of a procedure for transmitting information by which each command echelon can relay information on the position of its troops and the enemy directly to the next higher staff: the regimental staff to the army staff, the division staff to the front staff, and simultaneously to relay this information correspondingly to the division and army staffs also.

We have examined above only one of the questions of incongruity in the organizational structure of operational staffs due to the changed nature of combat operations. A second problem, which is directly related to the organization of control organs and which, in our opinion, is also in need of review, is the problem of control points.

The increased importance of uninterrupted control of troops provides a basis for assuming that in future operations staffs will be one of the primary targets of enemy action. The combatants will adopt every measure to disorganize the work of control organs and to disrupt the direction of troops. For this purpose, strikes by missiles or aircraft may be delivered, diversionary groups may be sent out, and jamming may be conducted against the means of communication. The capability of using nuclear weapons creates a real threat of instantaneous removal from action of entire control echelons and large bodies of troops. Therefore, the organization of operational staffs must be subordinated first of all to guaranteeing their vitality and ability to retain control in the most complex situation.

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Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this may be achieved by creating dispersed, more ramified, and constantly operative networks of control points to ensure rapid replacement of points which have been put out of action, and broad continuity in the control of troops.

In an operational element, the solution to this problem is reflected by the creation in formations of control points, command and forward command posts, and also rear control points. In this connection, it is believed that the existence of these points permits successful control of a large number of troops and weapons of destruction.

In our opinion, such an organization and echeloning of control points in the front (army) cannot sufficiently ensure their vitality under new conditions and, consequently, does not promote increased stability of control.

The creation of several points for the control of front (army) troops is justified only when each of them functions constantly, is fully independent and is capable of assuming troop control in the event that another point is destroyed by an enemy nuclear strike. Unfortunately, front (army) command and forward command posts, as they are at present constituted, do not meet these requirements. The basic reasons for this consist of the following.

In the first place, despite its numerical strength, the T/O of the field control of a front (army) does not in fact provide for the creation of two full-fledged control points. For this reason, only one independent control element, the command post, is actually created in a front (army). The forward command post is organized by using the forces and means of the command post. In its make-up it is usually a temporary and poorly organized control organ and, naturally, cannot fully provide the commander with firm direction of troops in the event that the command post is put out of action.

Secondly, the forward command post is not a constantly functioning control organ, because it is usually created only for the period of the conduct of combat operations. During the preparation for an operation, the generals and officers and the transportation and communications means designated for the command and forward command posts are usually located together at the command post.

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It must not be overlooked that the enemy will seek out and destroy control points, not only during the course of combat operations, but also during the period of preparation for an offensive and during the organization of defense. For this reason, it is quite obvious that with the personnel and the means of control of the command and forward command posts all located in one place, even for a short interval of time, there is serious danger of their simultaneous destruction and the actual removal from action of the entire control of the front (army), which can undoubtedly cause complete disruption of the control of a large number of troops.

Thirdly, the very fact of the creation of a forward command post predetermines its place and role in an operation. As is known, it moves forward on one of the axes, as close as possible to the front, so that the commander can feel the "pulse" of the combat and observe it to the extent possible. Almost all the chiefs of directorates (departments), services, and the commanders of arms of troops arrive at this post together with the commander, all communications channels are switched here, and in this manner the center of gravity in the control of troops is transferred entirely to the forward command post. Thus, because of this, the command post, with all the means of control, becomes an unnecessary attribute and actually participates only indirectly in the direction of troop combat operations.

We consider this to be nothing more than a vestige of the past. The tendency to move the commander and his observation post forward to the troop combat formations was justified in the years of World War II, when operations developed relatively methodically, when front formations and armies had a comparatively shallow operational formation /4 or 5 words missing/ means of control permitting direct influence on the course of operations from command posts far removed from the troops.

Now, however, when the nature and conditions of conducting operations have changed sharply, such a situation cannot be acknowledged as correct. In the future, the basic method of conducting combat operations will be mass nuclear/missile strikes, carried out with the aim of simultaneous mass destruction, not so much of troops located on the line of combat contact of the opposing sides, as of objectives located in the rear area. The center of gravity of combat operations under these conditions can shift from the zone of combat contact to the depth of the disposition of front (army) troops. The former

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linear formations and operations of troops will also disappear, engagements will be conducted on axes and in separate areas, and operations in the rear area will frequently begin before the advance of ground troops from the front.

It is perfectly obvious that in making decisions in such a situation it is insufficient to be guided by the picture of combat on one axis. In order to react both correctly and quickly to the course of combat operations, the commander must constantly be aware of the entire situation. But this is only possible if, during the course of the entire operation, he is supported by the basic personnel of the front staff who are located at the command post in the area of the main grouping of troops. If, however, during the course of an operation, the commander is located primarily at a forward command post on only one of the axes, he will be unavoidably detached from the overall situation and will be unable to influence not only the development of the operation as a whole but even the most important changes which may arise at any moment away from the forward command post. Under these conditions, it is difficult to say where the presence of the commander will be required first--forward, on one of the flanks or in the rear of the front's troops.

Deep disposition of front (army) troops, particularly of reserves, missile units, airborne troops, and the possibility of committing large units to battle in a hurry from the depth also make the forward move of the commander and the forward command post senseless, because in essence it causes him to be detached from the main forces. In the control of troops, emphasis must now be placed not on personal observation of the field of combat and on personal contact of the front troops commander with the commanders of large units, but on control from a distance. Of course, even under modern conditions, the commander must visit certain axes for the immediate direction of battle, particularly during the critical moments of the development of an operation. But this will take place only incidentally and will not be the system to which we adhere today.

It is also essential to consider the fact that the evolution of means of control is proceeding in the direction of complex automation of the processes of direction of troop combat activity, and it must be assumed that staffs will soon be equipped with automated systems. However, the relatively large size of these systems and the complexity of their apparatus limit their maneuverability and permit their effective use only at the command post.

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Fourthly, the necessity for an auxiliary control point will often arise in the course of an offensive operation as well as in defense, especially when we succeed in breaking up the enemy's operational formation and in cutting off part of his troops from the main grouping, and when the operation therefore disintegrates into a number of engagements. However, at present it is impossible to do this because of the limited capabilities in forces and means of the operational staffs, which are capable of creating only command and forward command posts from their complement.

And, fifthly, as has already been mentioned, as a result of changes in the situation, critical moments may arise on individual axes in an operation, requiring the personal presence of the commander and his involvement in the direction of troop combat operations. But the existing organization of control points and the means of communications and movement available to the staffs do not permit the commander to move rapidly to these sectors of the front. The forward command post is obviously not suited to accomplishing such tasks since it is too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, and it is impossible to conceal its location in the vicinity of the enemy. However, there is no other organ for this purpose in a front or army.

Another important condition in increasing the viability of control points is their reliable security (okhrana), defense, and combat support. The constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons against control points and the increased possibilities of an attack on them by mobile units of enemy ground troops, diversionary groups, and airborne troops indicate the necessity for having sufficiently strong special organic security and support units for the protection of staffs.

During World War II subunits and units from the troops were usually used for the preparation, support, and, frequently, also for the defense of control points. This led to disengaging combat subunits from the accomplishment of important tasks at the immediate front and was not justified. As a rule, temporarily detached subunits and units were not suitable in their organization, equipment, training, and experience for accomplishing the tasks of preparing and supporting control points. The productivity and quality of their work was low, despite the fact that a large quantity of personnel and equipment was detached, part of the equipment was not used because of the impossibility of using it in the preparation of control points, and work was performed separately and was not united under a single command.

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The situation concerning the security, defense, and support of control points is also in approximately this same state, even at the present time. The security and service regiment provided for by the T/O&E and attached to the front staff, and the battalion attached to the army staff do not have organic, engineer, chemical, and other special subunits at their disposal. This situation, as in the years of the last war, again leads to the fact that it will be necessary to use temporary and untrained special line units and subunits for the preparation, support, and servicing of control points.

Entirely different results can be achieved if these subunits are united and if on the basis of them, special units are created, equipped with the necessary weapons, equipment and the other standard items required for the combat support, servicing, and preparation of control points. The personnel of these units who are trained in advance will also acquire experience. On the whole, significantly greater effectiveness in the use of these same forces and means will be achieved and the organization and conduct of the security, defense, servicing, and support of control points will be greatly improved.

The problem of the direction of the entire security service for control points and of the maintenance of the required order in them is still decided by us in the old manner. Up to the present time, apart from the staff commandants, many staff officers who are insufficiently trained and inexperienced in this respect engage in this work, while having more than one function.

The growing volume of activities and the broadening functions of the commandant's service (komendantskaya sluzhba), as well as the necessity of carrying it out constantly, have drastically elevated the role of this service; it has now acquired the importance of one of the main elements in troop control. This circumstance requires centralization of the direction of the commandant's service, the placing of a strong independent organ at its head, and the subordination to it of all the forces and means assigned for the security and preparation of control points. In our opinion, only with this condition is it possible to resolve more purposefully and effectively the important problems of security and defense, of antiatomic protection, engineer preparation, and the concealed placement and transfer of control points and constantly to maintain the strictest order in their disposition areas, all of which will directly affect the viability of control organs.

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Therefore, all these arguments permit a restatement of the conclusion that the existing organizational structure of operational staffs does not provide for the creation in a front (army) of a ramified network of control points which in turn does not promote an increase in the flexibility and stability of troop control. The organization of operational staffs, it appears to us, must be such as to ensure the creation of not less than two permanently operative full-fledged control points in a front (army) for all forms of combat operations and to provide the opportunity for the commander, in certain cases, to personally and directly participate in the direction of troops in the most important sectors.

For this purpose, it is essential, in our opinion, to have two independent control organs in the composition of the field command of a front and army.

The first is the staff of the front (army), including the basic complement of the field command and all the above-mentioned centers. On the basis of it, it is necessary to develop the command post of the front (army) as the primary control point, headed directly by the front (army) troop commander.

The second is the staff operations group (organic). This control organ must be somewhat smaller in its composition than the staff but must have an organization similar to that of the staff. As an independent control organ, the group must have its own organic means of communications and transportation in such quantity as to make it capable of assuming complete control of all the troops of the front in the event that the command post is put out of action. On the basis of the staff operations group, regardless of the situation, a second permanent control point of the front (army) must be created and headed by the deputy front (army) troop commander. Its title and designation will be determined each time by the specific conditions of the situation. Therefore, during the preparation for an offensive operation and in defense, this will usually be an alternate command post, but during the course of the operation it can become an auxiliary control point or can carry out the functions characteristic of the forward command post.

In peacetime, the personnel of the staff operations group should be located and worked in the appropriate control centers, in order to facilitate the work and perfect the skills of the officers. During

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the training of staffs, this operations group must be prepared and knitted together as an independent control organ.

For the transportation of the commander and his deputy to any particular axis where their personal intervention in the direction of troop combat operations may be required, it is essential to have specially allotted control vehicles in the T/O&E of the staff of the front and the staff operations group.

For the security and combat support of control points, it is advisable to create special units and subunits and to include them in the T/O of the field control of the front (army). In our opinion, they should be called commandant's units (komendatskaya chast). It appears to be advisable to use organic commandant's regiments and separate commandant's battalions as the organizational basis. For servicing the command posts and rear control point of the front, it is essential to have a commandant's regiment for each of them; for servicing the staff operations group of the front and the command post of the army, to have separate commandant's battalions.

For direction of the commandant's service and of the security, defense preparation, and support of control points, it is essential to create in the staffs commandaturas (commandant's groups) with a complement of 5 to 8 officers headed by the commandant to whom the commandant's units and subunits must be subordinated. These will be organic, independent, and influential organs which possess the necessary forces and means and are capable of maintaining order at control points and of directing their relocation, security, and defense under any conditions.

The daily activity of the commandaturas must be carried out through permanent duty commandants. In this connection, and also on the basis of the proposed changes in the structure of staffs, we consider it advisable to abolish the operational duty officer in the staffs, particularly since he is no longer in a position to fulfil functions concerned with the collection of situation data which he has been charged with to the present time.

The presence of organic commandaturas will permit the concentration of the direction of all measures of security of control points in one element and in one place, will bring order to the commandant's service,

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and will significantly elevate its authority. In addition, this will release many chiefs and officers of staffs from their involvement in the organization and direction of the commandant's service and will give them the opportunity to spend more time on their immediate duties.

We propose a broad study of the questions which have been raised and a more rapid realization of the necessary changes in the structure and methods of work of control organs.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Organization of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel V. Savko and Colonel N. Maksimov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Organization of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel V. Savko and Colonel N. Maksimov.

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The Organization of Antimissile Defense

(According to foreign views)

by

Colonel V. Savko

Colonel N. Maksimov

Under modern conditions, a wide variety of means can be used for the delivery of nuclear strikes against troops in a theater of military operations and against the objectives of a country's military potential: piloted aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, artificial earth satellites and spacecraft. This variety of attack weapons, which has a great range of speeds, and flight altitudes, and an enormous range of operation, makes it necessary to examine the question of combatting them in a new way.

The ability of modern attack weapons to deliver strikes, from low levels, from the stratosphere and, in the near future, from space, has produced a need for the broadening of the scope of antiair defense. Antiair defense is developing into antiair and antispace defense.

By contrast to the atmosphere (vozdushnoye prostranstvo), which has limits at a certain altitude, space (kosmicheskoye prostranstvo) is boundless. The limitless range of modern aerospace attack weapons, their freedom of maneuver (their strikes can be expected from any direction) and the possibility of their combined use both against troops and against the military objectives of a country, make it necessary to establish a single system for antiair and antispace defense.

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The tremendous progress in the development of aerospace attack weapons has made necessary a revision of views on defense.

It is known that during the past few years the USA has spent about 35 billion dollars on the creation of a system of antiair defense for the North American continent. The "Sage" semiautomatic control system has been set up, depending upon three radar lines constructed in the northern part of the American continent and possessing the necessary means of communication and electronic computers. Active defense has been based on the employment of antiaircraft missiles and of interceptor fighters armed with guided "air-to-air" missiles.

The development of strategic missile weapons has thrown doubt upon the expediency of these huge expenditures. The USA has stopped the development of interceptor fighters and significantly reduced work on the creation of new classes of ground-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles, and has reviewed and reduced the original plans for the formation of squadrons of "Bomarc" antiaircraft missiles for the antiair defense of areas of the country.

At the same time, having proclaimed a doctrine of "terror" (ustrasheniye), the USA and its NATO allies had to ensure that there would be no possibility of the destruction of their own strategic aerospace weapons, which could occur as a result of the first enemy strike.

With the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons, the means of attack immediately and abruptly determined the means of defense. It has become necessary to create weapons and systems for defense against ballistic missiles, and in the near future against space weapons as well. Passive methods (dispersal, concealment underground of the launching mounts of one's own missiles, constant retention in the air of units of one's own bomber aviation) have not eliminated the need to establish effective systems

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of antimissile defense, despite the complexity of the problems which this has caused and their obviously enormous cost.

Work in the field of antimissile defense is being conducted in the USA, Great Britain, Canada and other countries. The leading role belongs to the USA.

The Americans have already been working for more than 10 years on the solution of the problem of antimissile defense (protivo-raketnaya oborona-PRO). The best scientific resources and a considerable number of the largest American industrial companies have been brought into work in this field.

The detection, recognition, interception and destruction of long-range missiles are problems that are hard to solve, because of the great speeds and altitudes at which missiles fly, and because of the small dimensions of the target (the nose cone of the missile). Moreover, the enemy can take various steps to make the detection and interception of the missile's warhead difficult, or measures to confuse the PRO system.

Three phases of a missile's flight trajectory are examined during theoretical investigations into the possibilities of combat with missiles. The first is the active phase, during which the engines and the equipment of the guidance mechanism of the missile are in operation. The missile moves through this phase in a comparatively short time, not more than 2 to 3 minutes.

The second is the middle or free-flight phase. The beginning of this phase of the trajectory is marked by the point in space at which the missile engines are cut off and its nose cone is released automatically. From this moment the nose cone of the missile moves along the trajectory of a freely thrown body (in the first approach to an ellipse).

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The third phase is the final phase, during which the nose cone of the missile enters the dense layers of the atmosphere. Its duration is determined by the altitude of the active layer of the atmosphere, which is about 100 km. Methods for combatting missiles are being worked out in the USA in accordance with these features of the flight of missiles.

The detection of missiles in flight. Timely detection of missiles in flight is one of the most important elements in a PRO system. For warning of a surprise attack using missiles, means for the early detection of the latter were required first of all. Using the newest achievements in the field of electronics, the Americans devised powerful radar sets with a range of operation of several thousand kilometers.

The increase in the range of operation of radar sets was achieved by increasing the power of the transmitters and the sensitivity of the receivers, by setting up improved antennas, and by using the technical and scientific achievements attained in the field of radar in the last few years. Great successes were achieved in this respect, thanks particularly to the application of methods of a new science - the theory of information.

Experimental models of the American PRO radar sets had a power of from 2 megawatts (the AN/FPS-17 set) to 10 megawatts (the AN/FPS-35 set). The vacuum tubes which are being developed at present allow the power of the transmitters to be increased to 20 to 50 megawatts. Thanks to the use of molecular amplifiers, the sensitivity of the receivers is increased tenfold and a hundredfold . This also permitted an increase in the range of action of the sets.

The use of huge directional antennas and of new methods for the separation of reflected signals

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made it possible to increase the range of action of a set without significantly increasing its power, both by concentrating the energy emitted in the required direction and by improving conditions for the reception by the antenna of reflected signals. Based on the use of new antenna devices, the AN/FPS-49 and AN/FPS-50 radar sets were devised in the USA, with a range of action of up to 5400 km against a target as small as that which is represented by the nose cone of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Besides such sets, whose range of operation is still limited by the zone of line-of-sight (zona pryamoy vidimosti) the possibility of using "Tepee" sets employing the [redacted] back-scatter probing (vozvratno-naklonnoye zondirovaniye) method. In principle, this method permits the detection of missiles while they are still in the active phase of their trajectory. But such sets can only determine the azimuth and, with little accuracy, the distance to the target. It is therefore proposed to use the "Tepee" set to supplement detection systems using AN/FPS-49 and AN/FPS-50 sets.

As well as radar sets, infrared equipment may be used to detect missiles. By locating such equipment on the ground it is very hard to provide the great range required. When it is located in space the situation changes fundamentally. First of all, the great obstacle of atmospheric absorption of the infrared radiation disappears. Secondly, the missile can be detected in the active phase of its trajectory, when it is a powerful source of infrared radiation.

Already in 1957 experiments were conducted in Canada which showed the possibility of detecting missiles with infrared equipment, at a range of up to 1600 km. In 1958 the Americans were able to track the flight of the third Soviet artificial earth satellite,

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flying at an altitude of about 400 km above the earth, with an infrared tracking device of the firm "Aerojet". Later, models of infrared devices with even greater ranges of operation were produced. For example, the range of operation of a multipurpose gyroscopic head, built by the "Martin" firm in 1959, is estimated as several thousand kilometers when the launch of a missile is detected from space and several hundred kilometers when using the head to aim at artificial earth satellites.

In this way, thanks to the enormous progress in the field of radio-electronics, the problem of detecting missiles in flight is being successfully resolved.

Recognition of missiles. In the development of a system of antimissile defense, a great deal of attention is devoted to solution of the problem of recognition of the missile's nose cone from among the various types of interference and of dummy targets.

There are many methods which make it possible to hamper the destruction of the missile in flight and to disorganize the PRO system. These methods include: covering the missile nose cones with a protective layer which sharply reduces the reflection of electromagnetic energy;--the use of dummy targets which camouflage the flight of the actual nose cone;--the use of active jamming of the radar sets of the antimissile defense system.

One of the simplest ways of creating dummy targets is to break up the missile airframe as soon as the nose cone is separated in the middle section of its flight trajectory. All of this presents complex problems for the PRO in finding methods of combatting equipment which creates radio-electronic interference and in developing methods of identifying targets, i.e., of determining their true nature. The general problem of recognition of dummy targets in the middle phase of a trajectory has not yet been solved by the Americans, even theoretically.

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One opportunity for recognition occurs during the flight of the nose cone and of its accompanying complex of dummy targets in the final phase of the trajectory--in the atmosphere. During reentry into the atmosphere the movements of the dummy targets and of the missile warhead change in different ways, their infrared radiation varies in intensity and spectral characteristics, and other phenomena appear which simplify the solution of the problem of recognition.

By studying the nature of changes in speed it is possible to distinguish the missile nose cone from the dummy targets. The missile warhead will brake more slowly than the dummy targets and will have a higher speed. However, since it passes through the dense layers of the atmosphere in a very short period of time (10 to 12 seconds) this method of recognition is not acceptable. Recognition of a target by this method will occur too late and the defense system will have no time to destroy the nose cone which has been picked out.

During entry into the atmosphere, both the nose cone and the dummy targets accompanying it heat up and give off infrared rays, a shock wave builds up in front of them, and an ionized gaseous trail behind them. However, the use of these phenomena for recognition of the nose cone is unacceptable for the same reason.

The most effective method for recognition, used by the Americans in the "Nike-Zeus" system, consists of the use of special radar sets with very high discrimination, capable of receiving data on the whole group of targets during flight while it is still in the middle phase of its trajectory. The signal reflected from a flying object makes it possible to obtain some idea of the change in its reflecting surface during flight, of its dimensions, and even of its shape.

If signals from flying nose cones and from various dummy targets are studied in advance, the knowledge of their "signatures" can be used to solve

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the problems of recognition.

In order to put this method to practical use, the Americans registered the signals reflected from the nose cones of their own missiles while these were being tested at firing ranges. Signals from the nose cones of Soviet missiles launched into the central part of the Pacific Ocean were also registered. In 1961 launchings of "Titan" missiles with devices for the creation of interference and of dummy targets began.

A recognition radar set is used in conjunction with an electronic computer, into whose memory are fed the characteristic signals which correspond to the flight of actual nose cones. This same machine receives data on the signals of all objectives observed from the recognition set. Comparison of these data in the machine permits recognition of the missile nose cone in a group of dummy targets.

Means of detection and recognition. At the present time the basic means for the detection of missiles in flight are ground radar posts with ultra-long-range detection sets, which make up the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.

The BMEWS system includes three radar posts, located in Thule (Greenland), Clear (Alaska), and Fylingdales Moor (Britain). The range of operation of the radar sets installed at these posts exceeds 5000 km.

In addition to the detection of missiles in flight, the BMEWS system permits the approximate determination of the probable objective of an attack. The performance of the second task is simplified by the fact that, after the engines stop working, the warhead of a missile follows a ballistic trajectory, to determine which it is enough to make several fixes and to determine the impact point of the missile by extrapolation of the trajectory.

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The total warning time--i.e., the time from the moment the alarm is given until the missiles strike their targets--provided by the BMEWS system is from 15 to 17 minutes.

The shortcomings of the BMEWS are that it does not cover all the probable missile launching areas and that it can be neutralized with the aid of special equipment or disorganized by the creation of dummy targets. In addition, the system is expensive, cumbersome, stationary, and could be destroyed before missiles are launched against objectives on the territory of the USA.

The realistic way toward an increase in warning time lies in the use of special earth satellites with infrared or radar equipment which permit detection of missiles in the active phase of their trajectory.

Satellites with infrared equipment for the detection of missile launchings are being developed in the USA under the "Midas" project. As is known, in October 1961, the "Midas-4" satellite recorded the launch of an American "Titan" ballistic missile from Cape Canaveral. The satellite passed over Florida at an altitude of more than 3000 km. The launching was detected within 90 seconds of the launch of the missile, but the detection signal was transmitted within 90 minutes, when the satellite passed over California, where there is a station for the reception of signals from such satellites.

In the experimental satellites, detection signals are to be recorded, together with time details, and transmitted to the earth on the commands of the tracking stations which have so far been built. In a future satellite operational system, the signals must be transmitted immediately as the launchings are detected. A network of interconnected earth satellites will be used for this purpose.

Besides detecting launchings of missiles, "Midas" satellites can probably determine, at least approximately,

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the direction of their flight, in order to provide plots for the sets of the BMEWS system.

An operational system of "Midas" satellites should be set up by the Americans before 1965.

Satellites with radar sets are still in the stage of scientific and experimental development, and their establishment, probably as multipurpose spacecraft, is possible after 1965. Thus, one of the projects, proposed by the "Ryan" firm, envisages the creation of a space system of early warning with satellites, on which a whole system of radar sets for the detection and tracking of the ballistic missiles and spacecraft of the enemy is installed.

The employment of artificial reconnaissance satellites in a PRO system increases the possibility of detecting missiles. With the help of satellites a missile can be detected within 1 to 2 minutes of its launch.

Interception and destruction of missiles. The task of intercepting and destroying missiles consists of preventing them from exploding in the area of defended objectives. The interception and destruction of a missile is considered most effective during the active phase of its flight trajectory (during the acceleration stage), when the missile presents a large target and is flying at a comparatively low speed. Interception during the middle phase of the trajectory may lead to the destruction of the missile at a great distance from the defended objective. However, in both the first and second cases, means of interception with a great range of operation and highly accurate guidance are required. The development of such means involves great technical difficulties. In the USA means for intercepting the nose cone of a missile in the final phase of its trajectory, when it enters the atmosphere, have been brought, in practice, to the stage of flight tests. Interception at this phase of the trajectory

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permits the use of weapons with a comparatively short range of operation.

Because of their great approach speeds, the interception of missiles is only considered possible on collision or collision-intersection courses. A nuclear warhead is used to destroy the nose cone of the missile.

Taking into consideration the comparatively small radius of destruction of even a nuclear warhead when it explodes outside the dense layers of the atmosphere, other probable methods of destruction are being studied in the USA. Special project "Glipar" was devoted to this question, having as its goal the study of the possibilities of destroying missiles or of rendering them harmless, including those which, at today's level of technology, appear highly problematical, but which may prove effective in the future, when our knowledge of these questions has increased considerably.

The "Glipar" project studied the possibility of destroying missile nose cones with small fragments or particles of hard substances, with gases, plasmas, electrical charges, radiation and with the action of various fields. The use of hard particles, which, when they hit a nose cone which is moving at high speed, may inflict considerable damage upon it, proved to be the most effective means.

One of the experiments to study the impacts of hard bodies, flying at great speeds was conducted in 1961 in the ballistics laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and in this, metal balls 7 mm in diameter brought about the almost complete destruction of the wall of a 105 mm artillery shell.

Evidently in connection with this, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U. S. Defense Department advertised for bids for the development of a PRO system (Project ARPAT) in which the warhead of a missile would be destroyed with "shrapnel" shells when it enters the atmosphere.

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As for the other methods of destruction studied, their realization at the existing level of technology was found to be in practice impossible, although research in this direction is still continuing. As an example, one can mention the method based on the use of so-called "lasers" --powerful sources of monochromatic infrared or light radiation. Such lasers already make it possible to obtain a narrow beam of radiation which has an impulse power of tens of megawatts, although it is true that this is of very short duration, measured in microseconds.

The use of similar means from the ground is hardly possible, even taking into account their future development and a future manifold increase in the energy of their destructive impulse. The basic obstacle here is the absorption of energy by the atmosphere. This obstacle can only be overcome by installing improved lasers on spacecraft with a high coefficient of effectiveness and great power. While impulses of modern lasers can lead to the heating of material to a surface temperature of several thousand degrees, in the future one can foresee the possibility of burning through the structure of the nose cone of a missile or satellite, which can prevent the explosion of the missile's charge or can lead to its destruction during reentry into the atmosphere.

Means for the interception and destruction of missiles in the active and middle phases of their flight trajectory are in the stage of theoretical development. Earth satellites are considered the most promising means for the performance of these tasks.

The development of a space antimissile system is being conducted in the USA under the "Bambi" program. Such a system could provide defense on a global scale, but requires the use of several thousand satellites. In order to bring this system into use it is necessary to reduce significantly the cost of orbiting a kilogram of payload and to bring this down to several dollars or, at the most, tens of dollars. The destruction of missiles can be carried out by homing satellites (the RBS project) or by satellites armed with homing antimissile

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missiles of the "space-to-space" class (the SPAD project). Both these projects are still in the initial stage of development. In both cases an infrared guidance system is considered to be the most suitable for homing.

Besides automatic interceptor-satellites, for anti-missile and antispace defense, it is also proposed to use piloted interceptor-satellites with a man on board. For the present the development of such satellites is being pioneered by some American firms.

In the USA it is considered possible to create PRO space weapons in 1966-1967.

For the interception and destruction of missiles in the final phase of their trajectory (during reentry into the atmosphere), the Americans, starting in 1955, have developed several PRO systems. The "Nike-Zeus" system, which permits the interception and destruction of missiles at altitudes of up to 150 km and at ranges of up to 320 km, has received the greatest development.

Up to the present day, experimental models of the radar set for this system, of the electronic computer, and of experimental models of the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile missiles have been constructed.

Although the "Nike-Zeus" PRO system has been under development for many years, and although some of its elements could be put into mass production, adoption of the system as armament is being delayed. In the U.S. Defense Department there are doubts of the reliability and effectiveness of the system, particularly in its ability to distinguish missile nose cones from dummy targets.

Moreover, the cost of setting up such a system, even for the defense of only the most important cities and objectives on United States territory, is calculated in billions of dollars (according to some data it may reach 4 to 15 billion dollars).

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Taking these circumstances into consideration, the U.S. Defense Department and the President of the USA have reacted to the proposals of the army to begin production of the components of the system before the completion of its comprehensive tests, including firings against "Atlas" type combat missiles, with a certain caution.

Flight tests of the experimental model of the missile began in 1959 at the White Sands proving ground. The second step in the tests, including the launching of a complete three-stage missile with a guidance system, but without a nuclear warhead, is being completed at present at Point Mugu on the west coast of the USA (the state of California). The third step, during which live firings of "Nike-Zeus" missiles will be carried out against "Jupiter" and "Atlas" missiles, is planned for the middle of 1962. The "Atlas" missiles will be launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base and the "Nike-Zeus" missiles from Kwajalein Island in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. A complete complex of components for the system is being built on this island, including underground launching mounts for the missiles, for radar sets (target acquisition, target recognition, and tracking of the target and of the missile), and the necessary computers, launching and auxiliary equipment.

After the speech of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy, who reported to the XXII Congress of the CPSU on the successful solution in the USSR of the problem of destroying missiles in flight, the American command decided to speed up the tests and the beginning of production of the components of the "Nike-Zeus" system. The time limits for conducting live firings of "Atlas" intercontinental ballistic missiles for interception by "Nike-Zeus" missiles are connected with the decision of the President of the USA on the resumption of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. The first tests, with the detonation of nuclear warheads on "Nike-Zeus" missiles with a yield of from 2 to 5 thousand tons are planned for the end of December 1961 or January 1962. The first firings against "Atlas" missiles, in which both the "Nike-Zeus" missile and the target missile will be fitted

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with nuclear warheads, are planned for February 1962. Without waiting for the conclusion of the tests, the Defense Department and the President of the USA decided to ask for appropriations to begin production of components of the "Nike-Zeus" system in 1962. It is planned to arm the first PRO batteries with them in 1963.

The organization and conduct of PRO. All means of antimissile defense will be subordinate to the Air Defense Command of the USA. It is planned to use the units and subunits of the PRO in the first place for coverage of missile bases and strategic aviation bases. The use of the "Nike-Zeus" system in combat is carried out in approximately the following manner. A target (missile), crossing the fan-like beam of a BMEWS system radar set, reflects electromagnetic energy which is picked up by the receiving apparatus of the set.

Information on the target, contained in the reflected signal, enters the target selection system and is then transformed into numerical form and fed into a computer.

The selection device enables the missile to be picked out among the numerous reflections which result from atmospheric phenomena, the Northern Lights, meteorites, artificial satellites, etc.

The computer calculates the approximate trajectory of the missile's flight and determines the objective which is probably under attack, for target acquisition by subsequent elements of the defense system. In addition, the computer formulates a message on the detected target, which is fed into the communications line in numerical (coded) form, and arrives at the US Continental Air Defense Control Center. The report shows the calculated trajectory and the probable impact point of the missile.

A special warning system has been set up to transmit data on the appearance of missiles. At each post of the BMEWS system there are data units (datchik) and means of communication which provide instantaneous transmission of data.

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In the antiair defense control center the message which has been received is decoded and evaluated and the data received are compared with information which has arrived from other sources.

In accordance with the indications received from BMEWS posts or at the command of the antiair defense control center, the antimissile subunits are put in a state of combat readiness.

The "Nike-Zeus" system consists of a series of defensive centers, which provide protection for particular objectives with the aid of several batteries of antimissile missiles. The fire of these batteries is controlled from the defense center, which has an acquisition radar set and a computer for processing both the data arriving from BMEWS posts and those from this set...

The acquisition set has an operating range of about 1600 km and carries out a repeat (povtornyy) detection of the missiles approaching the defense objective. For this it is necessary for the nose cone of the approaching missile to be in motion within the operating sector of the set for about 20 seconds. Information on the targets goes from this set to the computer of the defense center and is used for target acquisition and for the distribution of targets among the antimissile missile batteries.

The battery is the basic subunit of the system. It has a target recognition set, a target tracking set and several sets for tracking the antimissile missiles. Apparently a battery will consist of 24 antimissile missiles with the necessary launching and auxiliary equipment. All the equipment of a battery is stationary.

The target recognition set picks out the missile nose cone from among the dummy targets. Recognition of the target is based on a comparison of the signal characteristics reflected from the target, with the known characteristics of various objects which have been fed into the memory of the computer. As a result of such a comparison, the

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data on the real target are singled out by the exclusion of false information. Approximately 30 seconds is taken for target recognition, after which the missile nose cone is taken over by the target tracking set.

When the target is being tracked, its trajectory is defined with greater precision and the requisite data are fed into the device for controlling the launch and guidance of the antimissile missiles. The guidance computer calculates the flight trajectory of the antimissile missile and determines the point at which it will meet the target. At the necessary moment the command for the launch is given and this ignites the engine of the first stage of the antimissile missile.

After the missile is launched, data on the flight of the target and of the missile continue to be continuously fed into the computer of the tracking system, and on the basis of these, commands are evolved for the guidance of the antimissile missile to its target. This device is a digital computer capable of performing 200,000 arithmetical operations per second.

The intercept computer also determines the moment for the detonation of the antimissile missile and generates the command for the explosion, which is then transmitted to the missile by the set which is tracking it.

It is considered that about 100 seconds are needed to prepare the antimissile missile for launching, to launch it, and for it to enter the interception area. To carry out the series of operations in intercepting and destroying a missile warhead with a speed of 8 km/sec., approximately 2 min. and 40 sec. are taken by the "Nike-Zeus" system. During this time the missile warhead will travel approximately 1300 km. The interception and destruction of the missile warhead is effected in the final phase of the trajectory at an altitude of about 150 km.

From all that has been said one can conclude that so far the USA does not have an organized PRO system or

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effective means for combatting missiles. Many problems connected with recognition, interception, and destruction of the missile in flight still must be settled.

The establishment of antimissile defense involves huge expenditures of materiel which can only be afforded by states with a developed industrial-economic base and a large network of scientific-research institutions. The widest development of work on antimissile defense has therefore been achieved only by the USA. Meanwhile, in connection with the great expenditure on these tasks and the difficulty of resolving the technical problems of antimissile defense, some American military specialists are calling for the development, above all, of strategic attack weapons -- long- and intermediate-range missiles, strategic aviation and an atomic fleet -- as a means of "deterrence".

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Defense of the Operational Rear", by Major-General Yu. Novikov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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[redacted]

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

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Director, National Photographic Interpretation
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COUNTRY [redacted] USSR

SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Defense of the Operational Rear", by Major-General Yu. Novikov

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Defense of the Operational Rear", by Major-General Yu. Novikov.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

The critique of the 1961 Carpathian Military District exercise referred to herein was disseminated as [redacted].

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Defense of the Operational Rear

by

Major-General Yu. Novikov

The equipping of the Soviet Army with missile/nuclear weapons and other modern equipment has compelled us, in recent years, to reexamine, as is well known, many questions of the theory of military art. In particular new principles of the organization and activity of the operational rear have been worked out and put into practice. However, in the process of carrying out this great work, which is directed toward the further perfecting of the operational rear, the defense of the operational rear has, unfortunately, not been studied in sufficient depth.

Meanwhile, in modern conditions of carrying out armed conflict, this matter has acquired great significance. In this article we shall examine two questions of this complicated problem; namely, the defense of the rear against ground forces of the enemy and antiair defense of installations of the operational rear.

In examining the defense of the operational rear, it is necessary to consider two propositions: the striving of the probable enemy to disorganize the rear of our troops and the changing character of modern operations, and the results of this and the conditions of work of the operational rear.

As a result of study of the views of the probable enemy, the conclusion may be made that in future operations the neutralization and destruction of the most important rear area installations and disorganization of the work of the rear will be achieved by carrying out strikes with missile/nuclear weapons and conventional means of destruction against our rear area installations, and also by wide use of operational and tactical airborne landings for the purpose of carrying the struggle into

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the operational depth , destroy depots of nuclear weapons, break up the maneuver of reserves, and disrupt the work of the rear as a whole. A number of sabotage-intelligence groups will be sent into the rear of our troops, obviously, with the tasks of accomplishing various types of sabotage, attacking rear installations and sowing panic among the population.

The opinion is expressed abroad that it is advantageous to operate against the rear of the enemy with airborne landings or sabotage-intelligence groups; even small groups of saboteurs are able to disrupt the work of front missile-technical bases and thus degrade, or at least significantly weaken, the force of missile/nuclear strikes and greatly disorganize antiair defense of troops. In exactly the same manner the action of sabotage-intelligence groups and airborne landings against bases and front communication routes can hamper, and at times completely disrupt, the supply of materiel means to troops.

Modern operations are distinguished by their large scale. They develop on a wide front and in great depth with combat operations connected with mutual breakthroughs of the opposing sides developing simultaneously and into the depth of the troop disposition, which creates very complicated conditions for the work of the operational rear. The rapid tempos and the maneuvering character of combat operations lead to more rapid movement of the struggle into the operational depth, into the depth of army and front rear areas.

The fact that there will not be a solid front in modern conditions, has great significance for the work of the operational rear. Combat operations will develop on separate axes, and, consequently, the operational rear will not have before it the dependable barrier "wall" of the solid front, under cover of which it operated in the past. To this must be added that the troops of the first echelon, advancing on separate axes,

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will not normally be diverted to the defeat and destruction of enemy groups, which are left on the flanks and in the rear. This task will now be accomplished by the forces of the second echelons and reserves.

Enemy groupings which have retained their combat effectiveness, and which are left in the rear of our troops, can temporarily block communication routes, carry out raids on important rear area installations, and thus complicate the situation to a significant degree. It is necessary to remember that the combat operations of our troops can develop on the territory of a country in the aggressive imperialistic military bloc, and it is fully possible that some part of the population ill-disposed toward us will carry out an active role in the rear of our troops.

In solving the problem of defense of the operational rear, it is essential to bear in mind the degree of importance of a number of installations and those forces and means which can be used for their defense.

There are 8 to 10 missile-technical bases of a front, or 3 separate missile-depot battalions, and missile fuel dumps, located and functioning in the operational rear. The importance of all of these installations is unquestioned. At the front missile-technical bases the assembly of the missile-carriers and nuclear warheads, the mating of missiles and the storage of reserve (zapas) missiles of the front are performed; from these bases they are transported to armies and to missile large units. The reserve of missile/nuclear weapons located at front missile-technical bases ensures fulfilment of further tasks of the front and the subsequent offensive operation. Moreover, the reserve of nuclear means is stored at bases, and the reserve of an aircraft guided missile is stored at antiaircraft missile-technical bases. However, the forces and means which are at the disposal of all the enumerated installations are sufficient

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for the organization of defense against an attack of only a small group of the enemy.

Rear front and forward front bases must also be considered in the number of important installations of the operational rear. Other rear units and establishments — technical, medical, and transport — are also grouped in the area of deployment of front bases, as a rule.

A deeper echeloning of reserves of materiel means, carried out in the course of the change of the basic principles of organization of the operational rear, would undoubtedly be a useful measure. But it is necessary to bear in mind that now about half of all front reserves are located at forward and rear front bases. This increases the dependence of the armies on daily delivery of materiel means from front depots. It follows that even a short interruption of front communication routes can lead to the breakdown of the planned support of troops of the first operational echelon of the front.

Field pipelines, whose most vulnerable points are the pumping stations, have great significance in supplying front troops with fuel. The protection of the pipelines, stretching for hundreds of kilometers, and also of the pumping stations, is obviously quite complicated. However, this task is entrusted to the personnel of the pipeline brigades, who do not have sufficient forces for this task.

For carrying out regular delivery of materiel means, evacuation , and maneuvering of reserves, it is necessary to have a developed network of railroad and automobile communication routes. If it is considered that in a front there are not less than two railroad communication routes, three or four basic front military automobile communication routes, and several lateral railroad and automobile routes, then

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the difficulties of the defense of front communication routes throughout their extensive length become apparent. Moreover, in the rear area of the front it is also necessary to defend the main communications links of the front and the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with their powerful radio, radio-relay and telegraph communications centers.

And finally, in the rear area there will usually be 6 to 8 hospital bases with 15 to 20 thousand wounded in each, which would no doubt be objects of attack by enemy sabotage-intelligence groups.

During the preparation for an offensive operation, when troops in a tight grouping occupy a relatively stable position, there are more favorable conditions for defense of the rear. In the course of the operation, especially during high tempos of advance, the main mass of forces and weapons, and in particular of antiair defense, moves behind the troops, and the rear area of a front remains without any protection. This is explained by the fact that rear area installations of the front, by the nature of the tasks they fulfil, must work in the same place for a rather long time. The mobility of the main rear area installations must be considered far from satisfactory. Therefore, front missile-technical bases are moved once every two or three days, forward front bases, once every four or five days, and rear front bases are moved only once during a front offensive operation.

Thus, in modern operations the conditions of work of the rear will be significantly more complicated than in the last war, and the role of rear support will increase sharply. Now the success of combat operation of troops, as never before, has become dependent on reliable and prompt rear support. One of the decisive conditions for dependable and uninterrupted rear support of troops is the viability of the rear, i.e., the preservation of its ability to support troops

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in a complicated combat situation. Therefore the problem of defense of the rear has become one of the most critical problems, and if it is not solved there will be no guarantee of the success of the work of the rear, and along with this, the guarantee of success of the operation being carried out.

In these fundamentally altered conditions of the functioning and significance of the operational rear, the old, obsolete concepts, characteristic of the last war, unfortunately still survive: In agreement with these concepts, many persons consider that the entire grouping of rear area installations is to be protected by the operational troop formation, and, therefore, under no circumstances, are appropriate forces and means to be allocated for the defense of the rear, which is required to defend itself with its own forces and means. We are already accustomed to the expression, which in our opinion is trite: "the guarding and defense of the rear are carried out by forces and means of the rear", which, as a rule, is laid down in documents regulating the organization of these questions in the course of operations.

It is necessary to mention that in a number of theoretical works the question is raised of the insufficiency in the rear area of forces and means for the organization of its defense and protection. Thus in the fundamental work "The Rear Services in Modern Operations", it is indicated that "front and army rear units and establishments are spread out over a large area and have limited forces and means, so they are not in a position to organize reliable defense of the entire rear area. The accomplishment of this task is possible only by the utilization of combat units and large units of the front (army)" ... 1

1. The Rear Services in Modern Operations. Publishing Office of the Staff of the Rear Services of the Ministry of Defense, Moscow 1959, PP 261-262. 1.3(a)(4)

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However let us turn to the practice of the large operational exercises of the last few years.

In exercise "Don" (1960), no large units for the defense of the rear were provided for among the troops of the Don Front. Exactly the same situation occurred in the inter-academy exercise carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in February 1961. In this exercise only one motorized-rifle regiment was designated for defense of the operational rear, from the combined-arms army of the second echelon of the front; it was returned to the army when the army was committed to combat, with the result that the rear area of the front was left without any forces and means of defense at all.

In the recent front two-stage operational-rear services exercise of the troops of the Carpathian Military District (July 1961), once again no troops were designated for the defense of the rear. As a result, the rear area of the front, with all the reserves of nuclear weapons, antiaircraft missiles, materiel, and many rear services units remained without any means of defense.

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Let us examine briefly the question of defense of the operational rear from enemy air strikes. With full justification it can be said that the amount of forces and weapons usually designated are clearly inadequate for direct antiair defense of large rear area installations. Let us examine two examples from the experience of operational exercises of 1961.

In the above-mentioned inter-academy exercises (February 1961), only one antiaircraft missile regiment was designated for the antiair defense of stationary depots of the Central Front, located 400 to 600 kilometers from the troops and at large railroad junctions; naturally it could not screen all rear area installations. As a result, the "enemy" carried out nuclear strikes with impunity against the rear area front bases and large railroad centers.

In the operational-rear services exercises of the Carpathian Military District, the chief of PVO of the 2nd Front, possessing sufficient forces and means for antiair defense of the principal areas of disposition of the troops and front rear area, did not organize the defense of the most important installations of the rear, concentrating the main efforts on protection of the troops. After the intervention of the leadership this condition was corrected to some extent. For protection of the rear area of the front in the departure position, 25 percent of the antiaircraft missile means of the front, front fighter aviation, and part of the forces of the 7th Army of the PVO of the Country were allocated.The antiair defense of rear areas was also strengthened by the means of the PVO screening the troops of the first operational echelon and the TO & E means of the troops of the second echelons and reserves.

Analyzing this decision, it is necessary to remark on two aspects. Firstly, the main installations in the rear area of the front (the rear area front base and its separate, forward front base, two mobile missile-technical bases, and two separate antiaircraft missile battalions) were screened only by fighter aviation; antiaircraft missile units were not designated for their defense at all.

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Secondly, installations of the army rear and the missile-technical bases close to the troops of the first echelon of the front were in favorable conditions, since they were in fact screened by the overall system of PVO of troops of the first echelon.

This example shows that in the period of preparation for the operation, the army rear as a whole is protected from strikes from the air, while protection of a number of the most important installations of the front rear area is not assured.

The chief director of the exercise pointed out at the critique that when the troops go over to the offensive, the PVO means of the armies and divisions move forward along with the troops and the antiair defense of the rear area of the front is greatly weakened. In spite of this, the strengthening of the antiair defense of the rear of the front after the transition of the troops to the offensive was not provided for in the plan of the PVO troops of the front. A most important failing, if not a defect, in the system of antiair defense of installations of the operational rear, is concealed herein, in our view.

In the pages of the Collections of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", completely contradictory views have been presented on the most important question of the defense of the rear: whether a gap occurs between the system of PVO of the troops of the front and the system of PVO of the Country during the course of a front offensive operation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade S. Biryuzov, in the article "Antiair Defense in Modern Warfare and Trends in Its Development",[1] considers that "toward the end of an offensive operation, a significant gap may occur between organic antiair defense and Antiair Defense of the Country."

1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (58) 1961, P. 10

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Marshal of Artillery Comrade V. Kazakov, in the article "Troops of Antiair Defense of the Ground Forces in Modern Operations",[1] on the other hand, indicates that "in reality no 'gap' arises".

The importance of this question in connection with the problem under examination in this article is that in this gap are located such very important installations of the rear as the regulating railroad junctions, part of the front missile-technical bases, the rear area front bases, and railroad and automobile communication routes of the front.

The experience of command-staff operational exercises, and in particular the operational rear services exercise in the Carpathian Military District, confirms that this gap does in fact exist, and that as the front advances, the main part of the means of antiair defense of troops also moves, with the result that the already limited forces of PVO of installations of the operational rear are reduced. The control of these means is complicated by the fact that toward the morning of the third day of the offensive operation, as occurred in the exercise of the Carpathian Military District, the majority of antiaircraft missile units protecting installations of the front rear area are located at a distance of 100 to 360 km from the front command post.

Thus, it may be considered that the operational rear is almost completely deprived of the forces and means required for the organization of ground defense of the most important rear area installations, and its antiair defense, usually conducted by limited forces, is not assured, especially in the course of the operation.

1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 4 (59) 1961, P. 14

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This is why we consider that, in present conditions, it is necessary to support fully the proposals of Marshal of the Soviet Union Biryuzov — during the advance of the ground forces to a depth of 250 to 300 km, to widen the zone of responsibility of antiair defense of the country or of a border large unit of PVO by moving their borders forward behind the advancing troops, with simultaneous movement of part of its forces for protection of new installations.

A number of measures must be adopted in order to assure the viability of the operational rear. For this, first of all, it is necessary to have special units and large units for defense of the operational rear. Such a proposal is suggested by the experience of World War II, when, in a significantly less complicated situation, special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were placed with combined-arms armies and fronts. Of course, it must be mentioned that the units carried out combat against sabotage-intelligence activity in the rear of the troops, and fulfilled obstruction functions, but did not carry out the defense of the most important installations of the front rear area from the ground enemy. At the present time we need large units and units which will be able to provide defense of the most important installations of the rear, above all front missile-technical bases, rear and forward front bases, antiair defense of rear area installations from low-altitude strikes, and to carry out combat with airborne landings and sabotage-intelligence activity in the rear area of the front.

In our opinion, it is necessary to have these units and large units in cadre form in peacetime, with short periods of mobilization and buildup. The above-mentioned organic units and large units of defense of the operational rear, naturally, will not be able to fulfil all tasks of the defense of the rear, but will become the backbone of the forward means of this defense. In specific conditions, depending on the situation in the operational rear, the commander of troops of the front will assign supplementary forces and means from among the combat large units to the jurisdiction of his deputy for the rear.

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Secondly, it is necessary to solve the problem of antiair defense of the operational rear. In our opinion it is necessary to determine accurately the tasks of antiair defense of troops for the protection of installations of the rear. It is especially important to think over thoroughly, and provide for the coordination of, the forces and means of antiair defense of troops and of antiair defense of the country in relation to the operational rear, so that in the course of an offensive operation the boundary of responsibility for antiair defense of the country is promptly carried forward behind the advancing troops.

Thirdly, it cannot be expected that defense of the rear will be fully provided by any sort of allocated or organic forces and means. It is of utmost importance to increase the defensive capability of rear units and establishments themselves, equipping them with close antitank defense and means of defense from strikes by the enemy from the air at low altitudes. It would also be advisable to have organic observation and warning of enemy air activity in the main rear services units and large units.

Fourthly, it is necessary to organize precise control of all forces and means which provide defense of the rear. For the solution of this problem, in our opinion, two measures must be carried out: the creation of a unified system for the defense of the operational rear and centralization of control of it. Under the direction of the deputy commander of front troops for the rear, a unified system must provide defense of the rear from the ground enemy, antiairborne defense combat against sabotage-intelligence activity of the enemy in the rear, warding off low-altitude air strikes, and protection of the rear from means of mass destruction.

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The necessity of strict centralization of the control protection, defense, and guarding of the rear was reaffirmed in the operational-rear services exercise in the Carpathian Military District. The chief director of this exercise properly pointed out that even the limited forces allotted to organic antiair defense for the defense of installations of the operational rear, quickly became uncontrolled because of their separation from the control point of the commander of troops of antiair defense of the front by a distance of 300 km or more.

We consider that it would be advantageous to combine the control of guarding, defense and protection of the rear in the hands of the assistant commander of the rear of the front for these problems, and to create in the headquarters of the rear of the front a special section for guarding, defending and protecting the rear, freeing the first department of the staff of the rear from those functions. It must be remembered that the deputy of the commanding officer of front troops for the rear has an unusually large amount of work in directing the operational rear. It is known that in the rear services of the front there are up to 500 rear services units, large units, and establishments, spread out over an enormous territory, which, in the course of a front offensive operation, reaches 400-600 thousand square kilometers.

In solving the problems of the control of all the forces and means of defense and protection of the rear, it is interesting to examine the pertinent experience of our probable enemies. Thus, for example, in the combined-arms large units and field army of the USA, it is proposed there will be a center for control of the rear, of which one function will be the direction of the activities of the organs of the rear for defense and protection of the rear areas and elimination of the effects of nuclear attack. In this center of control there is to be a special section for defense and protection of the rear.

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In the new conditions of conducting operations, questions of the guarding and defense of the rear have grown into a problem of great significance. And we are convinced, in the light of this, that its theoretical analysis and practical solution, aimed at raising the stability and viability of the rear, have considerable interest, and promote a further increase in the combat readiness of the operational war.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "On the Question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientific Work", by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "On the Question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientific Work" by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

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On the Question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientific Work

by

Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

The thoughts presented in this article are the results of some of the author's experience in the work of scientific-research groups created during the last four years under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

The great and constantly growing significance of science in our country is known. The application of science has become one of the decisive factors in the mighty growth of the productive forces of society. At the XXII Congress of the CPSU, N.S. Khrushchev stated: "The constant improvement of the forms and methods of the management of the national economy, the most rational use of internal resources and potentialities, and adherence to scientifically founded proportions in the development of the branches of the economy are taking on special significance now..." (underlined by me - V.B.)

Life itself demands of the planning and economic management of new developments a much higher order of scientific substantiation and economic calculations. Profound scientific work on the problems of developing economics and technology must precede the formulation of plans and the confirmation of economic measures. Economic and technical research must facilitate the correct performance of economic tasks.

Obviously, military-scientific work should be approached with equally high standards, because it is gradually becoming the cornerstone of Armed Forces

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development. Military-scientific work in the broad sense of the word encompasses all research activity on military subjects. However, military-scientific work is normally considered to be only the part of this work that concerns military theory and that does not touch upon questions of armament and military equipment. In this article we shall arbitrarily call this part of general military-scientific work military-scientific operational work (including in it not only operational but also strategic and tactical questions), and we shall call the second part military-scientific technical work.

The organization of both component parts of military-scientific work is also different. Military-scientific operational work is conducted by certain faculties and in scientific groups of military academies, in military-scientific societies, and also by the scientific aktiv that is gathered around Military Thought, Naval Collection, and other military journals. During the past few years such work has also been performed in the scientific groups cited in the branches of the Armed Forces. Military-scientific technical work is also taken up in part by the majority of the faculties of academies, according to their curricula, and mainly by the numerous specialized scientific-research institutes of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Experimental-design work and, to a certain degree, the scientific-research work of industrial institutes serving the Armed Forces, are combined with their work.

In the second field of military science there is not only a huge numerical superiority of persons working directly on questions of military theory, but also significantly better organization of scientific work. Military-scientific technical work is conducted mainly in specially organized and equipped scientific establishments, such as institutes, and is fulfilled, as a rule, by harmonious scientific collectives. At the

same time, scientific work in the field of military theory is scattered among a number of establishments, is often fulfilled by persons working alone, not connected with one another, and, if it is fulfilled by collectives, the latter are often selected not on grounds of scientific qualifications, but are staffed by chance (in particular, many scientific groups in the branches of the Armed Forces have actually been selected in this way).

At a time when military-scientific technical work has, for a long time now, been carried out according to specific plans, often connected with large financial appropriations, and is usually fulfilled under rigid supervision, work in the field of military theory began to be planned only recently. It is poorly supervised and in a number of cases its quality leaves much to be desired. As an example, 2 to 4 years ago when one of the scientific groups was working on the problem of combatting ocean-sea communication routes and tried to familiarize itself with existing scientific material on these questions, it was discovered that among the several hundred pertinent monographs, dissertations, graduation theses, and articles, half of them were devoted to one single, important, but isolated topic, "Combat of Submarine and Air Forces Against Remote Enemy Communication Routes". In turn, a large part of the works in this half were compilations that were of no real value. At the same time, a number of vital questions of this combat against communication lines seemed to have dropped out of the field of view of our naval theoretical literature.

Such a situation is characteristic not only of work on this problem, but also on other problems. It can only be explained by deficiencies in planning and by a certain lack of organization in the selection of the subjects of scientific work. With all the need to give scientific personnel freedom in the selection of subjects, the overall maneuvering of scientific forces and capabilities must, first of all, ensure

research on all the essential questions with the necessary time limits.

Finally, while persons working on questions of armament and military equipment are constantly informed on the latest scientific-technical achievements in their field, since without this their work proves to be fruitless, the majority of the theoretical workers in the operational field, because of security considerations, are often not given access to documents that reflect pertinent achievements in the field of science and technology.

To summarize, with the comparatively large number of operatives and tacticians working on the theoretical front, with their quite high training and essential aptitudes*, the coefficient of the useful operation of our military-scientific network is not great: the factual results of its work are much lower than its potentialities. Lately, in connection with organizational-staff reductions, the position of operational scientific work has become even worse, not only absolutely but also relatively. These reductions have had less effect on scientific-technical work.

With any personnel reductions in the composition of the Armed Forces, military-scientific work cannot be weakened, but, just the opposite, it is necessary to broaden and deepen it in every possible way,

* Here we do not examine the situation of laboratory, experimental and the experimental-production base of our academies, and especially, scientific-research institutes. This question deserves separate discussion. It should only be said that in this field much better cooperation is required than exists now between them, especially with organs of industry.

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because only in this way is it possible to compensate for the quantitative reduction of forces. This pertains especially to scientific work in the field of military theory. For, in general, it should stand at the head of the military-scientific, including scientific-technical work. Indeed, this is also demanded by the development of armament and equipment itself.

Of course, changes in the development of weapons and equipment determine changes in the development of military affairs. But, undoubtedly, military theory also exerts its own reciprocal influence on military theory. Military technology cannot develop swiftly without being oriented by military theory. The latter has to indicate paths of development to military technology, the most effective ones from the standpoint of military art. Only on this basis is it possible to develop practical scientific-technical work in the most advantageous directions.

Now, when science and technology are developing so fast, acute scientific thought must be aimed at not less than ten years ahead. Only with this condition is it possible to possess modern armament and equipment of forces at any given moment, because scientific-technical and design work, the testing of experimental models, and the creation of large and smallseries, on the average, take just ten years.

In particular, the matter of research on comparative military effectiveness stands very poorly, including the military-economic profitableness of various methods of fulfilling particular strategic, operational, and even tactical, tasks. In conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction, and their delivery to targets by missiles, almost any one of these tasks can be performed by various methods and correspondingly with various constituents of forces and weapons, belonging to various branches of the Armed Forces.

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These forces, weapons, and methods are by no means equal in value - both purely military and military-economic. But, unfortunately, such comparative investigations are mainly conducted in scientific organs of the separate branches of the forces, and this does not ensure their necessary depth and objectivity, not only as a result of "parochial favoritism" and, thus, of a biassed attitude toward the capabilities of other branches of forces, but even as a result of the aforementioned insufficient knowledge of future possibilities of their neighbors, and likewise as a result of the lack of a common methodology of comparison.

The tasks of the Armed Forces on ocean-sea axes that are quite characteristic in this respect are shown in the table that follows. On the one hand the water has already lost its former "privileged" position, when it served as the only means of communication between bodies of land separated by it. Now the most universal medium, in this respect, is the air. Even though air transport is still limited in respect to weight and dimensions of cargo, and as a result of its relative high cost, a number of tasks formerly performed only on the water and from the water, now can well be carried out outside this medium.

On the other hand the water medium represents the most diverse field of operations, both for surface, submarine, and air forces and weapons. Moreover, for submarine forces it still ensures a fairly high degree of security.

To summarize the general formulation of the question of the preferred composition, not of the "navy" or even of the "ocean-sea forces" but of the forces capable of operating on ocean-sea axes, now comes to the following.

A. To have an effect on any objectives on the water, partially under the water, and also territorial objectives located "across the water", i.e., now it is

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also possible to perform the tasks cited in the table — 1a, and all of 2 and 3 — from the shore. But because , in a number of cases, these operations from the shore (especially against mobile targets) require too complex and expensive a system of target designation and guidance, it must be thoroughly examined against which specific objectives, when and under what conditions, specifically at what distances from shore, it is more advantageous to employ weapons, namely missiles, from the shore and when it is advantageous to employ them from "intermediate" carriers, i.e., first load them on special, mobile submarine, air or surface "platforms" and send them to sea (ocean), in order to move the weapons closer to the objectives.

Besides, as regards task 1a, it is necessary to note the importance of its study in this respect. Now submarines are recognized as the most promising forces for antisubmarine defense, including, above all, operations against missile-carrying submarines. Taking into consideration the very great significance of such defense for us and the huge forces required for it, maybe it is more advantageous to direct submarine construction mainly in this direction? But in some conditions our missile-carrying submarines (as the Americans themselves consider) will prove to be more advantageous than intercontinental missiles? All the more reason that the entire problem must be thoroughly analyzed as a whole.

The question of combat against communication lines, i.e., task 2 * has been studied the most. However even here there is insufficient clarity in

* See the book "Fundamentals of Employing Submarine and Air Forces Against Ocean... (several words missing) 1960.

the point that was just emphasized: with what weapons is it more advantageous to destroy enemy ports and bases - missiles from submarines or intercontinental missiles? And in conditions of nuclear warfare ports are the main objective in combat against communication lines!

The question of the optimal forces, weapons and measures for performing task 3 has been developed even less.

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Standard Ocean-Sea Tasks of the Armed Forces and Feasible Forces and Weapons for Performing Them.*

Tasks		Forces and Weapons								
Basic		Performed Coincidentally	Missile Troops	Submarine	Air	Subsurface ship-surface	Ground	Airborne Landing	Antiair defense/Antimissile defense	
	Offensive									
1.	Operations against coasts:									
	a. With weapons	2a,3,4,5&6	G**	G	V**	(G)**	—	—	—	
	b. With personnel	2a, 6	—	V	—	(G)	G	G	—	
2.	Operations against Communication Lines:									
	a. Against ports and bases	1a,3,5&6	G	G	V	(G)	—	—	—	
	b. At sea	3, 5, 6	(G)	G	G	(G)	—	—	—	
3.	Defense coast from the Sea:									
	a. From aircraft carriers (AV) and missile carriers (RM)	4, 5, 6	(G)	G	G	(G)	—	—	—	
	b. From submarines (PLPL)	4, 5	(G)	G	G	G	—	—	—	
	c. From missiles	——	—	V	V	V	—	—	G	
	d. From landings	2, 5, 6	G	G	G	G	G	V	—	
4.	Communication lines:									
	a. Coastal	3, 5, 6	(G)	V	G	G	—	—	V	
	b. Long-range	3, 5	—	—	(G)	(G)	—	—	—	
	Special									
5.	Combat with enemy naval forces		See 3a & 3b							
6.	Assistance for army flank***	1,2,3,4,5	G	V	G	G	—	G	V	

* The numbering and alphabetical designation correspond to the numbers of the main tasks.

** Key: G-capable of playing a major role; V-capable of playing an auxiliary role; (G)-potential

*** This task breaks down into a series of previous tasks of various scales.

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As regards task 3a, i.e. combat with aircraft carriers and missile carriers, both aircraft and submarines can and must be used for this. However, the employment of ballistic missiles from the ground against them, as well, seems to be promising and requires thorough investigation.

Task 3b, i.e. combat with missile-carrying submarines of the enemy, is especially complex and requires all-around utilization (and hence, also, all-around investigation) of the potentialities of a number of branches of the Armed Forces.

Despite the fact that the next task, i.e. 3c, antiair defense and antimissile defense, must be performed mainly by the forces and weapons of a special branch of the Armed Forces, the participation of the Navy is also useful in its investigation, because some of its potentialities in this respect, namely, the potentialities of mobile radar patrols, that are brought forward deserve attention.

Understandably, in modern conditions, task 3d, i.e. antilanding combat, requires special cooperation of the various branches of forces and corresponding research work.

B. As regards the more or less similar tasks 1b, 4a and 4b, which relate to sea transport, such short-range transport, within the limits of the possibility of our screening them with air and sea forces, are completely feasible even now. But we are now working enough on the question of the optimum forces, weapons and methods for supporting them, and the main thing is that we do not keep this question in the field of continuous attention.

If we refer to long-range transport, namely trans-oceanic, then, of course, military science must always be ready to report at the first demand of the leadership, comprehensive, clear views on the most advantageous variants of forces, weapons and methods for carrying out such transport, with detailed calculations of the time periods necessary, and the cost of creating these forces and weapons. Logically, the following thoughts should be presented here.

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Long-range (transsea and transoceanic) transport may be carried out on the water, in the air and by special methods.

Large-scale underwater transport has poor future prospects, as a result of its high cost and vulnerability.

Surface transport is entirely feasible but requires the support of forces that are superior to those of the enemy. What kind of forces? At present, with the inadequate range of aircraft — mainly surface means. Calculations show that if we wanted to we could create such forces no earlier than 15 to 20 years from now, and this is clearly useless. In the first place, in ten years the international situation will have changed sharply. "When the Soviet Union becomes the first industrial power" —said N.S. Khrushchev at the XXII Congress — "when the socialist system is finally transformed into the decisive factor of world development, when the forces of peace multiply even more throughout the entire world, then the balance will finally be tilted in favor of the forces of peace and the barometer of the international weather will show: clear. The threat of a world war will have passed forever."

Secondly, the technical situation also changes: it will suffice for autonomous aircraft to appear, to have the significance of aircraft carriers fall off sharply.

Hence the only realistic possibility for our carrying out such transport consists of creating sufficiently autonomous, powerful aircraft— not only for the direct performance of part of the transport by air, but also for screening the other part of it —— the transport carried out by sea. And because we also need these aircraft for other purposes, all efforts should be exerted toward its creation, the more so, because of other reasons, we cannot permit the Americans to outstrip us in this field.

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In his recent speeches President Kennedy spoke coolly about atomic aircraft. Of course, for the USA and Britain, which possess powerful aircraft carrier fleets, atomic aircraft are really unnecessary. But is not the USA simultaneously trying to confuse us with its announcements? Do not the remarks of the President remind us of the objections of the USA and Britain at the 1921-1922 Washington Conference, against submarines, which represented a clear threat to them? We cannot escape this thought.

C. In actuality the possibilities of performing task 5 have already been examined, and as regards task 6, in addition to what was said above, an important question is the creation of an amphibious fleet, which, unfortunately, we hardly concern ourselves with.

A few years ago the former Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, said that since the ground forces themselves possess powerful strike weapons, they are not in need of support from the sea. This, of course, is not so. If there is no navy at sea, then some kind of seagoing forces will have to be created by the army itself, as this is done to a significant degree by the U.S.Army, even though they possess a navy. The question is only a matter of what is more advantageous.

This, in brief, is not a program of the necessary investigations of the future forces, means and methods for performing tasks that are before the Armed Forces on the oceans and seas, but the prerequisites to formulation of such a program, and then only some prerequisites, because a number of other important questions have hardly been touched upon—for example, the cooperation of forces and their support—for such an important question as the most feasible standardization of the organization and control equipment in all branches of the Armed Forces, etc..

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Incidentally, it may be said that, while already long before the Second World War the constant and "general" threat of enemy aviation forced the creation of a unified system of antiair defense, now we are even more in need of having, if possible, standard organization and equipment of the control of all the Armed Forces (including observation, communications, secure communications and computer equipment).

As was already stated, the above, as well as other important questions, must be investigated not only directly from the military, but also from the military-economic standpoint. This has almost been ignored until the present time, which explains the completely inadequate development of the methodology of military-economic calculations. For the calculations must be carried out not only for each separate task but also for "algebraic sums" of particular variants of these tasks. Therefore, it is clear that this methodology must be common for all branches of the Armed Forces, but, of course, taking into consideration the specific characteristics of each of the branches of forces in their particular sectors.

"Freedom is the basic necessity." Under the existing situation, complete freedom in selecting the particular forces and weapons which are really better is lacking in a number of cases. It is lacking not only within one or another branch of the Armed Forces, but on the scale of the Armed Forces as a whole. It is already unnecessary to say that such a situation inevitably leads to the need for "impulsive" decisions, opens a broad field for all kinds of irresponsible statements, unnecessary friction, etc..

Naturally the correct solution to this entire, particularly important problem consists of the organization of timely, close, joint, creative scientific work of military theoreticians and engineers. The

question is only how to organize this work correctly, including the correct control and planning of it.

Also, overall considerations and security requirements have forced and are forcing the differentiation of this entire activity above all by the degrees of its concentration and significance. But it is important that in each of its "stages", the abovementioned creative operational-tactical collaboration should be retained. How is it best to organize it?

From the above it is clear that as the paramount scientific organ, it also works directly, plans the work of the "scientific periphery", may only exist at the level of the Ministry of Defense, most likely in the composition of the General Staff or of its Chief Operations Directorate. Only in this way is it possible to ensure complex purposefulness (perspective) and coordination of the development of the individual branches of the Armed Forces and thus, of the Armed Forces as a whole, along with the requisite competence of this organ, and the necessary security of its work.

Occupying itself only with future problems, i.e., being completely separated from current operational planning, this organ, incorporating several tens of the most qualified scientific workers and engineer-specialists on basic types of weapons and equipment*, must work on three basic problems:

— on scientific research into the most promising ways (variants) for performing the main strategic tasks that stand before the Armed Forces;

* Since such a technical organ already exists in the composition of the General Staff in the form of the Scientific-Technical Committee (NTK), maybe it would be best to simply reconstruct this NTK appropriately. Another variant could be the appropriate organization of military-scientific work of the General Staff Academy.

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— on the promising all-around system of armament that ensues therefrom, and equally on the optimal sequence of its creation;

— on the operational-tactical principles for the subsequent development of assignments for the main models of weapons and military equipment that ensue from this system of armaments.

Of course, the small staff of this central scientific organ will be able to handle the huge volume of tasks listed only under the following conditions:

— if its foundation is the work of the "scientific periphery" i.e., other scientific organs such as of the ministry as a whole, as well as of the branches of the Armed Forces;

— if at the same time it carefully follows the achievements of the general non-military sciences capable of having some military significance, and for this its representatives will enter into the top scientific organs of the country that have military interest, in the capacity of observers of their own arm;

— if it does not start to disperse the attention given to insignificant things, both in its own theoretical-research work and in its methodological management of the work of the other scientific organs of the ministry.

In order to observe these conditions it is necessary to deal only with the scientific organs (institutes) of the ministry, that work directly with it, and with the appropriate scientific management organs of the branches of forces. In turn, the latter organs must manage all the scientific establishments of their own branch of forces.

As regards the peripheral network of scientific organs of the Ministry as a whole, and of the branches of forces,

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i.e., academies and scientific-research institutes, in each case their scientific work should be directed toward the accomplishment of an immediate primary task of a particular faculty or institute — operational-tactical or technical. The cooperation of military theory with research in the field of weapons and equipment should fundamentally be ensured just as is done now. In the academies it may be founded on the joint work of related faculties; in institutes — on the existence in each one of them of an overall tactical department parallel with the specialized departments, etc.. The appropriate staffing of the scientific-technical councils of institutes and academic councils of academies must play a definite role.

This reveals the double subordination of scientific organs, that actually exists even now anyway: in all respects — to its immediate command (institutes — to chiefs of the appropriate directorates; faculties — to chiefs of academies, etc.);and in a special respect, more precisely in a scientific-methodological respect — to the scientific organ of the senior command. In the final analysis the faculties of academies and institutes in this special respect must be directed by the scientific management organs of the main staffs of the branches of forces, and these organs — to the management of the General Staff scientific organ. The central scientific establishments of the Ministry that do not enter into the composition of any central directorates must also be directly subordinate to the latter.

As at present, the actual plans of their work — long-range and annual — must be made up by each scientific organ, being guided by the directions of its command and senior scientific organ. In order to decrease inconveniences connected with double subordination, the senior scientific organs must give basic directions to the junior ones only through the chain of command, for example, to scientific organs of the main staffs — in the name of

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the General Staff. In order to avoid delay in the planning of these instructions from the General Staff to the main staffs, they must obviously arrive not later than 1 September, and from the main staffs to the directorates, not later than 1 October of each year.

In all plans not less than a 20 percent reserve must remain for performing "specialized" ("fakultativnyy") tasks that were not envisaged earlier. With the goal of improving planning, to insure first of all the essential subjects and to eliminate the search for the most important questions, when "time limits are already being felt", each planning stage must have and must constantly maintain at a current level, thought out, systematic lists of the most important subjects for research work in the basic sectors under their jurisdiction.

* * *

Science constantly enters into our life and into military affairs more and more. The purposeful "maneuvering" of scientific forces and capabilities to point them toward the performance of the main tasks that facilitate progress has vast significance that has already been recognized. In this respect, the newly formed State Committee of the Council of Ministers USSR for the Coordination of Scientific-Research Work is the main aid to the leadership of the country.

There is no doubt that the management of the entire system of military scientific-research work must be organized in a centralized way something like this, with differences arising from the specific characteristics of the Armed Forces. But successful overall treatment of the paramount military-scientific problems can be ensured only by the presence in the system of this work of a corresponding competent top military-scientific organ.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them", by Colonel V. Zemskov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them", by Colonel V. Zemskov

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them", by Colonel V. Zemskov.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them*

by

Colonel V. Zemskov

Under modern conditions, the role of antiair defense has grown so much that the course and outcome of ground troop operations depend to a large extent on its effectiveness. This is conditioned by the fact that our probable enemies consider a nuclear offensive, in which the leading role is assigned to missiles and aircraft, to be the main substance of the first strategic operation of the united Armed Forces of NATO in the initial period of a war. The goal of such an offensive is to achieve, in a short period of time, nuclear superiority, supremacy in the air and seizure of the strategic initiative from the very start of the war. Its scope can be judged from the experience of the "FALLEX-60" NATO maneuvers where, during three calendar days of the nuclear offensive, 1660 nuclear strikes were conditionally delivered, and up to 5000 aircraft, and also a large number of cruise missiles, "Thor" ballistic missile launchers, URS (upravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad - guided missiles) and NURS (neupravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad - free rockets) of the ground troops participated. Effective combat with this large number of carriers of nuclear charges represents one of the most important tasks of the ground troops in conducting operations during the entire war.

In the light of this, it should be noted that the work being reviewed has great theoretical and practical significance. Its authors, examining the most important problems of ground troop PVO, took a basically new tenet as the basis of

*Problems in the Development of Antiair Defense of Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them. Military Publishing House, 1960, 240 pages and 4 inserts.

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their investigation, which consists of the fact that antiair defense has now outgrown the framework of support and is one of the main component parts of the substance of troop combat operations, directed toward the destruction in the air of the enemy's basic carriers of nuclear weapons--his aircraft and missiles.

Proceeding from this concept, in the first chapter the influence of modern troop combat operations on the organization of antiair defense is correctly brought to light, and the basic requirements for it, resulting from the peculiarities of the operations of the air enemy under the conditions of a nuclear/missile war and the employment of new attack weapons by him, are validly formulated. It is stressed that the antiair defense weapons of the ground troops, by their active operations to destroy enemy aircraft and missiles, actually participate in the struggle for nuclear superiority over the enemy.

The process of changing weapons of air attack has unavoidably required a sound determination of the line of further development of the antiair defense weapons of the ground troops. This most important question is examined in the second chapter.

For combatting operational-tactical ballistic missiles, it is proposed to have special weapons—antimissile missiles, and for destroying high-speed piloted aircraft and cruise missiles at all altitudes, antiaircraft guided missiles of three types: --long-range (ZUR-D) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa-dalnyaya),--intermediate and short range (ZUR-S) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa - srednyaya) and (ZUR-M) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa - malaya). These types of missiles must comprise the basis of the antiair defense of ground troops. Close action antiaircraft guided missiles (ZUR-B) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa - blizhnyaya) manual and mounted (ruchnaya i stankovaya) are recommended as the basic means of combat with low-flying,

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mainly low-speed, aerial targets.

Concerning small-caliber antiaircraft artillery and fighter aviation, in the work it is pointed out that so far they have not yet lost their significance, but they will be ousted by antiaircraft guided missiles, as the weapons having the greatest future promise. It is possible to agree with this only in regard to antiaircraft artillery. Nevertheless, the authors persistently adhere to the idea that there is a need to improve antiaircraft artillery, even to create new models of multiple small-caliber antiaircraft artillery with autonomous radar sights. The question arises, is there any sense in expending considerable scientific-technical and productive efforts to create new models of these weapons? Isn't it better to work out more quickly, and introduce into the troops, the most effective antiaircraft guided missiles of all types?

The conclusions of the authors concerning fighter aircraft, in our opinion, are premature and not quite correct. Modern fighter aircraft, armed with "air-to-air" class missiles, are, at the present time, one of the basic means of antiair defense. In the future their significance and proportion in the overall system of antiair defense will undoubtedly decrease. However, it is impossible to fully replace them with antiaircraft missiles, and is hardly advisable, because both fighter aircraft and antiaircraft missiles have their merits and deficiencies, which can be compensated, and, consequently, continuous reliable antiair defense may be achieved only by joint use of all the forces and weapons of the PVO.

The tactical-technical requirements for all the weapons of ground troop antiair defense are, in our opinion, basically determined correctly in the book. But the proposed combat altitude of long-range and medium-range antiaircraft guided missiles is the same - from 2 to 4 to 25 to 30 km. It seems to us that these

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figures are only applicable for medium-range missiles. For long-range antiaircraft guided missiles it is necessary to increase them to 35 to 40 km. The ceiling of enemy aircraft operations now has already reached 25 to 30 km, and for automatic balloons of strategic designation--30 to 35 km. And, undoubtedly, in the near future the flight altitude of these weapons will increase.

In order to conduct modern operations, the average tempo of which reaches 100 km per calendar day, it is necessary to have highly maneuverable PVO weapons. The existing (S-75) missile complexes are not maneuverable enough because of the low mobility, not only of the launching mounts, but mainly of the missile guidance stations. However, the authors have not examined this question and have not formulated the scientifically based tactical-technical requirements for the missile guidance and target allocating stations which must be included in future antiaircraft missile complexes.

In examining the fundamentals of the operational-tactical employment of troop antiair defense weapons and the most acceptable ways to resolve the problems of firing against aerial targets (Chapter Three), in the beginning the authors give brief recommendations for employing antimissile weapons that are not yet available in the armament of the troops. Despite the fact that these recommendations are presented in a theoretical way, they may be examined as the basis for the practical combat employment of those antimissile missiles that will enter the armament.

In the book being reviewed, the bases for employing antiaircraft missile weapons are presented in a fairly detailed manner, based on theoretical research and a collation of accumulated experience. It is stressed that the employment of long-range and intermediate-range antiaircraft guided missiles, because they are a means of zonal cover, must have a clearly expressed operational nature. Short-range antiaircraft guided

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missiles may be used for both zonal and direct covering of troops and objectives. Therefore their grouping must have an operational-tactical or only a tactical nature. Recommendations on the grouping of missile units are also argued with adequate conviction and may be incorporated into the basis of practical activity; in creating them it is necessary to observe the principle of deep echelonment, including the larger part of them in the first, most powerful, echelon of the PVO.

In modern operations, observance of the principle of continuity in covering troops and objectives attains exceptionally great significance. In investigating this question special attention should be given to the organization of coordination of antiaircraft guided missiles with fighter aviation in order to insure true continuity of troop PVO in an offensive and the organization of the employment of antiaircraft missile units during combat operations conducted at a tempo of more than 4 km per hour.

However, the possibility of further increasing the tempo of an offensive is not sufficiently considered in the work. Only one version of displacement is given and it is stressed that continuity of troop cover will be disrupted with an average offensive tempo of more than 4 km per hour. Consequently, during pursuit, when troops will be moving at higher tempos, this task cannot be performed at all. However, the organization of coordination of antiaircraft guided missiles with fighter aviation, with the goal of insuring continuity of troop cover during an offensive operation, has not been examined at all,

Under modern conditions, in view of the fact that the most varied, including high-speed, weapons of aerial attack exist, the problem of organizing coordination between antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation has become considerably more complicated. On the whole, in the work the basic propositions are correctly formulated on these three types of coordination: --distributing

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efforts by zones; in one zone, and by time. The most complex, and at the same time the most effective in practice, is the organization of coordination by means of distributing efforts in one zone. It should be expected that this very question will be given the greatest attention. Unfortunately, very few specific practical recommendations on it are given.

The problem of organizing radio countermeasures against the air enemy in ground troop operations is fairly new. Nevertheless the authors were able to formulate the basic tasks of radio countermeasures fairly accurately and correctly and point out the general scheme for the utilization and the principles for organizing the combat operations of these means. However, the recommendations made require comprehensive practical checking. On the whole it is essential to continue constantly and persistently to work on this problem.

Questions of methods for determining the required quantity of the basic active weapons of antiair defense are thoroughly brought to light in the work. However, the collective authorship proceeded from the potential scale and nature of the operations of the enemy's weapons of aerial attack according to data for only up to the beginning of 1960. In a problematical work the nature of possible changes in the development of these weapons should have been pointed out in general terms. The reader who will use the data on the quantitative and qualitative composition of the aviation-missile grouping of the probable enemy must keep in mind that even now it has already undergone substantial changes. This is especially applicable as far as the missile weapons are concerned. Besides, it should be taken into consideration that since 1960 the NATO Command has begun widescale adoption of carrier-borne aircraft, which was not so in the past, and also "Thor" and "Polaris" missiles, to participate in a nuclear offensive and to support combat operations of the ground troops.

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In principle, the method for determining the required number of active PVO weapons for front troops, proposed by the authors, is acceptable. But a slightly overestimated version of the composition of the front troops was used as the basis of the calculation. Experience from operational-strategic exercises of the last few years shows that the composition of the front troops usually includes only 17 to 20 up to 25 to 26 combined-arms divisions, and not 26 to 35, as indicated on page 89. And in the future, in our opinion, the composition of the front, as the number of nuclear weapons allocated for an operation increases, can only decrease somewhat, but not increase. Besides, in the given version of the calculation, it is not pointed out which operation is being carried out by the front, defensive or offensive. Consequently, some abstract version of the amount of active PVO weapons required by the front troops is proposed. This would be justified only if the authors considered that such a factor as the nature of the operations of the troops being covered does not influence this. But, on page 80, they themselves point out that "the nature of the use of the troops being covered in an operation and a battle" should be taken into consideration. Moreover, on pages 208 and 213 (tables 17 and 18), two more versions of the composition of the active PVO weapons of the front are given, but here separately for offensive and defensive operations.

On the whole, despite the fact that this question is given a great deal of attention, it is still stated in a contradictory manner and without adequate bases. In our opinion, when determining the required quantity of active PVO weapons, it is most correct first of all to take into consideration the nature and the proposed scope of the front operation, and in all cases to be guided by this, together with consideration of other factors.

Up until recently, many varying opinions and views existed on questions of the control of PVO troops and their coordination, both in theory and in practice.

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In our opinion, the authors, on the basis of a thorough analysis of theoretical research and accumulated experience in the troops, were able, on the whole, to make completely correct conclusions and practical recommendations (Chapter Four).

It is stressed completely fairly that under modern conditions the front must carry out only operational control of all the PVO weapons of the front. The functions of tactical control should be given to the army level. In connection with this, in the front and army, it is proposed to have a PVO troop staff or a control organ that would be capable of insuring firm and continuous direction of all PVO weapons during an operation. But having, on the whole, made a correct conclusion concerning the inadvisability of carrying out tactical functions at the front level, the authors for some reason recommend that the chief of the PVO troops of the front should have part of the PVO weapons under his direct control, while failing to point out the purpose for which these means are necessary, as well as specifically how and by whom their fire will be controlled.

Reliable cover from nuclear strikes of the main rear area objectives, especially missile-technical units, and also of transportation centers, has great significance. The authors correctly stress that with the modern spatial scope of operations it is impossible successfully to perform this task without creating control organs for PVO weapons within the front rear area headquarters.

For effective control of modern PVO weapons, the authors of the reviewed book propose the creation of a special autonomous system of communications. In addition, the need to use the channels of the combined-arms communications system for the control of PVO troops of the front (army) is pointed out. At the given stage of the development of communications equipment, this, for the time being, is the most correct resolution of the above problem.

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In the work a great deal of attention is given to an examination of the problem of comprehensive automation of the processes for controlling active PVO weapons. It is stressed that when solving this problem the required speed for transmitting data and commands, maximum centralization of the control of the basic active PVO means, and correct organization of coordination among them must be insured. The rapid development of aerial attack and PVO weapons already requires an immediate practical solution of this problem. But having resolved it in the shortest possible time, it will be difficult to count on the successful fulfilment of the tasks that face the PVO troops. The recommendations developed by the authors on this question, taking into consideration projected tendencies in the development of communications and control equipment and prospects of domestic science and technology, can, in our opinion, also be incorporated into the basis for resolving the problem of the comprehensive automation of the processes of controlling PVO weapons.

Support of the combat operations of the PVO troops of the ground troops is examined in a special fifth chapter. In this, special stress is laid on radar support.

In modern operations, success in the antiair defense of troops depends, to a great degree, on the timely and complete receipt of necessary intelligence and target designation data by all the active PVO weapons simultaneously. Having analyzed the capabilities of the existing system of radar support for PVO weapons of the front and army, the authors have come to the correct conclusion—that it is not only not capable of providing all the active PVO weapons with data simultaneously, but is not even capable of providing each of them singly (page 148).

The proposals of the authors on radar support are basically fully acceptable. However, for some reason,

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the work does not take into consideration those means of reconnaissance and target designation that the antiaircraft missile large units and units have at their disposal. At the present time, and in the near future, they should be examined as a very substantial reserve of radar equipment in the hands of the chief of the PVO troops of the front (army). The indicated equipment can play a very important part in case operating radar posts, in those areas where combat formations of antiaircraft missile units and large units are deployed, are put out of commission. It seems to us that this question deserves investigation and practical verification in the troops.

In the reviewed work the authors devote a great deal of attention to providing PVO troops with missiles and, in our opinion, came to the correct conclusion, that it is impossible precisely to plan the expenditure of missiles by days of an operation, because it depends on the intensity of the air enemy's operations. And this factor, as is known, cannot be predicted accurately in advance. However, when presenting practical recommendations, the authors depart from this conclusion and still propose planning the expenditure of missiles released for the front by days of the operation, and even hold to the tentatively planned expenditure of missiles by days of the operation for the front. It seems to us that the authors are acting incorrectly in artificially limiting the expenditure of antiaircraft missiles and antimissile missiles. Obviously, it will be limited mainly by technical capabilities. If there is still a need to plan the expenditure of missiles by days of the operation, then it is more advisable to take the technical capabilities for assembling, equipping and delivering the missiles to fire subunits and units as the basis of the plan, taking into consideration the extremely tentative nature of the air enemy's operations.

Effectiveness in the operations of PVO weapons, to a large extent, depends on their rapid and high

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quality engineer support. And we fully support the authors, who write about the urgent need to have organic engineer subunits, equipped with modern highly efficient and portable equipment, in the PVO troops of the ground troops.

In the sixth chapter the future organizational structure of the PVO troops of the ground troops is examined. Several versions of how large units, units and subunits should be organized are proposed. On the whole, the recommendations have many positive features, but they require checking in practice. Thus, according to the opinion of the authors, in the tank and motorized-rifle division it is more advisable to have a regiment of close action antiaircraft guided missiles than a regiment of ZUR-M. According to our deep conviction, both divisions must have antiaircraft missile regiments with short-range missiles composed of 3 to 4 fire units, and in the motorized-rifle and tank regiment there must be a battery of mounted close action antiaircraft guided missiles composed of 3 to 4 mounts. We base this on the fact that in modern operations, the operations of large units and units on separate axes and in broader zones will be most characteristic. This will require the large units to have great independence in reliably covering troops from strikes by the air enemy. In addition, it is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that motorized-rifle and tank large units and units, having ground missiles, tanks, and artillery in their composition, have great fire and striking power, and will be the most important objectives for a strike by the air enemy. For this reason, they must be reliably and continuously covered during the entire operation, not only at low, but also at medium, altitudes, which can be accomplished more simply and reliably when there are both close action antiaircraft missiles and ZUR-M in the composition of the division.

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On the whole, the proposed organization of a brigade of medium- and short-range antiaircraft guided missiles corresponds to modern requirements, but even the brigade, in our opinion, must have no less than three regiments or battalions (with three fire units in each) in its composition. By having brigades composed of three regiments (battalions), it will be possible to achieve continuity in covering troops during an offensive conducted at an average tempo of 6 km per hour.

In the last chapter the fundamentals of the antiair defense of troops in offensive and in defensive front (army) operations of the initial period of a war are set forth. Under these conditions, the PVO of the troops and rear area objectives of deploying fronts will be carried out only with those weapons that are at the disposal of the troops of the first strategic echelon, i.e., formations and large units of the border military districts and groups of forces. In the reviewed work, the requirement that the antiaircraft missile units, fighter aviation and radio countermeasure means existing in groups of forces and in border military districts, must be at full strength, deployed, and be in constant combat readiness to conduct active combat with enemy weapons of aerial attack, is correctly formulated. It should be stressed that this requirement has an extremely important significance when the aggressor is preparing for a surprise nuclear attack. Experience from the past war conclusively showed that the success of the attacking side was usually explained not only by the factor of surprise, but also by the incomplete combat readiness of the armed forces.

In conclusion, it is essential to stress that all the deficiencies noted by us are of a specific nature, and cannot lower, as a whole, a highly positive evaluation of the work. The reviewed book is the first one on the given subject in the postwar period. The authors deserve great credit for being able to create

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a really problematical and perceptive work. It does not reiterate principles that are common knowledge, but creatively, on the basis of an analysis of the modern requirements of operational art and scientific-technical capabilities, trends, probable paths of development, and solutions to the vitally important problems of the PVO of the ground troops, are brought to light, and practical, acceptable recommendations are given. The work examined by us may be adopted as the basis for a practical resolution of the basic problems of PVO of the ground troops, not only for the present time but also for the near future.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

5 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "A Front Offensive Operation Conducted Under the Conditions of the Initial Period of a Nuclear/Missile War", by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "A Front Offensive Operation Conducted Under the Conditions of the Initial Period of a Nuclear/Missile War", by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "A Front Offensive Operation Conducted Under the Conditions of the Initial Period of a Nuclear/Missile War", written by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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A Front Offensive Operation Conducted Under the Conditions of the Initial Period of a Nuclear/Missile War

by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov

The power of the armament of modern armies and the probable radius and force of the destructive effect of new means of combat have now reached such a level that the roles of many of the concepts and requirements of the military art which were established previously are completely or partially disappearing. Indeed, the necessity of reviewing a series of obsolete beliefs and views and of taking an essentially new approach to the solution of questions of the operational and combat employment of troops is arising. In connection with the birth and rapid development of such a new type of armed forces as missile troops, new laws are being established in military affairs and the nature and substance of the interdependence existing between strategy, the operational art and tactics are being changed.

In contrast to previous wars, when the fate of the operation was decided principally on the field of battle and strategy basically crowned the efforts of tactics and the operational art, now the operational art and tactics very often will begin with the exploitation of the results of strategy or, stated better, with the exploitation of results of a strike by strategic weapons to complete the success of such a strike. Strategy will now operate not only with mass armies but also, directly with the use of large units of strategic missiles whose employment will have decisive influence on the progress and outcome of separate operations, as well as on the armed combat as a whole.

This does not mean, however, that the missile troops can independently decide all, or even a large portion, of the war's strategic missions. As indicated by the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, in contemporary conditions, just as previously, the successful conduct of combat activities is possible only on the basis of the coordinated use of all the types of armed forces and all means of combat. Mass employment of strategic and operational missiles

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with nuclear charges may sharply reduce the time of attainment of strategic goals of the war, will permit the infliction of crushing destruction on the enemy in a short time, and alter the forms and methods of the conduct of an operation. But it will not in any way reduce the role of man in warfare. Man has been and will remain the principal factor in the conduct of armed combat.

It is erroneous to think that a future war will actually become a kind of "nuclear/missile duel". To the same extent, it is incorrect to believe that the operations of the ground troops will lose their significance and that their missions will be limited to the overcoming of the unorganized resistance of the remnants of the enemy's troops and to the occupation of his territory.

The experience of many exercises testifies that even with the complete destruction of the majority of the industrial areas, the elimination of the most important transportation centers from use and the destruction of the most important air and missile bases, the enemy in many cases preserves the capability not only for resistance but also for the delivery of powerful strikes, frequently restores the combat effectiveness of groupings of his armed forces, and often attempts to seize the operational initiative. His complete and final destruction in the theater of military operations, under any scale of use of nuclear/missile weapons by both sides, is achieved as a rule only as a result of very intense combat, after the capture by ground and airborne troops of vitally important areas of territory, of centers of nuclear/missile weapons production, of the main airfield network, and also of the majority of the siting areas of the enemy's operational and operational-strategic missiles.

Fulfilment of the stated missions, as a rule, requires the execution of a series of successive front operations with the utilization of a very significant quantity of troops and weapons, including troops from border military districts.

In his article[1] Colonel-General Gastilovich, along with many absolutely correct conclusions, expressed the

1 Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue 1960.

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assumption that in view of the expected results of the use of strategic nuclear/missile weapons for the completion of enemy destruction in the European theaters of combat operations in modern conditions, 20 to 25 divisions in all are sufficient for the composition of the first strategic echelon, but taking into account the replacement of probable losses - 30 to 40 divisions. Furthermore, in his opinion, the above-mentioned forces can meet the main resistance only in the border zone of a depth of several tens of kilometers, after which the troops will have tasks connected chiefly with the overcoming of radioactive-contaminated zones and the occupation of the territory of hostile nations. Thus, active combat operations of the ground troops, in General Gastilovich's conception, are reduced in fact to one border engagement with a subsequent swift advance by large units without serious enemy resistance.

We believe that in spite of the enormous power of strategic nuclear/missile weapons, there still are insufficient foundations for such a conclusion. This permits the well-known underestimation of the enemy, and the countermeasures conducted by him, and does not consider the actual composition and disposition of NATO armed forces in the Western theater of combat operations (TVD) or the specific conditions of the execution of nuclear/missile strikes within the theater boundaries (even though connected with the prevailing direction of the winds).

In fact, if we are to believe that after the first nuclear/missile attack, our troops, located directly in the TVD in a depth up to 1,000 kilometers, will be able to preserve up to 2/3 of their forces, why then is the same possibility excluded with respect to the enemy? Why is the probability of the formation of new troop contingents and the transfer to the TVD of strong reserves, including reserves from the USA, Spain, and Algeria, completely discounted? Is it realistic to pose a question about the possibility of absolute disruption of these measures? Why is the probability of active operations on the part of a series of enemy groupings ignored; and why is it that, from the first days of the war, we contemplate only the complete withdrawal of his forces originally deployed in the border zone? Finally, what foundations are there to

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assume that, after the first front operations, the enemy will practically refuse to fight and that the advancing troops will have only to occupy his territory?

The experience of exercises does not confirm this. On the contrary, it shows in the majority of cases that with the conclusion of the first front operations armed combat in the TVD not only does not cease but is capable of assuming an even sharper character. The communication lines of our troops are being stretched out. The reserves fall behind. At that very time, the enemy, profiting from the great vulnerability of the crossings of our water boundaries and also from his more developed transportation system, can bring up fresh forces from the depth more rapidly and can establish new groupings and activate the use of his nuclear/missile means in a shorter period of time. As a result, a very serious situation can be created in a number of directions. It is also characteristic that at this moment, as a rule, new operational axes are opened up before the advancing troops, so that new strategic missions arise which require the introduction of additional forces and equipment.

In General Gastilovich's opinion, the 30 to 40 div divisions which began the operation must carry on the advance up to the ultimate limits of the theater. But what remains of them at the moment of completion of the immediate strategic mission? According to calculated data, verified by us in a number of exercises, on the 9th or 10th day of a war, the combat strength of up to 2/3 of the large units included in the composition of the first operational echelon of the front was generally already reduced by up to 30 to 35 percent of its original composition and furthermore, that up to 50 percent of the personnel remaining in action had to be hospitalized or evacuated to the rear because of their having received large doses of radiation.

Under such conditions it is clear that if an immediate buildup of strength from the depth is not carried out, the operation can abate and the success attained come to naught.

It is also indubitable that in the course of the

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initial period of a war large engagements will inevitably take place not only in the border zone but also further on actually throughout the entire extent of the front operations, because no matter how powerful the first nuclear/missile strikes, not all targets and all groupings of the enemy can be destroyed by them. The complete radioactive contamination of absolutely all enemy occupied territory of the TVD cannot be ensured for a prolonged time. According to the nature of the actual meteorological conditions, this is unlikely, and indeed, obviously inexpedient. Therefore, during the initial period of a war, the troops must not orient themselves for a march, but for intensive combat operations in the various areas, and moreover, not only in gaps, but also directly in the zones of high radioactive contamination.

In light of such conditions, we think that the composition of forces as defined by General Gastilovich for the fulfilment of the most immediate strategic missions will clearly be inadequate. One must proceed from the necessity of deploying a front not in the TVD, but on each of the strategic axes, incorporating not less than 3 to 5 combined-arms and tank armies in its composition, depending upon the operational scope, and also a number of separate divisions. Moreover, it is necessary to assume that in some cases the resolution of the most immediate strategic tasks might require, even during the course of the initial period of a war, an additional deployment of new armies and even fronts in the theater of military operations, not for the occupation of enemy territory, but for the conduct of active combat operations.

The specific means and forms of conduct of front offensive operations undertaken on various strategic axes during the initial period of a nuclear/missile war, will depend upon the characteristics of these axes, and the general strategic situation, but mainly upon the number and nature of the strategic nuclear/missile strikes carried out by the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Stavka VGK) in the theater of military operations. It may be assumed that prior to and during the course of the first front operation, several massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes will be carried out in the axis of the offensive of each front and will be tied into one another by the general strategic plan

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but distinguished from one another by assigned mission and by the areas of territory within whose limits the main body of nuclear/missile ammunition will be employed. The first of these strikes, usually a counterstrike, will be the most powerful. It will be conducted simultaneously in the entire strategic depth with the aim of eliminating individual states with limited territory from the war and also with the aim of inflicting within a short time by the main groupings of the armed forces, such losses as would permit the rapid seizure of the strategic initiative in the very beginning of the war.

In subsequent massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes, the main efforts of the missile troops can concentrate either on the fulfilment of analogous missions but with destruction of other less important or surviving targets or switch to the destruction, primarily of economic centers and areas, ports and transportation centers, with a view to the rapid annihilation of the enemy's military - economic potential and the disruption of his mobilization measures and strategic transport.

Of course such a sequence in the implementation of strikes is not the only one possible. It should be examined only as one of a large number of the most probable forms of the use of strategic nuclear/missile weapons. Quite varied forms of massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes can be employed in a specific situation in a TVD. It is not ruled out, for example, that in every one of them all of the tasks mentioned above will be resolved simultaneously rather than consecutively, in which case the sequence of the neutralization of targets for every group of tasks will be determined in accordance with the degree of their importance and the general concept of the strategic operation.

The main and decisive role in the execution of massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes will undoubtedly, belong to the strategic missile large units directly subordinate to the Stavka VGK. However, in a number of cases, both for the initial and successive strikes, it is also possible to include the missile weapons of the fronts for the fulfilment of separate tasks in a zone

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up to 300 to 500 kilometers from the border. In organizing their utilization, the Stavka VGK, apparently, will indicate to the front troop commander:

- the areas for carrying out nuclear/missile strikes to be accomplished by strategic weapons in the front zone of operations and capable of rendering direct influence on the development of the initial front offensive operation;

- the time and composition of front missile weapons included in the participation in the counterstrike and of subsequent massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes;

- the borders of the sectors established for the use of missile weapons of fronts;

- the tasks of front missile weapons to be fulfilled in the interests of the entire strategic operation, with instructions regarding the targets to be destroyed, their coordinates, and the time of destruction;

- the direction, zone, or the area within the borders of neighboring fronts in which maneuvers by nuclear/missile strikes must be prepared.

On the basis of this, the front troop commander must make a specific decision with regard to the destruction of all targets assigned to him or selected independently, including: establish the number of nuclear/missile strikes conducted by front and army weapons; the expenditure of nuclear ammunition utilized; plan the sequence and order of destruction of various targets, the yield and types of nuclear bursts, the coordinates of their epicenters, the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the target, the time of their readiness, etc.

The execution of powerful strategic nuclear/missile strikes in the TVD will raise sharply the capabilities of the fronts, will lead to a further increase of the scope of front operations, and at the same time will seriously affect their makeup.

When planning an operation, the front troop commander

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must carefully calculate the influence which the strategic nuclear/missile strikes may have on the operations of troops under his command, must estimate the probable level of destruction of various enemy groupings and targets, envisage when and which areas will become zones of high level radioactive contamination as a result of surface nuclear bursts and how these will reflect on fulfilment of the tasks assigned to the front.

Only after this can correct conclusions be drawn regarding the expedient organization of the operation, the most advantageous grouping of forces and weapons, the direction of the main strike, the order of use of our missile and nuclear weapons, and also, regarding all other questions of operational planning.

As a whole, the concept of a front offensive operation undertaken in the initial period of a nuclear/missile war must, in our opinion, reflect the following basic points in all cases:

1. The order of participation of front nuclear/missile weapons in the counterstrike and of subsequent massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes organized by the Stavka VGK in the theater of military operations.

2. The method of exploitation by ground and airborne troops of the results of nuclear strikes carried out by large units of strategic missiles and missiles of medium range.

3. The method of destruction of the deploying or deployed strike groupings of enemy troops by combined operations of operational and organic (voyskovaya) missiles, ground troops, aviation, and airborne troops.

4. The nature of the active cover of secondary axes by a minimum of forces in conjunction with a wide maneuver of nuclear/missile weapons depending on the possible operations of the enemy.

Of the aforementioned, it is especially worthwhile to examine the measures ensuring the opportune exploitation by a front of the results of strategic nuclear/missile

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strikes. We imagine that the aforementioned requirement will be achieved first of all by means of a swift breakthrough by front tank groupings into points or areas neutralized by strategic nuclear/missile strikes, with the aim of seizing these areas before the enemy liquidates the results of the assault; by the development of vigorous offensive operations at the moment when a large portion of the enemy operational-tactical weapons for nuclear attack will be neutralized or put out of action; by the utilization of zones of contamination created for the disruption of an enemy maneuver, blockading his groupings from the flanks, and for the economy of friendly forces on axes where because of an unfavorable radiation situation the operations of ground troops will prove to be impossible.

As regards other elements of the concept connected with the organization of destruction of the groupings of missile units, ground troops, and aviation deployed by the enemy on various axes in the front zone, it is our opinion that in all situations they must contain the idea, firstly, of surprise nuclear/missile neutralization of the most important groupings by front, army, and organic missiles at the most favorable moment, and secondly, the immediate exploitation of results achieved by combined-arms and tank armies by inflicting swift strikes from the march on those axes where the enemy does not expect it and where, as a result of the massive use of nuclear missiles, he is weakened to the greatest degree. In short, the front troop commander must determine when, where, and in what way the decisive destruction of the enemy will be carried out by various groupings with the assistance of front and army nuclear missiles and then --- what form of operational maneuver by the ground troops can be employed in order to finally destroy and finish off his troops, annihilate or capture an airfield, launching installations, and missile bases, thus ensuring the complete fulfilment of the assigned tasks of the operation.

It can be assumed that four groups of strikes, each different in character, will be delivered in the direction of the operations of the front troops:

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- strategic nuclear/missile strikes carried out in accordance with the policy of the Stavka VGK for the destruction of the enemy in the theater as a whole;

- nuclear strikes executed by strategic weapons at the request and in the interests of the front;

- nuclear strikes by front weapons carried out according to the Stavka plan for the fulfilment of individual missions of strategic significance;

- nuclear strikes by front weapons, carried out in accordance with the decision of the front commander in the interests of fulfilling his own missions.

All of these strikes must be carefully coordinated and considered in the plan of a front offensive operation with a view to the fact that they should complement one another during the suppression and destruction of various enemy groupings, his firing means, and rear installations.

A detailed elaboration of the questions of the use of front nuclear/missile weapons will now form the basis for the planning of a front operation. We must proceed from the fact that with the modern scale of use of nuclear/missile weapons, they can no longer be considered only as a means of supporting the combat operations of the troops. Within the framework of the front, this weapon now becomes the primary and decisive means of combat which determines the possiblity of the fulfilment of the majority of the tasks of an offensive operation. Therefore, the concept of the delivery of front (army) nuclear/missile strikes appears to be the most important pivotal element of decision and plan of the operation. The operations of division ground troops must be planned in conformity with the selected method of the use of the nuclear/missile weapon and not the reverse.

It is quite clear that under such conditions the purposeful planning and conduct of operations will appear impossible without an early preparation of the sequence of the use of nuclear/missile weapons in the entire depth of an operation with regard to the probable

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perspectives of its development.

As the experience of exercises demonstrates, it is advisable not only to plan the tentative distribution of nuclear/missile weapons according to axes and the tasks to be fulfilled, but also to determine, to the extent possible, the main massive nuclear/missile strikes which will be organized and conducted by the front with centralized use of both front and army weapons. It is necessary to establish the tentative number of such strikes, and when, for what purposes, and approximately what expenditure of nuclear ammunition will be used.

It is apparent that in the course of the operation there will not be so many such strikes (generally not more than 5 to 7), for, as experience has shown, a front cannot conduct more than one or two massive strikes within a 24-hour period. It is clear that of all these strikes only the first massive strike (primarily counter) will be carefully planned and organized in advance in all details, including the selection of specific targets (main and alternate), determination of sequence, the timing, and the nature of their neutralization. As regards the remaining massive strikes, they can and must be worked out only in a general way with determination only of the main tasks to be fulfilled, tentative periods for their implementation, and the approximate expenditure of nuclear ammunition. This will permit us to avoid the unexpected and will provide the front troop commander with the opportunity of having a sufficient amount of weapons in readiness at the necessary moment for a decisive influence on the situation.

The operations of front ground troops, closely combined with the massive use of nuclear/missile weapons in operations of the initial period of a war, will most likely take the form of swift and deep strikes delivered by separate tank groupings on independent axes with a mass landing of tactical and operational airborne forces in the depth and a broad movement of individual units by helicopters for rapid surmounting of zones with high radioactive contamination and also for the reinforcement of those troop groupings which have burst out ahead. As a rule, such a swift offensive will be closely combined with the simultaneous conduct of sustained defensive

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battles and engagements on other axes with energetically advancing enemy large units which have made a deep penetration. As a result, a very complex interlacing of combat formations of ground troops is created in a majority of cases. The engagement will develop on a very large front, but in depth it can simultaneously envelop a territory of several hundreds of kilometers. The combat will take on an extraordinarily sharp character for seizure and retention of the operational initiative. Success will accrue to the side which, in a shorter period of time, achieves sizable operational results, uses its nuclear/missile strikes more effectively, more quickly captures the principal areas where aviation is based, and especially the launching sites of enemy operational - tactical missiles. The front troops must not permit a deep penetration by enemy groupings and at the same time they must break through, in the gaps between the zones of contamination formed, and sometimes directly across these zones, in short time limits and at a high tempo, to the largest political and military-industrial centers of the enemy, to areas where his reserves are being formed, to ports, and also to the other most important objectives of the operational and strategic rear. At the same time it is necessary to ensure the decisive destruction of both these retreating enemy groupings and the new enemy groupings being deployed in the rear. Front tank troops must break up these groupings, force them into impassable areas or zones of contamination and liquidate them piecemeal.

As a rule, a surprise counterblow of several groupings from various directions in combination with massive nuclear strikes by army and front missiles must be organized for that. To aim for the encirclement of large enemy forces in such a situation will obviously be inexpedient. Indeed, to carry out such a maneuver will be extraordinarily difficult because of the impossibility of a reliable blockade of the encircled troops, as was correctly stated in the pages of the Special Collection of the Journal, "Military Thought" by General Gastilovich and General Tolkonyuk. Therefore, instead of encirclement with formation of a "ring", the advancing troops must strive to capture only the most

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important centers of transportation on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy, to restrict his maneuver by specially formed zones of contamination, to disperse the isolated grouping into units and then, meteorological conditions permitting, suppress them with powerful surface nuclear strikes.

The question of the operational makeup of front troops in an offensive operation of the initial period of a war stands in a category of its own. In view of the increase in the scope of possible enemy use of weapons of mass destruction, the necessity arises for further dispersion of forces and equipment. However, this does not mean that one can extend troop combat formations ad infinitum and undertake an offensive on an operational axis with only separate divisions or even just units. In all situations, the front and army must resolve their tasks not as individual large units but as operational groupings, each of which can have up to three or four divisions. Only in such a situation can one ensure continuous and rapid accumulation of forces from the depth, timely replacement of troops who have lost combat effectiveness, and a sufficient force for striking the enemy.

In this respect, General Gastilovich adheres to a different view in his article. He believes it advisable to repudiate completely the term "strike group" and proposes to introduce the term "offensive of separate divisions on independent axes". Thus, the idea of isolated strikes by small forces is being advanced.

On the basis of the experience of exercises conducted in the Group of Troops (Gruppa voysk) and also in other military districts, we believe that such a method of operation even with very large-scale use of missiles with nuclear charges of high yield will hardly be correct. Of course, if we count on an unhindered advance of troops through devastated territory, then an offensive by separate divisions can provide some results. But, if we proceed from the fact that the enemy will be able to preserve a certain portion of his forces and will attempt to undertake vigorous offensive operations, then the proposed method in conducting the offensive can hardly lead to significant success.

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We agree with the fact that our division, in the event it is equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, will be a powerful force. But can one division destroy one or two enemy divisions in a short time under conditions of direct contact when the use of high-yield nuclear ammunition is excluded? Can we ensure sufficient viability of such a "small grouping" and a continuous increase of its efforts from the depth? In the final analysis can we, with one large unit, simultaneously resolve several varied tasks, which, as a rule, will arise on any operational axis?

Obviously, not isolated divisions but operational groupings are needed for this. Depending upon the situation, the operational grouping may be formed and may operate in different ways. In the absence of direct contact with the enemy the gaps between the individual large units included in its composition may reach 10 to 15 kilometers or more. But in the course of battle the troops of an operational grouping must operate as an entity, maintaining close tactical and nuclear-fire liaison with one another. The fear that they can be destroyed by one strike of a nuclear missile with a megaton charge are groundless because the use of such a weapon is impossible under conditions of a dynamic engagement with direct contact by both sides in the tactical depth. As regards nuclear strikes of small and medium yields, they can inflict the same loss on the troops whether the divisions are operating within the composition of the grouping or if they are separated one from the other.

The matter is somewhat different as regards the disposition of operational and special reserves. We believe that they cannot be concentrated on the most important axes, as was done previously. Obviously, a great portion of the reserves and second echelons, will have to be dispersed along the entire front zone, avoiding areas within whose limits there might be objectives which are convenient targets for a nuclear/missile assault by the enemy (for example, large industrial centers, centers of transportation, ports, etc.).

The echelonment in depth of reserves must be sharply

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increased: in an army, up to 200 kilometers at least and in a front, up to 500 kilometers. It is true that at first glance such norms under the high performance conditions of modern engagements may appear to be excessively high. But one must keep in mind that these are the ultimate zone borders for the disposition of reserve large units, and that the immediate reaction to sharp changes of the situation can now and, obviously will, be carried out first of all by massive use of nuclear/missile means. At the same time a large echelonment in depth of the reserves will permit them to escape destruction by high-yield nuclear strikes, since it will afford an opportunity to enlarge the gaps between large units up to 30-50 kilometers and deploy each division over an area up to 300 square kilometers if part of the army reserve and up to 500 square kilometers if part of the front reserve.

Now, concerning the second front echelon. Is it necessary? General Gastilovich believes that it is not. In modern situations, according to him, only separate divisions can be introduced into an engagement from the depth. If it is necessary to overcome strong enemy resistance or to switch efforts quickly to a new axis, this must be accomplished principally by "concentration of nuclear weapons and their delivery means" and not by introducing strike groupings into the engagement.

We believe that such a juxtaposition of various front forces and weapons in an operation of the initial period of a war is not quite correct. In fact, a rapid change in the situation, as a rule, can be achieved only under conditions of a coordinated delivery of both nuclear/missile strikes and ground troop strikes. Every attempt to resolve a task by nuclear means or by ground troops alone is doomed to failure.

There are not sufficient bases to assume that separate divisions brought into an engagement in isolated axes after a massive nuclear assault can seriously influence the situation, particularly during the critical moments of the development of the operation. During battle with a strong enemy grouping, this will impede the exploitation of success and can bring about

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the piecemeal destruction of such divisions. The speedy resolution of a newly arisen important operational task can only be achieved, today as formerly, by the use on an operational axis of an operational grouping of troops composed of not one, but two or three and even four fresh divisions, united under a single army command. Consequently, a second echelon is necessary. However, its commitment into an engagement will apparently, have to be carried out somewhat differently now, on a wider front and, in a number of cases, not on one but on two adjacent axes.

How will the initial front operation of the initial period of a war under conditions of the Western TVD proceed as a whole? Naturally, this will depend on many factors, including the nature of the initiation of the war and the results of the first nuclear/missile strikes of both sides.

Enemy use of a large quantity of nuclear missiles and strategic aviation in the first strike can undoubtedly, inflict enormous material and moral damage on the opposite side: seriously weaken its military-economic potential, disrupt the established troop groupings (if they are not sufficiently dispersed), disrupt the mobilization build-up of the armed forces, etc. However, this still does not mean that the fate of the war, its initial period, or even the first strategic operation will be decided by such a strike.

Experience of exercises shows that with thorough preparation of the country for war and with sufficient dispersion of missile launching sites over a large territory, a surprise attack does not at all deprive the troops of the possibility of inflicting a nuclear/missile counterstrike of great force.

It should be taken into account that modern means already permit the detection of the flight of missiles when they are several thousand kilometers from target. Therefore, each side will have time to give the appropriate commands to missile units and to organize as a counter-strike the first launching of ready solid fuel missiles before the enemy is able to put them out of action.

One can also anticipate that the ground troops,

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subjected to an attack, will often retain the capability for active operations, thanks to the high results of the counterstrike and will be in condition to conduct a successful fight for the seizure and retention of the operational initiative. In any case, on the main strategic axes of the Western TVD it is necessary to aim primarily for immediate development of an offensive /3 or 4 words missing/ of the rapid exploitation of the results of a nuclear/missile counterstrike.

However, one cannot exclude a situation in which the results of an enemy nuclear assault will be so serious that there will be practically no forces for a quick shift to the offensive. In such circumstances the efforts of commands and staffs must be directed at bringing their forces back into order as quickly as possible (in any case before the enemy), preserving the initiative in the use of operational-tactical missiles and, at the most favorable moment when the enemy is weakened to the extent possible, at beginning vigorous offensive operations in decisive directions with the newly created groupings. The determination of such a moment requires great skill. This requires precise calculation, the ability to evaluate correctly our own capabilities and the capabilities of the enemy, and the most expedient planning of the targets for repeated nuclear strikes, of the deploying time of friendly strike groupings, and of the sequence of their entry into combat.

Depending on the level of operational readiness of the antagonists, the effectiveness of the first nuclear/missile strikes, and the decisions reached, the shift to the offensive by front ground troops can be carried out under conditions of a deep invasion of enemy strike groupings at the moment of their deployment on the border or, finally, in the course of the creation of such groupings in the depth. In all of these cases, the front troop offensive apparently will take the form of a series of large meeting engagements waged simultaneously in several directions.

Success on at least one of these axes must be achieved quickly and developed with utmost resolution in depth. Front strike groupings (especially the tank

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units included in their composition)must advance swiftly to the objectives destroyed by strategic nuclear strikes, split up the enemy reserves which are being moved up, and in cooperation with airborne forces must destroy them piecemeal. For this, the average rate of troop advance must reach 70 to 90 kilometers and for tank divisions - 100 to 120 kilometers per 24 hours; when conducting strategic nuclear/missile strikes on the TVD this can be considered entirely practicable.

The correct planning of the battle for fire superiority over the enemy and skilful organization of the fire support of troop operations will have vast significance for the attainment of a high offensive impetus.

During World War II the basic tasks of fire support were resolved principally in the process of conducting artillery -- air preparation and artillery -- air support of an offensive. Now, fire support greatly exceeds these limits in its aims and nature. Its basis will not be fire by conventional means of combat but primarily powerful nuclear/missile strikes, delivered on the entire depth of the enemy's formation.

In view of this, artillery and air preparation and support of the offensive as previously understood lose their significance. Actually, they are being converted into only one of the composite elements of fire support and not the principal one at that. In the majority of cases their task will be primarily the preparation and support of assaults by individual units and subunits. Therefore, they will find their basic use at divisional and regimental level.

In the army, and more so in the front, scope, fire support of an offensive operation as an operational concept will include: participation of front missile weapons in massive strategic nuclear/missile strikes organized by the Stavka RVK in the TVD, nuclear-fire preparation and nuclear-fire support of advancing troops.

The tasks of nuclear-fire preparation and support will be carried out by front, army, and organic missiles and also by light fighter-bomber aircraft, tube and light rocket artillery in close coordination and calculated to

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ensure the possibility of conducting a continuous troop advance with average tempos of 70-90-100 kilometers in a 24-hour period. In this event, the targets of fire strikes are not only enemy troops and fire means in the tactical and near operational depth, but also his missile units, aviation, tactical and operational reserves, control points, and also installations of the operational rear.

Because of the frequent and sharp changes of situation characteristic of the initial period of a nuclear war, the inevitable dropping out of action of individual elements of the operational organization and because of the possible establishment of extensive zones of contamination with lethal levels of radiation in the directions of the troop offensive, wider maneuver of forces and weapons than formerly will have to be conducted in the course of a modern front offensive operation.

The front troop commander must be constantly ready to transfer his efforts from one direction to another, in order to reinforce one troop grouping or another. This will be achieved primarily by means of a rapid reorientation of missile weapons and the maneuvers of their strikes with nuclear warheads. But reorientation solely of missiles does not provide the proper result in many cases, particularly since in mobile forms of combat there often will not be suitable targets either in the tactical or operational depth for the delivery of a large quantity of nuclear/missile strikes.

Therefore, as a rule the maneuver of nuclear strikes must be inseparably combined with the maneuver of ground troops, their forces, and weapons.

Of course, a rapid transfer of troops over considerable distances is sometimes linked with extraordinarily great difficulties. An especially severe situation can be created in this respect during the initial period of a war when many lines of communication are put out of action. Great skill is necessary under conditions of mass destruction to lead large units and units over territory with extensive zones of contamination during continuous activity of enemy aircraft overhead. Regrouping of troops in such a situation will require exceptionally precise control of the columns, flexible

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maneuver of them, repeated changes of routes of movement, and the conduct of extensive obstacle-clearing measures. Everything will have to be taken into account: the condition of the terrain, the radiation situation, the destruction created fires, the probable direction of the spread of radioactive dust clouds, etc.

In many cases all fixed bridges over both large and medium rivers in the directions of the movement will be knocked out of service. As a result, the laying of new river crossings will be required and quite often, the organization of crossing of river lines by tanks along the bottom. Naturally, all this cannot but affect the march tempos. In any case, estimates on the possibility of accomplishment by divisions /2 or 3 words missing/ in the course of the operation, daily marches of 300 to 350 kilometers can become practicable only with very well calculated engineering support, reliable screening of the columns from the air and also, with careful organization by the commandant's service, and the equipping of all large units with their own ferrying equipment.

The complex conditions of maneuver and the conduct of combat activities in front operations of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war require further improvement of the organizational structure of our ground troops.

Experience of exercises shows, for example, that tank armies of the existing composition will experience serious difficulties in their operations in almost all strategic directions under the conditions of the Western TVD. The inadequacies of motorized infantry sharply complicate their forcing rivers, the capture of densely populated and wooded areas, the overcoming of zones of great destruction, etc. Therefore, it is advisable to have tank armies composed of three tank and one motorized-rifle division. Eliminate heavy tank divisions as a permanent element from the tank army (TA) composition. Keep them in the capacity of large units of the High Command Reserve for the reinforcement of troops in separate directions.

Concurrently, the question of the future reorganization of tank divisions also arises. Postwar experience

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persistently bespeaks the advisability of conversion of tank divisions of T-55 type tanks. It is necessary to eliminate the heavy tank regiment of the tank division from the division.

In its stead, we should have, in the army composition, a heavy tank brigade as a reserve of the army commander for reinforcement of tank divisions in an offensive or defensive operational situation. The division artillery should be converted to self-propelled rocket artillery of the type of the separate battalions of the Rocket Artillery (RA). The entire parkofarmored carriers should be replaced with amphibious armored carriers. The division TOE should include a regiment of Mi-4 helicopters, instead of a helicopter flight (zveno), not for liaison, but for the support of combat operations of the division in the operational depth.

The necessity has arisen to introduce serious changes in the structure of the operational and troop rear service areas as well. Practically all the command-staff exercises of the past years have convinced us that despite the reorganization already carried out, the rear cannot yet properly support combat activities of the troops in operations of the initial period of a war. Because of the high tempos of the offensive of the troops and the mass destruction of communication lines, the existing system of supply and evacuation, based mainly on the use of rail and automotive transport, and the intended successive transshipment of cargo to front and army depots, is not justified.

Usually materiel for the troops begins to arrive already by the 3rd to 5th day of a war with great irregularity. As a rule, rail transport is put out of action. The work of automotive transport becomes difficult because of its limited quantity. The excessive bulk of rear organs also continues to affect adversely the activities of the rear. The army mobile base, for example, is now calculated for a volume of up to 5,200 tons of various cargo. Meanwhile, army transport is not in a position to pick up this quantity of supplies in one trip. Therefore the base, as a rule, falls behind and is not able to cope with its tasks.

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The complicated tasks in the organization of materiel-technical support of front operations of the initial period of a war require the vigorous elimination of these deficiencies. We believe that the basic means of supply and evacuation at the front and army levels must be air transport, automotive transport and only partly railroad transport. In connection with this, it is advisable to include heavy-duty helicopters and aircraft in the TOE of division troops at the rate of a division of Mi-4 and Mi-6 helicopters to an army and 3 or 4 air transport divisions to a front.

It is necessary to equip fuel dumps with field pipelines. For supplying fuel to the troops and servicing tank columns in the course of combat there should be "tanker" helicopters of large capacity with which a net of GSM (fuel and lubricant) distribution points could be organized in the operational depth and in the theater of military operations. By so doing, the dependence of materiel-technical supply on communication lines is eliminated and the necessity of excessive closeness of supplies to the troops is eliminated.

At the same time, it is necessary to review completely the system of supply and evacuation with an eye to abolishing the intermediate links. Previously, these were necessary because the supply arm was restricted by the possibilities of automotive transport turnaround. With the shift to a combined system of supply and evacuation, this principle does not justify itself. Therefore, in our opinion, there is good sense in organizing the supply of large units and units with all sorts of combat provisions and supplies directly from front depots located at various distances from the front line. In this way the reduction of supply time will be ensured and conditions will be created for flexible maneuvering of supplies on a front based on specific conditions in the conduct of combat operations by the various troop groupings.

Armies should maintain only a reserve of materiel (not more than 2,000-2,300 tons) which the troop commander could use to affect the support of the troops operating in the directions of the main strike.

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It is quite clear that the questions enumerated do not by any means exhaust the entire substance of the problems arising before us in connection with the study of the peculiarities of the preparation and conduct of an operation in the initial period of nuclear/missile war. But their statement and correct solution, in our opinion, can promote further development of military-theoretical thought, and the investigation and elaboration of new, more perfected forms and methods of troop combat operations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

8 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Problems of Modern Operations", by Lieutenant-General I. Tolkonyuk

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

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Atomic Energy Commission

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Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Problems of Modern Operations", by Lieutenant-General I. Tolkonyuk

DATE OF INFO: Early 1960

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Some Problems of Modern Operations", by Lieutenant-General I. Tolkonyuk.

This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 First Issue was the initial issue of this publication.

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Some Problems of Modern Operations

by Lieutenant-General I. Tolkonyuk

The problems of conducting military operations when both sides use nuclear weapons have already been under study in our system of operational training for several years.

A good deal is being written on these problems in our military press. However, in practical operational preparation, in the pages of the press and in military-scientific work, these questions are examined very timidly, which is out of keeping with the conditions of nuclear warfare. The matter is not taken beyond the adaptation of old forms and methods to new conditions, although the discussion should be concerned with essentially new categories of military affairs. It seems that the time has come to sacrifice boldly many of the theses from which the basic principles of operational art and tactics have developed.

Military art is confronted with the fact that nuclear/missile weapons bring strategic significance to the fire strike (ognevoy udar). There are many reasons for supposing that it will often be possible to crush the enemy's will to resist only by the strikes of nuclear/missile weapons. This phenomenon, which the nuclear age has brought to mankind, confronts states and their armed forces with a series of the gravest problems in the realm of military activity.

For this reason, our military thinking must work deeply on all the problems connected with the preparation and conduct of modern nuclear warfare. Once we have fully resolved these problems we can discuss forms and methods of conducting military operations. First of all, our nuclear/missile strategy must be worked out most precisely, since it is the strategic nuclear/missile weapon which will be decisive in the achievement of victory. Then, on the basis of the strategic requirements for the accomplishment of strategic tasks, and for the exploitation of the results of the nuclear/missile strategic operations being conducted, it will be necessary to work out the methods and forms of conducting combined operations with the types of armed forces, which are the subject of examination in the field of operational art.

Along with the study of the problems of nuclear/missile operations and the use of weapons of mass destruction in zones of military operation, it is necessary to make a radical reexamination of the

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problems connected with the use of ground troops and naval forces, whose utilization and operations must correspond to the conditions created by the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The resolution of questions of operational art and of questions on the preparation and conduct of modern operations is possible only on the foundation of solutions to the problems indicated above.

The absence of even slight experience in nuclear/missile warfare demands the ability to foresee and to analyze; it demands deep and logical thinking. To glance unerringly into the future, making realistic allowance for the prospects of development of the means of armed combat - this, in our opinion, is the urgent task of our military theory.

In this article it is our aim to raise only certain problems of modern operations and to express our views on these problems briefly.

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Nuclear/Missile Operations. The important strategic missions which, in the previous wars of our times, were accomplished by the conduct of a series of strategic offensive operations by ground, air, and naval forces, and which usually lasted a month or more, can now be accomplished in a very short period of time with the massed use of nuclear/missile weapons. Such an objective as depriving a hostile state or coalition of states of the capability to resist can be achieved, it would seem, in the course of a few hours or, at the outside, within a few days.

Of course, we do not consider that it is possible to capture the enemy's territory with nuclear/missile weapons. For this we will need mobile, well-trained ground troops with modern equipment, transport aviation, airborne troops, and troops supporting their operations.

It is possible, however, to deprive the enemy of the means of conducting war by nuclear/missile weapons alone if one has a sufficient quantity of the latter and knows how to use them to the greatest advantage.

The accumulation of a sufficient quantity of nuclear/missile weapons permits the conduct of so-called nuclear/missile operations for the performance of strategic tasks.

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What is meant by strategic nuclear/missile operations?

In our opinion, strategic nuclear/missile operations mean operations conducted by the missile troops at the decision and plan of the Supreme High Command, by the delivery of nuclear strikes aimed at depriving the enemy of the most important means of conducting war, at disrupting his civil and military administration and his national economy, and at breaking his ability and will to offer further resistance.

The execution of such operations will probably be the most important and the most crucial act of a future war. This is why the questions of preparing, supporting, and executing such operations must become --------- [remainder of sentence missing].

To learn how to prepare and conduct such operations is clearly the most vital task of our highest military echelons today; but this is a fairly complicated matter, not tested by experience, and entailing great responsibility. Here we have to deal with a very expensive means of warfare, which is used up in a short period of time, and which may not be available for repeating the operation in the event that the first attempt was unsuccessful.

The preparation of a nuclear/missile strategic operation and the attainment of its goals require first of all a good knowledge of the enemy's territory and of the geographical distribution and points of concentration of: modern means of warfare, primarily nuclear and missile industry; the storage points for nuclear ammunition (boyepripas) and missiles and the bases for their assembly and preparation; the main branches of industry; the launching sites of missile weapons and their control systems; the system of antimissile defense; transportation junctions; the most important points of concentration of manpower; sources of electrical power; the communication centers of state and military control, etc. On the basis of these data it is necessary to select targets in the enemy's territory whose destruction by nuclear strikes would paralyze the country and its military capabilities. It would seem that it is sufficient to destroy the most important points on the enemy's territory in order to place him in a situation in which it is impossible or senseless for him to undertake any measures whatsoever for continuing the war.

In planning such operations we should not scatter our resources, even if we are forced to deal with a powerful coalition of enemy states. It is necessary first of all to put out of commission the main partner

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who represents the basic and directing force of the enemy camp; having lost the combat capability of their main partner, the satellite countries will be faced with the impossibility of starting or continuing a war.

To find the enemy's main links (zveno), whose destruction will paralyze his power -- this is the most important task to be performed by a nuclear/missile operation.

Thus, for the preparation and effective conduct of strategic nuclear/missile operations, it is necessary:

- to know in detail and to evaluate correctly the capabilities and the viability of the opposing side;

- to select the most vulnerable targets for a strike; of these, to take only the minimum necessary to accomplish the objective of the operation;

- to determine the amount and yield of nuclear charges needed to ensure the destruction of the targets selected;

- to determine the number of missile installations necessary for the delivery of the nuclear charges to the targets selected, taking into account accuracy (tochnost popadaniya);

- to choose the most suitable time for delivery of the strike;

- to organize control of the missile troops participating in the operation.

In the preparation of the operation, a very important place is occupied by the reconnaissance of the strike targets. An incorrect picture of the enemy, of his vitally important centers, or ignorance of the location of his most important means of warfare, can result in the strike being delivered against secondary targets, which will not achieve the objectives of the operation.

No less important is the proper selection and preparation of the missile launching sites to ensure the greatest effectiveness and convenience in launching. The stockpiling of nuclear charges, their delivery to the launching sites, and their mounting (stykovka) on the missiles represent a large volume of work of primary importance, requiring the expenditure of much time and effort.

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Finally, there is the very complex question of organizing the control of the missile troops and of the launching and guidance systems of the missiles.

It is quite obvious that the preparations for a nuclear/missile operation are very complicated and demand well-trained personnel, a great deal of painstaking work, large numbers of qualified people, and the expenditure of colossal material means. However, the results that a successfully performed operation can bring are such that no means or efforts should be spared to achieve them.

The actual execution of such an operation will take a very short time. It appears that it will take from a few hours to a few days. In one instance, if sufficient means are applied, the strike may last a few minutes and will take the form of the launch of a particular series of missiles, in the form of an immense volley (zalp). In another instance, several series of missiles may be launched in the course of a few hours or even a few days, and the situation may then take on the form of a sort of missile duel.

It is quite possible that during the course of the war it will be possible to conduct only one strategic nuclear/missile operation which should determine the outcome of the war. If the enemy is a strong coalition, possessing powerful nuclear/missile weapons, we may land in a situation in which it will be impossible to carry out a subsequent nuclear/missile operation.

In any case, nuclear/missile operations must be carried out simultaneously in all, or at least in several, decisive theaters of military operations.

In presenting this question, we do not think that strategic nuclear/missile operations will have to be conducted with the aim of destroying all the hostile states composing the enemy coalition. This will be neither possible nor necessary. The operations must be directed at the main link of the enemy coalition, at his backbone. Once the enemy's back is broken he can be finished off by other means and methods.

After a strategic nuclear/missile operation has been carried out, it will be imperative to know the results of the strike immediately, to know to what degree the mission has been accomplished and how far the objective of the operation has been attained. Study of the results of a strike and of the degree of damage done to the

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enemy in a short time is an important job for the Supreme Command. It is needed so that the methods of carrying out further actions to exploit the results of the operation which has been performed may be determined and final victory may be achieved. To achieve final victory, it will be necessary to conduct offensive operations with ground troops, using mobile large units, airborne troops, naval forces and naval landing forces to crush the enemy troops who have survived or who have retained their combat capability, and to occupy the key positions in enemy territory. It follows, therefore, that nuclear/missile strategic operations will probably be the main link in the overall plan for waging a war. They must be conducted in close conjunction with the above-mentioned operations by ground and airborne troops and naval forces, who, in carrying out their tasks, must take maximum advantage of the effect of nuclear/missile strategic operations.

Modern Offensive Operations. The conduct of nuclear/missile strategic operations----/several words missing/ scales of aggressive operations by the ground troops. No matter what the effect of a nuclear/missile strategic operation may be, final victory can only be won by the occupation of the enemy's territory, or at least of the key positions.

Consequently, in order to attain final victory it is necessary for ground troops to carry out offensive operations. This is explained, first of all, by the fact that far from all the important targets and groupings of troops on the territory of the enemy will be destroyed by the strikes of a nuclear/missile operation, since to neutralize or to destroy everything with sufficient certainty would be practically impossible, and not even desirable. Whole areas, even very important ones, will remain untouched by strikes in these operations.

Even in those areas or in those theaters of military operations where the main targets and groupings of troops will be subjected to overwhelming blows during a nuclear/missile strategic operation, not everything will be destroyed, and it is mainly here that operations by ground troops are needed to exploit the results of the nuclear/missile strategic operation and to achieve final victory over the enemy.

In some theaters of military operations or in one section or another of these theaters and in one or another of the strategic or operational directions, nuclear/missile strategic operations will not

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be carried out, because it will be either impossible or inexpedient. In all such instances, it will be necessary for offensive operations to be carried on by ground troops. These can take the form of offensive operations by a group of fronts or of an offensive by a front or by an army, carried out either within the framework of front operations or independently. In addition, combined operations may be carried out by missile and ground troops and by the navy.

Similar operations (without the use of nuclear/missile weapons) were carried out during the Second World War. Now, however, they will be of an entirely different character.

In the first place, for the performance of the tasks with which they are confronted in operations, ground troops now have at their disposal, in their missile equipment, the means for the use of high-yield nuclear weapons. This allows them, in the shortest possible amount of time, to inflict overwhelming blows against the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, against his basic groupings in the entire depth of their deployment, which can lead to the disorganization of the opponent's troops and deprive them of the ability to put up any serious resistance.

These blows can deprive the enemy of his missile installations, of the aircraft at his airfields, destroy his supplies of nuclear and missile weapons, put the airfields themselves out of commission, annihilate the basic groupings of the enemy's ground troops, and disrupt maneuver and control in a theater of military operations. In addition, this weapon makes it possible not only to inflict losses upon the troops of the enemy, but to destroy them completely, or at least to subject them to such strikes that they will lose their combat effectiveness completely.

In the second place, possessing weapons of mass destruction, ground troops will be in a position to crush the enemy's reserves in their mobilization deployment or buildup areas, preventing them from approaching the battlefield. This situation imposes entirely new conditions for combat with the reserves, and poses the question of the repulse of the counterstrikes and counterattacks of the enemy in a new form.

It seems that in future battles counterstrikes may be ruled out entirely, if the attacking force is able to organize the reconnaissance and destruction of the enemy's reserves correctly.

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In the third place, the defensive maneuver of bringing up replacements and materiel to the field of battle can be prevented from the very outset of combat operations.

In the fourth place, the first nuclear/missile strike can, practically speaking, knock out of commission the basic elements in the enemy's system of troop control, which makes the unified and firm direction of the troops impossible.

In performing an offensive operation, a front must, above all, exploit to the maximum the results of a previously executed strategic nuclear/missile operation , as well as the results of their own nuclear/missile strikes. Thus, the goal of an offensive operation by a front must be the quick seizure of the key positions on the enemy territory so that he has no opportunity to recover from the blow and to carry out substantial counteraction. The most important task of the troops of the front will be the annihilation of those groupings of troops and weapons of mass destruction which have survived the nuclear/missile strike or have retained their combat effectiveness.

The depth of front operations in the recent past was primarily determined by the front's ability to suppress the enemy with a large degree of consistency in the given depth, by the depth of the operational formation of the enemy, by the permissible elongation of the rear areas (rastyazhka tylov), by the lag in the basing of airfields, and by the degree of effort and exhaustion which the troops were permitted to sustain. For the successive execution of intermediate tasks the front was allotted definite boundaries for the immediate and follow-up missions. Within the framework of a front operation several successive offensive operations by armies were carried out.

The most important form of operation was the encirclement of the basic grouping of the enemy and his subsequent annihilation. This was done in order not to give the enemy a chance to withdraw his grouping to the rear area, put it in order, reinforce it with reserves, and to organize further operations, i.e., to make it impossible for him to escape destruction or annihilation. The most important phase of the operation was breaking through the enemy's defense.

How do these questions appear in modern operations? Since modern weapons permit a consistent degree of annihilation (and not just suppression) of the groupings of the enemy in the entire depth

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of his deployment, the offensive must encompass the entire depth at once. For this purpose, the mobile groupings of the front must follow the nuclear/missile strikes and proceed in the most advantageous directions into the depth of the enemy's deployment to chosen objectives or to selected areas. Landings of airborne troops must be made immediately to capture objectives located deep in the interior, and in a coastal area amphibious landings must take place. Part of the troops must be moved by air. In such a situation combat focal points will form in the entire depth of the operational direction along which the offensive operation is being carried out. Only in this case can the results of nuclear/missile strikes be exploited effectively and in good time.

From this, it seems to us that the principles for planning a front offensive operation which we accept at present are outdated and no longer correspond to modern demands.

The division of the overall task of a front into immediate and follow-up territorial categories, to be carried out in sequence, does not permit the fullest and most effective exploitation of the capabilities of today's new means of combat. In planning an operation, it would appear to be more expedient to envisage two goals -- the immediate and the final goal of the operation.

The immediate goal of a front offensive operation should be the destruction by nuclear/missile weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, the annihilation of the basic groupings of his troops, the destruction of his communication lines and radiotechnical systems, disruption of his government and military controls, the liquidation of his supplies of materiel, and the disorganization of the population, i.e., the liquidation of the enemy's ability for organized resistance.

The final goal of the operation must be the capture of key positions or vitally important areas on the enemy's territory, i.e, the occupation of his territory.

In order to reach these goals the main operational problems for resolution by the commander of the front must be; to define the objectives whose destruction by nuclear/missile weapons should deprive the enemy of the capability to resist or counterattack and to determine the yield, types, means, timing, and method of these strikes. The resolution of these problems will in fact also resolve the main strike in the operation.

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After this, the commander of the troops of the front should determine the areas or objectives which must be captured by ground or airborne troops, or by troops carried by aircraft and helicopters, or, in a coastal area, by amphibious landing forces, in order to envelop the entire depth of the enemy's territory in the shortest possible time. He must determine the initial (iskhodnyy) grouping of the ground troops and the direction of movement of the mobile groupings for the capture of selected areas or objectives, and for the annihilation of surviving groupings of enemy troops, or of those which retain their combat effectiveness. Further, he must coordinate the timing and the tasks to be performed by all arms of troops, and resolve all the remaining questions connected with the preparation, organization, and execution of the offensive operation.

In this connection we must bear in mind that there is no longer any need to establish solid groupings of troops along a narrow front, as was the case in the past, when a front was forced to do this in order to penetrate the enemy's defense, since it is unthinkable that the enemy, under modern conditions, will establish any harmonious (stroynyy) system of defense with the continuous front and boundary lines typical of the last war. Supposing that such an attempt were to be made, it would lead to the annihilation of the defenses by nuclear weapons, and the entire front would in any case be destroyed.

On the whole, however, there will be no continuous fronts, and consequently the penetration of the enemy's defenses on an operational scale has already passed into history. It is possible that in isolated cases there will be a penetration of the enemy's defenses, but this can happen only in a tactical sense.

Proceeding from what has been said above, it is also necessary to review the matter of army offensive operations. It seems to us that there is no need for the combined-arms and tank armies operating within the composition of a front to execute several army operations in the framework of an offensive by the front. The tank army must penetrate to the entire depth of the front operation, and occupy that part of the opponent's territory which is farthest from the line of departure. The combined-arms armies should be given the task of operations throughout the depth of the front operation, or be assigned to occupy a specific portion of territory within the boundaries of the front operation. Airborne and amphibious landing forces, as well as troops being moved by air, must also occupy specific centers or areas in the interior of the enemy's territory.

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The tempo of the operation is a different matter. Measuring the tempo of a modern offensive operation by the daily advance of the ground troops is senseless, in our opinion, because this will not be in accordance with the decisive conduct of the operation, and will not allow the timely and effective exploitation of the results of the strikes of nuclear/missile weapons in the entire depth of the operation . The duration and procedure of conducting the operation -- these are the main issues in the calculations, rather than the tempo, in its former meaning. A battle will split into separate focal points of combat, dispersed over a large area, and therefore the planned advance of a mass of ground troops as a continuous front is unthinkable.

The most important and perhaps the most complicated element of modern offensive operations will be, it would seem, the preparation of the operation. It will include an entire set of complicated measures, large in scope, and labor-consuming, which will need a definite, and probably lengthy, period of time. Therefore, in studying modern operations, our operational art must pay special attention to the problems of the detailed preparation of an operation, because its successful execution and the results obtained will depend entirely upon its preparation. Hence, in our view, a modern offensive operation should consist of two phases; the preparatory phase and the phase of execution of the operation. These periods must be determined by the General Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme High Command, in close coordination with the strategic nuclear/missile operation being prepared, in order to coordinate and unite the efforts of the forces and means of those participating in the nuclear/missile strategic operation, and of the ground troops operating in one or another strategic direction. In addition, it appears that the nuclear/missile means of fronts will often be detailed for participation in and execution of a nuclear/missile strategic operation being carried out by the General Headquarters with the forces of missile troops of strategic designation.

It is plain that the preparation of such an operation is a complicated and crucial process which should start at the moment the front receives an assignment to carry out an offensive operation and end at the moment the signal is given to deliver the nuclear/missile strike. This phase will probable take longer than the actual phase of execution of the operation.

The phase of execution of the operation should begin at the moment the signal is given to begin the nuclear/missile strike, and end at

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the moment the final goal of the operation is reached. Now, when nuclear/missile weapons have become the basic means of destruction of the enemy and the decisive factor in achieving victory over him, it would be incorrect, to say the least, to call the beginning of the activities of the ground troops the beginning of the operation, because the start of artillery preparation, or the shift to the offensive of the ground groupings, does not represent the main phase of the operation; these activities will be of a subordinate nature in comparison with the operations of the missile troops by whom the destructive missile strikes will be inflicted on the enemy.

The first operations in a future war will be of a decisive nature, and the ultimate outcome of the war will probably depend on their successful execution. Therefore, the primary and urgent [one or two words missing]--of military thinking is the most thorough elaboration and the theoretical solution of all the problems connected with their preparation and execution.

The Materiel and Technical Support of Modern Offensive Operations. The advance of ground troops in an operation will undoubtedly be carried out under difficult circumstances. Supply bases, depots, communication lines, and other targets in the rear area may be subjected to heavy nuclear strikes by the enemy; the operation of railroads may be disrupted and delivery of materiel and technical supplies by air may be impeded. Thus, one can not count upon being able to supply troops with materiel according to plan during an operation which has already started. In this connection, both missile troops and ground groupings must have all the necessary materiel supplies at their disposal before the start of combat operations. These supplies must be dispersed, well concealed, and camouflaged, in areas which would be convenient, and from which issue to the troops at any time can be ensured. As much of this material should be stockpiled before the start of the operation as would be needed to carry the entire operation through to its ultimate goal. In addition, provision must be made for a specific reserve of these supplies, also concentrated in convenient areas, from which they could be delivered to the troops by motor transport and by helicopter. Fuel should be supplied mainly by pipeline in order not to burden other, more vulnerable, means of transport with its delivery.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

10 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Initial Period of a Future War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During This Period", by Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms
RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Initial Period of a Future War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During This Period", by Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy.

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This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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The Initial Period of a Future War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During This Period

by

Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy

Our Party and the Soviet Government are striving to achieve the lessening of international tension, the curtailment of the arms race, and the prevention of war by conducting a peace-loving foreign policy. The Soviet Union is doing everything which lies in its power to achieve this goal. One of the convincing proofs of this is the visit of our governmental delegation, headed by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, to the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

However, as is known, the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union is clearly not to the taste of the aggressive circles of the imperialist states which have grouped themselves around the United States of America, who continue, as they have in the past, to conduct a policy of exacerbating international relations, of stepping up the arms race, and of preparing for a new war. As soon as the efforts of the Soviet Union and of other peace-loving states directed toward the lessening of international tension begin to produce perceptible results, these states once again bring the world to the brink of war by the most extreme measures. In the last analysis, this can lead to the outbreak of a new war. History is already acquainted with many such examples so unfortunate for the fates of nations.

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Under these circumstances, the main task of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union is the further improvement of combat readiness for immediate operations, with the aim of disrupting the attack of the enemy and of crushing him decisively.

The constant qualitative changes in the development of the Soviet Army and Navy which are taking place before our very eyes call for a great deal of work on the further development of Soviet military art by all generals, admirals, and officers, in accordance with the present-day requirements for the conduct of armed combat.

One of the most important problems of military science, the study of which is given much attention both in our country and abroad, is that of the initial period of a war. This is, of course, fully understandable, since the outcome of a future war will depend to a considerable degree on the results of the first clashes, the first strikes of the combatants. For this reason, the study of the problems of the initial period of a war and the preparation of the types of armed forces for the conduct of military operations during this period have great theoretical and practical significance for us.

But in order properly to understand, and to resolve the problems of the initial period of a future war, we must have a clear conception of the nature of this war. We will therefore try, if only in a general way, to review this problem.

The nature of a future war. In examining the nature of a future war one must first of all take into consideration the existence of and struggle between the two world systems, the socialist and the capitalist. In spite of the tremendous efforts of the Soviet Union to conduct a policy of peaceful coexistence, which we have touched on earlier, the struggle of these two systems, under certain conditions, may become sharply

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exacerbated, and the imperialists will then attempt an attack on the USSR or on the other countries of the Socialist Camp, which represent the chief obstacle to the achievement by the imperialists of their aggressive goals. Such an attack can scarcely be confined to a local war. It will most probably lead to a world war in which the states belonging to the two opposing world systems will take part.

Consequently, in speaking of the possible nature of a future war, we start from the premise that it will be of a world-wide, coalition character. In this war, because of the existence of irreconcilable contradictions between the socialist and capitalist systems, any sort of compromise will be almost impossible. Both sides will pursue the most decisive political and military goals - they will strive to achieve total victory.

To wage such a war powerful modern weapons (sredstvo borby) and massive armed forces will be needed, together with the utmost exertion of the entire moral and physical strength of the peoples and economies of the belligerent states.

In recent years, the opinion has been expressed in the West, and sometimes even in our own country, that a future war will be of short duration and may be concluded in the course of several weeks, or even several days. Such prognoses are based on the fact that modern weapons are capable, in a short period of time, of inflicting such heavy damage upon the enemy that it can be presumed that he will be unable to continue the war; thus, the objectives of the war can be achieved considerably more rapidly than has been the case in past wars.

At the same time, a contrary point of view also persists, whose proponents claim it as axiomatic that a future war, like the world wars of the past, will assume a drawn-out character.

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In considering these points of view, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, in his report to the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations in May 1960, pointed out that both suffer from the fact that they solve the problem of the duration of a war in a one-sided fashion. It would be more sensible not to go to extremes in this question. We should, the Minister of Defense said, develop and perfect weapons and methods of armed combat primarily with a view to achieving victory over the aggressor in the shortest possible time, but at the same time it is also necessary to make serious preparations for a lengthy war.

We term a future war a missile/nuclear war, since the primary means of destruction will be nuclear weapons, and the chief means of delivering them to the target will be missiles of various types and designations.

The employment of nuclear weapons and of other means of mass destruction will impart a tense and desperate character to a war. In order to seize and retain the strategic initiative, and also to ensure the achievement of the aims of the war, each side will develop vigorous military operations by all the means at its disposal from the very beginning of the war, in order to inflict upon the enemy the maximum losses in personnel and material resources, and also in order to effect the greatest possible destruction on his territory.

The military-geographical disposition and the large territories of the countries which make up the military coalitions, and also the long range of modern means of destruction, make it certain that the war will be waged over huge areas. The war will be waged not only in the European and Asian theaters, but will embrace other continents and wide naval theaters of operation. Military operations develop

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both on a front and also deep in the rear of the belligerent states. The tremendous spatial scope (prostranstvennyy razmakh) of the war, the necessity to protect and defend objectives and lines of communication far to the rear, and also the probable growth of losses, will lead to a situation where the strength of the armed forces in a future war will far exceed those in all past wars.

The increase in the combat capabilities of all types of armed forces brought about by the swift development and widespread introduction of new means of destruction will lead inevitably to a change in the methods of waging war. In this connection, particular significance for our armed forces in the achievement of the goals of the war will lie in the operations of missile troops, the decisive delivery of mass nuclear/missile strikes designed to destroy and to annihilate vitally important objectives deep in the rear of the enemy, the destruction of the basic groupings of his armed forces, and the suppression of his will to resist.

The effective antiaircraft defense of troops and objectives in the rear of the country will have a no less important significance for the successful conduct of the armed struggle. It must be capable of giving timely warning of the threat of a nuclear attack, and of detecting and destroying in the air the missiles and aircraft of the enemy. It can be stated immediately that the success of nuclear/missile strikes on the one hand, and of the operations of the antiaircraft defense forces and weapons on the other, particularly at the beginning of a war, will determine its further development to a great extent.

In the general course of armed conflict in a theater of military operations, an important role will be played, as in the past, by the activities (operatsiya) of the ground troops, the most

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characteristic features of which will be: the widespread use of nuclear weapons and of other means of mass destruction; exceptionally high mobility and dynamism (dinamichnost) in the combat operations of the troops; an increase in the spatial scope and average speed of operations; the absence of solid fronts and the conduct of combat in a series of directions, at times in areas isolated from one another, at varying depths, frequently with the conduct of large head-on clashes (vstrechnoye stolknoveniye).

In the naval theaters of operation a no less decisive and intense struggle will develop between the forces of the two sides. This struggle will be directed toward the destruction of the enemy fleet at sea and at its bases. Groupings (gruppirovka) of warships, above all, of missile submarines, aircraft carriers, naval bases, and ports of the enemy will be subjected to strikes by naval forces employing all modern weapons. Along with this, naval forces, chiefly submarines, will wage continual war on lines of communication and in some cases will deliver nuclear strikes on targets of military and economic significance in coastal areas.

The widespread employment of nuclear weapons in a future war, primarily through the use of missiles, but also from aircraft and submarines, together with the highly mobile operations of ground and airborne troops, will permit the performance of tactical, operational, and strategic tasks in shorter periods of time than has been done in the past. Here, we must remember that in spite of the tremendous destructive capability of nuclear weapons, the achievement of success in a future war will be possible only through coordination in the use of all means of armed conflict. It is thus, in short, that we view the most characteristic aspects of a future war. It is quite clear that the conditions and means of waging this war will impart particular significance to its initial period, which we shall consider in more detail.

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The essential quality of the initial period of a war. Today, scarcely anyone can doubt that the results of armed conflict in the initial period of a war will have a decisive significance for its whole subsequent course.

If we turn to history, we can find in past wars many examples in which, right up to the outbreak of military operations, the belligerents were working to complete the preparations necessary for the seizure of the initiative from the very beginning of the war and the consequent predetermination of the further course of the war in their favor. And, despite the fact that there were not at that time sufficiently effective means of armed combat, as a rule, the side which seized the initiative in operations achieved victory over its adversary. Let us consider some historical examples.

In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, both sides, foreseeing the inevitability of the war, undertook strenuous preparations long before its outbreak. In this, however, Japan far surpassed Russia and began the war without a formal declaration on the night of 9 February 1904 with a surprise attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur. The results to which this Russian procrastination in preparing for war led are well known to everyone.

The First World War was also prepared for in advance. The main states which participated in the war took every step to carry out concealed mobilization and to forestall the enemy in the deployment for and the launching of military operations. However, neither side succeeded in this. The difference in timing (v srokakh) and in the time taken to mobilize and to deploy the armed forces of the main European powers was insignificant, and both sides began military operations under relatively equal conditions. As a result neither side was able to seize the initiative in the very first days of the war and to achieve decisive successes either at the beginning or in the subsequent course of the war.

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Events developed quite differently in the Second World War. Hitler's Germany, which had secretly mobilized its armed forces beforehand under the pretext of conducting maneuvers, concentrated and deployed them on the national border with Poland. The Polish command, not having correctly evaluated the military capabilities of fascist Germany, was not prepared for war. Mobilization was begun in Poland only on 29 August, and on 1 September 1939 the German fascist army invaded Poland from various directions and defeated the Polish Army decisively. In the course of three weeks the Polish Army was completely destroyed and Poland was occupied by the German fascist troops.

The German fascist army was able to achieve the same decisive results in the war against the other Western countries. Even such a country as ours needed more than a year to eliminate the consequences of the failures of the initial period of the war and to achieve a breakthrough in military operations in our favor.

Failure to evaluate the part played by the initial period of a war or the incorrect appreciation of its content and special features have led to a situation in which some countries and their armed forces have turned out to be inadequately prepared to conduct a war, have suffered huge losses, or have lost the war at its very beginning.

In the initial period of a future war the qualitative and quantitative status of modern means of armed conflict will create conditions for the achievement of incomparably greater results than has been the case in any war in the past. It should be clear to all of us that the surprise massive use of nuclear weapons can inflict huge losses in human and material resources on the armed forces and on the entire country undergoing attack, can disorganize front and rear areas, and governmental and military control, and can disrupt the systematic

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deployment of the armed forces and the carrying out of mobilization in the country.

All this obliges us to study the initial period of a future war with care and seek out the most effective means for the conduct of armed combat during this period.

It should be noted that before the Second World War we had no properly evolved theory for the conduct of a war in its initial period. The views which prevailed at that time concerning the conduct of operations during the initial period of a war were based for the most part, on the experience of the First World War.

At that time the initial period of a war was taken to be the segment of time encompassing events from the moment of the declaration or beginning of the war until the commitment of the main body of the armed forces. It was assumed that the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of the armed forces would begin after the declaration of war of after an attack by the enemy. This was considered to be the main constituentof the initial period of a war. It was assumed that military operations would be restricted to the conduct of reconnaissance operations and to border engagements by covering troops (voyska prikrytiya).

This view of the makeup of the initial period of a war had a negative influence on the preparation of our armed forces for war, and also on the development of plans for their strategic deployment. The incorrect evaluation of the changes which had occurred in the methods used by the imperialists in preparing and unleashing a war, and also of the possible nature of military operation in the initial period, resulted in the insufficient combat preparedness of the border military districts and a delay in the shift of the national economy of our country to military production. All this cost us huge losses in people and in material resources.

The Second World War brought substantial corrections

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in the understanding of the initial period. The mobilization and deployment of the main body of the armed forces of the aggressor countries and the switch of the economy to military production were carried out in good time, before the beginning of the war. The war began without a declaration, with a surprise attack. Thus, the basic constituent of the initial period of the last war was even then not the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces, but the conduct of active military operations from the very beginning of the war.

The development of weapons and methods of conducting armed conflict, and the nature of the preparations for a future war by the imperialist countries, give grounds for supposing that its initial period will differ considerably in its constitution from past wars and even more from former theoretical concepts.

We consider that a future war will most probably begin with a surprise attack by an aggressor employing the maximum possible quantity of nuclear weapons. In the course of this attack both sides will strive to inflict on each other by the most energetic strikes, such losses at the front and in the rear that the achievement of the immediate strategic aims of the war in the shortest period of time will be ensured as a result.

For our armed forces such aims might be the repulse of the enemy attack, the seizure of the strategic initiative, and the creation of favorable conditions for the further development of decisive military operations. In the course of achieving these aims, our armed forces will have to solve such tasks as the destruction of military and industrial targets, the disorganization of the governmental and military command of the enemy, the disruption of the strategic deployment of his armed forces, the defense of our armed forces and objectives in the rear areas of the country against nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, and also the occupation of . . .

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important economic and political centers and areas in the theaters of military operations.

Thus, the following conclusion on the initial period of a future war suggests itself:

- by the initial period of a future war one must understand the period between the beginning of the outbreak of war and the achievement of their immediate strategic objectives by the forces of the first strategic echelon (troops in constant combat readiness - ground, air, antiaircraft defense, and, in the first rank, missile troops);

- the main constituent of this period will be the conduct, from the very beginning of the war, of active military operations by peacetime forces and weapons, including formations mobilized up to wartime tables of organization and equipment and units maintained in skeleton strength on ready-reserve status. All types of armed forces will take place in these operations. The leading role will be assigned to the missile troops of strategic designation.

As to the duration of the initial period itself, one must keep in mind that it cannot be determined ahead of time. Its length will depend on the time required to achieve the immediate strategic objectives of the war, on the nature of these objectives, on the conditions under which the war breaks out, on the course of deployment of the armed forces, on the results of military operations, and also on a whole series of other factors. Only one thing is clear - that the objectives of the initial period of a future war can be achieved in a considerably shorter time than has been the case in the past.

For the correct determination of the nature of military operations in the initial period of the war, and of the methods of conducting them, a knowledge of the probable enemy, constant study of his true intentions, of the grouping of his armed forces, and particularly of his means of nuclear attack, and an

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objective evaluation of his combat capabilities are of great significance. It is quite obvious that the determination of the methods of operation of our armed forces and the effectiveness of their blows will also depend upon the timely disclosure of the true plans of the probable enemy against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

It must be said that a great deal of attention is given to the problems of a future war, and particularly to its initial period, in the armed forces of the imperialist countries. The military leaders of the aggressive blocs, headed by the United States and England, assign a decisive role to the initial period of a war, and particularly to the first operations.

In determining the methods of conducting armed combat in the initial period of the war and in the preparation of the armed forces, very great importance is attached to knowledge and consideration of the conditions in which the aggressive imperialist blocs can unleash a war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

The combat characteristics of modern weapons, and also the practical actions of the leaders of the imperialist blocs, provide reasons for considering that the most probable method of unleashing a war against the Soviet Union will be a surprise attack from various directions with the widespread use of nuclear weapons. In this case the war will immediately become worldwide in character.

It is not excluded that war may be unleashed by the imperialists with an attack on one of the countries of the Socialist Camp. Naturally, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp will be forced to enter this war, with the aim of providing assistance and defense to the friendly country which has suffered the attack. In this case, the war cannot be confined to a local conflict, but will turn into a world war.

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Finally, there may also be other conditions in which the imperialists will unleash a war, conditions which will undoubtedly leave their imprint on the nature and means of operation of our armed forces. We must study all these conditions attentively so that we will be ready in good time to take effective and decisive countermeasures in any situation.

The probable enemy will take as his main objective that of depriving us of the capability of using nuclear weapons from the very beginning of the war. For this it is contemplated that strikes will be delivered throughout the whole depth of our country in order to destroy our stocks of nuclear weapons and missile-launching installations, to destroy our airfields, annihilate our bomber aircraft, and inflict decisive destruction upon our armed forces.

Simultaneously with the fulfilment of these missions, we know that it is planned to deliver strikes against our most important administrative-political and military-industrial centers, naval bases and ports, railroad junctions, and other objectives in order to disorganize the administration of the country, to disrupt the mobilization and deployment of our armed forces, and to shatter the military and economic potential of the country and the morale of the people.

For the fulfilment of these missions it is planned to bring to bear the maximum quantity of forces and means capable of using nuclear weapons, in order to inflict immediate and decisive destruction upon us and to achieve their plans for seizing the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and of carrying the war to the territory of the Soviet Union.

In the imperialist countries, particularly in the NATO countries, in accordance with these aggressive plans, the buildup of armed forces and their training for war are being carried out, theaters of military operations are being equipped at an accelerated rate, reserves of material and technical resources are being

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set up, and nuclear/missile bases are being equipped.

It is necessary to say that the rapid development of modern means of combat is constantly bringing about great qualitative changes in the armed forces, both with us and with the capitalist states. As a result, a reevaluation of the places and roles of the various types of armed forces and arms of troops in a future war are taking place, the methods of fighting a battle are changing and considerable adjustments are being made in operational plans. Many postulates of military art which appeared correct only yesterday must be reviewed and decided upon completely anew today. In this connection, we should like to recall the statements of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov. Speaking before the students of the Academy of the General Staff at the beginning of the present academic year, he stated that we must all watch intently the changes taking place in the armed forces of the probable enemy, investigate everything new searchingly, summarize it intelligently, and draw the appropriate conclusions for ourselves.

The combat readiness of the armed forces. The successful attainment of the strategic objectives of the initial period of a war is possible only on condition that the armed forces and the country as a whole are comprehensively prepared to conduct a war against a strong enemy. We must always remember the lessons of the past war, which show that the errors and miscalculations which we permitted in preparing the armed forces and in considering the possibilities of a war with fascist Germany had a drastic effect on our conduct of military operations, and put our country in a most difficult position.

The consequence of these miscalculations was that our armed forces were not brought to the necessary state of combat readiness in time and that we began combat operations in a disorganized fashion, as a result of which we suffered large losses. It must be said outright that under present circumstances such mistakes could have catastrophic consequences.

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This is why the chief requirement for all the armed forces at the present time is the maintenance of a high and constant state of combat readiness. As we know, in the orders and directives of the Ministry of Defense on combat and operational readiness, the chief task which is set before our armed forces each year is to be in constant combat readiness in order to disrupt an attack by the enemy and to initiate immediate and active combat operations with the aim of seizing the strategic initiative at the very beginning of a war.

It is true, we admit, that a period of threat (ugrozhayemyy period) may precede the unleashing of a war by the enemy. However, one must not under any circumstances base one's calculations on the possibility of carrying out all the measures involved in bringing the armed forces to a state of combat readiness during this particular period. The imperialists may attempt to use their present means of attack completely unexpectedly, and they have the complete capability to do this. Therefore, in order not to allow oneself to be caught unawares, one should orient oneself on the absence of a period of threat or on one of extremely short duration, counted perhaps only in hours.

Justification for the institution of a threat situation (ugrozhayemoye polozheniye) in the country may be a sharp aggravation of the international situation or the receipt of reliable information on the clear threat of an outbreak of war. This period must be used to the maximum for bringing the armed forces to such a state of combat readiness as will permit them to begin combat operations immediately.

For this, all the measures to be carried out in the period of emergency by each sub unit, unit, and large unit and by each headquarters and establishment must be worked out and planned ahead of time. But this is not enough. All steps must be taken to ensure that the projected measures are executed in the shortest period of time with the maintenance of a high degree of organization and orderliness. For this, already

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in peacetime, a situation must be achieved in which all the personnel of the armed forces know and can carry out accurately the responsibilities with which they will be entrusted in the period of threat.

It is not necessary to list all the measures which can be carried out in the period of threat. In each sub unit, unit, large unit, headquarters, or establishment they will be different. We will cite just the main ones.

First of all, the maximum speed in delivering signals and instructions to units and large units concerning the introduction of the threat situation must be ensured. For this all rapid means (bystrodeystvuyushchiy) of communications will be employed, observing secrecy precautions for the transmission and a safeguarding of military secrets.

With the introduction of the threat situation, the activity of all types of intelligence must be increased immediately with the aim of discovering the enemy's direct preparations for an attack, changes in the grouping of his forces and means, particularly of his means of delivering a nuclear attack, the possible intentions and the timing of his operations, and also other information peculiar to a particular axis or theater of military operations.

In organizing reconnaissance one must take into consideration that with the changes in the character of a war and with the introduction into the armed forces of means of mass destruction, reconnaissance tasks and the methods by which these can be accomplished have become considerably more complicated. Errors committed in this sphere can have an immediate and most drastic effect upon the conduct of military operations.

Upon the receipt of a signal or order about increasing readiness, all armed forces are brought to a state of complete combat readiness.

The chief concern of the command at all levels

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and headquarters during the period of threat must be the protection of troops from the nuclear weapons of the enemy. For this purpose it is necessary to foresee and to organize the withdrawal of troops, aviation, and the fleet from their permanent dispositions (mesto dislokatsii) to new areas which have been prepared in advance, at the same time bringing them to a heightened state of readiness. This applies particularly to the troops, forces, and weapons of border military districts and fleets, whose disposition the enemy has more opportunities of discovering.

In some cases, troops, forces, and weapons of the border military districts and fleets will immediately occupy the areas and positions assigned to them with the view of going into action, directly in accordance with plans which have been worked out beforehand.

The protection of stocks of material and technical supplies against destruction by the nuclear weapons of the enemy is a no less important measure, to which particular attention must be given at all times, and particularly during a period of threat. There is no doubt that the appropriate organization to protect material stocks will be already envisaged during peacetime. However, with the introduction of a threat situation steps must be taken, where necessary, to disperse them further and to organize the transport called for by the plans and in order to supplement the stocks of the troops or to establish stocks in the directions (napravleniye) where military operations are forthcoming.

One should not exclude the possibility of taking steps during the period of threat toward the partial mobilization and deployment of some part of the forces, particularly from the personnel of the ground troops, and also toward the conversion of individual branches of industry to war production. However, it must be borne in mind that this must be done with the observance of extraordinary measures of caution and secrecy. We should not rely on the possibility of conducting widespread measures for mobilization during the period of threat. The deployment of the armed forces and their concentratior

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in theaters of military operations will be carried out mainly from the beginning of the war and under very complex conditions. Here, the problem of military transport will be very critical.

It must be taken into consideration that at the beginning of a war the operational movement of troops and the movement of material and technical supplies will be conducted on a tremendous scale. At the same time, the enemy will try to break up the operation of our communication lines by nuclear strikes and to disrupt this movement. The possibility cannot be excluded that, as a result of nuclear strikes on road junctions, bridges, and other vulnerable points and objectives, the main rail and highway arteries in various directions may be put out of commission for a lengthy period of time, which will seriously complicate the deployment and concentration of our armed forces.

The solution of this problem must lie in three courses. First, it is necessary to envisage and to organize the combined use of all types of transport: railroad, highway, air, and water, to achieve their complete interchangeability, and also to envisage broad mobility of the reserves of all transport facilities.

Secondly, we must achieve the maximum viability of our communication lines under the conditions of a nuclear war. To this end the reliable antiaircraft defense of communications must be organized. In doing this, particular attention must be paid to the protection of the more vulnerable points along the lines of communication; against strikes by the enemy transloading areas, railroad stations, highway and rail junctions, bridges, tunnels, viaducts, and other structures. To ensure the viability of communication lines, measures for combating enemy paratroops and diversionary groups must be worked out in good time.

Thirdly, it is necessary to provide for the organization and execution of rapid repair and restoration of portions of the lines of communication which have been destroyed, and for the construction of

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new sections of railroads and highways, bridges, bypasses, and the laying of pipelines. To carry out these large and labor-consuming tasks, construction and repair units, railroad troops, the construction organizations of the transport ministries, sovnarkhozes, and also troops and the local population can be enlisted. The successful carrying-out of reconstruction and construction operations on communication lines will be assisted by the timely creation of stocks of building materials and of prefabricated bridging construction.

For defense against the means of mass destruction and for the elimination of the effects of nuclear strikes, commanding officers and headquarters will organize measures for antiatomic, antichemical warfare and antibacteriological defense in the sectors or areas of action of their formations and also along the lines of communication, and will assign the requisite forces and resources.

All these measures for assuring the viability of communication lines are planned in advance.

In speaking of the combat readiness of our armed forces, it must be kept in mind that by this we do not mean just the ability of sub units, units, and large units to assembly quickly at the alert signal (po trevoge) and to occupy the areas assigned to them. This is only one of the elements of the combat readiness of troops, forces, and weapons, and it is very important. But it is not all-important. The combat readiness of troops is made up of very many elements, the fundamental one of which is combat coordination (slazhennost) and constant readiness to conduct military operations during the mass employment of all modern means of combat, to fulfil any task which may be assigned to the unit or large unit at the beginning of a war. Units or large units which , although they assembly quickly at the alert signal, are not capable of executing a combat mission, cannot be considered combat ready.

The fundamentals of combat readiness are: a high degree of field training of the troops; having combat

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equipment in excellent condition and being able to use it; well-organized control of troops and their readiness for rapid assembly; the presence of stocks of the material and technical supplies necessary for the supply of the troops in case they are alerted, and, in addition, for internal military districts, readiness to mobilize and to be transported or to carry out marches over long distances.

The high state of readiness of the armed forces for the conduct of operations in the initial period of a war will depend to a great degree on the level of training of commanders, commanding officers, and staffs, and on their ability to direct troops confidently and firmly under the complex conditions of the situation.

Another of the most important conditions ensuring the readiness of our armed forces for the successful conduct of military operations in the initial period of a war is the timely preparation of the territory of the country and of the probable theaters of military operations for a future war. Modern powerful, long-range means of destruction greatly widen the borders of the theaters and present new demands for their preparation (oborudovaniye).

What are the minimum necessary measures which must be taken already, in peacetime, to equip and prepare theaters of military operations?

The basic measures for the preparation of theaters of military operations can be given as follows: the development of lines of communication and the ensuring of their reliability and viability under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons; the construction of launch sites for missiles; the construction of airfields; the development of a communications network; the creation of a unified radar and radionavigation system; the equipment of bases and depots for the storage of materiel; the camouflaging of the most important targets in order to exclude their detection by any type of reconnaissance,

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including technical means.

Such, in short, are the requirements for the combat readiness of the armed forces and the most important measures to be taken to ensure it.

The nature and means of conducting military operations in the initial period of a war. The nature of, and means for, conducting military operations in the initial period of a war will be determined by the situation in which the war may break out. However, it can be said with complete confidence that under all circumstances massed nuclear/missile strikes will form the basis of military operations. The reserves of nuclear weapons accumulated during peacetime will be used immediately to the maximum possible degree to inflict decisive damage on the enemy in order to force him to capitulate or to create a situation of complete chaos in the country, and to make the development of active military operations and the carrying out of mobilization measures as difficult as possible for the enemy.

As has already been said, the most probable method by which the imperialists will unleash a war against the Soviet Union will be a surprise nuclear/missile attack. The unleashing of a war in this manner creates exceedingly complicated conditions for us, and we must prepare our armed forces for this before all else.

The chief task of the armed forces in the event of such an attack will consist of preventing mass nuclear strikes by the enemy, of instantly delivering crushing strikes by nuclear weapons, and of initiating vigorous military operations by all types of armed forces. In other words, we must disrupt the attack of the enemy and immediately seize the strategic initiative with all the forces and means at our disposal.

Thus, by the disruption of the attack of the enemy one must understand the sum total of military operations conducted by all the armed forces. The

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fundamental basis of the execution of this task will consist of nuclear strikes by the strategic missile forces, by the missile units and large units of the ground troops, and also by aircraft and missile submarines.

Successful operations by the missile troops, and, particularly, their first strikes, will determine the results of the armed conflict in the initial period of the war, and also during the course of its further development. Missile forces are the forces of a future war. It is for this reason that their development is now given such great attention.

A no-less-important role in disrupting the attack of the enemy will be played by the forces of the PVO of the country and by the antiaircraft forces and weapons of the ground troops and the navy. They must fulfil their task of destroying the missiles and aircraft of the enemy in the air and of thus preventing him from striking the vitally important objectives of our country and armed forces.

We should also not minimize the role and significance of our ground troops in the disruption of the enemy's attack. Having as their armament nuclear weapons and other modern means of armed combat, and possessing a high degree of mobility and maneuverability, they are capable, by swift actions, of inflicting decisive damage on the troop concentrations of the enemy, of moving rapidly deep into his territory, of seizing vitally important areas of the country, and thus of making more difficult the basing of the missiles, aircraft, and navy of the enemy, of disrupting the conduct of mobilization measures, and of depriving him of the ability to make up the losses which he has suffered.

The role of our air forces in disrupting the attack of the enemy will consist mainly of supporting the combat operations of the ground troops and fleet, and also in conducting reconnaissance. Long-range aircraft will be used to make strikes on targets located deep in the theaters of military operations

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which are weakly protected by antiaircraft defenses.

The efforts of the navy and particularly of its missile submarines and aircraft, disrupting the attack of the enemy will be directed primarily toward combating the carrier strike large units (soyedineniye) of the enemy and his missile submarines and surface vessles.

In speaking of the disruption of a surprise attack by the enemy, the decisive significance of the first blow, which must be the most powerful, should be particularly stressed. The industrial and economic centers of enemy countries, the missile, aircraft, and naval bases of the enemy, his stockpiles of nuclear weapons, aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, missile vessels, and aircraft carriers, the most important groupings of his ground troops, radar facilities, and other objectives will be subjected to its destructive action.

A first strike using massed nuclear weapons delivered at the right time can considerably weaken the strikes of the enemy, can paralyze his operations for a certain time, and under favorable conditions, can force him to cease active military operations. The success of such a strike will be determined by the degree of combat readiness of all the forces and weapons used to deliver it, by the validity of information on the objectives to be destroyed, by their proper selection, and by the skilful use of nuclear weapons to fulfil the basic tasks.

Of all of the tasks of the initial period of a war, the two most important, which will be carried out by the combined efforts of all types of armed forces and with all possible means, must be singled out. These are the fight against means of nuclear attack and the disruption of the deep rear of the enemy.

The mass employment of missiles with nuclear charges (zaryad), particularly at the beginning of a war, may very seriously complicate the activity

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of a country and of its armed forces. Therefore, the fight against means of nuclear attack, and in the first place against missiles, now assumes significance of the first order.

This fight must be conducted in a systematic manner, both in the theaters of military operations and in the deep rear of the enemy, using the combat capabilities of all types of armed forces. The organization of the fight against means of nuclear attack will be one of the most important tasks of any operation. The chief role in its fulfilment will belong to the missile troops, since the achievement of decisive results in the fight against means of nuclear attack is possible only when nuclear weapons are used on a large scale.

One of the requisites for the fight against means of nuclear attack will be the constant conduct of reconnaissance, the timely preparation of forces and weapons targeted on definite objectives, and decisiveness in the conduct of military operations. The protection of one's own means of nuclear attack against the strikes of the enemy will also have great significance for the success of this fight. This is achieved by a reliably organized system of antiaircraft defense, and also by dispersing and concealing the disposition of missile launch sites, aircraft, and depots and assembly bases for nuclear weapons.

The complexity of the fight against means of nuclear attack results from the fact that the anti-air means for the destruction of ballistic missiles (ballisticheskaya raketa) in flight are still in the developmental stage. The destruction in the air of cruise missiles (krylataya raketa) and also of modern, high-speed, high-altitude aircraft, especially during their mass use, presents a well-known difficulty. Therefore, the basic method of fighting means of nuclear attack, at least in the near future, is their destruction on the ground (on launch sites, bases, airfields, depots, and at places of production) in conjunction with their destruction in the air. In the fight against missiles and aircraft of the enemy's

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navy, the greatest results can be achieved by inflicting strikes on aircraft carriers, and on surface and submarine missile-carrying vessels at sea and at bases.

The solution of the task of fighting means of nuclear attack is inseparably bound up with another task -- the disruption of the enemy's rear. In a future war, the objectives in the enemy's deep rear will immediately be under direct strikes by the means of mass destruction, and its disruption will be the most important task of our armed forces from the very beginning of the war. Enormous destruction and property and personnel losses resulting from the mass use of nuclear weapons will result in the crippling of governmental and military control, in the upheaval of the military and economic power of hostile states, in the destruction of transportation systems, in reduction of the combat effectiveness of the enemy's armed forces, and in the demoralization of the population.

The disruption of the enemy's deep rear will require the performance of a number of important tasks. In the initial period of a war such tasks can be: the annihilation of reserves of nuclear weapons and missiles, the destruction of industrial objectives producing these weapons and also of the most important economic, administrative-political, and scientific-technical centers, and the annihilation of national reserves of finished military-industrial products. The successful performance of these tasks can exercise a serious influence on the course of the war at its very beginning.

Missile weapons, and in the first place strategic missiles, are the main means of delivering strikes against objectives in the enemy's deep rear. Operational-tactical missiles and long-range and front aircraft (aviatsiya) will be used to deliver strikes against objectives in the enemy's rear which lie within the zone of their range, against naval forces, especially missile submarines, for the destruction of sea and

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ocean communication lines with the aim of isolating hostile nations from the theaters of military operations and from sources of raw material. Ground troops can also fulfil tasks connected with the destruction of enemy objectives in his immediate rear by the delivery of strikes by missiles and aircraft. Airborne troops also can take an active part in the performance of this task.

Military operations concerned with the disruption of the enemy's deep rear are planned beforehand on the armed forces level and will be carried out under the direction of the Supreme High Command. Operations in the initial period of a war are planned in the utmost detail, especially in connection with the infliction of the first strike.

The feature distinguishing military operations in the initial period of a war from those of the very beginning of the war is their wide range. Both sides will strive to inflict mass strikes with nuclear weapons, not only on the troops in the theaters of military operations, but also, as has already been noted, on the deep rear, in order to ensure the attainment of the immediate strategic goals in the shortest period of time, to capture the initiative more quickly, and to ensure its firm retention.

Immediately after the first missile and aviation strike, or during the course of this strike, groupings of ground troops will turn to the offensive in the main directions. On those sectors of the front where a situation which is unfavorable for the turning of troops to the offensive takes shape at the beginning of the war, they will conduct defensive operations in order to prevent a breakthrough into the depth of our territory by the enemy groupings, to inflict destruction on them, and, with the approach of the reserves, to turn to the offensive.

The navy will develop active combat operations in the naval theaters, where the principal task will be to inflict destruction on the enemy's navy at sea and at its bases.

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The troops of antiaircraft defense of the country will conduct combat operations for the destruction of the aircraft and the annihilation of enemy missiles in the air.

Thus, combat operations at the beginning of the war will represent a system of operations which are interrelated and directed against a common goal by all types of armed forces, and which are planned and coordinated with one another even during peacetime. The appropriate forces and weapons are earmarked beforehand and the supplies of material and technical equipment necessary for the conduct of these operations are also provided for.Corrections are made, when necessary, in the plans which have been worked out, in connection with the changes which have taken place in military districts, groups of troops, fleets, and the armed forces as a whole.

Let us dwell on the characteristics of the combat operations of the various types of armed forces in the initial period of a war.

As has already been stated, the decisive role in performing the tasks of the initial period of a war belongs to the missile troops of strategic designation. They will deliver massed nuclear/missile strikes for the fulfilment of strategic tasks in support of armed combat as a whole. The objectives of nuclear/missile strikes are industrial and administrative-political centers, aircraft, missile, and naval bases, nuclear ammunition at storage and assembly points, and the most important groupings of the armed forces.

Nuclear/missile strikes can also be delivered in support of armed combat in the theater of military operations with the aim of annihilating the basic groupings of enemy armed forces, of destroying and annihilating important objectives, and of breaking up the concentration of his forces and weapons in the theater. The successful performance of these tasks will create favorable conditions for the conduct of military operations in a given theater. Here the timely exploitation of the results of nuclear/missile 1.3(a)(4)

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strikes by other types of armed forces will have important significance. Massed nuclear/missile strikes and the coordinated efforts of all types of armed forces should bring about the decisive destruction of the enemy in the initial period of the war and the achievement of the immediate strategic aims.

At the very beginning of a war, the enemy will also strive to achieve his aims through the mass use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, military operations in defense of the country and of the groupings of armed forces, against enemy nuclear strikes, take on paramount significance for us. This task will be performed mainly by the troops of the PVO of the Country. It is precisely for this that they are primarily intended.

Military operations in defense of the country against enemy nuclear strikes in the initial period of a war will be conducted in accordance with plans worked out earlier on the basis of a system of anti-aircraft defense set up during peacetime. This system must always be ready to repel surprise strikes by enemy means of air attack.

With the introduction of a threat situation or with the receipt of the first information concerning preparation of an air attack by the enemy the entire system of antiaircraft defense is brought to increased combat readiness. Simultaneously, a partial regrouping of forces and weapons for the reinforcement of the defense of the most important axes, areas, or objectives can be executed if necessary, and fighter aircraft can be dispersed. Part of the radar posts are moved to alternate positions. Command posts and control posts (punkt navedeniya) are brought to complete readiness to control the troops.

The repulse of the first enemy mass aviation and missile strike will be carried out by the maximum possible quantity of forces and weapons of the troops of the PVO of the Country, fronts, and fleets. In the first place, the duty means (dezhurnoye sredstvo) of antiaircraft defense will begin to function. Their

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efforts will be intensified immediately by the large units and units of antiaircraft missile troops, fighter aircraft, and antiaircraft artillery which have been brought to combat readiness.

After the repulse of the enemy's first mass strike, the entire system of antiaircraft defense may immediately be made ready to repel subsequent strikes. In case of need, the movement of antiaircraft weapons and aviation will take place in reinforcement of the defense of important areas and objectives, the supplies of materiel are replenished and the coordination procedure is spelled out.

Simultaneously with the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy decisive military operations will be developed in the ground theaters in the initial period of a war. In the course of these operations, the following basic tasks can be performed: the destruction of enemy groupings, the capture of vitally important territories and areas where the means of armed combat are based, and also the holding of the territory of our own country and of territory taken in the course of the war. The essence and paramount task of armed combat in the ground theaters is the destruction of operational-tactical attack weapons.

Ground troops and the missile large units and units included in their complements, aircraft, and airborne troops are the main force in the fulfilment of tasks in land theaters. Long-range aircraft and large units of the troops of the PVO of the Country near the front (prifrontovoy) can also be used to participate in the performance of these tasks. In a number of cases the missile troops of the Supreme High Command will be used for the performance of strategic tasks.

Military operations in ground theaters will be conducted mainly in the form of offensive operations by ground troops with the participation of other types of armed forces. Defense can be used as a temporary form of combat operations only in

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separate directions of the secondary theaters or in theaters with special terrain conditions. In some cases, the defense of large units and armies will also be used in the main theaters, but as a rule these will be actions forced upon them in the course of offensive operations.

The operations of the missile troops, the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy, and the immediate exploitation of their results by advancing troops must be made the foundation of operations by ground troops. The most important aims of the offensive operations of the initial period of a war may be the destruction of the enemy troops deployed at the beginning of the war or concentrating in groupings, and also of the strategic reserves brought into battle in the course of the operation; the disruption of mobilization and of the concentration and buildup of armed forces in the theater of military operations; the seizure of important economic and political centers, and also of areas of operational or strategic significance. The specific aims of an operation will be determined in accordance with the situation which has developed.

The aims which have been mentioned can be achieved through the execution of several successive operations throughout the depth of a front or a group of fronts, as a result of which favorable conditions should be created for the future successful conduct of armed combat. The first offensive operations will have a decisive significance in the destruction of enemy troops, in the seizure of the initiative, and in the attainment of the immediate strategic aims of the initial period of a war.

These operations can begin under various conditions. In the main direction of the basic theaters of military operations, we will have to conduct offensive operations against an enemy who has prepared for aggressive operations strongly and in good time. In a number of directions, the operations will often begin with meeting engagements, but they can also be conducted

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against an enemy who has gone over to the defensive hastily.

It is also necessary to take into account conditions in which the enemy is able to drive wedges into our territory in several directions. In such a case, a very complex situation can be created in which the switch of our troops to the offensive will be preceded by the conduct of defensive operations.

With all the diversity of conditions governing the conduct of the initial offensive operations, everything will be tense in character and will be marked by a fierce struggle to seize the initiative. Combat operations will be accompanied by the mass use of nuclear weapons by both sides, with the aim of achieving maximum results at the very beginning of the war. This requires skilful and immediate exploitation by our troops of the results of mass strikes by nuclear weapons for the swift development of the offensive. Together with this, well-conceived organization of the system of measures to reduce the effective action of the enemy nuclear weapons and to safeguard our own troops is necessary.

The first offensive operations will be started, as a rule, by those forces of border districts and groups of troops which can be brought to complete combat readiness right from the beginning of the war. A shortage of these forces will necessitate their particularly skilful use in the main directions and the employment of weapons of mass destruction, in the first place, against objectives whose destruction will best promote the advance of the troops and the execution of a skilful maneuver, with the aim of a rapid movement into the depth of the enemy's positions. The reinforcement of fighting (deystvuyushchiy) fronts will be carried out in the course of the operation with the forces and weapons arriving from the interior of the country, and also through maneuver from other axes.

The mobile character of combat operations in the

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initial period of a war makes necessary an operational troop formation which will assist their rapid change of formation, the transfer of efforts from one direction to another, and the development of the offensive where it will achieve the greatest success. The transfer of efforts from one direction to another will be achieved by redirecting the strikes of nuclear/missile-weapons in conjunction with the maneuver of large units of ground troops.

The operational formation of the front in the first offensive operations will most frequently be of a single echelon. In this case, at the beginning of the operation it is necessary to have strong reserves under the orders of the front commander. The second echelon, as a rule, will be created in the course of the offensive with the arrival of new formations. Part of the forces in the complement of the troops of a front can be deployed along the border in the initial period of a war to repel possible enemy strikes, and to support the build-up and switch to the offensive of the front strike groupings (udarnaya gruppirovka).

In spite of the fact that the first offensive operations will be conducted by comparatively limited forces, they will have great spatial scope.

The absence of an enemy defense system prepared earlier will permit the first offensive operations at the beginning of the war to be carried to a great depth. In the main directions, the depth of a front operation can reach 500 to 600 kilometers with a width of offensive zone up to 400 kilometers, and considerably more in mountain and desert areas. The destruction of the basic enemy groupings and the seizure of his territory to such a depth will facilitate the achievement of the strategic tasks of the initial period of the war in the shortest period of time. The performance of these tasks will require a high rate of advance by the troops. Effective use of the weapons of mass destruction and the high mobility of the groung troops will permit the delivery of strikes in depth against the enemy and will bring about an advance at high speeds. Under modern conditions, an offensive can attain an average daily speed of 100 kilometers and more.

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The distinctive feature of the first offensive operations lies in the fact that at their outset the main forces of both sides will not come into contact with one another, and that therefore the offensive will most frequently develop from the march. The front's first echelon troops, which can be deployed in departure areas or areas of concentration before the beginning of military operations, must be at such a distance that they can be moved quickly to the national frontier and go over to the offensive, exploiting the results of strikes by nuclear weapons.

It can also be that the troops moving up to the border from areas of permanent disposition will begin combat operations on the basis of a brief order or signal from the senior commander with reference to one of the operational variants envisaged by the plan.

Under conditions when the enemy forestalls us in the deployment and in the delivery of strikes from the air and by land groupings, the front's troops must inflict destruction with strong counterstrikes against the invading enemy and go over to a decisive offensive which will be preceded by powerful strikes by missiles, aviation, and artillery against the enemy's groupings and against his missile-launching sites, aviation, and reserves. After the infliction of destruction on the enemy's basic grouping, the front's troops must develop the offensive in depth unceasingly, with the aim of utterly destroying the enemy's troops and of fulfilling the assigned missions.

The offensive operations of the initial period of a war can be conducted in various ways. In a case when the enemy's defense is not prepared, his groupings of troops are dispersed, and his large reserves are located in the depth, it is not advisable to deliver swift, deep strikes in several directions. During this, it is necessary to concentrate the main efforts in the direction where the maximum results can be obtained in the shortest period of time and with the smallest losses. Such a method of operation

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ensures the greatest degree of diffusion of the enemy's front, the dispersion of his efforts, the destruction by units of the approaching reserves, and the seizure of important areas and objectives in the enemy's territory in great depth. During this, swift penetrations by strike groupings to the greatest possible depth will have particularly important significance.

Such groupings, exploiting to the utmost the results of nuclear strikes and avoiding involvement in prolonged engagements with the enemy remaining in the rear and on the flanks, must destroy the large enemy reserves, capture the areas where nuclear delivery means are based, disrupt communications and control, seize vitally important areas and objectives, and thwart the deployment by the enemy of his armed forces.

Other ways of conducting offensive operations can also be employed, for example, a strike in two directions, the encirclement and annihilation of large enemy groupings with the simultaneous development of an offensive in depth, and a strike in one direction. The methods and ways of conducting an offensive operation must always be determined by the particular conditions of the situation.

Together with the conduct of offensive operations in the initial period of a war, defensive operations can be carried out in separate directions or in secondary theaters of military operations.

These defensive operations, which we are considering as a temporary type of combat operation, can be aimed at disrupting the enemy's offensive, preventing his intrusion into our territory, inflicting the greatest possible losses on him, gaining time for the concentration and deployment of troops, and thus create favorable conditions for a switch to the offensive.

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Defensive operations can also be conducted in the course of a general offensive which has already begun. In this case, the defense will be conducted on separate sectors of the front by units and large units, and possibly by individual armies and will be conducted in support of the offensive.

The planning and preparation of a first defensive operation in those directions or theaters where, at the beginning of the war, the execution of extensive offensive operations is not proposed, are carried out during peacetime. The most probable variants of combat operations, subject to the possible conditions under which the operation can begin, are outlined in the plan. Besides the usual measures, the organization of cover for troop deployment in the border zone is provided for. It is quite clear that not all the conditions of a situation can be considered in the plan. On the eve of the war or at the beginning of military operations, therefore, it can be made more precise.

The defense will be built up and conducted differently from the last war. There will not be the defensive lines and zones which were set up in the past. The basis of defense must not be the creation of a solid front, but nuclear/missile strikes, the extensive use of fire maneuver and of maneuver by forces and weapons in combination with the holding of important areas and sectors and the use of various obstacles.

Those forces and weapons which will be in the border military districts at the beginning of a war will be used to execute the first defensive operations of the initial period of a war. The intensification of efforts in the course of the operation will be conducted, in the first place, by the maneuver of forces and weapons from other directions. It is advisable to use the troops arriving from internal districts mainly for the final destruction of the enemy in the course of the offensive.

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The operations of the defending troops will be distinguished by great intensity and high aggressiveness. From the very beginning of military operations, both sides will strive to achieve decisive results by nuclear weapons strikes. In a defensive operation in the initial period of a war, success can be attained only by the skillful concentration of basic efforts in directions where the enemy's offensive is expected, by mass nuclear strikes against his troops, by the means of nuclear attack, and by the extensive use of maneuver.

This success will also depend in large measure on the outcome of combat with an enemy grouping breaking into the positions of the defending troops. The destruction of such a grouping must be carried out by decisive counterstrikes.

In the first defensive operations, the troop grouping which will be used to deliver the counterstrike will be assembled earlier, but the counterstrike itself will most often be inflicted from the march. It must begin with strikes by missiles, aviation, and artillery using nuclear weapons against the main enemy grouping. Following this, the troops of the counterstrike grouping go over to the offensive. These troops must operate decisively and advance at high speeds until the complete destruction of the invading enemy grouping is achieved.

We will briefly consider air operations in the initial period of a war.

As is known, the development of missile equipment and its introduction into all types of armed forces, and also the significant increase in the effectiveness of modern weapons of antiaircraft defense, have caused a decrease in the role of the air forces, and especially of bomber aviation in armed combat. We are at present going through the process of replacing the long-range and front bomber aviation with strategic and operational-tactical missiles; however, we consider that aviation will keep its significance for some time yet.

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Long-range aviation will have to carry out tasks concerned mainly with the destruction of objectives which are weakly protected by antiaircraft weapons, and front aviation will be concerned with the support of ground troops and with ensuring that long-range aviation successfully overcomes enemy antiaircraft defense in the area in the vicinity of the front (prifrontovaya polosa) by neutralizing control points, the radar network, and the active means of the PVO.

One of the conditions of success of an operation in the initial period of a war is that heightened combat readiness be attained rapidly, and also that timely escape from an enemy strike can be achieved by the takeoff of the aircraft or by their transfer to other airfields. As a rule, the escape of bomber aircraft from an enemy strike must be completed by the delivery of strikes against his objectives, irrespective of the time of day.

The basic method of operation by bomber aircraft is the delivery of successive, massed strikes. At the beginning of the first strike, intensive air and radio-technical reconnaissance is conducted with the aim of obtaining information for subsequent strikes by missiles and aircraft, and also of determining the degree of destruction of the enemy objectives. Strikes delivered subsequently take into account the results of previous operations and newly arising tasks.

Naval operations. In the initial period of a war the navy will conduct operations in the first place with the aim of destroying the enemy's missile submarines, of inflicting destruction on his carrier strike large units (soyedineniye), also of disrupting sea and ocean transport.

Naval operations will be conducted primarily by the forces of large units of submarines and naval aircraft with the participation in some cases of large units and units of strategic missile troops and long-range aviation.

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The first naval operations will have particularly important significance in the performance of tasks in the initial period of a war. Advance and systematic study of the combat composition of the enemy's navy and of those of his objectives which it is intended should be hit during the delivery of the first strike at the very beginning of the war will significantly influence their success.

This strike must be carried out by naval forces in the minimum amount of time after the receipt of a signal regarding one of the earlier planned variants. It is delivered against objectives whose destruction would lead to the frustration of the enemy's nuclear strikes from the sea and the significant weakening of his navy. For the navy, in the first place, such objectives will be missile submarines and the carrier strike large units of the enemy and also his naval bases and most important ports, with the warships and transports which are there.

The maximum possible quantity of forces and weapons, with mass use of nuclear warheads, is used for the delivery of the first strike. Such a strike against enemy objectives in remote areas will be delivered by strategic missile large units, by submarines, by long-range naval aviation, and also by large units of long-range aviation assigned to the support of the navy. The destruction of enemy coastal objectives will be carried out, as a rule, by missile troops, and in some cases this task can be assigned to missile submarines.

For the performance of tasks in closed naval theaters and in the closest areas of open seas, surface vessels armed with missile weapons and mine-torpedo aircraft will also be used.

In order to keep the enemy under tension during intervals between mass strikes, it is advisable to conduct combat operations by small groups of submarines and aviation, and also to make methodical missile launchings using various means of destruction.

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The successes attained as a result of previous military operations must be consolidated by followup operations. Their aims will depend upon the success of the first naval operations and on the further tasks of armed combat at sea.

In speaking of armed combat in the initial period of a war, it is necessary to emphasize that none of the types of military activities or of operations which will be conducted in this period can be examined in isolation from one another. All of them will be coordinated according to target, time, and place and will be united by the single plan and direction of the Supreme High Command.

Active and decisive operations on the fronts and in the deep rear of the enemy in the course of the operations during the initial period of a war must lead to the undermining of the enemy's ability to withstand the disorganization of his rear, the seizure of the initiative by us, and the attainment of the immediate strategic aims of the war.

The subsequent course of the war will depend to a large extent upon the results of armed combat in this period.

We believe in the inevitability of our victory, the complete destruction of the aggressive imperialist states, and the downfall of the entire world system of capitalism. But this victory will not come into being by itself. We must prepare ourselves and our glorious armed forces for it tirelessly and with all our power.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FECCFD [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

TO: CSR/9

Jan 11, 1961 1962

SUBJECT: [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. The episode reported in [redacted] letter of 22 December, when [redacted] left alone for a few minutes in BUZINOV's office in the midst of a pile of secret papers, whipped out his Minox and tried to photograph VARENTSOV's "Theses", is but the latest and most dramatic illustration of a problem which has been troubling everyone connected with the case here for some time: the collossal and ever increasing risks that we are permitting [redacted] to take in the pursuit and transmittal of documentary intelligence. Another good illustration is the 420 page manual on atomic weapons which we recently requested [redacted] to obtain, and which now looks as if it will be of no more than marginal interest. Our frequent admonitions to [redacted] to be careful, to think first and foremost of his own security, to meet [redacted] less often, etc.,etc, — in the context of our simultaneous requests to ~~xxxxx~~ retake p. 18 of this, pp. 11-13-15 of that, and pp. 1-420 of the other — are of a "stop it, I have it" nature, and have clearly been interpreted by [redacted] in this vein. 1.3(a)(4)

2. It is clear that the great dangers to the operation in its present stage lie in the frequent meetings with [redacted] and [redacted] photographic endeavours, the two being of course largely interdependent. It should be sufficient to note that [redacted] has had 10 meetingswith [redacted] in the past ~~12~~ 11 (Oct 20 to Jan 5 exclusive) weeks, and that she has gone to the meeting site on several other occasions. In this same period, [redacted] has passed 27 rolls of film. These risks are not a constant factor in our operational equation; they increase geometrically with the regularity and frequency of the meetings and the amount of material photographed and passed. 1.3(a)(4)

3. It should be noted that just because these risks were justified at one stage in the operation, does not mean that they are necessary now. The following factors deserve consideration:

a) the translation backlog;

b) the evaluation backlog: consumers have not had a chance to properly digest the documents already provided.(It seems to me that it's entirely possible that we have already reached a point of diminishing returns on some of the articles and manuals.)

c) the improvement in [redacted] own reporting, which is increasingly timely, specific and well-sourced. 1.3(a)(4)

In the light of these factors,it seems to me that we can well afford to call a halt on photography for a few motnhs ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ this will allow [redacted] to "cool off" and will enable us to get caught up on the backlog and to take better stock of what we have. 1.3(a)(4)

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4. Everything else appears to be shipshape, and future prospects are brighter than ever, what with [redacted] rise in professional stature and the avenues of access opening up before him (e.g. KOROLENKO). All the more reason to examine carefully at this time whether or not we are justified in jeopardizing this unique source in the interests of acquiring more military manuals (in this connection, the record shows clearly that [redacted] himself is not a good judge of what risks he can and should take). 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4)

5. It is recommended that [redacted] be immediately instructed to suspend all documentary photography until further notice, and to concentrate on his own reporting. It is further recommended that we reduce the scheduled meetings with [redacted] to once every two weeks. 1.3(a)(4)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

18 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: " The Nature of Modern Warfare", by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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Original: Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Nature of Modern Warfare", by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan.

DATE OF INFO : January 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Nature of Modern Warfare", written by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan.

This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. This issue was consigned to the printer on 13 January 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The article by General Gastilovich which is cited below was disseminated as [redacted] General Tolkonyuk's will soon be published as [redacted] General Baskakov's article is in hand and will be forwarded as soon as processing is completed. 1.3(a)(4)

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The Nature of Modern Warfare

by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan

With great interest and attention, we read the article of Major-General Goryainov depicting the technical-mathematical bases of future warfare, the article of Colonel-General Gastilovich which, on this technical basis, analyzes the new possible methods for conducting war, the articles of Generals Tolkonyuk and Baskakov echoing in many respects the article of General Gastilovich, and finally, the article by General of the Army Kurochkin which expresses serious criticism of the basic positions taken in the articles of Comrades Gastilovich, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov.

We must admit that upon first reading the articles by Generals Gastilovich and Goryainov, some degree of doubt was created regarding the proper course along which our military science is developing and, consequently, regarding the correctness of the principles on which our armed forces are being built. However, subsequent deliberations and study of the problem have, in our opinion, shown that in many respects the authors mentioned are wrong: They have simply "laid it on thick", so to speak. True, it must be admitted that such "exaggeration"is useful. It will force our military specialists to analyze the nature of modern warfare more profoundly and to draw practical conclusions on a sound basis with consideration for the new conditions in military theory, as well as in the field of its practical implementation.

The article by General of the Army Kurochkin appears to us to be much more realistic and to reveal in greater depth the possible conditions and nuances of future warfare.

One of the basic problems discussed is the following: Does Soviet military doctrine require fundamental review, is Soviet military art undergoing a crisis? General Gastilovich insists that this is so, while General Kurochkin answers in the negative. This matter is complicated and fundamental.

We must agree with General Kurochkin that we have a military doctrine which dwells on the mass use of nuclear weapons, including those in the megaton class. This is attested to by the report of N.S. Khrushchev to the January 1960 session of the Supreme Soviet, in which he depicted the possible nature of the beginning and

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the development of modern warfare. However, the principles for the use of the types of armed forces and arms of troops within the framework created by this doctrine are not yet sufficiently elaborated. The views of the authors of both articles coincide on this. They claim that Soviet military-scientific thought, led by the new military doctrine, has only begun to develop and to determine those laws and principles which must be established as the basis for armed conflict in its modern phase.

This is true for both the strategic and operational scales. It is sufficient to imagine, for example, a front offensive operation in which the front troop commander has at his disposal two or three megaton warheads. Or, on the other hand, that there are such weapons at the disposal of the commander of the enemy group opposing the front. It can be stated with complete assurance that the front operation under such conditions will assume forms other than those under conditions when only kiloton warheads are available.

General Gastilovich's important and possibly basic mistake is due to the fact that in defining future warfare, he approached it too narrowly, without taking into account political and economic factors, and without consideration for the existence of various theaters of military operations, each with different conditions.

Proceeding from the premise that there would be a world war with unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, the author arrived at the wrong conclusions regarding the number of armed forces necessary to conduct a war and the nature of the actions of ground troops in offensive and defensive operations of modern warfare.

With a view to analyzing some of the positions expressed in the articles of Generals Gastilovich, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov, let us dwell in more detail on individual questions of military art.

First of all, it must be recognized that the yield of a thermonuclear weapon is extraordinarily high. It is still difficult for one to grasp and evaluate it. The radiological factor of destruction is particularly great. For example, a 10 megaton bomb is capable of destroying industrial and municipal structures over an area of 1,300 square kms; this is sufficient to destroy any capital. Radioactive contamination resulting from such a burst will be such that under average wind velocity (35 kms/hr) all persons in an area of about 5,000 square kms (a zone 170 x 30 kms) will perish from radiation sickness, and in an area of about 10,000 square kms (a zone 250 x 40 kms)

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about 50 percent of the persons will perish and the rest will lose combat (working) effectiveness for several months, and finally, all those in an area up to 100,000 square kms (a zone 2,500 x 400 kms) [sic] will partially lose combat (working) effectiveness. This means, for example, that an industrial area such as the Ruhr can be knocked out of action for a long time by two-three 10-20 megaton bombs as a result of the destruction of basic installations and of the annihilation of the labor force.

According to the estimates of American specialists, the use of 50 nuclear weapons against the principal cities of the USA would kill off about one half of the total population and would destroy up to 60 percent of all industrial enterprises. According to this same estimate, the USA has a total of 170 urban areas in which the principal body of the population and industrial plants is concentrated. Consequently, the use of 100-120 nuclear weapons over the territory of the USA would knock out up to three fourths of the industry and a significant portion of the population of the USA. Considering the high degree of industrial cooperation in producing complicated military equipment, one can say that such a blow would halt production of armament and supplies for the army and its demise would be only a matter of time.

But what would be the consequences of a similar blow against our country?

The large territorial expanses, the great dispersion of population and industry, and the observance of proper camouflage and secrecy measures will permit a significant reduction in the effect of a similar massive thermonuclear attack against our installations. However, this would only reduce the effect! Results of a strike would be significant enough to require the most extreme human efforts to restore order in the country and to ensure the capability of our armed forces to deliver a counterblow and to seize the strategic initiative.

Under modern conditions, aggressive circles possibly may not risk a war, if only because they recognize the impossibility of depriving the Soviet Union, as a result of one strike, of the capability of delivering a devastating counterblow.

But this situation cannot be permanent. The power of the first surprise attack in modern times is not determined by the supply of warheads but on the availability of the means to deliver them to targets.

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According to estimates, the USA at present has thermonuclear materials in sufficient quantity to build about 2,000 megaton warheads. The NATO countries' basic means for delivery of nuclear weapons on a strategic scale is still aircraft. Our possession of highly effective antiaircraft missile weapons does not allow them the necessary degree of confidence in their capability to deliver nuclear weapons by this means. The strategic missiles at their disposal clearly cannot satisfy the requirements of a major war, and, in addition, their quality is not high, since, according to assertions of the Americans themselves, only 50 percent of the missiles launched reach their target.

This is the situation today. What will the situation be at a future time, when governments which do not now have sufficient numbers of missiles will overcome their shortcomings in this type of armament? In the future, the probable enemy will have a greater capability to deliver surprise massive nuclear strikes in order to destroy a significant portion of industrial targets, administrative-political centers, missile-launching sites, strategic aviation airfields, and other vital areas and installations. Such a powerful, practically simultaneous initial strike can destroy the most important and crucial installations of the country, disorganize national control, disrupt mobilization and deployment of armed forces, and severely reduce the combat effectiveness of the army and the country as a whole.

This is so serious in its possible political and economic consequences that every measure must be taken so that if the imperialists try to start a war it will not begin by a sudden massed enemy nuclear strike.

The peace-loving foreign policy of our Party and the Soviet Government is known to all. It stems from the very nature of a socialist state. We do not want war and our Party is conducting constant work in the direction of preventing a new world war, which would demand huge numbers of victims and would destroy all that has been created by human hands. However, if it becomes evident that aggressive forces have decided on war, and that the initiation of military operations is only a question of a short time, and if we fail to prevent the aggressor's attack by diplomatic means, then it is necessary to wreck the enemy strike by all our available forces and means. Under such conditions, the strategic concept of the armed forces of our country must be based on the total annihilation of all enemy capabilities to accomplish his aggressive schemes during

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the first days of the war.

The question may be asked: When will these new conditions come about? From what year or what date must our armed forces be guided by the new concept? The number of missiles and launching sites grows gradually, and occasionally in spurts. The precise determination of the period of the transition of the quantity of these means to the new category is difficult and unnecessary. What should be done now and quickly is to prepare and organize our intelligence and the armed forces in such a way that they will be in a constant state of readiness to deliver such a blow against the aggressor.

The possession of missiles, particularly intercontinental, as a means for delivering nuclear weapons, permits the conduct of preparations for an attack in utmost secrecy. Under these conditions, the work of our intelligence organs will be very difficult. Possibly, information about aggressor preparations for an attack will be received only at the last minute before the beginning of an attack. This requires a new approach to the preparation and definition of the stage of readiness of our own means of attack.

Regarding the matter of the numerical size of armed forces, and specifically of the ground troops. We agree with the assertion of General Gastilovich that, in order to accomplish specific strategic and operational tasks in modern warfare, smaller numbers of forces will be required than in past wars. However, in making this conclusion, we must not forget that the number of strategic and operational tasks to be fulfilled in modern warfare will be incomparably greater than in the past.

In the event of a global war, today our armed forces will be required to operate simultaneously in many theaters of military operations, including the Arctic. Considering the wide use of means of mass destruction, which will create heavy demands for replacements in the active armies, and in a number of cases for their full reconstitution, one can say that in modern war more massive armed forces will be needed than those discussed by Comrade Gastilovich.

General Gastilovich considers that the role of ground troops in modern warfare will be essentially that of "occupation". In order to seize countries subjected to massed strikes by megaton bombs, ground troops need only overcome zones of partial and total destruction. Thus, the author excludes the bringing up of large operational and, what is more, of strategic reserves. On the basis of this, one reaches

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the conclusion that in the Western TVD (Theater of Military Operations) 30-40 divisions would be required to accomplish the war's tasks. There is no need to engage in polemics regarding the number of divisions (30-40 or 50-60). One thing is clear, that a sufficient number of troops must be available to make possible the rapid replacement of large units knocked out of action by nuclear weapon strikes. There will be numerous such situations. It seems to us that General Gastilovich's estimates are too optimistic.

Nor can we agree with the view of Generals Gastilovich and Baskakov that, under modern conditions, the distinction between defensive and offensive operations has been erased. We agree with the authors that the conduct of offensive or defensive operations will be conditioned by the number of nuclear weapons and their delivery means which are allotted to a given front. Let us add to this the fact that the conduct of one or another type of operation will depend essentially on the relative quantities of nuclear weapons and their delivery means available to the front and to the enemy grouping opposing the front.

At the same time it is impossible to agree that an offensive which differs from a defensive one in the purpose of the action will resemble it in the methods of tactical actions of large units (Gastilovich) or with the concept that the difference in conducting offense and defense will be retained only in tactics (Baskakov).

We fully agree with the view of General Kurochkin, who says that mass employment of nuclear weapons does not erase the boundaries between offensive operations and defensive operations, but gives them a unique character requiring the development of new methods for conducting offensive and defensive operations. Actually, what can there be in common between an operation whose goal is to crush enemy resistance and to penetrate into the depth of his territory, and an operation whose goal is to prevent enemy penetration and consequently to hold specific terrain and establish conditions favorable for a switch to a counter-offensive? In our view, such an assertion could have been made only in view of the denial by General Gastilovich that a stable defense is necessary.

Stability is a basic quality of defense, operational included. Without this quality, defense as such ceases to exist and becomes meaningless. Let us imagine, for a moment, the defense of an important economic or strategic area which does not have stability and in which stability is not required. Most probably, such a defense will not

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accomplish its defensive tasks and the installations defended can be surrendered to the enemy without any particular feeling of responsibility.

Defensive operations must, unquestionably, be stable. However, mass use of nuclear weapons has its impact on this concept. If the previous concept of "stability" included a specific, if one may use the expression, "linearity" (the holding of a specific line) now, under present conditions, stability must be referred to as being established within the depth of a sector of the territory.

Let us clarify this thought. To hold specific zones, positions, or centers, when the attacking enemy has a sufficient number of nuclear weapons, is practically impossible. Therefore, one cannot speak of "linear" stability. The offensive can be halted only by a system of massed nuclear strikes, counterattacks, and counterstrikes. This can be done, however, only within a specific depth of the defense. In each case the rear boundary of the defensive depth must be determined on the basis of specific conditions of the situation, in which the main factor is the relative strength in weapons of mass destruction possessed by the attacker and the defender.

Under these conditions, should defensive zones be established? General Gastilovich says that they should not. We do not agree with this. We know that the enemy will use gaps and open flanks during his attack. Therefore, we can channel the enemy offense along directions which are advantageous to us by establishing zones and centers in specific areas. In addition, defensive structures serve as troop protection against nuclear weapons. It is more advantageous to build defensive structures which serve a dual purpose (the protection of personnel and equipment and increasing the stability of the defense) rather than shelters at concentration areas with the sole function of protection.

We also consider General Gastilovich's view regarding the use of nuclear weapons in defensive operations to be incorrect. He rejects both the necessity for delivering massed nuclear strikes to disrupt the enemy offensive and the desirability of conducting counterpreparations.

The wide use of nuclear weapons changes the method for conducting defensive operations. Now, it is of paramount importance that action be taken to disrupt or to diminish the strength of enemy preparations for the offensive. Massed employment of even a limited number of nuclear weapons can place the enemy in a situation where he may be

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forced to cancel his offensive. In this case, the greatest significance will unquestionably be attached to counterpreparations directed primarily against the enemy's deployed nuclear means of attack and his troop groupings.

In light of this, the proposal to limit ourselves to day by day and immediate destruction of detected enemy nuclear attack weapons and to individual (to the degree possible) nuclear strikes at varying times against his most dangerous enemy tank divisions which have broken through, sounds strange, to say the least. Even more strange is the fear that a massed strike by nuclear weapons can lead to the growth of a defense into an offensive. First of all, such a growth is unlikely, considering the relative relationship of nuclear weapons, and secondly, it should be welcomed rather than feared.

In conclusion, we would like to dwell on the role of tanks under modern conditions. The development of tanks as an effective striking force from the time of the first world war until now was conditioned by the fact that the tank emerged victorious in the competition with antitank weapons. Today the development and serial production of antitank missile launchers which have a high effectiveness both with respect to accuracy and destructive action, have created a new situation.

In single combat, a tank against an antitank missile launcher, the tank will usually lose. This means that with a high enough concentration of antitank missile launchers on the field of combat, any tank attack can be disrupted and a large portion of the tanks and their crews participating in the attack will be destroyed. But if we consider further that the production of an antitank missile launcher costs several tens of thousands of rubles and that a tank costs several hundreds of thousandsof rubles, then it becomes clear that the use of tanks in their modern concept in warfare is unprofitable both militarily and economically.

In our view, heavy tanks must depart from the scene. They should be replaced by medium and, particularly, light, combat vehicles armed with an automatic multi-round missile launcher having a grazing range of 3-5 kms, equipped with anti-small arms fire, and splinter-proof armor, and capable of crossing water barriers.

The basis for this combat vehicle can be the amphibious tank, PT-76. It must be kept in mind that, under modern conditions, troops must cover great distances on their own power both during preparation

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for, as well as during the course of combat and that possibly it would be more advantageous to create a combat vehicle with an especially high cross-country capability wheel drive with three or four axles.

The proposed combat vehicles, retaining the basic positive quality of tanks --- stability against the destructive factors of a nuclear burst - would cost much less, would be easier to produce, and would be more effective in their firing action.

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Not considering that the views expressed in this article are the only correct ones, we trust that a review of the large and basic questions raised by this issue of the Collection will serve to develop individual views corresponding to the modern conditions of conducting an operation.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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19 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Strike Groupings of a Front", by Major-General of Tank Troops A. Shevchenko

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

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Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Strike Groupings of a Front", by Major-General of Tank Troops A. Shevchenko

DATE OF INFO: October 1960

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Strike Groupings of a Front", written by Major-General of Tank Troops A. Shevchenko.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

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The Strike Groupings of a Front

by

Major-General of Tank Troops A. Shevchenko

In a modern offensive operation by a front, despite the decisive role played by nuclear/missile weapons, the need to create strong and mobile strike groupings (udarnaya gruppirovka) remains. By the strike grouping of a front one should understand a unit of forces and weapons intended for the destruction of a particular grouping of the enemy by the use of means of destruction and by maneuver. In practice, strike groupings will be comprised of formations included in the composition of a front with their allotted forces and weapons. Since these groupings are intended for the successive performance of tasks in particular directions and to a specific depth, we consider it inadvisable to include in their composition the forces and weapons remaining at the disposal of the commander of the front. A front's forces and weapons may be used in support of the combat operations of several strike groupings and also for the performance of other tasks for the front.

Exploiting the results of nuclear/missile strikes delivered by the weapons of the front and of the General Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme High Command (VGK) the strike groupings of a front must be capable of destroying the enemy in short periods and of occupying his major installations and lines in depth.

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During the course of the past war and also in exercises and maneuvers in the postwar period there was and there still is a tendency to create strike groupings chiefly from the large units which combine strike force and mobility, i.e., from tank divisions. In the creation of front strike groupings at the present time, special preference is given to tank armies. It is considered that they constitute "the basis of the strike groupings of the first echelon of a front".[1]

The use of tank armies as the strike groupings of a front under modern conditions will become more difficult. It is known that during a series of recent training exercises there were certain shortcomings in the use of tank armies. The Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops noted substantial shortcomings in the use of tank armies by both sides at the exercise conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops in 1959. One of the reasons for these shortcomings is the change in the conditions of conducting combat operations brought about by the appearance of new means of combat.

Considerable influence is exerted on the use of tank armies by the state of modern means of intelligence and destruction and also by the enemy's ability to counter the maneuver of a tank army by maneuvering of his own motorized large units. The enemy will concentrate the main efforts of his intelligence on the detection of the tank army and, having detected it, will use a large part of his weapons of mass destruction for strikes against it; this may put the army in an extremely difficult position, sharply reduce its combat effectiveness even before the beginning of combat operations, and also diminish the speed of its advance. As we know, such difficult conditions for operations by tank armies did not exist during World War II.

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1. Tank Troops and Their Use in Modern Operations. Voyenizdat, 1960, page 31

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In connection with the fact that it has now become easier to detect the appearance of a tank army in a front and that modern means of combat make it possible to inflict serious damage on it in a short time, the commitment or a tank army to battle will be extremely difficult. Thus, in the September 1959 exercise, the forward movement of the 17th TA (Tank Army) of the "Easterners" was detected by the intelligence of the "Westerners", and during its approach to the line of deployment, surface nuclear strikes with a total yield of about 600 kt were delivered against it. Undoubtedly, under real conditions such strikes would sharply reduce the combat effectiveness of a tank army.

In the past war, the organizational structure of the enemy's infantry divisions (his basic large units) hampered their use for maneuvers intended to contain the operations of tank armies and tank and mechanized corps. Modern infantry divisions are capable of performing these tasks more successfully. Moreover, armored divisions, the number of which has increased, may be used for these purposes.

Modern offensive operations are characterized by more frequent shifts in the efforts of the front's troops from given directions to others. Such shifts demand the rapid creation, in selected directions, of strike groupings composed of a sufficient number of tank large units. If a tank army is used as a strike grouping of a front, its maneuver, in a shift of the front's effort to a new direction, will be impeded. Such a maneuver will be difficult to hide and its conduct will require a great deal of time. In a number of cases, the tendency to use a tank army to perform the most important tasks will result in a situation in which the large units included in its composition will be held in reserve unnecessarily. This was the case during the September 1959 exercises with the 18th Tank Army (TA) which did not take part in combat operations for seven days.

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In the course of an offensive operation, tank armies are often obliged to perform tasks which are difficult to fulfil with the forces of tank divisions. In these same exercises, the 16th TA was obliged, by the course of events, to conduct combat operations connected with forcing a crossing of the Dnepr and expanding the bridgehead. The operations of the army were contained, it suffered large losses, and did not succeed in its task. The 17th TA, which was supposed to force crossings of the Dnepr and Pripyat and to operate in wooded terrain, was put in a difficult situation. In the course of the front command-staff exercise held in the Transcarpathian Military District in June 1960, the 7th TA had to resort to combat in order to cross the Carpathians.

In connection with the changes which have taken place in the organizational structure of the troops, it has become more difficult for a tank army to be separated from a combined-arms army. Today, the organization of a combined-arms large unit has changed radically. Rifle divisions have given place to motorized-rifle divisions which are superior in their technical equipment to the former motorized corps which were used as independent mobile groups or within the composition of tank armies. If one takes into account that a combined-arms army may also have tank divisions, it becomes clear that the tank army does not possess the advantage over the combined-arms army that it had in the years of World War II. The modern combined-arms army, even with a small complement (three motorized-rifle and two tank divisions), has approximately the same number of tanks and assault guns (SAU) as a tank army (three tank and one heavy tank divisions).

The difficulty of separating the tank army from the combined-arms army may lead to operations by two armies in a single zone or along a single line, which will adversely affect the performance of combat tasks. The operations of the 2nd TA and the 61st Army

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(A) in the Pomeranian Operation and also of the 12th Tank Corps (TK) of the 2nd TA and the 5th A in the Berlin operation serve as good examples of this. With a similar accumulation of troops in modern conditions, there may be great losses from enemy nuclear strikes.

It should be pointed out that in using a tank army as a front strike grouping, its safeguarding is made difficult, particularly in the coverage of its flanks and in the consolidation of captured lines. In the September 1959 exercises the fact that the 16th TA was not able to secure its flanks with its own forces was one of the reasons for its encirclement south of Kiev. To safeguard the operations of tank armies, front commanders allotted motorized-rifle divisions to them in a number of exercises.

The use of the tank army as the basic front strike grouping leads in many cases to patterns in the plan of operations and makes it easier for the enemy to find the axes in which the primary efforts of the attacking troops are concentrated.

The difficulties examined above, concerned with the use of tank armies in offensive operations, force one to ask the question: Under modern conditions, does one need tank formations (obyedineniye) at all?

It should be noted that the opinion has been expressed in our military press that in many cases it is advisable to have a tank army of a different composition. Thus, Marshal of Armored Troops P.A. Rotmistrov writes, "The operations of a tank army organized along modern lines and reinforced by two or three divisions were tested in a war game conducted between academies. In this game, its director repeatedly reinforced the tank army with several divisions in order to make it possible for it to break away faster from the main forces of the front and to develop a swift offensive into the depth of the enemy's territory".[1] In this case, a formation superior

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1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 6 (50), 1959, page 18

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in offensive capabilities to the tank army of the usual composition was created. Actually, this was just a combined-arms army composed chiefly of tank divisions.

In our view, under modern conditions, it is inadvisable to have such formations as the tank army. Front strike groupings should be combined-arms armies which include the necessary number of tank divisions concentrated on the most important axes. The role of a front strike grouping may be successfully performed by a combined-arms army comprised of two or three tank and two or three motorized-rifle divisions.

A modern offensive may be conducted under the most varied conditions. Durings its course, in certain directions and at certain times, a task which has been assigned may be performed more successfully by a large unit possessing the qualities of a tank division and, in another direction and at another time, by a large unit with the qualities of a motorized-rifle division. In view of this, tank and motorized-rifle large units should be combined in a formation which comprises a strike grouping.

Certain comrades who persist in believing that it is necessary to retain tank armies and their special role in a future war are, at the same time, forced to admit that "The modern flexible organization of combined-arms armies which allows the motorized-rifle and tank divisions included in them to vary in their composition and which permits their transfer in case of necessity from one army to another, in order to create an army of the required make-up, favors, to a large degree, the effective use of the army in an operation. The new organization of a combined-arms army permits the modern front to be more flexible in its use of tank divisions in the decisive directions of an offensive and of armored troops in an offensive operation as a whole".[1] And, further, "The flexible

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1. Marshal of Armored Troops P.A. Rotmistrov. Armored Troops and Offensive Operations, Voyenizdat, 1957, page 179

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organization of our new combined-arms army, which will include a strong armored grouping within its composition, permits a front to perform the tasks assigned to it without a tank army".[2]

Also worthy of attention in this respect is the statement of Marshal of Armored Troops P.A. Rotmistrov that "In some instances it will seem more expedient to reinforce the composition of a front, not with tank armies, but with individual tank large units which, together with the regrouping of the large units in the armies of a front, can be set up as a combined-arms army (or armies) of the required composition which approximates to a tank army in structure".[3]

The experience of postwar exercises shows that the need to make up for the inadequacies of a tank or combined-arms army sometimes makes it necessary to attach motorized-rifle divisions to a tank army or to increase the number of tank divisions in a combined-arms army. In such situations, tank and combined-arms armies will be distinguished from one another chiefly by the ratio of tank to motorized-rifle divisions. This ratio must be in accordance with the particular situation: In certain cases, the number of tank divisions in a formation must exceed the number of motorized-rifle divisions, in other cases, there must be fewer of them. One thing which is indisputable, however, is that tank divisions today must be used not in a homogeneous formation (a tank army), but in combination with motorized-rifle divisions, i.e., within combined-arms armies. In the course of a front offensive operation, depending on the situation (the nature of the enemy's operations, the conditions of the terrain, etc.), the ratio between tank and motorized-rifle divisions in armies may change sharply in one direction or the other.

2. Ibid. Page 68

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A combined-arms army, which consists mainly of tank divisions, can fulfil the role of a front strike grouping with great success. However, a combined-arms army consisting of eight or more divisions will become cumbersome and of poor mobility. In this case, a strike grouping may in practice be composed of several tank and motorized-rifle divisions (three or four). More precisely, this will be, as it were, the skeleton of the strike grouping; essentially, the divisions comprising it will perform the tasks which are now assigned to a tank army.

A combined-arms army, which has a sufficient number of tank divisions, will possess great striking power and firepower, maneuverability, and the ability to advance at a high rate. The availability of such armies would produce favorable conditions for the concealed establishment of strike groupings and for the delivery of surprise strikes against the enemy.

The reinforcement of combined-arms armies with tank divisions by the successive introduction of the latter from the reserves of the front ensures the necessary dispersal of forces and weapons; divisions will not be concentrated in limited areas, as sometimes happens when a tank army is committed to battle.

More favorable conditions are created for changes in the direction of the main strike. By introducing individual tank divisions, supplementing those of the combined-arms army already operating in the zone, a strong grouping can be created in the required direction in a shorter time and in a concealed fashion. At the same time and to the extent necessary, a reserve of tank large units may be created in a front by detaching them from armies in which there is no longer any need to center the basic efforts of the front; divisions from this reserve may subsequently be put into the zones of other armies. Such use of tank divisions prevents their being held in reserve for a long time and is conducive to the wider maneuver of large units on a frontal scale.

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In the type of organization of strike groupings which we propose, one can perform more successfully the task of replacing tank divisions with motorized-rifle divisions during the course of combat operations, one can avoid operations by two formations in one zone, ensure better coordination between a tank grouping and other large units of an army, and can also create favorable conditions for the consolidation of captured lines and for the protection of the flanks of the strike grouping.

As is known, a tank army contains a heavy tank division. We consider that such a large unit must serve as an instrument (sredstvo) of the front. Although, essentially, a heavy tank division can perform all the tasks which are carried out by a tank division, it is most advisable to use it for battle with the enemy's tanks. The nature of modern combat operations demands the widest maneuver by a heavy tank division in the zone of a front, but this maneuver is limited by its organizational link with the tank army. Both during the combat operations of a tank army and before its commitment to battle, this powerful antitank instrument is frequently held in reserve. The heavy tank division which forms the reserve of the front will be used first and foremost as an effective antitank instrument. Naturally, in case of necessity, it may be transferred to the composition of one or another of the combined-arms armies.

The foregoing leads to the following conclusions. In view of the emergence of new means of combat, of improvement in the means of intelligence, and because of the change in methods of combat operations and in the organizational structure of troops, the need for the fulfilment by tank armies of "specific" tasks in developing the success of an offensive has passed; the use of tank armies as strike groupings of a front has become more difficult. The role of the strike groupings of a front may be performed more successfully by combined-arms armies, whose composition must correspond to the particular conditions in which the operation is being carried out.

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The shift to a new troop structure which rejects tank armies, which we propose, does not entail great difficulties. The implementation of such a measure is extremely necessary and will permit generals and officers to acquire skill more quickly in a new solution to the tasks of setting up a front's strike groupings.

On the question of the advisability of creating front strike groupings by the wide maneuver of tank divisions and by their use in combination with motorized-rifle divisions -- we consider this to be the best solution to this problem, given the present-day organization of troops (with tank and motorized-rifle divisions). At the same time, we consider it necessary to work on the creation of unitary (unitarnaya) divisions which are capable of the successful performance of the highly diverse tasks which arise in the conduct of modern combat operations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

22 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Conclusions on the NATO Armed Forces' Exercise SIDE STEP", by Colonel-General S. Ivanov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Conclusions on the NATO Armed Forces' Exercise SIDE STEP", by Colonel-General S. Ivanov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Some Conclusions on the NATO Armed Forces' Exercise SIDE STEP", by Colonel-General S. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

Headquarters Comment: Some of the detail on the attached map is unclear; although the majority of the designations can be accepted with confidence, there is some room for error in the breakdown of the various army corps and similar small print. It is also difficult to distinguish between the lines of the successive positions. The transliterated letters "N/N" indicate military units without designations.

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Some Conclusions on the NATO

Armed Forces' Exercise

"SIDE STEP"

by

Colonel-General S. Ivanov

The leaders of the aggressive NATO Bloc plan to launch a future World war primarily by means of a surprise attack against the countries of the Socialist Camp. One cannot rule out their launching a world war after a period of sharp political tension or local wars. They envisage carrying out preparations for an aggressive war in such a way that they will be interpreted as purely "defensive" preparations, not only by the enemy but also by the personnel of the armed forces and by the populations of the member-countries of the bloc.

Decisive significance is attached to the initial period of the war, in the course of which it is intended to destroy the atomic potential of the enemy, to disorganize the national administration and economy, to disrupt the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces, to undermine the morale of the people, and in this way to achieve the immediate strategic goals of the war and to predetermine its outcome to their benefit. For the fulfillment of these tasks it is planned to bring to bear the greatest possible number of forces and means capable of using nuclear weapons.

The operational plans for the initial period of the war are periodically tested in operational-strategic exercises, during which different variations for launching and waging war given various degrees of preparedness of the armed forces are studied and tested.

From this point of view, the command-staff exercise, SIDE STEP, conducted in September 1959 with the participation of troops of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO merits special attention. In the importance of the problems which were being worked out, in its sweep and in the composition of the participants it was one of the largest exercises of recent years. It covered almost the entire area of Europe, of the Atlantic, and of the Mediterranean.

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The commanders-in-chief and staffs of the armed forces of the North European, Central European, South European, Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters of military operations, the commanders and staffs of the branches (vid) of the armed forces and of the regions (rayon) in the theaters of military operations, the commanders and staffs of army groups, the tactical aviation commands of field and air armies, the commanding officers and staffs of army corps (altogether 19) and divisions (51), and also the commanding officers and staffs of atomic artillery, guided missile and free rocket units participated in the training exercise.

In addition, the central directorates of defense ministries, commands and staffs of military-territorial organs, rear elements (organ tyla), the central directorates of Ministries of Internal Affairs, of Transport, of the Merchant Fleet, of Economics, of Health, of Communications and a number of other agencies from all European member-countries of NATO participated in this exercise.

Exercise SIDE STEP consisted of four exercises which were conducted according to a common plan and against the background of a single strategic situation.

The most important were the exercises of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO of the Central European and of the Southeastern part of the South European Theaters of Military Operations in which problems of preparation and conduct of the first operations in the initial period of the war were worked on. The basic goals set were: perfection of the system for bringing the allied and national armed forces to combat readiness; testing the methods of using nuclear arms in the course of the initial operations; the organization of command; the coordination of forces and means and of the comprehensive support of military operations.

At the same time, a rear area exercise was conducted in all European theaters of military operations with the aim of testing the existing system of supply, as well as of studying the ability of member-countries of the bloc to support their armed forces with supplies independently. American troops stationed in Europe conducted a special rear area exercise, "RAPID SERVICE" ("Bystraya podacha"), in which questions of material-technical support of nuclear ground troops units were studied.

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On the basis of a common operational-strategic situation, a naval exercise was also conducted on defense of communications and on control of merchant shipping, in which the coordination between the Allied NATO staffs and the national staffs and establishments on questions of defense of naval communications and of insuring uninterrupted merchant navigation in the beginning of the war was worked on.

Exercise SIDE STEP was under the command of the Supreme Commanders-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO in Europe and on the Atlantic. For direct command of the exercise, directing staffs were created at all staffs of formations and large units of the armed forces, as well as at the commands of military-territorial organs of various establishments participating in the exercise.

This exercise was conducted against a background of "military operations" in Europe and in the Atlantic area between the armed forces of NATO (BLUE) and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact (ORANGE).

According to the given situation, the war between BLUE and ORANGE began as a result of gradual sharpening of international tension lasting for more than five months. The situation and the actions of the two sides were worked out so as to place all the blame for unleashing the war on the ORANGE , that is, on the Socialist countries, while the imperialist states, the NATO members, would be represented as victims of aggression, supposedly forced to carry out counter measures to the "aggressive" actions of ORANGE. If this rather artless camouflage is discarded, the predatory plans and actions of the bloc headed by the USA can be seen distinctly through the entire idea and course of the exercise.

How then was the development of events up to the outbreak of war envisaged?

The first period (January-March 1959) was characterized by "international equilibrium". This was followed by a period of "international distrust" (April-June), during the course of which relations between the leading countries of the political groupings deteriorated. The reason for this was supposedly a mutually prejudiced appraisal of the actions of the two sides, doubt of the sincerity of each other's policies and also the deadlock

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which had been reached in the negotiations of the leading powers on control of the production of nuclear arms (just exactly on control, rather than on prohibition of nuclear arms).

The period of distrust was followed by increased international tension (July-August).

Since the international situation "continued to intensify", the NATO command announced a threatening situation on 1 September which continued for two weeks (until 14 September). During this period all bloc participants mapped out measures for partial mobilization, for bringing the armed forces to combat readiness, and for establishing the necessary order in the rear. After this, the system of alerts adopted by NATO was put into effect (14-19 September), and during this time the armed forces were brought to full combat readiness and were deployed in operational formations.

In this manner, events gradually developed up to the beginning of armed conflict. Evidently the NATO command reckons that under these conditions the aggressive bloc will succeed in completely preparing for war against the countries of the Socialist Camp, and at the same time in disorienting world opinion, with which, it is true, the imperialists do not now especially concern themselves. However, this by no means signifies that they plan only this method of preparation for unleashing war. If we analyze other exercises, especially the practical measures of NATO in preparation for future war, then it is not difficult to be convinced of the fact that they place first priority on a surprise attack against the countries of the Socialist Camp, secretly prepared in a very short time.

Further events developed in the following manner: ORANGE, having concentrated three fronts (75 divisions) in the Central European Theater of Military Operations, and also considerable forces (24 divisions) on the Balkan Peninsula and in the Caucasus, launched massed air and missile nuclear strikes at 0530 hours on 19 September against airfields, the means of nuclear attack (sredstvo yadernogy napadeniya), ports, large communication nets, and against BLUE troops; simultaneously, they took the offensive with groupings of ground troops. In the Central European theater, ORANGE directed the main attacks in the directions of: Magdeburg; Hanover; Muenster; Eisenach; Frankfurt am Main; Kaiserslautern. Auxiliary attacks were launched in a series of directions (diagram I).

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On the Balkan Peninsula, the main attack was directed against Istanbul and two attacks against Salonika from the territory of Bulgaria and Albania. From the Caucasus, the offensive was carried out in a series of directions deep into Turkish territory.

BLUE carries out a nuclear offensive /attack/ using strategic, tactical, and carrier aviation, missiles and other ground troop weapons. The groupings of ground troops on all fronts conduct defensive actions and by 24 September fall back to a depth of from 50 to 150 km, where they stop the offensive of ORANGE. At the same time BLUE concentrate their reserves and prepare to go over to the counter attack. At 1500 hours on 25 September the exercise was concluded.

Let us briefly examine the grouping of ground troops set up at exercise SIDE STEP at the beginning of military operations.

In the Central European Theater were deployed the two army groups - the Northern and the Central - which existed there in peacetime. The Northern Army Group consisting of 10 divisions, one brigade group, and two regiments, strengthened by four atomic support battalions (divizion atomnoy podderzhki), and a "Corporal" missile regiment was deployed in a 280 km strip (polosa) along the Weser and Fulda Rivers, 100-120 km to the west of the border between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic.

The Central Army Group consisting of the 7th American and the 1st French Armies (14 divisions, one tank group, four separate regiments (otdelnyy polk) and 24 atomic support battalions) deployed in a 475 km strip along a line located 30-50 km from the GDR border and in places up to 120 km.

The desire of the NATO command to cover the entire strategic front with divisions to an average operational density of 30 km per division attracts attention. In front of the defense line a cover zone (zona prikrytiya) is organized, where reconnaissance units operate and possibly, individual units from the first echelon divisions. Cover units are distributed along a considerable front. Their mission is to carry out holding actions in front of the basic defense line. They are incapable of offering serious resistance to the advance of our troops.

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In the strategic reserve of the NATO command there were about 10-12 divisions from the complement of the first echelon of NATO (French and Belgian army corps, a Dutch division, West German units formed by mobilization, as well as large units transferred from North Africa, North America and England).

Approximately the same concept was applied to the operational formation of NATO forces on the Balkan Peninsula and in eastern Turkey.

Thus, in exercise SIDE STEP the NATO command organizes a typical linear defense along the entire strategic front, deploying the basic mass of its divisions in a single line. Such a defense condemned the ground troops to passivity, and consequently led to the instability of the entire defense, which was faced with strong offensive groupings of ORANGE ground troops superior to a significant degree to the NATO forces.

At first glance it may appear incomprehensibile that the NATO command forms a defense in the theaters of military operations, which can not withstand an offensive when nuclear arms are used. If one analyzes the entire course of the exercise, however, then it is not difficult to be convinced of the fact that the NATO command in the exercise relied basically not on the action of ground forces, but on the use of a large quantity of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, on the conduct of a nuclear offensive. Under these conditions, the ground troops which had been brought to readiness by the beginning of military operations, were entrusted with the task of covering the base locations of nuclear means (prikryt bazirovaniye yadernyye sredstva) and insuring the carrying out of a nuclear offensive and the deployment of the strategic reserves. By means of nuclear attacks, the NATO command evidently counted on inflicting such destruction on the enemy as to insure that its ground forces could go over to the offensive without engaging in----(4 or 5 words missing)----battles.

It is well known that ground troops are assigned an active role in the NATO plans of preparation for future war, especially in the Central European Theater. According to these plans, after a successful nuclear offensive, groupings of NATO ground troops must go over to a decisive offensive with the mission of destroying the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, of occupying the territories of the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and of carrying

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military operations onto the territory of the USSR. The most responsible role in the offensive is entrusted to the armored and airborne troops, who must quickly and effectively exploit the results of the nuclear strikes by decisive actions.

If for any reasons the surprise nuclear attack of the Western Bloc does not achieve the expected results, defensive operations by the ground troops are envisaged, in order to win time for the concentration of reserves and the creation of conditions for going over to the counter-offensive. It is calculated that this goal may be achieved in a short period. Defensive operations are also based on the massed use of nuclear weapons, on broad maneuvering of forces and means, on the carrying out of counter-attacks and counter-blows by highly mobile units and large units, and on the wide use of all possible obstacles. Facts at our disposal indicate that the defensive grouping of ground troops set up in the exercise did not fully ensure the conduct of such a defensive operation.

Let us examine the course of combat operations in exercise SIDE STEP.

According to the plan, ORANGE started military operations by striking massed nuclear blows by missile troops and aviation with the simultaneous taking of the offensive by the ground troops. Actually the game was conducted differently. ORANGE launched the first massed nuclear strike at 0530 hours on 19 September (on the Balkan Peninsula at 0500 hours), but the commanders of the exercise gave the signal for the use of nuclear weapons by BLUES at 0340 hours on 19 September, that is, almost two hours before the "enemy" attack. It follows that the first nuclear blow at the exercise was struck by the NATO troops, which is what they are indeed preparing for. This was a pre-emptive (uprezhdayushchiy) and not a "counter" (otvetnyy) nuclear attack, as the NATO command was trying to show.

From the first minutes of the war the NATO troops conduct a nuclear offensive on a broad scale. The nuclear offensive planned by our probable enemies in the initial period of the war can be arbitrarily divided into two parts. The first and main part is the destruction of objectives in the Soviet Union throughout the entire depth of its territory by strategic nuclear means of attack. This part of the nuclear offensive was not played out in the exercise, but it was taken into account. The second part of the

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nuclear offensive involves the destruction of objectives on the borders of the theaters of military operations and partly on the territory of the USSR and of the other Socialist countries up to a depth of 1,000 km from the front line by forces and means under the jurisdiction of theater commands.

The principal means of nuclear attack in the theaters of military operations are tactical aviation and cruise missiles (samolety-snaryady) of the "Matador" type, which are at disposal of the command in the theater. The missile weapons and atomic artillery of the ground troops which are under the direction of the commands of army groups, field armies, and army corps, and in the US Army - of divisions as well, are also used.

The following missions were entrusted to tactical aviation in the course of the nuclear offensive; the destruction of the means of nuclear attack (sredstvo yadernogo napadeniya); the neutralization of radiotechnical equipment; the disruption of communications; the destruction of reserves and of other enemy objectives; the support of their own troop operations.

The battle against the means of nuclear attack was considered by the NATO command as one of the most important tasks of the nuclear offensive. This was conducted by the destruction of airfields and missile launch sites, nuclear weapons, aviation and missiles, and of command centers. The final goal of this battle was set as the achievement of nuclear superiority over the enemy.

To disrupt communications, bridges and road junctions were destroyed, and barriers were created by atomic means. This was also intended to disrupt and interdict the transport of troops and supplies, to make difficult the maneuvering of troops, and to prevent the bringing up of strategic reserves.

Tactical aviation was used for the direct support of ground troops by striking blows against the combat formations of enemy troops, enemy reserves, command posts, depots, and also by conducting aerial reconnaissance. However, only a limited number of aircraft was made available for the direct support of ground troops.

The organization of the centralized control (upravleniye) of nuclear strikes in the South European Theater of Military Operations attracts attention. The resources of the 6th Fleet and the air

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command were combined. For this, an operational center for joint operations was formed at the 6th Allied Tactical Air Command; in this center there were representatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of NATO Armed Forces in Europe, of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the theater and of the commanders of the ground forces, the air force, and the navy. This center received requests from field and air armies for nuclear strikes, took decisions and issued the necessary instructions. Under this system, more than two hours elapsed from the moment intelligence information was received concerning identified targets for nuclear strikes to the time an order was issued for their destruction.

Operational-tactical missiles and atomic artillery were used to strike nuclear blows against objectives in operational-tactical depth and to support the combat operations of the ground troops. The majority of the missile and atomic artillery units was alloted to the army corps. A "Corporal" missile regiment was left under the command of the Commander of the Northern Army Group, while two "Redstone" missile groups (grupa) were under the command of the Commander of the 7th American Army.

Available information, though incomplete, concerning the use of nuclear weapons in exercise SIDE STEP attests to the significant increase in the number of nuclear strikes during the first days of the operation in comparison with previous exercises. Thus, the 4th Allied Tactical Air Command used 180 nuclear units (yedinits) during the first 38 hours of the war, the 7th American Army used about 205 nuclear rounds (boyevyye pripasy) in six days. In the South European Theater of Military Operations 313 nuclear rounds were used in the six days of war, 255 of which were used during the course of the first three days.

The experience gained in working on the problems of the use of nuclear weapons in exercise SIDE STEP confirms the existence of plans by the NATO command for the use of sudden massed (several - words missing) - with the aim of winning nuclear superiority, inflicting defeat on enemy troops, changing the strategic situation to their advantage, and insuring that their ground troops can go over to the offensive. The implementation of these plans in a future war can cause great damage to our armed forces in the theaters of military operations, unless timely effective methods to disrupt the nuclear offensive of the enemy are undertaken by our side at the very beginning of the war. In this connection,

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it is worth noting several weak points in the so-called nuclear might of NATO. The basic means for using nuclear weapons in the theaters of military operations by the probable enemy remains tactical aviation, against which combat is not a complex problem at the present time. A large proportion of the nuclear weapons of the NATO ground troops consists of the cumbersome 280 mm cannons and 203.2 mm howitzers, the annihilation of which does not present any special difficulty either.

In the exercise, a great deal of attention was given to the defeat in combat operations of the ground troops (proigrysh boyevykh deystviy sukhoputnykh voysk). Although these questions have not been sufficiently clarified, the following conclusions may still be made on the basis of available information.

Holding actions in the cover zone went on for one day. By the end of the day on 19 September, ORANGE approached the basic line of defense having negotiated a distance of from 30 to 120 km. From 20 to 24 September NATO troops carried out defensive operations and were forced to retreat with continuing resistance in all directions. The general depth of the withdrawal was on the average 100-150 km, the average tempo of the withdrawal was 10-15 km a day in major directions (na glavnykh napravleniyakh), and 20-30 km a day in secondary directions. The withdrawal was accomplished evenly, almost along the entire front, under cover of massed nuclear strikes. In the course of the defensive engagement, no active operations of any kind were apparent on the part of the groupings of ground troops. By the end of 24 September the front had stabilized. It can be supposed that from this line (rubezh) it was planned to go over to the counter-offensive with the concentrated strategic reserves, who had not participated in the defensive engagements.

The indicated method of conducting the defensive operations of NATO troops in exercise SIDE STEP has its strong and its weak sides. The strong side of the defense is the massed use of nuclear weapons, while its weak side may be considered to be the shallow linear formation of the ground troops and their insufficient aggressiveness during the course of the engagement. In order to shatter such a defense, it is necessary to destroy the means of nuclear attack and to organize skillfully the operations of mobile groupings of troops in the most important directions with the aim of quick penetration to a great depth and the conduct of maneuvering operations. As far as the reserves who have concentrated in the

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rear are concerned, they can also be uncovered and crushed by nuclear strikes. However, in the preparation of our armed forces it is necessary to assume that they will have to conduct offensive operations in the beginning of a future war under more complex conditions and against a more aggressive enemy.

Let us examine in more detail the more important questions which were worked out in exercise SIDE STEP.

First of all let us consider the measures taken by the member-countries of the aggressive NATO Bloc in preparing for and launching the war. The study of these measures was one of the important goals of the exercise. Incidentally, by these measures one may judge to a certain degree the actual plans of the probable enemy in regard to the unleashing of war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

In the period of mounting international tension, that is approximately two and a half months prior to the beginning of the war, a series of concealed measures are taken in the NATO countries in preparation for war. With the introduction of a threatening situation preparation is intensified. The NATO Command looks upon the threatening period as a period of direct preparation for war. Under various pretexts (conduct of exercises, various call-ups and other "usual" measures), a concealed and comprehensive build-up of the Bloc's preparedness for unleashing an armed conflict takes place during this period. First of all, it was planned to intensify construction and repair work at all installations (obyekt) of major military significance, with a simultaneous discontinuation of work at secondary and non-military installations. Government control was established for the distribution and consumption of fuel and critical raw materials; the security of air-fields, storage depots, pipe lines, staffs, communications centers, and other important installations was strengthened; measures were carried out on a broad scale for antiaircraft defense and anti-atomic protection; the evacuation of the most important enterprises from border areas was planned.

Ten days prior to the beginning of military operations the transfer of French first-line large units and units from North Africa to France and onto the territory of the FRG begins. At the same time secret partial mobilization is carried out in a number of NATO member-countries and the building up to prescribed strength

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of large units of the first echelon and the reserves; intelligence is activated as well.

In exercise SIDE STEP the introduction of a threatening situation did not signify change over to martial law. Martial law was introduced on 14 September, that is, five days before the war, when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO received authority from the Permanent NATO Council (its highest political body) to put the alert systems into operation.

Two alert systems have been worked out in NATO: the military alert system, and the so-called official alert system. The first is brought into operation by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of the Bloc even without the sanction of the NATO Council in that instance when armed conflict may be suddenly unleashed within a one to 36-hour period. In this system measures of a purely military nature are carried out -- bringing to combat readiness mainly the Allied Armed Forces.

The second alert system is brought into operation by a resolution of the NATO Council in that instance, when the military-political situation is aggravated relatively gradually. This system includes a simple, reinforced and a general alert, and signifies general political, military, and economic preparation by the Bloc for entry into war. It is important to note that the Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO is granted the right to independently declare a simple and reinforced alert in case of extraordinary circumstances.

In this manner, the military command of NATO, which is in the hands of the USA, has in essence unlimited authority to the extent of unleashing war, without considering the opinions of the other Bloc members. The alert declared by the Secretary of Defense of the USA, Gates, on the eve of the meetings of Chiefs of State in Paris, does not enter into the NATO alert system. This alert is considered to be an internal affair of the USA.

Exercise SIDE STEP was played out (3 or 4 words missing) alerts.

A Simple Alert was declared at 1700 hours on 14 September. On the basis of it the law on the state of emergency goes into effect in the member-countries of NATO. Secret mobilization

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measures are carried out on a broad scale, military reserves are called up, the units and large units assigned to the disposal of the NATO Command are brought up to wartime strength, as are the cadre units of national subordination. Armed forces in areas of permanent disposition are brought to combat readiness, as are the troops of territorial and local antiaircraft defense, the system of shore defense, etc. Reserve units of various branches of the service are formed, and new units of national defense forces (vnutrennaya oborona) and various units of special designation are created. The border defense, and the antiaircraft, anti-atomic, anti-chemical, and anti-bacteriological defense of troops, of the population, and of military and non-military installations are strengthened. The wartime communications system is brought into operation, and preparations are made for anti-communications obstructions (zagrazhdeniye) and destruction. The movement of material, technical and medical supplies into the zone of combat operations is begun. At the same time many other measures are also carried out (the limiting of non-military deliveries, partial evacuation of the means of transport from border areas, preparation for the evacuation of the population from combat zones, establishment of control over refugees, intensification of counter-intelligence, etc.).

Two days before the beginning of military operations a Reinforced Alert is declared. In these two days formations and large units are deployed along lines and in positions in accordance with the operational plan, and aerial reconnaissance is significantly increased. The Border Guard is replaced by ground troops. At this same time, the delivery of nuclear weapons to airfields and to firing positions is organized, and all the reserves of material supplies of the troops are brought up to the established norms. Evacuation of supply depots, enterprises, raw material reserves, and the means of transport from border areas to the rear is organized on a broad scale, censorship is introduced, and the means of electronic warfare (sredstvo radio-voyny) are readied for activation.
The carrying out of the above-mentioned measures upon the declaration of a Reinforced Alert two days before the beginning of military operations has been noted in a number of training exercises. This indicates that the NATO Command is striving to limit to the utmost the time needed for deployment of armed forces and operational formations and their arrival in attack positions prior to the beginning of military operations.

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The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to use nuclear arms was given 26 minutes later, i.e., at 0340 hours.

We have examined in detail the measures carried out by the NATO Command in exercise SIDE STEP in the way of preparations for unleashing war. Of course, these are far from all of the measures which will be carried out in an actual situation. For this reason, our intelligence organs are faced with a complex and responsible mission -- to keep all the preparations of the probable enemy for unleashing a new war under constant observation in order to give timely warning to our armed forces.

Of all the measures carried out by the NATO Command in the way of preparations for unleashing war, mobilization of the armed forces of member-countries of the aggressive bloc merits special attention. In exercise SIDE STEP, secret partial measures for building up the armed forces through mobilization started 20 days before the beginning of military operations.

Five days prior to the beginning of war the scale of secret mobilization in all the member-countries of the aggressive NATO Bloc broadened significantly. We do not have full information concerning the specific form taken by the development of mobilization in this exercise. However, if a number of training exercises and certain other measures of the NATO Command are analyzed, one may come to the following conclusions.

In accordance with existing agreements, 86 divisions and a number of separate brigade groups, units, and subunits were assigned to the Allied Armed Forces from the 109 divisions available in the NATO countries at the beginning of 1960. However, of these, only 50 divisions, and 23 brigade groups and separate units were subordinated to the Allied Command. The remaining large units and units remain under the subordination of national commands as part of the troops of the first and second echelons.

The large units subordinated to the Allied Command are maintained in peacetime at full TO & E strength and do not require additional build-up through mobilization. Almost all of them participated in the exercise and were deployed in operational formations two days prior to the beginning of war. The members of NATO provided the following number of divisions: USA-5, FRG-8, England-3, France-4, Turkey-15, Greece-8 divisions. A small

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number of divisions were provided by Belgium (two divisions), Holland (two divisions), and Portugal (one).

The first echelon of NATO is comprised of 16 divisions and four brigades. In peacetime, they are maintained at 60 percent personnel strength and 100 percent equipment strength. Five days are alloted for their mobilization build-up. It must be assumed that these divisions could be mobilized and fully ready by the beginning of war, although information is lacking about their use in the exercise.

The remaining 20 divisions which comprise the second echelon of NATO, are kept at only 25-30 percent strength during peacetime. It would require 10-20 days to bring them to combat readiness.

What base do the NATO countries have for the build-up of ground troops through mobilization?

In the USA, in addition to the existing 15 regular divisions (of which 5 divisions are in Europe) there are 52 National Guard and Army Reserve divisions (about 1.5 million men), a significant part of which systematically undergoes combat training. The Inactive Reserve consists of about 500 thousand men. In this manner, the USA has at its disposal a trained reserve of up to 2 million men. In the USA much attention is being given to the problem of insuring rapid mobilization and the reinforcement of troops deployed in overseas theaters of military operations.

The FRG had 11 divisions at the beginning of 1960. When the Simple Alert was declared (14 September), assembly points for mobilization were set up in Western Germany and the call-up of reserves was started under the guise of refresher training. By 17 September it was planned to bring all large units and units of the Bundeswehr to a full wartime complement, to form a considerable number of new units, and to form personnel reserves. Specifically, reserve battalions were formed in each of the eight divisions under the subordination of the NATO Command. In military districts 57 reserve training battalions were formed, which were deployed in areas adjoining the western border of the FRG. The total number of enlisted and non-commissioned officer personnel in the organized reserve by 17 September was 78 thousand men, and about 500 reserve officers. In addition - (several words missing) - men who had passed the examination but who had not served in the Bundeswehr.

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In Great Britain at the beginning of 1960 there were six divisions and 13 brigades and brigade groups. The base for the build-up of ground troops in wartime is the territorial army, consisting of 10 divisions which in peacetime are kept at 70-80 percent strength.

In other NATO member-countries contingents of military trained reserves are formed. Large units and units of reserves similar to the American and English ones do not exist in the majority of these countries at the present time.

It would not be correct to evaluate the potential build-up of NATO armed forces through mobilization in terms of divisions of ground troops. Under contemporary conditions the evaluation of the probable enemy's potential for the means of nuclear attack acquires decisive significance. Means of this type which are available to the NATO Command are: tactical aviation, cruise missiles "Matador" and "Mace", tactical missiles ("Redstone", "Corporal", "Honest John", "Lacrosse", "Little John"), and atomic artillery (280 mm cannon and 203.2 mm howitzers). As is known, the strategic means of nuclear attack have not been put at the disposal of the NATO Command, they are in the hands of the Anglo-American command and may be used in addition to the existing forces of NATO.

At the present time, plans are maturing for the creation of allied strategic nuclear forces within the Western European Alliance which includes Great Britain, France, FRG, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxemburg, that is, not all the members of NATO. Evidently, what is intended is to create air force and IRBM units capable of using nuclear weapons. These units are considered to be the basic means of war in Europe. For the present, no such allied strategic nuclear forces as yet exist in Europe. In exercise SIDE STEP, operational-tactical nuclear forces were used.

By 17 September all the tactical aviation forces available to the Allied NATO Command were brought to full combat readiness. In the Central European Theater of Military Operations the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Commands, composed of 115 squadrons (about 2500 aircraft, including about 1,500 fighters-bombers and more than 500 fighters of the Air Defense), were readied. In addition, the USA and England allocated about 1,000 fighter-bombers and fighters of the Air Defense. This number of aircraft basically conforms to the combat strength of NATO aviation in peacetime.

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In the South European Theater of Military Operations the 6th Allied Tactical Air Command was brought to readiness. In addition, two tactical air squadrons were transferred to this theater from the USA and the carrier aviation of the 6th Fleet was used.

Significant forces of tactical aviation remain under the subordination of the national commands of the USA, England, and France. It was also planned to bring this aviation to combat readiness. In line with this the principal members of NATO are creating aviation reserves for replacing losses. The best are the Air Force reserves of the USA (the National Guard and the Air Force Reserve), which can also be brought to combat readiness.

Tactical missiles and atomic artillery are for the present under the command of the USA and, in part, England. At the present time, there are 48 battalions of guided missiles and free rockets of an operational-tactical designation and atomic artillery concentrated in the European theaters, of which 36 battalions are located in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. Evidently all of them took part in the exercise. In the last two days before the beginning of the war it was planned to deploy all these units in the appropriate areas and to equip them with nuclear weapons. The NATO Command considers that there is an insufficient quantity of these means of nuclear attack to support the combat operations of the allied ground troops. For this reason it is planned by 1963 to bring the number of battalions, together with the former ones, to 130 missile battalions of operational-tactical designation.

In this manner, exercise SIDE STEP and a number of other training exercises indicate that the NATO Command evidently plans to carry out in advance secret, comprehensive measures for the build-up of the armed forces through mobilization under conditions when war is preceded by a period of sharp political tension. At the same time it is known, that in recent years in the West many of the military ideologists of imperialism are coming out against the build-up of the armed forces through mobilization before the beginning of war in view of the difficulty of hiding this undertaking, and consequently, the impossibility of achieving a surprise attack. For this reason it is proposed to have such armed forces in standing combat readiness in peacetime, as they would be able to start military operations without undertaking the slightest noticeable mobilization measures prior to the beginning of armed

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conflict. It is fully possible that these views are reflected in the aggressive plans of the Command of the Anglo-American Bloc. We have many facts which indicate that this Command, utilizing numerous bases and the territories of the countries dependent on the USA and England, is striving to deploy in advance the necessary groupings of forces and means in the appropriate areas and in the theaters of military operations, from where they plan to start a war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

Let us pause briefly on the problems which were worked on in the rear area exercises. These exercises took in all the European theaters of military operations. As already noted, in these exercises the existing system for supplying the armed forces of NATO with materiel was checked and the abilities of Bloc member-countries to independently support their troops assigned to NATO were studied.

The following principles were applied as the basis for organizing material-technical support in the exercise. Each member-country of NATO was responsible for the materiel, technical, and medical support of its troops and determined independently the types and quantities of the materiel necessary for the support of combat operations. The commanders of the Allied troops were charged with the responsibility for distribution and use of the material-technical supplies allocated to their jurisdiction, for making up requisitions (together with the corresponding national authorities) for material-technical supplies, and for the fulfillment of these requisitions by the national authorities and by the NATO high command. The commanders of the national formations were responsibile for the materiel, technical and medical support of the troops under their subordination.

Rear support of American and English ground troops was accomplished through zones of communication, which passed through the territories of France, FRG, Belgium, and Holland and were the connecting link between the USA, Great Britain and the zones of combat operations in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. In the aims of -- (part of one sentence missing) -- by rear units -- sectors, the base area (bazovyy uchastok) and the forward area (peredovoy uchastok) within the confines of which were located depots of various designations, rear units and establishments. The command for supplying atomic and missile weapons to the American ground troops was situated in the forward zone; it supplied these types of weapons to all atomic support units, including units assigned under the commands of other NATO

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members countries.

Motor transport was chiefly used for delivery of supplies; fuel and lubricants were delivered by pipe lines and brought up in tank trucks and RR tankcars. Special attention in the exercise was devoted to questions of rapid delivery of supplies from ports located on the French coast to depots in the zone of combat operations.

As a whole, the system of organization of material-technical support of ground troops in the exercise was characterized by extreme complexity; this was caused by the fact that the governments and commands of each NATO member-country were responsible for supporting their troops with essential supplies, as well as by the differences in the organization of supply of the national formations and troops assigned to the jurisdiction of the NATO Command. One of the vulnerable points in this system is the great extension of the lines of communication. It is sufficient to point out that the depth of the zones of communications of the American and English troops, without counting the depth of the combat operation zones, was more than 700-750 km. This forces the command to subdivide [illegible] into sectors, which in turn complicates the organization of delivery and supply.

There were certain unusual features in the operational calculations of the norms used in the exercise for material-technical supply of the West German ground troops, which consisted of the fact that to facilitate the formulation of estimates, all types of reserves of material-technical supplies were calculated on the basis of unit average norms of supply for one man, expressed in kilograms. Food, clothing, engineer equipment, construction materials, POL, communications equipment and other items were planned in weight units per man.

The method of calculating losses deserves attention. Losses of personnel and combat materiel were determined by taking into account the place of the large unit in the operational formation (mesta soyedineniya v operativnom postroyenii) and the degree of intensity of combat operations. For the first seven days of war these losses were estimated approximately as follows: personnel -14-21 percent; atomic artillery, guided missiles and free rockets, and combat vehicles -30-40 percent; tactical aviation combat aircraft - 71 percent; and air defense aircraft - 53 percent (taking into account repairs of damaged aircraft); atomic weapons - 30-35 percent; conventional ammunition -20-30 percent; POL - 20-35 percent.

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Characteristically, losses of personnel, armament, and combat materiel during the first day of war were 3-5 times higher than the average daily losses for the seven days of the war.

The questions worked on in the naval exercise were basically those of defense of communications and control of merchant shipping during the first days of the war. The staffs of the allied naval and air forces on the Atlantic and in the zone of the English Channel, the staffs of the naval forces in the European theaters of military operations, and also merchant marine enterprises of the NATO member-countries took part in this training exercise.

In the design of the exercise it was planned that the main efforts of the NATO naval forces during the first days of the war be concentrated on the annihilation of nuclear missile weapons, airfields and submarine bases in the northwestern and southern areas of ORANGE territory, and on the defense of communications lines in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Prior to the beginning of combat operations mobilization measures were carried out in the naval forces and in the merchant fleet, specific tasks of the allied naval forces in different areas were defined, the dispersion of the forces and weapons of the fleet was provided for, material-technical support and the evacuation of bases and ports were organized, a centralized directorate of shipping was created, convoys were formed and other measures were carried out.

It was considered that with the beginning of military operations a significant part of the NATO naval bases, ports and airfields in Western Europe and in North America was destroyed or was put out of commission for a prolonged period as a result of ORANGE nuclear strikes, and that a part of the reserves of different types of supplies on hand at the beginning of the war in depots of the European member-countries of NATO was wiped out. In this connection, the NATO Command planned to organize loading-unloading work in small harbors, in roadsteads and in unequipped sectors of the coast, although this brought about a decrease in shipping turnover (sudooborot) and a shortage of coasting vessels.

According to the plan of the exercise command, the principal threat to the shipping of NATO member-countries was created by ORANGE submarines, deployed along communications lines in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as by their

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aviation, which along with carrying out attacks against ports and ships at sea, layed mines in coastal communications lines and in the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean Sea. In these circumstances, the defense of naval communications was organized on a zonal principle, in accordance with which responsibility for the security of merchant navigation within the boundaries of a theater or region rested on the corresponding NATO naval commander. The guarding and defense of individual vessels which had not yet been brought into a convoy were organized only in areas of most intensive navigation with the use of antisubmarine vessels and aircraft for this purpose, as well as of aircraft carrier antisubmarine hunter-killer groups. With defense of naval communications lines organized in this manner, the NATO Command calculates that the communications lines will not be seriously disrupted at the beginning of the war.

The exercise shows that the NATO Command is devoting great attention to insuring uninterrupted merchant navigation in a future war.

We have examined the most important features of the exercise of the allied armed forces of the aggressive NATO Bloc, SIDE STEP, and the basic problems which were worked on in this exercise. As can be seen, the exercise was a many-sided one, in which many practical problems of preparation and conduct of war in Europe were tested. To a certain degree, the exercise reflects the official views of the command of the Anglo-American Bloc on the nature and methods of waging a future aggressive war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

Special significance is attached to the advance implementation of mobilization measures to bringing the armed forces to combat readiness, to their deployment in operational formations, and to supplying them with all the essential means of support. The leaders of the Anglo-American Bloc are evidently not certain of the fact that the war unleashed by them will end as quickly as they wish. For this reason they are looking for methods of insuring the readiness of their armed forces even for a war which may be of long duration (last two words uncertain).

In the plans for waging the war the main reliance is placed on the use of nuclear weapons and on the carrying out of a nuclear offensive, with the aid of which it is calculated to drastically

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change the correlation of forces in their favor and, it is hoped, to give the ground troops the possibility of conducting offensive operations. Among the means of using nuclear weapons side by side with aviation great importance is attached to missiles of operational-tactical designation. At the same time, atomic /barrel/ artillery is widely used as in the past. A large role is also assigned to the ground troops, who are given the mission of exploiting the results of a nuclear offensive for carrying military operations, as may be judged from certain available information, onto the territory of the Soviet Union.

On the whole, exercise SIDE STEP testifies to the aggressive nature of the NATO military preparations, which are openly directed against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp. It is well to bear in mind, however, that the military preparations of NATO reflected in exercise SIDE STEP do not exhaust all the aggressive plans of the Anglo-American Bloc. As is known, in the future war which they are feverishly preparing against the USSR, the militaristic circles of this bloc place principal reliance on the strategic means of nuclear attack - strategic aviation, intercontinental missiles, missiles of intermediate range, and the aircraft carrier and missile carrier assault fleet. With the aid of these means of armed conflict they aim to solve the main problems of a future nuclear war.

All this obligates our command personnel to study thoroughly the experience of the training exercises of the probable enemy, to analyze more deeply all the measures carried out by them on the preparation and unleashing of a new war against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp, and to take this into account in the preparation of our armed forces and in the working out of methods of thwarting the aggressive adventures of the NATO leaders.

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
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PLAN and COURSE of COMBAT OPERATIONS in the CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATER

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23 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

DATE OF INFO: Early 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", written by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov.

This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The First Issue of 1960 was the initial issue of this special collection.

Headquarters Comment: Related articles from the same Soviet publication were published as [redacted] and [redacted] The Field Service Regulations cited on Page 11 were disseminated as [redacted]

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Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks

by

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

The development of new equipment, the use of nuclear explosives, and of such delivery vehicles as missiles, have confronted military science with one of the urgent problems of the present day -- that of preserving the combat effectiveness of troops. The solution of this problem in almost all the armies of the world takes the form of perfection of the organization of troops and of their technical equipment, of the development of means of antiaircraft defense, of reconnaissance (razvedka) equipment, of methods for the antiatomic protection of troops on the field of battle, and of a number of other measures.

All the types of operational and combat support of troops must be developed and perfected in harmony with the development of the armed forces as a whole. One can have perfect organization of troops, unexceptionable means of controlling them, excellent missile equipment at all levels of the military organism, and strong and mobile means of antiaircraft defense, but if we forget one aspect of troop support, especially the development and perfection of reconnaissance equipment and the issue to intelligence subunits of this equipment, this will immediately influence all spheres of combat activity of troops, and especially that of the use of missile weapons.

Even so important a type of support of the troops as antiaircraft defense will also depend entirely on the ability of reconnaissance equipment to detect targets in good time and to warn the means of combat with the enemy in the air.

Our probable enemies are devoting very great attention to the development of technical reconnaissance equipment at both tactical and operational levels. They are introducing in divisions and armies, on a very wide scale, such reconnaissance equipment as: radar, television, heat sensors (teplolokator), and photographic equipment for ground and aerial photography. From divisional level upwards, all this reconnaissance equipment is available in both ground and aerial versions. Specially equipped aircraft and helicopters have been introduced into the Tables of Organization and Equipment (shtat) of divisions and armored regiments. Intensive work is being conducted on the evolution of pilotless equipment for aerial tactical and

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operational reconnaissance. Several modifications of pilotless equipment for aerial reconnaissance have already been developed and tested.

In the armies of the North Atlantic bloc countries, no less serious attention is devoted to the training of intelligence units for reconnaissance and diversionary operations in the rear of our troops. Thus, in the armies of Great Britain, intelligence regiments specially assigned to the conduct of reconnaissance against the disposition of our troops have been introduced into the composition of an army corps.

NATO member-countries must include in the composition of their divisions assigned to the allied armed forces, reconnaissance equipment which is capable of performing reconnaissance tasks against objectives which are liable for destruction by nuclear weapons.

The development and improvement of reconnaissance equipment will permit more successful use of missile units and of aircraft to combat the enemy's means of nuclear attack. Attention must therefore be paid to reconnaissance not only as a type of combat support for the troops in the development of theoretical situations at command-staff and troop training exercises; it is mainly necessary to possess the necessary reconnaissance forces and equipment during peacetime and to prepare and perfect them carefully.

In actual fact, how do our present army and division intelligence subunits differ from those of the Second World War? The difference lies only in the fact that amphibious tanks and armored carriers have been brought into the composition of the intelligence subunits of divisions and armies, as a result of which these subunits have acquired great mobility. However, just as there was previously no technical reconnaissance equipment in intelligence subunits, there is still none today. The Tables of Organization and Equipment do not provide intelligence subunits with equipment for optical reconnaissance, or with infrared equipment, heat sensors, or other technical reconnaissance equipment.

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It should be noted that the technical reconnaissance equipment of a front has not experienced any fundamental changes. Agent networks and radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, with the exception of aerial reconnaissance, are not capable of carrying out reconnaissance tasks for the missile troops with the necessary precision in determining the location of the target in a particular area.

It must be admitted with complete frankness that modern reconnaissance equipment, in the form in which it appears organizationally and in the way in which it is technically supplied, has lagged far behind the level of development of weapons of destruction. Without belittling the role or the significance of tried reconnaissance equipment or of its methods of operation, one can say without exaggeration that this equipment can no longer fully meet the tasks imposed on reconnaissance in furnishing missile units with intelligence data.

Existing divisional and army intelligence subunits (units) permit the organization of reconnaissance by observation, at best, with the help of ordinary binoculars, by the execution of raids and ambushes, and during combat by the dispatch of a reconnaissance detachment or of separate reconnaissance patrols whose range of operation is limited by the capabilities of existing means of communication which may reach 30 kms, which is obviously insufficient. Under the most favorable terrain and weather conditions the artillery reconnaissance equipment of a division and of an army can carry out reconnaissance to a depth of 10 to 15 kms, and, with their help, it is possible to obtain information on mortars, field artillery, the movements of the enemy, and the progress of engineering works, but only up to the limits of direct visibility.

We venture to assert that the function of the intelligence service is not valued highly enough by us; were this not the case, there would not be so vast a gap between the capabilities of weapons of destruction and of those of reconnaissance equipment.

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It is necessary to remember that in many respects modern operations will differ from those of previous wars. Some of the special features of these operations, it may be assumed, will consist of the tendency of both sides to carry out continuous combat operations directed, first of all, at the destruction of the means of atomic attack both on the ground and in the air; the destruction of the means of atomic attack before they are used will result in unprecedented reconnaissance activity by both sides with the goal of not only locating these means but of destroying them by all possible sabotage methods, both during the period of preparation and during the actual course of the operation.

The constant threat of destruction by nuclear weapons will result not only in the maximum possible dispersal of troops in areas of disposition but also in the carrying out of combat operations in broader zones.

No one will deny that the preservation of the combat effectiveness of troops in modern conditions, and consequently the successful execution of any operation, and especially the use of missile units, will, to a marked degree, depend upon the timely performance of the following tasks:

-- acquiring knowledge of the grouping of delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads and, equally, of the plants producing fuel components, of assembly bases and warhead storage depots;

-- acquiring knowledge of the control and guidance systems of guided missiles and pilotless weapons;

-- immediate destruction of the means of nuclear attack, without timing this to coincide with specific operational-tactical periods.

With existing technical reconnaissance equipment, neither a division nor an army can perform the tasks listed above, because they do not have at their disposal sufficient personnel and, even more, enough reconnaissance equipment. There is now a tendency toward the reduction in force of intelligence subunits

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which have already been reduced to the maximum. We have not a single organ, even at the center, which is working on the problems of the technical equipment of intelligence subunits at the tactical and operational level.

One asks how the commander of an army or the commanding officer of a division who lacks the most essential intelligence information and the equipment necessary to obtain this information can make well-founded decisions and utilize successfully his own means for the destruction of the enemy's means of atomic attack?

With the existing organizational structure of military intelligence, almost all the technical reconnaissance equipment which is capable of obtaining information on nuclear weapons is basically present at a front. The tasks of annihilating means of nuclear attack will be decided on by the commanding officer of a division and by the commander of an army. Hence, in the very organizational structure of the intelligence organs there is a rift between intelligence assets and the command echelons which organize the immediate fulfilment of important operational and tactical tasks.

The lack of technical reconnaissance equipment in a division, corps, and even an army during the Second World War resulted in the fact that these echelons solved the majority of the intelligence tasks by requests to higher headquarters. Thus, a division forwarded its requests for intelligence to a corps, the corps to an army, and [4 or 5 words missing].

The principle of solving intelligence tasks by means of requests to higher headquarters has outlived itself long ago and is obviously not suitable in modern conditions. Firstly, it impedes the activation of all intelligence assets at division and army level; secondly, and this is most important, it impedes the development and introduction of modern technical reconnaissance equipment into a division and an army; thirdly, this principle has become a cover for inactivity by subordinate headquarters in the problems of organization and of carrying out reconnaissance.

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The limited availability of intelligence personnel and equipment and the eagerness of commanding officers at all levels to receive intelligence information on objectives of direct interest to them in the shortest possible time, makes it urgently necessary to make the concept of the prospective operation (battle) the basis for the organization of reconnaissance, in order to ensure that all available intelligence personnel and equipment are used in the most purposeful manner from the beginning to the end of the operation (battle). Such purposeful use of intelligence personnel and equipment can be determined only by the commander (commanding officer) who has detailed knowledge of the intention and plan of the prospective operation and battle.

Regrettably, there are still commanding officers of divisions and commanders of armies who do not allot proper significance to intelligence problems, who farm out all the work pertaining to intelligence organization to the intelligence chiefs, which brings about a lack of purposefulness in intelligence.

In order to accomplish the tasks of discovering the grouping of the enemy and especially of his nuclear weapons, it is necessary to have strong, technically well-equipped intelligence subunits at division and army level which are capable of performing tasks which are within the range of their own means of destruction. The need for the availability of a variety of technical and other reconnaissance equipment in a division and an army is also expressed by the fact that information obtained from one source should not be considered as reliable until it is confirmed from two or three sources.

At the present time statements of opinion are appearing in periodicals on the formation of some type of joint centers for the utilization of reconnaissance equipment, for the collection and processing of intelligence data, of fire delivery centers and, about the endeavor to provide more reliable communications for all intelligence organs of the front with artillery headquarters, etc. All of this appears to be linked with the noble intention of finding ways to resolve the basic problem -- the reconnaissance of the means of nuclear attack and the provision to the missile units of targets for destruction. However, this has nothing in common with the problems of intelligence organization. The

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resolution of the problems of intelligence organization and the acquisition of intelligence data should be sought not by the creation of some type of improvised centers, but by the correct distribution and structural organization of reconnaissance assets able to perform intelligence tasks for a division, an army, or a front, and also in the centralized utilization of the reconnaissance equipment of the arms of troops.

The real centers for the organization of intelligence must be combined-arms staffs in the form of intelligence sections, departments, and directorates (otdeleniye, otdel i upravleniye). However, in order not to exclude the chiefs of other arms of troops from the intelligence system, provision must be made for an organizational structure in the composition of these arms of troops, with intelligence equipment capable of performing intelligence tasks for the given arm of troops.

The approximate layout of the organization of intelligence should be as follows. The combined-arms staff, with the active participation of the arms of troops, organizes reconnaissance, collects, analyzes, and collates all intelligence data. On the basis of a thorough analysis it determines the general grouping of nuclear means, the grouping of tanks, the means for control of nuclear weapons, and the grouping of the pilotless weapons and aircraft of the enemy. On the basis of this information, the commander (commanding officer) decides on the execution of the operation (battle). The chiefs of arms of troops, having received specific tasks and targets for destruction, study these targets together with the divisional, army, and front intelligence chiefs before delivering the strike, and organize additional reconnaissance of the objectives (targets) with their own and with the combined-arms assets. From this it follows that in the combined-arms staff a single intelligence plan must be developed which provides for the use of all the intelligence personnel and equipment of the arms of troops. Specific intelligence tasks, such as: the topographic and geodetic work of the artillery, engineer reconnaissance of terrain, of the passability of roads, etc., must be reflected in great detail in the intelligence plans of the appropriate arm of troops. In our opinion, such a principle of organization and execution of intelligence will permit the tasks of reconnoitering those objectives of the enemy which are liable for destruction by nuclear weapons to be fulfilled more successfully.

Conditions for the conduct of modern operations urgently demand a most attentive and serious review of the organizational structure

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of military intelligence organs from top to bottom.

The idea of providing command echelons with reconnaissance equipment in accordance with the tasks levied on any particular troop element must be implanted in the organizational structure of the intelligence organs. Therefore, in the composition of an army and a division, it is necessary to have reconnaissance equipment that could obtain data of interest to the commander of the army and the commanding officer of the division. This necessity results from the fact that the role of armies in modern operations and, correspondingly, the role of the division in a battle, has increased. The modern army (combined-arms and tank) is capable of the independent performance of operational tasks concerned with the destruction of the enemy in wide zones and to a great depth, and of the conduct of combat against the enemy's means for nuclear attack. The absence from an army (combined-arms and tank) of organic (shtatnyy) reconnaissance equipment puts the army commander and the army headquarters into a position of dependence upon the front headquarters, and this paralyzes their initiative in questions of the conduct of combat against the nuclear means of the enemy.

The high mobility of the use of nuclear weapons (as a rule there will be only one firing from each position) calls for a highly mobile means of reconnaissance. Today such a means is aerial reconnaissance, which is capable of penetrating enemy positions to a great depth, and of obtaining in a brief period of time the most reliable documentary (dokumentalno-podtverzhdayemyy) intelligence data on sizeable areas.

For this reason, the composition of combined-arms and tank armies must include organic means for tactical aerial reconnaissance. These must be capable of performing a great number of tasks, for example, of carrying out visual reconnaissance by day and night, of taking aerial photographs of objectives (areas) and of correcting the fire of the army's artillery. Aerial reconnaissance in support of the army must be carried out to a depth of not less than 200 kms. Reconnaissance aircraft must carry one-step photographic processing equipment capable of independent processing of the results of aerial reconnaissance directly in the aircraft in order to shorten to the minimum the time needed for processing and montage. In our view, in order to perform the tasks indicated, a combined-arms or tank army must have in its composition a tactical aerial reconnaissance regiment /3 or 4 words missing/.

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The means of radiotechnical intelligence are mainly concentrated at the front. Combined-arms armies have very weak radio intelligence companies, while tank armies have none at all. Radiotechnical intelligence can obtain highly valuable data on enemy troop groupings, on his posts and radar means for guiding missiles, pilotless means, and aircraft. On the one hand, the fact that radiotechnical intelligence equipment is available only in the front significantly reduces the potentialities of radio intelligence, since the front's means are not capable of intercepting tactical, operational, and aircraft radio nets, and on the other hand, because the transmission of radiotechnical intelligence data to an army, and also, occasionally, to a division, requires much time.

Because of this, the need has grown for a substantial improvement in the radio-and radiotechnical intelligence of an army in order that the latter may perform the tasks of uncovering radio nets from battle group to field army level inclusive, and the radar stations of guided-missile subunits and the control centers and posts of his pilotless weapons, and of the tactical aviation located in the tactical and immediate operational depth. For the performance of these tasks it is necessary to introduce an OSNAZ (osoboye naznacheniye-special designation) radio battalion into the composition of an army (combined-arms and tank) and to give it organizational strength. Such a radio battalion should be equipped with more highly-perfected radio and radiotechnical equipment with good protection against jamming, which should be mounted on mobile means with good cross-country ability.

In order to improve the capability of an army's long-range radio intelligence surveillance of ultra-shortwave and radio-relay nets, helicopters equipped with radio reception and tracking (priyemo-slezhechnyy) apparatus are needed in the composition of OSNAZ radio battalions.

The presence of breaches, gaps, and exposed flanks in the operational and tactical disposition of enemy troops creates conditions for the deep penetration of the enemy's positions by strong reconnaissance detachments with the aim of reconnoitering the approaching reserves of the enemy and of his nuclear means, with the destruction of the latter. To perform reconnaissance

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tasks against exposed flanks and breaches and for penetrations into the deep rear areas of the enemy with the aim of reconnoitering and destroying means of nuclear attack, it is desirable to bring a reconnaissance regiment into a combined-arms army, and to retain it in a tank army. It is desirable to have reconnaissance battalions in motorized-rifle and tank divisions.

The reconnaissance regiment of a combined-arms and tank army must have a uniform organization, and must include in its composition no less than three reconnaissance battalions: two battalions to carry out reconnaissance as reconnaissance detachments and one battalion to carry out reconnaissance in depth. Reconnaissance battalions, in their organization, armament, and equipment, must be capable of the independent performance of reconnaissance tasks both as whole battalions and by companies, as well as by platoons, at a considerable distance from the main forces of the first echelon of the army. As regards firepower, the armament of the battalions must be powerful and mobile, and the tanks must be equipped with perfected equipment for underwater operation.

Troop exercises have shown that groups specially trained for reconnaissance in depth are a most valuable source of intelligence data on enemy means of nuclear attack. A deep reconnaissance battalion should provide, from its own composition, for the formation of 30 to 40 reconnaissance groups. The presence of such a battalion in the composition of an army will provide for reconnaissance of the enemy's means of nuclear attack up to a depth of 100 kms.

In the composition of a regiment there must also be suitable communications facilities to ensure the control of deep reconnaissance groups and of the reconnaissance detachments of the army to a depth of not less than 100 kms. The composition of an army must include aircraft and helicopters specially designated to land deep reconnaissance groups in the enemy's rear area. The technical equipment of the helicopters must enable them to make night landings on unprepared terrain.

The need for effective reconnaissance equipment in a division is dictated by the fact that a divisional area of advance of up to 12 kms is already established by the Field Service Regulations.

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The possibility that a division will operate on even broader areas in the future is not excluded. Under these conditions, a division will have to perform independently numerous reconnaissance tasks such as: reconnaissance of the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons; discovery of his troop groupings and of the nature of his defense in tactical depth; reconnaissance of water barriers for the purpose of enabling tanks to cross on the bottom, and a number of other tasks. To perform the above-mentioned tasks, the reconnaissance battalion of a division must have in its composition not less than two reconnaissance companies, a deep reconnaissance company, an engineer-chemical and radiation reconnaissance platoon, a communications platoon, and a maintenance subunit.

A reconnaissance battalion must be capable of carrying out reconnaissance both in companies and in platoons, and groups equipped for movement away from roads and able to force water barriers without additional crossing equipment. Under modern conditions these demands are best met by amphibious tanks and combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles (boyevaya razvedyvatelnaya dozornaya mashina - BRDM) which have high cross-country ability over any terrain and which can pass any water barriers. The armament of a battalion must not impede its mobility. It must be equipped with recoilless weapons and machine guns mounted on BRDM's, i.e., the armament of each individual battalion and company must enable it to engage in a brief battle with a high volume of fire in the interests of reconnaissance. Battalion subunits must be equipped with the requisite optical, infrared, and lightweight radiotechnical means of reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance equipment of a front element (zveno) should consist primarily of technical means and of a competent agent net capable of performing intelligence tasks throughout the entire depth of the front's offensive operation. The organizational structure must ensure that intelligence data are rapidly collected, processed, and transmitted to interested commanding officers and troops without passing through unnecessary intermediate channels.

For the performance of a large number of reconnaissance tasks in the discovery of means of nuclear attack and for the carrying out of continuous additional reconnaissance of targets already detected, it is desirable to have in the composition of a front

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one or two regiments of operational, and one regiment of tactical, aerial reconnaissance. In the composition of each regiment of operational reconnaissance there should be squadrons of day and night photo-reconnaissance and infrared equipment. The need for night reconnaissance in each regiment is due to the fact that troop regroupings and the occupation and shift of firing positions of the means of atomic attack will be carried out by the enemy primarily during the night.

For the allocation of tasks and the control of aerial reconnaissance assets, it is necessary to have an aerial reconnaissance department in the intelligence directorate of a front headquarters.

To process the results of aerial photography, instead of a temporarily established center for photo-interpretation at the intelligence directorate of a front, there should be an appropriate number of photo-interpretation officers in the operational reconnaissance regiments capable of carrying out the operational and tactical photo-interpretation of targets and of determining their coordinates.

At present, aerial radiotechnical reconnaissance equipment is located at the air army and in the radiotechnical regiment (OSNAZ) of a front. To centralize the control and processing of intelligence data, it is advisable that this equipment should be concentrated in the radiotechnical regiment (OSNAZ) with 12 to 15 radiotechnical reconnaissance aircraft, which will enable it to conduct reconnaissance on a 24-hour basis to a depth of 400-500 kms. The radio intelligence (OSNAZ) regiment of a front should be left at its present composition.

For the conduct of intelligence collection against enemy means of nuclear attack and nuclear weapon storage depots located in the operational depth, and for their destruction, it is advisable to have one or two battalions of special designation in a front. With the goals of acquiring experience and of creating reserves of intelligence officers, it is necessary, even in peacetime, to have a company of special designation in the composition of a military district.

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The experience of troop, staff, and special intelligence exercises shows that in modern short-duration forms of combat, the control of reconnaissance equipment, the timely collection of intelligence information, and its dissemination to subordinate headquarters and troops assume very great significance. Maintenance of communications with the reconnaissance organs by command and headquarters networks is not always possible. In such cases, much time is expended in the receipt of intelligence data, and consequently the value of these data is partially lost. A need has therefore arisen for the creation of special intelligence communication nets, providing communications with reconnaissance organs which have been dispatched, with the chiefs of intelligence of subordinate staffs, and with deep reconnaissance groups and reconnaissance aircraft. In order to ensure stable communications with all reconnaissance organs it is necessary to have the requisite communications equipment, which should be included in the Tables of Organization and Equipment of divisional, army, and front communications units.

It is especially desirable to stress that our troops do not yet have radio sets which are light-weight, compact, rapid and of high-speed operation (bystrodeystvuyushchiy), ensuring the stable communications which are so necessary in providing communications with deep reconnaissance groups; this significantly impedes the operations of the groups and the maintenance of communications with them.

In our view, the realization of all these measures will permit more efficient use of all reconnaissance equipment, timely receipt of intelligence data, and more successful utilization of modern means of warfare.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense", by Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense

(From foreign sources)

Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy

Under the conditions of a nuclear/missile war, reliable antimissile defense, as a factor of strategic significance, is becoming one of the most important conditions for the successful conduct of a modern war.

The development of defensive weapons takes place in dialectical unity with the development of attack weapons. A comprehensive study of the characteristics, potentialities, and direction of the future development of ballistic missiles must be the basis for the correct resolution of questions of the organization of combat against ballistic missiles.

The basis of an aerial attack on objectives of the country consists of attack weapons of strategic designation, which in the USA are divided into three basic groups in accordance with their flight-technical characteristics:

-- aerodynamic aircraft;

-- ballistic missiles;

-- cosmic devices.

The second group is the most promising and rapidly developing. Here the main efforts are being directed toward the production of long-range missiles as the main striking force. The share of missiles' participation in the performance of the tasks of aerial attack will increase with every year, and in the near future, the ballistic

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missiles in the enemy's arsenal of attack weapons will assume the leading role. The armed forces of the USA are equipped with ballistic missiles of various classes and various ranges of operation. The intercontinental missiles, "Atlas", "Minuteman" and "Titan", are intended for delivering strikes against objectives located at a distance of 10,000 to 16,000 km, the intermediate-range missiles, "Jupiter", "Thor" and "Polaris", - for objectives located up to 2,000 to 3,500 km away and the short-range missiles, "Pershing", "Redstone", and others - against objectives at a distance of up to 350 to 550 km.

In the USA work is being conducted on the creation of ballistic missiles of the "air-to-surface" class. Specifically, it is intended to arm the B-52, "Victor", and "Vulcan" strategic bombers with a missile of this class, the "Sky Bolt".

At the present time the strategic missile attack weapons of the potential enemy are deployed in the continental part of the USA, and also on the territories of their allies in the aggressive blocs. In the USA, 65 launching sites for intercontinental ballistic missiles have already been built; by 1965 it is planned to increase their number to 860 launching mounts. On British and Italian territory there are 90 intermediate-range missile launching sites deployed; the construction of 15 launching sites is being completed in Turkey. There are 5 atomic submarines armed with "Polaris" missiles on combat patrol.

Thus, an analysis of trends in the development of weapons of strategic attack and in the proposed deployment of the probable enemy's missile bases permits one to conclude that in the future the basic means of strategic attack will be intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed on the territory of the United States of America, and intermediate-range missiles, the launching sites of which are located around the Soviet Union and the countries of the

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peoples' democracies.

Missile-carrying submarines, missile-carrying aircraft, and strategic bombers will be the maneuverable weapons.

An effort to use force against the elements that make up the national might of the probable enemy is the basis of the official American aerospace doctrine. The first task of aerospace operations is undermining the nuclear/missile might of the Socialist Camp in order to disrupt or weaken to a significant degree the strength of our missile strikes. Simultaneously with the performance of the main task, it is planned to deliver strikes against the most important administrative-political and military-industrial centers and other objectives, with the goal of disorganizing the control of the country, disrupting the mobilization of troops, and undermining the military-economic potential and morale of the people. A nuclear/missile attack must be massive, and be carried out using the element of surprise and in a short period of time. It should be assumed that the most powerful first ballistic missile strike will be organized so that the missiles of various ranges of operation will enter the zone of detection of the antimissile defense means at the same time.

For this reason the antimissile defense can successfully perform its tasks if its structure takes into consideration a capability for repulsing the first nuclear/missile strikes of the initial period of war which are carried out by the enemy with the use of various countermeasures directed toward reducing the effectiveness of the defensive weapons.

The nature of nuclear/missile war, with its decisive goals and unprecedented spatial scope, makes antimissile defense the most serious task of the present day.

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Success in combat with ballistic missiles can be achieved by the joint efforts of all types of armed forces. Disruption of enemy nuclear/missile strikes can be accomplished by destroying ballistic missiles which are ready for launching on launching sites, as well as by destroying them in flight.

We understand antimissile defense (PRO) (protivoraketnaya oborona) to be one of the methods of armed combat, directed toward the protection of the country and its armed forces from an enemy missile attack by means of destroying ballistic missiles in flight.

Combat with ballistic missiles in flight is a complex military-technical problem. In order to realize all its difficulty it suffices to say that in PRO it is necessary to deal with insignificant targets, as far as size and reflecting surface are concerned, flying at enormous altitudes and at cosmic speeds. Thus, for example, the nose cone of an "Atlas" missile, in the centimeter wave band, has a reflecting surface of about 0.5 square meters, a maximum flight speed of more than 25,000 km per hour, and a maximum height of the trajectory of 1,300 km.

This problem can be made even more complex by the enemy if a series of measures that complicate detection, interception and destruction in flight are taken into consideration:

1. The launching of ballistic missiles under quadrant angles of departure that are less than the optimum, which leads to a reduction in the range of detecting them by the means of the PRO.

2. The employment of dummy targets which lower the probability of destruction of the nose cones of the ballistic missiles.

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3. The reduction of the reflecting surface of the nose cones of the ballistic missiles by using various materials that absorb radio signals.

4. The use of special transmitters for creating active interference with the PRO radiotechnical equipment, including those that are located in the nose cone of the ballistic missiles or are ejected in containers.

Based on the nature of antimissile defense, the tasks of PRO are:

-- detection and recognition (raspoznavaniye) of ballistic missiles;

--destruction of ballistic missiles in flight;

-- immediate warning of the military command and the civil defense of the start of an enemy missile strike;

-- detection of artificial earth satellites.

Antimissile defense as a whole, like anti-air defense, must satisfy a series of requirements, the basic ones of which are constant readiness to repel an enemy missile attack, high effectiveness and stability.

Consequently, the construction of antimissile defense must be carried out simultaneously in two interrelated directions. One of these is the creation of a system of means for combatting ballistic missiles in flight, the other is the elaboration of the theoretical principles of employment, combat utilization and organization.

In principle, the destruction of missiles is possible both in the initial, active sector of the flight and in the final sector of the trajectory.

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However, research shows that at the present time, the creation of means of antimissile defense capable of destroying missiles in the passive sector of the flight, before entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere, is most realistic.

In the opinions of foreign specialists, at the present time an antiaircraft missile complex specially created for antimissile defense, with a guided antimissile missile can be an effective means for combatting ballistic missiles. Such an antimissile complex must:

-- detect the ballistic missile at a considerable distance from the area being covered and determine the elements of the trajectory of its flight;

-- pick out the nose cone against a background of dummy targets;

-- carry out the placing of the antimissile missile on the plotted flight trajectory of the ballistic missile and secure, with the necessary accuracy, the approach of the antimissile missile to the nose cone;

-- destroy the nose cone of the ballistic missile.

The total time during which an antimissile complex must fulfil its mission is only a few minutes; therefore all its operations must be fully automated. From the technical standpoint the PRO complex must be an aggregate of radar sets, ground equipment, the control system, the antimissile missiles, and computing devices.

The structure of the organization of combat with ballistic missiles may be examined from the example of the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile system that is being developed in the USA.

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


Diagram 1. Structural diagram of the basic elements of the PRO of the USA.

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I - Radar center of the system of ultra long-range (sverkhdalneye) detection;

1. Acquisition (obnaruzheniye) radar set [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
2. Tracking (soprovozhdeniye) radar set [redacted]

II-Target designation (tseleukazaniye) radar set

III-Means of the "Nike-Zeus" system:

3. Recognition (raspoznavaniye) radar set;
4. Target tracking (slezheniye za tselyu) radar set;
5. Antimissile missile tracking (slezheniye za protivoraketoy) radar set;
6. Complex of electronic-computing equipment;
7. Launching site of the antimissile missiles.

IV - Area defense center with an electronic-computing equipment complex.

In preparing a new world war, along with the development of new weapons of attack, American imperialism has in recent years been increasing work on the creation of means of antimissile defense. In this field efforts are exerted in two directions: the creation of an early warning system capable of ensuring ultra long-range detection of intercontinental ballistic missiles in flight and the creation of a complex of active PRO means capable of destroying a missile warhead.

Scientific-research work on the creation of active PRO means began in 1952 in the USA. As a result, plans for several systems were worked out; however, with the exception of the "Nike-Zeus" system, work on all the remaining plans was stopped. The basis of this system is composed of a battery of antimissile missiles, the unit of equipment for which includes: a target recognition radar set, a target tracking radar set, an antimissile missile tracking

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radar set, an intercept computing device, control equipment, launching mounts, and auxiliary equipment.

It is intended that control of the fire of several batteries be carried out from a so-called area defense center that is equipped with a target designation radar set and a computing device, the function of which is the processing of data on detected targets, and target designation for the batteries.

The organizational structure of the subunits of the system is still in the study stage, it is intended to have several antimissile missile tracking radar sets in a battery, which will permit the carrying out of several simultaneous guidance operations against one target.

The sequence of the work of the basic elements of the "Nike-Zeus" system in destroying the nose cones of ballistic missiles is as follows:

According to the early warning system's data, the target designation radar set detects the nose cone of the ballistic missile, and the computing device of the area defense center, on the basis of these data, carries out target distribution and target designation for the antimissile missile batteries. The set works in a pulsed mode. Because of its great power (up to 50 megawatts per impulse) it has separate transmitting and receiving antennas placed up to 300 meters apart. In order to ensure protection of the personnel from radiation, the transmitting antenna is enclosed by a screened metal shield with a height of 20 meters. The maximum range of operation of the set is 1600 km. The time available for reliable detection of the target and for determining its parameters is about 20 seconds.

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The antenna of the recognition radar set, located in the fire complex, is aimed according to the target designation data.

The need to use such a set is brought about by the peculiarities of protecting the system from passive interference and dummy targets outside the dense layers of the atmosphere, where they have the same high speed as the nose cone of the missile.

At the present time the set is in the stage of development (dorabotka), in the process of which it is planned to use the results of the work on the "Defender" program, specifically the study of the electromagnetic characteristics of the nose cones of ballistic missiles. It is planned that the recognition set will work in the decimetric wave band and have an operating range of about 1,000 km.

After separating the real target from the group of dummy ones it switches over to the target tracking radar set, which is designated for automatic tracking of the missile nose cone and processing of the data necessary to determine the calculated point of impact and the commands for guiding the antimissile missile to the target.

Using a parabolic reflector with a diameter of 7 meters, the antenna system of the set creates a narrow pencil-like beam, which is necessary for a high degree of accuracy in determining continuous coordinates of the target. The operating range of the acquisition and tracking (soprovozhdeniye tseli) radar set is about 1,000 km.

The antimissile missile tracking radar set is designated for the automatic tracking of the antimissile missile, for processing the data necessary for guiding it to the target and for transmitting guidance commands and commands for

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detonating the warhead of the antimissile missile. In order to simplify tracking of the antimissile missile, a radar responder is installed on board.

For intercepting and destroying the nose cone of a ballistic missile, the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile missile is used; it is a three-stage wingless missile 14.7 meters long and has a launching weight of 10,400 kg. The booster of the antimissile missile, which operates on solid fuel, develops a thrust of about 200 tons. The antimissile missile has a maximum altitude of 150 km, a range of 320 km and a maximum speed of up to 2,600 m/sec. These performance characteristics are obtained both by the booster and by the powerful solid fuel sustainer motor. All the missile-borne control equipment is located in the casing of the third stage of the missile. Control of the flight of the antimissile missile in the atmosphere is carried out by means of external rudders (aerodinamicheskiy rul'), and at great heights it is carried out by means of jet nozzles.

The warhead of the antimissile missile may be equipped with both ready-made (gotovyy) destructive elements and with a nuclear charge.

Destruction by ready-made elements occurs as a result of a mechanical effect on the nose cone of the ballistic missile. The nature of the destructive action of a warhead with a nuclear charge depends on the altitude at which it is employed. At heights of up to 40 km the basic destructive factor is the energy of the shock-wave; at greater altitudes it is the energy of various types of radiation, mainly neutron and roentgen.

According to data from the foreign press, total expenditures of the USA on the development of the "Nike-Zeus" system have exceeded 1 billion dollars;

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however the question of developing the production of the system has been postponed until the end of its testing program. American specialists consider that the tremendous success of the Soviet Union in the field of missile technology permits it to have any missiles required with appropriate devices and to outstrip the employment of countermeasures in a PRO system. Therefore a correct understanding of the potentialities of the PRO system may be grasped only after carrying out test firings against ballistic missiles that create dummy targets and other interference.

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In order to repel a massed missile attack, a system of antimissile defense that is organized in advance and built according to a single plan on the scale of the entire country is necessary. The theoretical bases for constructing an antimissile defense are the foundation on which a PRO which gives the maximum effect with the minimal expenditure of forces and means must be built.

In constructing a system of antimissile defense, the nature of employment and the technical characteristics of the enemy's ballistic missiles, the combat capabilities of antimissile weapons, the quantity and nature of the objectives to be defended, and also their location in relation to the probable axes of missile approach exert the determining influence.

If we take the Soviet Union, then the probable axes of missile approach for it at the present time are the northern, from the USA, and the western, from Britain and Italy. 1.3(a)(4)

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In conformity with the individual objectives of the country, specific sectors can be allotted on the probable axes of missile approach, within the limits of which the appearance of ballistic missiles of the probable enemy may be expected. These sectors are the determining factors in creating antimissile defense of objectives or groups of objectives. However, when determining probable axes and sectors of missile approach, the possibility of an attack with ballistic missiles of various classes, launched both from missile bases and from submarines and missile delivery aircraft, should be taken into consideration.

The structure of antimissile defense must provide for the interception of missiles not lower than the specific altitude at which the burst of the nuclear charge will be safe. Calculations show that for the safety of objectives of the country, when intercepting intercontinental missiles and intermediate-range missiles, the altitude of the destruction of their nose cones must be not less than 40 to 50km, and when considering the use of nuclear charges with a TNT equivalent of 7 to 10 megatons - not less than 80km. For short-range missiles. whose TNT equivalent does not exceed 1 megaton, the altitude of interception should be not less than 15km. Consequently the fire complexes must ensure destruction of the warheads of ballistic missiles at altitudes not lower than those indicated.

The defensive zones of the fire complexes exert a decisive influence on the structure of antimissile defense.

We consider the defensive zone of a PRO fire complex to be that part of the territory that is covered by the given complex. It represents the geometrical location of the possible points of impact of ballistic missile nose cones, the trajectories of which pass through the destructive zone of this fire complex.

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The size of the defensive zone of the fire complex essentially depends on the angles of fall of the ballistic missiles, and its orientation depends on the direction of firing (diagram 2).

There is a definite part of the territory that is covered by the fire complex irrespective of what are the angles of fall and from which directions the ballistic missile firing is being conducted. This part of the territory may be called the internal defensive zone.

The objectives located in this zone will be covered under any angle of fall and direction of fire; the remaining objectives located within the limits of the external defensive zone of the fire complex will also be covered, but only for certain angles of fall and directions of fire.

Obviously, by means of appropriate deployment of the fire complexes, the screening of an area that is considerable in size may be carried out. In this, the grouping of the complexes must be such that the important objectives of the area are definitely located with the limits of the internal zone.

The grouping of the PVO means must be sufficiently effective to repel massed missile strikes delivered simultaneously against a series of objectives. For this the number of fire complexes defending objectives or groups of objectives must be no less than the number of targets expected to be operating simultaneously against the given objective or groups of objectives.

In creating fire groupings, covering of the defensive zones of the fire complexes of contiguous groupings should be provided for, in order to create an overall defensive zone for all objectives located in the given area.

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


Diagram 2. Defensive zone of the PRO fire complex.

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The advisability of this formation is determined by the fact that, first, it permits concentration of the efforts of a series of groupings in repelling a strike by missiles whose number may exceed the fire capabilities of a grouping taken by itself; secondly, with a relatively smaller number of weapons it is possible to cover a larger number of objectives of various categories.

A system of antimissile defense, it appears, should be based on the use of antimissile weapons of several types, the basic ones of which may be:

- weapons intended for screening individual areas from intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range missiles; possibly these same weapons may also be enlisted for destroying artificial Earth satellites in low orbit;

- weapons intended for screening individual objectives from short-range ballistic missiles, mainly for the defense of frontier and maritime objectives.

Concerning the interception of artificial Earth satellites in high orbit, for this it is apparently necessary to have other fire weapons having a great range of operation. However, the radar support of the antispace defense fire weapons can be retained by the antimissile defense.

The need to employ two types of antimissile weapons is stipulated by the fact that the weapons intended for combat with intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles cannot be employed to destroy short-range missiles.

The small ranges and flight time of operational-tactical missiles make their destruction possible at comparatively low altitudes and short distances

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from the objectives being covered. The dimensions of the defensive zones of the fire weapons intended for the destruction of these weapons will be limited to several dozen kilometers.

As a result of this, groupings of these weapons may be used to cover individual objectives and compact groupings of objectives, mainly those located in border areas. It is completely possible that it will be feasible also to combat cruise missiles with complexes of this type.

The stability of an antimissile defense system will be determined, to a significant degree, by the stability of its radar system, for the disorganization of which the enemy will use both radio interference and strikes against its most important and vulnerable elements. In connection with this, a grouping of the PRO radiotechnical equipment must be created so as to ensure that the zones of radar detection are covered by the necessary number of sets. These elements of the system, like the centers of ultra-long-range detection, must without fail be screened by antiaircraft missile complexes.

The structure of the antimissile defense must be thoroughly coordinated with the grouping of the antiaircraft (protivosamoletnyy) defense weapons. In this case the stability of the antiair defense system as a whole is increased, and the enemy is deprived of the advantages that the joint employment of aviation and missiles could have given him.

Obviously, the deployment of the antimissile defense must be carried out in a definite sequence calculated so that it ensures covering, first of all, the most important areas and objectives, and at the same time so that conditions are created for the subsequent development of an antimissile defense, which includes new elements without reconstructing the system created earlier.

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It is known that the Americans plan to carry out the construction of their PRO system in two stages.

In the first stage such elements of the system are created as radar centers for ultra long-range detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, and fire weapons capable of covering comparatively small but the most important areas are deployed. Therefore, at this stage the system of fire cover may be considered to be a point system, receiving the necessary information about the targets from the territorial detection system.

In the second stage the number of fire weapons increases; their capabilities increase, mainly with an increase in the antimissile missiles' operating range. With this, the transition from covering individual objectives and fairly small areas to the defense of a considerable portion of the country's territory is carried out.

In stating our opinions concerning PRO, we proceed from the fact that an antimissile system is not autonomous, because the antimissile and antiaircraft defense are united into a single system of antiair defense of the country. It is also apparent that control of antiaircraft and antimissile defense at the operational level should also be unified. The question of tactical PRO elements requires study.

Control of antimissile defense must, in our opinion, be organized so that coordination of the operations of its individual elements and groupings and the most effective utilization of the antimissile weapons are ensured. Its material base must be a network of mutually connected command points making widescale use of automation for studying and evaluating the situation, making decisions, and for directing the combat operations of the forces and weapons. Before the start of an enemy missile attack, it appears that control of the PRO weapons must consist, primarily,

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of maintaining them at the necessary degree of combat readiness, of organizing coordination among the groupings of the fire complexes and among the radar centers of ultra long-range detection, and of comprehensive materiel-technical support.

In the process of repelling enemy ballistic missile attacks the control of the PRO weapons must consist of allotting targets among the radar centers and fire complexes, target designation, controlling the operating conditions of the radar sets, ensuring coordination between contiguous groupings of fire complexes, regulating the expenditure of antimissile missiles, and of other things.

The time available for performing the tasks enumerated is extremely limited. In conformity with the PRO system being developed in the USA, it will consist of not more than 10 to 15 minutes from the moment the missile is detected until the moment that it strikes. The "Nike-Zeus" fire complex requires only 4 minutes.

The limited time and the need to take into consideration a large number of factors, when working out a decision, require a high degree of automation of the control processes by using a whole complex of electronic computers at the command posts of all levels. In this, as shown by calculations, the operating speed of the EVM (elektronno-vychislitelnaya mashina-electronic computer) must consist of several hundred thousand operations per second.

The high level of automation of PRO, however, will not, it appears, rule out the participation of combat crews at the command posts during the process of controlling antimissile weapons. Their functions will be to react to unexpected changes in the situation, to introduce additional information, to analyze the developing situation, to clarify the initial data used in the algorithms of the machine resolution of

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tasks, etc. The equipping of command posts must ensure, practically, immediate reflection of the developing situation and of the status of the antimissile defense weapons.

The control of the antimissile weapons must provide for the cooperation of antimissile defense with the antiaircraft defense. Its goal is to operate against the enemy in the most effective manner with coordinated efforts. The cooperation must provide for:

-- concentrating the efforts of the antimissile and antiaircraft weapons for the defense of important areas and objectives;

-- questions of screening the weapons of antimissile defense;

-- coordinated use of radar reconnaissance means for discovering the start and the makeup of an air-missile attack, etc.

Thus, the main features of antimissile defense control will be: a high degree of centralization and subordination to a single command, comprehensive automation at all levels and echelons of command with the widescale employment of fast-operating EVM, and coordination of the operations of antimissile and antiaircraft weapons in the overall system of antiair defense.

Antimissile defense requires a reliable and fast system for transmitting information. Therefore, when organizing PRO, questions of communications, both from the standpoint of necessary technical means and from the standpoint of its organization, acquire an especially important meaning.

The exchange of information among the individual elements of the antimissile defense can be ensured only on the basis of the comprehensive employment

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of various means of communication, even the use of special earth satellites. In the PRO system of the USA, for example, it is planned to use as communication links, cable lines, microwave band radio-relay links, and tropospheric communication radio lines, in which, the transmission of information to certain levels must be duplicated on different frequencies.

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In connection with the creation of an antimissile defense, a series of particular problems arises. Let us examine some of them.

In antimissile defense, timeliness in the detection of enemy missiles being launched acquires tremendous importance. In the example of the PRO of the USA, it is seen that such a system of early warning may be constructed on the basis of employing radar sets of ultra long-range detection, moved out to the probable axes of missile approach. However, this solution does not exhaust the problems. A more complete resolution of it is connected with the creation and employment of qualitatively new means - radar sets based on the principle of back-scatter probing (vozvratno-naklonnoye zondirovaniye) of the ionosphere, or artificial earth satellites with equipment that permits fixing the moment of launch of a ballistic missile.

Calculation shows that when such warning means are set up, intercontinental ballistic missiles may be detected about 30 minutes before they strike and intermediate-range missiles 10 to 15 minutes before they strike.

Plans for organizing early warning based on the use of artificial earth satellites are being worked out.

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For example, one of them envisages a system made up of 72 satellites orbiting in six polar orbits whose planes are successively displaced in relation to one another by 60°. Twelve satellites orbiting in each orbit are the "simple cell" of the reconnaissance system that permits the simultaneous surveying of a strip of the earth's surface a little more than 6,000 km wide.

In each satellite, weighing up to 6 tons, it is intended to have an acquisition radar set operating on an impulse mode, with a range of up to 1,600 km and a scanning sector of 35°.

In view of the great operating ranges of the radar equipment and the extremely high requirements for accuracy of the radar information, important significance is acquired by the problem of studying the influence of the ionosphere on the errors of radar measurement of coordinates of high-flying objects and of working out methods to compensate for them.

It is known that when passing through the ionosphere a distortion of the path of radiowave propagation occurs and the speed of their movement changes. The first circumstance is the reason why errors occur in measuring angular coordinates, the second is the reason for errors in measuring distances. Moreover, the size of the error depends on the condition of the ionosphere.

Under the influence of factors originating in the cosmos, first of all radiation from the sun, the condition of the ionosphere constantly changes. These phenomena are both regular and accidental in nature. This leads to corresponding changes of the errors in radar measurements. Besides, within the ionosphere itself, there are dissimilarities of various scales, nature, the regularity of their appearance, the existence of which has not yet been studied

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to the necessary degree.

The accidental nature of ionospheric phenomena makes it impossible to take them into consideration and to compensate for errors in radar measurements without knowing the laws that are inherent to ionospheric phenomena and without taking into consideration the current condition of the ionosphere and the forecast.

Especially important significance is attained by this question in view of the fact that nuclear bursts can bring about artificial ionization of the upper layers of the atmosphere and changes in the condition of the ionosphere enveloping the entire globe.

The problem of excluding mutual radio interference also takes on great significance. The powerful radiation of the radiotechnical equipment of the antimissile defense, if appropriate measures are not taken, will create powerful radio interference for the other radiotechnical equipment. On the other hand, the highly sensitive receiving equipment of the antimissile weapons may find itself subjected to a powerful influence from various radio transmitting and television devices.

In view of the use in antimissile defense of radar sets with a great pulse power the problem of biological protection of personnel has arisen.

The powerful radio frequency, and in some cases even roentgen radiation, that exist when operating radio equipment, are of danger to the health of personnel. Therefore the question of reliable biological protection requires most thorough study and elaboration of both technical means and organizational measures to ensure personnel safety.

It is apparent that the search for rational resolution of these questions must be along the line of employing a system of shield protection, and

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also a systematic measurement of the level of radiation in working areas, with automatic signaling when levels of radiation arise that are harmful to health.

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The powerful economy of our country and the great achievements of Soviet science are the materiel base that ensures continuous growth of the strength of the antiair defense of the Soviet Union. At the present time the antiair defense troops of the country are carrying out a new qualitative leap in their development.

Speaking at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy said: "I particularly have to report that the problem of destroying missiles in flight has been successfully resolved." This means that antimissile defense, for the antiair defense troops of the country, has already become a task of practical application.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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29 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Role of Aviation in Military Operations at Sea", by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

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The Director of Intelligence and Research
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Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Role of Aviation in Military Operations at Sea", by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

DATE OF INFO : October 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Role of Aviation in Military Operations at Sea", written by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

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The Role of Aviation in Military Operations at Sea

by

Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

The gigantic development of missile weapons compels one to ask the question: Will the missile in its triumphal advance diminish the role which manned aircraft have played up to now in military operations at sea? One must answer quite categorically: Not only will it not diminish, but rather, on the contrary, giving aviation more perfected weapons will even increase this role in the foreseeable conditions of warfare. To demonstrate this is the aim of this article.[1]

Two dual, basic strategic missions have always stood and still stand before the navy: operations on sea (ocean) communication lines, and operations in connection with the coast; in each case combat is conducted against enemy objectives and for protection of one's own installations.

Previously, which is very important, to these basic strategic missions was added, so to speak, an operational mission - the battle for supremacy at sea, which facilitated the accomplishment of both primary missions. As a practical matter, it also developed into a strategic, and in many cases, even into the foremost of strategic missions, inasmuch as its more or less successful execution (by destroying or blockading the enemy's fleet) automatically led to a suitable level of accomplishment of the basic missions.

At the present time, this battle for supremacy at sea has changed its meaning and character to a significant extent. First, under conditions of the diversity and the dispersion of naval power (including here, above all, aviation), it is almost impossible to neutralize or blockade the forces of the enemy so as to completely curb his activity; submarines and aircraft, especially pilotless, have broken "the law of numbers", so that within known limits they can operate even where the enemy has superiority of forces. Second, for the accomplishment of some missions, such preliminary neutralizing or blockading of the enemy's forces is not required. Third, modern combat against the main forces of the enemy - aircraft carriers or

1 While the present article deals with the question in an operational-strategic context and perspective, in the Collection of Articles (Sbornik statey) No. 4 of the "Naval Collection" (Morskoy Sbornik) Journal for 1960, in the article of P.P. Nevzorov, the same question is examined from operational-tactical positions.

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missile submarines - has as its goal, primarily, not indirect, but direct and immediate protection of one's own installations from their influence, and not only the naval but, primarily, land installations.

Undoubtedly, operations against enemy sea (ocean) communication lines and against shore installations in a number of cases already can be executed not only by naval and air forces, but also by land-based (nazemnoye) missiles. To be precise, sea (ocean) communication lines of themselves also include, along with those at sea, shore installations such as ports, hydrotechnical facilities, etc. But while earlier, because of the limited capabilities of naval weapons, the basic objectives on sea (ocean) communication lines were vessels at sea, now such basic objectives are frequently becoming those on shore.

Therefore, the question is what is more "profitable": to destroy all these objectives with land-based missiles or those from "intervening" (promezhtochnyy) missile carriers - submarine, surface, or air? Even elementary calculations show that a uniform solution to this question in all cases is impossible: Under varied conditions it is advantageous to use varied forces and weapons.

If one has in mind the probable enemy's stationary ground installations which are separated from us by water and whose precise locations we know, it would seem in all cases more advantageous to destroy them with land-based missiles, for this saves us not only from losses of missile carriers, but also from the necessity for creating these carriers.

However, in a number of cases, depending on the distances, on the nature of the antiaircraft and antimissile defense of the enemy, and on other elements of the situation, the use of "intervening" carriers may be fully warranted, partly because of the feasibility of simplifying construction and decreasing the size, weight, and hence, the cost of the missiles, partly because of their great accuracy of hit at lesser distances from the target, partly because mobile "intervening" carriers are less vulnerable to the enemy's missiles than fixed land-based launching installations, partly because these carriers may be needed anyway for performing other missions, and finally, as a result of the necessity for the enemy to expend weapons in these cases to combat the missiles and their carriers.

If one takes as a unit the military-economic cost of destroying in the initial period of a war not less than 15 to 20 percent of an

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enemy industrial area measuring 60 by 20 kilometers by intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, then with regard to all the conditions enumerated, as well as the probable losses, the cost of accomplishing this mission by atomic submarines will be approximately the same, by diesel submarines-twice as much, by cruise missiles from land bases - three times as much, and by aircraft - several times more expensive. The expenditures of the enemy to counteract these strikes will be: for operations against missiles - 6 or 7 corresponding units, against aircraft - about 15, and against submarines - 20 to 30 units.[1]

Undoubtedly, these calculations, in view of their extraordinary importance, must be verified repeatedly and be defined more precisely for the most diverse conditions, for, depending on the situation, it will be advantageous to use one or another method of delivering missiles to the target.

If one speaks of "intervening" carriers, then it is very clear that it will be more expedient to use aircraft in case of relative weakness of the antiaircraft defense (PVO), and to use submarines in case of relative weakness of the enemy's antisubmarine defense (PLO).

Thus, one may conclude that in operations against enemy shore installations the role of aviation under modern conditions is rather modest, although in some cases it is not ruled out. It is more advantageous to use land-based and submarine missiles against such installations.

Let us proceed to an examination of methods of operation against mobile sea (ocean) objectives: the transportation means of the enemy, as well as his combat large units (soyedineniye) and vessels. The picture here is drastically changed.

The level of development of missile technology theoretically even now permits the destruction of any objective in any area of the world ocean by land-based cruise missiles, and in certain cases even by ballistic missiles. And, if one speaks of offshore (pribrezhnaya vodnaya) zones saturated with technical shore surveillance means, then such a solution to the problem, at least in relation to surface objectives, as a practical matter, is not only feasible, but in many cases even more advantageous.

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1 An exposition of the methodology of these calculations requires a separate place.

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In which cases? In those where the extent of the development of a theater facilitates the creation of the necessary system of missile launchers and shore installations in general. If this does not exist, then it is evident that it is simpler to utilize, for these targets, mobile forces and weapons, primarily aircraft. This question must also be solved on the basis of military-economic calculations based on initial operational-tactical requirements.

The width of the coastal zone now consists of several hundred kilometers and, in accordance with the development of technology, is growing continually. Extensive investigation must define precisely the order of this growth in the near future, but in any case one must consider that in some offshore naval theaters land-based missiles already are becoming the backbone of naval forces.

It may be asked: Why are land-based missiles regarded as a naval force, even if only provisionally? For the same reasons that "one gun on shore is worth ten guns on a vessel", as has been correctly assumed up to now, considering that one of the basic elements of naval forces is the so-called shore defense, including, above all, artillery. A naval direction is not necessarily connected only with vessels; it is connected with those forces and weapons by means of which it is more advantageous to accomplish the existing missions.

Concerning combat with submarines, in this zone the solution to the question depends on the method selected by us for detecting them. If this mission is assigned to fixed means (which at present can work only on the basis of hydroacoustics) having good communications with the shore, then detected submarines could be destroyed from the shore under conditions in which this will not disrupt the system of detection. But if the search and location of submarines is done by mobile forces, then these, naturally, will have the mission of destruction. As is known, the leading place among these forces belongs to aircraft, including helicopters.

Thus, the nature and degree of importance of one or another mission of aircraft in our offshore zone depends on the situation. But if the basic weapon against enemy surface forces in some cases is land-based missiles, then in combat against his submarines a prominent place, along with small vessels, as before, belongs to aircraft, in particular helicopters.

It must be added that if the operational range of shore missile

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weapons is superior to the range of shore technical means of surveillance and target designation, then in this "external" part of the offshore zone the significance of aviation will grow still more as a result of the assignment to it of the mission of surveillance (reconnaissance), target designation, and, when needed, guidance.

We shall turn to an appraisal of possible methods of operations against mobile enemy objectives located outside the offshore zone just examined. If one speaks of enemy submarines, then, naturally, detection and destruction of them outside the offshore zone by some type of fixed or shore means is impracticable, and may be accomplished only by surface and air forces. If one speaks of surface ocean objectives, then elementary calculations show that the destruction of them from the land, although possible, demands such cumbersome missiles and such a complicated system of target designation and guidance that in an overwhelming majority of cases it is much more profitable to destroy them with missiles from mobile, specifically "intervening", carriers. Which carriers in this realm are most advantageous - submarine, surface, or air?

As is known, we have set aside surface ocean forces as a result of a number of considerations. Therefore, the discussion may proceed solely with submarine or air forces.

Unfortunately, the requisite comprehensive examination of this question does not yet exist. Preliminary calculations permit one to assert that the most advantageous carrier of weapons at sea is indeed aviation.

The experience of history confirms this concept. Thus, while in the First World War, aviation, especially at sea, only spread its wings, in the Second World War, its share was already from one-third to one-half of the destroyed and damaged combat vessels and ships of all combatant nations. As long as manned aviation is compared here, not with missiles (for it itself uses missiles), but with the other "intervening" carriers - surface and submarine, then there is no doubt that this process of the increasing role of aviation in operations in open sea (ocean) theaters will continue. In addition, without the assistance of aviation, the operations of submarines, especially diesel, are made much more difficult.

Concerning intelligence, as is known, even with the comparatively favorable ratio of the rates of speed of German submarines on the surface and merchant ships in the First and Second World Wars (respectively

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10 to 15 knots for the submarines and 6 to 10 knots for the transports), the effectiveness of the submarines' combat operations depended to an extraordinary degree on their receipt of timely and precise data on the movement of convoys and ships. Now the ratio of these speeds is becoming all the more unfavorable for diesel submarines (15 to 18 knots for them and 10 to 16 knots for the transports). But in addition, while submarines traveled on the surface in the past war, especially at night, comparatively without hindrance, and were able to overtake and repeatedly attack convoys, now, with the widespread participation of aviation in antisubmarine defense, this is almost ruled out. The underwater speed of diesel submarines with regular use of the RDP (submerged diesel operation-rabota dizelya pod vodoy) apparatus does not exceed an average of 4 or 5 knots.

As a result, when the enemy has at his disposition routes in an ocean zone with a width of 500 to 600 miles, then for dependable assurance of only a single attack of a convoy by a group of submarines, it is necessary to deploy ahead of this group two reconnaissance screens of 15 to 20 submarines each. With a coefficient of operational utilization[1] of diesel submarines of not more than 0.1 to 0.15 for such uninterrupted reconnaissance (and only for reconnaissance), it would be necessary to have for only one ocean direction, not considering possible losses, 200 to 400, or as an average, about 300 submarines, at a total cost of 12 to 15 billion rubles. Meanwhile, for the accomplishment of the same reconnaissance mission by aviation, with two or three flights daily by paired flights of aircraft and with an intensity of 6 to 8 flights per month for one aircraft, 16 to 30 are needed, or an average of 20 to 25 aircraft with a total cost of 1 to 1.5 billion rubles. Figures are eloquent, and with regard to possible losses, such a comparison will be still more to the disadvantage of diesel submarines.

Of course, the mission of reconnaissance now can also be accomplished by pilotless means. If one bears in mind the long-term possibilities in this connection of artificial earth satellites (ISZ), which could systematically give a complete picture of movement on the oceans, then the conclusion follows that the speedy realization of that prospect should be worked at persistently. But if the discussion concerns the so-called reconnaissance missiles, then they, especially from submarines, may be launched only for

1 By coefficient of operational utilization is understood the relation of the time of the submarine's stay in the area of combat operations (i.e., without taking into account the time/remainder of footnote missing/.

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tactical elaboration of an already known operational situation, and to effect reconnaissance of the latter is actually much simpler and more convenient with the aid of manned aircraft.

Perhaps these calculations and conclusions will appear to someone to be exaggerated. But, it is enough to analyze the experience of the Second World War, in particular the extraordinary decrease in the effectiveness of the operations of German submarines because of their poor aerial reconnaissance support, in order to arrive at the same conclusions. And since at present the main bulk of submarines still have diesel-electric engines, the question of supporting submarines with aerial reconnaissance is exceptionally important.

Of course, nuclear submarines present another perspective. Considerably surpassing in their submerged speed the average speed of convoys, they can combine reconnaissance with attacks, even repeated attacks. Calculations still show that aerial reconnaissance can also substantially increase their effectiveness.

The close combat assistance of aviation is no less important for diesel submarines. Being obliged regularly to proceed under RDP from one fourth to one third of the time, for recharging their batteries, even though not rising to the surface, diesel submarines all the same are comparatively easy to detect by the radiotechnical means of the enemy's aviation. Hence, for a more or less reliable guarantee of their security, regular combat against enemy aviation is necessary - a mission which, on the ocean again, can be accomplished only by a sufficiently long-range (avtonomnaya) and powerful combat aviation.

There is no doubt that operational and combat coordination with aviation is also advantageous for nuclear submarines. Thus, the role of aviation in combat against mobile objectives of the enemy on the ocean, i.e., against his combat forces, primarily aircraft carriers, and against his convoys and transports, has even increased; moreover, not only directly in relation to combat, but also in the realm of supporting operations of submarines, especially diesel submarines. It may be asserted that now a greater role in operations at sea in general belongs to aviation.

Up to this point the discussion has concerned itself with the possible participation of aviation in the fulfilment of the first, "offensive", half of both basic missions of naval forces - operations

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against the shore and against ocean objectives of the enemy. At the same time, a second, "defensive", half of the first mission has appeared for examination, i.e., the defense of one's own shore installations, since operations against enemy aircraft carriers and submarines are really the execution of this mission.

What is the possible role of aviation in fulfilling the second half of the second mission, i.e., in the defense of one's own communication lines? If one speaks of the very real, for us, securing of them in the immediate offshore zone (with a depth in modern conditions, as has already been noted, of several hundred kilometers), then depending on the situation, land-based missiles and aviation must serve as the basic means of defense of communication lines from surface forces of the enemy.

Our small vessels of the patrol boat (storozhevoy kater) class ("subchasers" - okhotnik), together with aviation can fully protect shore communication lines from the submarines and air forces (VVS) of the enemy. It should be noted that in spite of some views the possibilities for aerial combat will in no way be curtailed. The history of the development of weapons irrefutably proves that when the conduct of combat by conventional means between any types of newly appearing major elements of armed forces (weapons carriers) becomes impossible, then human ingenuity finds a way out of the situation by creating new combat means. Thus it is here. While the tremendous speeds and great turning radii of modern airplanes prevent visual observation of the enemy and the utilization of cannon-machine gun armament against him, technical means of surveillance are arriving to assist the eye, missiles are appearing in place of machine guns and cannons, and the work of the brain is made easier by electronic computers.

Of course PVO vessels carrying a number of antiaircraft missiles, as well as helicopter vessels of the PLO, could also be useful for these purposes. However, the role of the PVO vessels will be too passive: owing to the short range of operation of their weapons, they cannot combat the enemy's aviation itself, but only the missiles launched by it. Concerning helicopter vessels, for each specific direction, one must consider whether it is not more advantageous to have landing areas for the helicopters on shore in place of the helicopter vessels.

There is no doubt, finally, that the transports themselves can be equipped with antiaircraft missile launchers and that they also

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can carry helicopters.

Thus, for the defense of close communication lines, shore-based aviation, including helicopters, have, as before, vital importance. What is its possible role in securing distant ocean communication lines? It must be said directly, that with its present range, aviation is not in a position to defend ocean communication lines, and that the defense of them now is feasible only for aircraft carrier aviation. This is precisely why the USA continues to build aircraft carriers - vessels which in their time were actually born from the insufficient range of aviation: our enemy cannot manage without ocean communications, and without aircraft carriers these communications are indefensible.

Of course, aircraft with a long flight range could, being based on the shore or near the shore, cover ocean convoys or large units of surface vessels "in watches" ("povakhtenno"), taking off from the shore and returning there. But the cost of such coverage will turn out to be less than the cost of aircraft carrier support only when the shore-based aircraft gain not less than several days' range.

This is why, while continuing in the meantime to construct aircraft carriers, the Americans at the same time have been working strenuously in recent years on the creation of a nuclear power plant for aircraft. There is no doubt that we have every possibility of outdistancing the USA in this connection.

But if sufficiently long-range (avtonomnyy) and cargo-carrying aircraft are created, then perhaps with their assistance transoceanic transport can be realized, at any rate, military.

To this, one may answer that cargo merchant marine transport will be retained in the foreseeable future owing to its great economy in comparison with air transport, and on the strength of the fact that along with regularly scheduled, there will always be irregular transport (seasonal, etc). In connection with passengers, the situation is different: even now, more and more people prefer air travel to travel by sea. In wartime the situation changes still more. During the Korean War, 1950-1953, the Americans transported by air about 5 million persons (true, in the same time, about 80 million persons by sea) and about 0.08 percent of all cargo. But the application of nuclear power to aviation will undoubtedly open here completely new perspectives in the area of the freight-carrying capacity of individual aircraft and in relation to the overall freight-carrying capacity of aviation.

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Will the cumbersome shipment of troops by sea transport still remain? It is doubtful. But the role of aviation in military operations at sea will become even more important.

We shall summarize our arguments by means of a small table.

The Role of Shore-Based Aviation in Military Operations at Sea			
Missions of Naval Forces			The Role of Aviation in Modern Conditions and in the Future
Operations in relation to shore installations	Against installations of the enemy		Manned aviation yields its role to pilotless aviation, but in some cases may be utilized.
	Protection of one's own installations		In combat against combat forces of the enemy-mainly against aircraft carriers, missile carriers, and to a certain extent also submarines-the first place belongs to manned aviation.
	Against communication lines of the enemy		Against shore installations of communication lines (see above); in operations against sea (ocean) objectives of communication lines, manned aviation plays a direct and essential role, and also in support of submarine operations.
Operations on communication lines	Protection of one's own communication lines	Close	Plays a large role
		Distant	At the present time it cannot protect distant communication lines. In the future it will protect sea transport and will also carry it out directly.

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Thus, at sea the relative weight of shore-based aviation not only remains high (with the assimilation of missile weapons by aviation), but in the future it will increase still more.

What kinds of aircraft are needed for operations in sea (ocean) theaters?

First and foremost, if this is not prevented by other circumstances, seaplanes, in particular, flying boats (lodka), are most advantageous, not only with regard to their ease of basing (both on a strip of water near the shore and deep inside the country), but also because, in a number of cases, by landing on water in the course of accomplishing their mission they may increase their range. It is really unnecessary to speak in this regard about aircraft specially designated for coordinated operation with submarines, for conveying supplies to them, or, on the other hand, for receiving supplies, in particular, fuel, from submarines.

Other demands on naval aviation must be outlined mainly depending on the planned area of its operations. In regard to aviation for coastal waters, it can manage without special range, although for some classes of aircraft, for example, reconnaissance aircraft, antisubmarine, and PVO aircraft guarding convoys, greater range would be useful. To the extent that this is "our zone" and we must always have air superiority here, especially high speed for these aircraft is not required, the main need is for excellent means of surveillance (including detection of submarines) and weapons.

On the other hand, especially great range and maximum speed (now not less than 1800 to 2000 kilometers per hour) in order to have the capability of evading an air enemy with superior forces are required for ocean-going aircraft. It should not be said that the best way to fulfil both demands will be secured by a transfer to nuclear power, the introduction of which to aviation, however, should be given most serious attention.

In the first volume of the secret military-historical essay The Navy of the Soviet Union in the Great Fatherland War 1941-1945, it is justly said that the main striking force of the Navy in World War II was aviation. Despite the systematic utilization of naval aviation for operations on ground axes, owing to the situation which arose, it still occupied the first place in inflicting losses on the enemy at sea. At the same time, it is noted in this work that by

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the beginning of the war "qualitatively, our aviation...in the navy was significantly inferior to the aviation of the enemy..." (page 76). Only 12.5 percent of the aircraft were new types; the remaining types were obsolete. "The lag of aircraft in a technical sense, principally in speed, and also their numerical deficiency in each of the operating fleets, created significantly difficulties in the initial period of the war" (page 62). Everyone knows what urgent and most energetic measures were required in order to correct this situation. And even long before the war, a basis already existed for considering that aviation in the near future would occupy the place of the basic striking force in combat operations at sea and, in addition, in the Basic Considerations in the Development of the Navy (VMS) of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) during the Second Five-Year Plan it was indicated that "The most important and decisive role must belong to submarines and heavy aircraft" (page 46).

Such are some conclusions, not so much from a theoretical, as from a practical, underestimation by us of the significance of aviation in operations at sea before the last war. There is no doubt whatever that on the basis of attentive study of the experience of the last war, exhaustive analysis of the new requirements of the situation, the powerful development of Soviet science and technology, and, finally, the gigantic potential of our industry, we shall not repeat the old mistake.

Of course, in a journal article one may take up the question being examined only on a very general plane. But its importance urgently demands the most attentive and detailed examination of both the question as a whole, and of all its individual facets.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

30 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Air Forces in the New Stage of Development of the Soviet Armed Forces", by Lt.-Gen. of Aviation S. Sinyakov and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation M. Kozhevnikov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

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Department of the Navy

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The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

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Atomic Energy Commission

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Air Forces in the New Stage of Development of the Soviet Armed Forces", by Lt.-Gen. of Aviation S. Sinyakov and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation M. Kozhevnikov

DATE OF INFO: October 1960

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SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Air Forces in the New Stage of Development of the Soviet Armed Forces", written by Lt.-Gen. of Aviation S. Sinyakov and Maj.-Gen. of Aviation M. Kozhevnikov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article referred to on page 5 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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The Air Forces in the New Stage of Development of the Soviet Armed Forces

by

Lt.-Gen. of Aviation S. Sinyakov

and

Maj.-Gen. of Aviation M. Kozhevnikov

The well-known postulate of F. Engels on the direct dependence of the armament, composition, and organization of troops, and their tactics and strategy, on the degree of development of industry, finds brilliant confirmation in our Soviet reality. The uninterrupted and stormy growth of socialist economics and the realization of technological progress in all branches of the peoples' economy, especially in heavy industry, has made it possible to supply the Soviet Army with the new nuclear/missile weapon, which has radically changed the quality of all the types of our armed forces, including the air forces (VVS).

The introduction of the nuclear/missile weapon was accompanied by a process of formation of new opinions regarding the preparation for and conduct of modern operations and of war as a whole. The nuclear weapon has changed the role and place of every type of armed forces and arm of troops in armed combat, in an operation and a battle, by advancing to first place a new, more powerful type of armed forces - the missile troops - to whom belongs the basic role of disorganizing the enemy rear, his economy, and system of governmental control, and also, of destroying the enemy's long-range means of attack.

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At the same time, it is quite obvious that no single type of armed forces is in a position, if isolated from the other types of forces, to perform successfully the combat missions assigned to it. The achievement of victory in a future war will be possible only with the united efforts of all types of armed forces and with their coordinated operations on land, in the air, and on water. The interdependence of all types of armed forces and arms of troops will increase significantly in a future war, since, with the employment of missiles and aircraft, war will reach all corners of the globe, the distance between the rear and front will disappear in fact and the losses in military equipment and personnel will increase many fold as compared with the last war. Continual mutual assistance and cooperation will be required between all types of armed forces in fulfilment of combat tasks, as well as in materiel-technical and medical support.

The air forces, owing to the availability in their composition of various types and kinds of aircraft, are capable of fulfilling diverse combat tasks, and because of their high mobility they are very closely bound to all types of armed forces in combat operations.

In fact, missile troops equipped exclusively with powerful combat means can at any time of the day and irrespective of weather conditions penetrate the air space of the enemy relatively freely and strike all of his stationary and low-mobility targets on land and water. But these troops urgently need to have aerial reconnaissance information on the targets of operations and on the results of their strikes.

The ground troops, despite their increased fire-power and penetrating ability, require the assistance of other types of armed forces, particularly aviation. The VVS, jointly with missile troops, can successfully strike the approaching enemy reserves and disrupt his communications. Military aviation participates directly in the combat and in the operations of ground troops by supporting and covering them in cooperation with other

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arms of troops. For the ground troops and for all other types of armed forces, reconnaissance aviation is and will be for the immediate future the only means of ensuring the receipt of reliable information on the activities and intentions of the enemy in the depth of his rear and on all close approaches to the front, just as military transport aviation is and will be the most mobile means of transporting troops and cargo.

The troops of PVO of the Country are interested in the neutralization and destruction of enemy means of aerial attack, especially of his missiles of all systems while still at their places of concentration and at their bases. It is quite obvious that only missiles and aircraft can neutralize and destroy enemy means of aerial attack at the locations of their concentration and bases. Fighter aviation and guided antiaircraft missiles of fronts, by delivering strikes against an aerial enemy in flight into the depth of the country, cooperate significantly with the troops of the PVO of the Country in the fulfilment of the important task assigned to them of covering the territory of the country from air strikes.

The navy, using submarines and missile-carrying surface vessels, can operate successfully against the enemy's ocean and sea communications only in close cooperation with reconnaissance and missile-carrying aviation. Effective combat with enemy aircraft carriers and missile-carrying vessels, just as with constantly maneuvering objectives, is possible in modern conditions only by aircraft armed with missiles of the "air-to-vessel" class.

It is quite likely that the enemy fleet, having received the signal of combat alert during the threatening period, will leave its stationary bases and will proceed to the vast sea and ocean spaces. Because of this, it will be practically impossible to catch military vessels at their bases through the launching of the first strike with the "surface-to-surface" (zemlya-zemlya) class of missiles. From

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this it becomes quite clear that destruction of enemy aircraft carriers and missile-carrying vessels will have to be carried out by the forces and weapons of missile-carrying aviation and submarines.

Consequently, the air forces as a type of armed forces must be separate and complete, because in a future war they will have to perform tasks in cooperation not only with one type of armed forces but concurrently with all of them. Therefore it is impossible to agree with the opinion of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, regarding the expediency of transferring the long-range aviation to the navy, which was expressed in the article "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review".[1]

In examining the problems of combat use of our VVS; and also in determining its role and place in modern operations and in warfare as a whole, it is advisable to proceed from the need to secure close cooperation between all types of armed forces, without which it is impossible to achieve success in modern armed combat.

It is known that the air forces, owing to the transfer of a number of their combat missions to the missile troops, have lost their monopolistic position in the destruction of many enemy objectives, especially those located on other continents. In this connection, the VVS sphere of operations in the intercontinental field has narrowed, but in theaters of military operations and in front troop operations it has significantly widened.

In the present article it will be advisable to examine certain already partially determined trends and directions in the combat use of the various types of aviation in modern operations. It is necessary to do this because the appearance of missile troops has generated many varied interpretations of combat use of aviation in modern operations and in warfare as a whole.

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1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Edition, 1960, page 6.

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In order to understand more correctly the peculiarities of combat use of VVS under the new conditions, we will begin with an examination of the qualitative changes which have occurred recently in aviation and of the combat characteristics of VVS, which derive from the nature of the various types and arms of aviation.

In the air forces, as in the other types of armed forces, the nuclear/missile weapon is becoming the basic type of weapon of strategic, long-range, and front bombers and is gradually being assimilated by fighter-bombers and fighter-interceptors. Data on the quantity and combat capabilities of aircraft - the carriers of nuclear bombs and missiles of the "air-to-surface" and "air-to-air" classes - are the basis for all calculations in answering the question of the combat complement and the structure of combat formations of aircraft, getting them to the targets of operations, evaluating VVS combat capabilities, and organizing control of them. Missiles of the "air-to-surface" class, which can be launched from strategic aircraft located at a distance of up to 600 kms from the target, ensure the destruction of specific objectives from long distances without the need for aircraft to penetrate the enemy PVO zone. As a matter of fact, the mother aircraft (samolet-nositel) becomes a missile-carrying aircraft (samolet-raketonosets) and the commonly used term "bomber" will obviously disappear with time from our military lexicon and will be replaced with the term "missile-carrier". The appearance of the aircraft-missile carrier -- this is the most important qualitative change that has taken place in the VVS -- has permitted a reduction in the combat complement of aviation operational formations (obyedineniye) and large units (soyedineniye) and, at the same time, even more effective execution of combat tasks. The determining factor is no longer the quantity of airplanes carrying out a strike on a target, as it was in the recent past, but their quality; for example, their capability to carry nuclear weapons and, under conditions of a strong enemy PVO, to locate moving targets quickly and to destroy them.

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In fighter aviation the guided-missile weapon of the "air-to-air" class is acquiring increasing significance, and is becoming the main type of weapon of modern fighters. This weapon permits the destruction of aerial targets in all weather conditions at distances of 3 to 5 times greater than the fire range of existing modern aircraft cannon and ensures the interception and destruction of aerial targets on approaching courses and from the forward semicircle (s peredney polusfery). The guided-missile weapon and the supersonic fighter flight speed of 2,000-2,500 kms/hr ensure the destruction of enemy cruise missiles, aircraft, helicopters, and aerial balloons.

Military-transport aviation is being equipped with new heavy freight capacity and with faster aircraft and helicopters capable of transporting troops and freight not only within the limits of one front and one theater of military operations but also between different theaters of military operations.

In the very near future, major qualitative changes will occur in reconnaissance aviation. This process will acquire an ever larger scope by its being equipped with new manned and pilotless cruise reconnaissance vehicles (bespilotnyy krylatyy razvedchik), and also with night-vision apparatus and automatic transmission of reconnaissance information from the aircraft to the screens of the appropriate command posts.

The increased speed, flight altitude and other features of our aircraft as carriers of nuclear weapons, and also the improved capabilities of active and passive PVO means, are connected with the successful mastery of all types of jet engines (turboprop, turbojet, ramjet, rocket). In comparison with conventional aircraft, they possess much greater thrust with lighter weight, and they impart to an aircraft, whether with liquid or solid fuel, exceptionally great speed which has not as yet been fully exploited, and in addition they have unlimited altitude. The appearance of aircraft with atomic engines will ensure the possibility of flights of unlimited distance.

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Electronics are far from being the least element influencing the basic qualitative changes in our VVS. Radioelectronic apparatus has made it possible to achieve more effective guidance of manned and pilotless means of attack and defense than was possible previously. In manned equipment, electronics has brought about the realization of complete or partial automation, without which the flight of aircraft (including bombers) would have been inconceivable with a crew at modern supersonic speeds. Radioelectronic apparatus permits control from the ground or from the mother aircraft of pilotless cruise missile flights.

The further development of aviation weapons will permit us, in the next few years, to have ballistic missiles of the "air-to-surface" class along with cruise missiles, within the armament inventory of supersonic strategic and long-range bombers.

At the present time the question of the need for creating rocket aircraft has become acute. In a future war, rocket aircraft, combining the combat characteristics of missiles and aircraft, and piloted by a human, will play a highly important role in space (kosmos) combat and in the destruction of the most important objectives on distant continents. The creation of rocket aircraft is a most immediate and completely practicable task in the development and construction of our air forces. There is no doubt that rocket aircraft, as an absolutely new and longer range weapon of the VVS, will find broad application in a future intercontinental war.

These are the qualitative changes taking place in our air forces and representative aspects of future development in military aviation.

Let us examine those combat characteristics of the VVS which are inherent to them alone and which retain their importance in the new phase of the development of the armed forces. Among these combat characteristics should be listed:

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-the high mobility and capability of the VVS to perform rapid maneuver with piloted means on operational and strategic axes and in theaters of military operations;

-the capability of carrying out independent search for and preliminary reconnaissance of targets assigned for destruction and of annihilating them either when they are on the move or when stationary;

-the ability to retarget more rapidly than other means, while airborne, against new targets which suddenly appear or against targets whose locations have changed;

-the capability to observe the enemy's operations from the air, to discover his intentions, and to transmit the reconnaissance information immediately to the command posts of all types of armed forces;

-the capability to support an airborne troop landing and to provide rapid air transport for troops and freight for any distance.

Mobility to one degree or another is also characteristic of other types of armed forces, but in the VVS it is notable for the fact that military aviation is capable, by maneuvering rapidly with piloted combat equipment, to ensure its immediate entry into combat. This should be emphasized particularly because under conditions of great destruction of railroad and automobile communication lines, relatively speedy reinforcement of separate fronts and active theaters of military operations with forces and weapons from other axes will be possible only by combat aviation, if we do not consider implementation of maneuver by fire of ballistic missiles of operational-strategic designation. Within 2 to 5 hours after receiving the order and notification of combat alert, aviation large units and units of the VVS can (depending on the types of aircraft) take off and carry out the assigned combat task in the direction or in the theater of military operations indicated to

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them. If, in this event, the aircraft are in a situation of "ground alert" (dezhurstvo na aerodrome) the time will be decreased to 15 to 25 minutes. It is absolutely clear that no other type of troops will be able in such a short time to maneuver even within a single theater of military operations.

A remarkable combat characteristic which only aviation possesses is the ability to combine independent search by aircraft crews for the assigned targets and the destruction of them by nuclear and conventional weapons.

In reality, we all recognize that a future war will have a highly maneuverable and destructive character. The troops, in order to escape enemy nuclear activity, will constantly strive to change location. The troops operating in the first strategic echelon will require more frequent reinforcement and the uninterrupted delivery of materiel means (ammunition, fuel, food) from the rear areas. All this, in the final analysis, will result in a stream of freight trains, numerous vehicle columns, and flights of transport aircraft and helicopters from the rear area to the front. If it were to be calculated, one could confirm the fact that a group of U.S. armies in the Western theater of military operations can have up to 45 percent of its installations mobile. It can be expected that during combat operations at least half of the enemy armed forces will be in a constantly mobile status. Combat against such mobile objectives can be carried out principally by aviation and partially by missile troops. In this event, missiles of the "surface-to-surface" class require the precise coordinates of each target, and with moving objectives, as is known, they change constantly. Therefore missiles can destroy mobile targets only on the basis of previously calculated coordinates, in narrow defiles, at road crossings, and also at loading and unloading places. All moving objectives can be most reliably destroyed, only by piloted aircraft, whose crews need only information as to the area in which moving enemy troops and equipment have been detected.

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The ability to see the enemy from the air and to observe his activities in both the deep and close areas of the rear -- this is a characteristic peculiar to aviation. It is difficult to overestimate it, if we consider that without reconnaissance information, which is obtained with the aid of aviation, it would be impossible to carry out modern operations.

As concerns airborne troop landings and the rapid transport of troops and freight for any distance, irrespective of the availability and condition of roads, aviation still remains the only means for performance of such tasks. The need for military-transport aircraft and helicopters is continually increasing in all types of armed forces, but under conditions of mass use of nuclear/missile weapons, aircraft and helicopters will in many instances be the only means to provide for the maneuverability of the troops and for timely materiel-technical supply to them.

On the basis of a brief analysis of the qualitative aspects and the combat characteristics of our VVS, it is possible to determine their combat tasks in warfare.

In the not too distant past, air forces, as is known, were responsible for three basic tasks:

-the disruption of the military-economic potential of the enemy;

-the struggle for supremacy in the air;

-cooperation with the ground troops and the navy in the successful conduct of operations.

In the past war all of these missions were successfully fulfilled by the Soviet air forces. This is especially apparent, for example, in the fulfilment of the second and third tasks by them.

As is known, in the middle of the summer of 1943 our aviation wrested the initiative from the hands of the enemy in heated combat and, after winning the

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battles for the Kuban and at Kursk, firmly secured supremacy in the air. By uninterrupted support and cover of the ground troops, our aviation actively cooperated in the destruction of the armed forces of Fascist Germany. The VVS activities against railroad networks, military-industrial targets, airfields, and groupings of troops, transformed aviation during the course of the war into a factor of strategic significance. Even after the war and right up to the appearance of missile troops , the VVS were actually the strategic means of combat and were the main striking force capable of subjecting the deep enemy rear to destructive nuclear action.

After the appearance of missiles of strategic and operational-tactical designation, the situation changed radically. Missiles, possessing the capability to reach any distant target strongly defended by enemy PVO means, will be able to fulfil the most important strategic missions. They will be used primarily along the main axes, where the most important large and stationary enemy objectives are located, well-screened by antiaircraft guided missiles. Despite this, one cannot overlook the fact that the enemy has many important mobile objectives, and that there are areas which are not screened by an effective PVO. Naturally, it is expedient to use long-range and strategic bombers in these directions.

Therefore, the first task - disruption and reduction of the military-economic potential of the enemy -which was previously the responsibility of the VVS, has now passed in significant degree to the missile forces. The very contents of this task have changed. It has assumed a more decisive character and consists now of the mass and rapid destruction and annihilation of the most important targets of the enemy's rear. In fulfilment of this broadened task, the air forces, in the new conditions, take an active part by concentrating their efforts on the destruction of targets mainly in directions not well covered by PVO means.

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The second mission - the fight for air supremacy - as one of the most important missions previously assigned to the VVS, has lost its earlier significance due to the appearance of missile troops. But in its place there has appeared a new, even more complicated task - the struggle against enemy nuclear/missile means of attack, which, in its significance to warfare, acquires paramount importance. Its significance flows from the colossal increased destructive might of nuclear/missile weapons. In a future war a stubborn, bitter struggle will develop between the warring sides for nuclear superiority and for more effective exploitation and use of nuclear weapons for more rapid achievement of strategic goals. Both sides will vigorously seek to locate the antagonist's nuclear/missile weapons and to destroy them immediately. It can be confidently stated that whoever resolves this task faster will win the battle and, consequently, the war. For this, it is necessary to have in constant readiness, not only missile troops, but also military aircraft and means of aerial reconnaissance that are capable, at the start of the war, to survey all corners of the globe that are enveloped by war, and later to carry on constant observation of the enemy on land and water.

In this connection, the task of the struggle with the enemy's nuclear/missile means of attack becomes the primary one for our missile troops. The air forces will take a most active part in its fulfilment.

The third most important task of the VVS - cooperation with the ground troops and the navy in their operations - remains fully intact under the new conditions. Military aviation takes part in cover and support of troops from the air, in the battle with the enemy's means of nuclear/missile attack and his reserves, in support of airborne troop landings, and in air transport of troops and freight.

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The fourth task of the VVS - combat against enemy transport operations via his ocean, sea, land, and air communication routes. Under the new conditions of waging war, this task will undoubtedly assume an operational-strategic scope.

The fifth task of the VVS - aerial reconnaissance. This VVS task is becoming, in its operational-strategic significance, no less important than all the other tasks. Therefore it seems expedient to us to raise aerial reconnaissance to the category of the independent and most important tasks of the air forces.

These are the combat tasks which must be fulfilled by the air forces in modern warfare with consideration for the existing capabilities of aircraft and the immediate prospects for receipt of new aircraft equipment into the armament. The many-sided nature of VVS tasks resulting from the new conditions also predetermines the need for long-range, front, and military-transport aviation within its composition.

Let's examine the apparent and already partially determined new trends and directions in the combat use of various types and kinds of aviation under conditions of wide use of missile weapons in the conduct of operations by the ground troops in the initial period of a war.

The experience of a number of aviation exercises carried out jointly with the troops of PVO of the Country indicates that the VVS's first massive strike against the enemy in the beginning of a war can be executed immediately following the first missile salvo, but that aerial reconnaissance must start fulfilling its assigned tasks simultaneously with the initiation of the first launch of missiles. The subsequent activities of long-range and strategic bombers, and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, will similarly be carried on between the missile salvoes (strikes). Such a sequence of operations of the missile troops and of the VVS creates for the VVS two quite new situations, one of a positive, the second of a negative, nature.

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Missile troops, simultaneously with the destruction of assigned enemy targets by nuclear warheads, inevitably destroy and annihilate the forces and weapons of his antiaircraft defense and thereby disrupt the only control system for enemy antiaircraft missiles and fighter-interceptors. This assists the long-range and strategic bombers to overcome enemy PVO.

But in this connection, during the course of a missile strike, the necessity arises to transit air space heavily contaminated with radioactive fallout. Therefore, the probability of air-crews entering a zone of radioactive contamination significantly increases at night and with adverse weather conditions, during daylight, when visual determination of the limits of the radioactive cloud is almost impossible.

These two circumstances strongly emphasize the need for continuous coordination between the respective headquarters of the missile troops and of the air forces. It must be expressed primarily in the assignment of targets of the operations, in the assignment of a time schedule for the missile strike and for mother aircraft, and in the determination of altitudes for the burst of nuclear charges. In practice it is possible to coordinate missile and aviation operations against enemy targets in the same area if they are plotted on a single board which reflects the combat capabilities of the missiles and aircraft being used.

For the air forces, even under the new conditions, the basic method of operations in the initial period of a war will be the execution of powerful massive strikes, with subsequent transition to operations by small groups on a broad front following the missile strikes.

The form of operational employment of the VVS under conditions of the initial period of a war remains the air operation, i.e., massive strikes with its entire strength. In its content, the air operation will have a somewhat different nature than previously. In the first place, it will be carried out under conditions

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of wide use of missiles; because of this, its duration will be sharply reduced and the immediate task can be fulfilled by the initial massive strikes, as the experience of training exercises indicates. In the second place, the air operation will be carried out by the entire or the major portion of the forces of long-range aviation, with the participation of front aviation. In such an operation the decision regarding the fulfilment of assigned tasks will ordinarily be made by the Commander-in-Chief of the VVS. In the third place, the targets and areas of operations of the VVS in an air operation will be determined by a higher command, depending upon the operations of the missile troops.

One of the main conditions for fulfilment of tasks by long-range and strategic bombers, as regards the destruction of targets in the enemy rear areas, is their successful overcoming of enemy PVO means. Wide use of low flight altitudes by bombers, and the use of passive and active jamming (pomekh), are highly effective. It was determined during training exercises that the percentage of aircraft attacked by enemy fighters in daylight at high altitudes was 5 or 6 times greater than at lower altitudes and at night it was quite insignificant. Destruction of aircraft by guided antiaircraft missiles during low altitude flights is limited by the combat characteristics of the anti-aircraft missiles. Thus, absolutely clear-cut determination was made of the direction of the use of existing long-range and strategic bombers against targets located in theaters of military operations - at night and at low altitudes. Low altitudes are becoming the basic operational altitudes for long-range and front aviation.

The training exercises carried out this year confirm the assumption that during the execution of the first retaliatory strike, a single echelon operational formation of long-range aviation forces and the overcoming of the pre-frontal zone on a broad front are the basic form of operational maneuver.

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These are some of the new tendencies and trends in the combat use of the VVS in conditions of the wide utilization of missile troops during the initial period of a war.

Let us examine definite directions in air operations when fulfilling tasks in cooperation with the ground troops in their operations.

It is known, that of all the types of aviation, front aviation plays the main role in the operations of the ground troops; during the recent past it has undergone major qualitative and quantitative changes which have resulted in a significant impact on the nature of the tasks performed by front aviation. For example, with the appearance of nuclear weapons, the main content of the air struggle with the enemy's means of attack changed from the destruction of enemy aircraft in general to the destruction principally of the aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and missiles and also of assembly bases and nuclear weapons storage areas; in the air support of troops-it has become the destruction of atomic artillery, various missile equipment, and of highly mobile, constantly maneuvering enemy reserves.

There was a particularly sharp change in these tasks due to the appearance of missiles of various designations in the armament of troops; as a result, front bombers and fighters began to execute their basic missions in conjunction with the missile troops and to concede to missile troops the main role in the use of nuclear weapons against stationary surface targets and against aerial targets.

By dint of these circumstances, front aviation, having conceded the main role to missiles, began to have only a part in the performance of a number of tasks - in the struggle with the means of aerial and missile attack, in the screening of troops and installations of the rear area of the front, and in the struggle with the enemy's reserves. The special province of front aviation operations remains air support of troops and the conduct of aerial reconnaissance.

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It is essential to state a number of new situations in the combat use of front aviation in ground troop operations. The struggle with enemy means of aerial and missile attack is now planned on a frontal scale, since the missile troops of the front take an active part in it in addition to aviation. Upon aviation falls the principal responsibility of destroying newly detected enemy means of aerial attack, i.e., those targets which are on the move and which will not be destroyed by missiles. The performance of this task by aviation will be resolved by the method of calling up aircraft from a position of "ground alert" or "airborne alert".

In screening of troops and installations of the rear areas of a front, new conditions have also been created which permit more effective resolution of this problem. The more important installations of the front are screened by antiaircraft missiles. However, troop, army, and front antiaircraft guided missiles are still able to destroy only the aerial targets located at insignificant distances from the missile positions; these means cannot destroy enemy missile mother aircraft at the limits from which they drop their missiles of the "air-to-surface" class. Fighter-interceptors, with their high maneuverability, are capable of meeting the aerial enemy and destroying him with guided weapons while he is still on distant approaches to the line of the front and to the installations being screened.

Taking into consideration the combat characteristics of antiaircraft guided missiles and of fighter aircraft, it is advisable to organize cooperation between them along the following lines.

First, zones of operations in area and altitude must be delineated between guided missiles and fighters. In doing so, it is desirable to assign to fighters a zone of combat operations ahead of the front line to the depth of possible interception within the radius

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of operation of a pair of fighters, i.e., beyond the range limits of antiaircraft missiles (ZUR). When operating in the same area with ZUR, it is advisable to assign low altitudes to fighters wherever guided missiles are still limited in their operations.

Secondly, it is necessary to distribute targets of operations between fighters and antiaircraft guided missiles. Fighter-interceptors must destroy principally mother aircraft, cruise missiles, fighter-bombers, military transport aircraft, helicopters and aerial balloons, antiaircraft guided missiles, cruise (krylataya) missiles and pilotless missiles (samolet-snaryad), and also all the other manned and pilotless means that manage to break through the covering screen of fighters into the air space of the front.

Thirdly, it is necessary to set up demarcation of areas of operations between the air large units that cover the troops and those that cover installations in the rear area of the front. Taking into account that under the new conditions a front air army may have no more than two fighter divisions, it is advisable to assign one division or a major part of its forces to cover the front tank army which is operating ahead and out of contact, and the second division - to cover the other troops of the front and the installations in the rear areas. Further, it is advisable to set up demarcation of operational areas between the fighter divisions.

In air support of ground troop operations, the need to use aircraft against mobile targets becomes especially clear, since they do not all have precise coordinates, and the majority of them do not produce a clearly defined radar contrast.

In this connection, it has been deemed expedient to carry out air support of combined-arms armies by a centralized method of allocating to armies, in

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accordance with the decision of the front troop commander, a definite number of flights (vylet) of fighter-bombers with nuclear bombs, without making the fighter-bomber subunits and units subordinate to the army. Support of the tank army that is operating separately from the main forces of the front is best accomplished by allocating designated aviation units of bomber and fighter-bomber aviation for this. The basic type of fighter-bomber and bomber operations in the air support of troops will be the method of operations on request.

From the above-mentioned facts it is possible to conclude that the basic method of operation for all types of aviation in the execution of combat missions under the new conditions is the method of operations with subunits and small groups of airplanes called up for air support from the command, or forward, control post from a condition of ground or air alert. Along with this, front aviation will participate in the execution of massive nuclear strikes against missile, air, and other enemy means of attack, not on the scale of an air army, as it was before the appearance of missiles, but on the scale of a front. This means that in modern conditions the massive strike becomes a front function.

A number of new postulates have also arisen in the conduct of aerial reconnaissance. The establishment of the reconnaissance mission has become an integral part of the operational decision. By its nature, aerial reconnaissance simultaneously fulfils, it would seem, two missions. The first and main one - the detection of enemy missile and nuclear means of attack, with the aim of ensuring direct effect on them by the missile, aviation, and artillery forces. The second mission - the continuous observation of all of the enemy's forces and weapons with the aim of planning combat operations for the following 24-hour period, day or night.

Such are the new concepts and characteristics which have been determined recently in training exercises which were carried out by the air forces, both independently and jointly with the ground troops.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

31 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics", by Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

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Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics", by Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics", by Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov.

This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 First Issue was the initial issue of this publication.

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New Developments in Operational Art and Tactics

by

Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov

In recent times the assertion has been growing continually more definite and more persistent, and is now deeply rooted, that the fundamental tenets of strategy, of operational art, of tactics, and of the structure of the armed forces, based on the experience of the last war, cannot ensure victory under modern conditions, and need radical revision. The reason for this is the wealth of material that has been accumulated by testing nuclear weapons - the basic and decisive means of routing the enemy in a future war - and also the experience of command-staff exercises, games, and drills with troops and from military-scientific research on the organization and conduct of an operation and of a battle. All this permits a practical review of the tenets that existed previously, and working out and basing new positions in military art in accordance with modern conditions.

In this respect, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy's article /footnote missing/, in which a serious and profound analysis is given of the nature of a future war, taking into account the employment of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, has especially important significance, many tenets of the past are decisively reconsidered, and concrete problems in working out the strategy of the next war are advanced.

It is essential to recognize that although atomic weapons have already been studied for many years, we often still continue to employ former tenets in theoretical operational studies and to apply them to modern conditions. If one compares the concepts of certain operational studies and exercises, and the decisions made according to them

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for a front and an army, with the concepts and decisions for an operation adopted by commanders of troops of fronts and armies in the last war, it is not difficult to be convinced that these concepts and decisions often coincide almost completely in their aims, forms of operational maneuver, and methods and means of defeating the enemy, and are very similar to one another. There is some difference only in the tempos of offensive, in the width of zones, and in the fact that now the absence of a continuous front is permitted.

So, on the one hand, we acknowledge quite definitely the decisive role of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction in the organization and conduct of an operation aimed at the complete defeat of the enemy; on the other hand, we continue to organize and plan an operation according to the methods of the last war. This obvious contradiction in the theory of operational art may, without exaggeration, be called a crisis. A correct evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons enables this contradiction to be resolved through discovering new forms and methods of armed combat and operations, and of the conduct of battle under modern conditions.

In connection with the radical alteration already recognized in the role of the types of armed forces and arms of troops in bringing about the complete defeat of the enemy, let us consider the aims, nature, and essence of a modern operation, the principles of using nuclear weapons, and other, in our view extremely important, problems.

Thus, before the appearance of nuclear weapons the main role in defeating the enemy belonged to ground troops, and as their basic operational-tactical form of organization - to divisions. In the last war, the infantry and armored divisions of ground troops were the striking force for defeating the enemy in an offensive and the basis of combat stability in defense. The destruction of divisions generally meant the complete defeat of the enemy, so the purpose of each operation was the encirclement and destruction of his main groupings of ground troops.

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After the defeat of the divisions, neither the aviation nor, even less, the artillery of the enemy, could have a decisive influence on the operations of the troops.

In connection with what has been stated, the well-known appreciation of the decisive significance of divisions of ground troops, advanced by I. V. Stalin, as one of the main constant factors deciding the fate of a war, was absolutely correct only for the last war. That is, "the quantity and quality of divisions" of ground troops at that time basically determined the military power of the opposing sides.

Under modern conditions, nuclear/missile weapons are the main means of destroying atomic weapons, ground troops, and other forces and weapons of the enemy. Therefore, one of the main aims of an operation in a future war must be, as the first priority, to deprive the enemy of nuclear weapons, the destruction of nuclear warheads and the means of delivering them to the target, but not the destruction of his divisions. This aim may also be attained by employing nuclear weapons alone.

Today, to defeat the enemy completely means wresting nuclear weapons from his hands, depriving him of nuclear power, or decisively undermining the possibility of restoring it. An enemy, having lost his nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether or not he has a sufficient number of divisions of ground troops, will already be unable to organize his defense, much less organize decisive offensive operations, and will be forced to capitulate before the threat of total destruction.

The proposition set out here is so important and basic that it can radically change not only the aims and tasks, but also the nature, of operations, and requires a quite different solution to all other problems of the organization and conduct of operations and of battle in the future. While operations were conducted previously by the forces of two or three, or even of one, front, now they will have a much wider scope and most likely will be conducted simultaneously on several strategic axes or theaters of military operations with all

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the forces and weapons at the disposal of the opposing sides. Operations will be carried on until all enemy forces on a given continent have been totally defeated. Therefore, the scale of an operation will have nothing in common with the scale of operations in the last war. The depth of operations will not be limited to four, five, or six hundred kilometers, but will increase to at least twice this amount.

On a number of axes, where by employing nuclear weapons great destruction and devastation will be achieved, the tempo of advance of ground troops will be determined by the movement capability of the troops and will approximate the length of a day's march. However, it is extremely necessary to take into account constantly that for ensuring movement in these areas, measures will need to be taken for surmounting vast zones with high levels of radioactive contamination of terrain and with great destruction. On other axes, where the scale of employing nuclear weapons will be less, the tempo of advance may be correspondingly somewhat lower.

The essence of operations will amount to the following: organizing and delivering nuclear strikes by the forces of missile troops and aviation for carrying out strategic, operational, or tactical tasks; the employment of chemical and bacteriological weapons; moving divisions, corps, and armies of ground troops forward on selected axes into enemy territory, with the purpose of exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, completing the defeat of the remaining enemy forces not destroyed by nuclear weapons, and the final disruption of his attempts to continue the delivery of nuclear strikes; and organizing the protection of friendly troops from strikes of enemy nuclear weapons.

In connection with the above, the basic content of planning and preparation for operations will amount to organizing the employment of nuclear weapons. It is pertinent to define the general principles and to consider the concrete forms of organization of the operational employment of nuclear weapons.

The basic principle of employing nuclear weapons, in our view, must follow from the fact that they cannot and must not be used any

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longer as a means of supporting the operations of divisions of ground troops. Nuclear weapons must be considered and used as an independent and decisive means of defeating the enemy.

Up to the present time, in theoretical studies and command-staff exercises, nuclear weapons have been planned and employed just as a means of support. For example, in the exercise in the autumn of 1959, the "East" employed 82 percent of its atomic warheads in direct support of the conduct of combat by divisions of ground troops, and only 18 percent for the destruction of means of nuclear attack and for hitting other enemy objectives. Can such employment of nuclear weapons really be considered advantageous? Does it answer the problem of depriving the enemy of the capability for employing nuclear weapons? Of course not. More than that, such employment is harmful, as essentially it means squandering the most powerful weapons of the present time on targets of secondary importance and permits the enemy to preserve the means of nuclear attack.

It is not for supporting a partial advance of this or that division and neutralizing an ordinary strongpoint that these weapons must be used, but for defeating the main forces of the enemy, and first and foremost the means of nuclear attack. Very much will depend on how far this basic proposition is perceived and understood. According to our profound conviction, this is the guarantee of success in operations.

Nuclear weapons must be used purposefully and en masse. This means that, first of all, for the total annihilation of enemy nuclear means, and then of the main grouping of his ground troops, aviation, and naval forces, an absolute majority of the nuclear warheads must be employed.

It is hardly necessary to prove that with nuclear weapons it is possible not only to annihilate individual objectives and targets but also to carry out tactical, operational, and even strategic tasks. With nuclear weapons it is possible to rout entire formations /obyedineniye/ and the main forces of the operational groupings of

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enemy ground troops, including their own nuclear weapons and airfields which are located over a considerable area and in great depth. Nuclear weapons must be employed suddenly, effectively, and economically, i. e., so that each burst should inflict maximum losses on the enemy and so that all the destructive properties of the burst itself and radioactive contamination of the terrain are used in the most advantageous manner.

Based on the general principles of employing nuclear weapons, with the object of obtaining a common understanding of the methods of their operational use and a simplification of planning methods, it would be advisable in our view to establish a separation of nuclear strikes into concentrated and individual nuclear strikes; in this, the former, depending on the importance of the tasks and goals they carry out, should be subdivided into strategic, operational, and tactical nuclear strikes.

A strategic concentrated nuclear strike is a series of most powerful nuclear bursts, directed at carrying out strategic tasks such as: the neutralization of ballistic missile bases, the annihilation and destruction of the main economic and political centers of the enemy, the crushing of his atomic industry, military bases, and other objectives.

An operational concentrated nuclear strike must be a series of nuclear bursts, delivered simultaneously or in succession by several salvoes with the purpose of carrying out operational tasks. These tasks may be: the disruption of the enemy's concentrated nuclear strike and the annihilation of his means of delivery, assembly bases, and reserves of nuclear warheads in the immediate zone of the front; the rout of a strike grouping of the ground troops, the destruction of aircraft and naval forces of the enemy; the destruction of second echelons or large operational reserves of a group of armies of the enemy and, as first priority, the annihilation of their nuclear weapons; the disruption of control and the work of the rear, the destruction of communication lines, ports, enemy bases and so on. Depending on the situation, an operational concentrated nuclear strike may coincide in timing with a strategic nuclear strike, which will be a characteristic

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feature of operations in the initial period of war.

A tactical concentrated nuclear strike may be delivered with the purpose of routing immediate reserves, neutralizing the tactical depth of defense and the enemy nuclear weapons located in it, destroying airborne forces landed in our rear area, and also carrying out other tasks of a tactical nature.

An individual nuclear strike consisting of single or of group nuclear bursts is intended for the annihilation, neutralization, or destruction of individual enemy targets or objectives from day to day during the course of an operation, as the need arises.

A concentrated nuclear strike must be planned as an independent and most important stage of an operation, and its organization and execution are very complex and responsible matters. Such strikes, depending on the situation, may be differentiated according to the purpose of their delivery, yield, and duration, and may have the most varied plans or schemes. Military operations will start, as a rule, with concentrated strikes. It is convenient to call the one with which an operation starts the initial strike. Strikes will also be carried out during the course of a war up to its final conclusion. In connection with the considerable special features in the organization and execution of concentrated strikes, it is advisable to divide them into preemptive and counter strikes.

Such a division of nuclear strikes, in our view, is convenient for solving problems connected with the operational use of nuclear weapons. The concept of a "missile operation", on the other hand, it seems to us, fails to express fully the operational aims of this measure. The concept of a "strategic nuclear strike" would define its content considerably better. The fact is that the missile is only a means of delivering nuclear weapons to a target. In a number of instances, apart from missiles, the carrier of an atomic charge may be aircraft. In any case, the heart of the matter is not in the missile or the aircraft but in the charge itself and the burst emanating from it.

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The next problem that has arisen in the operational art, in our opinion, lies in a categorical rejection of the basic principle of the operational art of the past - the principle of determining the main strike and selection of its axis, and the concentration on that axis of the main part of the forces and weapons of the front and the army.

In the last war, when complete defeat of the enemy lay in the destruction of divisions of his ground troops and was carried out in the main by the combat of our divisions, it was impossible to achieve success, either in the offensive or on defense, without selecting the axis of the main strike and concentrating the main forces on it. This had special importance when breaking through the enemy's defense, when opposite one defending division the efforts of two, and sometimes even three, divisions were concentrated, and manifold superiority in artillery, tanks, and aircraft was built up. Such a concentration of forces on the axis of the main strike, together with the extremely weak overall maneuverability of troops at that time, naturally ensured a breakthrough of the enemy's defense in the selected sector, and made it inconceivable, as a rule, for the enemy to hold zones and lines on other axes.

In this way, the principle of concentrating the principal efforts on the axis of the main strike, selected so that this axis should lead to the enemy's most vulnerable point, and the provision on this axis of double or triple superiority over the enemy in forces and weapons, was the basic principle of operational art in the past, and corresponded to the level of development of armament and combat equipment and ensured the successful execution of operations.

But can this principle remain basic in modern operational art? Does it conform to the nature of an operation and of battle being conducted under conditions of the massed employment of nuclear weapons? In our view it cannot, for two main reasons.

Firstly, nuclear weapons will play the main role in defeating enemy troops. Even to talk of concentrating the main efforts of nuclear weapons, i. e., of the employment of a neutralizing

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quantity of nuclear bursts on an axis, even on the main one, is not only incorrect but simply absurd. With this method of delivering strikes, a considerable number of enemy troops, his corps, and divisions located beyond the boundaries of the selected axis will remain unaffected, and in the area of the burst there will not be a target deserving attention.

As an example one may cite the decision taken by the commander of the 18th Army of the "West" in the war game conducted in February 1959 in the Military Academy i/n M. V. Frunze. According to the situation on the morning of 20 July (diagram 7 of the critique materials of the game), the main forces of the 3rd Tank Army of the "East", composed of two tank and one heavy tank divisions, were in one limited area, a fourth division, operating on a broad front, covered the left flank of the Army, and the right flank of the Army was covered by an airborne division. In this situation it seemed quite clear that a large portion of the nuclear warheads should be brought down on the main grouping of the tank army with the purpose of routing it. In practice, however, the very opposite occurred. By decision of the commander of the 18th Army, all 11 warheads were employed against the divisions on the flanks of the 3rd Tank Army, and not one strike was delivered against the main grouping of its forces. As a result of this, the main forces of the tank army, not having come under the enemy nuclear strike, continued to develop their offensive without hindrance and carried out their assigned task.

This, to say the least, strange decision, was taken, obviously, because we still underestimate the role of nuclear weapons and their capabilities, while, at the same time, we overestimate the role of divisions of ground troops in a modern operation. In this decision there was very clearly reflected the tendency to employ nuclear weapons simply as a means of supporting an offensive by ground troops, and the main hopes were evidently put on the results of their operations. Adherence to the principle of concentrating the main efforts on strikes on selected axes, which, in the example given, the ground troops of the "West" were preparing, played a considerable, if not the main, role here.

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Secondly, to concentrate the main part of the divisions of a front, army, or even a corps and the means of their reinforcement, on no matter what axis, including the main one means taking a risk, and not only taking a risk, but simply from the start giving the opportunity for these troops to be defeated, as the enemy will certainly endeavor to take advantage of such an opportunity for the effective employment of his nuclear weapons against the grouping most threatening to him.

The example cited by us is undoubtedly a minor one, but it has been taken because it clearly reflected the failure of the principle of concentrating efforts on axes to conform with the means of conducting modern operations and battle, and the recognized harmfulness of employing this principle in the training of our cadres for a future war. Therefore, modern operational art, in our opinion, can no longer employ as a basis the principle of the main strike, selection of its axis and concentration on it of the main efforts of the troops, as this principle no longer conforms either with the level of development of the armed forces or with modern military theory.

Undoubtedly, the principle of concentrating the principal effort on the main axis resulted from a most important tenet of dialectical materialism - the doctrine of the main element- and was, as it were, its interpretation in the theory of operational art. Therefore, it cannot simply be rejected, but must be replaced by a new principle, which, in our view, must become the principle of concentrating the main efforts for destroying the nuclear means and main grouping of troops of the enemy. This principle takes into full account the present level of development of the means of armed combat. It not only permits, but even compels the use of the main mass of nuclear weapons for the annihilation of enemy nuclear weapons and the route of the strongest main grouping of his ground troops, naval forces, and aviation. The divisions of the ground troops have every opportunity of bringing up their units from various axes to the area where the main forces of the enemy are; and of committing them to battle in those sectors where it seems appropriate in a particular case, in order to achieve success and not to expose friendly forces to a destructive enemy nuclear strike.

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Recently, we have frequently been considering the problem of where to deliver the main strike - on a strong or a weak point of the enemy defense. This problem, absurd in itself from the point of view of conducting operations in the age of nuclear weapons, in view of keeping the outdated principle of concentrating the principal efforts on the main axis, has now led to an impasse. Indeed, if one is to deliver a strike on the strongest point of the enemy defense, then it is possible to employ nuclear weapons successfully, but the ground troops are placed in an unfavorable position. But if one delivers a strike on the weak point of the enemy defense, then conversely, the divisions of the ground troops can select favorable flank, and generally more successful, axes, but nuclear weapons will have to be employed on targets and objectives of minor importance. What is better then, what should one sacrifice - the advantages of using nuclear weapons or the convenience of operations of ground troops?

In our view, neither one nor the other can be acceptable. One ought not to sacrifice either the advantages of employing atomic weapons or the convenience of the operations of divisions of ground troops. The only thing one should really sacrifice is the principle of selecting the axis of the main strike and concentrating on it the main efforts of fronts, armies, and even divisions. The necessity has arisen for introducing clarity into this question, lest our commanders and staffs be completely disoriented.

The problem of removing the sharp distinction between the concept of operational defense and operational offensive deserves consideration.

Previously, when divisions of ground troops were the main combat force of the two sides, defense and offensive were fundamentally different methods of operations, in each of which definite independent tasks were carried out. Defense ensured holding large fronts and territories with comparatively insignificant forces, and made it possible to free the necessary forces for an offensive. The offensive, as the main type of combat operations, was the principal means of decisively defeating the enemy and of seizing the initiative.

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Under conditions of the massed employment of nuclear weapons, obviously the purely classical type of defensive and offensive operation will disappear. The success of an offensive operation, for example, will depend not only on the correct organization of the offensive itself but on how skilfully are decided the problems of cover and protection of friendly troops and means of mass destruction from destruction by enemy nuclear weapons. Elements of defense, such as security of the flanks and points at which flanks meet, consolidation of occupied lines during the course of an offensive operation were already being practised in the last war, and began to penetrate into the offensive particularly vigorously in the postwar period. The system of modern antiaircraft defense appeared and is being improved all the time.

It is quite clear that it is now impossible to plan an offensive operation without providing at the same time for measures for the defense and reliable protection of the main forces and weapons of the offensive troops from enemy nuclear weapons up to the beginning of the offensive, and consolidation of lines and repelling counterstrikes during the course of it. These measures must become one of the main component parts of the general operational plan of offensive.

It is also the same on defense. Its object will consist in the concealment of the main forces of nuclear weapons, ground troops, naval forces, and aviation, and providing for their protection from enemy nuclear weapons. Stability of defense under modern conditions is based on the massed employment of nuclear weapons with the decisive purpose of defeating the main grouping of enemy troops and the means of enemy nuclear attack. Without this, the defense is powerless and cannot carry out its tasks. But at the same time, insofar as nuclear weapons will be employed, and the destruction of the attacking strike force achieved, it is senseless not to make use of these results and to continue to go on sitting on occupied lines. It is natural, under these conditions, to go over to the offensive, even with very limited forces of ground troops, immediately after nuclear strikes have taken place. Operational defense, which counts on the maximum use of nuclear weapons, cannot now be considered without going over to the offensive

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All this points to the fact that nuclear weapons are eliminating the distinction between operational offensive and operational defense. There will no longer be clearly defined breakthrough sectors, offensive zones for operational formations, and defense with a developed system of solid positions and zones on a front of considerable width.

The difference between the conduct of an offensive and the defense, in our opinion, will persist only in tactics. Divisions and regiments will, as before, receive tasks for the offensive and the defense and carry them out, taking into account the special features of operations when nuclear weapons are being employed.

A feature of no small importance in modern operations will also be that the rear areas of fronts and the rear of the country as a whole, with its economic and political centers and manpower resources, will be subjected from the very beginning of the war to the most powerful effects of enemy nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, which will seriously complicate the process of mobilizing troops and conveying them to the front, and also material support for operations. It follows from this that border military districts will have to initiate military operations with those forces and weapons which they had at the beginning of the war and which they can save from enemy action.

As far as internal military districts are concerned, their role and the nature of their activities are being abruptly changed in comparison with the last war; under these conditions they will be forced to take part immediately in active combat to frustrate enemy strikes and eliminate their consequences. For this purpose, they must have all necessary means at their disposal; in particular there must be concentrated in their hands all the means of antiaircraft defense (PVO), local antiaircraft defense (MPVO), etc. Dispersal of these means in various organizations can only make the situation worse.

We feel that a special type of operation must be developed - operations of an internal military district. For training generals, officers, and staffs of internal military districts in the conduct of such operations, appropriate command-staff exercises and games

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must also be carried out, in which the problems of troop operations must be worked out under conditions of an enemy attack employing nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons on the territory of the district.

The next problem in operational art, in our view, consists in the employment and the nature of operations of the ground troops themselves. As we have already ascertained, their role will amount to the most advantageous and effective exploration of the results of employment of nuclear weapons, and will be completely in line with the general concept of routing the opposing enemy forces. The tasks of large units of ground troops and the means of reinforcing them will now result from the aims of completing the rout of an enemy being subjected to nuclear strikes, advancing into and capturing enemy-held territory, conclusively depriving him of his capability to employ nuclear weapons, and maintaining the stability of the operational situation of friendly troops. At the same time, the achievement of the necessary surprise and effectiveness of the nuclear strikes being delivered and the endeavor to exploit the results of them to the maximum with ground troops and aviation must be made fundamental in organizing coordinated action.

At the same time, the massed employment of nuclear weapons cannot fail to result in changes in the operational structure of troops and a revision of the role of echelons and the methods of increasing efforts for routing the main forces of the enemy.

In the last war, an absolute majority of the troops of armies and fronts was in their first echelons. Can this position be maintained now? No, it cannot. Nuclear weapons make it possible to neutralize effectively the troops of the enemy's first echelon in certain sectors, and in a short time to break through the defense in these sectors, with a powerful first echelon which is smaller numerically. Therefore the tendency is growing immeasurably of deploying operational echelons of ground troops deeper, to have more forces and weapons in the depth, and to reinforce second echelons and reserves considerably in order to be able to increase the efforts of the first operational echelon.

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In our view, the method of intensifying efforts in an operation on those axes where the most favorable or the most difficult situation has arisen, must also be fundamentally changed. The intensification of efforts must now be carried out by small groups of troops not larger than a division. In this connection, second echelons of armies must consist of tank and motorized-rifle divisions, and the second echelons of fronts - of corps and divisions. It is not advisable now to create second echelons of fronts in the form of a combined arms or tank army, as it is simply impossible to commit to battle a whole army (and still more a reserve front) without incurring serious losses, which the enemy is now able to inflict by employing nuclear weapons.

Let us take as an illustration an example from the same war game carried out in the Academy i/n M. V. Frunze. By the time that the "West" knew about the concentration and movement of the 3rd Tank Army of the "East", the "West's" 18th Army alone had 40 nuclear warheads with a total yield of up to 1000 kt, and no less than 15 warheads could be used rapidly on the "East's" 3rd Tank Army. In addition, the group of "West" armies also had a large number of nuclear warheads at that time, of which only 23 warheads were used for delivering strikes on the area of the hills of the "Thueringen Forest", with the aim of creating there zones of high radioactive contamination. If all these warheads had been used with a definite purpose on the troops of the "East's" 3rd Tank Army, especially when it had not moved up to the "Thueringen Forest" hills, then this army would undoubtedly have been completely routed and could not have been committed to battle. The exercise could have been concluded at this point.

In defense, divisions of the first operational echelon which are in direct contact with the enemy, will as a rule be better reconnoitered by the enemy. Therefore commanding officers of and commanders of armies will undoubtedly also endeavor to conceal from the enemy their main forces operating in the first echelons, having at every slightest available opportunity concentrated their efforts on positions deployed in depth, on the strength of which even the first operational echelon will be considerably more dispersed in depth.

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In our opinion, evaluating the power of atomic weapons and their possible operational use, it must be considered that second echelons and reserves of armies and of a front must now consist of more than 50 percent of all their component forces and weapons. In connection with this, the overall density of troops in first echelons will also be many times less than it was in the last war.

In order to evaluate better the effect of employing nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction on the nature of operations and combat, let us consider several basic problems of the organization and conduct of a defensive and an offensive operation.

In principle, defense, in our opinion, must be constructed in the following manner: divisions of the first operational echelon cover the main axes and ensure observation on the remaining axes. Reconnaissance subunits are in direct contact with the enemy, then come the troops detailed for combat in the security zone, further the units defending the forward position, and, finally, the main line of resistance.

The question arises, is such cover adequate or should one not also, under modern conditions, organize such a multi-zone echelon-in-depth defense as there was in the past? Could the enemy, even without nuclear weapons, unexpectedly turn to the offensive with ground troops, break this sparse cover and successfully develop an offensive in depth?

In our view, such a structure of cover is adequate. If the enemy really tries to deliver a strike without having neutralized the nuclear weapons of the defense, i. e., without having thoroughly organized the operation, then he will receive a counter-nuclear strike of such strength that it will not only paralyze any offensive of his, but may bring about the total loss of troops assigned for it. On the other hand, will the reliability of the cover be increased much if a "normal" defense is organized, as it was in the last war, with an average density of 10 to 15 kms per division? Are there really no weapons now, capable of neutralizing any sector in this defense that is essential for a breakthrough at any place and at any time?

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The success of covering operations of troops will now depend not on how many divisions of ground troops are defending the main zone of defense, or whether there is such a zone at all, but to what extent the attacker will succeed in neutralizing the nuclear weapons of the enemy. If this task is not carried out by the attacker, then comparatively small forces, reinforced by the maneuver of tactical and operational reserves, are quite adequate, by the massed use of nuclear weapons, to frustrate the development of an offensive by enemy ground troops into the depth of the defense.

Such an organization of cover, in our view, will now be typical in all cases preceding the beginning of active combat operations. Such cover will replace the operational defense of the past.

Let us turn to the problems of the offensive. The organizational beginning of an offensive operation of a front is a General Headquarters (Stavka) directive in which the tasks, composition of forces and weapons, and the time of carrying out the operation are defined. In contrast with the past, there is now no need to define in the General Headquarters directive the axis of the main and other strikes, or to stipulate the amount of forces to be allotted to these axes. At the same time, the necessity of indicating the following arises: which nuclear strikes will be delivered by the means of General Headquarters on the axis of operations of the front, when and how the long-range enemy nuclear means which are beyond the range of the means of the front will be neutralized, and whether the means of the front will be called upon to carry out the indicated strategic tasks.

In our view, the content of the decision of the commander of troops of the front (army) for carrying out an operation must be changed materially. A resolution of the following problems must be included in it: - determining the maximum required number of nuclear warheads and the selection of their most advantageous yield, determining the points of concentration and time periods for readying nuclear warheads for use; - establishing methods for neutralizing and destroying nuclear means and also for routing the main groupings of ground and naval forces and aviation of the enemy; determining the number of operational and tactical concentrated nuclear strikes, their tasks, compo-

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sition of forces, and time of delivery; a detailed working out of the initial concentrated nuclear strike; - determining the lines of the immediate and subsequent tasks arising out of the planned nuclear strikes; - making the decision to use ground troops (and naval forces on a maritime axis) and aviation for completing the rout of the enemy, and the time of their move to the lines of the immediate and follow-up tasks; - determining the tasks of the airborne forces and troops designated to be dropped in the rear of the enemy from the air; - establishing methods of cover from enemy strikes for friendly troops and weapons, above all nuclear weapons; - allocating tasks to operational formations and large units.

As is evident from the list given here, the basic content of a decision for a modern offensive operation must include determining the problems in employing nuclear weapons, and of these one of the main and most complex is the organization of the initial operational nuclear strike, the main purpose of which is to destroy the nuclear means and neturalize the main grouping of ground forces and aviation of the enemy.

The destruction of enemy nuclear means is the most important and, at the same time, the most difficult of the tasks. The fact is that with the means of reconnaissance available at the present time it is difficult to discover the location of enemy nuclear weapons. Attempts to develop a special device which would permit determining at a considerable distance the location of depots of nuclear warheads, assembly workshops, positions of missiles, and delivery aircraft, have not yet, according to data in journals, given favorable results. However, this does not mean that with the available .../one line missing/. In our view a thorough analysis of all intelligence data received from all sources can ensure the discovery of the location of the main part of the enemy's nuclear means. But this study must be very carefully and thoughtfully organized. For such a study and analysis of reconnaissance data, it is essential right now to have special groups for evaluating targets in the staffs of fronts and armies. In addition, it is necessary to continue persistently to search for new methods of getting intelligence on enemy nuclear means. In this, the

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main direction must be taken not toward piloted reconnaissance aircraft, but to the use of pilotless aircraft-missiles (samolet-raketa) for this purpose, and also in the creation of a device which transmits an image during flight, determining the coordinates of objectives, precisely expediting the development of film and photographs greatly, etc., i. e., wholly answering the requirements given for reconnaissance of the enemy's nuclear weapons.

Nuclear means and missiles must be located only in well-prepared areas before the beginning of an offensive. Commanding officers of all levels must remember that if it is possible to weaken the consequences of the effect of the shockwave by means of dispersion of troops, it is possible to save the troops from penetrating radiation only by giving them cover in shelters and blindages. All movements must be carried out in the shortest possible time, at high speed, and with a considerable dispersion of troops.

The beginning of an offensive must be timed to the execution of the initial operational nuclear strike. Divisions of the first echelon must begin their move forward from shelters and areas which are completely prepared from the engineering standpoint under the cover of the initial nuclear strike or after the delivery of such a strike by the enemy. The attacker must strive to guess the enemy's intention to carry out a concentrated nuclear strike, and to frustrate or weaken it as much as possible.

During the course of an operation the reinforcement of appropriate sectors of the front must now be carried out by employing nuclear weapons and maneuver by trajectory (manevr trayektoriyami) and to a lesser degree by transferring the reserve of the front or the reserves of neighboring armies, to complement one or another army. An offensive by divisions of ground troops will be carried out along the whole zone of the front on individual axes in accordance with the requirements of the Field Service Regulations. The axes of operations of a division must be selected so that they ensure an adequate dispersal of forces and of the movement of units toward corresponding enemy groupings of troops, and should also lead into the operational depth of his defense.

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In conclusion, it is desirable to emphasize once again the idea that the success of an offensive operation will, in the final analysis, depend on whether the attacker is able to neutralize substantially the enemy's nuclear weapons. If he is unable to ensure this, the offensive will be frustrated no matter what measures he may undertake. That is why it is now impossible to conduct operations with the forces of a single front, as neighboring enemy armies or groups of armies can ensure a concentration of nuclear strikes that will stop any offensive by maneuvering means of delivering nuclear weapons. For these same reasons, offensive operations of a group of fronts must be secured by the conduct by General Headquarters of a strategic nuclear strike or a missile operation with the object of neutralizing the enemy's strategic nuclear weapons means.

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MEMO FOR THE RECORD 6 Feb 1962

SUBJECT: Discussion between SR/COP, CSR/9, DCSR/9, [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
[redacted] re: SR/COP's European trip, 1-5 Feb 62, and SR/COP conversations with [redacted]

1. SR/COP stated that [redacted] agreed that [redacted] high volume of document photography was the greatest risk to the operation. However, [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
does not feel that [redacted] would accept KUBARK's suggestion to reduce either this activity or the number of personal contacts within [redacted] for the following reasons:

a. The personal contact with someone he knows is very important to [redacted] subjectively. 1.3(a)(4)

b. [redacted] has not accepted previous suggestions to reduce the number of personal contacts.

c. The case officer teams were not able to hold down [redacted] on the number of personal meetings during the Paris phase. (Note: CSR/9 took exception to this, noting that [redacted] himself was pushing for more meetings.)

d. [redacted] is loath to use dead-drops because of security considerations, as well as because he derives satisfaction from personal contacts. (Note: CSR/9 observed that this was true so long as [redacted] had other means available to him.)

2. [redacted] noted to SR/COP that [redacted] has followed closely his requirements briefing, and extra material he has reported has been well selected, comprising materials to which we did not know he had access. He has not been passing material of low interest since the Paris phase. [redacted] feels that the introduction of new requirements normally should be avoided, as this will probably spur [redacted] to renewed collection activity, and this would be a greater risk to the security of the operation than to allow [redacted] to continue in his present method. [redacted] would therefore prefer to avoid inserting additional requirements now. While agreeing on the desirability of reducing the number of personal contacts, [redacted] doesn't believe that we presently have that kind of control over [redacted] However, [redacted] feels we have a reasonable chance to secure a reduction in the number of personal contacts on grounds of [redacted] physical condition. This would only be good temporarily. 1.3(a)(4)

3. [redacted] according to [redacted] presently has three Minox cameras in his possession. He has hidden one, and carries the other two with him, enabling him to shoot 100 frames without pausing to reload. 1.3(a)(4)

4. SR/COP met [redacted] for several hours together with [redacted] and received a favorable impression of her. She seemed fairly relaxed about 1.3(a)(4)

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31 MAR 1992

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SR/COP
C/SR/9
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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

her part in the operation, and SR/COP stated that he was somewhat reassured about the conduct of her contacts with [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

5. SR/COP learned from [redacted] that the personal contacts in the vicinity of the park are generally executed in the manner outlined below. [redacted] is in the park with her son, who is about 2½ years-old. [redacted] appears on the scene, and then proceeds down one of the streets leading from the area, selecting a different one each time. [redacted] follows after him, occasionally with some trouble persuading her young son to leave the piles of snow in the park. There is little vehicular traffic along these various side streets, but a fair amount of pedestrian activity. [redacted] is a plain girl and dresses in such a manner that she does not feel she is conspicuous as a foreigner in the neighborhood. [redacted] enters one of the doorways along the side street, apparently pre-selected by him before each contact, and stands behind the stair well, so that he can observe anyone coming down the stairs or through the door. (Note: On just one occasion, [redacted] apparently changed the entry he had chosen when it was suddenly entered by four people. No further incident occurred.) [redacted] enters after [redacted] and is with him about ten seconds, but sometimes more. [redacted] passes anything for [redacted] in a package of [redacted] cigarettes, and he passes material to her in a package of [redacted] cigarettes. [redacted] places the material received from [redacted] in her bag, and [redacted] pushes it down himself, being sure it is firmly in place. They always exchange a comment or two about such things as family health, etc. [redacted] always says when the next contact will be. They have never been interrupted. When meetings begin in the shop instead of the park, [redacted] follows [redacted] out to another doorway in the same manner as above. 1.3(a)(4)

6. SR/COP asked [redacted] about normal surveillance on her and her cover for action. [redacted] noted that her husband was heavily surveilled, but that she herself was seldom followed. SR/COP observed that she was probably good at detection. [redacted] cover for being in a doorway would be to adjust her clothing or tend to her son out of the cold. [redacted] has never made a record of the windows overlooking the contact sites, but feels that the normal traffic in these streets renders the whole action inconspicuous. The only contact which took place in the open was the first one. [redacted] does not discuss the contacts with her husband, but must communicate in writing for security reasons. 1.3(a)(4)

7. [redacted] expects to withdraw [redacted] and her husband from the area about June 62. He has in mind another married couple to replace them; the wife is also a former [redacted] secretary. She has three children. Two are too old for cover use, but the third will be "pram age" at her arrival in the area. 1.3(a)(4)

8. SR/COP raised with Shergold the question of making a gesture of appreciation for the work of [redacted] [redacted] thought that a "handsome present", implying cash, would be in order after she and her husband return to [redacted] SR/COP agreed, and said that KUBARK would like to share in the present. 1.3(a)(4)

9. [redacted] agrees on the need to supplement or, if possible, to swithh from clandestine meetings to meetings with a cover. [redacted] is now preparing a younger 1.3(a)(4)

officer, in an appropriate cover slot, to enter the area sometime in the fall for this purpose. His language proficiency is reputed to be high, and SR/COP speculated whether George Blake might know of him. In the interim caused by personnel changes, a slow-down on personal contacts may be required.

10. SR/COP and [redacted] briefly reflected on the possiblity of using KUBARK staffers' wives for the contacts. SR/COP informed [redacted] that KUBARK was also preparing personnel who could serve as contacts. 1.3(a)(4)

11. In answer to a query by DCSR/9, CSR/9 suggested that SR/9 should probably itself handle the debriefing of members of the Parsons-Wittemore delegation.

12. [redacted] explained the time required to pass material from [redacted] to KUBARK Headquarters. He said that there is no delay in London, because he puts the material in the next pouch to [redacted] after he receives it. However, the material may wait for nearly a week in [redacted] for the next pouch after having been delivered by [redacted] to her husband. [redacted] says that he tries to avoid sending cables to [redacted] husband outside of normal working hours, in order not to disrupt what should be normal routine in [redacted] (Note: DCSR/9 observed that [redacted] husband obviously knows of the occurrence of a contact with [redacted] very soon after it happens, and wondered how [redacted] informs him.) [redacted] has three cipher clerks in [redacted] Headquarters cleared to process [redacted] traffic, but says that there may be week-end delays, again because he does not want to disrupt a normal pattern. One of the cipher clerks, however, is always on call. 1.3(a)(4)

13. London Station, KUBARK, told SR/COP that [redacted] normally responds to any communication from KUBARK Headquarters via the same channel through which he receives it. It was explained to [redacted] that the KUBARK cable channel is preferable to [redacted] and that with KUBARK's move to its new building the [redacted] channel will be quite cumbersome. [redacted] saw the point, voiced no objection at all, and said he would discuss it with [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

14. [redacted] has been asked by [redacted] to "begin lining up" a trip to [redacted] in March or April 62 if [redacted] does not by then appear to be coming out. In any event, [redacted] will definitely go to [redacted] about August 1962. [redacted] has a scheme for a pre-fabricated display van for making exhibits portable. [redacted] has (?) advanced him about $15,000 in this connection. Apparently this is construed as a loan on an eventual profit-making venture. [redacted] will take this van with him to [redacted] [redacted] did not raise the question of KUBARK participation in the financing of this van. 1.3(a)(4)

15. SR/COP raised with [redacted] the question of contact reports on the meetings with [redacted]. [redacted] confirmed that separate reports would be sent on any special incidents, and also agreed to furnish more detail in the routine notices; specifically, the street and number where the contact takes place. 1.3(a)(4)

16. There is nothing new on [redacted]

17. SR/COP raised with [redacted] the question of a general operational accounting. [redacted] said that he would provide one to Kubark. [redacted] also volunteered the information that he had alerted [redacted] Finance to earmark an approximated £100,000 (One hundred thousand pounds sterling) against [redacted] possible defection and resettlement. [redacted] has in mind that this would be administered to [redacted] as a trust fund, thereby provding him with a guaranteed annual income. 1.3(a)(4)

18. [redacted] prefers, for his own administrative purposes, not to change the YOGA cryptonym, unless it is causing KUBARK in confusing traffic with that in another [redacted] channel.

19. [redacted] would prefer not to issue the electronic dead-drop to [redacted] without further opportunity for [redacted] personal instruction in its use. SR/COP agreed that this would be most desirable, but advised that written instructions will be adequate in themselves to instruct [redacted] It was agreed, therefore, that one unit would be retained in the [redacted] Embassy to be passed as opportunity permits if [redacted] does not come out in the reasonably near future. 1.3(a)(4)

20. [redacted] Embassy in [redacted] is not able to provide W/T confusions to support [redacted] possible transmission on an harmonic of their frequency. It would necessitate too great a departure from their normal W/T procedures. 1.3(a)(4)

21. [redacted] is willing to go along with the proposed audio operation against [redacted] Embassy, Paris. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

END

(QJ/pbc from rough approved 9 Feb 62)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Suitability of Modern Means and Methods in the Conduct of Operations", by Major General I. Zavyalov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

3 0 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY	:	USSR
SUBJECT	:	[redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Suitability of Modern Means and Methods in the Conduct of Operations", by Major-General I. Zavyalov
DATE OF INFO	:	Early 1960
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT	:	Documentary
SOURCE	:	A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled " The Suitability of Modern Means and Methods in the Conduct of Operations", by Major-General I. Zavyalov.

This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 First Issue was the initial issue of this publication.

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The Suitability of Modern Means and Methods in the Conduct of Operations

by

Major-General I. Zavyalov

In all armies, the essence of the development of military art has consisted, at all stages, of researching into and of developing methods of conducting combat operations which will ensure the most effective use of the weapons available.

This task acquires particular urgency during periods when a weapon of a completely new principle is appearing which has higher combat characteristics and which calls for completely new methods in the conduct of combat operations. Such a situation has been created today by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the armament of armies.

We must recognize that if a great leap was made in a short period of time in the development of modern means of armed combat and especially of nuclear weapons, there are still many very complicated and unresolved problems in the research into and the development of methods for the conduct of combat operations.

It stands to reason that new methods of conducting armed combat must be built not on the conjectures and fantasies of individuals or on their good intentions but on a real foundation; on the material resources for war which the State and its armed forces possess with regard to the quality and quantity of the new weapons and to the other military equipment which is already available or which can be produced by the State for the conduct of a war and, also, with regard to the forces and potential of the probable enemy. Obliviousness to these requirements during research on and the development of new methods of conducting armed combat will lead inevitably to serious mistakes in the theory of military art and to adventurism in the conduct of war, as was the case, for example, with Germany in the two World Wars.

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At the same time, the theory of military art must not become simply a registrar of practical achievements. In studying and summarizing the experience of troops and the results achieved in the development of means and methods in the conduct of armed combat, military theory, like every other advanced scientific theory, must light the way for practice, must provide decisive influence on the structure of armed forces / a few words missing /----------means and methods of conducting a war. To perform a task, one must have a clear perspective before one and one must look far ahead.

Under modern conditions, military art, in theory and practice, must not go so far as to base its calculations on the idea that the entire military-political and strategic aims of a war can be attained solely with the aid of nuclear/missile weapons. This will lead to narrow mindedness in military theory, to one-sidedness in the preparation of the armed forces and in the final analysis, to the inability of the latter to perform combat tasks in the complicated situations of a future war. It should not be forgotten that nuclear weapons are, after all, a complex, expensive, and, in the quantitative sense, a limited means of armed combat. This situation obliges us to seek and to create such new methods of conducting combat operations as will ensure the most effective use of the vast combat capabilities of nuclear weapons in the first place and, with this, of the conventional means of armed combat.

Large qualitative changes have occurred in the development of nuclear weapons. They have been widely introduced in all types of armed forces and have become the basic means of armed combat. The aircraft, as the basic carrier of nuclear weapons, has yielded its place to the missile. At present, the nuclear/missile weapon has attained a level of development which has called into being a new type of armed forces - missile troops of strategic designation to whom the main role in a future war has been assigned. Thus, the nuclear weapon has already ceased to be just a means for the independent fulfillment of combat missions on any scale.

It is no longer possible to limit oneself solely to adapting the old methods for the conduct of combat operations to the new weapons.

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A bold, radical break is needed in this matter, so that the use of nuclear weapons becomes the basis of everything. This break must not be indiscriminate, needlessly disclaiming all previous experience, but reasonable.

However, we do not always take into account the changes which have taken place, and even now the mere renovation of past experience in tactical and in operational art and the adaptation of antiquated methods of conducting armed combat to the new weapons continue to persist. We will attempt to show this, using as an example the solutions of some of the questions of the preparation and conduct of modern offensive operations.

Conditions of the Preparation of an Offensive Operation

As is generally known, any offensive operation is restricted in time and space which are, in turn, determined primarily by the supply of material and technical equipment and by the moral and physical capabilities of the troops. In the past war, after the conclusion of a normal offensive operation and the performance of the assigned tasks, the troops halted, put themselves in order, and consolidated themselves along the lines which they had reached. This occurred most frequently while the defending enemy, having brought up fresh reserves, was strengthening his resistance and when the advancing troops were exploiting their offensive possibilities completely.

As a result, an operational lull of varying duration occurred, during which both sides prepared for new operations. Such an operational lull, during which preparations for a new offensive were carried out or the troops prepared for defense, was characteristic of past wars. However, even now, one comes across attempts to transfer this experience mechanically to modern conditions although such operations are no longer in keeping with the new means of armed combat.

In speaking of the first operations of the initial period of a war, one must assume that these will be primarily nuclear/missile

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operations, directed at the complete destruction of the enemy. It is beyond any doubt that both sides, even during peacetime, will attempt to discover and to study all of each others most important targets and particularly those such as missile sites, nuclear weapons storage sites, and military-industrial and political centers. The opponents will estimate and prepare the quantity of nuclear weapons needed for the annihilation of these targets and will take every measure required to accomplish the tasks of the war with the first massive salvoes of nuclear/missiles, using fixed launch sites (statsionarnaya pozitsiya) already prepared in peacetime, and missile submarines and aviation.

In the course of such shattering blows or after their delivery, if the goals of the war have not been attained, the ground troops, who will develop offensive operations aimed at the consolidation of the results achieved and at completing the destruction of the enemy, will go into action.

Under these conditions, as a rule, the transition from one operation to another will take place without any operational lull since the preparation for a new operation will have to be accomplished while the offensive is developing. Even in cases when such a lull does occur, it will be far shorter in duration than those of the last war and will differ significantly from these in accordance with the character of the combat operations. It is surely quite evident that, with the powerful long-range means of destruction at their disposal, the belligerents will scarcely limit themselves to operations which are purely of a reconnaissance nature or to fighting to improve their positions during the preparatory period of an operation. Therefore, given that the means of nuclear attack are available, both sides will conduct aggressive combat operations even during an operational lull. They will strive to make use of every favorable moment to deliver nuclear/missile strikes, primarily against the enemy's means of nuclear attack, against his approaching reserves and against concentrating groupings of his troops, in order to disrupt the preparation of an offensive long before its beginning or to seriously weaken the enemy and thus to create favorable conditions for the successful execution of a new operation. The strength of such strikes will depend upon the availability of nuclear weapons

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and on the ability of the ground troops to perform the tasks assigned by exploit ng the results of nuclear strikes.

Modern means of combat not only permit the allocation and performance of such tasks but also require similar activity in the course of the operation as well as during the operational lull. Furthermore, given a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons, a transition to the offensive is possible even though the troops are not completely ready and although the correlation of the remaining force and weapons is unfavorable. This lack of readiness can be offset by the delivery of preemptive (uprezhdayushchyy) nuclear strikes against the enemy which will make it possible to inflict serious losses on him and to change the correlation of forces to our advantage quickly.

Incidentally, too, we still approach the appraisal of the correlation of forces in the old manner: we consider divisions, aircraft, tanks, and guns first of all and often forget that the principal advantage / a few words missing /----------in the methods of using it, in the skilful employment of these means, even though all this is more difficult to bring out and to evaluate.

Thus, the constitution of the operational lull, if one takes place, will now change completely. It will be characterized by aggressive operations by the troops with decisive goals, owing to the fact that there will apparently be no sharp distinction between the end of one offensive operation and the beginning of another. In order to avoid needless losses during the operational lull, both sides will strive to shorten it as much as possible. As a result, the preparation of a new offensive operation will now take place under different and considerably more complex conditions than was the case during previous wars. Past methodology, in this matter, is dead. However, we must take into account that such operational methods will require high combat readiness on the part of the troops both in the exploitation of the results of their nuclear strikes and in repelling possible enemy strikes.

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The Contents of a Commander's Operational Decision

In the making of decisions on an operation, the tendency which manifests itself most noticeably is that of adapting former methods of operations to new weapons, or alternatively, new weapons to old methods. If we take the operational decisions of the World War II period or of the immediate postwar years before the adoption of nuclear weapons and compare them with modern operational decisions involving the mass employment of nuclear weapons, it is difficult in a number of cases to discover any kind of difference in principle in their content. In both cases, the activities of the combined-arms and tank formations or large units form the basis of the commander's plan for the attainment of the assigned aims of the operations. Dependent upon this, the method of using (or the tasks of) aircraft, artillery, and other means of armed combat for the support and protection of infantry and tank combat operations is determined. Today, such tasks are also given to the means of nuclear assault.

This was correct at the time when there were no nuclear weapons or when their consumption in an operation did not exceed twenty or thirty units, because the main role in the rout of the enemy and in the operation as a whole was played by the tanks and the infantry while nuclear weapons, as well as aircraft, artillery and other means of combat, played a protective role and supported the operations of the infantry and tanks. Now, with the mass employment of nuclear weapons, when they have become the basic and decisive means of destruction, when with nuclear missiles of varying designation one can perform independently any tasks in the destruction of enemy groupings, it is wrong to put these weapons on a par with conventional weapons as used to be done and to decide on the way in which they should be used in accordance with the methods of infantry and tank operations, i. e., it would be wrong to assign them to a protective role, as was done previously.

The activities of those forces and weapons which play the main role in the attainment of the goals of an operation must

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form the conceptual basis of any decision. Under modern conditions operations by missile troops and nuclear/missile strikes on the enemy will form the basis of the troop combat activities designed to fulfil the tasks of an operation and to attain its goals. If the missile troops and nuclear weapons are allotted the main role in an operation, the methods and sequence of use of these missiles must form the basis of the plan, which aims at inflicting decisive destruction on the basic groupings of the enemy. In accordance with and bearing in mind the possible results of nuclear strikes, it is necessary to determine the sequence and methods of operations by the infantry, tanks, and other means of armed combat in order to exploit these results to the fullest for the final destruction of the enemy.

Questions concerning the planning of an operation, which must be based on the use of nuclear weapons, should be resolved in the same fashion. This position provokes objection from no one. However, in practice, during our exercises, the reverse is often done: operations by the infantry and the tanks are made the basis of the plans in these cases, while nuclear weapons are seen as means for their reinforcement and support.

Thus,past experience prevails even in this question.

The selection of the direction of the main strike. As we know, the principal goal of any operation has been and remains the destruction of the enemy. It is for this that operations are organized and conducted. In offensive operations by a front, this goal is attained by the combined efforts of all the forces and weapons called upon to carry it out by the delivery of a series of simultaneous or consecutive strikes on the enemy, most frequently in several directions. One of these strikes is the main one.

In Soviet military art the greatest importance is attached to the selection of the main strike because it is on this that the success of the operation largely depends. The determination of

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the direction of the main strike depends on the goals and tasks of the operation, on the nature of the defense, on the groupings and expected methods of enemy operations, the availability and condition of our troops, the nature of the terrain, and on other conditions. The basic requirements in directing the main strike are, firstly, that the most effective use of the combat capabilities of all forces and weapons called upon for the operation is made in this direction; secondly, that the main strike is aimed at the destruction of the basic enemy grouping and that it is delivered at the most vulnerable and weakest point of his defense where maximum results can be attained with the least losses in short periods; and thirdly, that a concentration of the basic forces and means of the advancing troops is ensured in the direction of the main strike and that their significant superiority over the enemy is established.

To what extent do these requirements correspond to modern conditions for the conduct of operations and to the combat capabilities of nuclear weapons? In order to answer this question, one must take into consideration the fact that the direction of the main strike is always selected in the interests of the most effective use of the basic means of armed combat. Previously, these means, which decided the success of an operation, were infantry, artillery, and tanks. The direction of the main strike was selected in their interests and they formed the basis of the principle of military art -- deliver the main strike on the enemy's weakest and most vulnerable spot. This principle accurately reflected the capabilities of earlier combat weapons.

Why was it necessary to deliver the main strike exactly at the enemy's weakest spot? First of all, because to deliver the main strike directly on the basic grouping of the enemy made it necessary to concentrate a large quantity of forces and weapons in order to establish superiority, involved the advancing troops in heavy casualties, did not ensure high rates of advance and, as a rule, did not lead to the destruction but only to the repulse of the enemy, i. e., the goal of the operation was not achieved. Of no small significance was the fact that the advancing troops did not have the powerful long range means of destruction which

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would have enabled them to inflict decisive destruction on the enemy by strikes carried out throughout his entire tactical and operational defense, to inflict decisive destruction on him, to paralyze the movement of his reserves, and to prohibit an organized withdrawal to occupy new defense lines. The absence of these means could only be compensated for by a rapid breakthrough in the weakest sector of the enemy's defense and by a swift movement (vykhod) to the flanks and rear of his basic forces by powerful strike groupings of the advancing troops, particularly tank, with the simultaneous dropping of airborne troops on the enemy's communications.

Finally, it is necessary to remember that the enemy, who was on the defensive, also lacked long range means with sufficient power to allow him to step up his efforts rapidly in the weakest sectors of his defense, where the advancing troops were breaking through and delivering the main strike. In the majority of cases, this could only be done by maneuvering the reserves or by removing troops from sectors which were not under attack, which took a long time. Profiting by this and possessing superiority in forces and weapons, the advancing troops most often succeeding in breaking through the enemy's defense before he could bring his reserves up into these directions.

Consequently, the delivery of the main strike against the weakest spot of the enemy's defense was dictated by the relatively limited combat capabilities of earlier weapons. It was primarily by breaking through the weakest link in the enemy's defense that the rapid movement of the strike groupings of the advancing troops against the flanks and rear of the basic enemy forces and the task of destroying them as quickly as possible could be achieved.

At the same time, an analysis of many of the operations of past wars, and of World War II in particular, also shows that in a number of cases the main strike was delivered directly against the basic enemy grouping, i. e., against the strongest sector of his defense. This happened particularly in offensive operations conducted in mountains, in deserts, in wooded and marshy areas

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and also during an advance from bases of operations on river lines. But in the process, a multiple superiority over the enemy was always established particularly in weapons for neutralization (sredstvo podavleniya).

Under modern conditions, nuclear weapons alone, without the aid of other means of combat, are able to inflict such losses on the enemy that they can seriously reduce and even completely deprive his basic groupings of combat ability and can thus ensure a correlation of forces advantageous to us. Therefore, in determining the direction of the main strike, it is now necessary to begin by considering the possibilities offered by the most effective use not of the infantry or of the tansk, but primarily of the nuclear weapons. Where, against what targets, and for the solution of which tasks would it be most advantageous to employ these weapons? Obviously, in the spot where the most appreciable losses can be inflicted on the enemy, where his system of troop control will be destroyed for a prolonged period, and against those targets which present the greatest danger to the advancing troops and which could prevent the attainment of the goals of the operation. Such targets are the enemy's means for nuclear assault, the basic strongest groupings of his troops and his control centers. The destruction of these targets will lead to a sharp reduction in the enemy's capabilities for the employment of nuclear weapons and to the disorganization of his defense in the most important directions and thus creating advantageous conditions for a swift advance by the infantry and the tanks. The bulk of the means for nuclear attack and the basic efforts of the attacking troops must be directed towards the fulfillment of such tasks.

The use of nuclear weapons against the most important targets of the enemy's defense permits the infliction upon him of such destruction that he will not be in a condition to offer any kind of serious resistance here. The surviving remnants of the enemy's forces and weapons will be paralyzed over a vast area and because of the areas devastated by nuclear strikes, the existing gaps in his defense will increase even more. This will become the weakest spot in the enemy's defense, which the ground troops must boldly

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exploit in order to destroy the enemy completely and to develop the offensive in depth rapidly, without the execution of a complicated maneuver.

The availability at the front of nuclear missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometers now permits the simultaneous delivery of strikes throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation and against his communications and his troop supply bases, thus destroying the stability of his defense and prohibiting troop maneuver, and the provision of supplies. Such strikes will oblige the enemy to use his reserves not to deliver counterstrikes against the advancing troops but to close the breaches formed in his defense and to make up the losses of the first echelon of the defense troops. As a result of the operations indicated above, the necessity for the execution of deep enveloping maneuvers by large groupings of the advancing troops, aimed at gaining the rear of the basic enemy forces and at their subsequent encirclement and destruction, has largely passed. Now this task can be more successfully performed by the rapid advance of strike groupings in the shortest direction after nuclear strikes, with the simultaneous landing of airborne troops in the enemy's rear.

To use nuclear weapons for the penetration of the enemy's weakest defense sectors and for the delivery of strikes against unimportant targets, contradicts the very nature of these weapons and leads to their unproductive expenditure. One must take into account that the defending enemy will also have nuclear weapons and that, if the advancing troops do not inflict decisive destruction on him at the proper time, making use of the whole power of their nuclear weapons, the enemy can forestall them and can wreck the advance with strikes by his own nuclear weapons.

One must also take into account that the concept of "a weak spot in the enemy's defense", in itself, acquires a completely different meaning under modern conditions. The availability to the enemy of nuclear/missiles permits him to carry out a maneuver with nuclear strikes, concentrating them in any sector of the defense.

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Furthermore, the enemy will deliberately leave sectors in his defense uncovered by troops while keeping them covered by nuclear weapons in order to lure the advancing troops into this trap, and then to destroy them with nuclear/missile strikes. Even where the advancing troops are successful in breaking through the weak defense of the enemy, he will be in a position to block the progress of the advance in depth by using the nuclear weapons of his basic grouping. Consequently, sectors weakly protected by enemy troops are no longer necessarily his most vulnerable spots. Under modern conditions, the most vulnerable spots can even be those sectors with the strongest defense, if the enemy is unable to conceal them and to cover them with a sufficient quantity of nuclear weapons. When superiority of nuclear means over the enemy is present, his defense in any direction can be disorganized and weakened / several words missing / ---------- for the attainment of the aims of an offensive operation. Properly assigned reconnaissance is necessary in order to prevent nuclear weapons being used against an empty area.

In selecting the direction for the main strike, the nature of the terrain plays a role which is far from unimportant. In the past, terrain was usually selected which best provided for the use and maneuver of large masses of infantry, tanks, and artillery, and for the maintenance of close coordination. It should be said that the suitability of the terrain from the point of view of using all forces and weapons and of the advantageous delineation of the front line often determined the selection of the direction for the main strike, despite the fact that, as a rule, it was here that the enemy set up his strongest defenses.

Under modern conditions, the terrain will also be of great significance in the selection of the main strike direction. However, it is not now necessary to establish powerful groupings of troops in the most accessible section of the terrain for the penetration of a strong defense. The performance of this task is facilitated by the availability of nuclear weapons. The delivery, here, of the main strike through the mass use of nuclear weapons makes it possible to deliver decisive destruction to the defending enemy grouping, to destroy the stability of his defense, to paralyze his reserves, and to develop a swift troop advance in great depth.

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In speaking of the main strike, one cannot pass in silence over the fact that the demand still persists among us, although with various reservations, for the concentration of the basic forces and weapons in the main strike direction. Under modern conditions this demand is not only unfounded but also conceals within itself the danger of unnecessary losses caused by the enemy's nuclear weapons. Now, it is of primary importance to attain superiority over the enemy in nuclear weapons dispersing them throughout the entire zone of a front's advance. The great ranges of operational-tactical missiles permit nuclear weapons to maneuver their strikes freely and, when necessary, to concentrate these strikes in any direction and in any area , thus exerting a decisive influence in changing the situation to our advantage.

There is, therefore, no need to concentrate large forces of infantry, tanks, and other weapons in the main direction. They, too, should be dispersed throughout the entire zone of the front. However, they should be aimed in advance against those directions where nuclear strikes will be delivered and where they will be operating. The high mobility of tanks and motorized infantry will also permit them to carry out a swift maneuver in any direction if they are supplied with suitable itineraries (marshrut dvizheniya).

Thus, under modern conditions, the concentration of the efforts of the troops is determined, not by the creation of powerful groupings and great densities of the forces and weapons of the ground troops, but, primarily, by the quantity and power of the nuclear weapons which can be used in one direction or another and for the performance of the most important tasks.

Finally, in speaking of the selection of the main strike direction, it should be noted that under modern conditions this term is beginning to acquire a highly conditional connotation. It must be realized that in view of the threats of nuclear strikes, the defending enemy will not allow large concentrations of troops in any one definite direction. By maneuvering the strikes of his nuclear weapons, dispersed throughout the entire defense zone, he can quickly intensify the efforts of troops in any direction where the

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situation demands it. For these reasons, powerful strike groupings will not be built up in the advancing troops as previously and, indeed, perhaps the necessity for them will disappear since the advance will probably be conducted by small troop groupings in separate and most advantageous directions. In addition, it must be considered that fronts will not now obtain the quantity of troops which they had in the past war. The tasks of operations and of the war will be resolved primarily by nuclear weapons, while the infantry and tanks will be used for the destruction of the remnants of the enemy and for the consolidation of occupied territory.

In connection with all that has been said, the conclusion suggests itself that, under modern conditions, it is more correct to speak not of the selection of the main strike direction but of the determination of the main tasks of an operation toward whose fulfillment the basic efforts of the means of nuclear assault and of the troops should be directed.

Thus, the requirements established by us for the selection of the main strike direction need serious correction. If there is a sufficient quantity of nuclear weapons, these must be used immediately for the destruction of the basic enemy grouping and the main strike by the ground troops must be delivered in this direction; if these means are not available it will be necessary to resort to cunning and deception, to seek out the enemy's weak spots, to maneuver, and to achieve victory by a more difficult and dangerous path. It must be borne in mind that the sensitivity of the troops to strikes along their flanks and rear is not weakened in the least by the fact that they have been armed with nuclear weapons. Therefore, the delivery of a strike against the enemy's weakest spot retains its full significance in all cases when, for some reason, it is not possible to employ nuclear weapons, when they are insufficient or when they are completely lacking. This is especially applicable to the operations of the troops in the depth of the enemy's defense.

The quantity of strikes in a front. As a rule, during operations in World War II, a front, in addition to the main strike, also delivered

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one and, less frequently, two auxiliary strikes. An army practically always delivered one strike. This system for the delivery of strikes by a front and an army is employed, without any changes, in the organization of modern operations. Attempts to deliver a large number of strikes and to disperse the striking groupings somewhat are often seen by us as a dissipation of the efforts of the troops.

It seems to us that, in this question, too, a mechanical transfer of past experience to modern conditions is taking place. When there were no nuclear weapons or missiles, the front was indeed unable to deliver more than two or three strikes since it did not have either the forces or the weapons to do this. Much time was required to maneuver forces and weapons from one direction to another and fire maneuver was limited.

Modern nuclear/missile weapons permit the execution of a maneuver with nuclear strikes along the entire zone of a front and can ensure the destruction of the enemy by advancing troops at any point of his defense. It is therefore entirely possible that, during operations by motorized rifle and tank divisions in separate directions, a front may deliver three, four, and five strikes, coordinated by general concept and directed at the attainment of the goals assigned to the operation. A sufficient quantity of forces and weapons must be assigned to each direction to ensure the fulfillment of the task which has been allotted and to make dense operational and combat formation unnecessary. / Sentence missing /---------- Between adjacent strike groupings and also between separate large units there can be considerable gaps.

Under modern conditions, it is not important how many groupings have been established for an offensive in a front, although this, too, has considerable significance but, primarily, how their advance is organized, where it is directed to, which main tasks are carried out with the aid of nuclear weapons, and how the infantry and tanks are to exploit the results of nuclear strikes in order to advance at maximum speeds. The dispersion of forces

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and weapons throughout the entire zone of the front does not by any means indicate that the efforts of the troops are being dissipated. One must look at the essence of the situation and not at the outward form. And the essence is that, irrespective of the disposition of forces and weapons, the basic efforts of the troops of the front should be directed towards the solution of the main task--the destruction of the enemy's basic grouping. Here it is appropriate to recall the well-known saying "go separately but fight together." Nuclear/missile weapons allow this maxim to be fully realized.

The operational formation of the troops of a front in an offensive operation. In the resolution of this question, too, the changes essential in any comparison with the last period of World War II have not taken place. Powerful, strike groupings of troops, of low mobility, continue to be set up for an offensive. In the process, two echelons are created in a front as a rule and, in addition, a general reserve of several divisions is set up. If one takes into account that armies, divisions, and even regiments can also advance in a two-echelon formation, it turns out that nearly 75 percent of all the forces and weapons of the front will be located in the second echelons and the reserves.

Such a situation was normal and even necessary during the period of World War II since, at that time, commanders and commanding officers had no means for performing subsequent tasks or for the development of the offensive in depth, other than the second echelons and reserves. Furthermore, there were no effective long-range means of destruction which could have threatened the second echelons which, until their committment to combat or engagement, hardly ever suffered any serious losses.

Things are different in modern operations. The availability of missile weapons makes it possible to provide effective support to the troops with nuclear strikes throughout the entire depth of an operation and to support the development of the offensive in any

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direction. The commanders of the armies and troops of the front can now influence the course of the operation not so much through the second echelons, which will be located at a great distance from the first echelons, as through strikes by nuclear weapons and by strong, highly-mobile and maneuvering reserves.

Front and army reserves must be echeloned in depth, must move in a dispersed fashion and must be used to develop the success of the operation, to relieve divisions which have suffered great losses and have lost their combat efficiency, to repel enemy counterstrike, , and to carry out other unforseen tasks which may appear in the course of the operation. Here one should remember that,in connection with possible sharp changes in the situation, the replacement of some divisions by others during the course of an operation will take place repeatedly and fairly frequently.

For this reason, and also because of the complexity of control in modern operations, separate large units and units located in the reserve can be directed beforehand to fulfil definite tasks as is now done for second echelons.

Under modern conditions the operational formation of a front or an army should be no less flexible than the combat formation of a regiment or a division, in accordance, of course, with their sizes. This suggests the conclusion that the many-echeloned operational troop formation which we use in offensive operations does not correspond to the changed conditions in the conduct of combat operations and requires serious review. One may agree that, with modern means of destruction, the two-echeloned formation in a regiment and in a division can be to some extent justified. As regards an army and, even more so, a front, however, the creation of second echelons in the old concept is not necessary. Their tasks can be performed most effectively by the more mobile reserves, which are maneuverable, and echeloned in depth.

Coordination (Vzaimodeystviye). The basic principle of coordination -- the synchronization of the efforts of troops in the

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carrying out of tasks concerned with the aim, place and time of an operation-- retains all its significance under modern conditions, but one should include in it another constituent produced by the new means of armed combat and by the changed nature of combat operations.

In each stage of an operation and during the fulfillment of any task, Soviet military art requires that coordination be organized in the interests of those large units and formations which play the main role in the performance of the tasks allotted and in the attainment of the goals of the operation. Previously, in offensive operations by ground troops, coordination was organized most frequently in the interests of the infantry and tanks because they represented the principal means of performing the allotted tasks. Today, this question must be resolved in a different manner, since the principle means of combat are nuclear/missile weapons, and it seems that it will be necessary to arrange coordination in support of the operations of missile large units and units.

It appears to us that support for the fulfillment of the two main tasks should form the basis of coordination in modern operations. The first task is the destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear assault; the troops will be faced with this from the beginning to the end of an offensive operation and also, during the operational lull (if there is one) while the troops are preparing for a new operation. The second task is the timely exploitation by the advancing troops of the results achieved by nuclear strikes, with the aim of completely destroying the enemy. Both these tasks are of paramount significance. The success of an operation depends upon their fulfillment.

In considering the first task, it should be noted that the enemy's means of nuclear assault, located not only in the zone of (a front's) advance but also in the zones of adjacent fronts and beyond their limits, represent a great danger to the front. The destruction of these means must therefore be carried out not only by forces of one front but also by those of adjacent fronts and armies; those enemy means which are out of range must be

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destroyed by the strategic missile troops / a few lines missing / ---- ------ With the help of nuclear weapons large losses can be inflicted on opposing enemy groupings and their combat efficiency can be seriously reduced, but it will not always be possible to destroy them completely or to force them to capitulate. First among those who are in a position to perform this task are the ground troops - the infantry and the tanks. It is they who must exploit the results of nuclear strikes and complete the final destruction of the enemy. Therefore, during the arrangement of coordination in the delivery of nuclear strikes, there must be agreement on the place and time of the subsequent operations of the infantry and tanks with a view to the maximum utilization of their combat capabilities. Nuclear weapons must clear the way for the infantry and tanks, while the latter, taking advantage of the results of nuclear strikes, must push forward with determination, break the organized resistance of the remaining enemy forces, and consolidate the territory which has been occupied.

The remaining questions of coordination in an offensive operation must be resolved with regard to and in accordance with the accomplishment of the two basic tasks mentioned above.

In organizing coordination in modern operations, it is also very important to ensure the maximum viability of our own means of nuclear assault, their timely preparation for an operation and an agreed place and time for the delivery of nuclear strikes.

Methods of conducting offensive operations. The experience of many exercises shows that even in the first operations of the initial period of a war, we often envisage the timely concentration of troops in the attack positions, their deployment in combat formation, the carrying out of artillery and air preparation and a subsequent transition to the offensive. Generally, such an opportunity is not to be excluded in a period of threat (ugrozhayemyy period), if there is one, but this will not be typical for troop activities in operations during the initial period of a war, which are conducted with the mass use of nuclear weapons.

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As we have already said, the first and decisive act of a future war will be the mutual delivery of mass nuclear strikes by both sides, with the aim of destroying the means of nuclear assault of the enemy, the disorganization of his deep rear, the destruction of his most important military-economic and administrative-political centers, the creation of complete chaos in the country, the undermining of popular morale and the destruction of the basic groupings of armed forces.. Therefore, the first offensive operations will most probably be initiated by those troops who have escaped the enemy's nuclear strikes, in those directions which have already been determined for them in peacetime.

The transition to the offensive of these troops will not be preceded by artillery or air preparation. These methods of using artillery and aircraft in combat, which were highly recommended during World War II, have already lost their former significance and do not correspond to the modern capabilities of the Armed Forces. It is not these means but nuclear weapons which will now determine the content of the fire preparation for an offensive.

The first offensive operations in a future war will develop simultaneously with or after strikes by the missile troops which will prepare the shortest and most advantageous ways (napravleniye) for the advancing troops to attain the goals assigned to the operation. Only during the course of the offensive in the depth of the enemy's defense can the means of close combat - aircraft, artillery, and small arms - find combat application. The nuclear offensive has replaced the former artillery and air offensive and it will determine the success of the operations.

The main tasks of the advancing troops in the first operations will be, while exploiting the results of nuclear/missile strikes to the full, to complete the destruction of the remaining enemy groupings, to capture the areas where his basic means of armed combat are based, and to paralyze any effort by the enemy to put himself in order or to offer organized resistance. Time and, consequently, the speed of the advance will play a decisive role

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in the fulfillment of this task. He who first seizes the initiative and who acts more quickly and more decisively will be in the better position. For this, according to our estimates, troops should move forward at an average speed of not less than 100 kilometers in every 24 hours. Such speeds can only be guaranteed by troops who are highly trained, mobile, and well provided with a variety of equipment, who are capable of restoring roads and bridges in a limited time and of crossing water obstacles quickly, of operating in zones contaminated by radioactivity, in areas where there are fires and obstructions, and under other difficult conditions. The surprise factor and the destructive power of nuclear/missile strikes make it impossible for the enemy to set up organized defense over any significant area of the front near the border or in the depth of his country. Large gaps and unoccupied sectors of terrain are inevitable in his troop grouping and in his defense system. Even if the enemy were successful in creating such a defense in several directions, it would be completely disrupted by mass nuclear/missile strikes. Under these conditions there is no need to conduct a methodical advance in combat order. Most probably the basic method of troop operations will be an advance by highly maneuverable columns of tanks and of infantry on armored carriers. These columns must move ahead swiftly, going around or overcoming obstacles, barriers, contaminated sectors of the terrain and other obstructions. With tank fire they must quickly destroy the enemy groupings which attempt to offer resistance, and, in cases where this cannot be done, they must search out places which are not occupied by the enemy, break through them and continue to move forward without pause, allocating part of their strength to deliver strikes against the flanks and rear of the defending enemy grouping or leaving large covering detachments (deployed) against it. Sometimes the accomplishment of this task will be left to the echelons and reserves which are following. In order to avoid the loss of high speeds of advance, one should not get involved in prolonged battles, even if the enemy is successful at some point in recapturing the basic directions in the zone of a front or of an army and in organizing their defense. In such a situation, it is better to go round the enemy and to transfer the efforts of the troops immediately to other directions or to withdraw one's own troops to a safe

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distance and to deliver repeated nuclear strikes on the consolidated enemy grouping, exploiting their results to continue the advance.

Aggressive and decisive operations by airborne troops, who are dropped in the enemy's rear and across the route along which he is moving and, especially, while troops are negotiating zones which are contaminated by radioactivity or wide water barriers, are acquiring great scope and increasing significance in offensive operations. / Several words missing /----------high speeds of movement of the advancing troops and their performance of tasks aimed at the final destruction of the enemy.

In the course of offensive operations, the most varied types of combat operations are possible: in some directions troops will move forward swiftly, meeting no serious enemy resistance, or will perform a turning maneuver; in others large head-on collisions may develop or the troops may be compelled to conduct defensive operations, to contain an offensive by superior enemy forces and to repulse strikes by his airborne troops; in still other directions, the troops may overcome the enemy's defense or may withdraw in order to make possible the delivery of repeated nuclear/missile strikes on the enemy. Very frequently, troops will have to negotiate contaminated sectors of terrain with high levels of radiation, obstructions, and other obstacles which are created by nuclear strikes. As a result of such operations, the front line, as it used to be understood, will disappear. Front and army engagements will develop across vast areas along the front and in depth and will become separate centers, areas and zones of combat operations of the most varied scope and nature. The driving of deep mutual wedges (vzaimnoye vklineniye) by the troops will become a general phenomenon. Our troops may find themselves deep in the enemy's rear and his troops will conduct aggressive combat operations in the rear of ours.

Although the troops will have to conduct such a variety of combat operations in the course of an offensive, the basis of all

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these operations must be wide maneuver, founded on the use of a mobile/combat (pokhodnoboyevoy) order, i. e., coupling a swift forward movement in small columns with operations in combat formations when this is demanded by the situation. When nuclear weapons are being used, such a method of operations can provide the best assurance of a high rate of advance and of the performance of tactical and operational tasks in significantly shorter periods of time than was possible with earlier means of armed combat. As a result of this, the duration of offensive operations can be greatly shortened despite their increased depth.

This, in general terms, is how we see the methods of conducting an offensive in the operations during the initial period of a war.

We have very briefly surveyed separate questions of offensive operations in order to show the disparity which exists in a number of cases between the methods of troop operations in modern operations and the combat capabilities of the new means of armed combat. . Such disparity can be found in a number of other questions of military art.

Of course, our reasoning cannot pretend to represent any degree of exhaustive argument. The questions which we have touched upon, like many other questions of modern military art, require profound and complete study and research, and practical testing on "battle" training grounds. A fraction of this study is represented by the attempt of this article to provide a critical analysis of the nature of the operation of one of the most important laws of development in military art - the law of the interconnection and interdependence of means and weapons of armed combat - and to show the fulfillment of the requirements of this law in our resolution of the questions of the preparation and conduct of modern operations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

13 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel-General F. Malykhin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms
RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel-General F. Malykhin

DATE OF INFO: 1960

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Period of a War", written by Colonel-General F. Malykhin.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.

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Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Period of a War

by Colonel-General F. Malykhin

Fundamental changes in the nature of a future war require a basically new approach to the resolution of a series of highly important problems in the materiel-technical support of armed combat.

We have in mind, first of all, the problems of rear area support of all types of Armed Forces when missile troops have the leading role in the theaters of military operations and simultaneously, the fulfilment of missions for the protection of the zone of the interior and the groupings of the Armed Forces in the depth, from enemy strikes with weapons of mass destruction. In brief, we are discussing the necessity of developing special theoretical postulates concerning the utilization of those tremendous forces and means which will be made available by the State for the comprehensive rear area support of the Armed Forces at the beginning of a war.

In none of the previous wars was this problem so keen and urgent. Even during the period of the Second World War the attention of military leaders with respect to the rear area support of the Armed Forces was directed mainly at the delivery of allotted materiel-technical supplies to the fronts and to their proper utilization in the theaters of military operations. Moreover, the delivery of a significant part of the supplies to the consumers, i.e., to the distribution stations of the front, was carried out by elements of the national economy. Those supplies which were delivered to the central supply elements, could be delivered to the fronts in a planned manner by using the regularly operating transportation network of the country. The disruption of delivery plans by the enemy took place primarily in the rear areas of the front and in zones directly adjacent to them.

Completely different conditions for rear area support of the Armed Forces will prevail in modern warfare.

In delineating the conditions of work in the rear area of the Armed Forces, it is necessary to bear the following factors in mind above all:

- the necessity of simultaneous support of operations of fronts

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in different theaters of military operations and of those groupings of the Armed Forces which are carrying out combat missions in the deep rear;

- the provision of reliable transportation networks for the rear area and for the front, and between theaters of military operations, for supplying fronts with everything necessary and for carrying out strategic and large operational regroupings;

- the difficulties of ensuring protection of the rear area of the Armed Forces from the means of mass destruction over the entire territory of the country.

In modern conditions the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, as never before, depends upon the timely preparation and stability of rear area support. For this reason the theoretical development and serious scientific investigation of problems of the rear area support of the Armed Forces at its present stage must be viewed as the most important tasks.

The modern rear services of the Armed Forces represent a huge organism which must be arranged in such a way as to support continuously, with minimum losses, the combat activity of fronts, the Antiaircraft Defense Troops of the Country; and reserves of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in precise conformity with their missions and the situation.

By the rear services of the Armed Forces, in our opinion, one should understand both the forces and equipment included organizationally in the complement of the Armed Forces and those attached by the State to the jurisdiction of a military command for overall materiel, technical, and medical support and for the servicing of missile and ground troops, troops of antiaircraft defense of the country, and the air forces and the navy.

Depending upon the nature of the missions being fulfilled, conditions of work [1 or 2 words missing] and the organizational order, the forces and means of the rear area of the Armed Forces [are divided into the following] elements: troop, operational, and central.

[The troop element] is composed of rear services units and subunits, [2 or 3 words missing] materiel-technical supplies and property [2 or 3 words missing] of supporting the combat activity of large units [and units].

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The operational element of the rear is composed organizationally of special organs of control of rear services large units, units, and installations of fronts, armies, fleets (flotillas), and PVO districts. It is designated for organization and implementation of measures for materiel, technical, and medical support of troops, preparation, restoration, and utilization of transportation routes, and other work in support of the combat activity of troops.

The central element of the rear services includes a large number of various large units, units, and installations, bases, depots, arsenals, repair plants, and other production enterprises of the Ministry of Defense designated for the rear services support of all the Armed Forces of the country (their various types), and at the same time constituting the reserve of the Supreme High Command and Commanders-in-chief of the types of Armed Forces.

The central organs of the rear services of the Armed Forces utilize the transportation network of the national economy in accordance with the full needs of the Armed Forces, and also the forces and means of State reserves and the mobilization potential of industry prepared during peacetime and assigned to their jurisdiction by special government decrees.

/2 or 3 words missing/ in the preparation of the rear services of the Armed Forces for warfare is extremely large. In this article we shall endeavour to set forth our point of view only on the most important problems, having, in our opinion, primary significance for fulfilling practical missions of preparation of the rear services for the support of the Armed Forces in the initial period of a war.

In these problems we refer first of all to the changing role of stocks of materiel, determination of their size and principles of their echelonment, the preparation of communication routes, and means of transport, and problems of developing new forms of control of the rear services of the Armed Forces.

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With the growth in size of armies, adoption of new, more sophisticated means of armed combat, increase in offensive tempos, and the intensity of defensive engagements, the materiel requirements of the troops increase correspondingly. During the First World War the Russian Army expended about one million tons of ammunition and a total of several tens of thousands of tons of fuel. During the period of the Second

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World War the total expenditure of ammunition by the Soviet Armed Forces comprised about 8 million tons, and fuel - more than 13 million tons.

The materiel expenditures of the Armed Forces in a future war apparently will increase even more. The high level of technical outfitting of the Armed Forces has caused a significant increase in the estimated units of supply expressed in weight. Thus, the weight of a unit of fire of a modern front (without aviation) currently amounts to 18.5 thousand tons, and fuel servicing exceeds 22 thousand tons. Calculations indicate that for 8 to 10 calendar days of an offensive operation, developing speeds of 80 to 100 km in a calendar day, and for the period of its preparation, the troops of a front may expend upwards of 240 thousand tons of fuel and about 120 thousand tons of various ammunition. To this should be added the probability of increased combat losses from weapons of mass destruction. It follows that the quantitative growth of materiel expenditures conforms to an objective law.

Along with the quantitative changes in modern conditions, as a result of equipping the Armed Forces with new types of arms, great qualitative changes in materiel requirements have taken place. A future war will be a nuclear/missile war, in which the decisive type of Armed Forces will be missile troops of strategic designation, and the basis of the firepower of each of the types of Armed Forces will be their missile weapons. In connection with this, the supply of troops with missiles, missile fuel, and other special materiel for missile troops acquires primary significance. The need, however, for conventional types of ammunition, especially for tube artillery and aircraft bombs, is decreasing significantly at the present time. Speaking of the decrease of the needs of the troops for these types of ammunition, we are basing it on the fact that fire preparation and the support of operations during broad use of nuclear/missile weapons will undergo great changes. An offensive will be carried out at great speeds with broad utilization of nuclear weapons. Nuclear/missile weapons will also form the basis of defensive fire.

No less serious qualitative changes have also taken place in the fuel requirements of the Armed Forces. The proportion of aviation fuel in the total expenditure of fuel has significantly decreased, with a simultaneous colossal growth in the fuel requirement of ground equipment. The supply of troops with missile fuel has acquired the greatest significance.

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Serious qualitative changes in the requirements of the Armed Forces also arise from their increased technical outfitting.

In a future war, much very complex equipment will be used. For this reason one of the main missions of the rear services is the uninterrupted supply of the Armed Forces with technical equipment for the use, repair, and servicing of nuclear, missile, and radioelectronic equipment, tanks, motor vehicles, and other materiel.

While, during the Second World War, this equipment comprised altogether only 8 to 10 percent of the weight of expended ammunition, fuel, and rations, its present proportion has grown to 20 to 25 percent.

The preceding statements permit the conclusion that under modern conditions the basic types of materiel supplies for support of the Armed Forces may be considered to be: missiles and assorted nuclear ammunition, missile fuel, artillery ammunition, fuel for ground equipment and aircraft, technical equipment, and rations.

The uninterrupted support of troops with these types of materiel supplies as the first priority in modern conditions is one of the chief factors in their high combat readiness, and depends upon the status of the supplies and accumulated stocks in case of a war.

In our time the significance of materiel supplies has grown immeasurably.

The role and size of stocks depends first of all on the volume of materiel expenditures, the urgency with which needs may arise, and the capacity of the transportation system to guarantee uninterrupted delivery of freight from the place of production to the consumers. Under modern conditions, with increased requirements for materiel supplies and the great vulnerability of the routes of communication and transportation, guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of goods will be extremely difficult, and in certain instances altogether impossible. Namely for this reason, stocks of materiel supplies created in advance in all elements of the Armed Forces will, as never before, be essential for guaranteeing the constant combat readiness of troops. This is especially important for guaranteeing the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and conduct of operations during the initial period of a war, when industry will only be converting to military production, the transportation network will be occupied mainly with movements for the concentration of troops, and in a number of areas may be disrupted by the first massive nuclear/missile strikes of the enemy.

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Arguments are now in process concerning the size and order of echelonment of stocks created in peacetime. Certain comrades advise maximum reduction of stocks with the aim of supposedly easing the burden of troops further. We are against such an approach to the resolution of this important problem.

The correct determination of the essential scale of materiel stocks accumulated in advance has been a subject of special concern to governments, general staffs, and the rear services elements of their armed forces throughout the course of the entire history of warfare.

In our opinion, during the development of plans for the rear services support of the Armed Forces in the initial period of a modern war, careful consideration should be given such factors as:

- the strategic goals facing the armed forces along strategic axes (theaters of military operations);

- the total volume of materiel requirements [1 or 2 words missing] of the Armed Forces;

- the probable period of conversion of current production to military needs;

- the degree of preparation of the transportation system of the country for uninterrupted work in carrying out planned movements of troops and bringing up of materiel supplies under conditions of the initial nuclear/missile strikes;

- the economic potentialities of the country (of the combined countries), and the state of combat equipment development (the possibility of rapid obsolescence of accumulated ammunition, technical, and other supplies).

On the basis of the experience of the last war, and after consideration of the postwar changes of the factors indicated above, we assume that, in preparation for war, it is essential to create stocks of materiel in advance directly within the troops, with the armies and fronts planned for deployment, and under the jurisdiction of the central organ of the rear services of the Armed Forces. We consider the following to be the optimum sizes of these stocks applicable to the western axis:

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- general stocks of deployed fronts (mobile - troop, army, and front) calculated on the monthly requirement of the troops;

- supplies of the central organ of the rear services, calculated on the three-month requirements of all the Armed Forces of the country, taking mobilization buildup into account.

When determining the size of the stocks, which are eligible for prior creation and regular maintenance within the troops, in army and district depots (depots of groups of troops), we proceed from the fact that in the first 20 to 25 calendar days after the initiation of war, the main types of transport will be converted primarily to operational movements of troops for supporting strategic concentration and deployment of future fronts.[1] On overland communication routes a large number of barriers and centers of persistent contamination will be formed. A portion of the peacetime stocks will be subject to contamination or will be annihilated by the initial nuclear strikes of the enemy. For this reason the delivery of materiel supplies during the course of the first and even partly during the second offensive operation of the front will be extremely difficult. In volume it apparently will not exceed 25 to 30 percent of the monthly requirements of the troops, which might cover only the combat losses and form some reserve for supporting the combat effectiveness of troops until the moment of establishment of a system of uninterrupted supply of the operating army for the delivery of everything necessary from the depots and bases of the center.

In the determination of the size of stocks, which it is feasible to accumulate in advance and maintain at central bases, taking into account all the above-listed factors, we took as a base the time necessary for the buildup of the mobilization potential and for the conversion of industry to war production.

As is known, three months were required during the last world war for the conversion of industry to the military needs of our country, during the course of which bases for production of combat equipment and various military materiel were created in interior areas. Already

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1. The period of the most intensive operational movements on railroads of the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War lasted for about a month. During this time the volume of supply movements was very low. During the first 10 days of mobilization it made up altogether only 10 percent of the total volume of military railway movements.

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in October-November 1941, our Armed Forces began to receive regularly everything necessary for combat and life from current production. It is this very period that we are taking into account, proposing minimum quantities of supplies at the center for supporting the Armed Forces at the beginning of a future war.

We may hear objections that the last war was started with extremely disadvantageous conditions of enemy superiority; the organization of military production in the summer of 1941 was combined with the evacuation of a large number of enterprises to the East; in addition to this, our supply organs did not have sufficient practical experience in the fulfilment of these complex missions, etc.

All this, undoubtedly, should be considered. However, it is impossible to overlook the new difficulties connected with the enemy capability of carrying out nuclear/missile strikes against important economic centers over the entire territory of the country. For this reason we take into consideration the potential possibility of annihilation, or heavy destruction, of a number of enterprises and bases and, consequently, also, a substantial decrease in mobilization potential and State reserves in the first days of a war.

Under modern conditions, with the great vulnerability of the lines of communication, the correct determination of the echelonment of stocks of materiel supplies will have exceptionally important significance. The accepted order of echelonment and location of stocks has direct influence on the creation of conditions of autonomy and independence of troop operations and on the viability of the system of rear area support during widespread utilization of weapons of mass destruction.

We consider that for a deploying front, as regards a western axis, stocks should be echeloned in the following order:

- with the troops (in regimental and divisional depots) - mobile stocks on motor vehicles in amounts required by the troops for three or four calendar days of medium intensity combat;

- in army depots - similarly mobile stocks for two calendar days;

- in front depots (of military districts, groups of troops) for 20-25 calendar days requirements of the grouping being supported.

A modern division is a highly mobile, fully mechanized large unit, capable of engaging in combat under complex conditions, along an

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independent axis, as a landing force, etc. For this reason it is very important to create definite conditions of autonomy for the division, opportunities to conduct combat while cut off from bases of supply, with broken communication lines, and in other instances of complex combat situations. In the interests of easing the burden of the division, during the last years its rear services have been significantly decreased and stocks of materiel supplies have been substantially lowered. Further decrease of stocks in the division, in our opinion, is already impossible. As long as the basic means of transport continues to be land transportation, based on highly vulnerable routes of communication, the lowering of the mobile stocks below the level of three to four calendar day requirements of the division will inevitably harm the combat effectiveness of the troops. This pertains especially to fuel, without which modern, fully mechanized troops may become immobile targets for the enemy.

It is known that the expenditure of fuel during a calendar day when the speed of the offensive is 80 to 100 km may amount to: diesel fuel for heavy tanks, 1.3 fuelings, and for medium tanks, 0.7 fuelings; aviation gasoline for armored carriers, 0.7 fuelings, motor vehicle gasoline for combat and transport vehicles, 0.45 fuelings. If with such expenditure the divisional supply of diesel fuel drops to two fuelings, and aviation and other gasoline to 1.25 fuelings, then in case of disruption of transport, the troops will not be able to continue the fulfilment of their combat missions after one and a half to two calendar days.

For this reason we categorically object to those who, viewing the idea of easing the burden of the troops as a goal in itself, recommend lowering the fuel stocks in a division to one and a half to two calender day requirements.

We consider that the very minimum mobile stocks of fuel in a division must be: motor vehicle gasoline - 1.4 fuelings, diesel fuel - 2.5 fuelings.[1]

The combined-arms and tank armies, under modern conditions, form the basis of both operational internal and operational interfrontal maneuver. For this reason, it is extremely essential to have at the

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1. All fuel calculations were carried out on the basis that motor vehicles have a cruising range of 500 km, and for tanks, taking into consideration the fuel in all fuel tanks making up the fuel system of tanks.

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disposal of the army commander at least minimal reserves of materiel supplies for operational influence on sharp and unexpected changes in the situation. Such a reserve is proposed by us for a combined-arms army on the scale of troop requirements for two calendar days, and for a tank army - for one calendar day.

In connection with such a lowering of stocks with the troops and at mobile army bases, as well as in connection with the significant decrease of other forces and materiel of these elements of the rear services, there has appeared a necessity to alter the echelonment of stocks of a front. In the interests of bringing these stocks nearer to the troops supported, we consider that up to 60 percent of them should be maintained in forward bases of the front, which, with great strain on the communication lines, can move their sections forward. The remaining 40 percent of the stocks of the front may be kept in rear area bases of the front for the regular replenishing of forward bases, for deliveries by air transport to armies, and for the direct support of troops carrying out missions in the depth of the rear area.

Such a system of stocks echelonment in the zone of operations of the front, in our opinion, more readily satisfies the requirements of uninterrupted support of troops under the complex conditions of modern operations.

Certain comrades consider that in order to avoid unnecessary transshipment, bases should not be formed in the deep rear area of a front. Thus, for example, it is proposed to have one front missile-technical base with two sections, which must deploy in an area along a 200 to 250 km front and 100 to 150 km in depth. Such a scheme, seemingly very simple at first glance, may become, in actual conditions, very complex, and will not guarantee the fulfilment of assigned missions. It does not satisfy the requirements of maximum dispersion, stability of supply during the sudden appearance of barriers on lines of communication, and hinders support of missile large units deployed in the depth of the rear area.

In view of the great vulnerability of rear area lines of communication, remoteness of theaters of military operations, and the long-range ability of modern means of attack, the problem of correct echelonment of stocks of the central organ of the rear services of the Armed Forces has arisen sharply at the present time.

The investigation of this problem leads to the conclusion that

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in our time the stocks of the center should be maintained in two echelons: in the border zone and in the zone of interior. By the border zone, we mean the groups of our troops located on the territory of countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the territory of Warsaw Pact countries contiguous with our borders, and, for military districts, the border areas of the USSR.

The moving out of bases of the center on the Western axis beyond our borders, with the moving of stocks nearer to troops supported, will permit us in initial operations to avoid dependence on vulnerable railroad meeting points of Soviet and European gauges.

During the echelonment of stocks in border areas, their distribution along the axes of probable troop operations must also be provided for, taking into consideration requirements of groupings of the Armed Forces for materiel stocks along a particular axis.

Altogether in the bases of the center in the border zone, there should be 50 to 60 percent of the total volume of stocks of the center which are accumulated ahead of time. It is advisable to create the remaining portion (50 to 40 percent) in the zone of interior, located in scattered places sheltered from nuclear/missile strikes of the enemy. These stocks will be utilized to support the full mobilization of the Armed Forces, troop operations of the antiaircraft defense of the country, missile troops of strategic designation, and other groupings fulfilling combat missions in the zone of interior.

During the distribution of stocks created ahead of time, special attention should be given to their preservation during enemy attack with weapons of mass destruction. The preservation of troop and army stocks is assured chiefly by the mobility of bases and depots. Insofar as the stocks of the front and bases of the center are concerned, in the interests of great security, they should be located at an appropriate distance from probable targets of nuclear strikes, in sheltered places and carefully concealed. Unfortunately, at the present time this vital principal is a long way from being observed everywhere.

It appears to us, that we should not be carried away with the creation of large bases, the sheltering and concealment of which would require huge resources. It is considerably more advantageous to create smaller bases, to spread them over a larger territory, and place them at a distance from possible targets of enemy nuclear/missile strikes.

The stocks of materiel supplies of the center need not be located

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only in bases under the jurisdiction of the military command. A portion of these stocks may also be located in bases of State materiel reserves, but which are earmarked even in peacetime for support of troops in the initial period of a war. The military command must take part in the determination of the size and points for locating these stocks. The stocks of the center must be constantly kept prepared for movement, and ramps and approach routes must be prepared in advance on the various fronts for all types of transport.

Under modern conditions large shipments of materiel supplies, from the central bases and depots, can be accomplished by air transport, so it is very important to have a prepared network of airfields in the area of these bases, approaches to them, transportation for bringing up freight to the airfields, and also a labor force with loading-unloading equipment.

Such preparation has special significance for missile bases, dumps of missile fuels, and special articles (izdeliye), belonging to the armament of missile troops. The most advantageous way to move materiel supplies of this type will be over great distances from the deep rear directly to the points of their utilization.

Thus, the most important problem of supporting troops in the initial period of a war and during the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces is the accumulation of the required stocks of materiel supplies ahead of time, their proper location and echelonment, and their reliable protection from enemy strikes. The timely and purposeful resolution of this problem will form the most important materiel basis for armed conflict in the initial period of a future war. This will also reflect, to a significant degree, upon the successes of our Armed Forces during the subsequent course of the war.

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The conditions for conduct of armed combat in a future war bring up a series of new, highly important problems in the realm of preparation of communication lines and means of transport.

In the interests of assuring the required viability of the rail and motor vehicle roads which form the basis of the transportation system in internal areas and in the prefrontal zone, it is essential, still in peacetime, to carry out a number of important measures.

Among these measures are the following, above all:

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- the development of a network of roads on the required strategic and operational axes;

- the construction of deep and local bypasses of large junctions, administrative-political, and industrial-economic centers;

- the preparation of alternate crossings over water obstacles;

- the preparation of modern types of transport.

In the postwar period our country has significantly broadened the program of construction of lines of communication.

A large measure of capital investment is directed toward the fulfilment of these missions. With the goal of looking after the interests of the Armed Forces, the appropriate elements of the Ministry of Defense must very vigorously place before the planning elements of the national economy the missions for ensuring dependable communication lines for the vitally important strategic axes which run through economically less-developed areas of the territory of the country. These very important measures must be given foremost attention by State planning organs, as well as by organs of the Ministry of Defense.

We consider one of the most important problems in the preparation of the rear services of the Armed Forces for war to be the long-range development of a network of communication lines in precise conformity with strategic plans being developed for the conduct of armed combat.

Under conditions of a modern nuclear/missile war, when the stability of the operation of networks of communication lines in internal areas of the country becomes the most important factor in the maneuvering of armed forces and in ensuring the fulfilment of strategic missions by them, views on the preparation of communication routes for operation in wartime change radically. At present the mission of constructing deep and local (depending upon the importance of the target) bypasses of centers of communication routes, large stations, transshipping, and other narrow points and sectors, as well as bypasses of large administrative and industrial centers, should be pushed to the fore. Only by having such bypasses prepared ahead of time is it possible to count on assuring uninterrupted operation of transport by rapid transfer of the flow of trains and motor vehicle march columns to alternate routes or to adjacent axes.

It is no less important to carry out preparatory measures ahead of time, ensuring uninterrupted military movements across large water

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barriers. In our opinion, the resolution of this problem may be achieved by implementation of a complex of various measures. Of these, we must first of all mention the construction of main alternate bridges, the cutting and filling of roadbeds, and also in certain instances, the laying of load-bearing surfaces on the approaches to points where temporary alternate crossings are being erected. To shorten the periods for reestablishment of traffic in cases of destruction of bridges by the enemy, it is essential, already at the present time, to develop broadly the procurement and accumulation of stocks of materials for erecting floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and ferry crossings. In addition, it is essential to have such materials directly under the control of the Ministry of Defense for concentration along the most important operational axes, as well as under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport Construction for maintenance of rear area roads where barriers are most likely to occur. In the fulfilment of this mission, a significant reserve for the decrease of capital investment may be the adaptation of floating river equipment for the erection of temporary floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and ferry crossings. In terms of capacity of the river tug fleet and freight-carrying capacity of the towed fleet in river basins, the Soviet Union at the present time occupies first place in Europe and second in the world. This fleet is growing rapidly. During the period from 1951 to 1958 alone, the freight-carrying capacity of the self-propelled and towed river fleets increased by more than 3.5 million tons.

In the makeup of the river fleet there is a large number of barge-lighters with a freight-carrying capacity of 300-2000 tons, open double-bottomed metal barges with freight-carrying capacities of 1800-3000 tons, and other cargo vessels, entirely suitable for rapid erection of floating bridges of any length. For the rational utilization of this reserve and appropriate preparation of vessels, it appears essential to develop their fixed tonnage for series production and to achieve the introduction of certain design changes, especially in the superstructure.

Closely related to the resolution of the problems listed is the need to organize vigorous protection of major transport installations from the means of enemy attack (allotment of antiaircraft defense means). It is extremely essential at the initiation of military operations to screen basic installations (large centers on main lines of strategic designation, rail meeting points of Soviet and West European gauges, large bridges) reliably with antimissile and antiaircraft weapons. It appears to us that this problem must be worked out beforehand by the joint efforts of elements of PVO Troops of the Country and the rear services

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of the Armed Forces.

In the resolution of problems concerning the stability of the system of the rear services support of the Armed Forces and the strategic maneuvering of troops under modern conditions, the continuity of the transportation process has very important significance. At the present time a portion of our Armed Forces along the western axis are located beyond the territorial limits of the USSR. For this reason we must closely tie in the execution of all missions connected with the preparation of networks of communication lines and means of transport on our territory with analogous measures carried out on the networks of communication lines of adjacent countries. This pertains especially to the readiness of rail and motor vehicle roads, as well as to sea transport in maritime theaters of military operations.

Modern warfare creates such difficulties in the organization of troop transport that the fulfilment of these missions can be achieved only under conditions of combined utilization of all types of transport. Even in the last war, depending on conditions, various types of transportation were utilized. Under modern conditions the necessity of our intensive and cooperative operation of the various types of transport has increased even more. For this reason the preparation of communication routes and means of transport for operation in wartime should be carried out at once, proceeding precisely from the problem of their combined utilization.

Let us examine in somewhat more detail the possibilities of utilizing measures for the preparation of each of the types of transport.

Rail Transport. The utilization of railroads in a future war will depend on the conditions of the theater of military operations, the density of networks and other factors mentioned above. If we take the Western Theater of Military Operations, then within its limits, on the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp, the density of railroad networks is 9.2 km per 100 square km, and in capitalist countries it reaches 10.7 km. Such a density of railroads in this theater of military operations, even under conditions of the use of nuclear missile weapons, permits hope of the possibility of carrying out a significant volume of military railroad shipments within the confines of the rear areas of fronts deploying there and in the prefrontal zone. Railroad transport in the internal areas of our country will play a basic role in the total volume of shipments when it is prepared beforehand.

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An extremely complicated mission for the rear services of the Armed Forces will be ensuring continuity of the transportation process from the centers of production (bases) to consumers. In the fulfilment of this mission, we must emphasize, above all, such measures as ensuring dependable operation at the meeting points of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges, and the organization of transloading operations at points where barriers have resulted from enemy strikes (in the destruction of bridge crossings over large water lines and railroad tunnel sectors).

For ensuring uninterrupted supply of our Armed Forces operating in the period of the Second World War on the territory of European countries, along our Western borders were organized ten transloading areas, and a large number of transloading stations were set up.

Such a fundamental system of transloading areas may also be adopted in a future war, but it must be organized with consideration of the new conditions of nuclear/missile war. Each transloading area at the meeting points of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges is a huge military installation and a huge installation of the national economy. It must include several stations with sectors of deep extensions of railroad lines of various gauges, a branching network of motor vehicle roads and pipelines, a communications system, a large quantity of loading-unloading equipment, and specially prepared places for changing the trucks of the rolling stock, as well as transloading bases with depots and means for transporting freight. The degree of prior preparation of transloading areas for operations under conditions of a nuclear/missile war will render a decisive influence on the feasibility of maintaining uninterrupted delivery of materiel supplies from the zone of interior to the distributing stations of the fronts.

Sometimes proposals are introduced to reject transloading areas and to resort, at the initiation of a war, to the altering of gauges of West European lines to Soviet gauges. In the period of the Second World War it was not uncommon to resort to such a measure. Thus, in the zones of operation of the Belorussian and the First Ukrainian fronts, to the line of the Vistula River, most of the railroad lines were altered; later the following main lines were fully altered: Kaunas-Insterburg-Koenigsberg-Marienburg; Bialystok-Tluszcz-Ostrolenka-Deutsch-Eylau; Brest-Warsaw-Poznan-Berlin-Lvov-Przemyzl-Krakow-Katowice-Breslau. Experience showed that to rely upon the alteration of basic

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main lines is not advisable. This must be resorted to only in exceptional cases, in individual secondary sectors. The alteration of basic main lines may lead to broad gauge lines' cutting the entire network of railroads of European countries into isolated areas, and this will drastically limit the utilization of local transport in rear areas of the fronts and in the prefrontal zone. Along with this there will be insufficient native rolling stock and locomotives in the event of a sharp increase in the length of the network, and it will be impossible to utilize West European gauge rolling stock. Besides, the smaller dimensions of the auxiliary structures on West European gauge railroad lines would make it more difficult to utilize our rolling stock, especially in the organization of two-way traffic on two-way bridges and tunnels. In connection with this we consider it more advantageous to concentrate on ensuring the stable operation of a diversified network of transloading areas at meeting points of railroads of different gauges.

A new and extremely complex problem in ensuring the continuity of transport networks between the front and the rear will be the organization of the surmounting of obstructed places along railroad lines, especially in the internal areas of the country. The most rational form for organizing this operation appears to be the creation of temporary transloading areas (vremennyy peregruzochnyy rayon -- VPR). In the composition of the VPR it is essential to have various special railroad formations, as well as motor vehicle, road, pipeline, loading-unloading, and other equipment. The basic mission of the temporary transloading areas must be the ensuring of continuity in the flow of freight without a substantial decrease in the tempo of shipments during the surmounting of obstructed places until through railroad traffic is restored.

We consider that such organizations should be provided for in the mobilization plans of railroads for operations on railroads of internal areas of the country. To support transloading at water barriers, as well as at tunnel sectors of railroads on the territory of Western countries (outside the borders of operating fronts), it is essential to have rather strong reserves of this equipment which could be moved up to an area where needed in a short period of time.

It is expedient to have mobile formations of temporary transloading areas in the reserve of the rear services of the Armed Forces for aiding fronts to surmount obstructed places.

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The volume of reconstruction work on railroads in a future war will significantly exceed the work carried out during the period of the Second World War.

Taking this into account, it is essential to begin serious work on preparation for the restoration of internal railroads and those in the prefrontal zone. In the complex of preparatory work, primary significance is attached to the creation and training of special formations, the prior creation of stocks of repair-reconstruction materials, and others. All these problems in internal areas of the country will be resolved by elements of the transport ministries. However, it is essential for us to submit our requirements now and participate in the measures which are being carried out.

More intensive conversion to diesel-electric traction takes on special significance for railroad rolling stock, will increase significantly the transport capacity of railroads, and will facilitate reconstruction operations. A significant increase must be obtained in the proportion in the car park of large-capacity flatcars and tank cars for the transport of petroleum products. It is extremely essential to create, in the near future, a sufficient park of special cars and flatcars for the transport of missiles and missile equipment, and also tank cars for the transport of the components of liquid missile fuel. The problem of creating a sufficient park of trucks and steam locomotives of West European gauge which may be utilized for movement from transloading areas along railroads of West European gauge in the first days of a war, acquires great significance.

Water transport in maritime theaters of military operations and when there are internal water routes along the axes of combat operations, and in the zone of interior, will carry out a significant volume of troop transport, especially the transport of supplies.

For the preparation of water transport, the problems of organization of transloading areas and outfitting them with equipment capable of carrying out rapid transloading of armaments and all types of supplies from an unequipped shore to vessels anchored in the roadstead and vice versa, should be decided beforehand. It is necessary to carry out scientific-research and experimental design work for the creation of special equipment of sea-going river vessels for the transport of modern types of weapons and ammunition and the development of transloading equipment on board the vessels.

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For the maintenance of water communication routes in a state of constant usability, it will be necessary to create special formations.

In our opinion, it is expedient to have a part of the vessels in the composition of the naval fleets and flotillas adapted so that they are capable of operating at sea and on large river waterways. This will make it possible, in many instances, to avoid the rather difficult operations of carrying out transloading work in roadsteads.

Motor vehicle roads and motor vehicle transport deliveries played a large role in carrying out transport of troops and supplies within a front already during the past war. There were also frequent instances when motor vehicle transport was utilized for delivery of materiel supplies to the fronts in accordance with the plans of the central elements of the rear area, and for urgent transport of personnel replacements. Thus, in 1942 the vehicle park of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) transported up to 1.3 million tons of various freight to the fronts, and altogether for 10 months of 1943 - about 1.4 million tons of freight and 130 thousand personnel replacements.

In connection with the large volume of motor vehicle shipments of the center in the 1941 to 1943 period, the following special military motor vehicle roads of the center were prepared and serviced: Gorkiy-to-Moscow, Moscow-to-Leningrad, Moscow-to-Volokolamsk, Moscow-to-Mozhaysk, Moscow-to-Yukhnov, and others. During the final stage of the war the Moscow-to-Warsaw-to-Berlin highway was in operation.

In modern conditions it is most probable that there will be, not periodic, but constant use of motor vehicle transport along the entire extent of the basic axis from the zone of interior to the operating fronts. Motor vehicle transport will not only have to supplement or duplicate railroad transport, but during a certain period will fully replace it along individual axes.

In modern conditions large motor vehicle highways will be utilized not only for delivery of materiel supplies, but chiefly for the movement of troops in motor vehicles and by mechanized traction, reserves, and all types of replacements. For this reason the role of motor vehicle roads is now growing and qualitatively changing.

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In connection with this the problem of development of a network of hard-surfaced motor vehicle roads arises sharply. In addition, it is necessary to strive to improve correspondingly the transportability and passability of motor vehicle roads on our territory and on the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp allied with us. In an adverse situation the holding up of motor vehicle transport in narrow places and delay in the flow of freight will be unavoidable.

The intensive transport traffic, and enemy actions against important installations of basic motor vehicle communication routes demands the carrying out of serious measures for their maintenance in usable condition and their reconstruction. We suppose, that during the first days of the war the basic motor vehicle highways of the center must be serviced by special road-reconstruction and maintenance formations, which must be capable of carrying out work of technical concealment, reconstruction, and maintenance of the rear area motor vehicle roads.

In the interests of ensuring a high degree of readiness of the road service for operations in the initial period of a war, it appears expedient to carry out large-scale preparatory work in peacetime, taking into consideration the utilization of all forces and means of the military establishment as well as civilian organizations.

A special role in the preparation of military motor vehicle roads will be played by such measures as prior buildup of stocks of construction-repair materials, the procurement and concentration, in necessary locations, of spare structural components for reconstruction of auxiliary structures, the preparation and proper setting-up in peacetime of civilian road organizations equipped with machinery, the development of bypasses of the most vulnerable places, etc.

The motor vehicle park of our country has grown significantly during the postwar period, and is more than 80 percent modernized by the receipt of more highly perfected motor vehicles. For equipping the Soviet Army, especially the motor vehicle transport large units and units of central subordination, there will appear, in ever increasing quantities, larger freight-capacity motor vehicles with large trailers, semitrailers with independent transmissions, and motor vehicle trains. The introduction of this equipment will permit a sharp increase in the freight capacity of transport units and large units and will significantly decrease loading-unloading operations. From this it follows that it is essential for us to

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submit, in a timely manner, the military requirements for newly designed models of motor vehicle equipment, in order that during mobilization the motor vehicle park of the national economy might, with great effectiveness, be utilized in all elements of the rear services of the Armed Forces in wartime.

A task which cannot be postponed is the development within the system of the Ministry of Defense of essential types of motor vehicles, semitrailers, and motor vehicle trains for transport of all types of missiles, missile fuels, and other special freight for supporting missile troops. Here we are speaking of special motor vehicle transport suitable for operations in the central element of transport.

Pipeline transport is an economical, high-capacity method of fuel transport that has low vulnerability. These positive qualities of pipeline transport are extremely important for the creation of a stable system of supporting modern mechanized Armed Forces in wartime. In the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Camp friendly to us, the network of pipelines is increasing from year to year. At the present time a large program for the development of permanent pipelines is being planned. The Seven-Year Plan for developing the national economy of the USSR provides for the construction of new petroleum and petroleum product pipelines, which will ensure an almost three-fold increase in the length of the main pipelines. Together with this, the construction of the petroleum pipeline from the Trans-Volga region through Bryansk, with branches to the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which has been started, will have special significance not only for the national economy but also for supplying the Armed Forces in the European theaters of military operations with fuel.

In modern conditions it appears extremely essential to force the construction of pipelines within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA), to achieve the uniting of the basic main lines and local petroleum pipelines into a single network of the countries of the Peoples' Democracies. The stability of the support of the Armed Forces in theaters of military operations may substantially facilitate the creation of a system of field main pipelines as an extension of permanent lines. For this reason we consider that the development in every possible way of the production of field pipeline equipment with a pipe diameter of 150 mm has good prospects. Systems of such

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pipelines with a 24-hour delivery capacity of each line of 2,000-2,400 tons, must guarantee the delivery of basic types of fuel, without overloading, to a depth of 600 km and more from the terminals of permanent pipelines or from operating sectors of railroads.

Air transport, even in the last war, in various instances, played an important role in the transport of troops and their materiel support. It is sufficient to indicate that the forces of the Civil Air Fleet and Long Range Aviation, based upon incomplete data for the period of the war, transported over 300 thousand tons of freight and more than 1.5 million personnel.

Air transport during the period of the Second World War was utilized primarily centrally in the capacity of a resource of the Supreme High Command. However, even during that period there were instances of temporary assignment of certain units of transport aviation to the fronts. Thus, out of the 228 transport aircraft in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations during the summer of 1945, 189 were detached for the servicing of the Transbaykal Front. During the time of preparation and conduct of the operation by this front, about 16.5 thousand soldiers and officers, up to 2.8 thousand tons of fuel, and 2 thousand tons of miscellaneous freight were moved by air transport.

In view of the exceptional prospects for the use of air transport under future war conditions, an important modern problem is the long-range increase in freight capacity of the transport aviation pool and ensuring the capability of aircraft to operate from small dirt airfields. It is expedient, even now, to determine the basic axes for utilization of military transport aviation according to the plans of the central elements of the rear services. In order to ensure these shipments it is essential to have powerful central military transport aviation for transfer of troops and to determine beforehand the quantity of this aviation needed by the rear services at the beginning of a war. This will permit timely planning of the utilization of transport aviation of the center, the preparation at the necessary points of materiel stocks, materiel support, airfields, and other means ensuring the uninterrupted operation of transport aviation.

In line with this it is essential for elements of the rear services of the Armed Forces to unfold more broadly the work of resolving problems of airfield-engineering, materiel-technical, and special support of military transport aviation itself.

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The enumeration of problems in the preparation of the lines of communication and transport is not by any means limited to those indicated above. However, even those listed, show with sufficient conviction, the necessity of adopting decisive measures for further development of transport.

* * *

The investigation of the problems of the organization of rear services support of the Armed Forces in a future war acquires entirely new significance at the present time.

First of all these questions arise.

Who in the Armed Forces must exercise control of all the means allotted by the State for the rear services support of missile troops, the ground troops, the air forces, and the navy?

What organs are needed in the system of the Armed Forces for the correct distribution and organization of rational utilization of the means of materiel support in the interests of the overall armed conflict?

In our opinion, the only correct resolution of these questions lies in the centralization of the entire matter of the rear area support of the Armed Forces. There are sufficient grounds for such a conclusion both from the scientific-theoretical viewpoint and from the experience gained from past wars.

In May 1919, at the height of the Civil War, V.I. Lenin wrote in The Draft Directive to the Central Committee on Military Unity: " -- the necessary condition for the success of this war is the unity of command of all detachments of the Red Army and the strictest centralization in the direction of all forces and resources of the socialist republics, specifically, of the entire apparatus of military supply, as well as railway transport, as the most important material factor of the war --" (Underlined by us - F.M.) (Collected Works, Volume 29, page 373).

The fulfilment of this demand of the leader of the revolution and founder of the Soviet Army permitted the utilization of the available extremely limited materiel resources of the country in the interests of protection of the young socialist republic during the period of the Civil War with maximum expediency and effectiveness.

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During the period of the Second World War, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was in charge of all resources which the State Committee for Defense allotted for the conduct of armed conflict, carrying out its functions for the rear area support of the Armed Forces through a single central element of the rear services of the Ministry of Defense.

It follows that there is every basis to consider the strict centralization of the entire matter of rear area support of the Armed Forces as an objective necessity. Being guided by such a conclusion, it is appropriate to object to the authors who fight for the creation of a territorial system of materiel [2 or 3 words missing] support in place of the existing elements of the rear services, organized along the principle of channels of military command.

The completeness and efficacy of satisfying the materiel requirements of the Armed Forces in a future war will depend to a significant degree, as indicated above, on the prior accumulation of mobilization stocks, State materiel reserves, and the creation of mobilization capacities of industry corresponding with the proposed groupings of troops and the directions of the armed conflict which evolve. The correct fulfilment of these most important missions, connected with the plans for the development of the national economy of the country, is only in the power of central elements. It will be a drastic mistake if we permit decentralization in this matter among various elements having a limited sphere of activity, according to zones. The division of these missions according to types of Armed Forces is likewise intolerable.

Ensuring the stability of the network of communication lines, for use in wartime by various types of transport, in our country as well as in the countries of the Socialist Camp allied with us, may be achieved only under conditions of unified centralized planning and management. The fulfilment of this mission is tied in with large capital expenditures carried out in accordance with the general plan for the development of the national economy of our country and the Warsaw Pact. For this reason the impossibility of handing over these functions to any elements responsible only for one axis or one area of possible local operations of an operational or even of a strategic grouping of the Armed Forces, is completely apparent.

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We recommend, for the fulfilment of all tasks of organization and control of the rear, the materiel and medical support of fronts and other groupings of the Armed Forces, and the management of all types of transport, that there be a special element in the form of an organ of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces will be able to direct purposefully all the forces and means of rear services support in accordance with future strategic plans only under the condition that he be included in the General Headquarters complement.

The Staff of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, the central supply, the supporting and transport elements, being under unified management of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, must, in their work, closely cooperate with the General Staff and be guided by its directives. The central elements of the rear services of the Armed Forces must be assigned the missions of organizing rear area support of operating fronts, the troops of PVO of the Country, missile large units of strategic designation and the utilization of production capabilities in the territory occupied by the troops, under the jurisdiction of the Supreme High Command. These elements will likewise carry out the functions of direct management of large units, units, and installations of the central element of the rear services of the Armed Forces deployed in the interior areas of the country, as well as in the prefrontal zone.

In the course of war there may be created high commands in various theaters or axes of military operations in the interests of achieving better coordination of operational efforts of operating front formations.

We consider that in the high command of a group of fronts, in this instance, it will be expedient to have an operational group of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces. However, such a group cannot be looked upon as an intermediate supply echelon. The creation of additional supply levels always involves the enlargement of the rear services operations; the introduction of intermediate trans-loading points, in the end result, adversely affects the flexibility of the system of rear area support.

In our opinion, it is expedient to charge the operational group of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces attached to the high commands of groups of fronts with rendering assistance to

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the fronts in the rear area support of troops, when the timely information of the Headquarters of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces, emanating from a concretely established situation, indicates a suddenly arising necessity to change the supply plans and carry out an interfrontal maneuver. Herein we allow for temporary subordination to the operational groups of the appropriate central bases created beforehand in the prefrontal zone. The operational groups of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in specific theaters of military operations may be formed also for the fulfilment of certain narrower missions (organization of use of production capacities, putting right the operation of the transportation network on occupied territory, etc.).

The activity of central organs of the rear services of the Armed Forces in a future war has not as yet been sufficiently explored, and it is essential to carry out appropriate work in this sphere. However, we are absolutely convinced that it is most expedient during the organization of rear area support to take as a basis a system which has proven itself: General Headquarters - front - army - troops. This system meets the requirements of centralization to the greatest degree, corresponds to the structural organization of the Armed Forces, and is relatively economical and efficient.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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20 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs", by Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs", by Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Perfecting the Method of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs", by Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.

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Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, and Staffs

With the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear/missile weapons, in the technical equipment of modern armies, vast changes have taken place which have, of course, introduced much that is new into the methods of conduct of operations and of warfare as a whole. In searching for the new in military affairs, numerous comrades have recently expressed in publications a number of valuable theses directed toward more rapid exposition of the basic changes that are taking place and the theoretical interpretation and substantiation of the probable nature of armed conflict. The statements by authors of articles in the first issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" and certain other articles are of considerable interest in this regard.

We fully share the opinions of those comrades who speak out for a fundamental review of the existing basic tenets of the theory of military art, and we think that one of the most important factors assuring successful resolution of this complicated problem is the further improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs. This question acquires special acuity in connection with the numerical reduction of the armed forces and the increase in demands on the officer corps to master the practical skills in troop command. In his address at the All Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations in May 1960, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, among other tasks of increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces, pointed out the necessity "...to continue to improve the organization and the methods of operational, combat, and political training and to carry out, in a positive fashion, the struggle against the phenomena of oversimplification and weakness in troop training."

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It is greatly regretted that not enough attention is devoted in practice to the problems of the methods of training troops and command cadres. There is evidence of this in the fact that the forms and methods of operational training during the postwar period have, in essence, undergone no serious changes. The presently existing methods of operational training of commanders and staffs consist mainly of carrying out command-staff and refresher training courses and group exercises with the command complement of district and army troops.

All of these methods of operational training, proven in the past, cannot, in present conditions and in full measure guarantee the qualitative training of command cadres since they are far from comprehensive and perfect. Among the deficiencies we include the following.

In the general system of operational training, the mastery by generals and senior officers of new combat equipment, and particularly of missiles of various designations, has been weak to date. Formally acknowledging the decisive role of nuclear weapons in the destruction of the enemy, and realizing that modern war will be waged with powerful long-range means of combat which in no way compare with the weapons of past wars, generals and senior officers are actually planning and organizing operations as of old, principally on the basis of World War II experience. It is a revelation to no one that methods for reaching decisions, all plans for operations, and other documents that are developed in staffs in the operational training system, differ very little in form and content from what existed during the period of World War II. The methods of training and execution of operations as they are stated in the articles of Comrades Gastilovich and Baskakov, have basically remained as before.[1]

We ask why it is that we conduct the training of troops and command cadres without regard to the basic changes which have occurred in armaments due to nuclear/missile weapons?

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 1960, First Issue.

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In our opinion, this occurs because the military-technical training of generals and senior officers is still inferior. It is precisely because of ignorance of the technical characteristics of nuclear/missile weapons and the means of their delivery to a target that many comrades are unable to evaluate properly the role of these weapons in modern warfare, to utilize them in a battle and operation in a qualified manner, and to assign tasks wisely to the troops utilizing these weapons. By the apt statement of Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, not all of us clearly realize what changes have been wrought in military affairs by the adoption of new means of combat and particularly of nuclear and missile weapons. One of the vital deficiencies, as is pointed out by the Minister of Defense, is the inadequate knowledge of the combat potentialities of nuclear weapons and missiles on the part of generals and officers.

Inferior military-technical training of command cadres is explained by a number of circumstances.

Firstly, within the system of operational training to the present time, the practical study of weapons of mass destruction, and especially of the means of delivery of nuclear warheads to a target, is not being planned for or carried out. Military-technical information on these weapons has been gleaned by generals and officers from various manuals, textbooks, military journals, etc. It is quite understandable that this information has been superficial and contradictory. The first four-day refresher training course, for the study of weapons of mass destruction, and principally of missiles of various designations, was held in 1960 in the Baltic Military District on its own initiative. Almost 150 generals and senior officers of the district troops participated in this refresher course. Many of them saw there for the first time those weapons which they "ably utilized" earlier in a battle and an operation.

Secondly, even today there are no textbooks on missile weapons in the military districts. The so-called handbook materials on the organization and tactical-technical data of missile troops that were distributed to military units at various times are very confusing, contradictory, incomplete, and can in no way serve as training aids in the military-technical training of generals and senior officers concerned with the planning for and the use of these weapons.

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Thirdly, inadequate reflection on the limitations in the study of even the training data on missile weapons also affects the training of generals and officers adversely. At the present time missile weapons are available to only a few. The majority of comrades who are directly connected with the planning and utilization of these weapons are familiar with these weapons only from the periodical press. It is apparent that in order to have our command cadres really master the art of conducting modern operations, it is necessary to review and broaden the limits of study of missile weapons.

All of these circumstances have undoubtedly played a negative role in the military-technical training of generals and senior officers which cannot but reflect upon their practical activities.

The second deficiency existing in the methods of operational training during refresher training courses and commanders exercises with the command complement of the district (army), is the tendency to study the training problems and the conduct of operations by the methods of group exercises.

In our opinion, the method of group exercises for studying the problems of operational art in the system of commanders' training of the command echelon of a district (army) is unacceptable because it does not conform to the categories of the persons studying and it does not assure inculcation of the qualities necessary for battle, such as rapid formulation of decisions, boldness, and resoluteness in operations.

On the basis of many years of experience, it is known that training of command echelons of districts and armies is usually carried out in two study groups (the commander and the chief of staff) in which all commanders of arms of troops, chiefs of directorates, and departments are included. And within these groups, numbering 20 to 25 persons, consisting mainly of general and officer-specialists (artillerymen, engineers, chemical specialists, rear services troops) and one or two generals (officers) of combined-arms speciality, the training problems of the operation are worked out (determination of the task, evaluation of the circumstances, working out of the decision), which are chiefly the concern of the command echelon. During the exercises, only the

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combined-arms generals and officers are fully and beneficially occupied. As concerns the specialists, they participate only briefly within the framework of their specialities, and for the remainder of the time they are obliged to be inactive. In turn, the generals (officers) of combined-arms speciality also gain very little benefit from these exercises, since the command complement of directorates of the district and armies has sufficient experience for the resolution of such problems as clarification of the task, evaluation of the circumstances, and making the decisions.

As a consequence, the method of group exercises so necessary for a number of reasons in higher educational institutions is not warranted in the training of staffs. Instead of training the command complement of a district (army) in their functional responsibilities and specialities and their skill in the organization of a battle and an operation, because of the existing method of operational training, we unwittingly expend valuable time in the resolution of secondary problems and engender in the subsequent practical activity of generals and senior officers unnecessary verbosity, an inclination toward all sorts of meetings and to hear all types of information and reports.

Proceeding from these considerations, we believe that the method of group exercises utilized in the system of command exercises of the command echelon of the district and army ought to be eliminated and replaced by the method of military-command map games. Depending upon the composition of the military districts and armies and the established training goals, the military-command map games can be single-or two-stage, one- or two-sided. These games, especially the two-stage and two-sided, permit the whole command complement of a district and army to realize conditions more nearly approximate to the combat situation in comparison with group exercises and to load all participants to the maximum with creative activity and to elaborate more fully the training problems and the conduct of the operations.

In 1959 the headquarters of the Baltic Military District carried out a two-stage, two-sided military-command game to which were invited

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the command complement of the directorates of the district, of the combined-arms and air armies of the army corps, of large units of PVO of the Country, the fleet operational group and also certain chiefs of military departments of civilian higher educational institutions and retired generals. During the game the commanders of armies (corps), arms of troops, and chiefs of directorates acted as the appropriate commanders and chiefs in the composition of a front according to Soviet Army organization, and their deputies - as the corresponding commanders and chiefs within the composition of a group of "Western" armies. The remaining participants in the game performed the duties which coincided with their own responsibilities and specialties. In order to preclude contact between the two sides and to create the most favorable conditions for the game, the sides were located separately--in the district headquarters building and in the officers' club. In content and method of execution, the game received the approval of the participants. For some reason, however, they were not used in subsequent military-command games of staffs of districts and armies.

A third and no less serious deficiency in the method of operational training of the command echelon is, in our view, the fact that staffs of districts participate too infrequently in the arrangements for operational training which are carried out in accordance with the plan of the Center. For example, not one operational exercise was carried out by the headquarters of the Baltic Military District during the past six years. The district troop commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the operations directorate have not participated in the activities of operational training on a strategic scale for many years now, if we exclude their participation as umpires in the exercises of the Southern Group of Forces.

Such a situation cannot be called normal. The headquarters of districts must themselves participate in the role of trainees periodically and prepare themselves as troop control organs under the immediate direction of the Center. This will permit a significant increase in the effectiveness of the work of staffs, the study of new developments in military affairs, the adoption of experience in the organization of large exercises, and the observation of one's own errors and deficiencies which go unnoticed under normal conditions.

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We realize that the measures carried out by the Center in operational training with the districts involve definite material expenditures. However, it is possible to find methods which would not require large monetary expenditures.

It is also necessary to find methods for improving the special training of army commanders, chiefs of staffs, chiefs of operations directorates (deparments), i. e., those commander-comrades who have direct responsibility for operational and special training of large numbers of generals and senior officers. While the chiefs of arms of troops and services (artillery, PVO, etc.) have increased their knowledge to some degree at special refresher courses during the past years, the above-mentioned category of persons have, for incomprehensible reasons, remained out of the field of vision for many years. Do not commanders and chiefs of staffs have need to study the missile weapons and the resultant revolutionary changes they have wrought in the operational art? Absolutely. And, it seems to us, they also need special refresher courses for the study of the latest equipment and the urgent problems in the field of strategy, operational art, and tactics.

Noting the deficiencies in the existing methods of operational training, we propose a change in the system of conducting the training of generals, senior officers, and staffs since it is obviously antiquated. Our proposals for improving the methods of operational training consist of the following:

For practical study of nuclear weapons and methods of their delivery to a target, military-technical refresher courses for the district command complement, including commanding officers of large units, should be held at the beginning of the training year. During these refresher training courses, lasting 4 to 5 days, there should be study of the new equipment received by the district troops, and chiefly of missiles of various designations. The refresher training courses should conclude with formulation of operational-tactical leaflets on problems of the use of this equipment in a battle and an operation.

Upon completion of the military-technical refresher training courses, and within the time limit fixed by the operational training plan, a two-stage military-command map game should be conducted with the participation of the command complement of the district, of the armies and

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large units subordinate to the district, and also of the command complement of the other types of armed forces and military-educational institutions that are located in the district territory, and with the generals of the reserve.

As far as possible, military-command games should be two-sided. In this case, one of the sides (main command echelon) must operate in accordance with the organization and tactics of the Soviet Army, the opposing side--in accordance with enemy organization and tactics. This will permit a study in depth of the troop organization and the methods for conducting operations of our probable enemies and, by comparative analysis, the detection of the strong and weak points of both sides.

It is expedient for both sides in war games to be located in different places (buildings) in order that participants do not have the opportunity for personal contact and so that each side carries out its internal control by technical communications means with observance of all rules of cryptographic security (skrytoye upravleniye voiskami-SUV).

The decisions of each side will be presented to the director of the games according to an established schedule and, in keeping with these decisions, combat operations will be developed and new situations will be introduced in accordance with the operational schedule.

The duration of military-command games of a district is 4 to 5 days.

In addition to these undertakings, a district and its armies should conduct one operation command-staff exercise of 6 to 7 days on the spot with the participation of the staffs of combined-arms large units and the staffs of missile units (large units).

In their content, the operational command-staff exercises presently being conducted do not satisfy the requirements for the conduct of modern operations. The majority of these exercises are being conducted too methodically, without sharp changes in the situation. The staffs being educated usually create easy conditions for themselves: the initial situation is presented beforehand at their points of permanent assignment, the decisions made on the basis of the initial situation are put into practice without substantive changes during the entire course of the exercise; changes of location of control points do not take place, the entire activity of the

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staffs amounts basically to the collection of data on the situation and the development of various types of combat documents. Naturally, such exercises are not beneficial to the command complement and they only create incorrect impressions for generals and officers about the nature of modern warfare.

In our practical activities we proceed from the guiding postulate that war can start suddenly. The so-called threatening period will amount to several hours or will be entirely absent. Consequently, the system of staff training must proceed from a more complicated situation in which staffs will be brought to readiness in a limited time and will be dispatched to the reserve command post from which they will assume troop control. Therefore, such undertakings as operational command-staff and staff exercises should begin with calling the staff trainees to alert and imparting to them the initial situation when they arrive at the designated areas from their points of permanent assignment. Prior to the sounding of the alert, it is necessary to take all measures to achieve its surprise effect. Then we will have the opportunity to reveal, although not completely, an accurate picture of the readiness of the staffs for troop control in a complicated situation, and the exercises themselves will approximate combat conditions.

Guided by these considerations, in May 1960, the command complement of the Baltic Military District arrived at the 11th Guards Army without warning and issued a directive to the commander which required the army troops to go on combat alert, to be brought up to combat readiness, and to be regrouped by the combined method on another axis within a limited time for fulfillment of the combat task. All of these measures were to be carried out under the conditions of combat operations that had already been initiated by the enemy. Simultaneously, groups of officers were dispatched to the large units of the army with authority to control the conditions of the bringing to alert of each large unit. During this particular exercise, in addition to the directorates of the army, one division at full complement and only the staffs of divisions and one motorized (tank) regiment each in the remaining large units were alerted.

The commander and the staff of the army had to notify the subordinate troops to bring them to the areas of concentration, plan the

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regrouping over a large distance, brief the troops on the task, and prepare them for march a few hours after the alert was sounded. These requirements were also laid on the troop staffs. Due to the surprise alert, the command complement of the army and the unit staffs were placed in a complex situation and they gained practical work experience in the control of troops under such conditions. Both the directors of the exercise and the participants had the opportunity to observe their own weak spots and gaps in training in general, and in combat readiness in particular.

In our view, operational command-staff exercises to improve the staffs as organs of control should be conducted in complex and sharply changing situations at the front and in the rear, demanding of participants the adoption of new decisions in short periods of time. In the background of this situation, there should be practice in shifting control points by air transport, and also in effecting continuity in troop control among the various command echelons. With these aims, it is obviously advisable to reduce to a minimum the dependence upon the rear services units and establishments which are included in the command-staff exercises so that control points will be highly mobile and efficient.

As an example of how these exercises should be conducted, we can refer to the experience of the front operational-rear services exercise with designated troops which was carried out with participation of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko in the Baltic Military District in June 1959.

In accordance with the directive of General Headquarters (STAVKA), the staff of the front (district) planned an offensive operation and received instructions for its execution. By initial decision, the tank army, which was to enter into the composition of the front during the progress of the operation, made up the second operational echelon and was to be brought into combat on the 3rd or 4th day of the operation. When the operation was already planned, it became known that General Headquarters had the opportunity to transfer the tank army into the composition of the front earlier than the previously designated time and offered the use of it in the first operational echelon on the main axis. The command and staff of the front were placed in

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a difficult situation and had to replan the operation anew in a limited period of time, pass on the decision to the troops, and to carry out their regrouping. In this episode the staffs obtained considerable work experience under complex conditions.

In the course of the operation, by direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, there was repeated introduction of elements of sharp change in the situation, which resulted in the need for sharp changes in the tasks of formations and large units and there was also practice in alerting the troops and committing them to combat from the march from their permanent billets.

In the final phase of the exercise, a proposal was made to the district staff that it develop and execute an army exercise within a limited period. During the course of the army exercise, by direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, a situation was created wherein the advancing army was forced to change its direction of advance by 90^{o} which, of course, required intensive work on the part of the troops and staffs.

These exercises were a good training school for generals, senior officers, staffs, and troops. It appears to us that operational command-staff exercises should be carried out in just this fashion.

In the arrangement of preparations for command-staff exercises it is expedient for the staffs of a district and of armies to carry out two to three calendar days' staff training on the spot, utilizing communications means to train principally generals, officers, departments, directorates, and staffs as a whole in rapid development of operational documents in accordance with a given situation and in the ability to carry on communications on technical equipment and with cryptographic security documents SUV, during the movement and deployment of control points.

Therefore, during the course of the training year, it is necessary, in our view, to conduct in a district, as operational training, 1) military-technical refresher training courses, 2) a military-command game, and 3) operational command-staff exercises on the spot. In all, 15 to 20 calendar days are required for this training.

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We also consider it necessary and feasible to have the staff of a district participate no less than once in two to three years in an operational training exercise carried out by the Center on a strategic scale. They can be strategic command-staff exercises on the spot with means of communications or strategic military-command map games involving several military districts. When a district participates in a strategic command-staff exercise or game, district measures for operational training inevitably relate to measures carried out by the Center, and the second exercise planned by the district is not carried out.

As concerns military-command maps games on a strategic scale, they can be conducted with the staffs of districts stationed at their points of permanent assignment, and it appears to us that the method for conducting them should be as follows. Having determined the group of military districts that are to participate in the game and the complement of participants from each district, the Main Staff develops the initial situation (tasks) and disseminates it to the participants. The staffs participating in the game are suddenly alerted and proceed to their reserve control points. To supervise the work of the exercise, groups of generals or officers--representatives of the Main Staff and the central directorates, may be dispatched to the staffs of the districts.

In the course of a strategic military-command game, in order to present the plan of the operation and to get agreement on coordination with other districts participating in the game, the commander or the chief of staff of the district along with commanders of arms of troops will go by air at a definite time to the Center and to neighboring district headquarters.

The basic content of a strategic military-command game, it appears to us, must be the resolution of such practical questions as bringing troops up to increased combat readiness during the threatening period, the removal of these troops from a possible enemy strike, the immediate execution of retaliatory nuclear strikes, the elimination of the results of a nuclear attack, and joint operation with the armies of the other Socialist States.

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The method proposed for a strategic military-command game does not require large expenditures of material means and will undoubtedly have great benefit in the training of the command complement of the districts and their staffs. The duration of conduct of such exercises should be no more than 6 to 7 days.

Therefore, a total of 20 to 25 days will be required for the operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs of a district, including the exercises which are carried out on a strategic scale.

It is quite obvious that execution of the measures indicated does not end the operational training of generals and senior officers. The principal method of studying the theory of operational art remains their independent efforts to synthesize and master the developments which are continually appearing in the military affairs.

However, the volume of military literature being published at the present time is so large that one person has practically no opportunity to comprehend, nor even to read, all that is published on various aspects of military affairs. Therefore it would be expedient, in our view, to plan and carry out so-called operational rallies (aktiv) at least once every six months in the headquarters of districts, with the participation of generals and officers of the principal directorates and departments of the district and its armies.

The basic aim of such rallies is to convey to generals and officers of the command complement, in a comprehensive form, the new changes which have occurred during a certain period of time in operational art, tactics, and organization of our troops and those of the enemy. At these rallies it would be possible, within a short time, to familiarize the generals and officers with the basic contents of the most important exercises carried out in the Soviet Army and abroad, to bring changes in troop organization to their attention, and also to review the questions and postulates raised in the order of their presentation in the periodical press. Of course, for these undertakings it is advisable to make preparation and to pass to the audience only those problems in which the solutions disclose fundamentally new tendencies.

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With approximately this same aim, but with a view to special problems, and at more frequent intervals (no less than once in 1 to 2 months), it would be beneficial to plan and to have operational information (operationaya informatsiya) in directorates and departments in the staffs of districts and armies in order that the generals and officers be continually aware of new trends in operational art.

In connection with further improvement of the methods of operational training and the raising of the level of military knowledge of generals and senior officers, there is a need to improve the quality of the training aids being published, especially those on nuclear/missile weapons.

At the present time, there is available to the troops a large quantity of various forms of tables, lines, and graphs for the determination of the basic data for the use of destruction weapons and for the protection of troops against them. But all of these aids were prepared in primitive fashion and by amateurish methods, are inconvenient to handle, and are far from perfect. A tremendous amount of money is expended for the preparation of these aids in the districts. Is it not time to formulate a single, more sophisticated training aid for the whole army by a centralized method and financed by those funds which are being wasted in districts? It seems to us that an affirmative answer to this question will economize on financial expenditures and will provide the staffs with more sophisticated aids for which they have such great need.

The proposals suggested by us for the improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior officers, and staffs claims in no measure to be an exhaustive exposition of the problem posed. Therefore it would be desirable to exchange opinions in the pages of the military press in order to discover more sophisticated forms of operational training of generals, officers, and staffs, and then use them to fulfill more qualitatively the requirement of the Minister of Defense contained in the directive on operational training No. 0060.

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The general task of any command-staff or staff training exercise on the spot is the training of commanders and staffs for operations in complex conditions of modern combat reality. Whatever the specific arms established by the command for each exercise and whatever the methods used to carry out the exercise, the final aim boils down principally--to training the command complement, preparing the staffs, and continually raising the level of their combat readiness.

It is understandable that the quality and results of an exercise depend to a great extent on the nature of its preparation and organization. In the exercises carried out during the past years, there can be noted a number of negative points common to all of them which, in the interest of the subject, we feel it advisable not to ignore in the future.

The desire to commit the headquarters, not with their existing, but with considerably increased, personnel composition, communications means, and organizational transport is striking. This results in the withdrawal of transport equipment and personnel from subordinate troops, which in turn disrupts the everyday life of units and subunits. Using the personnel and motor vehicles attached to the headquarters for the period of the exercise, there is hasty formation of temporary, disorganized subunits for carrying out such functions as commendant's service and assistance to the "Military Store" (Voyentorg); their personnel are not usually utilized in accordance with their specialties. Commanders and staff officers are placed in a false position because the staffs are brought out for the exercise not as they actually are, but "reinforced" at the expense of weakening other troops. The most harmful thing here is the fact that commanders and staffs become accustomed to participating in

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training exercises only after definite organizational measures, but the enemy really will not often permit this, especially in the initial period of a war.

The best solution would be to have the staffs being the exercise with whatever composition they happen to have at the moment and to give them some "reinforcements" during the course of the exercise; to teach the commanders and staffs to command and direct with their available, though limited means, and not to place them in an easier and more favorable situation in advance. The example should be set by higher headquarters, chiefly of districts.

The presence at a command-staff exercise of large numbers of umpires is not always expedient, and occasionally is downright harmful, at times not promoting the successful progress of the exercise as much as distracting and tieing up the participants. We are not even speaking about the fact that a significant number of umpires, and especially of their vehicles, at control points very often interferes with the camouflaging of the latter.

These deficiencies are plainly noted when, for example, the commander summons to his field control point (PKP) vehicle or tent one or two subordinate officers but instead, three or four persons arrive, since each person summoned is trailed by one or two umpires. They usually attempt to justify the assignment of so many umpires with the excuse that it is done in the interests of training. But these aims should be achieved by classroom study, by group exercises, and war games. And in reality, a commander will never organize this type of meeting, which in actual conditions would take extra materiel equipment (large tents, transport for their movement, personnel to service them). Frequently the commander and the staff, in preparing to go on an exercise, concern themselves principally with where to billet and how to provide lights and food for the umpires, and in what vehicles to transport them. But after all, this is not the important thing.

The main thing is how to make one's headquarters combat ready and mobile, to set up the headquarters and ensure that its activities are inconspicuous to the enemy, thus guaranteeing uninterrupted con-

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trol of the troops. Therefore, in preparing for the exercise, its director is obligated to adopt the measures which are necessary to eliminate the concern of the commander and staff conducting the exercise about umpires. One should include only the minimum number of umpires. For the headquarters of a large unit, there should be no more than 5 to 7, and not 25 to 30 persons, as usually happens. In order to observe properly the work of contiguous departments and specific individuals it is advisable to combine the work of umpires and to assign one person for 2 or 3 departments, e. g., for the operational and intelligence departments, the rear services, special services, artillery, and aviation. In case of extreme necessity it is possible to assign an assitant to certain umpires. In this situation, it will be less crowded and the participants will work more independently with more interest. During the course of the exercise, the secondary personnel will be under the management of the commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the department. Therefore, 5 to 7 qualified officers of the senior staff will be enough to instruct and to check a subordinate commander and the staff of, let us say, a division or corps.

It is particularly desirable to note the role of terminal umpires (kontsevyy posrednik), if they are present at the exercise. First of all, it is necessary that they be located in operating areas and that the commander and his staff participating in the games should have communications with both the umpires and their subordinates by the actual means that are possible in the given situation. An exercise does not achieve the desired results when the terminal umpires are located at reduced distances. It is necessary that the terminal umpire fulfill the will and orders of the commander if they are not incomprehensible. The director of the exercise must so instruct the umpire as regards decisions adopted by a commander. It is not possible to acknowledge the following situation as procedurally correct. Having assigned a subordinate (final umpire) the ~~task~~ TASK of an offensive in the mountains, the commander categorically required him to make a broad enveloping maneuver, utilizing the many available routes. The terminal umpire acted incorrectly, and against the commander's orders, hit the enemy "head-on", met with no success, and during the critique the director

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of the exercise rebuked, not the terminal umpire, but the participating commander.

Neither is it possible to tolerate the fact that with the wide use of liaison aircraft and helicopters in all branches of the national economy, through the fault of the command, they are used very little or not at all in command-staff exercises. In the event of a restriction in the operation of radio communications, the participating commander and his staff are obliged to utilize only vehicular transport, at a time when the helicopter (airplane) would be an incomparable means of liaison if you consider that the troops will usually be located at great distances from one another.

The problem here is certainly not in the real economy of resources but in the fact that in "departing further from sin" and from superfluous "extraordinary occurrences" (ChP), we do not train the commanders and staffs to fulfill important responsibilities by mastering air transport (selection of landing areas, concern about materiel support). Furthermore, we neither teach nor train commanders and staff officers in observation, reconnaissance, and orientation from the air. This is a very serious gap in the conduct of command-staff exercises. For corroboration of the above, we shall cite an example from the experience of the command-staff exercise of the Turkestan Military District which was carried out in 1959. The day before the start of combat operations the commander of a large unit was summoned for clarification of his task to the senior commander's headquarters, which was located at a great distance from the large unit. The commander, taking the deputy chief of the operations directorate with him, proceeded by vehicle to the airfield, expending four hours of the night going cross country. Upon arrival at the airfield, it turned out that the commander did not have to make the flight. He returned to his command post (P) in another 4 hours, just 30 minutes prior to the "attack". The deputy chief of the operations directorate returned by airplane from the higher headquarters to the area of location of his own headquarters on the second day of operations and, in his own words, found the headquarters, but the pilot, not being trained for operations under these conditions, was afraid to land. The officer returned to his

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headquarters after the end of the exercise. The above again corroborates the fact that at the tactical level (zveno), not to mention the operational, it is necessary to utilize air transport more widely for the control of troops and to train officers and staffs as a whole to use air transport more sensibly.

Two-sided command-staff exercises are carried out in an interesting fashion, but they demand great flexibility of the command echelon in the course of the exercise and also adequate communications with the umpires of both sides, in order to permit correct reaction in good time to the decisions adopted by the sides. For example, if the "northern" troops depart at 1700 hours from their areas of concentrations to new areas, it is not possible to evaluate positively the results of a strike by the "southerners", carried out against these areas after the departure from them of the "northern" troops.

Another example. The results of the action taken by the "northern" side created favorable conditions for the landing of a tactical airborne force in the rear of the "southerners", which was carried out after the necessary substantiations and calculations. The senior umpire of the "northern" side noted all of this. However, when this matter reached the director of the exercise, he changed the conditions radically, "annihilated" the "northern" airborne force, and "threw back" their left flank for a considerable distance, to the benefit of the "southerners". Such lack of understanding between the director and the senior umpires cannot pass unnoticed by the participants, as well as the fact that at exercise critiques, quite correct actions by one or the other side are declared incompetent and incorrect without any basis.

In two-sided exercises, the sides must receive particularly precise results of reconnaissance of targets in the depth which cannot be observed from the ground, especially if there are no actual means of reconnaissance available to the participating staffs. In order that the exercise proceed with great interest and in order that the assignment of tasks to reconnaissance and the receipt of its results be made more concrete and substantial, it is expedient in command-staff exercises to use realistically simulated means of reconnaissance, particularly aerial reconnaissance.

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Depending upon how and when the reconnaissance, communications, and control of intelligence organs is organized, the latter are responsible for furnishing pertinent information on the enemy which must arrive at the headquarters via actual means of communications, for example: by radio from an artillery fire-adjusting plane; from a staff officer observer in a helicopter, reconnaissance plane, or bomber; from a reconnaissance group dropped into the enemy rear; radio intelligence from a higher headquarters, etc. But the content of this information and the nature of its arrival must be as close as possible to those of a real situation.

Completeness of information on the enemy is frequently dependent, not upon well-organized and well-directed reconnaissance, but upon how persistently an intelligence officer follows "on the heels" of the umpire and peers at his map.

At command-staff exercises carried out on the spot, many opportunities exist to organize and carry out reconnaissance with realistically simulated means and even with actual reconnaissance subunits. This is especially important in two-sided command-staff exercises. Of course, there must be designated persons (umpires) in helicopters, airplanes, and subunits of troop reconnaissance who, depending on the nature of the operations of the crew (subunit), will be responsible for furnishing the necessary information and relating this information to the locale which a given crew is observing. In the capacity of umpires, in airplanes (helicopters) and in subunits, it is expedient to have the commanders of these subunits, who will be able to instruct their subordinates in the conduct of reconnaissance simultaneously. This means that the subunits included for this purpose must be composed of their own standard complement and not of a contrived one.

In recent years, units and large units of troops have begun to participate more frequently in command-staff exercises where, as the background of a given exercise, they develop a definite theme in the program of combat training and examine some particular problem. Undoubtedly the inclusion of these troops raises the interest of the participants of the exercise and compels them to be

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more careful in considering the situation and in calculating time realistically; it obliges them to keep in mind the presence of troops; to be attentive also when resolving problems of materiel supply, which frequently are simplified in the absence of actual troops. In the course of the exercise the command echelon must not forget the participating troops, but must train them also. The deputy commander of troops, in particular, must be responsible for this.

At times, due to a number of reasons (hindrances due to sowing of crops, which creates a lack of sufficient motor vehicle transport, etc.), it is expedient to have the troops participate only in certain stages or phases of the exercise. It is always permitted and is never advisable to decline, to simulate troops as subunits of motorized infantry, tanks, artillery, other arms of troops, and also of aviation. This is always justified and will make the exercise more interesting and instructive. The execution of command-staff exercises with simulated troops has special significance now for skeletonized (skadrirovannyy) large units and units and for units and large units maintained at reduced complement. However, even with simulated units, the commanders and staffs must operate in realistic areas and not in reduced areas.

In conclusion, it is advisable to note once again that any command-staff or staff exercise will be more beneficial and instructive only if the staffs participate in the exercise at the strength which they actually have, at the strength in which they will be caught in a real situation, without extra preparations calculated for show and effect of equipment. It is necessary to give the staffs only a strictly limited time period for preparation to go on an exercise or to put them on the alert and place them in conditions close to actual reality.

Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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21 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Submarine Operation of the Navy - the Naval Operation of the Future", by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

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Atomic Energy Commission

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Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Submarine Operation of the Navy - the Naval Operation of the Future", by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev

DATE OF INFO: July 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Submarine Operation of the Navy - the Naval Operation of the Future", written by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Third Issue went to press on 10 July 1961.

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The Submarine Operation of the Navy - the Naval Operation of the Future

by

Admiral Yu. Panteleyev

In the past war the principal enemy of the fleet at sea was the aircraft armed with torpedoes and bombs. This is attested to by the statistics on losses of combat vessels by the nations involved. Whereas, in a number of instances, a vessel could evade a submarine and then even pursue it, the evasion of an aircraft by a vessel was very difficult, and the overtaking and destruction of a departing aircraft was completely impossible. It was hindered in this by its significantly slower speed and by the limited ceiling of its antiaircraft artillery. In other words, in comparison with an aircraft, a vessel possessed neither the maneuverability nor the requisite firepower.

The submarine has actually remained all-powerful ever since World War I.

In our time the aircraft and the submarine have become the major enemies of that leviathan of combat fleets, "the king of the oceans" - the battleship. And this leviathan, which costs billions, has departed from the seas and oceans in ignominy; all naval powers have stopped building it. The same fate has also befallen other large combat vessels. The missile/nuclear weapon has become the basic means of destruction even at sea. Its development has led to the division of naval power into two parts: one part, consisting of nuclear/missile delivery vehicles immeasurably smaller in size than the old battleships and cruisers, has taken to the air (jet aircraft); the other has gone under water, into the depths of the seas and oceans (the submarine fleet).

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We visualize a future armed conflict primarily as a battle in the air and underwater. Moreover, where air operations have their own clear-cut organization and definite composition, the concept of "submarine operations" is entirely new and not reflected in our literature, and has not yet received the "rights of citizenship" in our naval art. Is this right? It would seem not. This conviction evolves from the following considerations.

The study of the history of military operations at sea in past wars must be carried out neither exclusively nor largely for the purpose of learning and defining the course and results of the events themselves, but rather for establishing the new trends in naval art which took place in a given war, what the prospects are for their development, and what results they might produce.

It will be recalled that "submarine warfare" has been mentioned more than once in naval art. The Germans especially declaimed about this; nevertheless, neither in the First nor Second World War, after having declared merciless submarine warfare against the Allies, were they able to bring the Allies to their knees. After carrying out a series of bandit attacks against hospital vessels, and after gaining, unquestionably, certain operational-tactical successes, the German submarine fleet was still unable to achieve any kind of strategic goals with submarines alone. Although partly disrupted, the supplying of England proper was not stopped. The failure of German "submarine warfare" is explained by the fact that their submarines,although able to sink enemy vessels at sea, were not able to demolish his military economy entirely, to destroy the basis for the construction of new vessels, and to crush the antisubmarine defense. For each transport sunk toward the end of the war, the Allies constructed two which were more modern.

Thus, in past wars submarines primarily carried out operational-tactical missions; strategic missions were not within their power to accomplish, primarily because of the status of equipment and the organization of the submarine fleet of those days.

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Is it correct at the present time to raise the question of the organization of purely submarine operations as naval operations of the immediate future? It seems to us that it is. Moreover, a delay in deciding this question can cause harm to the future increase of the defensive power of our country.

First of all, let us attempt to define submarine operations. The meaning of "operation" as a form and method of achieving operational or strategic goals has a very definite connotation in our military art; it is known to the reader and there is no sense in citing it here. Let us agree beforehand that we do not admit the possibility of resolving all missions of a war, or the achievement of its strategic goals, by any one type of armed force. Victory in war can be achieved only through the combined efforts of all types of armed forces in cooperation with one another. Therefore, we view a submarine operation as an integral part of battle by the armed forces in a naval theater, carrying out the performance only of particular operational or strategic tasks.

By a submarine operation we mean an operation of submarine forces which is conducted in the depths of the ocean or the sea without rising to the surface. The term "underwater vessel" was not applied accidentally. The designation "underwater boat" appears to us to be too general, inexact, and not at all suitable for operational-tactical language. At the present time there are missile-carrying submarines with a displacement of several thousand tons, submarines for antisubmarine defense, and submarines of other designations. It is natural, therefore, that a generic understanding be developed for all submarines, whether the submarine fleet or submarine forces which operate in their own peculiar element - in the depths of the oceans and seas.

A purely submarine operation can take place only when purely submarine missions are carried out in ocean depths by a submarine fleet and where the possibilities exist for their fulfilment by submarine forces. In the immediate

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future, just as at present, the submarine forces may conduct operations primarily in conjunction with the aviation and, in some instances, also with the surface fleet. But such operations will not be designated submarine operations; it would be more exact to call them operations of submarines.

As is known,at present submarines operate in close coordination with aircraft and surface vessels which are supporting their operations. We devote a great deal of attention to this problem. Much is said about aerial reconnaissance on behalf of submarines and about the support afforded by surface vessels to the deployment of submarines from their bases or to their return. Some of these situations have become prescribed requirements. During any naval exercise a thorough minesweep of the channels of a naval base is instituted directly prior to the departure of the submarines from the base. Also, in order to support this departure of submarines, all antisubmarine defense forces (protivolodochnaya oborona - PLO) in the area of the naval base are deployed. (We have in mind destroyer escorts and aircraft of PLO.) Finally, a special direct escort is organized to support the departure of submarines from the bases. This great number of ships at sea and aircraft circling about, all engaged in driving off enemy minelaying submarines and in "sweeping away" mines, without even knowing if there are any at all, most blatantly reveal that an operation is being prepared.

Even during the past war a number of measures for the so-called support of submarine deployment started to become outmoded, while submarines more and more gained the right for complete independence of action. Today this trend is becoming evident with an even greater force. Of course, the execution of all or part of the measures indicated above is not excluded even now in certain cases. However, it is entirely clear that such methods for supporting the deployment of submarines or supporting their combat activity are rapidly becoming outmoded and it is necessary to seek new measures.

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One more example. In order to force the enemy antisubmarine defense line with our submarines, it is considered essential to carry out decisive strikes from the air and sea against his PLO forces. But the execution of this strike makes it patently clear that our submarines are getting ready to force that particular line. In this manner, our actions will serve as a distinct combat alert for the enemy PLO. Is it not time for the submarine forces themselves to secure the forcing of the PLO line covertly underwater, without all the uproar on the surface of the sea and in the air? It seems to us that such a time is here, or practically here. Evidently, operations for forcing the PLO line will constitute one of the first submarine operations of the submarine forces.

What kind of operational and strategic missions can the submarine fleet resolve independently because of this developing situation?

As is well known, the military leadership of NATO countries still attaches special significance to its aircraft carrier large units, viewing them as mobile airfields from which aircraft can take off with nuclear weapons. According to the plan of the NATO leaders, these "airfields", being mobile, must be in their positions at the right time in the Atlantic, in the Norwegian Sea, and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which they can destroy designated targets on the territory of the USSR.

Aircraft carrier large units, the fleet's"Enemy No. 1", are powerful but far from invulnerable. They can be destroyed, first of all, by missile strikes of our aviation. But the enemy may try to create strong counteractions with his PVO forces and weapons against these strikes. At the present time it is extremely difficult to conceal the deployment of large masses or of separate groups of aviation and their approach to aircraft carriers, because the eyes of the enemy have become very keen and his ears sharp. The "sudden" appearance of strike aviation from behind the clouds is also excluded, inasmuch as to bank on the inadequacy of enemy equipment or on errors by his leadership is worse than foolhardy. Aircraft also cannot

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"hover" in one zone for a long time, awaiting the arrival of the enemy. For the enemy can deploy his aircraft carrier strike large unit (avianosnoye udarnoye soyedineniye - AUS) prior to the beginning of a war under the most plausible pretexts (cruises, training exercises, etc.).

The submarine fleet possesses incomparably great capabilities for combat with the AUS. It may be deployed in complete secrecy, during the period of exacerbation of the military-political situation, to those very areas of the ocean or sea, designated by the enemy as zones for the deployment of his forces for a strike against our installations. And it may very well be that the enemy aircraft will not have time to take off for the delivery of a strike, as they will go to the bottom together with their "airfield" after being attacked by nuclear weapons of the submarine forces which had been covertly deployed beforehand in the appropriate areas of the ocean or sea.

For the execution of an independent submarine operation to sink the enemy strike aircraft carriers, is it sufficient to have only atomic submarines with nuclear weapons? No, it is not sufficient! The resolution of this mission requires an entirely new organization of large units of the submarine forces. In the interests of ammunition supply and technical servicing, submarines are still grouped in large units on the basis of class and type (submarines with atomic engines, submarines with diesel engines, submarines with torpedoes, submarines with missiles, etc.). Such large units are not suitable for carrying out independent submarine operations.

Upon receiving a combat mission to destroy an AUS, a submarine (or a group of them) must, at the present time, first of all be guided to the target either by aircraft or by a reconnaissance screen of submarines. The commander of an attacking submarine does not see or know who is providing his tactical support or where it is and is forced to operate independently; he watches nothing except the target. Submarines beneath the surface do not yet represent dependably controlled large units.

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It appears to us that it is now essential to create separate submarine large units capable of independently resolving tactical or operational missions. We have in mind submarine squadrons of vessels with atomic propulsion. Such a squadron must consist of strike submarines (with missiles and torpedoes), reconnaissance submarines with powerful hydroacoustical equipment, antisubmarine defense submarines, minelaying submarines, and supply submarines. Upon receiving its combat mission for operations in a prescribed area of the ocean or sea, the submarine squadron, independently, with its own submarine reconnaissance forces, must find the assigned target and direct its strike forces against it. On the basis of his intelligence data, the commander of the operation must plan the main direction of the strike and determine the forces to be used against the main target, the operational makeup of these forces, and the forces to be used in a strike along the auxiliary axis. In a number of instances the covert laying of mines (anchored or floating) may delay enemy deployment and in this manner support the operations of the strike submarine forces. It is doubtful that the existing hydroacoustical equipment of the enemy will be able to determine accurately the entire depth of the operational makeup of the submarine forces and the large number of attacking submarines deployed at various depths. In any event, the ranges of this equipment are still much less than the ranges of our modern long-range torpedoes, let alone missiles.

It is evident that an ocean-going atomic submarine, carrying powerful nuclear armaments, must have its own reliable defense under water from enemy submarines (antisubmarine defense) and from mines (while moving at corresponding depths), in order that the submarine commander can devote all his attention to the major task - the attack of the assigned target. With the development of the means of underwater television, sonar, and communications, the control of a submarine squadron becomes possible and submarine battles and engagements with all their underwater aspects - reconnaissance, deployment, strikes against protective forces and against the main target - assume realistic forms.

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Of course, an operation for the destruction of an AUS may be conducted, as we have already indicated, either by aircraft alone or in coordination with submarines. We do not exclude such a variant, for it does not contradict the basic views indicated above. But we reiterate that even for joint operations with aircraft, the submarine forces must be organized along a new principle. This is primarily necessitated by the strengthened defense of the AUS and by the rising cost of atomic missile submarines, which require considerable support in all their operations. (We have in mind reconnaissance, PLO, and PVO, i.e., those types of defense which a battleship required for itself on the surface of the seas in its time.) It can be said that since "naval power" has gone under water, all of its defense must also go under water.

We have already spoken of the impossibility of aviation's remaining a long time in waiting zones, of its significantly lower capability than submarines for covert tactical deployment, and of the great dependence of aviation upon the condition and availability of an airfield network. To this must also be added the dependence of aviation capabilities upon the weather. Thus, by no means can aviation always guarantee the complete success of its operation against the AUS on all expanses of the world's oceans.

The struggle for securing the possibility of the first strike in the initial period of war will be an important problem for both sides; therefore, in a number of instances, the operational deployment of forces even during peacetime will be unavoidable. Even today submarine forces can occupy necessary waiting positions and from them conduct covert and prolonged observation of the enemy. Aircraft cannot do this. Sonar is incapable of determining either the hull number or the designation of a submarine; for this reason, during an intermittent sonar sounding for submarines it is difficult to determine immediately the number of submarines operating in a given area, since the same submarine may be detected several times.

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We are correct in asserting that "underwater danger" is more serious than aerial danger, for it is more difficult to gain rapidly the particulars of an underwater situation than of an aerial one. After intercepting the enemy, the submarine forces are capable of delivering strikes against him repeatedly and of organizing a pursuit while reloading their torpedo nuclear weapons underwater. All these considerations speak for the advantages and the reality of submarine operations.

Although recognizing the vulnerability of aircraft carriers from the sea, as well as from the air, foreign authors for the time being are still timid but, nonetheless, are expressing views on the growing obsolescence of aircraft carriers as floating, maneuverable "airfields". The attention of these authors is turning to missile-carrying submarines which can use their missiles from the depths of seas and oceans and, especially, from the areas of the Arctic (through the many unfrozen patches of water in the midst of ice) where an aircraft carrier cannot operate at all. It is natural, that in contrast to the AUS, with its numerous support vessels and aircraft, the appearance of our missile-carrying submarines in the ocean and their tactical deployment at great depths can, as we have indicated, be carried out covertly without the knowledge of the surface fleet of the enemy, his aviation, and, even more so, the shore facilities for the detection of submarines. Neither aircraft carriers nor the most powerful aircraft can counteract the arrival of submarines in the Arctic area. The sinking of one or two submarines during their passage into the Arctic by surface vessels or aircraft will not have a decisive effect. In the near future only enemy submarines will be able to counteract the deployment of our submarines. And only our submarine forces, organized into submarine squadrons and carrying out submarine operations, can counteract this formidable force of the enemy.

We shall discuss briefly the plan of operations for the destruction of enemy missile-carrying submarines in the Arctic area, i.e., under the ice in the depths of the

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Arctic Basin. Here, neither an aircraft nor a surface vessel can aid a submarine in the usual manner in any way. Our submarine squadron (a large unit of submarine forces in a given theater) must first of all have its own underwater reconnaissance, consisting not only of reconnaissance submarines but also of technical equipment for submarine detection, installed by special minelaying submarines under the ice (buoys for detecting enemy submarines, mine obstacles, and nets). The creation of such means is not an insoluble problem. In addition, our strike missile-carrying and torpedo submarines for combat against enemy missile-carrying submarines in the ocean depths under the ice must have a mobile underwater patrol and a direct underwater defense consisting of PLO submarines and submarines for detecting mine obstacles (submarine mine detectors, a type of submarine mine-sweeper). A squadron commander must command such an operation from one of the submarines. Control of the forces must be based on reliable means of underwater communication and television. The validity of such an operation has already become apparent; however, the materiel base for its resolution is still more theoretical than practical. Let us recall that this is not the first year that American atomic submarines have studied the under-ice Arctic area.

During the conduct of submarine operations it is absolutely necessary that each submarine know its place in the formation and its place in relation to the bottom of the ocean or sea and to the nearest banks and islands, first of all for security of navigation, as well as for the tasks of tactical deployment and placement of technical means of combat (buoys, mines, nets). One of the most important navigational aids for helping submarines determine their position must be a well-made naval chart showing depths of the Arctic basin and a series of other important data (underwater currents, the steepness and unevenness of the bottom, as well as its characteristics). Such a "submarine" chart should be in the making now and should be periodically updated with new data (areas of sound channels and other hydrological elements) for the most detailed portrayal of the entire underwater environment. However, the availability of even the most detailed charts

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cannot guarantee that there will be an exact pinpointing of the submarine's position. A question arises concerning the creation of underwater hydroacoustic beacons for submarines, concealed from the enemy and operating when triggered by our submarines. Theoretically, the creation of such a beacon, operating on the basis of a coded format, also presents no problem.

We do not deny, of course, the possibility of submarine forces' detecting enemy submarines through the use of technical equipment installed on the ice surface or in the water through holes cut into the ice. But in view of the great mobility and hummocking of Arctic ice and of the vulnerability of these technical means from the air, it should be taken into consideration that these technical means will be used only occasionally. Therefore, they should not be the principal basis on which the reliability of an entire submarine operation is planned.

Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that combat against missile-carrying submarines under the ice in the Arctic is exclusively a submarine operation, in which the participation of other types of armed forces is completely insignificant. On the basis of all that has been stated, it is now time to consider the creation of submarine sailing directions for the seas and oceans.

Combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines outside the Arctic basin must be planned on the same principles as those in the Arctic. To escape aerial and surface pursuit, modern enemy atomic submarines more and more are increasing the depth of their dives, which are now measured in hundreds of meters. In our time, it is not the structure of the submarine itself, but the depth of the sea or ocean, that will soon limit the diving depth. Combat by our submarine forces against enemy missile carriers at great depths will also be a purely submarine operation with all its inherent characteristics.

The significance of the potential enemy's communication routes from America to Europe, across the Atlantic Ocean and, to a lesser extent, the Pacific Ocean, is well known.

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It is necessary to understand correctly the composition and role of ocean shipments in order to assign a mission to the fleet skilfully and to select appropriate forces for the resolution of that mission without expecting more from them than they can accomplish and, at the same time, not assigning them missions which are impossible for them to carry out. Strikes against a convoy on the communications routes, carried out by a group of submarines or by aircraft, can destroy part of the guard vessels and part of the transports. However, this will have no perceptible influence on the situation on the ground front or on the course of the war as a whole, for in a given instant only tactical success is achieved at a time when all ocean communications routes as a whole will have strategic significance. The results of a strike against a convoy must not be judged by individual transport sinkings out of an entire convoy, but by the sinking of the entire convoy, or at least three-fourths of it.

It should be remembered that in a number of instances even the destruction of a convoy in its entirety will not by any means immediately influence the situation at the front, in a campaign, or in the war as a whole. This is all the more reason why it is necessary to destroy a convoy and not to settle for partial tactical successes in the battle against communications routes.

How, then, and by what means, can the destruction of an entire convoy be achieved, a convoy which in a number of instances will proceed in separate groups (large units) which do not fall into the zone of one nuclear bomb? In addition, it should be taken into consideration that some of the vessels will proceed without cargoes for purposes of camouflage.

In the immediate future the resolution of an assigned mission only by missile forces from our own territory is not yet very realistic, since an enormous number of missiles will be required even for one convoy of 100 transports with its escort if a high rate of probability for its destruction is desired. In resolving this same mission aviation will require reliable, uninterrupted reconnaissance of the ocean

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and, since it is capable of only a single attack, will not be able to reload in the air, but will be forced to return to the airfields. We are by no means deprecating the significance of strikes against convoys by aircraft, but we must also note all the weak spots of this type of force.

The matter is different insofar as the capabilities of submarine forces are concerned. Even now, unlike aircraft which can only search for hours, submarine forces can search for convoys independently underwater for tens of days; they can wait until the convoy approaches, overtake it and, without surfacing, take up advantageous positions; then they carry out strikes against the escort forces, break through them for strikes against the transports, and moreover, deliver these strikes repeatedly with the use of underwater nuclear explosions. Naturally, the strike of one submarine squadron will serve as reconnaissance and guidance for another, which can, in several hours, deploy for the completion of the first squadron's strikes against the convoy.

At the present time, and for the immediate future, it is difficult to assume that the enemy convoy escort will quickly and easily detect all the submarine squadrons (2 to 3) deployed in a given zone of the ocean at various depths and be able to determine where, how many, and what type of submarines are deployed. Atomic submarines will always have superiority over a convoy in speed with all the benefits ensuing from this, including the guarantee of concealment of actions.

The place of departure of convoys and their place of assembly at sea can be established not only by aviation, but by reconnaissance submarines; and in the future the entire mission for the destruction of a convoy can be resolved completely within the framework of a submarine operation. It should be kept in mind that the development of PVO means makes aerial reconnaissance very complex and less reliable than reconnaissance with the aid of submarines.

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The parameters of a submarine operation for the destruction of a convoy are already indicated. In its battle against communications routes the German-Fascist fleet adopted "wolfpack" methods with the use of reconnaissance submarines. And only the weakness of technical means during the period of World War II - the lack of underwater television and means of reliable covert communication, prevented the Fascists from resolving the problem of submarine operations completely. Allied communications routes were not disrupted. At the present time the means and methods of radiocountermeasures in our country and abroad have improved significantly. The achievements in this field are not to the advantage of guided missiles and aircraft but do not at all affect the ocean depths, where the means of hydroacoustic concealment and counteraction by submarines are still a long way from results capable of decisively breaking up a maneuver and strike by submarine forces.

Thus, a submarine operation during operations against enemy communications routes becomes plausible in all respects. In a given case we also do not exclude the coordinated operation of submarines with aircraft when this is possible, we say, that a purely "submarine operation" is more effective when it is conducted with decisive goals in mind against communications routes where not a single, but a prolonged and methodical, action is required.

To the extent that the threat to sea communications routes from missile strikes increases, a future war could, unquestionably, see the appearance of submarine tankers, submarine vessels for transporting troops and cargo, and, finally, special submarine amphibious-force-landing vessels. During the past war there were attempts in our country and abroad to create submarine transports. Thus, we delivered ammunition and supplies by submarines to the besieged naval bases of Hanko and Sevastopol. True, these were not special submarines,but combat vessels with limited capabilities for taking on various cargoes, but the idea of creating submarine transports and underwater communications routes received its first practical application.

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Thus, in a future war there will undoubtedly be missions for the destruction of enemy underwater communications routes and for the protection of our underwater communications routes. It is apparent that missiles and aircraft will not be able to destroy submarine transports in the ocean and sea depths. Of course, it is possible that they could achieve partial tactical successes as a result of an underwater atomic explosion capable of destroying one or two submarine transports. However, these successes will not lead to the breakdown of communications routes or to the disruption of deliveries over them.

Underwater communications routes will be at various depths and along different courses, and the submarine transports will proceed in a dispersed manner. Under these conditions, who will be able to find quickly and destroy such a submarine convoy? It is apparent that only properly organized submarine squadrons of the submarine forces are in a position to resolve this important operational and, in a number of instances, even strategic, mission. Aircraft and, even more so, surface vessels, certainly cannot do it.

It is necessary to mention certain special missions which, though not tied in with strategic tasks, have come up in the past and apparently will face the fleet in the future. We are referring to diversionary operations of different magnitudes, carried out for the purpose of destroying radar stations and radio stations of communications of special designation, and also to resolve other missions of the most varied nature, especially on islands or on a sparsely populated and poorly protected shore. These missions cannot by any means always be resolved by a missile, no matter how it may be delivered. Modern technical means permit an installation to be reliably protected even from a ground nuclear burst. Very frequently it will be necessary not only to knock this or that installation out of commission, but, what is much more important, to obtain documents and seize the "tongue". Neither an airborne landing nor a missile can accomplish this mission.

For the resolution of a number of missions of a diversionary nature the temporary presence of subunits of our armed forces at an enemy installation will be required.

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Only submarine forces can suddenly and covertly land such a force and also quickly and covertly remove it. In past wars there were many examples of such use of submarines, but the scale of these operations was limited.

We have reviewed a number of operations, the aims of which, in our opinion, can most effectively be achieved even today by submarine forces and even more so in the immediate future. We have discussed the destruction of aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines, the disruption of surface and underwater communications routes in oceans and seas, and certain diversionary actions of submarine forces.

This is, of course, far from a complete list of all of the missions which could be assigned to the navy and, especially, to its submarine forces. To this should be added the contribution of missiles fired by submarines against naval bases, shipbuilding yards, and other enemy military installations located on shore and in the zone of interior of the enemy country; also, missions involving coordinated action with troops of our maritime front by landing forces in the enemy's rear. However, it appears to us that while these missions can be assigned to our submarine forces today, in the future they can be accomplished with equal success by missile units and long-range aviation. In the resolution of these missions, strategic missiles will completely replace submarine forces, but nothing can replace submarine forces in their battle under the ice and in the depths of the oceans and seas against enemy missile-carrying submarines, his submarine transports, and his aircraft carrier strike large units. Therefore, the question arises as to whether it would not be better to orient our submarine forces in the future chiefly toward those types of operations, the execution of which depends entirely upon them, and in which a missile (ballistic or from an aircraft) cannot at present replace a submarine? Without exception, every type and arm of the armed forces must first of all execute those missions which it has been designated to accomplish and which no one else can accomplish.

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It was not just for sport that our naval reconnaissance seaplanes (MBR-2) bombed troop concentrations on the ground front at Leningrad during the first months of World War II. Of course, during this period no one conducted aerial reconnaissance at sea, since it was impossible in those days to replace a naval reconnaissance plane with any other aircraft - all aviation operated on the ground front. Many seaplanes were lost, but the grave situation at the front at that time necessitated such sacrifices. Such use of naval aviation cannot serve as an example for the future, for this was a unique and atypical case for methods of conducting military operations at sea.

The approach of our missile submarines to the enemy shore to carry out a missile salvo will always entail their entry into the enemy antisubmarine defense (PLO) zone; therefore, if the salvo is carried out from a distance, outside the PLO zone, from an area of complete security (more than 500 to 600 miles from shore), then is it not better in such a case to use the ballistic missiles of the missile troops or to use long-range aviation? For the ocean-going atomic missile submarine is a very expensive weapon; it not only carries expensive equipment, but large groups of highly qualified specialists are on board. There is no one on a strategic missile and the results will be the same, and perhaps even greater, than from missiles fired from a submarine. Why risk an expensive submarine weapon and its entire crew in such a poor cause? We might be asked - why then is the NATO fleet preparing to fire missiles at USSR installations specifically from their submarines? It appears to us that this is explained by the fact that neither the USA nor England at the present time has strategic missiles with the range and, mainly, the accuracy of flight, to justify their being fired from USA bases against all our important installations.

If, nevertheless, our submarine fleet will be assigned the mission of destroying enemy shore and rear area installations, in this case the submarine forces must be organized in a new manner. Individual submarine operations off enemy shores must be dropped, because the enemy anti-submarine defense has become very effective. The strike

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submarine, or a group of them, must have their own direct underwater protection from enemy submarines; and their own reconnaissance submarines to clear the approach routes and the firing area, which is covered not only by the enemy PLO submarines but also by his mine obstacles and other technical means. Thus, even in this case there is a need for a special large unit of submarines, which we have already mentioned.

In no way by our discussions are we preparing to deprecate the significance of missile strikes from submarines against enemy naval bases or other of his installations. We are discussing only the selection of the most effective, economical, and reliable weapon for the accomplishment of a given mission. It appears to us that with the development and perfection of strategic missiles, missions for the destruction of shore installations by submarines will be eliminated.

The role and significance of first strikes in the initial period of a war have been sufficiently delineated in our military literature. The effectiveness of the first strike depends, first of all, upon the secrecy and timeliness of the deployment of the forces during a threatening period. In a number of military-political circumstances, it will be necessary to carry out such a deployment even during peacetime for, so to speak, protective purposes, without the least violation of existing international practices. Which type of weapon can do this with the most secrecy? Who can covertly occupy positions in the area of probable deployment against us by enemy aircraft carriers and missile submarines, or in the area of appearance of a large convoy with troops? Obviously, only submarine forces can accomplish this, because as we have already indicated, it is a very complicated matter to detect their deployment, to say nothing of determining their exact position and the exact number of submarines in the depths of the ocean and sea.

A few words concerning the supply of submarine forces. Submarine vessels are designated for a long stay under water, which their equipment already guarantees. It is

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also necessary to provide for the replenishment underwater of certain types of supplies for submarines. Not too long ago the possibility of refueling a jet aircraft traveling at an enormous speed and height seemed unrealistic, yet today this problem has been resolved. Surface vessels already take on fuel from other vessels while underway, as well as while in anchorage, from storage containers hidden in the depths of the sea. Submarines, however, still come to the surface to take on supplies, and in so doing deprive themselves of all their submarine qualities. It is time to create special supply submarines for supplying submarine squadrons underwater and underwater depots from which a submarine could take on supplies while lying on the bottom.

It should be kept in mind that the possibility of counting on stationary surface floating bases is becoming more and more problematical. There is an urgent need for underwater submarine supply bases in bays near our shores or for special submarines to furnish supplies away from bases. The technical solution of this problem is entirely possible.

What kind of deductions can be made from all that has been discussed?

First of all, it appears to us that the appearance of independent submarine operations in naval art is completely natural. The object and goal of these operations will be such that no other types or arms of the armed forces except submarine forces will be able to engage in or achieve them. We have in mind combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines in the Arctic, under the ice, or in the depths of non-freezing oceans and seas, and also, the destruction of underwater and surface communications routes. In the future, submarine operations will be able to achieve operational, as well as strategic, goals.

Submarine operations will also be conducted in those instances when the accomplishment of a mission jointly with aviation, or by aviation alone, is difficult or, for many reasons, temporarily impossible. We are referring to the

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conduct of submarine operations involving the destruction of the carrier strike large unit (AUS) and the destruction of naval bases and the forces stationed there, as well as a number of diversionary operations, including the landing of tactical amphibious forces.

During the conduct of submarine operations with any type of goals, in a number of instances, when it is possible, a joint operation of submarines with various types and arms of the armed forces is not excluded, first of all with the missile troops and aviation; but at the same time it should be remembered that forms of coordinated operations, besides strategic ones, are becoming more and more complex.

In order to support the conduct of submarine operations, it appears to us that it is necessary now to resolve a number of organizational and technical problems:

-first of all, to work out the organization of strike submarine large units (squadrons);

-to organize a system of covert underwater communications and television in order to ensure navigational security of movement in the depths and to maintain position in an underwater formation, as well as to control the large unit during the delivery of strikes against the enemy underwater;

-to create navigational charts especially for the operation of submarine forces at all depths attainable by them (with an indication on the charts of the temperature, density, and transparency of the water, and the relief of the bottom, currents, and other data);

-to work out and create materiel-technical means for underwater navigation (underwater beacons with coded format) in our own as well as in neutral waters; and also, means of obstruction, placed covertly from submarines (light nets in combination with mines);

-to work out a system for all types of underwater supply, for submarines lying on the bottom at points of dispersal

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and at definite depths and not moving;

-to create a class of special submarine tankers and submarine transports for the shipment of combat supplies, equipment, and contingents of personnel.

None of these proposals is fantastic, for a number of them already are coming into being. The task now consists of creating an orderly system of theoretical postulates and to give clear-cut "orders" to our technology on the basis of these, lest the realities of combat operations of submarines catch us unawares.

In this article we have attempted to present and, wherever possible, to substantiate, certain problematical questions of submarine operations which are subject to detailed elaboration, because submarine forces must, above all, prepare themselves for the conduct of submarine operations as the naval operations of the future.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

23 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", by Admiral V. Tributs

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Artilces of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", by Admiral V. Tributs

DATE OF INFO : October 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", written by Admiral V. Tributs.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article cited on page 11 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art

by

Admiral V. Tributs

The decision of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, on the publication of a Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", in which materials dealing with the most pressing problems of today in the development of the theory of military art will be published, merits a salute. This decision will find wide approval and support from all command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The development by marshals, generals, and admirals of new military-theoretical problems, and the publication and comprehensive discussion of the corresponding materials, will facilitate the development of Soviet military art and the working out of unified views on the nature and methods of waging armed combat with the use of means of mass destruction, missile weapons, and the newest military equipment.

It must be noted that up to the present time the development in our Armed Forces of the most acute and pressing military-theoretical problems has been of a timid nature. This work, which is very important in content, scope, and rate of execution, is still limited.

As a result of this, for a number of years we have not been able to overcome the gap which has arisen between the level of development of the means of destruction and their delivery vehicles and the theory of military art. The latter obviously lags behind and does not keep up with progress in the area of means of mass destruction, missile weapons, and combat equipment in general.

In developing the theory of military art, we must proceed from a quite clear understanding of the fact that under modern conditions wars will not proceed as in the past.

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They will bear little resemblance to previous wars. In view of this, one should speak not so much of the necessity for revising the theory of military art, which will lead us only to partial solutions, as of a new, revolutionary approach to the development of the most vital military-theoretical problems which have appeared before us in recent years.

Modern armament which permits, in essence, an unlimited increase in the speed and scope of destruction, demands not simply a revision but the fundamental development and creation of a new theory of military art, conforming completely to the potentialities of the latest means of combat. At present it must be developed in conformity first of all with the means of mass destruction and missile weapons, the development of which leads to a radical change in the structure of the armed forces as a whole.

Among modern military problems, one of the most important places undoubtedly belongs to the problems of the situation of threat and the initial period of war. To approach the solution to these problems correctly, it must be quite clearly understood that the situation of threat and the initial period of war are not farfetched, but are completely objective strategic categories. It is impossible, therefore, to agree with those authors who assert that under modern conditions war can begin suddenly and that the situation of threat will not occur at all. Such assertions are patently false. The situation of threat will always occur but its characteristic indicators and duration may be extremely diverse. Specifically, there may also be a variant of the situation of threat when its duration will be very, very short.

However, one cannot even conjecture such helplessness of our military leadership and intelligence in which the direct preparations of the aggressor for surprise attack on our Homeland will not be detected to a certain extent. There exist a significant number of indicators which we must know, consider, and know how to uncover. These indicators will enable one to proclaim in advance the period of threat, accomplish the necessary measures for the

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final completion of preparation for war, bring to complete combat readiness all forces and means for the delivery of immediate and crushing strikes on the aggressor, and also for the organization of defense, protection, and speedy elimination of the consequences of the first strikes.

The threat situation may be characterized by such a status of international relations that as a result of a sharp aggravation of contradictions between the states of the Anglo-American imperialist coalition and countries of the Socialist Camp, the threat of the immediate outbreak of war will become so real that it will be necessary to reorganize the armed forces, the economy, and the entire life of the country quickly in accordance with wartime demands. The situation of threat does not appear at once and its tension will increase in accordance with the aggravation of contradictions, complication of the international situation, and the execution by the aggressor of a series of military, economic, and other measures directed at immediate preparation for military attack. On the eve of the Second World War, the German-Fascist command carried out similar operations over a long period. This complex was to some extent known to the leadership of our country and the military command.

Specific signs of the rise of the situation of threat comprise a complicated number of socio-political, economic, mobilizational, and military measures being executed by the probable enemy with the goal of the immediate unleashing of a war. Not only the birth, but also the nature, of the situation of threat may depend on these measures.

At the present time, for the imperialist states, socio-political measures acquire exceptionally important significance among the various directions of preparation for future war. Characteristic indicators of the birth and development of the situation of threat in this area may be, for example, acute activation of ideological indoctrination of the population, arousing in it a national-chauvinistic and revanchist mood, intensification of propaganda of an alleged military threat from the states of the Socialist Camp, and broadening the activities of various fascist and pro-fascist organizations. To these ends, the enemy will make broad use of radio, television, the press, and various forms of socio-political activity.

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At the same time, active preparation of the population for various types of defense will be carried on.

In the area of economics, there may take place such phenomena as a sharp increase in the rate of output of military industry, expansion of its reserve potential, conversion of enterprises of various branches of industry to intensive fulfilment of military orders, limiting the supplies of raw materials having a strategic significance for enterprises producing articles for civilian consumption, and a number of other measures directed at supporting the development of the armed forces and accelerating the preparation for war. The nature of the ocean and sea transportation of the probable enemy and activities of his merchant fleet will change.

The relatively high readiness of a portion of the forces and means of the probable enemy in peacetime which supports the possibility of sudden initiation of military operations, does not preclude the necessity for him to conduct mobilization, even though it be a partial one. Its basis will obviously be the extensive preparation of the forces and means of the second and subsequent strategic echelons of the armed forces which are impossible to maintain under peacetime conditions. These measures will include the callup from the reserves of enlisted and officer personnel and the intensification of their training, transfers of leading command personnel, dispersal of material-technical stocks, taking military vessels out of storage, mobilizing ships of the merchant fleet, developing mobile shore bases and new bases on the unimproved seacoast, etc.

One of the most important indicators of the situation of threat may be measures of the enemy in preparing his naval forces for specific operations: changing the areas and nature of operational and daily combat training of aircraft carrier large units and missile-carrying submarines, movements of aircraft carriers under the guise of training cruises, training exercises, or movements to bases and ports of states continguous to us, the appearance of aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines in zones of ocean

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and sea theaters of military operations from which they can utilize missile weapons and carrier aircraft against our coast and rear areas of the country.

Significant changes in the nature and setup of military communications, radio counteractions, etc., can be observed. The deployment of forces and means of various types of defense and protection, especially antimissile and antisubmarine ones, will obviously assume wide proportions.

It is especially important to consider that there will occur a significant intensification of all types of intelligence and the activiation of intelligence operations of the enemy with broad use of various technical means. The number of flights of his reconnaissance aircraft and pilotless means of observation, and also violations of our air space will increase. The number of enemy submarines conducting systematic observation of the coast and possibly also the number of violations of our territorial waters by various vessels and ships will increase.

This enumeration of possible indicators which can accompany the beginning and complication of a situation of threat is far from complete (the majority of them, to one degree or another, appeared before the start of the Second World War in 1941). Careful monitoring, study, and comprehensive appraisal of these indicators in their dynamics and interdependence has, for us, very important significance. In this it is necessary to bear in mind that the basic measures executed by the enemy with the aim of preparing for the immediate unleashing of a war will be carefully concealed and conducted with great secrecy.

In view of this, the activity of our intelligence, which in the threatening period must be activated to the maximum extent, gains paramount importance. It must uncover the nature of the enemy's preparations to begin a war and make it possible for us to frustrate all attempts for a sudden attack on our Homeland. The

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development of modern technical means of intelligence will have decisive significance in the first place to assure effective operations of submarine and air forces against enemy aircraft carrier and missile carrier large units.

Considering the intentions of the probable enemy and his preparation for the sudden and perfidious unleashing of a war, we must orient ourselves to the least favorable variant of the situation, when the duration of the situation of threat will be extraordinarily short.

Considering these conditions, our Navy is faced with a number of difficult requirements:

-the basic forces of the fleet (submarine and aviation) must be continually maintained at the highest level of combat readiness for immediate use of their weapons;

-indispensable stocks of weapons and means of material-technical support must be dispersed and made invulnerable to strikes on them by the enemy beforehand (in peacetime);

-duty forces and means and also forces and means of all types of defense, antiaircraft (PVO), antisubmarine (PLO), antimine (PMO), etc., and protection must be at a high level of readiness for their immediate use;

-efficient organization and method of preparation of missile weapons for their immediate dispatch to large units, units, and vessels, which still requires a significant amount of time, must be worked out beforehand;

-advanced organization and performance, in specific threatened areas of ocean and sea theaters of military operations, of systematic and reliable reconnaissance, with the aim of uncovering first and foremost the nature of the operations and intentions of missile carrier and aircraft carrier forces of the enemy;

-maintenance at a high level of readiness of the means of controlling forces and the entire communication system.

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Under modern conditions the initial period of a war acquires extremely great importance. Our entire strategy must be purposefully directed so that in this very period of armed combat we may make maximum utilization of the full might of nuclear and other means of destruction and thoroughly predetermine the fate of the enemy.

The top-priority mission in the initial period of a war must be the frustration of a sudden attack by the enemy and the infliction on him of immediate and crushing strikes with the use of all the latest means of destruction.

The determination of the specific content and duration of initial operations does not enter into our mission. Very many diverse variants may be proposed for this. However, one thing is clear -- that the main content of the combat activities of our armed forces in the initial period of war will consist of missile operations in which missile and strike forces of the fleet missile-carrying submarines and missile aviation will also take part.

The effectiveness and success of combat operations in the initial period of a war, to a great extent, will depend on the degree of understanding of the missions assigned to us and the knowledge of the peculiarities of war under modern conditions. It seems expedient to us to point out that further elaboration of problems of the initial period of a war must lead to the singling out in the theory of military art of a special and relatively independent area - the initial period of a war. This will make it possible to raise to a higher level the elaboration of problems, both of the situation of threat and the initial period of a war.

Without touching on the general and extraordinarily important problem connected with determining the structure of the armed forces, which will be solved under the influence of the new situation, when the basis of their entire striking power even now is the missile troops, we shall attempt to throw light on some questions relating to the Navy.

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Undoubtedly the structure of the Navy under the influence of the development of weapons and technology has changed sharply and will change in the future.

Now the basic striking power of the Navy will be composed of submarine forces equipped with missile weapons and long-range torpedoes, and also missile aviation. At particular stages of a war, these strike forces may be strengthened by allocating missile large units from the reserve of the Supreme High Command. The basic composition of the Navy will also include the forces required for protection of the coast and our own sea communications lines. These will be surface vessels equipped with missiles and antisubmarine weapons, and coastal missile units. Finally, the Navy must have special forces required to accomplish the missions of antisubmarine and antimine defense (antisubmarine defense vessels and aviation and minesweepers), intelligence forces (reconnaissance aviation), and a number of other forces.

Not only in a structural but also in a qualitative sense, the modern Navy will radically differ from the Navy of the period of the Second World War and the subsequent years.

We must bear in mind that in a future war we will have to deal with an enemy with a strong Navy, who places great significance on ocean and sea axes with the goal of preparation for and execution of sudden attack by aircraft carrier and missile carrier forces. Therefore, the simplification and narrowing of the missions of the Navy which are going on are premature and completely unjustified measures. On the contrary, under modern conditions the missions of the Navy will become especially critical and more complicated, and the role of the Navy in a future war, if the imperialist aggressors unleash it, will, undoubtedly, grow.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that our Navy will perform missions of an offensive and defensive character in close coordination with the missile troops and other types of armed forces in complete conformity with the unified strategic concept and war plan. Obviously, such missions may be:

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-destruction of the main aircraft carrier strike large units, missile-carrying submarines and groupings of antisubmarine forces of the enemy;

-frustration and disruption of ocean and sea communications lines by destroying convoys and transports at sea and annihilating naval bases, ports, and economic centers located on the coast;

-supporting our troops in their offensive and defensive operations in coastal areas, in the capture of straits and the coastline in straits zones;

-protection of our own naval communication lines.

The destruction of strike aircraft carrier large units and missile-carrying submarines of the enemy will have paramount significance for the elimination of the threat of strikes launched by the enemy from the direction of the ocean and sea. This is one of the most important missions of the Navy, the fulfilment of which becomes most pressing during the initial period of a war.

The destruction of various coastal objectives, including naval bases and ports, and also the destruction of enemy vessel forces located in them, will be executed by naval forces, both independently, and jointly with the missile troops.

The accomplishment of the enumerated basic missions of the Navy in ocean and sea areas contiguous to the theaters of military operations in Europe will support our troops in the execution of swift offensive operations. At the same time we shall note that in various naval theaters of military operations, depending on the general course of armed combat, other missions of a most diverse character may face the Navy.

In the series of new missions now facing the Navy, it is necessary to single out an especially important mission, which is that we must assimilate missile weapons at an accelerated pace and learn to use them skilfully and

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effectively from submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft, as well as from the shore. New weapons become a real and formidable force only when they are thoroughly and skilfully mastered by the personnel of the armed forces. This applies in full measure primarily to missile weapons.

At the same time one also cannot underestimate those types of weapons with which we are still armed and which for some time will not lose their combat value. It is natural that we not only do not have the right to lose the skills acquired in their effective utilization but are obliged to improve them continually.

In the article of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich[1] a highly important question is raised connected with an estimate of the possibility for our troops to carry out the defense of the coast against landing forces. However, in our view, these questions did not receive proper elucidation in the article. Its author proceeds from the assumption that in a future war the enemy will not be able, and will not try, to conduct large-scale landing operations with decisive goals, and therefore the author approached the solution of this question of defense against a landing, in what may be called a somewhat oversimplified manner, with which it is in no way possible to agree.

From an analysis of the operational training of the armed forces of the Anglo-American bloc, exercises and maneuvers conducted in recent years, estimates of the nature and direction of construction of naval forces, and from official documents, one is forced to the conclusion that the probable enemy in a future war not only will not reject such an effective form of conducting offensive operations on a strategic scale as large-scale landing operations, with the aim of capturing territories and broadening the front of armed combat, but on the contrary will execute them very widely. The execution of such operations by the enemy is possible even in the initial period of a war. Therefore, one should not be guided by the fact that the enemy will not try to invade the European

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1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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or any remote theater of military operations by means of large forces. Our attention must be directed to the study of the operating methods of the enemy in landing operations and to devising effective methods for counteraction and elimination of his attempts to execute such operations.

Special attention in this must be paid to the study of enemy methods of landing airborne forces, subsequently reinforced by amphibious landing forces.

The postulation of such a mission is, in our view, more correct. Profound and comprehensive knowledge of these questions will make it possible to organize successful combat against enemy landings. It is known that our defense against landing forces is organized and set up basically with forces of the maritime front which are responsible for preventing enemy invasions from the direction of the ocean or sea. The Navy, participating in this defense, fulfils the missions peculiar to it.

From the arguments of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich it follows that the basic strike against the enemy's landing forces, with the aim of routing him, must be launched only after he has landed on the coast. This is a fundamentally false assertion.

At present we already have the potentialities to detect enemy preparations for a large-scale landing operation. In the future these potentialities must be increased by utilizing new technical means. But this is not the only thing which permits us to eliminate successfully the enemy's attempts to execute a large-scale landing operation. The main thing is that missile weapons and the modern development of naval forces offer us wide possibilities for pinpointing enemy landing operations both on his territory and at sea, i.e., before the landing of his troops on our shore.

Thus, the main efforts of defense (operations) against landing forces must be transferred from our shores deep into the enemy's maritime operational zones, into his territory, and into his rear areas where landing operations are prepared and forces designated for participation in them are concentrated.

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Defense (operations) against landing forces must be given not a waiting, but an active offensive character. The mission must now consist of not permitting the landing of enemy troops on the sea coast, their consolidation there, and creation of bridgeheads for further advance. This is all the more important as every sea landing operation is accompanied and supported by large-scale airborne landing operations. The destruction of landing forces located at sea, landing and disembarking means at ports and bases, and not permitting landings of enemy troops on the shore, will greatly facilitate the combat activities of our ground troops in offensive and defensive operations on coastal axes.

In his article, Colonel-General A. Gastilovich raises the extraordinarily important question of control. However, this question is not developed, apparently in view of the author's opinion that "from the viewpoint of the substance of control of operations, new forms of armed combat will not bring about fundamental changes". If we consider that the most vital aspect of control, its heart, is the working out and adopting of new solutions, then we shall hardly ever detect any sort of evolution in it, either in the past or the present.

Actually this question is considerably more complex. We think that the opinion of General A. Gastilovich as set forth above does not conform to the objective character of the changes occurring in the entire sphere of control, its principles, substance, organization, methods, and means.

Obviously, it is not by chance that problems of control, especially its automation and the use of electronic computers, is of late in the center of attention of our military-theoretical thought. It seems to us that the substance of control has gone through a definite evolution in the past and at present is undergoing extraordinarily great changes. The most important of these is the fundamental growth of the significance of centralization of control and its concentration in strategic spheres, which is the result of the influence of equipping the armed forces with new means of destruction. One should proceed to the solution of the latest problems in the area of control primarily from this point of view.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Tasks", by Lieutenant-General of Aviation P. Dankevich

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Tasks", by Lieutenant-General of Aviation P. Dankevich

DATE OF INFO: October 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Tasks", written by Lieutenant-General of Aviation P. Dankevich.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article cited on page 2 was disseminated as [redacted] The RYM system mentioned on page 3 is a short-range navigation system. 1.3(a)(4)

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Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Tasks[1]

by

Lieutenant-General of Aviation P. Dankevich

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov's article is extremely timely and possesses great significance for a further increase in the combat readiness of our troops. The author's suggestions, both organizational and technical, are directed at the further improvement of the forces and means of military intelligence, and they deserve thorough study and rapid practical implementation.

The role of intelligence is understood by everyone; it is one of the basic types of combat and operational support of troops. However, the lag in the development of the forces and means of intelligence, in contrast to the uninterrupted improvement of combat weapons, gives rise to apprehension and anxiety.

The imperfection in the organizational structure of the organs of military intelligence, as well as the weakness of their technical equipment, is correctly noted in the article.

Let us briefly consider the problems of aerial reconnaissance touched on in the article.

Under the conditions of the high maneuverability of weapons of mass destruction and of troops in operational and tactical depth, and the dynamics of modern combat operations, aerial reconnaissance is one of the basic types of intelligence. It is capable of observing large areas and obtaining the most reliable and documentarily supported intelligence data on important enemy objectives in a short period of time.

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1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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In connection with the increased scope of tasks which are performed by aerial reconnaissance, and the difficulty of their fulfilment, we consider that Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov is absolutely correct in suggesting that an air army (VA) of a front have one regiment of operational and one regiment of tactical aerial reconnaissance. Furthermore, it is desirable that two squadrons in an operational reconnaissance regiment composed of three squadrons be equipped for night photo-reconnaissance and infrared photography, and in a regiment composed of two squadrons, that one of the squadrons be so equipped. Units of such an organization will be able to detect more reliably all enemy operations carried out during the hours of darkness.

For the immediate determination of the coordinates of mobile targets detected by aerial reconnaissance crews, the RYM system and direction-finding equipment must be widely used. It is therefore desirable to have 6 to 8 aircraft equipped with this system in the composition of an ORAP (separate reconnaissance aviation regiment) of operational reconnaissance.

For the support of combat operations of the missiles of a front, the chief of front artillery must have aerial reconnaissance means at his disposal, for example, an artillery fire adjusting reconnaissance aviation regiment (2 to 3 air squadrons).

There should be a single photogrammetric center in the composition of a regiment for the processing and rectification of aerial photos and the determination from these photos of target coordinates. Such a center will be able to unite the photo specialists of the separate artillery fire-adjusting reconnaissance aviation regiment (otdelnyy korrektirovochno-razvedyvatelnyy aviatsionnyy polk - OKRAP), the artillery photogrammetric batteries, and also the specially trained officers from the topographic service of the military district. The photogrammetric center is the final authority for the processing of photo documents and the issuance of target coordinates to the command.

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Non-organic (neshtatnyy) reconnaissance aviation squadrons of air army air divisions will, as a rule, conduct aerial reconnaissance and re-reconnaissance in support of the combat operations of their own large units (soyedineniye).

The time is quite ripe to pose the question of the transfer of the means of aerial radiotechnical reconnaissance from the composition of an air army to a radiotechnical regiment of special designation (osoboye naznacheniye - OSNAZ), subordinate to a front, in order to achieve centralization of control and clarity of purpose in the organization and conduct of such reconnaissance.

Attention and support are deserving for the author's suggestion for the inclusion in the composition of a combined-arms and tank army of an organic regiment of tactical aerial reconnaissance consisting of 2 to 3 squadrons. In our view, a regiment should have one artillery fire-adjusting reconnaissance squadron armed with multi-place aircraft and helicopters for re-reconnaissance and fire adjustment for army missile artillery.

The availability to ground troop armies of their own organic means of aerial reconnaissance will increase the initiative of the commander and the staff of an army in the organization and conduct of combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons and will reduce the time needed for assignment of tasks and for the receipt of reconnaissance data from the crews of reconnaissance aircraft. In order to ensure the timely receipt of reconnaissance data from airborne aircraft (helicopters) and the control of crews in the air, the large units of ground troops must have radio stations (receiving and transmitting) with the necessary anti-jamming features and range of operation (up to 200 km).

In order to fulfil the entire scope of tasks assigned to reconnaissance aviation, the latter must not only be greater numerically in its composition, but it must also be correspondingly better equipped technically.

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A reduction in the combat strength of the aviation of a front, in our view, must not lead to a decrease in the number of reconnaissance aircraft until they are gradually replaced by pilotless means of aerial reconnaissance.

Modern technical outfitting of the means of aerial reconnaissance is most inadequate and obviously lags behind the development of combat weapons. The reconnaissance aircraft presently in use will not be able to provide the full scope of reconnaissance data to our missile and aviation units.

For the successful conduct of aerial reconnaissance, special reconnaissance aircraft are needed, capable of conducting observation from various altitudes (from 100 meters up to 25 to 30 km) and having a great range of speeds (up to 2000 to 2500 km/hour) and sufficient range and duration of flight. It is perfectly obvious that such aircraft must have improved flight and ground technical equipment, enabling them to conduct reconnaissance and photography by day and night from any altitude, to conduct television and radiotechnical reconnaissance, and to rapidly transmit data on the enemy with the use of automatic coding and secure transmission apparatus.

A no-less-important element of strengthening the organs of military intelligence is the training and retention at all echelons of intelligence officer cadres and their acquisition of experience in the organization and conduct of reconnaissance, especially of the weapons of nuclear attack. It is also very important to take stock in peacetime of targets detected on the territory of the probable enemies.

Concerning the urgent necessity for the creation in our armed forces of more sophisticated means of reconnaissance, a number of articles have been published in the military press and many proposals have been put forth at military-scientific conferences; however, the accomplishment of this most important task is moving very slowly.

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The urgent execution of measures directed at the improvement of the organizational structure of military intelligence as a whole, including aerial reconnaissance, and the marked improvement of technical equipment of the means of reconnaissance, undoubtedly will permit the elimination of the lag in the capabilities of intelligence in contrast to the rapid development of combat weapons, and will fully support the combat operations of our troops.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

27 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare", by Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev, Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and Colonel K. Pavlovich

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare", by Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev, Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and Colonel K. Pavlovich

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare", written by Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev, Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and Colonel K. Pavlovich.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article cited on page 3 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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The Problem of Transportation in Modern Warfare

by

Lieutenant-General of Technical Troops I. Kovalev,
Colonel-General of Technical Troops P. Bakarev, and
Colonel K. Pavlovich

The appearance of nuclear/missile weapons has caused basic changes in the means and methods of conducting armed combat.

On the basis of the well-known tenet of Engels that "tactics and strategy depend, first of all, on the level of production and means of communication attained at a given moment" (F. Engels, Anti-Duehring, State Political Publishing House, 1952, page 156), it is necessary to examine in the light of new conditions, one of the problems of utmost importance to our country, namely, the problem of transportation in modern warfare, the strategic role of which has grown immeasurably.

V.I. Lenin indicated that without well-prepared and organized transportation, and without railroads, modern warfare is an empty phrase.

These tenets of Marxist-Leninist teaching retain their full strength and meaning. Modern warfare will demand the maximum effort of the economic, military, and psychological forces of the country. From its very first moments the efforts of all types of transportation must be concentrated on supporting combat operations of the missile troops, PVO troops, and the first strategic echelon of our Armed Forces. At the same time tremendous efforts must be directed at ensuring shipments for mobilization of the armed forces and their strategic concentration.

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In connection with this, it is impossible to agree with the opinion of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich which was expressed in his article.[1] He apparently maintains that allegedly mobilization and strategic deployment of a multimillion-man army is impossible and unnecessary under present conditions because nothing from the interior of the country will reach the front in time, and may not even reach it at all. In his opinion, the outcome of war will be decided by missile troops and border district armies, in such strength and with such armament as they had when war fell upon them.

The views of Colonel-General Comrade Gastilovich are apparently based on the assertion that allegedly under modern conditions only "blitzkrieg" war is possible.

We cannot agree with this viewpoint. The country and its armed forces should not be prepared only for a "blitzkrieg" war. The risk is too great, too great and tragic are the possible consequences in the event that the war assumes a protracted character. Indeed, the fate of the Socialist Camp will be placed on the scales of war. Prolonged war must not be rejected at the very outset. On the contrary, it is for just such a war that the country and its armed forces must be prepared, allowing, at the same time, for the possibility of a "blitzkrieg", and preparation for the latter must be provided for and carried out, but within the framework of preparation for a protracted war.

The tasks connected with preparation of transportation for war are distinguished by their tremendous labor-consuming character and demand great resources and attention. To organize these properly there must be a clear and concise conception of the nature of modern warfare. If we agree with the viewpoint of Colonel-General Comrade Gastilovich, and rule out the possibility of anything but a "blitzkrieg" which would be decided by the forces of only border district armies, and plan the development of the war economy, and specifically transportation, accordingly, then we may lose precious time made available by the period of peacetime development, and at a moment of severe trial find ourselves ill-prepared for a protracted war.

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1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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Our opinions are based on the fact that nuclear/missile weapons will not eliminate massed armies but, on the contrary, will cause their inevitable increase, because losses in personnel will increase and large numbers of reserves will be required to replace them. Besides, no amount of missiles can ensure the occupation and retention of enemy territory; troops are needed for this, and a great many troops.

The decisiveness of the aims and the tremendous spatial scope of modern warfare make it necessary to transit considerable expanses. Armed combat carried on simultaneously in several isolated theaters of military operations will call for strategic and operational maneuvering of forces and weapons, as well as the bringing up of large quantities of supplies to troops in action during the course of the war. These shipments, for the most part, will be carried out not only on the territory of the USSR, but also on that of the adjacent allied countries, as well as on enemy territory.

Organizing shipments between countries is complicated by the varying widths of railway gauge, differences in means of transportation, and by the absence of a unified controlling organ which has appropriate authority for carrying out and coordinating military shipments between countries, conducted on land, sea, and air.

In addition to military shipments, consideration must be given to the large volume of shipments within each country to satisfy the requirements of the military economy and civilian population of the countries taking part in a war.

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Recently, with the spread of opinion regarding the possibility of a "blitzkrieg", and the simplifications permitted in conducting command-staff exercises, many generals and officers have formed an incorrect idea

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regarding the place and role of various types of transportation in war. The role of railroads is greatly belittled because of their supposedly great vulnerability to strikes of all types of weapons and the complexity of reconstructing them. These ideas are quite erroneous. Their authors fail to take into consideration the fact that railway transportation remains the basic and decisive type of transportation in the zone of interior and one of its basic types within the limits of the front.

The experience of many wars shows that with a well-organized reconstruction service, railroads possess a high degree of viability, and any damage to them is quickly eliminated. This pertains to the conditions of nuclear/missile war as well, during which it is possible to maintain relatively prompt reconstruction of damaged sections of railroad lines by the assignment of appropriate manpower and the extensive mechanization of work.

In relation to this question, the statements of two prominent American generals are of considerable interest.

The former commander of the 8th U.S. Army in Korea, Van Fleet, writes in his memoirs: "We knew that the basic mass of military supplies was delivered to the enemy by rail. We knew the location of all railway lines. We had superiority at sea and in the air...We did everything possible day after day, and still could not stop the traffic of the Red trains. We attacked with dive bombers and from low altitudes, shelled with artillery fire from heavy sea and landbased guns, attacked with rocket weapons and machine guns, and organized sabotage. We were witnesses of new proof of the dependability and flexibility of railroads in wartime."[1]

Chief Engineer of the U.S. Army General Hall, in mentioning that in case of war railways will pass from the category of a necessary means of transportation to one of vital importance, stresses the fact that even under the impact of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, railway installations were the most stable.

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1. James Van Fleet, Railway Transport and the Winners of Wars. Washington, 1956.

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All this attests to the high viability of railroads and, consequently, also to the fact that with appropriate preparation and organization of a reconstruction service, they will be one of the major strategic means of support for armed combat even in modern warfare.

For proper clarification of the role of the individual types of transportation in the economy of the country, now and in the near future, let us list some figures which characterize their relative proportion in relation to the overall freight turnover of our country.

Types of Transportation	1940	1958	1965
	in percent		
Rail	85.1	81.17	71.33
Sea	4.9	6.6	10.5
River	7.4	5.3	5.1
Pipeline	0.79	2.1	6.8
Motor Vehicle	1.8	4.8	6.2
Air	0.01	0.03	0.07

It is apparent from these figures that rail transport still accounts for more than 80 percent of all freight and passenger shipments, and if we count only that which covers distances of over 1,000 km, then the proportion of rail shipments will rise to 90 to 95 percent. This should always be kept in mind in working out various theoretical conceptions and in developing long-term plans for shipments, so that they are based on the actual capabilities of the transportation means.

It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that the railway type of transportation is the cheapest, and, after all, questions of economy have important significance not only in peacetime but in wartime as well.

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The cost of shipping one kilometer-ton of freight by rail is about 3 kopeeks, as compared to 58 to 70 kopeeks by motor vehicle, and more than 3 rubles by air transport.

For a long time to come railway transport will have a decisive role in serving the transportation needs of the country, in peacetime as well as wartime, especially in long distance shipping of freight.

During the period of the Second World War, 1941 to 1945, the proportion for the various types of transportation in the total volume of military shipments (excluding medical shipments) were:[1]

Types of Transportation	Average Shipping Distance (km)	Proportion (in percent)
Railway	700	70.5
Water (sea and river)	700	9.5
Motor Vehicle	100	19.8
Air	700	0.2

In modern offensive operations, when the operational rear is of considerable depth, regardless of the development of other means of delivery, rail transport will carry up to 50 percent of all front shipments. Neither transport aviation, field pipelines, nor motor vehicle transport can replace railways in the near future.

We are for the comprehensive utilization of all types of transportation because no single type can independently fulfil all the needs of the national economy and the armed forces. Consequently, the task consists of working out the principles of comprehensive utilization of all types of transportation on the basis of a thorough analysis of the nature of modern warfare and taking into consideration the actual potentialities of the theaters of military operations. In accordance with this, we must bring about their development and essential construction.

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1. Military Communications in Light of the Further Development of Military Art. Military Publishing House /date and page missing/

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The viability of the transportation network depends to a large extent on the degree of its preparation in peacetime.

One of the most important measures is the development of a network of railroads and highways, construction of airfields, pipelines, river and seaports, and also of bypasses of major junctions of communications lines, tunnels, large bridges, etc. The accomplishment of these tasks will take a prolonged period of time and large capital investments, and in this connection, they must be closely coordinated with the economic needs of the country. It is necessary to combine correctly the economic and defense interests of the country, which in our opinion, is not always done in practice in questions of the development of the transportation network.

For instance, the Seven-Year Plan calls for laying 90,000 km of rails on railroad lines. Of this amount, only 9,000 km are allotted for new railway construction, and the rest will be used for the reconstruction of existing lines and replacement of old rails. It must be stated, that in the course of the past several years the rate of railway expansion has fallen behind the growth rate of the volume of industrial output. For the past 10 years the volume of industrial output has grown yearly by 10 to 12 percent, but the expansion of rail lines has been only 1 percent, and highways even less than that. The density of the network of rail lines and mobile highways even in the western theater of military operations, the most favorable in this respect, is illustrated by the following figures:

	Rail lines	Automobile highways
	(in km per 100 sq km of territory)	
In the Soviet Union	2.7	10.5
In other countries of the Socialist Camp	9.2	42.0
In the capitalist countries	10.7	75.0

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It is necessary to note that in compiling these figures on the USSR, only those territories having the most highly developed networks of railways and automobile highways were considered.

Having a total network of main railway lines stretching for 123,000 km, we haul 60 percent more freight than the entire railway network of the USA, which stretches for 340,000 km (first-class roads only). Thus, the density of freight traffic carried by railways in the USSR is 4.5 times that of the USA. During the current Seven-Year Plan the average freight traffic density will be increased by another 50 percent approximately. Thus, despite the development of other means of transportation, the operating pace of the railways of the USSR in the coming years will not decrease, but on the contrary, will increase considerably. Meanwhile, it is now planned to utilize basic capital investment not for the development of new rail lines, but for the reconstruction of existing lines.

From the military viewpoint, in a number of important areas it would be more correct to solve the problem of ensuring the shipment of the increasing flow of freight by building new railway lines, because a denser network also has a higher degree of viability.

Converting the basic railway main lines to electric traction will not raise the viability of the transportation network, because the work of the railways will depend entirely on the uninterrupted performance of the powerful electric power plants, which in themselves will be an important target for enemy strikes. In these circumstances it is necessary to establish alternate sources of power (zakoltsevat) in our power system as soon as possible.

Diesel-electric traction is more independent, and consequently more viable, provided that stocks of diesel fuel are established for a prolonged period of time, because fuel suitable for diesel locomotive use is produced in only one or two places in the country. It must also be noted that our main line locomotives cannot be used abroad because of their clearance and load characteristics and the design of the running gear, which is not adaptable to West European gauge.

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One of the measures for increasing the viability of the transportation network which is being carried out in peacetime is the construction of bypasses of major railway junctions and establishment of stocks of reconstruction materials and structures.

In our opinion, a number of errors are committed in this matter. Bypasses of junctions take a long time to build, and are expected to be used only in wartime. Thus, large capital investments are immobilized. For example, the bypass of the Smolensk railway junction, which has been under construction for 10 years, and whose estimated cost is 52 million rubles, does not completely perform the task of increasing the viability of this railway. It is necessary to construct wide bypasses of junctions, taking into account the possibility of using them in peacetime for transporting local freight, thus allowing for fast recovery of the expenditures which have been made.

Little attention has been given to the problems of the construction and development of rail spurs to river and seaports, moorages for support of combined rail-water shipments, and also to the construction of railway spurs to airports.

Not everything is going well in establishing stocks of materiel, structures and equipment for the reconstruction of bridges, tunnels, ports, airfields and other installations in the transportation network. For instance, the Ministry of Transportation is stockpiling pre-assembled, transportable (tselnoperevozimyy) spans weighing up to 68 tons to reconstruct bridges, and they can be transported only by rail and installed by special railway cantilever cranes.

Under modern conditions, when the enemy will attempt to cut our railway network into individual isolated sections, in a majority of cases it will not be possible to transport these spans and cranes by rail to the bridges under reconstruction.

In our opinion it would be proper to stockpile prefabricated bridge structures, and cranes to install them, so that in case of need they could be shipped by motor vehicle transport.

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It is advisable also to establish stocks of materials and structures for reconstructing highway bridges and river ports.

At present the need has arisen for closer coordination of activities among the member countries of the Warsaw Pact. Many problems have accumulated which require coordinated solutions and collaboration. Specifically awaiting a solution are problems of great importance such as:

-establishing a park of special rolling stock which would allow for automatic transfer (while in motion) from the Soviet gauge of 1524 mm to the West European gauge of 1435 mm and back again without changing trucks;

-setting up extensions of rail lines with Soviet gauge deep into the territory of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania and of West European gauge deep into our territory;

-establishing common bases for reconstruction materials and structures and consolidating them;

-reinforcing railway and highway bridges to meet the load specifications of our rolling stock and units of independently driven equipment.

All these problems have a direct bearing on ensuring the viability and the uninterrupted performance of the transportation network during a period of war.

To solve them we must first of all enlist the services of the already existing Organization for the Cooperation of Railroads of the Socialist Countries (Organizatsiya Sotrudnichestva Zheleznykh Dorog-OSZhD) but include in it appropriate military specialists.

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In addition to engineer-construction measures, the viability of communications lines is ensured by the presence of reconstruction organizations, capable of moving quickly to work installations and having at their disposal the necessary equipment cadres of specialists trained in working under conditions of radioactive contamination of the terrain.

Within the boundaries of the zone of the front, the viability and reconstruction of communications lines will be ensured by railway, engineer, and road units which are trained to perform this work in peacetime.

Reconstruction of the rear area networks is entrusted to the organizations in charge of their operation and which do not have the technical equipment or the trained cadres for performing this work.

The exception is the Ministry of Transportation, which has reconstruction trains and bases of reconstruction materials. In addition, for reconstruction of major installations it is provided that construction organizations of the Ministry of Transport Construction will be called upon. However, even these organizations are not trained in the reconstruction of installations destroyed by nuclear weapons.

In case of large-scale destruction of major railway installations whose reconstruction will require a great deal of time, the organization of temporary transshipment areas (vremennyy peregruzochnyy rayon - VPR) should be provided for in order to transit obstructed areas by using other forms of transport, primarily motor vehicle. For servicing the VPR, special mobile formations should be organized for wartime and equipped with loading-unloading machinery and motor vehicle transport.

It would be incorrect to assume that such special formations will be able to perform independently the task of transshipping freight in obstructed areas. Even rough estimates indicate that for setting up a VPR on such a main line as that between Moscow and Minsk, when the railway

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junction at Vyazma has been destroyed, and through which pass 76 pairs of trains daily, the transshipment area stretches for 250 to 300 km, and for it to service transshipment of supply trains alone we shall need no less than 10,000 motor vehicles and more than 15,000 men for the loading-unloading operations.

In circumstances when the enemy inflicts large-scale destruction, it will be very difficult to effect necessary national economic and military shipments without strict centralization of the comprehensive utilization of all forms of transport.

At the present time in our country, all forms of transportation are controlled by various ministries and departments. Some of them are subordinate to central, and some to republic and local organs of authority. Because of this, it is very complicated,even in peacetime, to organize and conduct combined shipments with the participation of 2 to 3 types of transport.

In time of war, such bureaucratic disunity in transportation means is intolerable because it can lead to serious consequences for the armed forces, as well as for the economy of the country, and these consequences would be difficult to correct.

All forms of transportation which are at the disposal of the country can be systematically and expediently utilized only if the control of their exploitation emanates from a single center, closely connected to the Supreme High Command.

In our opinion, it is extremely essential to unite the management of all types of transport in one organ, for instance, in a specially established transportation committee. At the same time, decentralization of control must be ensured by establishing 8 to 10 directing bodies territorially and administratively linked with industrial-economic areas and military districts. Such a system will ensure the viability of the controlling organs and will permit a more effective solution of the problem of combined utilization of all types of transportation in peace and wartime.

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At the same time it is necessary to complete the unification within the Ministry of Transport Construction of all construction organizations which conduct construction of rail lines and highways, pipelines, airfields, and sea and river ports, after preparing them organizationally and technically for wartime accomplishment of the most complex work in reconstructing communications lines in the zone of interior.

However, the forces of the construction organizations of the Ministry of Transport Construction alone will be far from sufficient to reach this goal. Appropriate preparation is needed so that reconstruction work and the establishment of VPR's are also assigned to local territorial organizations and the populace.

In wartime, reconstruction of communications lines in the zone of interior must become a common task of all the people and be organized by the State. People and equipment must be assigned in advance to all the most important installations (rail centers, ports, large bridges, etc.) and, in case of need, must go immediately to the installation and put themselves at the disposal of the chief in charge of organizing the reconstruction work.

Under peacetime conditions, it is expedient to conduct a series of measures in accordance with the policy of the Ministry of Defense and the civilian ministries to ensure more effective utilization of the means of transport in the initial period of a war.

In the present situation, to outfit one fully mobilized motorized-rifle division, various types of equipment must be brought from 29 to 32 separate depots to the activation point from distances of 500 to 2500 km. In order to decrease this volume of shipments at a time when the railways are working under the most strain, complete depots should be set up at the mobilization points, from which all the requisite military equipment and materiel could be obtained at once.

The problem of supplier and consumer routing of trains must be solved in order to reduce to a minimum the layover time of military goods at points where trains are reconstituted.

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It is time to take practical action in creating special freight containers, pallets (poddon) and other means for shipping military goods which will ensure mechanization of loading-unloading work and will sharply reduce the layover time of trains in transshipment areas.

To decrease the time needed for full mobilization and shipment of troops of the first strategic echelon, the traveling speed of trains should be increased to 1000 km per 24-hour period (i.e. doubled) and the weight of a military train increased to at least 1500 tons (gross weight) instead of the 1200 tons used presently. The present level of technical equipment of railway transport fully allows implementation of these measures.

According to modern views, it is planned to reconstruct, in a frontal zone, 2 or 3 frontal railway routes and 1 or 2 lateral ones. To carry out these tasks, the composition of the front includes 5 or 6 railway brigades, reinforced with bridge regiments, battalions of railway pontoon bridges, special formations, and, when necessary, tunnel battalions.

The rate of reconstruction of railways will depend to a considerable extent on the extent and nature of their destruction and on the number of railway units assigned to the reconstruction of one or another railway route.

It is known that in previous wars each of the opposing sides tried to effect complete destruction of railways during a retreat. Roadbeds, tracks, all bridges and pipes, communication lines, railway water supply installations, and service and technical buildings were all blown up. Practically speaking, such complete destruction was possible only in a tactical zone of defense to a depth of 20 to 40 km from the main line of resistance, and then only under conditions of a slow retreat. In an operational zone 100 to 200 km in depth, railways suffered a slight to average amount of destruction.

In the currently effective regulations and instructions of our probable enemies, there is provision by way of "delaying operations" for massive obstructions along communications routes. In the field manual of the

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US Army, Obstruction and Destruction, it is planned to use nuclear weapons to create obstructions. Considerable work has been done in West Germany in preparing structures for destruction. According to available data, mine devices have been installed in more than 300 installations (bridges, tunnels, dams, reservoirs).

The experience of the last war showed that the faster the rate of offensives of troops, the less time the enemy has to set up obstructions. Under modern conditions, with the fast rate of offensive and the dense railway network in the western theater of military operations, it is to be expected that the enemy will be in a position to destroy railways only by individual focal points, striving to split and break up the entire network into isolated sections. Moreover, first to be destroyed will be all large bridges and tunnels. The extent of destruction to railways in this case will not be as great as in the case of complete destruction, but the nature of destruction and conditions of reconstruction will be more complex than in the last war.

Under the conditions of highly mobile modern warfare, when offensive operations are conducted in great depth and the destruction of railways is accomplished at certain points, railway units will have to work along a wide front, separated from each other, as a rule, in small subunits, often in a "deep envelopment" of railway sectors still occupied by the enemy, or in "corridors" made by our troops.

Taking into account the possible tempos of offensive operations, railway troops must reconstruct the basic front railway main lines at a pace of no less than 45 to 50 km per 24-hour period and strive to raise this to 55 to 60 km per day. In the last war the railway reconstruction rate in one front operation was 5 to 8 km on one route (in individual cases up to 20 to 25 km).

In order not to be separated from the advancing troops by more than a distance of a day's ride by motor vehicle transport, railway troops must reconstruct any destroyed point or any installation in 3 to 3.5 days. If its

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reconstruction requires more time (for instance, building a bypass of a railway junction or bridge, reconstruction of tunnels, etc), then it will be necessary to overcome the obstructed area by establishing a VPR and by wide use of other types of transport.

The task of increasing the rate of reconstruction of railways to 55 to 60 km per day, and more, demands a fundamental change in the technical equipment of railway troops, the creation of new types of reconstruction means based on wide use of automation, telemechanics, and the overall mechanization of reconstruction processes.

Railway troops must be mobile. Their technical equipment and reconstruction equipment must be capable of being transported not only by rail and motor vehicle transport, but also by airplanes and helicopters. Only by this approach can the task of increasing the pace of railway reconstruction to the required level be performed. In addition we must not lose sight either of certain problems of an organizational nature.

As is known, the composition of the troops of the Soviet Army which are deployed beyond the western national borders of the USSR does not include railway units. In case of war, railway units will take at least 5 to 6 days to arrive at the front and start work, while during this time the advancing troops will move forward considerably. Consequently, in the very first days of a war, a significant separation may develop between operating railways and the advancing troops.

All bases for reconstruction materials and structures are also located on the territory of the USSR, at a distance of more than 2000 to 3000 km from the line of deployment of troops of the first line. Even if there are sufficient stocks of these materials, it is impossible to deliver them quickly to reconstruction sites.

Such a situation cannot be considered normal. In order to reconstruct railways in the wake of the advancing troops, railway units and materiel bases must be located as close as possible to departure lines.

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There is no clarity in the problems of organizing the operation of reconstructed sectors and their technical concealment. Many independently operating organizations have appeared in front railway sectors. Reconstruction of railways is conducted by railway brigades and special reconstruction formations subordinate to the chief of railway troops of the front (NZhVF), and operation of the reconstructed railway sectors is ensured by operating railway regiments and operating special formations, subordinate to the chief of the military-operating directorate of the front (nach. VEU). The organization of military shipments is conducted by the chief of military transport of the front (nachalnik VOSO). They all have equal rights and, with the exception of the chief of VOSO, are directly subordinate to the commander of the front. The NZhVF and VEU for special service are also subordinate to the Ministry of Transportation of the USSR.

When our troops are operating on the territory of allies, it must be taken into account that there are also local governmental organs of railway administration with whom the work must be coordinated.

As was pointed out earlier, under modern conditions we must strive for the comprehensive utilization of all types of transportation located within the limits of the front: rail, water, motor vehicle, air, and pipeline. Yet, all these types of transportation are subordinate to different arms of troops and services.

The need has arisen to examine the problem of setting up within the composition of the front a single military transport service (directorate), endowed with the necessary powers for organizing centralized utilization of all types of transportation subordinate to the front and appropriate authority to coordinate problems of military shipments with appropriate ministries and departments. The complement of this directorate must include experienced specialists and representatives of all types of transportation who are capable of establishing and efficiently directing a powerful transport service.

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At the beginning of the Second World War an attempt was made to assign the responsibility for reconstruction and operation of front railways to a representative of the NKPS (Narodnyy Komissariat Putey Soobshcheniya - Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation), who was attached to the Military Council of a front. The experience of many wars has shown that front railways must be controlled by the military, especially beyond the limits of our national boundaries. In time of war, neither railwaymen nor local agencies of authority will recognize anyone else's authority, and no one else will have adequate legal rights.

At the present time the planning of shipments and coordination of the tasks of all types of transportation are the responsibility of the third department of the headquarters of the rear services of a front. This department will be unable to resolve a single practical problem, and will be a superfluous echelon of command, tying up the operations of all transportation agencies. This conclusion is corroborated by the experience of many practical exercises.

To ensure comprehensive utilization of all types of transportation, it will be necessary to make up mutually coordinated schedules and plans (possibly using electronic computing machines), a unified dispatcher control for shipments, good and accurately operating communications, etc. All this requires highly qualified specialists who have experience in working in transportation agencies.

To coordinate the preparation of the entire transportation network for operation in wartime, and also to resolve problems of its utilization in the interests of operating troops, it is necessary to set up, within the scope of the member-countries of the Warsaw Pact, an appropriate transportation agency which must be closely connected with the OSZhD.

It is also expedient to distribute properly the stocks of reconstruction materiel, and to unify reconstruction

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equipment and reconstruction units so that they will meet modern requirements. Comprehensive utilization of all types of transportation must also be organized in accordance with a unified plan, regardless of the nation to which they belong.

It is perfectly obvious that appropriate preparation of means of transportation for work under conditions of war must be carried out in advance. Every delay in this matter is very dangerous because the scope of the work is so great that it will be impossible to make up lost time in the course of a war.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 Feb 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Rear Services Support of Missile Troops in an Offensive Operation of a Front", by Lieutenant-General M. Novikov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

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U. S. Air Force

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Rear Services Support of Missile Troops in an Offensive Operation of a Front", by Lieutenant-General M. Novikov

DATE OF INFO: 1960

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Rear Services Support of Missile Troops in an Offensive Operation of a Front", by Lieutenant-General M. Novikov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army commander.

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Rear Services Support of Missile Troops in an Offensive Operation of a Front

by

Lieutenant-General M. Novikov

Nuclear weapons, missiles of various designations, and radio-electronic equipment are the basis of the further development of our Armed Forces. These means of combat, together with the mechanization of the Army and Navy, have altered the appearance of our Armed Forces and have given them new combat qualities.

In the troop composition of the Soviet Army there are large units and units armed with ballistic, antiaircraft, and other missiles of various designations. A front can have several missile large units and units of front and army subordination, armed with operational-tactical and antiaircraft missiles, and also subunits of tactical and antiaircraft missiles which are organizationally a part of the motorized-rifle and tank divisions.

The extensive equipping of troops with missile weapons and their leading role in the attainment of the goals of an operation bring forward completely new and very responsible tasks for the rear services, namely, the rear area support of missile troops. The fulfillment of this task is complicated by the fact that the demands of the front for missiles and missile fuel for an operation attain quite imposing dimensions. According to experience gained from exercises conducted, the expenditure of all types of missiles in an operation consisted of several thousand missiles, while the expenditure of missile fuel was several thousand tons, of which up to 70 percent were oxidizers--components of missile fuel which are extraordinarily dangerous during storage and transport.

It should be emphasized that the success of modern operations will now depend largely upon the uninterrupted delivery to the troops

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of missiles, nuclear ammunition, and missile fuel, and also upon the timely assembly and preparation of missiles for firing. Therefore, the problems of rear area support of missile troops acquire exceptionally important significance.

As is generally known, primary and alternate siting areas are assigned to missile large units and units in a front offensive operation. They are located along the entire front zone and are echeloned to a great depth. The movement of missile units and large units in the course of an operation takes place, as a rule, by battalion or by battery, at various times, taking into consideration the tasks being fulfilled and the tempos of the troop offensive. The troop missile subunits move, for example, several times in a 24-hour period with jumps of 10 to 15 kilometers, army subunits once in a 24-hour period, and front subunits two or three times during the entire operation. Strictly on the basis of the features of dispersed disposition of missile units and the necessity of their frequent movement, it is necessary to organize the rear services and carry out rear area support of missile troops.

In organizing rear area support for missile large units and units, it is also necessary to bear in mind that missiles, as regards their construction, weight, and overall dimensional characteristics, differ substantially from other types of ammunition, and their preparation for launching is involved with the execution of a number of preliminary tasks with regard to assembly, fueling, and testing. In connection with the great weight and overall dimensions of missiles, specially equipped rail, motor vehicle, and air transport, and also loading-unloading equipment with great hoisting capacity, are required for their transport.

The complexity of supplying the missile troops with missile fuel is explained by its special properties: toxic, aggressive, and hygroscopic. This makes it necessary to have special means of transportation, storage, and pumping of fuel. At the same time, the handling of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel requires an exceptionally high degree of training of personnel of rear services units and installations.

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It is quite understandable that the high combat readiness of the missile troops is ensured largely by a stable and sufficiently flexible system of supply. However, until recently, a fairly protracted period of probing and experimentation could be observed in this question. Thus, in accordance with existing procedure for assembly and preparation of missiles for firing, the following system of supply for missile troops was provided. It was proposed to have subunits for storage, servicing, and transport of missiles and special charges, and also workshops for the assembly of nuclear warheads, under the jurisdiction of the chief of front artillery armament. The missiles arriving at the front were unloaded at railroad stations and were delivered by motor vehicle transport of these subunits to front depots, and then to supply points, deployed in the axes of operations of the missile large units and units. From here, the missiles were brought by motor vehicle transport of the missile troops directly to their technical subunits, where the assembly, fueling, and preparation of the missiles for launching took place. Besides railroad and motor vehicle transport, it was also planned to use air transport for the transport of missiles and nuclear warheads.

For the supply of missile fuel to the missile troops at the front, there were dumps at the forward and rear area bases of the front. The transport of missile fuel from the rear area to the forward depots was carried out by rail transport or by motor vehicle transport (in case of disruption of the work of railroads). From the forward depots or from their sections, deployed over the terrain in the course of the operation, the missile fuel was delivered by the transport means of engineer battalions and antiaircraft missile units directly to their technical subunits.

As the experience of exercises showed, this system had substantial deficiencies. First, in connection with the fact that the assembly and preparation of missiles for firing--a process that is quite labor-consuming and requires the expenditure of large forces and means, the fulfillment of such tasks is very difficult./one or two words missing/ of units and large units. Secondly, three persons essentially were responsible for the delivery of missiles to the same level of supply: the deputy commander of troops of the front for rear services (rail and air transport), the chief of front

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artillery armament (motor vehicle transport to the supply points), and the commanding officers of the units(motor vehicle transport to the technical subunits). Thirdly, the missile units broke off contact with the supply points and depots in the course of the operation which led to great strain in the work of missile unit transport. Besides, the system of support outlined greatly complicated the organization of coordination, communications, and rear area control, especially with regard to questions concerning the use of various types of transport for the delivery of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel. The complexity of coordinating these matters adversely affected the efficacy of the work of rear area units and establishments. Cases were noted during exercises, when missiles and missile fuel were delivered to the units at various times, which, in essence, did not ensure the timely combat readiness of the missile troops.

Later, as missiles were improved, the possibility arose of carrying out the assembly and preparation of missiles--not in the technical subunits of missile units, as was done earlier, but in the rear area of the front. This circumstance made it possible, by a number of organizational measures, to improve the entire system of rear area support of missile troops. Technical subunits for the assembly of missiles, and also subunits for the storage and transport of them to the missile units and large units, were introduced into the composition of the front rear area. For convenience of operation, these subunits were integrated into missile technical bases, taking into consideration the specific peculiarities of the employment and preparation of operational-tactical (tactical) and antiaircraft missiles. While the former are used mainly with special charges, the latter are used mainly with conventional charges. Thus, there are two bases at the front: one for the preparation of operational-tactical and tactical missiles (surface-to-surface class), and the other for the preparation of antiaircraft missiles. These bases, depending on the plan of the operation, the tasks to be fulfilled, and the grouping of missile troops, are placed 200 to 250 kilometers from the front line, beyond the range of fire of the main body of enemy missile weapons. Sections, which are deployed on the basic axes of operations of missile units, at a distance of

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100 to 120 kilometers from the front line, are detached from the missile-technical bases. Besides, the missile units of the front, located near missile-technical bases, will obtain everything necessary from them, and the missile large units and units of army and front subordination, moved to the border of the army rear area, will obtain everything necessary from the sections of these bases. Besides the missile-technical bases, the front has at its disposal missile fuel dumps which are able to detach their own sections over the terrain.

There are sub-units for storage and transport of prepared missiles in the composition of the rear services of combined-arms and tank armies. These subunits are placed at a distance of 40 to 50 kilometers from the front line and are moved in the course of the operation in accordance with the movement of missile units and subunits. Subunits for checking out, storage, and transport of missiles prepared for firing must also be in the composition of missile units and large units.

With the given composition and manner of deployment of rear services units and installations, it is envisaged to carry out rear area support of missile troops in the following manner (sketches 1 and 2). Missiles arriving at the front are unloaded at unloading stations (airfields) and are delivered to missile-technical bases (their sections) where the assembly, checkout, and fueling of missiles are carried out. From here, the missiles prepared for firing are delivered by front, army, and troop transport to missile units and large units of front suborindation, and also to armies. From army subunits the missiles are delivered to missile units (large units) and to the divisions. The delivery of missile fuel is carried out from the front dumps directly to the technical subunits of bases and their sections.

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
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
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Sketch 1. Supply of Troops of a Front with Operational-Tactical and Tactical Missiles

A - Army
F - Front
V - Troop (organic)

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Sketch 2. Supply of Troops of a Front with Antiaircraft Missiles

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It can be considered that the existing system of supply has a number of advantages in comparison with the former. Missile units and large units, released from a number of labor-consuming functions, become more mobile and maneuverable and their commanding officers can, in connection with this, give more attention to questions of combat use of missiles. The possibility of dispersing the stocks of missiles and missile fuel has emerged.

At the same time, as has been shown by the experience of exercises, the system of supplying missile troops still has rather considerable shortcomings and requires further improvement. This, first of all, concerns such important aspects of rear area work as the organization of transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuels, and also the planning of missile troop supply. In essence, the organization of transport and the procedure of planning supply remained unchanged after the reorganization of the rear services of the front and army that has taken place in the interests of missile troop support. We consider that all the prerequisites for the introduction of a new, more advanced principle of planning and transport of everything necessary to the missile troops are present.

First of all, let us examine how the matter stands in regard to the transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel. In accordance with the existing system, the chief of the front (army) artillery armament is responsible for the organization of the transport of missiles and special charges by all types of transport, while the deputy commander of the rear services is responsible for the transport of missile fuel. In our opinion, such a method of organization of transport will not ensure the timely transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel to the troops. The point is that the chief of artillery armament of the front, having at his disposal, for the delivery of missiles, only special automotive transport, cannot use for these purposes all the other types of transport which are not under his jurisdiction. Uninterrupted transport of missiles, special charges, missile fuel, and other important types of materiel supplies to the troops during operations carried out at a great depth, at high speeds, with sharp and frequent changes in the operational

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situation, and under conditions of heavy enemy action against communications routes and rear services installations, is possible only with the combined use of railroad, motor vehicle, and air transport. Therefore, in our opinion, the deputy troop commander of the front (army) for rear services must have full responsibility for the organization of transport; on the basis of the decision of the troop commander, he will be able to organize the planning of transport and the coordinated operation of the various types of transport taking into consideration the operational-rear area situations which arise. The rear services staff must ensure the direct supervision of the work of special motor vehicle transport units for transport of missiles and missile fuel, and of railroad and air transport, in combination with the directorates of artillery armament, fuel supply, and other services of the front; only by the coordination of their work will the timely delivery of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel to the troops be ensured. With this goal, the deputy troop commander of front (army) for rear services and the staffs of the rear services must organize close coordination of artillery armament and fuel supply services, coordinate plans for the delivery of missiles and missile fuel with the work of the various types of transport, and determine measures for the preparation of a road net and for control of traffic on the roads.

Mostly railroad and motor vehicle transport are used for the delivery of missiles and missile fuel during the preparation of an operation. Missiles, special charges, and missile fuel should be delivered to front missile-technical bases and dumps of missile fuel or to their sections by railroad. Depending on the distance of army rear services units and missile troops from front bases and depots, motor vehicle transport of a front, armies, and missile units and large units can be used for the delivery of missiles to the troops. In the event of disruption of the work of the front's railroads, it is necessary to provide for the duplication of transport by the special automotive transport of the front and for special charges also by air transport. In the course of the operation, the transport of missiles and missile fuel basically must be carried out by front motor vehicle and air transport. Special motor vehicle transport of armies and missile brigades should be used mainly for the delivery

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of missiles prepared for firing to the units or directly to the firing positions. In the event of long extension of communication lines, it is necessary to deploy depot and base sections on the basis that their distance from missile large units (units) and the army rear areas, does not exceed 50 to 100 kilometers. With a short distance of separation, the transport of missiles from the deployed base sections can be carried out by front, army and troop motor vehicle transport.

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In modern operations, uninterrupted support of missile troops will depend to a significant degree on the availability of stocks of missiles and missile fuel at the front. Inasmuch as missile weapons will be the decisive means for the attainment of the goals of the operation, we believe that the stocks of missiles and fuel for them at the front must be established at the beginning of the operation, calculated so as to provide the complete needs for the entire operation. These stocks should be echeloned and maintained at all levels where missile troops are employed. It is necessary to take into consideration that the greatest quantity of missiles is expended during the first days of an operation. Therefore, in our opinion, not less than 50 percent of all missile stocks must be located in missile units and large units, 15 to 20 percent in the army rear area, and the rest in the front rear area. Owing to this principle of echelonment, stocks can be moved closer to the troops, make the entire supply system more stable and reliable, and thus afford the commander of the front (army) troops and the commanding officers of combined-arms and missile large units and units the opportunity to render timely influence on the course of a battle and an operation. In the echelonment of missile stocks, it should also be taken into account that in the zone of the front offensive there will be created not one, but several groupings of missile troops, varying in their composition and designation, separated from one another by significant distances. Therefore, it is advisable to establish larger stocks on the axis where the main missile troop grouping is operating.

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For the uninterrupted support of missile troops, it is very important to execute, in good time, maneuver of the stocks. With this goal, units and installations intended for storage of missiles and missile fuel, especially in the troops and armies, must be completely mobile. Missiles must be stored on special carriers (telezhka) (semi-trailers-polupritsep), and missile fuel in fueling vehicles and special tank truck - semi-trailers. In the course of an operation, the stocks of missiles and missile fuel must be constantly replenished. In any case, it is always necessary to have mobile stocks for the troops within the limits of the established norms which will ensure their constant combat readiness.

Correct placement and relocation of rear services units and installations intended for rear area support of missile troops, the organization of their safeguarding, protection, preparation, and employment of railroads and military-motor vehicle roads for the transport of missiles and missile fuel, and also other questions regarding the support of missile troops, can be resolved successfully only with coordinated work of the various services and with unified, centralized control of the rear area. We believe that the rear area support of missile troops is one of the most important measures in the general system of work of the operational rear area. The deputy commander of the front (army) troops for rear services must be one of the basic organizers of rear area support of missile troops.

Some mention should be made of the support of missile subunits of motorized-rifle and tank divisions. Combat operations of these large units proceed at high speeds, with sharp and frequent changes in the situation. The separation of missile subunits included in their composition from army support units, as shown by experience of exercises, may be 70 to 100 kilometers. Under these conditions, it is doubtful that the army, with only its own means, will be able to support the missile subunits of the division in a timely manner. Therefore, small mobile subunits for storage and transport of missiles must be put into the composition of the rear services of the motorized-rifle and tank division.

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Uninterrupted delivery of missiles and missile fuel to the troops by motor vehicle transport depends in many ways on the organization of road support. As experience of exercises has shown, front (army) military-motor vehicle roads prepared for the movement of motor vehicle transport with ordinary freight, basically ensures the passage of motor vehicle columns and echelons with missiles and missile fuel. The volume of shipments by this method of supply constitutes up to 500 vehicles in a twenty-four hour period, and usually does not have substantial influence on the intensity of the movement. Therefore, the delivery of missiles and missile fuel must be carried out, as a rule, on the operating net of military-motor vehicle and controlled roads of the front and armies. It is only necessary that the technical standards of these road (the width of the roadway, the grades, the radii of curves, and also the load capacity of bridges) meet the conditions for the passage of special heavy-duty motor vehicle convoys with missiles. It is necessary for the front (army) road unit forces prepare approaches from the basic military-motor vehicle roads to the rear services units and installations of the missile troops and armies, and also to the missile fuel bases and dumps of the front.

One of the basic missions of the road service will be the organization of uninterrupted traffic and top-priority transit of transport echelons with missiles and missile fuel. The transport of missiles and missile fuel most frequently will be carried out by comparatively small columns and road subunits must be assigned for their escort and ensuring their unhindered passage on the roads, especially the overcoming of various obstructed places.

Special attention is now being given to the medical support of missile troops. This follows from specific conditions of their disposition in the front zone and the work of the personnel with nuclear ammunition and missile fuel. One of the essential features in the work of the medical service of missile units and large units is the necessity to conduct a gamut of measures directed at preventing the contamination of personnel by ionized radiation and by the components of missile fuel. The measures must provide for the execution of control over the work conditions of the personnel during

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the handling of nuclear warheads and missile fuel, and also for the rendering of necessary medical assistance.

It is very important to determine correctly and establish the procedure for planning supply of missile troops. It was carried out in different ways during the exercises conducted. For example, during one of them, the supply of missile troops with missiles and with missile fuel were planned separately. The plan for supplying troops with missiles was worked out by the directorate of artillery armament of the front, while the staff of the front rear services, jointly with the directorate of fuel supply, worked out the plan of missile fuel supply. Such a planning procedure required the staffs and services to conduct very complex work in the coordination of many questions: the stockpiling and echelonment of stocks, the determination of the time and periods of missile and missile fuel delivery, the use of various types of transport, etc. All this reduced the operational efficiency of the rear services work to a considerable degree and not infrequently led to errors in supplying the missile troops.

We believe that the planning of missile troop supply must be carried out in the following manner. In the front (army), it is necessary to work out a general plan of supplying missile troops with missiles, special charges, missile fuel, and other types of materiel supplies. A limited number of officers from the rear services staff, the artillery armament service, the fuel supply and other interested services, should be involved in the working out of this plan, conducting all the work in close coordination with the operational directorate (section) of the front (army) staff.

In our opinion, the following basic questions must be reflected in the plan which is being worked out graphically on a chart with a supplement of the necessary computations:

--the expenditure of missiles, special charges, missile fuel, and other materiel supplies for the missions of the operation;

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--the volume and echelonment of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel stocks;

--the capabilities of rear services units and installations of the front for the assembly and servicing of missiles and special charges;

--the organization of transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel with the employment of the various types of transport;

--the disposition, and method and periods of movement in the course of an operation, of front missile-technical bases and dumps of missile fuel, and also other rear services units and installations intended for the support of missile troops;

--the organization of control, protection, and defense of missile-technical bases, depots, and other rear area installations.

The plan must be signed by the deputy troop commander for rear services and the commander of the artillery, and after coordination with the staff it must be approved by the troop commander of the front (army). In the development of the general plan of missile troop support, it is expedient for the directorates of artillery armament and fuel supply to work out more detailed plans for supplying troops with missiles, special charges, and missile fuel.

For example, in the plan being worked out by the directorate of front fuel supply, data can be reflected concerning the weight of missile fuel supplies of the front (army), the expenditure of missile fuel by tasks and days of the operation, the norms and echelonment of fuel supplies in units, the army, and in front dumps, a detailed estimate of the delivery of missile fuel to front missile-technical bases and to front depots, and also other questions.

The proposed method of planning, in our opinion, will permit comprehensive consideration of missile troop needs and the most

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purposeful organization of their materiel, technical, and medical support.

The operational efficiency of front (army) rear services work in the comprehensive support of missile troops will be determined in many respects by the reliability and precision of control and the organization of rear area communications. Experience of exercises shows that for the direction of missile troop support, it is advisable to have a special radio net in the communications system of the rear area, permitting the organs of the front (army) rear services to control directly and uninterruptedly the front missile-technical bases and rear services subunits of missile units and large units. Furthermore, a general rearservices communications system with top-priority allotment of equipment and channels of communications can be employed for communications with rear services units and installations intended for the support of missile troops.

* * *

The considerations stated concerning the principles and procedure of missile troop support originate from existing views of their combat use and organization with regard to the technical level of missile weapons currently attained. However, the development of technical thought in the realm of missile technology is proceeding so rapidly that we must constantly consider its further improvement.

The simplification of missile design and the increase in accuracy of their use, not only with special but also with conventional charges, can be expected soon. All this will lead to a further extensive saturation of large units and operational formations with missile weapons, to a change in the organizational structure of the missile troops, and also to an increase in the expenditure of missiles in battle and in an operation. The feasibility of performing the assembly of missiles in the deep rear and transporting them in ready condition over a great distance will arise. Then the support

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of missile troops included in the front and army composition can be organized along the existing system of supply of combined-arms units and large units with standard types of materiel supplies, taking into consideration only the specific peculiarities of storing, transporting, and servicing missiles.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the manner and methods of missile troop support examined in the article require further detailed study and testing in exercises.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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2 MAR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat", by General of the Army A. Gorbatov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat", by General of the Army A. Gorbatov

DATE OF INFO : October 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat", by General of the Army A. Gorbatov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article referred to on page 2 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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The Nature of Modern Armed Combat

by

General of the Army A. Gorbatov

It is absolutely clear that without the seizure of enemy territory, notwithstanding the power and the maximum effective range of modern combat weapons, it is impossible to achieve victory in war. Reaching the Atlantic coast of Europe, the area beyond the Pyrenees, or the penetration of "the toe of the Italian boot" will not yet signify the end of a world war, because the basic military-economic potential of the aggressive blocs is located across the ocean.

In recent times it has been possible to hear opinions that in the course of several hours or days it is possible to perform not only the basic strategic tasks, but even the tasks of the entire war, and also that, "the example of the capitalistic countries, annihilated in the first days of the war, will hardly evoke enthusiasm in the remaining countries for its prolongation."[1]

One cannot reason in this manner, one cannot flatter oneself with the hope of an easy victory, and it is harmful to sit back complacently and rely upon a short war. The authors of such statements probably forgot that the enemy is strong, that he also has nuclear/missile weapons, aviation, motorized troops, and a navy, and that not we but the enemy, will attack first. If the thoughts of these authors are projected, then one can convince oneself that the enemy, attacking first and having the same weapons as we have,

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[1] A. Gastilovich. "The Theory of Military Art is in Need of Review" Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960, page 8.

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will also advance in lightening manner and achieve victory in the very shortest periods. No, this cannot be, and not for the reason that the Soviet people possess such clearly pronounced advantages as great endurance, patriotism, singlemindedness with their Communist Party and Government, but because war between the two world systems cannot be of short duration!

Speaking of the role of nuclear/missile weapons, in our opinion, it is basically wrong to think, much less to write, that "nuclear/missile weapons have replaced artillery and aviation". Nuclear/missile weapons increase many times the destructive power of aerial bombs and artillery shells, but cannot replace them. Replacement has not occurred and will not occur, not because in the enemy's infantry divisions the quantity of artillery and machine gun tubes is constantly increasing, but because the fate of operations and war will be decided by the sum total of all forces and weapons.

The last war proved the worthlessness of the theory concerning the exclusive role of aviation or tanks capable, seemingly, of independently deciding the outcome of the war. Now a new "theory" has appeared--to decide all the aims of war "with sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons", ignoring and belittling the role of other types of armed forces. And what should one understand by, "a sufficient quantity of nuclear weapons"? Of this no one says anything, and cannot say anything because this depends entirely upon how many nuclear weapons the enemy will have. Much also depends on the extent to which the weapons are skilfully used and on the quality of intelligence. Depending on this, it is sometimes impossible even with the availability of a large quantity of nuclear weapons to achieve such results as can be attained with an insignificant quantity of these same weapons.

Let us turn to what is, in our opinion, a very important question concerning the beginning of war, which should not be confused with the initial period of a war. Even though the enemy's combat operations started by a surprise attack can strongly influence the course of operations of the initial period, the beginning of war will be counted nevertheless in terms of several days, and the initial

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period--in terms of months. The initial period of a war, by our accepted definition, extends to the moment of fulfillment of the first strategic missions. There is no objection to this. But when the first strategic missions are planned only in one variant, without considering the situation, i. e., the accomplishment of missions is envisaged only on enemy territory, then we cannot agree with this. In order that our military art might not be one-sided, the fact should also be considered that the first strategic missions can also be fulfilled on our territory, in the case of repulsing an enemy invasion, especially in the event of his surprise attack.

The decision for a surprise attack will not be made by parliaments or cabinets of ministers of imperialist states, but by 3 to 4 heads of states, or possibly even by one of them, from the other side of the ocean. Their commanders-in-chief may not even know about this beforehand. The regular, large NATO maneuvers may serve as cover for a surprise attack. Prior to the moment of attack, obviously, not even partial mobilization will take place, the normal operation of railroads and air and sea transport will be maintained, and city life will not change.

The possibility of a provocation on the part of the Pentagon is not excluded, when nuclear bombs may be dropped on the cities of NATO allies of the USA and at the same time the whole world will be informed by radio that other "Red" aircraft are being successfully repelled at the approaches to the USA, thanks to the perfection of the American antiaircraft defense (PVO) system.

It need not be doubted that the attack on the countries of the Socialist Camp will be accomplished, not during the summertime, as is usual, but in the fall or winter, during the period of extended darkness. It may happen that this will coincide with the discharge of older servicemen from the Soviet Army, when the drafted youngsters have not yet completed training.

It is necessary to assume that all ground, air and sea large units of NATO, including various missile bases, aircraft carriers, and missile-carrying vessels, already have sealed orders, in which

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are indicated the initial and follow-up missions, the departure positions of ground large units, the targets for carrying out missile strikes with nuclear and conventional charges, with aviation, etc. Sealed orders will be opened upon a specific signal. It also cannot be excluded that during the course of maneuvers, prior to the signal for opening the sealed orders, ground troops, aviation large units, vessels, and missile units will be moved to those very areas which are indicated in the sealed orders.

Unfortunately, among many of our responsible military chiefs themselves the thought still lingers that we will learn in advance of the strike being prepared and that we will have time to adopt various measures. In our opinion, there is nothing more dangerous than such lack of concern. It should be clear that we must always be prepared for the worst. But if we have prior knowledge of an attack being prepared, then, naturally, we shall be able to do much beforehand. To foresee all the measures connected with minimizing losses during a surprise enemy attack is not easy and to carry them out is more difficult, but thought and work must be given to this now.

It is necessary to suppose, it appears to us, that the violation of our borders along the entire perimeter will take place simultaneously with all forces and weapons available to the enemy, and approximately in the following manner. The air forces, numbering up to 20 thousand bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft, will fly at low and high altitudes individually, in small groups, and in subunits of several tens of aircraft. Each aircraft, group, and subunit will have its own special missions: some will carry bombs with nuclear charges, others with conventional charges, and still others with chemical and bacteriological agents. If the attack is carried out during the evening of the longest night, then the aircraft will return before sunrise and will be able to ready themselves for a daytime sortie. All fighters will also carry bombs, in order to destroy as many of our troop garrisons, airfields, and border radar stations as possible. These fighters after several hours will not only return to their bases, but will also have time to ready themselves for repelling our bombers and to afford cover to targets. All reconnaissance aircraft will cross the border simultaneously with other aircraft to conduct reconnaissance

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of missile launch sites, control and adjustment of fire of their own missiles, the detection of new targets, as well as the intersection of our radar stations in the zone of interior during their operation.

The enemy navy will be able to inflict nuclear/missile strikes not only on sea, but also on land targets located along the shore and in the zone of interior of the mainland.

Ground troops, located in the interests of concealment at a distance of 100 to 150 km from our border, might be on the border at dawn,provided the attack is carried out on the eve of a long night. The enemy divisions will proceed along separate axes, having the common plan after the surprise nuclear strike of breaking into our territory and disrupting mobilization. The rate of their advance will be guaranteed by organic and supporting nuclear/missile weapons, aviation, and landings (drops) of airborne forces on the main axes.

Considering subversive activities as third in order of significance in achieving the strategic goals of the war, after nuclear weapons and the combat operations of the troops, especially in the initial period of a war, during the first nights after the attack, for diversionary purposes, our probable enemies will drop small groups which have been specially trained, from among displaced persons. Special aircraft will disperse tens of millions of leaflets, primarily in the countries of the Peoples' Democracies, with an appeal to the population to aid the NATO troops, to leave work in enterprises, and to depart from the cities to escape nuclear attack.

It must be noted that a surprise attack provides the enemy certain advantages which will be more appreciable if we prepare ourselves poorly for repelling the strikes. Therefore, it is essential to envisage, and when possible, to carry out now such measures as, for example:

---expediently beforehand to find alternate sites for border radar stations in order that they may be transferred there during the time of an alert, leaving mock-ups at the old sites;

---at the time of NATO troop maneuvers which are by their nature suspicious, to move troop units from their places of permanent billeting

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on exercises to the field and to take ammunition with them;

---while conducting regular reduction of the armed forces, to strive not to leave in one city entire large units, to avoid by every means possible the location of large headquarters in cities which might be primary subjects of nuclear attack;

---under conditions of the broad development of the construction of industrial and housing installations in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to try to obtain agreements with local authorities, and sometimes to turn for help also to the central agencies to build military camps outside large cities; to turn over existing military structures to appropriate agencies as factories, hospitals and schools, and officers' clubs as apartments for the local population;

---to have copies of mobilization documents of the oblast military commissariat in one of the rayon centers 30 to 50 km from the oblast center so that it might be possible to continue work if a strike is made against the latter;

---in case of a surprise attack against a border troop garrison as a result of which it will not be in a state to carry out previously assigned missions, to plan an alternate operational variant with a limited mission;

---to provide methods for the timely receipt and rapid transmission of information concerning an impending attack and to determine security measures connected with this;

---to organize precise coordination of radiotechnical units, permitting the detection of a massive buildup of enemy aircraft and their flight in the direction of our borders, the instantaneous notification of the PVO system, troop garrisons, airfields, naval bases, and other installations; good organization of notification will secure us 20 to 30 minutes of time; though this is not much time, with increased combat readiness it will be sufficient to bring all forces and weapons into action;

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---it is essential to move our bomber aviation from the border zone to the zone of interior of the country, since it will be needed only for a counterstrike, and to turn its airfields over to fighter aviation, in order that the latter might strengthen the PVO of the Country in distant approaches to the maximum extent; the location of not more than a regiment at one airfield will hasten the takeoff of fighters and will lessen the losses in case of a strike on the airfield; subunits of reconnaissance aviation can be based with fighter aviation;

---to assign missions in advance to our reconnaissance aviation for reconnoitering definite zones in order that it might act upon their execution a minimum amount of time after the alert.

---to stop providing the enemy with important intelligence information. In the central papers it is frequently possible to see diagrams showing new industrial installations which have appeared during the last five-year plans; for instance, a map of Kazakhstan with an exact indication of the locations of new industrial centers and their production capacities; a great deal of varied information characterizing our econpmy may be obtained from republic and oblast papers; and some responsible individuals--deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, speaking at sessions in the presence of foreign correspondent-spies provide precise information concerning the types and volume of production output and the location of installations;

---to train groups at enterprises in cites who could save the wounded and materiel wealth in case of necessity; to provide for the formation of analogous groups in areas adjacent to the cities to provide assistance to the population of the city;

---to organize the delivery of fuel by means of pipelines to the western border.

The first priority mission in case of an attack must be considered to be the preservation of the armed forces and installations of the country because without this it will not be possible to carry out a powerful counterstrike. For the execution of this mission, weapons, forces,

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and time must not be spared. This is why we must not allow carelessness and must concentrate all our attention on raising the combat readiness of the troops and their vigilance.

We reject the opinion of comrades who state that "upon the initial operations will depend the outcome of the war". Because he attacks first the enemy may have success in the initial and follow-up operations, but this does not mean that the outcome of the war will be predetermined.

One cannot agree either with the statement that, "after our counterstrike the enemy will go immediately over to the defensive". The enemy does not attack to give up his goals easily and go over to the defensive.

The opinion that "the initial surprise strikes do not frighten us because we possess a large territory, and the administrative and industrial centers are dispersed over it" is no good at all. The enemy will deliver a strike not over the entire territory, but on targets of which he has prior knowledge. If we are to speak of territorial dimensions in general, then the enemy, if one considers the territory of her allies in various pacts, as well as the expanse of Africa and Latin America, covers a territory no smaller than that of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Is it proper to reassure ourselves with the thought that after our counterstrike, the enemy, "will have undestroyed only a border strip with a depth of several tens of kilometers", that "the taking of this strip will then become the primary mission" of the ground troops, moving at a rate of 80 to 100 km during a 24-hour period, and in the depth we shall meet neither operational nor strategic reserves? No, this is not correct, and we should not exclude the possibility of waging stubborn and difficult battles, considering as well that our troops may also suffer losses as a result of the initial enemy surprise strike. It is inconceivable that, once having reached enemy territory, we shall not encounter his reserves. But it is also possible that separate large units of ours, notwithstanding enemy resistance and obstacles encountered, may penetrate deeply into the enemy dispositions.

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The authors of some articles consider that the initial operations will start with a small number of combat-ready divisions and that reinforcements will enter later, or not at all. Others even claim that there will be no need for reinforcement because the enemy will have few forces left and it will only be necessary to crush them and occupy his territory. Is it possible to have such absolute disregard for the 60 combat-ready and well-equipped large units of NATO? It is not an exaggeration if we say that this opinion is absurd. We cannot assume complete combat ineffectiveness on the part of the enemy or, similarly, consider our large units approaching from the depth as not providing help. Notwithstanding the large number of obstacles which will be encountered along the path of their progress, some large units will advance at a rate of 100 to 150 km, and others at a rate of 200 to 250 km, in a 24-hour period. As a result, even those large units which were located 1000 to 1500 km from the border can be included in the composition of a front on the tenth day, i. e., after the front, having repelled the attack, advances onto the territory of the enemy.

The fact must also be considered that even after our counter-strike up to 30 NATO infantry and tank divisions will be on our borders, some of which will invade our territory, and the remaining 20 to 30 large units of those available at the present time will follow after the first echelon in one to three 24-hour periods. In this case, the essence of the first front operations (for a period of 2 to 5 days) will consist of fierce meeting engagements, as a result of which on one axis we shall overthrow the enemy and pursue him, on another will conduct combat with varying success, and on a third the enemy may penetrate into the depth of our country. These operations may be conducted with the intensive support of missiles and aviation utilizing nuclear and chemical weapons, with great effectiveness against rear area installations, communications lines, railroad junctions, and bridges, and with reinforced reconnaissance on both sides. Only after the engagements of these days and after heavy losses suffered by both sides, is the tendency noted to go on the offensive on one axis and on the defensive on another.

The offensive will be characterized by the rapid replacement of one form of combat by another. Swift and skilful operations with the use of all types of troops and good reconnaissance will frequently

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compensate for inadequate forces and weapons.

In connection with the appearance of new combat weapons, the motorization of troops, and more versatile intelligence, special significance is acquired by the rapid evaluation of a situation and the making of a decision. He who hesitates in search for a better decision or who waits for direction from above, will frequently be beaten.

Some authors think that General Headquarters (Stavka) will not assign missions to the front, prescribe forces, weapons, the direction of the main strike, and the beginning of the offensive. They oppose the selection of the direction of the major strike as an antiquated, harmful concept. This opinion appears to us to be incorrect.

The General Headquarters' directives and orders to lower-ranking commanding officers will also have their place in the future. They will not undergo major changes in their content, but will only reflect the utilization of new combat weapons. The selection of the direction of the main strike and the specification of the forces and weapons for it will remain. Along this axis the basic strikes with nuclear weapons will be inflicted, a large portion of the tank large units will be concentrated, operational airborne forces will be dropped (landed), and the services of aviation and other means will be enlisted. It is clear to everyone that we are not referring to some sort of condensation of groupings.

The recommendation to refuse to surround enemy groupings and to form a ring around them, but to annihilate the cut-off groupings only with reserves and nuclear weapons, is unacceptable, in our opinion. Up to now, the best method to annihilate and capture the enemy has been to surround him, and for this reason one cannot dismiss it. In the future, despite the thinned-out combat formations and offensives along separate axes, one must always strive to come out on the enemy's route of retreat, to cut him off, and to surround him with a portion of one's forces, while continuing to advance with the basic forces. There will also be instances when it will be necessary for a portion of the

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forces to advance and for the basic forces to surround the enemy. It is not expedient to create a compact or complete ring, but rather to surround the enemy by intersecting all routes to limit his movement; otherwise he will withdraw to a new line and will be able to provide resistance even before the approach of his reserves.

Some authors demand that we give up the training of troops in breaking through an established defense of the enemy, because it may be annihilated by nuclear weapons or bypassed. However, if we do not train the troops in this, then with a shortage of nuclear weapons and the impossibility of bypassing the defense of enemy troops from the flank, we will find ourselves in a difficult situation. For this reason, in our opinion, we must train the troops in everything which may be encountered in war. In addition to this, we do not always know how many and which types of nuclear weapons are available in our depots, much less those which the enemy has. It may be supposed that in the first days of a war nuclear weapons will be used abundantly, and in the succeeding period in a more limited manner, because the plants producing these weapons will begin to be destroyed more rapidly than they can be restored. With the limited use of nuclear weapons, the role of aviation, tanks, and artillery will be raised, and we will more frequently encounter positional defense of the enemy.

The mission of our defense in the future will still remain the disruption of the enemy offensive. Its execution will be possible provided there is a combination of stubborn defense of the main points and installations with counterattacks, counterstrikes, and the utilization of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The defense system will depend upon zones, positions, and continuous trenches. In order to avoid a stereotyped formation, and with the aim of optimum utilization of the terrain, the number of zones, positions, and the trenches within them will vary. Their depth and design will not be the same. In this light we consider especially harmful the opinion expressed by General A. Gastilovich against the creation of zones of defense and the continuous trenches within them, an opinion based on the theory that the troops defending them will be annihilated or bypassed. It is quite clear that if those troops situated in the defense can be annihilated, then those advancing without benefit of cover are all the more

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subject to the same treatment. General A. Gastilovich expresses an incomprehensible pity for amphibious landing force of the enemy on the sea and recommends that they be destroyed by missiles alone! And why not hit it with aviation and naval forces? He does not recommend the erection of obstacles in places suitable for a debarkation of inflicting strikes on the enemy at his most critical moment in the debarkation on shore, but proposes destroying the enemy only on the shore and only with tanks. This is completely incomprehensible.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on the Principles of the Offensive Operations of a Front", by General of the Army V. Kurasov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on the Principles of the Offensive Operations of a Front

by

General of the Army V. Kurasov

The rapid development of the socialist economy and of Soviet science and technology testify more eloquently than any words that our nation is successfully creating the material-technical foundation for Communism and at the same time is increasing its defensive capability.

The Soviet Armed Forces, while undergoing reduction in numbers, are being equipped more and more with nuclear weapons and other means of modern military technology. A new type of armed force has been created--missile troops of strategic designation. The equipping of all types of armed forces with nuclear weapons in quantity that will ensure their mass use in operations immeasurably increases their combat capabilities. All this introduces radical changes in our views on the nature of modern warfare and the methods of waging it.

History offers many examples of how the development of armament and technology has given rise to great changes in views on warfare and in military art, but the revolution in the field which is occurring at the present time, mainly on account of the development of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their mass use, cannot be compared with the changes of the past. The radical modern changes in views on warfare and in military art have the nature of a headlong gallop, a break with the gradual development of military art, which signifies the elimination of a number of old tenets and their replacement by new ones.

By their own combat capabilities, nuclear, and especially nuclear/missile, weapons under conditions of their mass use are the principle

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means of armed combat, and have a decisive influence on the course of operation of all types of armed forces. Moreover, these weapons have altered the combat capabilities of even identical types of armed forces. One cannot now, for example, imagine the nature of offensive operations of a front and the means of conducting them without an analysis of the possible influence on them of strikes of nuclear weapons of strategic designation and various types of armed forces participating in these operations. Thus, during and as a result of strikes by nuclear weapons of strategic designation, as we can well imagine, nuclear superiority over the enemy can be won, his economic power can be undermined, and the destruction of the strategic groupings of his ground troops, air forces, and navy can be attained.

It remains to be said that such nuclear strikes will as a rule be inflicted on enemy objectives located in the strategic depth. Therefore, despite the views stated in the article by Colonel-General A. I. Gastilovich,[1] the destruction of enemy objectives in his tactical and operational zones is the goal of the offensive troops of a front and above all of their nuclear weapons, and not the target for nuclear strikes of strategic designation. Of course, one cannot completely exclude cases where such strikes of strategic designation may be delivered against enemy objectives in his operational depth. However, these cases will not be typical, owing to the fact that such use of strategic nuclear weapons contradicts their designation and does not completely exploit all of their combat capabilities.

Success of these powerful strategic nuclear strikes, especially if they precede the beginning of an offensive operation of a front, will undoubtedly ensure favorable conditions for the conduct of the operation with a comparatively small expenditure of nuclear weapons of the front. Under other conditions, when nuclear weapons of strategic designation are not employed in the area of the offensive of a front, the successful attainment of the goal of the offensive will require the use of a greater number of the nuclear weapons of the front.

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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Not too long ago, during our command-staff exercises, the front, having a limited amount of nuclear ammunition, was able to deliver nuclear strikes only against the most important, individual targets and objectives of the enemy, while a substantial portion of other targets and objectives continued to be destroyed by conventional weapons. And if it is recalled that practically the only carrier of nuclear weapons at that time was aircraft, which often did not reach the target, then one can even more fully understand the insufficient effectiveness of nuclear strikes of that period. In connection with the limited use of nuclear weapons in offensive operations of a front, the possibility of simultaneous destruction of enemy groupings and objectives in the entire depth of their operational formation was precluded during our exercises at that time. Therefore, the troop offensive, as in the past, was carried out through the successive overcoming of enemy resistance, during which the enemy had the opportunity to maneuver his forces and weapons from the rear and the flanks for the creation of strike groupings.

Thus, nuclear weapons under conditions of limited use still had not introduced decisive changes in the structure and conduct of offensive operations of the front.

Only now, with the mass employment of these weapons in operations with the use of various delivery vehicles, mainly missiles, is it possible to deliver surprise nuclear strikes against a significant number of enemy objectives and achieve their rapid and complete destruction. Without exaggerating, it can be assumed that with the successful mass use of nuclear weapons in an offensive operation of the front, not less than 60 percent of the entire opposing enemy grouping will be destroyed with these weapons. This is why nuclear, and especially nuclear/missile, weapons have now become decisive in the destruction of the enemy and above all in the attainment of nuclear superiority over him. The attainment of such superiority will significantly quicken the destruction of enemy groupings, while in the absence of this superiority the enemy will always have an opportunity to disrupt our offensive through the mass use of his nuclear weapons.

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Only now in connection with the development of nuclear, and principally nuclear/missile, weapons, and also in connection with the possibility of their mass use, are radical changes in the structure and conduct of offensive and other operations taking place.

Let us examine several more specific instances of the influence of nuclear weapons on some of the principles of offensive operations of the front in the initial period of a war.

The goals of an offensive operation of a front, as is generally known, determine its concept and scope. Such goals, as in the past, are: the destruction of the basic enemy groupings, the swift development of the offensive, the seizure of his territory and specific operational-strategic objectives. However, the essence and nature of these goals have changed considerably. While, in the past the basis of the enemy's grouping of troops consisted of his infantry and tank large units, now nuclear weapons, as the principle and decisive means of combat, have become the basis.

Studying the development of nuclear weapons of operational-tactical designation in the armies of the probable enemy and above all in the US Army, we come across a great number of types of nuclear weapons, of TNT equivalents and of delivery aircraft. Quite recently, up to 10 types of aerial atomic bombs with 19 various TNT equivalents (from 2 to 300 kilotons) could have been noted in the US Army. Seventeen different types of delivery aircraft supported the use of these bombs.

At the present time the arsenal of nuclear/missile weapons of operational-tactical designation in the US Army consists of only five types of guided missiles and free rockets: "Honest John", "Little John", "Lacrosse", "Corporal", and "Redstone" with nine different TNT equivalents (from 1 to 3800 kilotons), and two types of cruise missiles: "Matador" and "Regulus" with five TNT equivalents (from 1 to 100 kilotons).

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Furthermore, it should be noted that the probable enemy has at his disposal artillery pieces with calibers of 203 and 208 /sic - 280/ mm with nuclear shells (from 1 to 45 kilotons).

As is evident from the aforementioned data, the most modern and powerful nuclear/missile weapons in the armies of the probable enemy have not yet become his principle and decisive means of combat. It looks more as if the enemy's aviation still fulfills this role, in spite of its increased vulnerability to antiaircraft missiles. This should be kept in mind. However, this situation requires further study.

As regards the possible number of enemy infantry and tank large units in his troop grouping, able to resist the front, considerable changes have also taken place here. Comparatively recently, under conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons, it was considered that in a front offensive area with a width of 300-400 kilometers, and basing the average operational density of troops at 15 kilometers per division, the enemy could have up to 20-27 infantry and tank divisions. Because of the mass use of nuclear weapons, these divisions can now successfully advance and conduct combat operations in areas with a width of up to 30 kilometers, and such an enemy grouping will undoubtedly be smaller. For example, in a front offensive area with a width of 400 kilometers, it will have in all only 13 to 15 infantry and tank divisions. Such a quantitative reduction of groupings is a direct consequence of the unusually increased fire power and troop maneuverability, and also of the requirement for their maximum protection from destruction by nuclear weapons.

Together with this, the dispersal of enemy groupings in area has grown even more. Now it is impossible to imagine compact groupings with a continuous front of even one or two enemy divisions, to say nothing of several of his armies, since such groupings would immediately be subjected to nuclear strikes and destroyed.

Under modern conditions, not armies, but often individual enemy divisions, not creating a continuous front, will conduct an engagement in a particular area, while others of his divisions on the flanks and

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in the rear of this area execute a maneuver with the aim of a swift penetration ahead. Hence, the enemy grouping will not only be smaller with regard to its force and composition, but also more widely dispersed in area.

Finally, mention should be made of the great influence which the mass use of enemy nuclear weapons has on the nature of his troop operations, accelerating them significantly. The offensive operations of the probable enemy during his training exercises acquire a deeper and more dynamic nature. The enemy has recourse less often to the solution of tasks by shifting to the defensive, and even the latter has begun to have a different, more aggressive, and maneuverable nature.

Thus, the modern enemy grouping has become not only smaller in relation to its force, and more widely dispersed in area, but also more aggressive and maneuverable with regard to the methods of the execution of operational tasks.

Regarding the operational-strategic enemy objectives which may be the goal of a front offensive operation, it should be emphasized that under conditions of mass use of nuclear weapons, their destruction, seizure, and retention will no longer create difficulties as in the past and will not require as large forces as were used for this during the past war.

A true conception of the probable enemy, a careful study of his strong and weak points, and also their skilful exploitation during the preparation and conduct of an offensive operation, will ensure his rapid and most complete destruction.

The forces and weapons needed for the conduct of a front offensive operation determine the success of the operation to a large extent. As is well known, the basis for the determination of such forces and weapons was always the demand for the creation of the appropriate superiority over the enemy. The stronger and more aggressive the enemy was, the more forces and weapons were

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required for his destruction, and consequently, the more significant was their superiority over the enemy, and as long as superiority of forces was not attained, the front offensive operation often did not begin. This was true in the past and, incidentally, quite recently under conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons.

Now that the possibility of the mass use of nuclear weapons has become a reality, the relative strength as a result of powerful nuclear strikes of the offensive side can rapidly and sharply change in its favor even at the very beginning of the operation.

Since, as a result of such powerful nuclear strikes, the front can destroy not less than 60 percent of all enemy forces and weapons at the beginning of the operation, then the general superiority of his forces and weapons over the enemy can become significant, and on the axis of the main strike, even great. However, this can occur only if the offensive troops themselves have not already suffered enemy nuclear strikes. Therefore, under modern conditions, the necessary superiority of forces and weapons over the enemy will as a rule not be attained prior to the beginning of the offensive operation, as it was previously through the concentration and deployment of these forces on appropriate axes, but at the beginning and in the course of the offensive operation as a result of the infliction of powerful nuclear strikes on the enemy.

Thus, under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the front offensive operation can be successfully conducted even with equality in the relative strength of forces and weapons.

The influence of nuclear weapons affects not only the quantity of forces and weapons of the front and their relative strength, but also the combat composition of a front. The most important place in this combat makeup is now occupied by nuclear weapons, and principally by missile troops. An estimate of other forces and weapons included in the combat composition of the front depends on a correct and accurately grounded estimate of the necessary quantity of these weapons.

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For an estimate of the nuclear weapons needed for the entire offensive operation of a front, it should be taken into account that for a reliable destruction of all selected targets and objectives, it seems to us that we must allot from 4 to 6 nuclear weapons of appropriate TNT equivalents against every large unit and operational-strategic objective of the enemy, or 1 or 2 nuclear weapons of high yield (100-500 kilotons). Such an estimate will permit, even if only approximately, the determination both of the overall number of nuclear weapons needed for the operation and of their types and level of yield. In its turn the estimate of the nuclear weapons of a front depends on what tasks will be carried out in behalf of the front by nuclear weapons of strategic designation.

The strength and composition of the motorized rifle and tank troops of a front are determined in accordance with the combat potentialities of the nuclear weapons of the front, the operational density of the enemy grouping, and the tasks of these troops in the operation.

In view of this, the front grouping cannot be permitted to have a lower operational density of troops than the enemy. Let us suppose that the front grouping of troops has an operational density of troops, equal to 20 kilometers per division. Then a front offensive area having a width of 300 kilometers must have no fewer than 15 divisions in its composition. Furthermore, additional forces and weapons should be provided, to allow for possible losses of our troops in the course of the offensive operation and for the appearance in the area of the front offensive of fresh enemy troops or of enemy troops who have escaped destruction. In the case of limited use of nuclear weapons, the estimate of the forces and weapons of a front must include appropriate adjustments for an increase in the number of motorized rifle and tank large units.

The tasks of the motorized rifle and tank troops in a front offensive operation are also determined by these conditions. While, under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the basic task of these troops is the completion of enemy destruction upon whom nuclear strikes have been inflicted, in the case of the limited use of these

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weapons the motorized rifle and tank troops of the front will fulfill the basic task of destroying the enemy grouping.

The destruction and neutralization of the enemy in his tactical and operational zones may require reinforcement of the front with artillery, which at the beginning of the offensive and especially in the operational rear, will unquestionably render great benefit to the offensive troops in overcoming the centers of enemy resistance which have survived nuclear strikes.

Taking into consideration the increased role in an offensive operation of a front of airborne troops who are capable of seizing the most important areas in the enemy's operational rear more quickly than other troops, their forces in the effective strength for combat of the front should be especially accurately determined, starting with the tasks that can be assigned to them. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that in a modern offensive operation of a front, which is conducted against a considerably greater depth, airborne landings on a tactical and operational scale may have a place in the combat makeup of the front.

Large units and units of engineer troop reinforcement may enter into the combat composition of the front when the front's own (shtatnyy) engineer resources are not able to support a maneuver of troops or the rapid rate of their advance, especially during a crossing in force of water barriers or during operations in zones of radioactive contamination.

The strength and composition of the aviation of a front are also determined in accordance with the tasks which will be assigned to it. Such missions in a front offensive operation may be: the conduct of reconnaissance, the destruction of mobile and small-sized objectives in the tactical and operational zones, and the support of the attacking troops of the front during the course of the operation.

It is particularly important in the combat composition of the front to have units of antiaircraft-missile troops, fighter aviation

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and antiaircraft artillery in sufficient number to provide reliable air cover for the launching areas of missile large units and units, for airfields with delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons, for command posts, for basic troop groupings, especially in the areas of their concentration, and for the most important installations in the rear area of the front.

The selection of the axis of the main strike is the most important fundamental offensive operation, which in essence determines the concept and methods of conducting the operation. However, some authors of articles (Comrades Baskakov and Zavyalov), in their review of the principles of our military art, have expressed the view that under modern conditions the established opinions about the axis of the main strike are obsolete and may lead to the creation of concentrated strike groupings of troops, which would offer a highly profitable target for enemy nuclear strikes, and thus do injury to our military art. In connection with this, they propose either to abolish this most important principle of military art or to replace it with the principle of concentrating the basic efforts on the destruction of the nuclear weapons and the main troop grouping of the enemy or with the definition of the principle tasks of the operation, to the fulfillment of which the basic efforts of the weapons of nuclear attack and of the troops must be directed.[1] But are not such conclusions and proposals too hasty, and will they not inflict damage on our military art?

It has long been known that one cannot be strong everywhere in an offensive. Any such tendency has always led to the dispersal of forces and weapons, to strikes against the enemy with widespread fingers.

If this was fallacious before, then under present conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, such strikes are even more inadmissable, since they may lead not only to the dispersal of the

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[1] Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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troops but above all to the dispersal of nuclear weapons in various directions often of secondary importance. Of the several axes along which the troops of a front are advancing, one always will be decisive, i. e., the axis of the main strike, which usually involves the entire depth of the front offensive operation. Therefore, not only are strategic and operational-tactical factors to be considered, but also the possible influence of political, economic, and physical-geographical conditions on the course of the offensive operation. The axis of the main strike determines the concept of the offensive operation, the tasks of the front troops, and above all of nuclear weapons, and also the methods of fulfilling these tasks.

As for the proposed principle of concentrating the basic efforts on the destruction of the nuclear weapons and the main grouping of the enemy, these are nothing less than the most important tasks of the offensive troops, but they can be accomplished only when the areas of the location of the nuclear weapons and of the troop groupings of the enemy have been precisely determined. However, these tasks still cannot determine the concept of the front offensive operation and the methods of conducting it, since far from all the areas of location of the nuclear weapons and groupings of the enemy will be known to us prior to the beginning of the operation.

The same thing can also be stated regarding the main tasks of the operation, which have been proposed to replace the concept of the axis of the main strike since these tasks can likewise be assigned to the troops only after the establishment of the coordinates of the appropriate enemy targets and objectives. Thus, neither the principle of concentrating the basic efforts on the destruction of the nuclear weapons and the main grouping of the enemy, nor the main tasks of the operation, can abolish or replace the axis of the main strike.

One can likewise hardly agree with the view that the selection of the axis of the main strike leads to the creation of concentrated assault groupings of troops, which would offer a highly advantageous target for mass nuclear strikes. Is it not a fact that the

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axis of the main strike is not a line but a zone of terrain within the borders of which the troops advance? Why then cannot this offensive zone, with its width, ensure the necessary dispersal of troop groupings and the most effective use of their firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities?

Such a dispersal of troops is now necessary as one of the most important conditions for ensuring the success of the offensive, and not only on the axis of the main strike but also on other axes. At the present time concentrated strike groupings of offensive troops will not be created on these axes. Very likely, on the axis of the main strike, as distinguished from other axes, a more powerful troop grouping will attack, but in a wide zone, thus ensuring the necessary dispersal and maneuver, while on the other axes of the advance the troops will be of less strength and not in such wide zones.

Prior to the mass use of nuclear weapons, the main strike was as a rule launched on the axis most likely to ensure the successful breakthrough of the enemy defense and the destruction of his basic grouping. Therefore the axis of the main strike almost always ran through weak sectors of the enemy's defense and took the attacking troops to the flank and rear of his strong grouping. It should be recalled that this was conditioned by the complexity of the destruction and neutralization of the enemy's defense system in its strong sectors and by the difficulty of penetrating this defense.

But now, under conditions where the mass use of nuclear weapons favors the rapid and most nearly complete destruction of an enemy of any strength, it is advisable to launch the main strike on the axis which will ensure the rapid advance of the troops and the seizure of the operational-strategic objectives of the enemy.

In accordance with the goal of the front offensive operation, in addition to the axis of the main strike, the axes of other strikes are also determined. It should be emphasized that at the present time the destruction of the enemy and the success of the troop advance on the axis of the main strike depend on the success of these other strikes to a greater degree than was true in the past. As soon as there occurs any confusion or even worse, any failure, in the advance of the troops

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on the other axes, then the flanks of the troops attacking on the axis of the main strike are immediately exposed, the possibility of their isolation is increased, and favorable conditions are created for the enemy to destroy this grouping of the attacking troops.

Therefore the troops attacking on the other axes must have a sufficiently high penetrating ability and capabilities for maneuver, thus ensuring their swift advance. In other words, these troops must have at their disposal nuclear weapons and the appropriate reserves to the extent necessary.

The determination of the immediate and subsequent tasks of the front was always the most important part of the concept of the offensive operation and of the commander's decision. The distribution of front troop efforts for the fulfillment of successively resolved tasks takes place as a result of the fact that with one, even with the most powerful strike, it has been impossible to destroy the entire enemy grouping and to attain the final goal of the front offensive operation. But perhaps now, under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons and the increased combat capabilities of the armed forces, the final goal of the front offensive operation can be attained with the delivery of one powerful strike against the enemy grouping. However, an analysis of the combat capabilities of the enemy and of our modern armed forces does not allow us to give a positive reply to this question.

Even now not one, but several strikes against the enemy grouping, and also considerable effort and great stress on the part of the attacking troops, are required for the attainment of the final goal of the front offensive operation. In other words, even under modern conditions, the goal of the front offensive operation can be attained only as a result of the fulfillment of the immediate and subsequent tasks of the front. But now these tasks, principally under the influence of nuclear weapons, have increased in depth and have been abbreviated in the time needed for their fulfillment. Furthermore, with the availability of long-range missiles and of delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons, the fulfillment of a subsequent

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front task can be begun at the same time as the destruction of the enemy and his tactical and closest operational depth, i. e., during the time that the front troops are fulfilling their immediate task.

Proceeding from the above, the immediate task of the front in a modern offensive operation must be understood to be the rapid and decisive destruction of the enemy grouping, and above all of his nuclear weapons, the swift advance of the troops, and the seizure of important objectives or areas to a depth of 300 to 400 kilometers, i. e., to the depth of approximately the entire front offensive operation in the last war. Taking account of the increased rate of advance of troops, the modern front can fulfill this task during 3 to 4 calendar days.

The subsequent task of the front will be to complete the destruction of the strategic enemy reserves by means of a swift advance of the troops and to capture the objectives and areas whose seizure will accomplish the final goal of the front offensive operation.

As is evident, the greatest importance is attached to the fulfillment of the immediate task of the front, in the course of which the destruction of the enemy's basic forces takes place and in essence the fate of the front offensive operation is decided. Therefore, the largest portion of all the forces of the front, and above all nuclear weapons, must be employed for the fulfillment of precisely this task.

However, under the conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, and in connection with the increased role of his strategic reserves, the importance of the subsequent mission of the front has been increased, for the fulfillment of which the front will often have to be reinforced with the appropriate quantity of nuclear ammunition and with fresh large units of troops.

The methods of conducting an offensive operation of a front under the influence of the mass use of nuclear weapons has also undergone significant changes.

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Soviet military art has always striven to find a method of conducting offensive operations which would lead to the quickest and most complete destruction of the enemy and to the attainment of the final goal of the operation. In the search for such methods, Soviet military-scientific thought, as is generally known, even in 1935 worked out the theory of combat in depth, which consisted in essence of simultaneous attack against the enemy to the entire depth of his combat formation. However, the firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of the troops of that time could not ensure the practical implementation of this theory. Nor was this problem resolved in World War II operations. Only now, in connection with the rapid growth of firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of the armed forces have conditions appeared for the practical solution of the problem of the simultaneous destruction of the enemy to the entire depth of his operational formation.

It is a fact that modern nuclear, and especially nuclear/missile, weapons can be successfully employed for the delivery of sudden, long-range, and crushing strikes against the enemy to the entire depth of his operational formation, and even against his strategic reserves.

The development of airborne forces and military-transport aviation, now as never before, ensures the dropping and combat operations of front troops not only in the immediate but also in the deep rear area of the enemy on the most important axes and in the decisive areas.

The increased mobility of ground troops, ensuring their advance at a speed of 100 kilometers and more, permits them to gain the enemy's operational-strategic rear quickly.

More than was true in the past, modern aviation ensures effective support and cover for troop combat operations to the entire depth of their offensive.

Thus, the increased firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of modern armed forces fully ensure the conduct of a front offensive operation in greater depth and completely resolve the problem of simultaneous destruction of the enemy grouping to the

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entire depth of its operational formation. Any other method of conducting a modern offensive operation which results in the consecutive, methodical advance of troops, is a step backward. It fails to exploit all the firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of modern troops, and permits the enemy to maneuver with ease in his operational rear and to create groupings for the launching of strikes against the attacking troops. The simultaneous destruction of the enemy can be accomplished through the annihilation and prolonged neutralization of his groupings and objectives on the axis of the main strike and on other axes, in the tactical and operational zones, at least to the depth of the immediate task of the front. The main role in the simultaneous destruction of the enemy grouping in the entire depth of its formation is carried out by the missile troops both of the front and of strategic designation.

Missile troops, in coordination with aviation, employing nuclear and chemical ammunition, destroy and neutralize enemy nuclear weapons at bases, depots, launching sites, and airfields, as well as his troop groupings and control centers. The missile troops, as a rule, deliver the most powerful nuclear strike at the beginning of the offensive. In the course of an offensive operation, the missile troops deliver nuclear strikes against newly discovered enemy targets and objectives opposing the attacking troops.

Chemical weapons are also employed, mainly against objectives which were not subjected to nuclear strikes, in order to ensure the most complete destruction of the enemy and to preclude the possibility of his counteraction and maneuver.

However, the transformation of nuclear strikes into the final destruction of the enemy, together with the seizure of his territory, requires the immediate carrying out of airborne landings and the swift advance of motorized rifle and tank troops in coordination with aviation.

Airborne forces quickly occupy the most important areas on the axis of the main and of other strikes of the attacking groupings in

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coordination with the missile troops and front aviation; they complete the destruction of the enemy in these areas and prevent the approach of his fresh large units from the rear and from unattacked sectors, thus ensuring the swift advance of the troops into the operational depth of the enemy. With this goal, tactical airborne landings can be employed by armies at a depth of 100 to 200 kilometers from the enemy's line of defense, while operational airborne forces of a front can conduct combat operations at a depth of 200 to 400 kilometers and more. The basic conditions which ensure the success of airborne forces operations are the suddenness and rapidity of the landings, and also the aggressiveness and resoluteness of the operations during the execution of the combat tasks. However, for the reinforcement of operational airborne forces it will sometimes be necessary to increase their forces through the transfer by air of motorized rifle units and large units.

The motorized rifle and tank troops of a front, in coordination with missile troops, aviation, and airborne forces, by skilfull maneuvering and by not becoming engaged in protracted fighting with the enemy, can quickly overrun his tactical and operational zones, swiftly reach the area of the combat operations of the tactical and operational airborne forces, accomplish the immediate task of the front, and continuously develop the offensive to the accomplishment of the goal of the front operation. Artillery, and above all rocket artillery, destroys and neutralizes the enemy's nuclear installations, his weapons, and his personnel. In the course of the offensive, the artillery destroys and neutralizes newly discovered targets, objectives, and revived centers of enemy resistance.

The speed of the troop advance, especially on the axis of the main strike, must be not less than 100 kilometers per calendar day.

Aviation, in coordination with the missile, airborne, and ground troops of the front, destroys and neutralizes enemy nuclear weapons and troops, against whom missile strikes and artillery fire may not be sufficiently effective. It also supports and covers the attacking troops, destroying newly discovered (mainly mobile and small-sized) objectives and also enemy air targets.

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It is obvious that such a method of conducting an offensive operation of a front in which all the combat capabilities of the attacking troops are used to the maximum, significantly hastens the destruction of the enemy and the attainment of the goal of the operation. However, it should be emphasized that this method of conducting an offensive can be successfully carried out only with the mass use of nuclear weapons, and even then only when the enemy troop groupings and objectives marked for destruction, are well reconnoitered and their coordinates precisely determined. Therefore, the method of the simultaneous destruction of the enemy to the entire depth of his operational formation can be used most often at the beginning of an offensive operation. Under other conditions, when the enemy groupings and objectives are insufficiently reconnoitered, and when the launching of a simultaneous strike against them to their entire depth does not appear possible, the front offensive will be conducted by means of the successive destruction of enemy groupings and objectives in accordance with their discovery and the precise determination of their coordinates. Such a method of conducting an offensive naturally cannot ensure the most complete utilization of all the firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of the attacking troops and it permits the enemy to maneuver in his depth with the aim of delaying and disrupting our offensive. Most commonly, the goal of the offensive front operation will be attained as a result of a combination of the methods of simultaneous and successive destruction of the enemy, with the first of these methods having the decisive role.

It should be emphasized that these methods of conducting an offensive front operation may be successfully employed for the implementation of any concept of the operation.

The grouping of troops in the offensive operations of the front consists not only of their operational makeup but also must provide for various procedures of the large units and units--marching, approach march, and combat. At present one cannot conceive of a front grouping solely in terms of the formation of the individual armies of which it is composed, without those formations of large units and units which, properly speaking, accomplish the operation.

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A troop grouping of a front and of armies, depending upon their tasks, can be varied, but must always and to the greatest extent possible, ensure the successful execution of these tasks. While the immediate task of the front is carried out through the launching of a simultaneous strike against the enemy in the entire depth of his operational formation, the front troops must strive to execute this task in one grouping. As a rule, in such a grouping the front troops will be formed into one echelon, following which the necessary reserves must be provided. It is impossible that in the course of the execution of the immediate task of the front, the situation will require changes in the grouping of the troops, but in this there should be no large-scale regroupings of troops.

The rapid and complete destruction of the enemy to the entire depth of the immediate task of a front must ensure to the grouping of troops a continuous and swift advance right up to the execution of the subsequent task.

When the immediate task of a front is to be carried out through the delivery of successive strikes against the enemy, and his complete destruction requires more prolonged and intensive combat, the most advisable grouping of a front may be formation into two echelons. In this case the second echelon of the front is usually committed to battle at the beginning of the execution of the subsequent task of the front.

The most important place in the modern grouping of a front is held by missile troops and delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons. Therefore the creation of a front grouping must begin with the determination of the siting areas for missile large units and units, and also for the airfields of delivery aircraft, and only after this can the assembly and departure areas of other front troops be laid out. Nothing must reveal the siting areas of missile troops or the airfields of nuclear delivery aircraft.

The departure areas of airborne troops must be occupied immediately before the beginning of airborne operations.

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As regards tank and motorized rifle large units, in the interest of achieving concealment of the offensive, they can pass through their departure areas without stopping, or else occupy them for the minimum time necessary for the deployment of artillery in firing positions, the inspection of equipment, and the refueling of tanks and vehicles.

The security of a front troop grouping from enemy nuclear strikes, as is generally known, is largely ensured by its dispersal. However, even in a dispersed state, troops must not be located for a prolonged time in the same areas. In this connection, now to a greater degree than previously, emergency areas, firing positions, and airfields must be provided, and also the arrangements for the concealed movement of the troops must be more carefully worked out. At the same time, the importance of counterintelligence in the areas of troop disposition, especially of missile troops, and on the routes of their movement has increased.

But skill consists not only of the creation of the most advantageous grouping of troops in a departure position, even though this is very important, but also of maintaining its advantages during the course of the entire offensive, taking into consideration that an enemy employing nuclear weapons can at any moment suddenly introduce large, unfavorable changes in the front troop grouping if appropriate measures are not taken by our side. The continuous maintenance of a favorable grouping of the attacking troops can be achieved through the timely delivery of sudden and crushing nuclear strikes against the enemy, thus exerting great influence on the course of the offensive, and also through the skilful maneuvering of the attacking troops. But such means of maintaining an advantageous situation and the superiority of our grouping will provide the necessary effect only if the command and staff of the front, in their planning and direction of the offensive operation, prudently determine the most favorable grouping of troops not only in the departure position but also during the crucial moments of the offensive, and also toward the end of the first and each of the subsequent days of operation.

Let us examine the problem of the influence of nuclear weapons on the scope and nature of the offensive operations of a front.

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The width of a front offensive zone. It is known that under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the number of large units of ground troops in the composition of a front is reduced and their operational density considerably diminishes. In connection with this, the width of the front offensive zone now will ordinarily be determined by the established operational density of the troops, which in its turn will depend on the amount of nuclear ammunition alloted to the front. Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this density will scarcely be higher than 20 kilometers per division. With such an operational density of the troops of a front, an offensive zone 300 km wide, e. g., may have 15 division, besides the necessary reserves. But if there are 20 divisions in the composition of a front, then for the same operational density of troops the width of the zone of its offensive will be 400 kilometers.

Thus, depending on the quantity of nuclear weapons alloted for the operation, the number of divisions in the composition of a front and the established operational density of troops, the width of a front offensive zone may now vary within the limits of 300 to 600 kilometers. A further increase in the width of a front offensive zone may cause considerable complications in the control of the troops. In determining the width of a front offensive zone, the relative strength of forces and weapons should not be forgotten and, even more, the enemy should not be permitted an overall superiority of them. Together with this, it is necessary to take into consideration that in the development of an offensive the front zone will widen, and toward the end of the operation its width may have grown approximately one and one-half times.

The depth of a front offensive operation is usually determined by the goal of the operation and by those installations and areas which are to be taken. Under the conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, including those of strategic designation, an offensive operation of a front in the initial period of a war can be carried out to a depth up to 800 kilometers and more, since at this depth the enemy's groupings and his most important installations can be destroyed as a result of nuclear strikes. Under conditions where a front does not have at its disposal the capability of delivering mass

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nuclear strikes at such a distance, the depth of its offensive operations will, of course, be less.

The rates of advance of the troops can be varied and they depend upon the extent of destruction of the enemy and also on the preparation of the attacking troops for rapid negotiation of natural and artificial obstacles and obstructions in the terrain. Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons and the increased mobility of troops, their advance at a rate of 100 kilometers and more in a calendar day is quite possible. However, in order to realize such rates of advance of the troops, it is necessary to inflict such destruction on the enemy that he would be deprived of the capability of offering serious resistance to the attacking troops or of creating radioactive contamination of the terrain in the zones of the offensive. Under other conditions, chiefly with a lesser degree of enemy destruction, the rates of advance of the front troops naturally cannot be as high.

The duration of offensive operations of a front at the highest indices of their scope may reach 8 to 10 calendar days. With lower indices of scope of the offensive operations of a front, their duration will be considerably greater.

Thus, under the influence of the mass use of nuclear weapons and the increased mobility of troops, not only have the indices of the scope of the offensive operations of a front changed, but also their nature. Now the troop advance, as a rule, will be carried out in wide zones, on separate and disconnected axes, by the method of simultaneous and successive destruction of the enemy. The advance of the troops will develop at high rates in order to penetrate swiftly and rapidly into the operational-strategic rear of the enemy. However, on account of the perfectly natural tendency of the enemy, by extensive use of nuclear weapons, to accomplish his tasks also by means of an advance, the most frequent type of combat operation of troops in modern offensive operations will be the meeting battle and meeting engagement.

The high degree of maneuver in a modern offensive operation almost completely precludes the penetration of the enemy's defenses in its past meaning, since his defenses will not have the continuous

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fronts and the high density which they formerly had.

While,up to now, this article has discussed the overall influence of nuclear weapons on the principles of offensive operations of a front, we would now like to emphasize its special characteristics, the radioactive contamination of the terrain. It should always be taken into consideration that troop personnel operating on terrain contaminated by radioactive substances can be disabled as a result of radiation sickness.

It is known that this casualty factor is most insidious, since it does not have any apparent external symptoms and can be detected only with dosimetric instruments. The greatest radioactive contamination of the terrain endangers troop operations, and occurs with nuclear surface bursts. Radioactive contamination of the terrain in areas of nuclear air bursts and in the path of movement of a radioactive cloud is considerably less and is less dangerous to troop operations.

It also should be kept in mind that the fallout of radioactive dust, and consequently, the level of radiation on the contaminated terrain, will vary. As regards the duration of radioactive contamination, if at ground zero it is lethal for a considerable period of time, the levels of radiation in the path of the cloud gradually diminish and cease to be lethal.

It is obvious that as a rule nuclear surface bursts will be employed against troops and installations located in the operational depth under favorable operational and meteorological conditions. Wherever these conditions are favorable for the attacking troops of a front, they naturally preclude the possibility of enemy nuclear surface bursts and, conversely, wherever the front troops, because of operational and meteorological conditions, cannot employ nuclear surface bursts, they will be advantageous for the enemy. Hence, it can be assumed that during the course of an operation up to 25 percent of all nuclear warheads of both sides can be employed with surface bursts.

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Let us suppose that in the zone of the immediate task of a front, equal to 120,000 square kilometers, both sides, for the fulfillment of their combat tasks, use up to 200 different nuclear warheads, or half the total supply allotted to the operation, of which 25 percent, or 50 nuclear warheads, involve surface bursts. If, for example, 25 nuclear warheads have a yield of 10 kilotons and each of the remaining 25 of 100 kilotons, then in the general area of radioactive-contaminated terrain, equal to approximately 60,000 square kilometers, almost 9,000 square kilometers of terrain will be contaminated with dangerous levels of radiation from 50 roentgens and higher. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that with the mass use of nuclear warheads overlapping of the zones of radioactive-contaminated terrain and the creation of dangerous levels of radiation will inevitably occur, where the single bursts would not have been dangerous.

Even from this estimate the great significance of the casualty factor which arises as a result of the radioactive contamination of the terrain, and its influence on the course of the operation, are evident. However, it should be taken into consideration that the data of this estimate are more likely too low than too high, since in reality in the zone of the immediate task of a front both sides can employ more nuclear warheads with surface bursts and with a more powerful charge. Furthermore, in the present estimate no account has been taken of the fact that the zones of radioactive contamination can be especially designed to follow water and other natural boundaries, and to cross the axis of the troop offensive with the task of delaying the enemy or stopping his offensive. It should be kept in mind that the zones of radioactive contamination are not distributed uniformly throughout the whole of the zone of the front offensive, but as a rule will be created on the axis of the main and other strikes and will reach the greatest extent and the most dangerous levels of radiation there. In short, radioactive contamination of terrain has become a most important factor of operational-strategic significance. Without constant prognosis of the radiation situation, continuous study of it and reconnaissance of the probable zones and strips of radioactive contamination, and also without the prudent adoption of measures for the immediate withdrawal of troops from these zones

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and strips or for their rapid crossing, the success of offensive operations cannot be guaranteed. With this aim, a chart of the radiation situation must be kept constantly in all staffs, especially in the operational staffs. The commanders of troops and the commanding officers of large units and units are obliged to know the radiation situation at all times and to take account of it in their decisions, orders, and operations.

Neglect of these requirements in a combat situation, or insufficient attention to them, may lead to unnecessary mass troop loss and to a deceleration of the rates of their advance.

The withdrawal of troops from the zones of radioactive contamination prior to the beginning of the operation may take place along the shortest axes on the initiative of the commanding officers of large units immediately after the detection of contamination, but crossing through such zones and strips during the course of an offensive operation, as a rule, will be carried out only on the decision of the commander of the front troops or with his sanction in order not to upset the plan of the operation.

The methods of crossing through these zones are determined by the axes, the dimension, and levels of radiation. If these zones do not completely intersect the axis of the troop advance and are not too extensive, then the most advisable method of crossing through them may be a detour not requiring a great deal of time.

When the zones and strips of radioactive contamination intersect the axes of the troop advance, and bypassing them does not appear possible, crossing through such zones and strips must be carried out by forcing them along routes with the lowest levels of radiation. Under conditions where high levels of radiation exist on all probable routes across the zone of contamination, it is advisable that the forward movement of troops be postponed until some abatement of these levels, but with the impossiblity of doing this, they immediately f orce the zone with tanks. Crossing through zones of radioactive

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contamination must be carried out at increased speeds, with increased distances between vehicles, subunits and units and with the best use of means of individual protection.

In isolated cases, depending on the situation, continuous zones of radioactive contamination can be crossed by small units of troops in helicopters.

Furthermore, one cannot but consider the necessity for complete medical processing of the personnel of units and large units, and also the decontamination of their armament, equipment, and transport immediately after the troop crossing of zones and strips of radioactive contamination. Even with the thorough preparation of troops, medical processing and decontamination will require considerable time, but, as is known, an offensive penetration, especially under modern conditions, cannot tolerate any interruption. Therefore, the problem of the continuity of the offensive under modern conditions acquires especially important significance. Its solution depends mainly on the ability of the troops to cross the zones and strips of radioactive contamination rapidly and without great losses. Furthermore, for a more complete solution of this problem, it is necessary to envisage the swift maneuver of reserves from the rear to bypass the zones and strips of radioactive contamination and subsequently to emerge on the axis of the main and other strikes, frequently in conjunction with the dropping of forward units on these axes.

The views stated in this article are an attempt to examine briefly the influence which is exerted by the mass use of nuclear weapons (having due regard for other qualitative changes of troops) on some of the principles of modern offensive operations of a front.

In a short article, naturally, not all the principles of offensive operations could be examined. Therefore, such important questions as the influence of nuclear weapons on the support of front troops and on coordination, control, etc., were not touched on in this article.

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It should also be taken into consideration that further development of nuclear weapons will without doubt reinforce the firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of troops, and consequently, will bring about appropriate changes in the principles of modern offensive operations of a front.

A correct understanding of the influence of nuclear weapons on the principles of modern offensive operations of a front is undoubtedly necessary for the successful practical work of generals and officers regarding the preparation and conduct of these operations.

In the development of military-scientific thought in this and other directions of the growth of the military art, and also in the realm of the structure of the armed forces, we must not only remember but also persistently carry out, the orders of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy to the effect that "at the present time, when our Armed Forces are at a critical stage of development, further thorough working out of military doctrine, of the theory of the military art, and of other questions of a military nature has acquired special significance. We must clearly realize that without marked improvement in military-theoretical work, practical errors in the building up of the Armed Forces are possible."[1]

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[1] The All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, Military Publishing House, 1960, page 20.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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12 MAR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Factors Affecting the Planning of a Modern Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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COUNTRY : USSR

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This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Some Factors Affecting the Planning of a Modern Offensive Operation

by

Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov

The concept that the planning of a modern operation should be based primarily on the capabilities of nuclear weapons and their most effective utilization, which now appears to be the decisive factor in achieving victory over the enemy, has become universally recognized. However, it would be useful to examine some particular factors affecting the planning of operations.

In this connection, the first point on which we must dwell is the clarification of the concept "the main strike and the number of strikes in an operation."

In the past, the direction of the main strike for a breakthrough of a solid positional defense, which was typical, was always selected in support of the most effective use of the infantry, artillery, and tanks which were concentrated for the delivery of a strike on the weak spot on a selected axis, as a rule, in narrow zones, for subsequent destruction of the basic enemy grouping. This axis had precise limits in an operation and required compulsory superiority over the enemy in forces and weapons. This, naturally, had its definite influence on the content of the planning of the operation.

Under modern conditions, atomic weapons without the aid of other weapons of combat can, in the shortest periods of time, destroy the basic enemy troop groupings and deprive them of their combat effectiveness and in this way ensure an advantageous correlation of forces for the delivery of strikes and the development of an offensive.

Hence, when working out a solution and planning an operation, primary attention must be given to the determination of the sequence of the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons, which would guarantee maximum effectiveness of the latter in the destruction and neutralization of enemy groupings in the entire depth of the tactical and operational formation.

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With such a solution to the problem, very often on the axes and through the areas where nuclear weapons will be used (4 to 5 words missing) groupings of ground troops or in general to circumvent these areas in avoidance of a sharp deceleration of the rates of advance as a result of the serious destruction of populated points, of road structures, and of radiation contamination of the terrain.

It appears that the concept "main strike" under modern conditions and on an operational scale is primarily a mass nuclear strike against the enemy's nuclear weapons and his basic troop groupings which is followed by strikes with tanks and infantry on several axes, and no longer against a solid positional defense, but against a defense having primarily a clustered nature (ochagovyy kharakter).

In resolving the problem of the quantity of strikes, the mechanical transfer of the experience of the past war to modern conditions must be decisively rejected in a front and an army because of the still extant conception of the inadvisability for a front to deliver more than two strikes and of the impossibility for an army to deliver a strike on more than one axis. Substantiation of this leads to assertions which are far from the truth, namely that with a large number of strikes a front, and even more, an army, will dissipate its forces and will not be able to perform the assigned mission.

If concentration and utilization of a large mass of fire and of considerable masses of troops were required to execute a breakthrough in the past, now it can be carried out much more simply. Now nuclear/missile weapons are capable of breaking through an enemy's defense over large areas not only along a front but in depth and to form in it such breaches and even vacuums as to lead not only to the weakening of the enemy but also to his complete loss of combat effectiveness on the axes selected for the offensive. Thus, conditions have been created in which the operations of ground troops are possible without amalgamating them into some sort of a dense striking force.

Consequently, if one speaks of strikes, keeping in mind the axes of ground troop operations, there can be several of them, both of an army and of a front. Their number will be determined by the capabilities of the nuclear/missile weapons, the advantages of utilizing them, and also by the conditions supporting convenience in the operations of large units of ground troops.

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The delivery of several strikes by a front and an army, united by a common concept and directed toward the achievement of the assigned goals of an operation, is advantageous not only from the point of view of the availability of possibilities for ensuring these strikes by nuclear/missile weapons but also because with this, favorable conditions for achieving surprise are created. Dispersion of troops in several areas and over a large expanse together with the execution of other measures for operational concealment hinders the enemy in the timely determination of the intentions of the attacker. This will permit concealment from the enemy of not only the actual employment of the troops in an operation but also of the nature of the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons.

The operations of front (army) troops on several isolated axes create more favorable conditions for the utilization of the most varied forms of operational maneuver, permit a comparatively easy change in the direction of operations, especially during the course of the operation's development, and a quick transfer of the efforts of the troops into the depth. Furthermore, such conditions considerably simplify the use of various arms of troops since excessive congestion and shifting of their combat and precombat formations are eliminated, they permit a more effective utilization of the terrain, assist in the better organization of the work of the rear services and in particular, permit a more rational utilization of the main railroad and vehicular highway networks, and also of bridges and rivercrossings in support of supply and evacuation.

It is perfectly obvious that troops dispersed along a front for operations on various axes cannot be equivalent in composition or equipment. The content and importance of their missions will also differ. But they will be united by a single concept and the efforts of the troops will be directed toward the achievement of the overall goal of the operation. Moreover, now it is not important how many groupings have been created in a front for an offensive, but rather how the troops are organized for the most effective exploitation, at high tempos, of the results of the use of nuclear/missile weapons. Therefore, dispersion of troops along a front does not at all mean that their efforts are dissipated as a result.

The spatial scope, tempos and the duration of an operation must also be examined in a different manner from that which is still the practice at the present time.

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First of all, the establishment of rigid and constant sizes in relation to the width of offensive zones loses its significance, especially for operational formations. In reality, when planning an operation, a front (army) will be assigned zones, determined not on the basis of some constant size, but rather on the basis of such factors as the composition and condition of the troops, the availability of nuclear/missile weapons, the possibility of organizing not only simultaneous neutralization of the enemy by fire in the entire depth and by a strike against the enemy from the front, but also the effect on him of airborne troops and motorized rifle units and large units transported by air, and also (and this is very important!) by the necessity to support an extensive maneuver of troops in the course of an offensive both for the delivery of simultaneous and successive strikes against the enemy from the most advantageous axes as well as for protection from his nuclear weapons.

From this, it is obvious that the principle of planning an army offensive operation is a zone 50 to 70 km wide with a breakthrough of the enemy's defense on a front of 25 to 30 km is outmoded. If this principle is examined carefully, it will be found to hide nothing more than an indirect requirement for the necessity, even now, to concentrate a large number of men and equipment on a sufficiently limited area (even if for only a brief span of time), i.e., as previously, to accomplish the tasks of breaking through the enemy's defense by an avalanche of troops and not by the power of modern fire and maneuver.

It appears to us that at the present time an army can, right from the beginning of an offensive, conduct it successfully in its entire zone or even in a significantly wider one than indicated above, including an offensive against a prepared enemy defense.

It is all the more possible that the basic methods of its operations will be mutually coordinated, in space and time, maneuvering operations of its individual large units, which come into direct contact with each other only in cases when the efforts of several large units are required against some particular enemy grouping. Under these conditions, moreover, even the large units of an army may often have to operate as individual units in wide zones. Consequently, in planning an operation, the offensive zone of an army should be such as to permit conduct of maneuvering operations both at the beginning of the operation and during its development and to provide a capability to concentrate the strength of the strike by means of the reserves dispersed in depth. Apparently, a zone of 100 to 150 km, in the

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absence of a solid front, will ensure such operations to the highest degree to the troops of an army, particularly under conditions of considerable radioactive contamination of the terrain, which will better assist the fulfilment of assigned missions, and will undoubtedly lower the possibility of their destruction by the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons.

The necessity for maximum exploitation of the capabilities of nuclear/missile weapons for the speediest shifting of the efforts of a front's (army's) troops into the depth of the enemy's defense aimed at his final destruction and the seizure of the enemy's means of using nuclear ammunition and his missile weapon bases, engenders a legitimate desire to sharply increase the rates of offensive, which is now proposed to be 80 to 100 km per 24-hour period.

In connection with such a presentation of the problem of offensive tempos, we think that 80 to 100 km can be only an average daily rate with the presence of completely favorable conditions of the development of the operation.

Daily troop movement of 80 to 100 km can take place only with the absence of any enemy activity and, obviously, this cannot be counted on for the course of the entire operation; this is confirmed by past combat experience and by the experience of all exercises.

High offensive tempos and inevitable losses will, naturally, demand a high degree of strain on the troops and consequently the timely relief of large units of the first echelon, who have borne considerable losses and have lost their combat effectiveness as a result of the enemy's nuclear strikes. This very factor must be carefully appraised in order to correctly plan the conduct of operations at high but realistic rates, determined in light of the concretely developing situation. From this it appears that in each specific case, depending on the goals of the operation and the capabilities of the nuclear/missile weapons at hand, the indicated rates can vacillate to one side or the other.

Further, to the extent that as a result of the use of nuclear/missile weapons by both sides considerable areas of the terrain will be transformed into solid radioactive fields and because of which the engagement will break up into individual centers of combat over a

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wide expanse, it must be assumed that the planned movement of ground troops will not take place as was done during the years of the past war. For example, an operation can begin with the simultaneous use of nuclear/missile weapons and of ground troops over the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation and will conclude as soon as the surviving centers of resistance have been destroyed, and the enemy's potential for undertaking any serious countermeasures to regain its lost position or to reestablish equality in forces on a given axis has been paralyzed.

With this method of conducting an operation, the degree of fulfilment of the assigned missions must be provided for in the plan of operation not by the number of kilometers covered by ground troops but by the possibility of seizing as much of the enemy's depth as possible through active combat operations including airborne landings, in order to paralyze his freedom over significant expanses and to bring to naught his efforts to continue resistance. Under such conditions, the most important thing is to calculate correctly the time necessary for a particular front or army grouping to conclude the destruction of the enemy in individual areas of resistance.

Of considerable importance in planning an offensive operation is its depth, which also cannot be of constant magnitude and which depends on the goals of the operation, the scale of use of nuclear/missile weapons, and the distance from the enemy's key operational-strategic objectives, which the front (army) must seize. In the category of these objectives which have a decisive influence in the determination of the depth of the operation and consequently the depth and content of the front's (army's) missions, the enemy's political-administrative and economic centers, important supply junctions, and the disposition areas of the enemy's bases of nuclear/missile weapons should be included.

The factors which in the past influenced the planning of the rates, the depth, and the duration of operations, such, for example, as the need for a front (army) to use force against the enemy successively depending on the means of destruction on hand for this goal, the depth of its operational formation, the possibility of a lag in airfield basing of aviation, of artillery, and a number of other things, which, if they must be considered at the present time cannot be determining because the capabilities of nuclear/missile weapons are actually limitless and, therefore, conditions for significantly speedier destruction of enemy groupings and the seizure of his territories are created.

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At the present time, as is known, it is customary to plan offensive operations by missions, in which all intermediate missions composing the substance of the immediate and subsequent missions of a front are included.

Thus, in planning for the execution of a front's immediate mission, the subsequent execution of the following intermediate missions is usually envisaged: the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy's defense and the destruction of his nearest reserves, the seizure of the army zone and of the intermediate zones, the encirclement and destruction of the enemy by the forces of the front or, in coordination with adjacent units, the forcing of water obstacles, etc.

This type of mission assignment is connected in principle with methodical operations of the troops with their relatively steady movement on a solid front, from one line to another.

Moreover, modern conditions, operations of the troops of a front will be completely different and will not resemble the operations of the period of the past war, since both an offensive and defensive will be conducted on different principles.

The shifting of troops to an offensive will be effected, as a rule, from areas removed from the line where both sides are in direct contact; broad maneuver must be incorporated in the methods of troop operation, based on a combination of swift movement in columns with operations in precombat and combat formations along separate axes with subsequent conduct of individual engagements and battles in individual areas on a large expanse. Moreover, on some axes groupings of troops will advance swiftly, on others they will conduct meeting battles and engagements, temporarily withdraw, circumvent vast zones of radioactive contamination, changing the direction of advance or wait for a time.

Deep mutual breaking in by troops will become a normal phenomenon. Loss of direct contact of advancing and defending troops will take place frequently. An airborne landing may at times be the only possible way for the speedy fulfilment of the goals of the operation because (2 to 4 words missing) mass nuclear/missile strikes, whole expanses may become inaccessible for operations from the front of troops for an extended period of time.

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Armies of a front will advance, exposing themselves to enemy nuclear strikes, encountering the fierce opposition of his individual mobile groupings in separate areas, with which it will be necessary to wage heavy battles and engagements, and then to swiftly advance at rates close to those of marches, in order to seize the more deeply deployed objectives or to destroy the enemy groupings which are covering them.

As a result of the nature of combat operations by troops of a front, the rates of advance of the armies operating in the first echelon, and of the divisions which are part of the complement of the armies will be most uneven. Therefore, under conditions when the enemy's defense has lost its clearly expressed positional nature, when the mobility of the troops has significantly increased, and combat operations in the absence of solid fronts have become exceptionally maneuverable, by which both sides, in the course of executing combat operations will strive to deliver powerful deep strikes in order to break through into the depth of the territory along separate axes to seize the most important areas and objectives. The seizure of certain lines will not be a necessary condition for the complete defeat of the troops of the enemy whose groupings will also be maneuvering on the battlefield.

The assignment of missions by lines binds the maneuver capabilities not only of tank but also of combined-arms armies and paralyzes the commanders' initiative in their choice of the method of operations and the direction of a strike when deciding on missions for the destruction of the enemy.

One should also keep in mind that the basic fire strike force are nuclear/missile weapons on whose destrudive power the success of the operation depends in the final analysis, but these weapons, as is known, are not permanently located in some limited area. They are dispersed in the depth and along the front, practically throughout the entire zone of the defender.

With movement of our troops, the bases of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons will be changing all the time, therefore, the arrival of troops of the front (army) at some given line still does not ensure the mission of routing the enemy.

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On the basis of the above, we come to the conclusion that the content and character of their assignment to the troops must be changed and brought into accord with the new methods of combat operations of troops.

The missions of a front (army) must be assigned so that their content does not bind the commander to the seizure and holding of certain lines on a solid front, but so as to have their fulfilment lead to the achievement of a perfectly definite operational or operational-strategic result.

In this, the main attention of the commander and staff should be aimed, above all, at the destruction (neutralization) of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons, on the destruction of his basic groupings and the seizure of individual areas having important significance for the further development of the operation.

For example, the most immediate mission of a front in the initial period of a war can be the destruction (neutralization) of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons along the entire depth of his operational formation, the route of the first operational echelon of the opposing grouping by gaining the main routes of approach of the major enemy reserves, and prevention of their inflow and unification for a strike against the troops of the front.

A subsequent mission of a front can consist of the destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons that have remained intact or have newly appeared, the destruction of deep reserves, the seizure of the primary areas of his missile bases, political-administrative or economic centers, and also the disruption of mobilization measures in a particular area of the country.

However, in these questions also, we must decisively reject our accepted practice of strict centralization and detailing of missions. The experience of war shows that the degree of detailing in assigning missions to troops depended, in every case, on the scale and the designated purpose of formation and large units, on the specific conditions of the situation and the nature of the combat activity of the troops. In this, great independence in operations was permitted at the operational level and to a lesser extent at the tactical. During the war, there was also a very clear expression of

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the tendency toward strict centralization of control in the preparation for an operation and combat and a relatively smaller degree of centralization in the process of their conduct. At all levels, centralization of control by the senior commanders also took place with regard to the utilization of fire and strike means.

However, in the course of the past war it had already become evident that strict centralization of control is applicable in those forms of combat operations where the troops lack a capability for an extensive maneuver, for example, during a breakthrough of a prepared positional defense and also in instances when the qualities of the troops are not adequate for maneuvering. But as soon as conditions were created for an extensive maneuver of forces and weapons, the necessity immediately arose to switch from strict centralization to granting subordinates more initiative and independence in accordance with the specific situation within the framework of the general operational concept.

Under the conditions of highly dynamic combat operations and abrupt changes in the situation, it would hardly be correct to centralize the control of troops right up to the point of indicating to large units and units the methods for fulfiling their combat missions, as sometimes happened during the past war. The increased combat capabilities of troops, the nature of a modern battle and operation now urgently require granting subordinates greater independence and the opportunity to manifest initiative in operations in all instances.

Of course, the degree of centralization of control, even under new conditions will depend on the specific situation which has taken shape, the nature of the combat operations, and the preparedness of command cadres and staffs at all levels of the military organism.

Under certain situational conditions, the senior commander, in addition to assigning missions to subordinate troops and allocating to them the means of reinforcement, can define the method by which the assigned missions are to be fulfilled, under others, he can apportion to subordinate troops the necessary means for reinforcement and indicate combat missions without predetermination of the methods of fulfilling them and the sequence of the use of forces and weapons, granting this right to the subordinate commanders.

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However, the general trend in the development, characteristic of troop control under modern conditions, must lead to subordinate commanders and staffs using greater freedom and independence than was the case, for example, in World War II.

The circumstance, that a tendency has been clearly noted to change the combat composition of the operational formations of the front and armies, in the direction of a quantitative reduction also has very great significance for the planning of an operation.

In the past, the basic criterion determining the troop composition of a front and an army for the successful execution of a major offensive operation, as is known, was the necessity to create on the main axis, one and a half, double or sometimes even triple superiority over the enemy in forces and weapons. Therefore, it was completely natural to have the desire to achieve such superiority by means of a maximum increase in the combat composition of formation for the execution of not only the initial, most difficult missions of an operation, but also those in the course of its development. In this way, the strength of front and army formations was determined by the number of large units, and also by the capability of the weapons of destruction, chiefly of artillery and aviation to whose level of development the methods of combat operations corresponded. These methods, although they were basically maneuvering and fast moving, were developed in complex situational conditions, and always required for their initiation and development, the availability of compact groupings of troops and fire, coordination and close lateral contact between them and their separate elements. This is why army and front formations included in their composition a large number of combined-arms large units, not counting the units and large units of arms of troops and special troops. It is known, that the combat composition of a front reached 35 to 40 large units and of an army up to 12 or more large units.

It is perfectly obvious that in view of the existence of nuclear/missile weapons and their limited capabilities, front and army formations can no longer have their former composition in motorized rifle and tank divisions. Under modern conditions, the criterion of the ability of a front and an army to execute its assigned missions is determined by their capabilities to deliver crushing strikes with nuclear weapons and other fire weapons.

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Considering the above-mentioned conditions in total, the composition of a front for the West European theater of military operations can be defined as 15 to 20 motorized rifle and tank large units, 4 to 6 missile large units and a number of special units.

With the indicated number of large units in a front, the operational density will be from 25 to 35 km for a division (when conducting an operation in a zone of up to 500 km), i.e., 2.5 to 3.5 times larger than was accepted in accordance with the experiences of the past war.

In view of this possible composition of a front, the problem arises as to the number of armies in a front and the number of divisions in an army. We consider that it is inadvisable for a front to have, as formerly, less than three or more than five armies. Concerning an army, its composition should also include no more than 5 divisions plus a missile large unit and special units. This composition, in comparison with 7 divisions, is sufficiently capable of strikes and is more flexible from the point of view of control, does not lead to unnecessary supersaturation of the operational formation with forces and weapons and, consequently, to a possible increase in losses from enemy nuclear strikes. Hence, the need for army corps finally passes away to the degree than an army and a corps cease to be in any way substantially different from one another in their composition. With such limited composition of the armies, army corps could be used in a front in their stead but this step is hardly advisable if only for the reason that in every respect, the control of an army is in its capabilities, undoubtedly a more dependable and secure operational organ for control of troops under modern conditions, when great military erudition is required from a command element on this scale.

Planning the use of nuclear/missile weapons in an operation is the most important and definitive part of the planning of the entire operation. In attributing great significance to this principle, it is impossible, in our view, not to turn attention to a sometimes not thoroughly correct understanding of the role of the missile troops of a front. In concrete terms, we are speaking of certain opinions according to which the initiation of an offensive by front troops should be preceded by a missile operation conducted by these troops, i.e., in other words, an attempt is being made to mechanically extend the principles for conducting missile operations in a strategic plan to the front also.

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With such an approach to this problem, the fact is overlooked that missile large units and units are the main fire and strike force of the ground troops and are intended not only for combat with enemy nuclear weapons which, as is known, constitutes one of the basic tasks of any missile operation, but for the support of troop combat operations as a whole. For this reason, they cannot, in principle, be planned separately from the utilization of motorized rifle and tank troops, aviation, tube artillery, and other combat weapons of the armies and front as a whole. It is, therefore, all the more important to emphasize the fact that the relative weight of conventional weapons of destruction has sharply decreased at this time.

The missile troops of a front are varied in their combat characteristics and are found at various troop levels. It follows from this, that every type of missile has its definite operational-tactical designation and every echelon of command to which they are subordinate assigns them tasks in the required detail.

Thus, we believe, that striving to conduct missile operations at the level of the front, with the means organizationally included in the composition of the various combined arms elements of the front, has no basis.

Nevertheless, measures for the timely and qualitative planning of the use of nuclear/missile weapons in an operation are complex, many-sided, and therefore require a very correct approach to the delimitation of functions between the commander and staff of the front on the one hand, and the commander and the staff of the missile troops and the air force (VVS) of the front on the other.

However, it must be said that in problems of control of missile large units and units in a front and in an army, various extreme points of view are expressed at times. Some believe that the entire control, including the issuance of commands, must be executed by the commander of troops of the front (army) through the staff of the front (army) which is directly connected with the missile large units and units, others believe it to be advisable to transfer almost all questions of control to the commander of missile troops and artillery of the front (army), leaving to the commander of troops of the front (army) the obligation, in essence, to review and approve the proposals of the commander of missile troops and artillery of the front (army).

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These extreme points of view are clearly not acceptable and it therefore appears more correct that only the commander of troops of the front with his staff be able to take it upon himself to decide the basic fundamental problems in the utilization of nuclear weapons. It is his prerogative alone to determine the targets for nuclear weapons, the time and sequence of the utilization by the missile troops and aviation, the expenditure of nuclear warheads in an operation, and distribution of them among the armies and missile large units (units) of front subordination.

Of very great significance is the planning of combat with the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack by all possible means (not only with nuclear weapons, as is sometimes done), as well as the organization of control of the means of using nuclear weapons in light of the concrete conditions of the impending operation. In this, the front and army must very carefully work out the problems of ensuring massed fire of several missile large units and units of various subordination for the execution of the most important tasks in the course of the operation.

The staff of the front conducts the operational planning for the use of nuclear weapons, organizes and ensures control of the means of using them through the commanders and staffs of the missile troops and the VVS.

Specifically, the staff of the front (army) must organize reconnaissance of all kinds in support of the utilization of nuclear weapons, organize the collection and analysis of intelligence data, organize communications for control of the means of utilizing nuclear weapons, organize engineer support for the deployment and maneuver of the missile troops, and also organize security and defense of the missile troops and organs of the missile rear services in areas of disposition and during transfers.

At the same time, direct control of the missile large units and units of the front (army) and especially of their fire, must naturally be the prerogative of the commander of the missile troops and artillery.

On the basis of all these considerations, the following sequence of work can be recommended.

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The commander of troops of the front (army) determines the enemy grouping to be destroyed by nuclear warheads and the most important objectives to be destroyed, the expenditure of nuclear warheads for the missile troops and aviation, the types of nuclear bursts, the order and the time of delivering the nuclear strikes.

The operational directorate of the staff of the front (army), together with the staffs of the artillery and the air army (the representative of the supporting aviation) works out the specific problems of nuclear preparation and nuclear support of the offensive, distributes the objectives for destruction between the missile troops and aviation, determines the yield of the nuclear charge, the type and the height of the burst for the destruction of each objective, the safe distance of our troops from the ground zeros (centers) of the nuclear bursts, evaluates the expected results of the nuclear strikes and the possible resultant radiation situation, determines the large units (units) of missile troops and aviation to be used to deliver strikes and other matters resulting from the specific situation.

After confirmation of the problems which have been worked out by the commander of troops of the front (army), the transmission of fire missions to those who will execute them and the entire work of fulfilling them is organized by the commanders of the missile troops and of the air army personally and through their staffs.

Such a work sequence speeds the planning and transmission of decisions to the troops, and the combined-arms staff and the staffs of arms of troops are freed of the necessity to request and prepare necessary memoranda and considerations for the preparation of nuclear strikes.

The problems of utilizing nuclear/missile weapons must be the basis of the plan of the operation. It must reflect: the objectives to be destroyed, the time and sequence of the delivery of strikes, the expenditure of nuclear warheads with an indication of their yields, the types and heights of bursts and also the coordinates of their ground zeros for each objective, safe distance for troops and the time periods of their readiness, and also a tentative calculation of the use of nuclear warheads in the course of the entire operation. Only after deciding all these problems do the operations of the remaining forces and weapons of the front, the combined-arms formations and large units, the conventional field artillery, the aviation, and other arms of troops and special troops, become reflected in the plan of the operation.

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It is completely obvious, that there is no need whatsoever to draw up a special plan for the use of nuclear/missile weapons as an attachment to the general plan for an operation. All questions of the organization and conduct of an offensive operation are covered by a single plan of the operation. This is a direct result of the leading role of nuclear/missile weapons in accomplishing the goals and missions of an operation.

Weakening the nuclear strength of an opposing grouping of the enemy and depriving him of his capability to use nuclear weapons is one of the most important tasks, whose correct solution ensures the success of the offensive operation as a whole. It is completely obvious, that planning the fulfilment of the tasks of achieving and maintaining nuclear superiority over the enemy must be carried out within the framework of the nuclear preparation and support of the offensive of the troops of the front.

In this connection, the following should be mentioned. At the present time, we employ such concepts as "fire preparation for an offensive", "nuclear preparation for an offensive", while at the same time such concepts as "artillery and aviation preparation for an offensive" continue to exist. A correct clarification of these concepts, it seems to us, is of a fundamental significance in planning the utilization of missile troops and nuclear/missile weapons. But are all these concepts valid and do not some contradictions exist in this problem?

It seems to us that they all have a quite definite content. Fire preparation for an offensive is a somewhat general collective concept and includes fire strikes by nuclear/missile weapons, as well as by aviation and artillery. Therefore, a direct result of this is that component parts of the fire preparation for an offensive are nuclear, artillery, and aviation preparation.

Fire preparation must be examined and planned as a comparatively brief, powerful, massed, and sudden strike by nuclear/missile weapons, aviation and artillery against the most important objectives of the operational formation of the enemy's troops to a depth required by the specific conditions of the situation.

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One of the most essential problems in planning nuclear preparation and fire preparation as a whole for an offensive is the ability to accomplish it in the most limited periods of time and at the same time to ensure the delivery of a powerful fire strike against the most important objectives of the enemy. The mass utilization of nuclear weapons in short periods of time is the only way to achieve decisive destruction of the fire power of an opposing enemy grouping, destruction of his main nuclear/missile and aviation means, and also disruption of the control of troops and the disorganization of work of the rear services.

As to nuclear support of an offensive, depending upon the expected nature of the combat operations of the troops, it can be planned to include the delivery of individual, group, and mass nuclear strikes. These strikes must ensure the fire support for the advancing troops in the most vital and intensive (3 to 5 words missing) for the use of nuclear weapons during the days of the operation, obviously, are possible only tentatively during the period when the troops are fulfilling their immediate tasks. Detailed planning of nuclear support against targets and objectives to be destroyed, can apparently be executed only for 1 or 2 days of the combat operations.

Briefly summarizing the thoughts expressed above concerning the influence of new factors on the planning of a modern offensive operation, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that little remains of former concepts, including those drawn from the experience of World War II. The time has come for a much more discriminating approach to the use of this experience under new conditions which would sweep aside everything which to any degree hinders the further evolution of our views, which should not lag behind the development of the modern weapons of armed combat.

* * *

Taking advantage of the opportunity presented to share thoughts on the pages of this Collection, the publication of which must be warmly greeted, I should like to touch very briefly on an abnormal situation which has been created in connection with the working out of the operational instructions necessary for the Armed Forces.

The fact is that, such instructions, as is known, have not yet appeared since the conclusion of World War II, if we disregard the

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several published drafts which were not approved even though they were widely used in their time during the training of higher staffs. Such a situation does not help to bring about unity of views and does not provide guidance for long-range elaboration of theories in particular directions.

It is not possible to agree with the point of view which gives preference to so called works which are not intended to give strictly defined recommendations and, consequently, are not to be categorized as either regulations or instructions.

A situation such as this evokes serious concern and in the study particularly of sectors of applied military theory, it leads to the necessity for orienting oneself primarily to analyses of the major measures of operational training, carried out by the types of Armed Forces and the General Staff which, as is known, most clearly elucidate the specifics of a given measure. In addition, the lack of official instructions also gives rise to the situation that the level of preparation and knowledge of generals and officers always depends upon the personal views of superior commanders on any particular question. And since these commanders come and go, it is perfectly obvious what consequences this has.

In passing, it should be noted that in the work published by the General Staff called "Bases of Modern Operations", it is difficult to grasp anything different in the nature of the exposition of problems from what was accepted as the content of previously proposed instructions. There are fewer practical recommendations, but it is questionable whether this is really good. And does this better support the training of young cadres who are moving up and have no combat experience in commanding formations and in serving in higher staffs?

It seems that it would be far more correct to decide in favor of working out those instructions necessary for training the command personnel of the Armed Forces in the conduct of front and army operations, and as a matter of fact, those and others as well. At present, it is intended that the instructions for conducting army operations will be worked out separately from and parallel to the work "Bases of Modern Operations" without any coordination between them, one in the General Staff and the other in the Main Staff of the Ground Troops.

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The working out of operational instructions must be organized so that it does not become a substitute for the working out of theoretical works in development of and on the basis of these instructions. Therefore, it seems to us, this practice in working out regulations should be judged as an extraordinary inflation of their scope by means of superfluous detail and repetition. That this is very widespread with us can be easily confirmed by looking at previously worked out drafts of similar instructions and even of other works.

Moreover, it is very important to clarify published instructions in a timely manner. Under present conditions, which are unprecedented in rates of development and perfection of combat equipment, one can never be completely sure that the problems have been finally worked out. Obviously, many of them will, to one degree or another but at different times have to be clarified to the extent of the study and revelation of new factors. It is asked, how can this be best done? To republish the instructions yearly makes no sense but nevertheless, every year changes concerning one problem or another become solidified and they must reach the proper people in a timely manner. Failure to do this will result in the fact that many outdated situations in the above-mentioned work of the General Staff will continue to exist along with other recommendations that have been elaborated later.

In order to correct this situation, yearly directives should be issued on operational training, not only stating shortcomings and assigning general tasks for this training, but primarily clarifying those problems and recommendations in previously published instructions which require changes and supplements. In this instance, the significance and authority of these directives will increase immeasurably. As for the republication of instructions, this should be done after a few years, depending on the necessity.

Experience in working out instructions and regulations shows that it is clearly inadvisable to conduct parallel elaboration of them, since this gives rise to the necessity for numerous and frequently fruitless coordination, hampers to a great degree the selection of author groups, and dissipates efforts. It is perfectly obvious that this work could be fulfilled in a significantly more productive and qualitative manner and even in a shorter time of there was a prearranged plan for working out operational instructions and issuing them before the field regulations, and not vice-versa, as is still the case today.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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13 MAR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvement of the Ground Troops", by Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvement of the Ground Troops", by Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

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This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

The table of contents of the 1961 Third Issue is also included. This Issue was sent to press on 10 July 1961.

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Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvement of the Ground Troops

by

Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

The rapid development of nuclear/missile weapons and their broad introduction into the armed forces predetermined the necessity for a review of previously formed views on the nature, methods, and forms of conducting modern operations and on the role and significance in them of various means of armed combat and also of views on the means of further development of types of armed forces and arms of troops. However, in this natural process, sometimes, under the guise of being something new, positions are expressed which are poorly founded, or entirely unfounded and already repudiated by reality itself.

Recently in our periodical press and in certain speeches, the opinion has been expressed concerning the advisability of repudiating tank armies and the necessity for creating, in place of tank and motorized rifle large units, unified divisions capable of performing varied missions under the complex conditions of a nuclear/missile war.

Taken by itself, this viewpoint is not new. It was even put into practice in the structure of our ground troops and the armies of a number of capitalist countries. Thus, for example, in the French Army which, on the eve of the invasion of German-Fascist troops into France had a significant number of tanks, there was not a single tank division or tank corps. At the beginning of the war, there were only two mechanized divisions in France and a third was in the state of formation. A large portion of the tanks of the French Army were dispersed by small subunits

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in infantry units and designated for joint operations with the infantry. This could not help but have an effect on the combat effectiveness of the French Army and to a large degree facilitated its rapid destruction by the German-Fascist troops.

In the structure of our ground troops prior to the Second World War there was a similar repudiation of major large units of armored troops. An attempt was made to rectify this serious error but not in time, due to the commencement of war with Fascist Germany. Until the end of 1942 this error continued to have an effect on the operations of our troops, even though we strove to equip combined arms armies with as many tank regiments and brigades as possible. But such an action did not produce the needed effect, and during the course of the war we were forced to create tank corps and tank armies which did play an important role in the successful conduct of all the successive operations of the Second World War.

After the war mechanized armies were created instead of tank armies. Subsequently, it was necessary to abandon these and once more return to tank armies.

Thus, as was proved by our experience and numerous examples from the armies of other nations, measures for the unification of tank and rifle (motorized rifle) large units have thus far not justified themselves. Are there sufficient bases to affirm that under the system which has arisen, of arming ground troops, these measures will be correct? In our opinion such bases do not yet exist.

It is well known that the decisive role in attaining the aims of war and of individual operations belongs to nuclear/missile weapons. The efforts of ground troops are directed toward the most complete and effective exploitation of the results of the application of these weapons with the aim of final defeat of basic enemy groupings and the seizure of his vitally important centers and areas for basing weapons of armed combat, primarily nuclear/missile weapons. Ground troops complete the defeat of armed forces on ground fronts, seize and hold enemy territory and the most important installations.

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"One of the most basic missions of ground troops, one of primary concern to the command and staffs", indicated Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, "must be the skilful exploitation of the results of strikes by missile troops for the rapid advance of armies and fronts".

On the basis of the nature of modern operations, it is possible to say that in the composition of ground troops the most important role will be played by that arm of troops which by its combat characteristics is able, to the maximum degree, to exploit the results of the effects of nuclear weapons on the enemy, which loses its combat effectiveness to the least extent from nuclear strikes by the enemy, which can successfully conduct active, highly mobile combat operations at high tempos, rapidly overcome broad zones of radioactive contamination, and rout enemy groupings in meeting engagements and battles precipitately.

At the present time such an arm of troops is the tank troops. This is explained by the specific characteristics and combat capabilities of tanks. Tanks are more stable than other weapons under the effects of nuclear weapons against them, possess powerful armament, high mobility, and armor protection, and can operate immediately after nuclear strikes; at the same time their crews are quite dependably protected from the destructive factors of a nuclear burst. The high combat qualities of tanks allow tank troops to exploit effectively the results of nuclear strikes and conduct highly mobile combat operations, to deliver, in coordination with nuclear weapons and air drops, powerful and deep strikes on the enemy during an offensive, and to guarantee the activity and stability of troops in defense.

The high combat qualities of tank troops have predetermined the sharp proportional increase of them in the composition of ground troops and the significant equipping of combined arms large units and formations with tanks. The organizational inclusion of tanks in the composition of combined arms units, large units, and formations, as well as their full motorization, have significantly raised the maneuverability, striking force, stability of ground troops during enemy nuclear strikes, and their ability to conduct combat operations under conditions of the mass utilization of nuclear weapons.

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The equipping of ground troops with nuclear/missile weapons and the broad introduction of tanks and other armored equipment into their composition have had a decisive influence on raising the combat capabilities of combined arms large units and formations. A modern combined arms army is able not only to penetrate successfully the tactical defense of the enemy but also to direct its efforts rapidly to an operational depth and develop an offensive at high speeds.

Thus, the combat and maneuvering capabilities of combined arms large units and formations have increased significantly. However, is it possible, on the basis of this, to equate motorized rifle to tank divisions or combined arms armies to tank armies, to assert that the former can replace the latter, and on the basis of this to conclude that tank armies are not needed? In our opinion, this cannot be done because the large units and formations named differ from one another not only in quantity of tanks but also in basic combat characteristics and operational-tactical capabilities.

The modern tank army is an entirely new operational formation and by its combat qualities and capabilities is significantly superior not only to the tank army of the Second World War period but also to the postwar mechanized army. It also differs in many aspects from the modern combined arms army. Having in its composition four tank divisions, the tank army is a powerful striking and highly maneuverable tank formation, capable of exploiting the results of the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons in the best manner. The organizational structure and combat characteristics of tanks contain great capabilities for delivering rapid and powerful tank strikes to a great depth, for executing a rapid and broad maneuver on the battlefield, for preserving a significant degree of stability during enemy nuclear strikes and for surmounting wide zones of radioactive contamination with high levels of radiation. By its composition the tank army is homogeneous and much more mobile than the combined arms army.

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The combat capabilities of a tank army allow it to overcome the enemy defense after mass nuclear strikes more quickly than a combined arms army, to reach an operational expanse rapidly, and there to develop bold, decisive, and highly mobile combat operations, directed in conjunction with missile units, airborne landing forces, and aircraft toward the destruction of the enemy's deep reserves and the achievement of operational aims at the highest possible speeds.

The high maneuverability of large units of a tank army, their great antiatomic stability, and strike-penetration force allow the army to conduct combat operations successfully at a significant distance from the remaining forces of the front and to perform in conjunction with other forces and means the most important missions in the defeat of enemy troops. The role and significance of tank armies in modern operations was defined very exactly by the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, who stated that tank armies were bundles of arrows released from a tightly bound bow string for the swift achievement of the final goals of an operation.

Certain comrades do not see the fundamental difference between tank and combined arms armies and propose doing away with tank armies. In our opinion, this proposal stems from an incorrect understanding of the significance of tank troops in general and tank armies specifically in a nuclear/missile war and from an underestimation of their combat capabilities.

Recognizing the important role of tank armies, we are in no measure trying to belittle the significance and combat capabilities of combined arms armies. Yielding to tank armies in antiatomic stability, mobility, and ability to conduct highly maneuverable combat operations, at the same time combined arms armies possess a number of advantages which allow them to perform many combat missions successfully. The same may be said of tank and motorized rifle divisions.

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We consider that under modern conditions the necessity for tank armies and tank divisions has in no way diminished in comparison with the Second World War but, on the contrary, it has increased. Speaking of the superfluousness of tank armies, some comrades refer to the complexity of committing them to battle, and the difficulty of securing their flanks and supplying them with various materiel. But these deductions, in our opinion, are not sufficiently confirmed. With the existence of massive, multi-million man armies, the huge spatial scope of a future war and the large variety of missions which ground troops will perform, tank troops and motorized infantry will, for the time being, remain independent arms of troops, and the negation of one or the other of them is premature. A repetition of mistakes committed in the past may now lead to even worse results. We hold the opinion that even with the presence among ground troops of nuclear/missile weapons permitting the destruction of enemy groupings of any composition, the necessity continues to exist for a strike force, for tank troops and their basic large units and formations which are tank divisions and tank armies, and their long-range development and improvement should be given due attention also in the future.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the presence of tank troops which are more advanced in technical equipment, organizational structure, and methods of operations, also, to a significant degree, in turn stimulates the development of the infantry which must carry out highly maneuverable combat operations in conjunction with tanks. The attempt of certain comrades to reverse the direction of this process is in obvious contradiction with the real course of development of the means and methods of armed conflict, as well as with the position that preferential development must be given to the most modern arms of troops.

The currently accepted organizational structure of large units and formations of ground troops basically corresponds to the modern conditions of conducting combat operations. However, the constant development of weapons of armed combat and methods for their use governs the necessity for its further improvement.

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The improvement of the organizational structure of tank and motorized rifle large units must proceed, in our opinion, along the line of an even greater decrease in personnel, unprotected by armor, increase in antiatomic stability and viability, strike-penetration force and maneuverability of large units, and also an increase in their ease of control and capability for conducting independent combat operations to a great depth and at high speeds.

In our opinion it is advisable to have tank divisions and tank armies of the same composition. A tank army could consist of 4 to 5 tank divisions, and a tank division of 4 tank regiments of medium tanks. In a tank army as well as in tank divisions it is necessary to have organic nuclear/missile weapons. Instead of a motorized rifle regiment in a tank division it is advisable to have a motorized rifle battalion in each of its tank regiments. It is more advisable to have heavy tank regiments and divisions under army or front subordination and to turn them over in case of necessity to large units and formations during the course of an operation.

Together with improving the organizational forms of troops, great significance is acquired by the question of the means of long-range development of tanks and other armored equipment.

In the armament of our ground troops there are T-55 medium tanks and T-10M heavy tanks which more than other combat vehicles guarantee protection of the crew from the influence of the destructive factors of a nuclear burst and are best suited for operations under conditions of the mass utilization of nuclear weapons, and by their basic combat characteristics are significantly superior to foreign tanks of corresponding types and years of manufacture. However, it would be a mistake to suppose that these tanks do not need improvement. New conditions of conducting combat operations make radical improvements in the combat qualities of tanks essential and force the working out of new directions in their development, because the possibilities of further improvement of tanks by old methods are, in practice, almost completely exhausted. In this connection, the question arises as to along which directions our tank construction must develop, and which types of tanks is it more advisable to have in the armament of ground troops?

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In recent years the question of the future of tanks has been broadly discussed in our military press, on the pages of which are expressed the most varied proposals and opinions, some of which even cast doubt generally on the possibility of successful tank operations on the field of combat with modern antitank weapons.

It is well known that the appearance of tanks brought forth the need for weapons to combat them. Such a weapon was first of all artillery: initially conventional, field; later antitank, special. All subsequent development of tanks was carried out in a competition between the protective characteristics of their armor and the destructive capabilities of armor-piercing shells. Toward the end of the last war it had already become evident that the superiority in this competition was with shells. By this time, capabilities for increasing the thickness of tank armor and its antishell stability had approached their limits, but the destructive capabilities of shells radically increased in connection with the use of high-explosive charges.

The increase in the proportion of tank troops and their role in performing combat missions under conditions of the utilization of nuclear weapons has given new impetus to searches for more effective antitank weapons. In recent years for arming the armies of NATO countries recoilless weapons and antitank guided missiles have been adopted, the destructive capabilities of which almost doubly exceed the protective characteristics of tank armor. Work to improve these weapons continues. At the same time attempts to create a qualitatively new armor have not as yet reached any appreciable results in practice.

Thus, at the present time, as in the period of the Second World War, a significant gap exists between the protective capabilities of tank armor and the destructive capabilities of antitank weapons. Basing their reasoning on this fact, a number of foreign authors arrive at the conclusion that tanks are weapons of the past and not of a modern war, and they propose doing away with the heavy armor of tanks because the armor is pierced by antitank

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weapons anyway, and changing to lightly armored, but more mobile and maneuverable, vehicles. This viewpoint finds support among a certain segment of our generals and officers, who propose the creation of a light tank and having it in the armament of ground troops as the basic and only combat vehicle. We cannot agree with this for a number of reasons.

In the first place, a change to tanks with light armor increases the possibility of their destruction not only by antitank but also by other weapons.

Secondly, the chief weapon of destruction under modern conditions is not antitank, but nuclear weapons, and for this reason it is first of all necessary to proceed from a consideration of the impact of the latter. During the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations under conditions of the broad use of nuclear weapons, the most effective means, capable of protecting a person from the effects of the destructive factors of a nuclear burst, is still the armor of tanks. If it is weakened, tanks lose one of their most important qualities.

Thirdly, with a change to light, thinly armored vehicles, the qualitative superiority in tanks will immediately shift to the side of our probable enemies, in whose armies medium tanks continue to be basic.

Fourthly, data concerning the destructive capabilities of modern antitank weapons reflect at present only the results of firing range trials in the absence of the effects of firing against these weapons, and consequently, without considering the difference between firing conditions on the firing range and in combat. Under equal conditions of the effects of nuclear weapons and other means of destruction on tanks and on antitank weapons, tanks will be in a more favorable situation and will be able to carry out combat operations successfully, even with the existence of effective antitank weapons.

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Based on the nature of modern operations and the conditions of tank construction in our country and in the major capitalist countries, we consider that until new models are developed for the armament of our army, three types of tanks must remain: heavy, medium, and special amphibious. When tanks with higher performance criteria are created, it is possible that we will do away with heavy tanks and have in our armament, in addition to light tanks, one basic type of tank, but with various armament systems. It seems to us that it does make sense to create light tanks for airborne troops and reconnaissance units and subunits.

In our opinion, tanks of the future must, as in the past, combine in themselves firepower, high mobility, and armor protection and must guarantee maximum possible protection to crews from the destructive factors of a nuclear burst. The preferential development of one or another quality at the expense of other characteristics of tanks might lead to the drastic decrease of their overall combat effectiveness. In connection with this the basic guides in the work of building new tanks must be:

-a further significant increase of the firepower of tanks by improving the quality of rifled and smoothbore guns, and subsequently by installation in tanks of more modern guided missile armament, providing the capability to destroy enemy tanks with certainty at such ranges and with such accuracy as to exceed the capabilities of enemy tanks;

-a sharp improvement in the protection of crews from penetrating radiation as well as improvement in the protection of tanks from high-explosive charges;

-a further decrease in the weight of tanks by new arrangements of parts, the use of light alloys, plastics and other new materials;

-an increase in the maneuverability of tanks and raising their maximum speeds to 60 to 70 km per hour and average speeds to 40 to 45 km per hour;

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-a significant increase in the cruising range of tanks, an increase in the dependability of their operation, and a decrease in the amount of servicing during the course of combat operations;

-a decrease in tank crews to 2 or 3 persons as a result of complete automation of the combat operations and servicing of tanks;

-the equipping of tanks with more modern instruments for firing, sighting and navigational apparatus guaranteeing the conduct of combat operations at night as well as during the day;

-the maximum standardization of units and assemblies for tanks;

-the creation of an improved system of driving tanks under water;

-the creation of conditions for transport of tanks by air.

All these measures must guarantee in the future the superiority of our tanks over tanks of the armies of capitalist countries. Tank troops equipped with new tanks will be able even more successfully to carry out combat operations under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons.

The interests of increasing the mobility of ground troops also govern the necessity to seek means for increasing the combat and maneuvering capabilities of infantry.

Our infantry in actuality is not only unprotected from the destructive factors of nuclear bursts but also from modern small arms. Its mobility and maneuverability on the field of combat is also very low in comparison with tanks. Tank units and subunits are capable of attacking the enemy at combat speeds equal to 12 to 15 km per hour, and of developing an offensive at a speed of 20 to 25 km per hour and more. On the other hand, the speed of movement

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of dismounted infantry on the field of combat is limited by the capabilities of the human organism and does not exceed 3 to 4 km per hour. The armored carriers existing in the armament of ground troops do not fully guarantee protection of the infantry and its necessary maneuverability on the field of combat.

Thus, the infantry at present is the most vulnerable and least mobile element of the combat structure of the attacking echelon of ground troops. The great difference in the combat capabilities of tanks and infantry hampers the effective exploitation of the results of using nuclear weapons and conducting offensives at high speeds.

With the aim of raising the combat and maneuvering capabilities of the infantry it is advisable, in our opinion, to create as inexpensively as possible a special mass combat vehicle for the infantry, which would permit it to follow the tanks without lagging and to wage combat jointly with them from these vehicles, dismounting only in the most exceptional instances.

We cannot agree with the opinion of certain comrades who propose, with the aim of raising the combat capabilities of the motorized rifle division, increasing the number of tanks in its composition to 300. It is completely obvious that in this case the division will not be a motorized rifle but a tank division. In our opinion, there is no necessity for such an increase in the number of tanks in a motorized rifle division. A more important problem at the moment is the matter of raising the combat capabilities of the infantry. One of the possible ways of solving this problem is the creation of an infantry combat vehicle.

An infantry combat vehicle must be, in our opinion, fully armored, tracked or half-tracked, capable of overcoming obstructions on the field of combat and difficult sectors of terrain on a par with tanks, amphibious, transportable by air, with high viability and antiatomic protection for the crew and troops transported (desant). The maximum speed of the vehicle may be: on wheels - up to 70 to 80 km per hour, on tracks - up to 40 to 50 km per hour.

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The vehicle must have powerful, but compact and light-weight missile weapons, permitting the conduct of effective combat not only against personnel and various fire weapons but also against armored enemy targets.

The crew of the vehicle may consist of two persons. The passenger complement is a rifle squad. The construction of the vehicle must permit the transported troops to conduct combat without dismounting, as well as provide for the convenient accommodation, boarding, and debarkation of the transported troops under various conditions of the combat situation. The weight of the vehicle must be as little as possible.

With the adoption of such a combat vehicle, the necessity might arise for certain changes in the organizational TO&E structure of tank and motorized infantry large units and units. We are not examining this matter in this article, considering that it can be decided only after the vehicle is created. At present we should only like to indicate very briefly what such a combat vehicle might do for ground troops.

An infantry combat vehicle will provide first of all the possibility for significantly increasing the mobility and maneuverability of motorized rifle units and subunits, which then will be capable of successfully advancing behind tanks under the most complex conditions of combat situations and terrain. Operating from these vehicles, the infantry will not lag behind tanks and always will be able to perform various combat missions together with them.

The high cross-country ability and complete armor of the combat vehicles will permit the infantry to carry out broad maneuver on the field of battle and conduct combat operations under complex and rapidly changing situational conditions both together with tanks and independently.

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In equipping the infantry with the new combat vehicle, the viability and stability of motorized rifle units and subunits during enemy nuclear attacks and their capability to exploit the results of our nuclear strikes and dross zones of radioactive contamination will be raised.

The presence on the combat vehicle of machine guns and missile mounts capable of engaging in combat with armored and openly positioned enemy targets will sharply raise the firepower of the infantry. Conducting combat operations on these vehicles, the infantry will be able to combat successfully the enemy's fire weapons and personnel and offer more effective support to tanks on the field of combat.

All the properties which the infantry will acquire with the adoption of the combat vehicle will lead not only to raising the combat capabilities of motorized rifle units and subunits but also to increasing the mobility of tank and motorized rifle large units as a whole. Thanks to this, the combat qualities of tank and motorized rifle divisions will correspond more closely to the requirements of a nuclear/missile war.

The high mobility, great strike force, and armor protection of all personnel of the combat subunits of tank and motorized rifle divisions will favor more effective exploitation of the results of the use of nuclear weapons and the delivery of even deeper and more rapid strikes against the enemy. The capabilities of troops for carrying out broad and rapid maneuver from the zone of interior as well as directly on the immediate field of combat will increase significantly.

The presence in the composition of tank and motorized rifle divisions of easily controlled tank and motorized rifle units with equal mobility and maneuverability will provide the capability for rapidly creating such combat formations for combat as to satisfy the various conditions and requirements of a sharply changing situation. These qualities of tank and motorized rifle units will permit,

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in addition, the avoidance of a prior dangerous concentration of considerable forces and weapons in a limited area on the axis of a major strike and will more fully instill into the practice of combat operations the principle of dispersal of troops and their operations along separate axes. This principle corresponds to the nature of modern operations to the greatest degree.

The advance of large units and units in dispersed formations on a broad front and along axes undoubtedly will decrease troop losses from enemy nuclear strikes, will make it more difficult for him to utilize weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time will permit our troops to carry out a broader and more flexible maneuver of forces and weapons with the aim of reaching the enemy's deep rear area and destroying his troops by units in short periods of time.

In conducting combat operations in dispersed formations and along separate axes, tank and motorized rifle large units will accomplish the destruction of the enemy usually in mobile forms of combat in conjunction with missile units, airborne forces, and aviation. The necessity for a methodical breakthrough of the enemy's defenses no longer arises. The latter will be overcome after nuclear strikes along axes, providing rapid penetration to an operational depth and development of an offensive at maximum possible speed. At the same time, the advance of infantry on combat vehicles following nuclear strikes also must become a regular occurrence in overcoming the defense. Only under this condition can the speed of an offensive be sharply increased and the results of nuclear strikes against the enemy be exploited to the maximum.

In overcoming the defense, the motorized rifle subunits and units will be able to attack the enemy from the march, not dismounting at a line of deployment as has been done up to now. Moving out from the zone of interior after tank subunits, as they approach the main line of resistance, they will carry out necessary reformations while on the march and in conjunction with tanks will overcome the enemy's defense on vehicles in combat or approach march

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formations. Operating on combat vehicles, motorized rifle units and subunits will be able to maneuver more on the field of combat, more quickly change the structure of combat formations and change if necessary from combat formations to approach march formations or the reverse.

Of course, under varied situational conditions the possibility of the infantry operating in dismounted combat formations is also not excluded when the joint operations of tanks and infantry on combat vehicles are for some reason impeded. However, even in these instances the infantry will be in more favorable circumstances than now. After the infantry has dismounted, the combat vehicles will not be removed to cover, as is done with armored carriers, but will support the combat of the infantry with their fire, advancing after the combat formations of their subunits. During this, the combat vehicles will be kept in constant readiness to load the infantry and provide it with a rapid means of advancing after the tanks.

The fullest high maneuvering capabilities of tanks and motorized rifle large units will come about after overcoming the enemy's defenses. Tank units and large units, in reaching an operational expanse, will break through more boldly and deeply into the depth of the enemy's defenses, knowing that the infantry on combat vehicles will not lag behind them and when needed can unite their efforts with them for delivering coordinated and sudden strikes against the enemy. All this will increase even more the capabilities of tank large units in conducting independent highly maneuverable combat operations at speeds of 100 or more kilometers in a 24-hour period.

Equipping the infantry with the combat vehicle creates new conditions, differing in principle from the past, for troop forcing of water barriers.

First of all, after the infantry combat vehicle has become part of our armament, the requirements of troops for various landing and ferrying means is decreased considerably and operations of the infantry in the forcing of water barriers will no longer depend on troops' having these means.

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Motorized rifle units and subunits, operating on combat vehicles, will be able to force water barriers while on the march, in the literal sense of the word. Possessing high cross-country and amphibious qualities, the combat vehicles will ensure that troops reach a water barrier rapidly on a broad front, and ensure their rapid deployment and quick forcing of the barrier in combat or approach march formations. Thus, in the majority of cases, motorized rifle subunits and units will be able to surmount water barriers from the march simultaneously with amphibious tanks along the entire forcing sector without carrying out preparatory engineering work for preparing crossings (except for mine clearing).

Having infantry combat vehicles will increase the possibilities for carrying out maneuver with forces and weapons while forcing water barriers and for transferring the efforts of advancing troops from one direction to another. The execution of a subsequent forcing of water barriers from the march will likewise be made significantly easier. Not being tied down by crossing equipment, motorized rifle units and subunits together with amphibious tanks as well as tanks equipped for movement under water, after forcing one water barrier will race toward the next water barrier and force it from the march.

The equipping of motorized rifle units and subunits with an infantry combat vehicle will have a great influence on the nature of troop operations under conditions of strong radioactive contamination of the terrain. Possessing high mobility, motorized rifle units and subunits on combat vehicles will be able not only to rapidly bypass zones of contamination, but also to cross them successfully in directions with the lowest level of radiation. The combat vehicles will provide in this a higher degree of protection for personnel from penetrating radiation and radioactive dust than armored carriers, much less motor vehicles.

Under modern conditions, together with the maneuvering of troops on the ground, great significance is acquired by troop maneuver in the air. On the basis of this, troops, together with their weapons and combat equipment, must be capable of being transported by air.

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The mass movement of troops by air, as is well known, is impeded because of the absence of light transportable combat equipment and means with a larger load-capacity for transporting airborne forces. With the creation of a relatively lightweight infantry combat vehicle, an important step toward solving this important problem will have been made. The transportability of the infantry combat vehicle by air will permit the transfer by air of motorized rifle units and large units in future operations in mass formation over considerable distances and in short periods of time.

Naturally, in the future the question will arise of whether all motorized rifle units of tank and motorized rifle divisions should be equipped with the infantry combat vehicle. The solution of this question is directly dependent on the designated operational missions of the large units and the economic capabilities of the country. It seems to us that first of all it would be advisable to equip with these vehicles those motorized rifle units which make up the complement of tank armies and tank divisions of combined arms armies. Subsequently, other large units located in the most important theaters of military operations could be so equipped.

It should be noted that in equipping the infantry with the combat vehicle, the question of raising the mobility of tank and motorized rifle divisions is still not completely solved because there will remain in their composition a relatively large number of subunits and units of other arms of troops which are not protected by armor and have less maneuverability.

Under modern conditions, in the composition of all tank divisions including those in tank armies, it would be advisable to have not trailer but self-propelled mounts, mainly with atomic armament, which are capable of more effectively executing various fire missions during the conduct by tank troops of highly maneuverable fast moving combat operations.

Subunits and units of special arms of troops which are included in the composition of tank and motorized rifle large units and conduct combat as an attacking echelon must

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also possess increased mobility and greater protection from the destructive factors of nuclear weapons. This brings out the necessity of also developing appropriate means of armament and movement for them.

In the near future, apparently, vehicles can be created for ground troops utilizing for movement the so-called principle of the "air cushion". The adoption of such vehicles will permit a sharper increase in the mobility of infantry and their maneuverability to a level corresponding to modern requirements. The cross-country ability of such vehicles will provide troops with the capability to execute rapid maneuver, to cover large expanses, including significant zones of radioactive contamination and wide water barriers in short periods of time, and to deliver sudden strikes against the enemy from the flanks and rear.

Units and subunits equipped with these vehicles will find the most widespread use as reconnaissance units and forward detachments of attacking troops. By exploiting breaks and unoccupied sectors in the enemy's defense, they will be able to reach the deep rear of the enemy very quickly and execute not only missions assigned to forward detachments but also a portion of the missions which are carried out by tactical airborne landing forces.

For ground troops it is advisable, in our opinion, to build vehicles which would have an average speed of 100 to 120 km per hour and a cruising range of 400 to 500 km, with not less than 30 to 40 per cent of this by air.

The question arises as to whether or not the increase in the combat capabilities of the infantry will reach the point where it will be capable of performing all combat missions with the same success as tanks. It seems to us that this will not occur for this reason. No matter how good the infantry combat vehicles will be, on the basis of its characteristics it will be far from comparable to our basic tank. And because this is so, tank large units and units under other equal conditions will potentially have greater combat capabilities at their disposal than motorized rifle large units and units on these vehicles.

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The basic advantages of tanks over other combat vehicles will remain: the best protection of the crew from nuclear destruction, more powerful armament, and greater penetrating strike force. The influence of the first factor indicates that under conditions of equal effects by any of the enemy's weapons of destruction losses in tanks will be less than losses in other combat vehicles. Thus, tank troops will better retain a capability for executing combat missions. During operations along separate axes or isolated from the main forces, this will have a decisive significance. More powerful armament will permit the infliction of great losses on the enemy and facilitate the possibility for completing his destruction by a powerful strike by the tanks themselves. All these advantages taken together will provide tank troops with the opportunity to advance at a higher speed and to a great depth. It should also be kept in mind that the development of tanks, even though it encounters certain difficulties, proceeds relatively rapidly in our country. By the time the infantry receives the combat vehicle in its armament, tank troops can receive a new and even more improved and powerful tank.

It should be noted that the development of the infantry in the postwar period proceeded along lines of increasing its strike force and maneuverability, i.e., properties more characteristic of tank troops.

Our present motorized rifle divisions and combined arms armies, on the basis of these characteristics (without taking nuclear/missile weapons into consideration), approach the level of the large units and formations of armored and mechanized troops of the Second World War. Tank troops also have advanced a great deal during this period in technical equipment and organizational forms and have become different. They are constantly reinforced with new models of combat equipment and armament, have a more improved organization, and are capable of carrying out highly maneuverable combat operations at a speed of up to 100 and more kilometers per 24-hour period at a significant distance from the basic forces of a front (army). However, these high combat qualities of tank troops have not yet been

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fully realized during several training exercises, sometimes efforts are in evidence to utilize tank divisions and tank armies on a par with motorized rifle divisions and combined arms armies, and often they are drawn into long and fruitless combat instead of being utilized for carrying out active and rapid offensive operations to a great depth. For this reason, together with the further improvement of combat equipment, armament, and the organizational structure of troops, it is essential to search for and master in practice such methods of their use as to fully correspond to the changing conditions of conducting combat operations and to permit the maximum exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes against the enemy.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 MAR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Utilization of the Missile Troops of a Front (Army) in an Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General P. Koshevoy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

/Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Utilization of the Missile Troops of a Front (Army) in an Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General P. Koshevoy

DATE OF INFO: July 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Utilization of the Missile Troops of a Front (Army) in an Offensive Operation", written by Colonel-General P. Koshevoy.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1961 Third Issue was sent to press on 10 July 1961.

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Utilization of the Missile Troops of a Front (Army)

in an Offensive Operation

by

Colonel-General P. Koshevoy

In modern warfare, along with the decisive role of nuclear/missile weapons, extremely important tasks are entrusted to the ground troops.

In close cooperation with other types of armed forces, especially with the missile troops of strategic designation, they are called upon to perform one of the most important tasks of armed combat, which is the annihilation of the enemy's troops on the ground and the occupation of his territory. Successful accomplishment of this task is considerably facilitated by the presence of the most modern means of combat within the composition of the ground troops: missile large units and units of operational-tactical designation and highly maneuverable motorized rifle and tank troops, also equipped with missiles.

After the ground troops were provided with missile large units and units, their fire power increased immeasurably. Fire, which now consists basically of nuclear strikes, has acquired new qualities: there has been a sharp increase in its power and effectiveness. While the role of fire formerly consisted of supporting tank and infantry operations directly on the field of battle, today missile large units and units of the ground troops are capable of destroying major installations and groupings of troops in the entire depth of the operational formation of the enemy.

Due to the high effectiveness of the nuclear/missile weapon, a front can now fulfil its tasks in an offensive operation with a greatly reduced number of forces and conventional fire means.

At present, the front is usually made up of 4 to 5 armies, including one tank and one air army, one or two front missile brigades, as well as large units and units of special troops. Altogether, in this case, there will be 17 to 22 divisions, about 4 thousand pieces (orudiye) and mortars, and up to 600 airplanes within the composition of a front.

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In comparison with the closing period of World War II, there has been a considerable decrease in personnel and pieces in a front, but on the other hand, missile troops have emerged in the form of front and army missile brigades, as well as the missile battalions of motorized rifle and tank divisions.

A front of the above-mentioned complement contains 58 to 80 launching mounts, including 6 to 12 front, 18 to 24 army and 34 to 44 organic (voyskovoy), and also one or two regiments of front cruise missiles.

By means of these weapons nuclear strikes can be delivered against enemy objectives to a depth of 500 to 600 km. Thus, under conditions when nuclear/missile weapons have become the principal means of destroying the enemy, the problems of the use of these weapons are the basis of the decision of the front (army) troop commander in an offensive operation. The operation as a whole cannot be planned without ensuring, in all respects, the most effective utilization of the missile troops.

The newest means of armed combat and the radical changes in the methods of combat operations to which they have given rise, demand from commanders and staffs of all levels exceptionally accurate and mobile work with a minimum expenditure of time in all command and staff echelons. In view of this, we consider that the established practice of the commander working out a decision on the basis of the information reports of various officials is completely unacceptable under the new conditions.

The commander of the troops of a front (army) must be quite familiar with the condition and capabilities of the missile troops, because only then can he make a well-founded decision for using missiles, without spending time listening to information reports.

It seems to us that in the period of preparation for an operation, it is best for the commander of the troops of a front (army) to make his decision in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief of the missile troops and artillery, the commander of the air army, and the chiefs of the operational and intelligence directorates. Each of the above-mentioned persons must, if necessary, give a brief and clear description of the enemy objectives, the readiness and

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capabilities of the missile large units and units, the availability of nuclear/missile warheads, and answer other questions of interest to the commander.

In his decision, the commander determines the procedure for the use of the nuclear warheads issued to the front (army), establishes enemy objectives or groupings of troops, the number of warheads, the yield, and the time of strike, and also indicates the ground zero (center) of the nuclear strikes which are intended to destroy the most important enemy objectives.

The staff of the front, together with the chief of the missile troops and artillery and the commander of the air army, organizes the execution of the decision of the troop commander; they organize the reconnaissance and preliminary reconnaissance of enemy objectives, plan the fire tasks, determine siting areas, and carry out the regrouping of missile large units and units. After this the staff of the missile troops and artillery, the staff of the air army, and other interested directorates and departments can plan in detail the thorough support of the missile troops. This procedure of work was applied in special exercises conducted in the district (okrug) and, in our opinion, corresponds fully to the new requirements pertaining to the control of troops.

The initial data, on which the decision to use missile troops is based, consist of intelligence information on the enemy targets and objectives destined for destruction by nuclear weapons, the condition of our missile troops, and the availability of nuclear warheads. Without this information, it is impossible to plan the use of the missile troops.

In the Western Theater of Military Operations, in a front's zone of offensive, the enemy may operate with a group of armies consisting of 2 or 3 field armies (up to 6 army corps, 18 to 20 infantry and armored divisions), reinforced by units of guided missiles and free rockets, cruise missiles, and tactical aviation. Within the composition of this grouping there will presumably be about 140 to 150 objectives which must be destroyed by nuclear weapons of varying yield.

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It must be taken into account that in preparing and carrying out an offensive operation, we will not always have sufficient information available on the position of the objectives and, because many of them are highly mobile, intelligence information may rapidly become obsolete. At the start of nuclear preparation, we will be able to have more-or-less correct information on only 50 percent of the objectives against which it is necessary to plan and deliver nuclear strikes. The remainder will be destroyed by massed and individual nuclear strikes, as they appear.

By using all the front, army and a greater part of the organic missile launchers, as well as the front cruise missiles, it is possible to deliver 50 to 70 nuclear strikes simultaneously during the nuclear preparation and in the beginning of the nuclear support. This obviously is not adequate for the simultaneous destruction of all enemy objectives. It will be necessary to destroy part of them by missiles of strategic designation or by front and army missiles in the course of follow-up strikes.

There may be instances when the front will have sufficient ballistic and cruise missiles available for delivering a simultaneous strike against all detected enemy objectives. But more often, the number of detected objectives requiring destruction by nuclear weapons will exceed the number of available missile launchers and warheads. Therefore, naturally it is necessary to deliver strikes first against those objectives whose destruction will lead to an abrupt weakening of the basic enemy grouping, disorganize the control of his troops, and, on the whole, change the correlation of forces to our advantage.

It should be borne in mind that, in the preparation for an operation, more time will be spent in working out the decision and planning for the use of missile troops than in the performance of these tasks during the course of combat operations. During the period of preparation and planning of the operation, we can have at our disposal more complete data about the enemy objectives, more time for carrying out preliminary reconnaissance of the objectives and for transmitting the tasks to those who will perform them.

In the course of the operation, however, the decision for delivering nuclear/missile strikes must be made without any delay and be transmitted quickly to the missile brigades, battalions, and batteries. This is possible only when there is mechanization and automation of the data receiving process and of the control of troops as a whole.

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Experience gained from the special exercise conducted in the district with missile large units indicates that it will take about 3 hours to clarify the plan for the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons and to transmit it from the front to the launch batteries. At the headquarters of the missile troops and artillery this work was performed in one and one half hours; transmitting the tasks from the front headquarters to the missile brigades consumed 40 to 50 minutes, and the work performed at the level of the missile brigade and launch battery also consumed 40 to 50 minutes.

It is completely obvious that the time expended on all the above-mentioned operations must be sharply decreased.

We maintain that in the staff of the missile troops and artillery of a front, all the work connected with clarifying the tasks should consume a maximum of 30 minutes and at the level of the missile brigade and launch battery, 30 to 40 minutes, of which 15 to 20 will be used for technical preparation of the launching assembly for the launch. As various guidance devices and technical communications means are perfected, this period of time will be increasingly shortened.

During the course of an operation, as well as during its preparation, it is best that the decision for delivering a massed nuclear/missile strike be made by the commander of troops of the front (army) in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief of the missile troops and artillery, the commander of the air army, the commander of the operational directorate, and the chief of intelligence of the front. After a brief exchange of opinions and after clarifying the conditions of the situation and the capabilities of the missile troops, the troop commander must determine the ground zero of the nuclear strikes on a map for the missile troops and aviation and set the time for their delivery and the yield of the warheads to be used. The chief of missile troops and artillery of the front and the commander of the air army, on the basis of the commander's decision, ensure the preparation of the appropriate commands and their transmission to those who will carry them out.

Of course, the choice of the method for working out a decision depends largely on the personal characteristics of the individual military commander. However, we are convinced that the suggested method in which the commander of troops of the front, proceeding

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from an analysis of the situation which has taken shape, personally and immediately makes the decision for the delivery of a nuclear/missile strike, requires the least expenditure of time.

In the exercise conducted in the district, after the commander had announced his decision, the staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front spent about two hours in obtaining the coordinates of the targets, distributing the missions among the units, and in relaying the commands and preparing the batteries for launching. This included 45 to 63 minutes for work within the staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front, 4 to 12 minutes for relaying the commands from brigade to battery, 17 to 23 minutes for preparing the duty batteries for launching, and 45 to 53 minutes for preparing the batteries in waiting positions.

It is perfectly obvious that such squandering of time cannot be tolerated, especially since the lion's share of it is wasted in the staffs and in the transmission of commands by technical communications means.

We believe that under the conditions of highly dynamic combat operations, the time expended, from the moment of beginning to work out the decision at the front to the moment of firing at the launch batteries, must not exceed one hour. This result can be achieved if no more than 25 minutes are used by the staff of the missile troops of the front in preparing all the commands and transmitting them to the front brigades and staffs of the missile troops of the armies, 10 to 12 minutes are used to transmit the commands at the level of the missile brigade and launch battery, and no more than 23 to 25 minutes are used for the work of the launch batteries.

Why do we contend that no more than one hour should be expended for carrying out the tasks enumerated above?

If the decision for delivering a massed nuclear/missile strike against an enemy grouping which is advancing for a counterstrike is made by the commander of troops three hours in advance of the strike, during the period when the enemy troops are still marching to the line of deployment, then there is no guarantee that the intentions of the enemy will be discovered and that his line of deployment will be determined correctly. It is quite possible that during this period of

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time, the direction of movement of the enemy grouping will be changed and it will not be on the line supposed by us. As a result, the nuclear/missile strike will be delivered against a vacant area. However, if there is a reserve of time available, it is essential that it be used in the most effective way possible for the preparation of the strike: to determine the most probable areas of concentration or congested movement of the enemy troops, especially his nuclear weapons, and to prepare the necessary data for conducting fire with conventional and nuclear charges.

If, however, on the basis of accurate intelligence information, the commander makes his decision one hour before delivery of the strike, by this time the enemy columns will be located somewhere within 15 to 20 km from the line of deployment. In this case, any significant change in the direction of their movement is unlikely and the probability of destroying the enemy groupings will therefore be sharply increased.

A nuclear/missile strike can be delivered immediately upon determining an enemy advance for a counterstrike. But even in this case, the destruction of the columns will be guaranteed only if no more than one hour elapses from the time of their detection to the launching of the missiles. This is explained by the fact that during the movement, for example, of an infantry or an armored division along three lines of march, the length of each column reaches 50 to 60 km and the rate of speed 20 to 25 km per hour. If we determine the coordinates of the heads of the columns an hour before the strike and subsequently deliver a strike against them, the columns will be destroyed.

The best time for delivering a massed strike is at the moment of the enemy's deployment for a counterstrike. In this case, the personnel and combat equipment are outside their concealment and are disposed in relatively compact combat formations. As deployed, enemy infantry or armored division occupies up to 20 km along the front, 8 to 10 km in depth (150 to 200 sq. km.), and has the greater part of its forces in the first echelon with a view to delivering a powerful initial strike.

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If 4 or 5 nuclear strikes are delivered against the first and 1 or 2 strikes against the second echelon of the division, with a total yield of 300 thousand tons or more, the bulk of the personnel and combat equipment will be put out of action.

Massed strikes against troops advancing for a counterstrike or for other operations must, in our opinion, be preceded by strikes of nuclear and conventional weapons in areas of various defiles and other sectors of terrain that are difficult to traverse, in order to brake the movement and produce congestion of enemy troops.

Thus, delivery of massed nuclear/missile strikes in the course of combat requires quick and decisive actions, principally from those who make the decision for a counterstrike and organize its execution, and also smooth-functioning staff work, reliable intelligence, stability of the technical means of communications, and timely transmission of commands to those who will carry them out.

Proper organization of the control point of the chief of the missile troops plays an important role in the control of missile troops.

In conducting exercises with missile troops, we have avoided locating the control points in tents scattered at considerable distances from each other. The mobile control point of the front has been located in special buses, built on the chassis of MAZ-501 vehicles. All the motor vehicles of the troop commander, chief of staff of the front, chief of the missile troops and artillery of the front, and the chiefs of the operational and intelligence directorates were interconnected by gangways. Officers of the staff of the missile troops and artillery were located in three specially equipped ZIL-157 buses with trailers.

Convenient, compact placement of the control point permitted a decrease in the amount of telephone lines for internal communications and the wide use of selector loudspeaker communications which ensured individual as well as collective receipt of information regarding the situation, simultaneous assignment of tasks to the officers who are to fulfil them, etc.

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Selector communications were established with all the directing officers (napravlenets) of the armies and missile large units of the front, with the planning group, the intelligence department and with the operations group of the chief of the missile armament department located at the command post (komandnyy punkt--KP) of the front. In the course of the exercise, telegraph apparatus, equipped with a secure communications device (zasekrechivayushchaya apparatura--ZAS), were deployed in direct proximity to the directing officers' buses.

It was established at the exercises that it is possible to shorten considerably the time needed for transmitting orders to the troops and receiving information from the troops, if all the directing officers were located in one specially equipped bus in which were concentrated the receiving and transmitting ZAS and signal-code device (signalno-kodovaya ustanovka--SKU) apparatus and the direct telephone channels for radio relay and radio communications. In the exercise, direct telephone channels for radio relay communications were organized and signal-code communications (SKU) devices were used for communications with the missile brigades and the chiefs of missile troops of the armies.

On the whole, experience from the exercises indicated that radio and radio relay means of communications utilizing ZAS and SKU ensure stable and flexible control of the fire and maneuver of the missile troops. Wire communications, including high frequency (vysokaya chastota--VCh) were found to be unsuitable during combat operations of a highly mobile nature.

Nevertheless, the use of the above-mentioned methods of organizing communications only partially solves the problem of ensuring dependable control of the missile troops. We are of the opinion that in order to achieve a radical improvement in communications, the chief of the missile troops of a front must have his organic means of communication, which would ensure the establishment of radio communications with the missile troops up to and including missile battalions not within a radio network, but only on point-to-point nets. In addition, the control point of the chief of the missile troops of a front (army) must be equipped in such a way as to ensure the transmission of orders with a minimum expenditure of time. It is also necessary to perfect control devices and the preparation of officers' working areas, to work out the sequence of issuing commands, etc. All this will undoubtedly shorten the time expended in the transmission of commands.

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In a modern offensive operation it is vitally important to organize correctly and maintain continually coordination of the missile large units and units of operational-tactical designation with cruise missiles and aviation.

In order to coordinate the delivery of nuclear strikes by missile large units and aviation it is necessary to determine for them the objectives to be destroyed and to establish the order and the time of delivery of the strikes. These questions must be resolved more thoroughly and concretely during the conduct of fire preparation and also fire support for an offensive during execution of the immediate task of the front.

Due to the fact that cruise missiles and aviation are capable of destroying the enemy in considerable depth, zonal distribution of objectives for destruction among the missile troops and aviation is not advisable since one zone may contain objectives which it is more advantageous to destroy by missiles than by aviation and vice-versa.

The allocation of objectives within zones should be so calculated as to reduce the effect of nuclear bursts on the flight of the cruise missiles, and for this reason it is advisable to assign to them independent objectives, which are separated by some distance from objectives of ballistic missile strikes. In case of a need for a massed nuclear strike by ballistic and cruise missiles against objectives in the same area, the latter should deliver strikes 1 or 2 minutes before or 10 to 15 minutes after the ballistic missiles. It is also important that there be no nuclear bursts along the flight paths of the cruise missiles, otherwise the missile may turn itself or depart from its course. The launching times of all types of missiles should be designated on the basis of a coordinated time of strike and of the individual flight time of each of them.

The unexpectedness of a massed nuclear strike in an offensive operation is one of the most important conditions of the effective use of nuclear weapons by the missile troops and aviation. It can be achieved if the flight of delivery aircraft over friendly territory is carried out simultaneously with the delivery of nuclear strikes by missile large units or shortly thereafter, and must be done with changes in altitude which will make it more difficult for the enemy's radar stations to detect the delivery aircraft in their approach to

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the objectives to be destroyed. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice the advantages of a simultaneous strike, especially since, in order to ensure a breakthrough by the aircraft to the objectives, it is necessary to create corridors in the enemy's PVO system for them beforehand.

In organizing coordinated action between missile large units (units) and aviation, it is necessary to establish restricted zones for the flight of aircraft over the combat formations of the missile large units (units) and over regions to be subjected to nuclear strikes by other means.

* * *

The utilization of nuclear/missile weapons depends largely on timely engineer support of the combat operations of the missile troops. Missile troops must reach the area of combat operations without hindrance, at high speeds and, as a rule, at night, and shift rapidly to new siting areas during the course of an offensive. For this reason, it is necessary to transport missiles over long distances to the missile troops, which requires special transportation conditions.

Experience from exercises has indicated that in order to transport missiles to the armies and front missile brigades, it is imperative to designate a special route in the rear area of the front, which must have engineer preparation, well-organized traffic and control services, and appropriate forces for the protection of transports with missiles. This route should be maintained by the forces and means of the front.

Similarly, each army should designate one route for the transport of organic missiles from the army missile-depot battalion (raketno-parkovyy divizion) to the army brigades and battalions. Army routes should be maintained by the forces and means of the army.

In a special experimental exercise, we established that by using helicopters and photography it is possible, in the course of an offensive, to raise the speed of engineer reconnaissance of supply routes to approximately 70 km per hour, compared to the 12 to 15 km per hour maximum by motor vehicles.

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As yet unresolved are such important problems in the engineer support of the combat operations of the missile troops as the preparation of siting areas and areas of concentration of missile large units and units with regard to ensuring their anti-nuclear protection and camouflage. Taking into consideration the high speeds of a troop offensive (for their own security), it is known that missile large units and units must not remain in one spot for more than 24 hours. Therefore, their engineer support must be so organized that all personnel and combat equipment can be satisfactorily concealed within 4 to 5 hours. On the basis of this requirement, it seems to us that it is also necessary to proceed in providing the missile brigades with engineer equipment.

Camouflage of missile troops, in our opinion, should be up to the front. Therefore, it is intolerable that front camouflage battalions have nothing for camouflaging missile troops. They should at least be equipped with dummy launching mounts.

A few words regarding the organizational structure of missile brigades. Experience indicates that in order to increase the fire power as well as to ensure the viability and the constant readiness of missile large units to conduct fire, missile brigades should be composed of three battalions. The shifting of brigades of this composition in the course of an operation should be so organized that two battalions are in constant readiness to conduct fire, and the third, meanwhile, is moving to the new position. This ensures continuity of the fire accompanying the troops in the course of an offensive.

The general conclusions which we have set forth, based on the special exercise, represent only an initial attempt to investigate the use of missile troops and their control in the course of an offensive operation of a front (army). The joint creative efforts of the generals and officers of our Armed Forces are required in order to complete the study of these important problems.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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23 [illegible] 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensive Operations", by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
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National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

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Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: " Some Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensive Operations", by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan

DATE OF INFO: 1961

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SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

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Headquarters Comment: The Special Collection article which is noted in footnotes on pages 4, 6, and 13 was written by Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy, and was disseminated as [redacted]. It may be of interest to note that the footnote on page 6 refers to the intermediate version of the three known versions of Military Thought.

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Some Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensive Operations

by

Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan

The constant quantitative and qualitative growth of missile weapons and the increase in the quantity of nuclear warheads allotted for the execution of an operation are causing continuous changes in the methods of combat operations of ground troops. These changes are now occurring so rapidly that, at times, that which only several months ago was new and progressive becomes obsolescent and ceases to correspond to the requirements of the day. Specifically, the methods of execution of the offensive operations of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war have undergone such a rapid development. The purpose of this article, which is on the order of a response to a number of articles published in previous issues of the Special Collection, is to examine some of the questions in the preparation and conduct of initial offensive operations.

As is well known, a nuclear/missile war will be of an exceptionally decisive nature. The availability of modern, powerful combat weapons permits even an enemy who is being defeated and is close to destruction to deliver telling thermonuclear strikes against the deep rear area and groupings of the armed forces holding the upper hand. In order to fully deprive the enemy of any opportunity to use nuclear weapons, it is not enough to deliver strategic massed nuclear strikes against his territory. No nuclear strikes can guarantee the complete destruction of all the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack or eliminate his capability to deliver strikes.

The fulfilment of this mission can be guaranteed only by the swiftest capture and occupation of enemy territory. By this very means can our country be made completely secure from strikes by the enemy's ground nuclear weapons and the enemy deprived of bases for his submarine and surface missile-carrying fleet which can still operate on the ocean for a certain period of time after the land forces are destroyed.

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For the quickest capture of enemy territory (of course, that territory the seizure of which will not require the organization of landing operations across the ocean), it is necessary to carry out a decisive strategic offensive throughout the entire depth of the theaters. In this regard, under no conditions of a situation can one front be slow in shifting to the offensive, or alternate the latter with defense in all or the greater part of its zone of operations. We emphasize that, immediately at the beginning of combat operations, all fronts, without exception, must shift to the offensive on the axes where the seizure of enemy territory is possible and necessary. A shift to the defensive on such axes is not permissible. The troops of the front must shift to the offensive regardless of their condition, even after undergoing enemy nuclear strikes.

In connection with this, in our opinion there must be a change in the point of view regarding the nature of the combat operations of ground troops in the case when the enemy pre-empts us in operations. Previously, we considered that, under these conditions, a front must shift to the defensive in order to repulse an enemy attack. Now, it is necessary to consider that, even in this situation, a front with all available forces will immediately shift to the offensive, which, most probably, will assume the nature of a meeting engagement.

The next question is of great practical interest. What will be the duration and the depth of the first strategic offensive operation directed at attaining the immediate strategic goals of a war?

By looking at a map, it can be seen that the goals of a strategic offensive on the European continent can be defined as the destruction of the armed forces of the aggressor countries located there and reaching the seacoasts of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. In terms of depth, this consists on various strategic axes of from 600 to 800 km (Southwestern Theater of Military Operations--TVD) and from 1200 to 2000 km (Western TVD).

According to modern views, the average speed of an offensive can reach 100 km per day. It is also considered that, in a system of strategic offensive, the offensive operations of formations must follow one after the other without operational pauses. Consequently, the tasks of a strategic offensive in the theaters being examined can be fulfilled within 10 to 20 24-hour periods. If adjustments

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are made in their time periods to account for mountainous conditions, for delays in forcing wide water barriers (for example, straits), and for obstacle zones of radioactive contamination, then it will take more than 20 24-hour periods. It is possible that these time periods will even comprise the duration of the initial period of war.

How many subsequent front offensive operations will it be necessary to carry out on the two above-indicated basic theaters in the initial period of a war?

According to existing opinions, the depth of an offensive operation of a front can be from 500 to 600[1] up to 800 to 1000 km[2]. We consider that the second opinion corresponds to a greater degree to the conditions of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war.

The depth of a front offensive operation is determined by the range of operations of the weapons of destruction, by the maneuver capabilities of the troops, by the capability for uninterrupted supply of material, and by the depth of the enemy's operational formation. In the past war, as a practical matter, the range of the front bomber aircraft was about 300 km; the rear services could, uninterruptedly, support the advancing troops to a distance of not more than 250 to 300 km from the area where they were initially based; the depth of the operational formation of the enemy's group of armies was 200 to 250 km. All this determined the depth of a front offensive operation as 250 to 300 km.

The offensive operations of the concluding stage of World War II occupied a special place in their scope, when a significant quantity of tank and mechanized large units and formations, which sharply increased the mobility of troops, appeared in the composition of our ground troops. For example, the depth of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation was more than 500 km, and the depth of the Manchurian offensive operation was 600 to 800 km. The scope of these operations, achieved in 1945 when the troops did not have those weapons of

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961.

2. "Modern War", published by the Military Academy of the General Staff, 1960, page 194.

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destruction or those maneuvering capabilities which modern ground troops have, shows that the proposed depth of a modern front offensive operation of 1000 km is not fantastic.

Even now the weapons of a front and the means of reinforcing a front can ensure the destruction of the enemy to a depth of up to 500 km. The question of supplying the front with missiles possessing a great range of fire is in the stage of practical resolution. In addition, missile troops of strategic designation will undoubtedly be used in the front zone during the initial period of a war.

In comparison with the past war, the depth of the enemy operational formation has, at present, also increased. Certain elements of the enemy's operational missile rear services are located at a distance of up to 1000 km from the front line.

The only thing that still causes one to doubt the reality of assigning a mission of such depth to a front is the limited capabilities of the operational rear services. The fact is that the capabilities of the rear services have not undergone any substantial changes during the past several years and, to some degree, have even decreased, if one considers the probable destruction of railroads and the mass destruction of motor vehicle roads. Decisive measures are necessary to increase the capabilities of the rear services for delivering material, in the first place, providing the rear services with units and large units of aircraft, helicopters, and motor vehicles with large load capacities, and the extensive introduction of pipeline transport. Only in this case can the rear services ensure the execution of deep and swift offensive operations.

Thus, it will be necessary to carry out 1 or 2 successive front offensive operations in order to attain the immediate strategic goals in Europe: one operation on the Southwestern TVD and two on the Western TVD.

At the present time, various opinions exist as to how the strategic offensive will be executed organizationally.

The authors of the book Modern War believe that in the system of operations in ground theaters the first position will be given to front operations, not to the operations of groups of fronts as it was in the past war.

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In the article "The Question of the Theory of the Operation of a Group of Fronts",[1] Colonel S. Kozlov considers it necessary to create high commands in all TVD's and to subordinate to them not only front formations but also the other types of armed forces operating in a given TVD (missile troops, the Navy, long-range aviation, and troops of the PVO of the Country).

A compromise is expressed in the point of view presented by Colonel-General M. Pavlovskiy[2] that offensive operations in the initial period of a war can be executed by fronts and groups of fronts.

Let us examine this question. During the years of World War II, beginning with the Soviet Army counteroffensive near Moscow (December 1941 to April 1942), all the main offensive operations were carried out, as a rule, not by separate fronts but by the united efforts of several fronts. Usually, the goals of an offensive operation on a strategic axis were achieved by the efforts of 2 or 3 fronts. The conditions of the past war required this, when an enormous density of weapons and a superiority of no less than 2 or 3 times over the enemy were needed for a breakthrough of defenses. The efforts of several fronts were usually concentrated on such a strategic or operational axis, the geographic conditions of which provided the capability for close operational coordination among the fronts.

In the conduct of a nuclear/missile war, a concentration of enormous masses of personnel and equipment is not required to carry out an offensive. Even now the density of troops has sharply decreased, while the zones of offensive of formations have increased 1.5 to 2 times. All of this indicates that under modern conditions the efforts of one front are sufficient for those axes where in the past war it was necessary to concentrate the efforts of several fronts.

Consequently, the troops of one front will now operate, as a rule, on each of the strategic or important operational axes. It is our view that under these conditions the combining of several fronts into a group is not advisable, if only because operational coordination

1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 2/52/, 1960.

2. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" First Issue, 1961.

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between fronts operating on independent strategic or important operational axes is not always possible, or is almost impossible. The General Headquarters (Stavka) will organize strategic coordination between the fronts, or rather, implement strategic coordination of the efforts of strategic nuclear/missile weapons with the operations of the fronts.

On the basis of the above, we conclude that in a nuclear/missile war the main role in attaining the goals of armed combat in theaters will belong not to the operations of a group of fronts, but to the system of simultaneous and successive front operations. This does not preclude, of course, the conduct of operations by a group of fronts at individual stages of a strategic offensive operation on axes where operational coordination of several fronts is feasible.

In our view, the limited number of fronts in a nuclear/missile war also makes the formation of TVD commands inadvisable. It is known that, at the beginning of World War II, the number of fronts was limited (five fronts) and corresponded exactly to the number of strategic axes which existed at the time (Northern, Northwestern, Western, Southwestern, and Southern). Under these conditions the fronts fulfilled not only operational, but also strategic missions.

The commands of three axes were created in July 1941, the Northwestern, the Western, and the Southwestern; they were called upon to carry out the operational-strategic direction of the fronts (which generally numbered from 5 to 11 at various periods). The complexity and the intensity of the situation at the fronts of war frequently forced the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to directly control the fronts, bypassing the commands of the axes, thereby making them useless. As is known, after existing for about one year altogether, these commands were abolished.

In conducting a nuclear/missile war the number of fronts on the indicated axes will be less than in the past war. The conditions for military operations will become still more complex. The maneuverability of troops and the mobility of the front line will increase by several times. All this provides a basis for considering the creation of commands of axes or of TVD's in a future war inadvisable.

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In our opinion , the formation of TVD commands is possible only in remote theaters where the control of the armed forces will be difficult for the General Headquarters, for example, in the Far East (as it was in the past war) or on other continents when our troops arrive there.

However, granting the possibility of creating strategic commands in remote TVD, it is not possible to agree with the proposal that the naval forces operating in the waters adjoining the theater should be subordinated to these commands. The mission of supporting ground forces is secondary for the naval forces, in comparison with the missions of blockading enemy countries and of disrupting enemy ocean and sea intercontinental transport, which missions are frequently carried out in remote ocean areas or even on other oceans. For the fulfilment of these missions, a broad strategic maneuver by submarine forces is required. The subordination of all naval forces to the TVD command could thus fetter and limit the Navy's capability of fulfilling its main missions. Of course, the part of the naval forces which will be operating in support of the troops of a TVD (the destruction of enemy strike missile-carrying and aircraft-carrier naval forces, the disruption of enemy amphibious landing operations, the participation in amphibious landing operations of TVD troops, etc.) must be subordinated to the TVD command.

The thought expressed by some authors of articles concerning the creation of operational-strategic commands in our theaters of military operations was undoubtedly influenced to some degree by the presence of such control elements on the territories of the countries of the imperialist coalition. However, such an analogy is not justified here. The fact of the matter is that the American Joint Staff in essence controls the armies of the countries which comprise the imperialist coalition. But the Americans are not in a position to effect centralized control of all the armed forces that make up the coalition and which are dispersed on almost all the continents of the world. Therefore, they formed intermediate control elements, commands of the TVD.

Under our conditions, when theaters of military operations are located on two continents (Europe and Asia) and are connected by land borders with well-established means of communications and supply, it will hardly be necessary to form such an intermediate command as a TVD command.

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Several words on the initial offensive operations of fronts. These operations can begin under various conditions of a situation. The shifting of fronts to an offensive can be preceded by a threatening period. It will take place if a war starts after a significant intensification of tension in the relations between the principal countries of the imperialist coalition and those of the Socialist Camp, and when it becomes clear that the political relations of the two camps will inevitably bring on a military conflict. The threatening period can also take place when a world war starts through involvement of the principal countries in the course of a local war in one of the areas of the world.

War can also be started by a surprise enemy strike, when there will be no threatening period. The most characteristic version of a surprise attack can be the delivery by the probable aggressor of a mass thermonuclear strike against the socialist countries under the guise of carrying out large training exercises.

A surprise attack is the most advantageous method of starting a war. It may be assumed that war will be unleashed by a surprise attack, if the imperialists decide on this. Therefore, in the practical activity of our armed forces and in their operational and combat training, it is necessary to embark decisively on a course for the preparation of troops for the entry into a war which is not preceded by a threatening period. If the armed forces are ready to begin military operations when there is no threatening period, then they will always be able to do so when there is a threatening period.

An important situational condition, under which fronts can begin their initial offensive operations, is the location of the troops of a front in relation to the enemy before the start of military operations. A front (group of forces) which, prior to the start of military operations, is located directly on the border beyond which the countries of the imperialist coalition are located, will come into contact with the ground enemy immediately. However, a front located at a distance from this border at the start of military operations can shift to the offensive only after reaching the line of contact between the aggressor troops and the armies of countries friendly to us.

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In all cases, the troops of a front will shift to a decisive offensive immediately after a counterstrike or after a strike to frustrate a surprise enemy attack. A counterstrike, or a strike to frustrate an enemy attack, will be carried out on the basis of the decision of the higher party and government leaders of the country; the main role in carrying it out will be played by the missile troops of strategic designation. It is understood that government leaders will also make the decision for the front troops to shift to a decisive offensive.

There is a wide-spread point of view that front nuclear/missile weapons must also participate in a counterstrike to frustrate a surprise enemy attack, which are measures of the Supreme High Command. In our opinion, the front weapons will not be in a position to participate in a counterstrike or in the first nuclear strike for the following reasons:

--the nuclear/missile weapons of a considerable number of the fronts, which are located at a distance from the borders adjacent to the enemy prior to the start of military operations, cannot be used because of the comparatively short range of the operations;

--the nuclear/missile weapons of these fronts, even those directly in the border zone, will not be able to participate in immediate operations, because considerable time (up to several hours, and, under certain conditions, up to several days) will be required to bring them up to combat condition (basically, for the assembly and checking of missiles and warheads).

In addition to the above, it is necessary to take into account the following consideration. In an offensive operation, the planned transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel will be greatly hampered because of the mass destruction of communication lines and the destruction of certain depots which had become known to the enemy. Therefore, it is not advisable to expend a significant amount of the nuclear/missile weapons of a front at the very beginning of an operation. They should be saved for subsequent use in the course of an operation and in completing it.

The extensive use of nuclear/missile weapons compels a new approach to solving the problem of the combat composition of a front. In the past war, the combat composition of a front was determined by the necessity of creating a twofold or threefold (and sometimes even more) superiority of forces and weapons over the enemy on the axes of strikes.

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Under modern conditions, the criterion for determining the composition of a front is its capability to inflict destruction on an opposing enemy grouping with nuclear weapons and to complete its rout with motorized rifle, tank, and airborne large units. Figuratively speaking, one can say that combined-arms and tank large units will now play the role of a "broom" by means of which the front's offensive zone will be cleared of the remaining enemy troops after they are routed by nuclear weapons. Under conditions when, as the result of nuclear strikes, the correlation of forces can rapidly and sharply change in favor of the side that has executed them, an offensive operation of a front can be carried out successfully even when the initial correlation of forces and weapons was equal.

The combat composition of a front in an initial operation will depend on the method of unleashing the war.

If a war starts by a surprise enemy attack, the front will then be forced to start combat operations with a limited number of large units in constant readiness. During the course of an operation, the front will be reinforced by fully mobilized large units and by large units in constant readiness arriving from the zone of interior (in accordance with the plan for the strategic deployment of the ground troops).

If, however, military operations develop after a threatening period, then the first front operation can start with a larger number of troops: large units in constant readiness and those fully mobilized. In all cases, it is necessary to consider that the approach of troops from the zone of interior can be frustrated or delayed by the enemy by means of direct strikes against these large units and also by the destruction of communication routes.

Missile large units and units are the skeleton of the operational formation of a front, without which the conduct of combat operations under modern conditions is impossible. Therefore, in a border district (group of forces), the composition of the missile troops must be such as is necessary for achievement of the objectives of the first operation. In addition, the composition of the missile troops and their supply of ammunition must compensate for the shortage of combined-arms and tank large units when these are put out of action on the field of battle or when their arrival from the zone of interior is disrupted or delayed.

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Let us dwell briefly on the methods of operations of the troops of a front in initial offensive operations.

The following factors will exert an influence on the methods of conducting initial offensive operations: the limited number of front troops; disorganization of the enemy's governmental control and the control of his armed forces, and, consequently, the isolation of the enemy's troops and the putting out of action of entire elements of his operational formation; the enemy's lack of prepared and occupied lines of defense; and the existence of large areas of radioactive contamination.

The above-listed factors create favorable conditions for an offensive by several strike groupings on axes. An offensive on separate axes ensures the splintering of the enemy front and a dispersal of his attention and efforts. At the same time, an offensive on axes is much more complicated than an offensive which is carried out with close lateral contact between units, large units, and even armies. During an offensive on axes, each grouping will be in a difficult situation and will have to operate independently with its flanks, and even its rear area, exposed. In view of this, the significance of preparing our command cadres for such operations becomes clear.

In the years of World War II, an offensive was conducted on a solid front in close combat formations, with a methodical breakthrough of enemy positions and defense zones. Actually, combat operations were conducted in the zone of effective fire of the infantry and artillery weapons, i.e., in a zone 10 to 15 km on both sides from the line of contact, if one does not consider sporadic aerial strikes against the depth. Under these conditions, the effect of fire against the enemy was exploited immediately. Close coordination in timing and location was executed between the fire weapons, the infantry, and tanks.

Under modern conditions, the sharply increased capabilities of fire weapons have led them to a contradiction with the capabilities of the infantry and tanks. The infantry and tanks have become incapable of immediately exploiting the effect of nuclear/missile strikes against the entire depth of a defending enemy. To ensure rapid seizure of the entire depth of the enemy defense by active

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combat operations and to achieve the objectives of the operation in the shortest period of time, it is necessary to increase sharply the rate of the offensive which, by the Directive of the Minister of Defense for Operational Training for 1961, was ordered to be increased to 100 km per 24-hour period. This is a very high rate. It is sufficient to state that the distance covered in a 24-hour period in the execution of a march consists of 180 to 250 km, i.e., only two times greater than the distance which must be covered by attacking troops in a 24-hour period.

In planning an operation, is it possible to guarantee that a rate of, say 100 km per day, will be sustained every day? Certainly not. There will be days in an operation when troops will be able to advance only negligibly, days when they will not move at all, and, possibly, days when they will even fall back. We are speaking of those days when front troops will be repulsing enemy counterstrikes, conducting meeting engagements with the enemy, forcing water barriers, and overcoming substantial zones of radioactive contamination and mountain passes. Consequently, on the other days of the operation, the rate of advance must be such so as to compensate for the days of slow or of no rate of advance, i.e., it must approach the speed of executing a march.

In the offensive operations of the past war, the most decisive results were achieved by encircling the enemy operational groupings and subsequently annihilating and capturing them. However, at the end of the war, especially in the Vistula-Oder operation, the ineffectiveness of encirclement as a form of conducting an operation had already become obvious. Those enemy groupings, around which a solid ring of encirclement was not closed, turned into so-called "roaming pockets" and quickly ceased to exist. But those enemy groupings that were encircled by our troops (for example, the Poznan and the Schneidemühl groupings) continued to fight while surrounded until the end of the war, diverting a substantial number of our troops to them.

We cannot agree with the statement[1] that in a modern war encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings can be employed along with the delivery of swift, deep strikes on separate axes.

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961.

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Under the conditions of highly maneuvering combat operations, it will be inadvisable to encircle a large enemy grouping which is dispersed over a large area. The limited number of troops in a front will not permit the creation of inner and outer fronts of encirclement and the conduct of methodical combat for the purpose of contracting a ring of encirclement, breaking up the encircled grouping, and destroying it piecemeal. Such operations threaten loss of the rate of the offensive and, possibly, even its frustration. It is much more advisable to use small forces to intercept the main routes of retreat of an enveloped enemy and subsequently destroy him with nuclear/missile weapons. In this, the main body of the front troops must move forward without delay and without glancing back at the encircled enemy grouping.

In the most general terms, this is how we visualize the initial offensive operations of the initial period of a war. Undoubtedly, some of the problems we have examined require further consideration and critical analysis.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 MAR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Certain Problems in the Organization and Conduct of Modern Operational Defense", by Lieutenant-General P. Igolkin and Major-General S. Buryak

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
3 0 JUN 1992

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: [redacted]ILITARY THOUGHT: "Certain Problems in the Organization and Conduct of Modern Operational Defense", by Lieutenant-General P. Igolkin and Major-General S. Buryak

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This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. This issue was consigned to the printer on 13 January 1961.

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Certain Problems in the Organization and Conduct of Modern Operational Defense

by

Lieutenant-General P. Igolkin, Major-General S. Buryak

Recently, our military press has given considerable space to an examination of the problems of modern operational defense. Many comrades who write about these problems attempt, in essence, to adapt the increased capabilities of nuclear/missile weapons to old methods of organizing and conducting defense. At the same time, the view is expressed that under conditions of the use of nuclear/missile weapons, operational defense loses its significance and that in a future war, and especially in its initial period, it will be limited within the framework of army defensive operations.

On the basis of an analysis of the probable conditions of military operations in a future war, we are coming to the conclusion that defense undoubtedly will take place on a tactical as well as an operational scale.

In examining the conditions of the origin and conduct of operational defense, especially in the initial period of a war, we take into account the fact that nuclear/missile weapons are offensive weapons, and that the urge to grasp the initiative in our hands from the very beginning of a war requires the conduct of decisive offensive operations on the most important axes. However, it must also not be forgotten that, under modern conditions, not even an economically powerful state can, in peacetime, maintain in readiness such armed forces, especially ground troops, as to permit it at the beginning of a war to initiate and conduct offensive operations in all possible theaters of military operations. Therefore, offensive operations will be conducted only in the

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most important theaters of military operations, while our troops can carry out defensive actions on an operational scale in other theaters. The latter may take place specifically in secondary theaters of military operations, especially along our open ocean coastlines, where landings and operations of large enemy amphibious and airborne landing forces of operational significance are fully possible, if not in the first days of a war, at least during its initial period. In these theaters, antilanding defense can be prepared in peacetime, which, at the beginning of military operations, will be conducted not only by an army, but also by a front.

In our opinion, it is even possible to have a situation in which, during the war, a front may be forced to shift to the defensive in a situation which is developing unfavorably in order to wear out the enemy, inflict decisive destruction on him, and create conditions for a shift to the offensive. However, such a short-term defense on the scale of a front is only permissible as an extreme measure in those cases when during a war, due to some unforeseen circumstances, the enemy temporarily seizes the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons on a given axis and by his strikes puts out of commission a large part of the missile weapons of the front. In such an unfavorable situation, to save our own troops and avoid their final defeat, and also to receive new troops arriving from the reserve of the General Headquarters or transferred from other operational axes, the front obviously will be forced to conduct a defensive operation.

Defense, on the scale of an army, will take place most frequently during the conduct of front offensive operations, especially during the initial period of war, when on one or another axes, one of the armies of the first echelon of the front will be forced, temporarily, to shift to the defensive under the strikes of superior enemy forces. The necessity for shifting to the defensive may arise, for instance, when the army is providing cover for the deployment of troops of the front, when repelling an enemy counterstrike, or as a result of a meeting engagement which had an unsuccessful outcome for the troops of the army.

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Of course, we take into consideration that under modern conditions, the imminent threat of an enemy counterstrike may be eliminated or significantly weakened by massed nuclear/missile strikes. However, under conditions of a difficult situation, when the basic missile weapons of the front are used for the support of troops successfully advancing on other axes, the army which is conducting combat with strong counterstrike groupings of the enemy, may not receive the necessary nuclear/missile support. Under such conditions, the army will be forced to conduct a defensive battle within the framework of the offensive operation of the front. This battle will be a part of the latter and will be of a short-term nature because, in the final analysis, the determining influence on its outcome will be the successful operations of the attacking troops of the front.

The considerations expressed above provide a basis for concluding that our ground troops must be prepared to conduct operational defense on various scales, for which it is very important to develop further the theory of preparing and conducting not only army but also front defensive operations. Proceeding from this conclusion, we shall examine a series of fundamental principles pertaining to the goals, tasks, nature of the formation, and methods of conduct of modern operational defense.

In the past, as is known, the destruction of an advancing enemy was begun and completed by the forces of combined-arms large units and formations which defended, as a rule, on a solid front, and were supported by artillery and aviation. The basic means of achieving the goals of a defensive operation were the fire of artillery, mortars, and small arms, strikes by aircraft, and the counterattacks and counterstrikes of second echelons and reserves. The combat operations of combined-arms large units and formations, at the beginning of an enemy offensive, were developed in sequence for holding solid zones, first in tactical and then in operational depth. To hold the tactical zone of defense, the basic forces and weapons of armies, and in certain instances, of a front, were used. To breach it, the enemy needed a considerable amount of time during which the defender was able to effect the necessary increase of forces and weapons.

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Defending troops conducted combat operations until they exhausted the strong enemy grouping, which advanced, as a rule, on one of the decisive axes, in compact formations, having close lateral contact between large units. Due to the fact that the defending forces, especially those in the zone of interior, remained undefeated, the defender could use them systematically to form a new front in the zone of interior, or to create a strong grouping designated to deliver a counterstrike which was usually executed with a limited goal, that of reconstructing the defense on the same or new lines.

The methods which we have examined, of combat operations of troops on the defensive in the recent past, fully corresponded to the weapons of destruction and the nature of offensive operations of the enemy which were used at that time. With the appearance of nuclear weapons in the armament of troops, these methods, in essence, began to adapt themselves to them, but retaining, on the whole, the principles of the organization of defense which were used in the past. Thus, it was considered possible to achieve the goal of a defensive operation by inflicting destruction upon the enemy by all types of fire, including missile weapons, and also sustained defense by the main forces of the armies of the first echelon in first or second defense zones which had been prepared in advance along a continuous front, by conducting counterstrikes (in their former meaning) with the aim of routing enemy groupings which had broken through, and re-establishing the lost position or with an even more limited aim. The basic forces and weapons were usually concentrated to hold a specific defense zone and a larger part of the combined arms large units were deployed in the zones in advance.

Certain tendencies to increase the depth of defense zones and areas of troop disposition in them, to create and increase the intervals between battalion defense areas, and also to transfer the main efforts from one zone to another, did not introduce any radical changes in the nature of the formation and methods of conduct of operational defense in comparison with the past.

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Of course, when the capabilities of nuclear weapons were limited, only single units of nuclear warheads were allotted for conducting a defensive operation, and the only means of delivering them was aircraft, the measures pointed out above helped somewhat to ensure the stability of operational defense because combined arms large units continued to be the main means of destroying the enemy. However, these measures are obviously inadequate under conditions when the basic means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets have become missiles of various designations which are available to ground troops in sufficient quantity. As a result of being equipped with missiles, the firepower of the ground troops has increased so much that they have acquired the capability of accomplishing the main tasks with nuclear/missile weapons, and of completing the enemy's rout with powerful counterstrikes by combined arms large units, delivered, as a rule, right after the nuclear strikes. This requires a new approach to the solution of the problems of operational defense.

The methods of preparation and conduct of defensive operations which have existed up to the present time and the creation of solid defense zones do not permit troops to exploit to the maximum their sharply increased fire and strike capabilities, to execute, in a timely manner, a broad maneuver on threatened axes during a defensive battle, and, in essence, condemn a significant part of the troops to passive operations. In addition, it is necessary to consider that modern operational defense must withstand methods of operations of the attacker which are fundamentally different from the past.

Now, with the mass use of nuclear weapons in the entire depth of the operational defense, the attacker will have no particular difficulty in neutralizing solid defense zones in short periods of time, and creating significant breakthroughs (breaches) in them. Exploiting these breaches, the enemy's groupings, especially his tank troops, will drive through them on several of the most important axes into the depth of the defense, splitting the formation of the defending troops with the goal of destroying them piecemeal. Simultaneously, nuclear/missile strikes and strikes by

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strong airborne groupings will be carried out against the depth of the defense. Under such conditions, the large units and formations which are defending on a solid front will scarcely be able to maneuver quickly to threatened axes, and without active and mobile operations, which depend on the possibility of using nuclear/missile weapons, we cannot count on successful combat with an attacking enemy during a defensive battle.

Providing stability for modern operational defense must be based primarily on the utilization of weapons which are capable of using nuclear warheads, i. e., missiles. Only they are capable of dependable destruction of the main striking weapons of the attacker--nuclear weapons--and also of routing his troops and frustrating the offensive. Routing of the enemy will now be initiated, and in most cases carried out, even during the course of established combat operations, by missile troops.

In connection with this, there is no longer any need to create a solid "zonal" defense and even less to utilize a larger portion of the motorized rifle and tank large units in the first echelon for holding the zones. In organizing defense by the system of zones occupied by troops, one can hardly count on successful combat with an enemy, which is advancing on unconnected axes in a large area and with the simultaneous use of airborne forces against the depth of the defense. At the present time, defense can be successful when it is based not on sitting in place, even in prepared positions, but on delivering strikes against the enemy precipitately, even though it be with limited aims. Creating a solid front under these conditions is not only inadvisable but also harmful, because this condemns a considerable amount of forces to passive operations. Now, only a part of the combined arms large units will be used for covering the most important axes and for supporting the combat disposition of the missile troops. It is advisable to designate a large part of them for completing the rout of the enemy by delivering strikes against him and to have a part dispersed in the depth of the defense.

Thus, the goals of operational defense must now be attained by the mass and skillful use of nuclear/missile weapons and the

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utilization of the basic forces and weapons of the armies, not in combat for holding defense zones, but, as a rule, for maneuvering operations based on the execution of a series of strikes by combined arms large units against those enemy groupings which have broken through on various axes, in combination with the holding by a comparatively small part of the forces of certain important areas of terrain on the basic axes of his offensive. In this, the holding of certain areas of terrain must serve to exhaust the enemy, slow down the speed of his advance, and force him to deploy into combat formations and to set up compact groupings of troops within a limited area in order to destroy them subsequently by nuclear weapons.

Modern operational defense cannot be stable in the former interpretation of this term, i. e., based on holding at any cost a definite line prepared in advance. We consider stability in modern operational defense to be a capability to slow down the speed of an enemy offensive, exhaust his groupings in maneuvering battles, delay his forward movement into the depth of an area being defended, and create conditions to inflict decisive destruction on him by nuclear weapons, followed by final routing of the enemy by strikes of the combined arms large units.

Slowing down the speed of an enemy offensive must be based on holding only certain important areas of terrain, on counterattacks and counterstrikes delivered precipitately and from various directions, on the extensive use of obstacles, primarily antitank ones, and the utilization of natural barriers until such time as the possibility of routing the enemy with nuclear weapons presents itself.

Based on the above, we feel that it is necessary to reject defense zones (as a system of engineer preparation of the terrain), and to construct defense on the principle of creating the defense zone of an army and a front (within their boundaries), individual defense areas with a capacity of not more than a division, intercepting the most probable axes of an enemy offensive, and ensuring the execution of a broad maneuver by the troops. In this, the disposition of forces and weapons in defense, the organization of the system of fire, and the

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engineer preparation of the terrain in the defense areas of large units, must not so much ensure the holding of the most important key points in the paths of the enemy offensive by repelling his strikes with fire from the halt, as permit maneuvering of forces, especially of the tank subunits and units, in order to conduct counterattacks against an enemy which has effected a breakthrough.

In a number of instances a defense area can be designated not only for a largeunit but also for an army as a whole, especially when it shifts to the defensive during a front offensive operation. Thus, often an army will be forced to shift to the defensive under conditions when part of its forces (individual large units) are continuing offensive operations up to a definite line, certain large units under enemy strikes shift to the defensive, a part of the reserves are thrown into combat with his airborne forces, and on the whole the troops of the army are carrying out combat operations over a wide area, with exposed flanks and having large gaps in the operational formation. Under these conditions, the efforts of the troops of the army in repelling enemy strikes will be directed not only toward the front, but also toward the flanks, and in a number of cases, toward the rear area as well. Therefore, it may not be always advisable to determine a defense zone for an army which is shifting to a forced defensive during an offensive operation, as was done in the past, but sometimes it will be more advantageous to assign it a defense area in which it must halt the advance of the counterattacking enemy groupings, inflict decisive destruction on them, and in this way support the offensive of the main forces of the front on other axes.

The grouping of forces and weapons of a front and army to carry out a defensive operation (operational formation) will now include: a grouping of the missile troops, the first echelon, a strong combined arms reserve (and in certain cases also a second echelon, especially in an army), a grouping of forces and weapons of the antiaircraft defense, special reserves, and in a front, even a grouping of combat, special, and transport aviation. In addition, the operational formation of the troops of a front and of an army

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should also include, in our opinion, their rear services, i. e., large units, units and establishments designated for uninterrupted materiel, technical, and medical support of troop operations and also forces and weapons for their protection and for defense of the rear services.

A qualitatively new element in the operational formation of the troops of a front (army) is the grouping of missile troops, which will perform the main tasks in the destruction of the enemy. Strikes by missile troops using nuclear weapons combined with strikes by aircraft will now make up the basis of a system of fire which will ensure quick destruction of the enemy on any axis.

The grouping of missile troops of operational-tactical designation must, in all cases, ensure the delivery of massed nuclear/missile strikes in short periods of time against the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack and against his main groupings, primarily of armored troops, in order to rout them by nuclear strikes and frustrate an offensive, and also ensure the capability of rapid retargeting of the main nuclear/missile weapons to fulfill newly arising tasks during the operation.

In shifting to the defensive, the most important task of the command and the staffs is to ensure the timely movement and deployment of missile large units and units in siting areas. In selecting siting areas, both primary and alternate preference must be given to the missile troops over the other large units. The movement of missile large units and units to siting areas is calculated in such a way as to give them the necessary time for deployment of combat formations, preparation (oborudovaniye) of positions, and preparation (podgotovka) of missiles for launching.

The grouping of combined arms large units and formations, its composition, tasks, and designation will be determined by the composition of the grouping of the missile troops and its capability to perform the basic tasks in destroying the enemy.

In creating a grouping of combined arms large units and formations the following two circumstances must be taken into consideration.

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Firstly, to accomplish tasks of completing the rout of an enemy who has broken through to the depth of the defense, on whom the missile troops have inflicted heavy destruction, and who is sustaining systematic nuclear/missile strikes, there will be no need to have the same number of combined arms large units and formations in the composition of a front, as was the case, for instance, in the past war. These tasks can be fulfilled successfully with an even smaller number of large units (formations).

Secondly, success in combat with enemy groupings whose breakthrough into the depth of the defense is possible on several axes, and with his airborne forces deep in the rear area, can be expected only when the greater part of the motorized rifle and tank divisions are located in the depth at various distances from the line of the front, in constant readiness to deliver strikes against an enemy who has broken through, deploying for this precipitately, or to hold, with a part of them, advantageous areas of terrain on the most probable axes of the enemy's offensive. Under favorable conditions, these large units can also be utilized for a subsequent shift to the offensive. In the first echelon of armies, it is advisable to have a small number of divisions to organize the defense of the most important areas on the probable axes of the enemy's offensive.

A system of engineer preparation of the terrain is set up to correspond to the grouping of forces and weapons which is created to conduct a defensive operation. It will include: the siting areas of the missile troops, the defense areas of the large units of the first echelon, the areas of disposition of the large units of the second echelons and reserves, their routes of movement for maneuver and lines of deployment, the areas where aircraft are based, sectors of obstacles and demolition, areas which have been prepared for the location of control points and rear area installations, the road network, and also dummy positions (areas) and other installations.

The positions of the missile troops are selected on terrain having natural concealment, a developed geodetic grid, and convenient routes for supply and maneuver. In size, the siting areas of the

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missile troops must ensure the capability of preparing primary and alternate launch sites, containing all the defensive structures needed for concealed and dispersed disposition of units and subunits and stockpiles of missiles, nuclear charges, and fuel components.

In the defense areas of large units of the first echelon, a system of centers of resistance (strong points) is created, in which positions for fire weapons, shelters for personnel and combat equipment, observation posts, and communication trenches are prepared. The centers of resistance (strong points) are linked with the system of artillery fire and are protected by obstacles.

The engineer preparation of the areas of disposition of large units in the second echelon and in the reserve is calculated not only to ensure cover for the personnel and combat equipment of units and subunits, dispersal of them, and repelling by them of an attacking enemy by fire from the halt, but mainly to execute rapid maneuver in any direction. These areas should be selected with consideration for the most probable directions of enemy breakthrough into the depth and for the conditions of the terrain, and whenever possible should be tied in with the system of fire of the missile troops and artillery and, when needed, with obstacles. In the areas, centers of resistance, positions for fire weapons, and cover for personnel and combat equipment can be created and routes of maneuver can be prepared or staked out. For large units of the second echelon and for the reserve, alternate areas must also be designated, for which it is advisable to accomplish engineer preparation in the same manner as for primary ones, if time is available.

Under conditions when the attacking enemy strives to create zones of radioactive contamination and destruction, primarily on the routes of troop movement, advance preparation of the routes (cross-country routes) for the maneuver of troops acquires paramount significance. Engineer troops which have been previously allotted to the complement of traffic support detachments (otryad obespecheniya dvizheniya) are usually used to provide roads and river crossings for maneuvering troops.

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The system of obstacles, contamination, and destruction is prepared in strict accordance with the disposition of groupings of friendly troops and the planned maneuver, taking into account the terrain and the need to cover the most important axes as well as the intervals and gaps in the defense. In many cases, it may prove advisable to create solid zones of contamination and destruction ahead of the front of the attacking enemy by nuclear weapons for the purpose of halting his forward movement, inflicting losses, and gaining time for the transfer of forces to this axis.

The obstacles created by the engineer troops must be set up quickly, and, when possible, be controlled from a distance, although it is not mandatory to cover them with small arms and artillery fire; on the contrary, it is more advantageous to prepare obstacles on those axes where there is insufficient firepower and personnel. To ensure speedy setting up of obstacles, it is desirable to equip the engineer troops with helicopters. Mobile obstacle detachments, in helicopters, can be widely employed during a defensive operation.

The main element in the engineer preparation of terrain is the concealment of personnel and combat equipment in their dispersed disposition over a large area [redacted] by carrying out various deceptive measures, including the creation of dummy installations and by wide maneuver, preventing the enemy from detecting one or another grouping of troops, especially missile troops. Today, the weak spot in defense will be that grouping of troops which the enemy detects and against which he delivers a strike by nuclear weapons, and conversely, the strong spot in defense will be the grouping which is not discovered by the enemy, and therefore is able to launch surprise strikes against him, primarily nuclear/missile.

The fire system in defense is based on strikes by nuclear/missile weapons, [redacted] which are combined with fire from tube and rocket artillery, strikes by aircraft, and the system of obstacles. The fire system should ensure a capability of concentrating nuclear/missile and aircraft strikes in a short period of time on any threatened

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axis with the aim of destroying the enemy's nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and destroying his troops in their areas of disposition during their move forward and at the beginning of their offensive.

Tank fire is of great importance in defense. Tank units, conducting fire from concealed firing positions, can perform several fire missions to destroy and neutralize an enemy which is located within their range of fire, which is very important under conditions when there is a limited amount of tube and rocket artillery in the armies and divisions.

The system of fire in defense is organized in such a way as to increase continually the fire effect on the enemy in proportion to his concentration and deployment, and to make possible the rout of his groupings and frustration of the offensive. In organizing a fire system, primary attention should be given to ensuring the readiness of the missile troops and aviation to deliver nuclear strikes first of all against the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack and basic groupings before the beginning of his offensive. In connection with this, the readiness of the operational defense as a whole will be determined first of all, by the readiness of the missile troops to deliver strikes against the enemy and, if necessary, to retarget them to any threatened axis during an operation.

In our opinion, the greatest attention in problems of conducting modern operational defense should be given to the carrying out of counterpreparation and counterstrikes.

It is known that in the past, counterpreparation, as an active fire countermeasure, directed at frustrating an enemy offensive, was carried out immediately before the enemy shifted to the offensive when his strike grouping was already concentrated in compact formations, usually on one of the decisive axes in direct contact with the defending troops.

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To carry out counterpreparation against such a grouping, the defender, in turn, concentrated the greater part of the artillery from the complement of the first and second echelons on the axis of the probable main strike of the enemy, brought in artillery from adjacent sectors, and utilized aviation.

During the counterpreparation, only the large units of the enemy's first echelon were subjected to more or less heavy fire effect, and even these quickly reorganized themselves, and after an insignificant period of time, calculated in hours, shifted to the offensive. In regard to the reserves and second echelons of the enemy, on the whole they were not subjected to any serious fire effect and in all cases were utilized according to plan, the defending troops accomplished their destruction during the actual defensive battle.

Now the task of frustrating an enemy offensive can be fulfilled with incomparably greater effect by missile troops who, within short periods of time and without changing firing positions, are capable of concentrating nuclear strikes on any area of disposition of the enemy. Under modern conditions, we cannot count on the enemy to concentrate his groupings in area limited in size, in compact formations, and in direct contact with the defending troops. To wait while the enemy prepares his own offensive groupings for operations, and moreover, to give him the opportunity to deliver pre-emptive strikes by nuclear weapons, means to give up the initiative to the enemy without a struggle and to place our own troops under the threat of defeat in advance. To prevent this, it is necessary to make maximum use of the capabilities of the missile troops.

Combat with the enemy with the aim of frustrating his offensive must be carried on for the duration of the entire period of his preparation for an offensive. This combat will be initiated by the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes, supplemented by aircraft strikes immediately as the enemy's groupings are successfully detected and must continue without interruption. In all cases, it is imperative to strive to deliver strikes, first of all, against the

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enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, whose destruction will deprive him of the capability of utilizing his ground forces with the greatest effect.

Taking the above into account, we consider the use of the very term "counterpreparation" to be inadvisable because this may lead to adapting the old methods of its organization and execution to the new powerful weapons of destruction.

Modern defensive operations will begin with combat operations, primarily of the missile troops, who can successfully wage combat with the enemy even on distant approaches to the defense. In addition to the missile troops, aircraft using nuclear warheads and other weapons of mass destruction and, on the nearest approaches to the defense, tube and rocket artillery, and some of the tanks, are used in operations to frustrate an offensive which is being prepared.

The decisive role in frustrating an enemy offensive belongs to the missile troops of operational-tactical designation. The objectives of their strikes will be weapons of nuclear attack, groupings of ground troops (mainly armored), depots and workshops for assembling nuclear warheads, control points, and radiotechnical means located in the entire depth of the operational formation of the enemy's troops. To destroy the indicated objectives, the missile troops can deliver individual, group, and sometimes even massed nuclear/missile strikes, supplemented by aircraft strikes against these objectives.

With the sharply increased capabilities of the front and army to frustrate an enemy offensive by nuclear/missile strikes, the task of delivering a strike ahead of the front of the defense by the forces of the combined arms large units, has become more realistic. If the situation permits, it may be advisable, following the successful delivery of massed nuclear/missile strikes, to deliver a strike before the front of the defense by the forces of the large units located in the second echelons of the armies and in the reserve of the front with the aim of completing the rout of the strike groupings of the enemy and the capture of important areas.

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In many cases, this strike may develop into a general offensive.

In examining the methods of conducting counterstrikes during a defensive battle, it is necessary to proceed, first of all, from the changed nature of the offensive operations of the enemy, who has great capabilities for using nuclear/missile weapons and for conducting large-scale offensive operations. Under conditions when the enemy is making decisive use of nuclear weapons in the entire depth of the defense and is shifting to the offensive on several axes while simultaneously making several landings of airborne forces in the operational rear, deep breakthroughs by his strong groupings of armored troops are possible. We can no longer count on successful combat with these groupings by conducting counterstrikes in their former sense, when large groupings of troops were concentrated on one axis to carry them out.

This was possible before because the enemy also operated with a strong grouping of his troops usually on one decisive axis. By concentrating the main forces and weapons on this axis the defender forced the attacker to gnaw through the defense at a relatively slow pace, as a result of which he had more or less considerable time available for planned preparation and concentration of the counterstrike grouping, without fear that the enemy would decisively disrupt its combat effectiveness before the beginning of operations. At the present time, the situation has undergone a marked change. Despite this, in the practice of major troop exercises, it is possible, even now, to encounter cases when a strong grouping of troops is moved up to carry out a counterstrike on one of the axes and after fire preparation simultaneously /several words missing/ one or another combined arms large unit, being used to carry out the counterstrike is late in moving up to the line of deployment, other large units usually bide their time, thus condemning themselves to passiveness. The enemy, on the other hand, is enabled to reorganize himself and to deal with the counterstrike grouping which has been readied with nuclear weapons. Similar activities were observed even at the last major command-staff exercise which was conducted in July 1960.

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At the present time, it is very dangerous to concentrate a grouping of troops consisting of three or four divisions on one axis. This only plays into the hands of the enemy, who, in all cases, will be striving to compel the defender to concentrate such groupings within a more or less limited area and to finish them off with nuclear weapon strikes.

Under conditions when, from the very beginning, combat operations develop in great depth and over a wide front, assume a highly mobile nature, and proceed very irregularly, when several strong centers of combat are formed in the defense zone of an operational formation simultaneously on a number of axes and at varying depths, the methods of conducting counterstrikes must be changed.

At the beginning of a defensive battle, the missile troops will deliver nuclear strikes against the enemy to inflict maximum losses on the enemy's defensive groupings and to prevent their breaking through to the depth. A portion of the combined arms large units will conduct sustained combat operations to hold the most important areas, repelling the enemy's offensive by all types of fire and by counterattacks; the other portion of the large units is thrown into combat with the enemy's airborne forces. A large part of the motorized rifle and tank divisions will be used to deliver strikes against enemy groupings which have effected breakthroughs on various axes into the depth of the defense. It is advisable to deliver these strikes precipitately on several axes at various depths, and possibly at various times, especially in the front. However, all the strikes must be united by a single concept to complete the rout of that enemy grouping which at the given time represents the greatest danger with the use of the main forces.

To effect rapid elimination of destruction on the routes of troop movement, it is advisable to set up in each large unit several small, but highly productive and mobile traffic support detachments which are now becoming a necessary part of the march formation of large units and units. The delivery of strikes against an enemy who is making a breakthrough by the combined arms large units on various axes and at varying depths leads to dispersion of the enemy's efforts.

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With the systematic use against the enemy of nuclear/missile weapons and aircraft, he will hardly be capable of delivering effective strikes on all axes against large units which are moving. Even if the enemy succeeds in disrupting the combat effectiveness of certain divisions, other divisions nevertheless will still be able to deliver strikes against him that will have considerable influence on completing the rout of an enemy who has broken through into the depth.

During a defensive battle, strikes (counterstrikes) will be delivered not only on the enemy's flank, but also from the front because the situation will not always allow the execution of a maneuver to reach the flanks of the groupings which have broken through. Moreover with the timely and successful delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy groupings which have broken through, it is possible to achieve decisive destruction of them, and, in a short period of time, to create favorable conditions for the execution of frontal counterstrikes.

Taking this into consideration, and also the fact that the basis of the combat operations of the troops in a defensive operation as well as in an offensive, is nuclear strikes, rapid maneuver, and swift attacks by tank and motorized rifle units and large units, with the aim of rapid exploitation of the results of nuclear bursts, then meeting engagements and battles become very typical in operational defense. They will arise and be conducted simultaneously or successively, on a number of the most important axes, over a large area along the front and in the depth when there are large breakthroughs in the operational formations of the troops, and also under conditions when there are numerous zones of contaminated terrain and destruction of the most important routes of movement.

Meeting battles and engagements occurring during a defensive operation will be characterized by: the brevity of the time for their organization; the intensity of the combat to seize the initiative, mainly in delivering nuclear strikes against the troops moving up to meet each other; the deployment of large units on dissociated

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axes at various times and in varying depth, and also their entry into battle rapidly after the nuclear strikes; the speed of the combat operations; the wide use of maneuver by forces and weapons.

A striving to forestall one another in the use of nuclear weapons may lead to a situation by the time of the encounter, where neither of the opposing sides will have a clearly evident advantage in number of combined arms large units. Therefore, pre-emption in the use of nuclear weapons will be the main condition determining success in a meeting engagement.

The simultaneous inflicting of decisive destruction on several or a large part of the combined arms units which are moving up or being deployed may force one of the sides to shift to the defensive in a short period of time or to withdraw in the face of the evident threat of a rout of its troops. In this case, the outcome of a meeting engagement may be predetermined even before the encounter of the main forces of the sides, and the meeting engagement will quickly develop into an offensive or pursuit for one of the sides and defense or withdrawal for the other.

Such, in brief, are our views on certain problems in the formation and conduct of modern operational defense, which urgently require further investigation.

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2 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversations with [redacted] in London on 8-11 March and in Geneva on 14-25 March 1962 1.3(a)(4)

1. At our meeting on 8 March [redacted] was very pessimistic about the future of the operation and expressed his personal belief that [redacted] had been compromised by overly enthusiastic photographic endeavour, possibly at the Main Artillery Headquarters after BUZINOV'S departure. [redacted] repeated his previously expressed views that the [redacted] meetings were much less likely to have caused trouble, but did admit that [redacted] behaviour at the last two meetings (12 and 19 January) was noteworthy in that it reflected, for the first time, some concern on his part about the security of the meetings. On 12 January, when [redacted] met [redacted] at the Praga and led her to the street and entry which he had selected, he told her that he felt they had been overdoing the shop routine, and that the next time he wanted her to go straight to this same doorway. On 19 January, when [redacted] came down the street and started to enter the designated doorway, she saw [redacted] in the phone booth directly across the street making (or pretending to make) a phone call. He was in a position to see the length of the street in both directions. [redacted] joined [redacted] in the entryway a short time later and the meeting took place as already reported, without any comment on his part as to why he had been in the phone booth. [redacted] left first and has not seen [redacted] since. 1.3(a)(4)

2. On 9 March, when we related the substance of the first interview with [redacted] took some pains to review the record in the light of the fresh information and to admit, in effect, that he had been wrong about the risks involved in the street meetings. [redacted] told us that on 19 January, when [redacted] was taking the bus to her ballet class she noticed a car make a U-turn in front of the bus to follow it. This was the first and only time that she noticed anything that might be construed as surveillance of her. (She did not observe any surveillance when she went from the ballet class to the meeting with [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

3. In subsequent discussions at Geneva about future communications with [redacted] on his own initiative took the position that we should abandon street meetings as the primary means of contact with [redacted] and that we should accept reduced production as the price of increased security. This, of course, is our own view, and 1.3(a)(4)

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whatever the past difficulties may have been, it appears that we will not have any trouble with [redacted] on this score in the future. It was agreed with [redacted] that both sides would strive to place people in a position to have social and professional contact with [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) that we would try to improve the impersonal commo arrangements in the operation [redacted] a more flexible W/T plan, emergency S/W channel, better dead drop, etc.), and that if need be, we would simply be patient during the intervals between [redacted] trips abroad. It was recognized that we might well have some trouble with [redacted] himself when it comes to cutting down personal meetings in the USSR, but it was nonetheless agreed that we would do everything possible to achieve this.

5. [redacted] fully agreed to the revised plan for W/T broadcasts 1.3(a)(4) which we presented.

6. [redacted] agreed to our proposal that it would be desirable for [redacted] to have a set of prepared postcards which he could mail to accommodation addresses in the U.K. to signal certain key situations. To forestall [redacted] objections to the use of his own handwriting, 1.3(a)(4) these postcards would be furnished him with cover texts already written in (in English). Each postcard would stand for one simple message, the key to which could be the signature, the picture on the postcard, the accommodation address, or any other identifying mark agreed on with [redacted] It was tentatively agreed that the following messages were the most important:

a. "I am under suspicion."

b. "I am on an internal trip."

c. "I am ready to do business again."

d. "I will be coming to the West soon." (10 days notice)

Appropriate picture postcards were selected, and [redacted] undertook 1.3(a)(4) to have a batch of them prepared with various British handwritings and innocuous tourist texts to several accommodation addresses in the U.K.

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3 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Messrs [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)(5)
[redacted] re [redacted]

1. This morning, after discussions with key officers of the Division, Mr. Bulik and I met with [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)(5) regarding the visa application of [redacted] We said that we thought [redacted] was applying for a visa to visit the U. S. and wanted to make sure the application was not turned down. However, we emphasized the sensitivity of the matter and [redacted] 1.3(a) (5) on how it could be handled without revealing our operational interest. [redacted] he was at a loss to know how to proceed, and said he thought we should consult [redacted] 1.3(a) (5) we explained the problem to him, pointing out that in the normal course of events, there was some danger that a visa application for [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) might be rejected since he had formerly served as a military attache abroad and thus was doubtlessly carried on the records as an intelligence officer.

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the information provided by [redacted] was of unique and outstanding 1.3(a)(4
value, that this was by far the most productive intelligence operation he had ever known of and that, with the possible exception of technical sources, nothing else had ever produced material of such concern to the national interests.

4. [redacted] somewhat reassured by this and expressed a desire to see some of the recent [redacted] reports, 1.3(a) (5 1.3(a)(4)
which I promised to bring over and show him in the near future. As examples of some of the reports, I mentioned the Soviet awareness of [redacted] he had not read this report and would very much like for me to bring it over and show him. 1.3(a) (5)

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5. I later reported the above to Mr. Helms who was disturbed that we had revealed [redacted] identity and said 1.3(a)(4)
that, while perhaps we had no alternative, in the future he wished to be consulted before we took any such step. He also asked that we call [redacted] impress upon him 1.3(a) (5)
the importance of the handling the matter with the utmost discretion. Mr. Bulik later called [redacted] 1.3(a) (5
and emphasized the security problem in the strongest terms.

John N. Maury
Chief, SR Division

[redacted]

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[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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4 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in a Front Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General V. Chizh (Mil 1st Issue)

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in a Front Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General V. Chizh

DATE OF INFO: 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in a Front Offensive Operation", by Colonel-General V. Chizh.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1961 Third Issue was sent to press on 10 July 1961.

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Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Missile Weapons in a Front Offensive Operation

by

Colonel-General V. Chizh

As is known, modern operations are characterized by the large scale utilization of nuclear/missile weapons, by highly mobile troop operations, and by sharp and rapid changes in the situation. The mass employment of nuclear/missile weapons promotes a more rapid attainment of operational goals than has been the case in the past. There is every reason to suppose that the duration of operations will be sharply curtailed. In any case, the protracted battles, lasting many days, which were characteristic of the Second World War have, we consider, become a thing of the past. According to the experience of a number of exercises, a front offensive operation will continue for an average of 8 to 10 calendar days.

Along with a significant curtailment in the duration of conducting an operation, its depth will increase sharply. Whereas in the last war the depth of a front offensive operation was within the limits of 250 to 300 km and only reached 500 km in exceptional cases, under modern conditions a front operation will be conducted to a depth of 800 to 1000 km. Such depth can and must be attained mainly as a result of the decisive exploitation of the results of nuclear/missile strikes. At the present time, the problem of increasing the rates of troop advance to 100 km in one calendar day has already been raised. High rates of advance will now play a decisive role in the attainment of operational goals.

However, in spite of the recognition of the dominant role of nuclear weapons, we still do not fully take into account all their capabilities in planning operations. We have cases in which many problems in the preparation and conduct of modern operations are decided from the standpoint of the past with insufficient regard for the particular features of a nuclear/missile war. The nuclear warheads released for an operation will, as the Minister of Defense

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points out, often be hastily expended as quickly as possible by using obsolete methods of artillery preparation against insufficiently reconnoitered targets.

The enormous role of the new means of combat, which they can play in a future war, requires a new approach to the planning of their use. With the modern scales of using nuclear/missile weapons, they should not be looked upon as a means for supporting the combat operations of ground troops. Now, these weapons are the main and decisive means of combat, determining the possibility of accomplishing the majority of the tasks confronting the troops of a front in an offensive operation. Consequently, problems of the employment of nuclear weapons play a determining role in the planning of a front offensive operation.

The operational directive of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on its conduct serves as the organizational impetus in the planning of a front offensive operation. Following the directive, after he has understood the task and has carefully appraised the situation, the troop commander of a front reaches an operational decision in which, in relation to the use of nuclear weapons, he defines:

--the aims and tasks for which nuclear/missile weapons are to be used in the operation and the allocation of nuclear warheads in accordance with the operational tasks;

--the objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons, and the sequence and timing for the delivery of nuclear strikes against them;

--the number of nuclear warheads allocated to the armies for the operation and the order of participation of the army missile units in the massed nuclear strikes of the front;

--the primary and alternate siting areas of the front's missile large units (units) and the airfields at which the delivery aircraft of the air army are based, the sequence and timing of their employment; the order of movement of the front's means for using nuclear weapons during the operation;

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--the readiness periods of the missile units and aircraft for the delivery of nuclear strikes;

--the reserve of nuclear warheads;

--the measures for material-technical and combat support and other problems.

The authors of some articles, in considering the problems of planning an operation, express the opinion that, in connection with the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons in a front and army, two plans should be worked out: a plan for the front (army) offensive operation and a plan for the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons in the operation.

We share the point of view of Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov and consider with him that there can be no separate plan for the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons. Nuclear/missile weapons and combined-arms large units and formations cannot be used when isolated from one another. The main elements in the operational formation of the enemy's troops will be destroyed by nuclear/missile weapons, and, as is known, the combined-arms large units will complete their rout. Operations by ground troops are now impossible under any conditions without the aggressive use of nuclear/missile weapons in both operational and tactical elements. The basic problems for decision by the troop commander of a front on the operational use of nuclear weapons must be reflected in the plan for the front's offensive operation. The various special technical problems connected with the preparation and the delivery of nuclear strikes which do not come into the operational plan are reflected in the appropriate plans of the chief of the missile troops and artillery of the front (army) and of the commander of the air army.

In our opinion, it is necessary to introduce clarity into the problem of who must work and on what in planning for the use of nuclear/missile weapons in a front (army) offensive operation.

It is known that the main role in planning for the use of nuclear/missile weapons is played by the operational directorate (department) of the staff of a front (army), the staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front (army), and the staff of the air army. Let us examine their functional responsibilities in planning an operation.

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The operational directorate (department) of the staff of a front (army), on the basis of the instructions of the commander and chief of staff of the front (army), works out the specific problems of the nuclear/missile preparation and support of a front troop offensive, allocates the objectives to be destroyed between the missile troops and aviation, determines the yield of the nuclear charges, the types and height of bursts, the safe distance of friendly troops, estimates the expected results from the nuclear strikes, and keeps a radiation situation map and a record of the irradiation of the large units.

In performing these tasks, the operational directorate (department) coordinates its work with other directorates (departments) and receives from them essential data. Thus,

a. with the intelligence directorate (department), the following are determined in detail:

--the locations of the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, depots, and assembly bases for nuclear warheads and data on their preparation;

--the disposition areas of major operational reserves, the places in these areas where troops are most densely located, the degree of engineer preparation of the areas, and the probable directions of operations by the reserves;

--the locations of major control points (of armies and groups of armies), the nature and durability of the installations they occupy;

--the procedure for receiving intelligence data before and during the offensive operation, in support of the employment of nuclear/missile weapons.

Data on targets must be presented in the form of the precise topographic-geodetic coordinates of the targets (and not in the form of areas approximated on a map). Only then can the use of nuclear/missile weapons produce the desired result;

b. with the staff of the missile troops and artillery of a front (army) and the staff of an air army, the following are coordinated:

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--the readiness periods of nuclear warheads for use in combat and their issue to the missile (aviation) large units and units of the front (army);

--the objectives for destruction by the missile units (large units) and delivery aircraft;

--problems in the allocation of nuclear warheads, according to the objectives to be destroyed;

--the timing for the delivery of nuclear strikes;

--the order and periods of time for the dispatch of the missile units and subunits to siting areas and aircraft to dispersal airfields (aerodrom rassredotocheniya) (or maneuvering airfields (aerodrom manevra));

--the system of cooperation between missile units and aviation;

--measures for ensuring the security of friendly troops during the delivery of nuclear strikes;

c. with the chief of the PVO troops of the front (army), the problems of protecting the troops of the front (army), especially the missile units (large units), against strikes by enemy aircraft in areas of concentration and during the operation, are determined in detail;

d. with the chief of engineer troops of the front (army), problems in the preparation of routes, the procedure for supplying troops, and especially missile units, with the elements of prefabricated structures and with other construction materials for the preparation of cover are coordinated;

e. with the chief of communication troops, problems in the organization of communications, primarily with the missile units (large units) and with aviation, are coordinated; in this, communications must be organized down to the duty battery (squadron) inclusively;

f. with the chief of chemical troops of the front (army), problems in the organization of radiation and chemical reconnaissance both by the means of the front (army) and by those of subordinate

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troops are determined in detail; in addition, together with the operational directorate, the chief of chemical troops collaborates in keeping up the radiation situation map and the record of irradiation of large units; irradiation doses must be considered in an army for the regiment and in a front for the division and for front units (large units).

The staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front (army):

--in conjunction with the intelligence directorate (department), organizes reconnaissance against objectives on behalf of the missile troops of the front (army);

--on the basis of the tasks assigned by the commander of troops of the front (army) to the missile units (large units), allocates nuclear warheads among the missile units and subunits and designates specific objectives to be destroyed by them in accordance with their fire capabilities; conveys tasks to those who are to perform them;

--in accordance with the nature of the objectives designated for destruction, calculates the necessary yield and height of nuclear bursts, ensuring the specified degree of destruction of the objectives;

--organizes the preparation of siting areas and ensures the timely delivery of missiles to the missile units and subunits;

--together with the staff of the rear services decides the question of the procedure for the delivery of missile fuel;

--organizes the tour of duty for launch batteries in the siting areas.

In addition, the artillery staff of the front (army), in planning the combat use of the missile troops, decides such questions as the organization and carrying out of topographic-geodetical preparation and engineer preparation of the siting areas, meteorological support, ballistic and technical preparation; the organization and safeguarding of the movement of the missile units to the siting areas and of their movement during the course of the operation; the organization of direct

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control of the missile units and of their fire; the clarification of problems of coordination by the missile troops with aircraft and cruise missiles in the joint destruction of objectives.

The staff of the air army:

--allocates nuclear warheads among delivery aircraft and cruise missiles, designates specific objectives for destruction by them and organizes the delivery of nuclear strikes in accordance with the plan of the front's offensive operation;

--makes the necessary calculations (yield and height of nuclear bursts) to ensure the prescribed degree of destruction of the objectives;

--organizes and provides for continuous duty by delivery aircraft and for the timely delivery of nuclear warheads to the airfields on which the aircraft are based;

--organizes direct control of the large units (units) using nuclear warheads and also their combat support and cover;

--clarifies problems of coordination by the aviation units and cruise missile units with the missile units of a front (army) in the joint delivery of nuclear strikes.

The procedure for planning the employment of nuclear/missile weapons in an operation, suggested by us, eliminates the necessity for preparation by the directorates and departments of the front's (army) staff of a series of memoranda and considerations for the front commander.

We have discussed only one side of planning, i.e., we have defined the role of the directorates and departments of the staff of a front (army) and have shown the content of their work in planning for the employment of nuclear weapons in an offensive operation by the front (army).

The other side of planning consists of the resolution of separate problems connected both with direct planning and with the execution of nuclear/missile strikes. Let us examine some of these:

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In the allocation of nuclear warheads for the tasks of the operation and in the designation of specific objectives for destruction by them, it is necessary to proceed from a basic rule: it is better to destroy a smaller number of objectives with certainty, but those that are more important and have been well reconnoitered, than to hit at all or a large portion of the objectives without attaining the required result in doing so.

According to the experience of a series of exercises, nuclear warheads can be allotted for tasks as follows: for the first mass nuclear/missile strike (for the conduct of fire preparation)--20 to 30 percent; for accomplishing the immediate task of the front--30 to 40 percent; for accomplishing the subsequent task of the front--20 to 30 percent; for the front's reserves--10 to 20 percent. Of course, this is a most tentative calculation. The specific allocation of nuclear warheads in accordance with the tasks of an operation must be made according to the actual situation.

The nature of the objective and the particular features of the disposition of its separate elements have an exceptionally important significance in determining the type, amount, and yield of the nuclear warheads needed for its destruction. For example, the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, battalions of "Honest John", "Corporal", "Redstone" and of many other weapons, can be deployed in concentration areas or assume combat formation, with their launching mounts, at the waiting or launch sites. The most profitable objective for a nuclear strike will be a concentration where these weapons are located more compactly and for a longer time. The destruction of weapons of nuclear attack at their launch sites will be impossible in most cases because of their short stay at these sites.

In all cases, one must strive in the first instance to destroy depots of nuclear warheads and their assembly bases, and also the radio-technical means of control and guidance of missiles, without which the launching mounts are nothing more than heaps of metal.

In the allocation of objectives for destruction to the various means of delivering nuclear warheads to their target, it is necessary to consider the distance of the objectives from the main line of resistance, the degree of their cover by PVO weapons, and the nature of the objectives (their mobility). The inclination to plan nuclear

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strikes against mobile objectives beforehand, as was indicated by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov in his critique of the 1960 command-staff exercises, is nothing more than self-deception.

For the destruction of stationary and relatively immobile objectives, it is advisable to designate missile units, and for the destruction of mobile objectives, aviation. To deliver strikes against objectives located near our troops and also against targets of small dimensions which refer primarily to the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, it is necessary to select means of destruction which are more accurate in their combat characteristics (cruise missiles and solid fuel ballistic missiles).

In order to allocate objectives for destruction between the missile troops and aviation correctly, it is necessary, first, to consider fully their characteristics and combat potential; and second, from the total number of objectives, which almost always exceeds the capabilities for their destruction, to select the most important, the destruction of which will ensure the attainment of the assigned goals.

In determining the type and height of a nuclear burst it is necessary to consider not only the probability of destroying this or that objective, but also the possibility of radioactive contamination of the terrain in areas in which operations of front (army) troops are impending, as the result of one's own nuclear bursts.

As is known, depending on the location and nature of the objectives (targets) to be destroyed, and also on the level of destruction required, either surface or air bursts can be used.

Surface bursts should usually be planned for the destruction of troops located in solid shelters (dugouts), and also for putting out of commission military-industrial and other objectives with very sturdy structures. In addition, it is advisable to use surface bursts (along with the destruction of the objective) to create zones of radioactive contamination of the terrain, with high levels of radiation.

However, in each specific case it is necessary to consider carefully the meteorological conditions (mainly the wind direction), the location of friendly troops, and their subsequent operations,

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together with the configuration of the front line. In delivering strikes against objectives located near our troops, surface bursts may be used only when there is a steady wind in the direction of the enemy and under conditions in which troops will not enter these areas before the level of radiation falls to within safe limits.

Air nuclear bursts should be planned for the destruction of troops without cover and also of objectives which do not have sturdy structures. In addition, air bursts are used in all other cases when it is necessary to exclude strong radioactive contamination of the terrain. Low air bursts can be planned when it is necessary to avoid strong radioactive contamination of terrain and, at the same time, to destroy as large a number of sturdy structures as possible.

The solution to the problem of selecting the type of burst to destroy one or another enemy rear area objective also depends on the task which has been assigned. If, for example, it is necessary to put a rail junction out of action for a short time, with the intention of using it subsequently for the needs of the front during the operation, it is more advisable to plan a high air burst.

In conducting an offensive operation, more air than surface bursts are usually planned and in the conduct of a defensive operation this is reversed. In mountains, it is more advisable to use air bursts, because the protective qualities of the ground configuration are thereby lessened.

Timing for the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes. It is known that the greatest effect from nuclear/missile strikes can be achieved if they are delivered simultaneously, or within a strictly limited time. Therefore, the troop commander of a front establishes the timing for a simultaneous nuclear strike against the target by all nuclear warhead delivery means. In accordance with this timing, the staff of the missile troops and artillery and the staff of the air army must calculate the time at which each missile (aviation) unit (large unit) should begin launchings (strikes), separately. The staffs of the missile and aviation large units (units), depending on the flight-time of the missile (delivery aircraft) to the target, calculates the launch-times for each launch assembly (take-off time of delivery aircraft).

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The timing of nuclear/missile strikes during an operation is calculated so as to deliver the greatest destruction against this or that enemy objective. For example, it is most profitable to destroy infantry and tank groupings at the moment when they are deploying for a counterstrike or in concentration areas when they leave cover and prepare to move. It is advantageous to destroy airfields at which delivery aircraft are based at the moment when the greatest number of aircraft has built up or when nuclear bombs are being loaded, etc.

It is thus, in our opinion, that the planning for the use of nuclear/missile weapons in an offensive operation by a front (army) must be carried out.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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10 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance Under Modern Conditions", by Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov and Major-General of Aviation M. Muskhin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance Under Modern Conditions", by Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov and Major-General of Aviation M. Mukhin

DATE OF INFO: July 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance Under Modern Conditions", by Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov and Major-General of Aviation M. Mukhin.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1961 Third Issue was sent to press on 10 July 1961.

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Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance Under Modern Conditions

by

Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov
Major-General of Aviation M. Mukhin

It is generally known that the degree of troop control is directly dependent on the timeliness with which the various command echelons of the armed forces receive necessary intelligence information.

The demands of military art for all types of intelligence are constantly increasing in proportion to changes in the nature of armed combat, and the equipping of troops with the newest types of weapons and combat equipment. This emphasizes the problem of further technical improvement of the present means of reconnaissance and the creation of new models of reconnaissance equipment.

On the basis of a study of experience from the combat training of troops and the state of the means of reconnaissance, it can be said that the troop demands levied on the organs and means of reconnaissance significantly exceed the capabilities of the latter. This pertains mainly to aerial reconnaissance, the status of which causes us particular alarm.

Aerial reconnaissance performs its tasks with the aid of a whole complex of various technical means which are organically inter-connected and which together constitute a single intelligence system.

It is necessary to consider the vehicles of reconnaissance equipment as the first element of this system.

Aerial reconnaissance must have at its disposal a great number of sophisticated flying equipment: manned and pilotless, fast and slow, high and low flying and having various ranges of operation. Up to the present, however, we have had only manned aircraft, mainly of obsolete construction (TU-16R, IL-28R, MIG-15R bis), with low performance characteristics and extremely limited capabilities for overcoming an enemy PVO system.

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The reconnaissance aircraft which are available can only partially perform their tasks. Moreover, their reconnaissance equipment does not provide for detection of small and mobile targets, for determination of their geographical coordinates, or for transmission of information from the aircraft.

The YAK-27R, which is in series production, has limited performance characteristics and the equipment installed on these aircraft permits only visual observation and aerial photography reconnaissance during daylight hours under favorable weather conditions.

The second most important element of the system of aerial reconnaissance means is the complex of technical equipment of reconnaissance aircraft, including reconnaissance, navigational and communications devices designated for detection and identification of targets, determination of their geographic coordinates, and transmission of the intelligence information from the reconnaissance aircraft to the appropriate command posts. It should be noted that the problems of receipt, processing and transmission of intelligence data in short periods of time, and in the necessary volume, are the most complex of all the problems facing aerial reconnaissance.

This is explained by the extraordinary and varied nature of the targets which may be point-like (tochechnyy), of small dimensions, area (ploshchadnyy), aerial, on land (on water), underground (under water), concealed or camouflaged. The characteristics of each type of target exert a great influence on determining the requirements that are levied on the reconnaissance devices: in relation to the capability for long-range detection of targets, the resolving power of the devices, the time for conduct of reconnaissance of a given target, etc.

Aerial reconnaissance can exploit such important characteristics of targets as, for example, the reflection and radiation of electromagnetic waves of various frequency ranges and also the magnetic, ionization and radiation characteristics. Thus, taking into account that the targets of reconnaissance naturally emit electromagnetic waves, radio and radio-technical reconnaissance devices are constructed, and on the basis of exploiting the principle of reflection--aerial photography, television, infrared, radar and other devices are constructed.

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At the present time, aerial photography and radio-technical reconnaissance devices have become the basic reconnaissance equipment of our armed forces. Unfortunately, other types of these devices (television, infrared, radar, magnetometric, radiometric, radiational and meteorological) are not sufficiently developed. Individual models of such devices have not yet been perfected and are of little use in obtaining intelligence data.

The inadequate development of the above-listed types of reconnaissance devices seriously limits the capabilities of aerial reconnaissance. The devices of reconnaissance aircraft do not satisfy the requirements of the armed forces as to volume, quality or timeliness of receipt of intelligence information. The degree of automation of airborne reconnaissance devices is extremely low and special operators are needed to operate them in flight. Night photography is limited because airborne lighting means have not been perfected. It is possible only after lighting the terrain with photobombs, as a result of which the number of aerial photographs is limited by the supply of photobombs on board. There are no electrical lighting devices in the equipment of our units for taking night photographs of targets from various altitudes.

The radio-technical reconnaissance equipment does not ensure complete detection of the enemy's radar networks, particularly of the stations for controlling missile weapons. The handling capacity of the equipment is low. As a result, an experienced operator, in one flight in a TU-16R with an SRS-1 station, is capable of reconnoitering only 8 to 10 ground radar stations. The accuracy of determining the locations of individual radar stations is extremely low: 10 to 20 km.

The processing and interpretation of the results of radio-technical reconnaissance require a rather lengthy period of time.

Intelligence on the enemy's modern radio-technical equipment which operates by rapid bursts or by switch-over of frequencies is practically nonexistent.

The existing means of air navigation do not in fact provide for the necessary accuracy in determining the geographical coordinates of targets, especially under difficult weather conditions and at night, and the navigational problems in long-distance flights over areas without reference points and in northern latitudes are also unresolved.

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The creation and perfection of navigational means which permit accurate geographical pinpointing of targets and the determination of a current position of the reconnaissance aircraft is an independent problem in itself, as is also mastery of the whole complex of reconnaissance devices.

Modern warfare emphasizes the need to shorten, to the maximum extent possible, the intelligence cycle, i.e., from the time of receipt of the initial reconnaissance information to the time of receipt of exhaustive intelligence data by the appropriate staffs. A whole complex of airborne and ground devices is necessary for this.

This problem can be resolved in various ways, for example, by transmitting the initial information directly from the reconnaissance aircraft. Another method is the processing of the initial information aboard the reconnaissance aircraft. A third method envisages having all the reconnaissance information accumulated aboard the aircraft but processing it on the ground after completion of the reconnaissance flight. This method is basically embodied in the existing reconnaissance apparatus since the problems of processing reconnaissance information in flight and its automatic transmission from the reconnaissance aircraft are still unresolved.

The existing ground equipment is not capable of processing and transmitting reconnaissance information in the required volume. For example, the production capacity of the photo-laboratories of reconnaissance units provides for the processing of only 40 to 50 percent of the photographic materials produced by reconnaissance crews during the course of a day. Unfortunately, as yet there has been inadequate development of such highly advanced means of reconnaissance information processing as television, photo-television, aerial photography with processing of photo-documents on board during flight, and also apparatus for the systematic processing of information aboard the reconnaissance airplane with subsequent transmission to the ground.

For a complete resolution of this problem, it is necessary to create ground points for collection and automatic processing of information which is received from strategic, operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance. For transmission of the reconnaissance information to the interested headquarters, it is necessary to introduce television, facsimile and other high-speed means.

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An examination of the basic elements that enter into the complex of aerial reconnaissance indicates that each of them presents a complicated scientific-technical problem.

In order to ensure the necessary coordination in the development of aerial reconnaissance means and in the activities of the various organizations conducting work in this direction, it is advisable to concentrate in a single center the processing, development and requests pertaining to all means of aerial as well as satellite reconnaissance. In our opinion, the air forces will most successfully cope with this problem with appropriate guidance from the General Staff. Together with this measure, in order to eliminate more rapidly the existing discrepancy between the capabilities of aerial reconnaissance means and the requirements of modern weapons of destruction, it is advisable to broaden greatly the scope of scientific-research, experimental and experimental-design work in the field of the creation of the latest technical means of aerial reconnaissance. In particular, it is necessary to designate the leading institutes (especially for the development of reconnaissance devices) and to broaden the production base of the industry engaged in the creation of series models of aerial reconnaissance means by widely initiating the production of devices in small series. In this connection, the development and creation of new aerial reconnaissance means should, in our opinion, be considered one of the primary tasks in the field of increasing the combat readiness of all types of armed forces.

In order to ensure timely intelligence data for all types of armed forces, we must solve a number of problems that are connected with determining the numerical composition of aerial reconnaissance forces for peacetime and wartime conditions, the organizational structure of these forces and control over them, and also the development of the most favorable system for the flow of intelligence information from the lowest level to all interested echelons.

In considering the necessity for maintaining a high degree of combat readiness of aerial reconnaissance, we believe that in peacetime it is very important to have strategic, operational, and tactical means in quantities which will permit the timely detection of the preparations of an aggressor for nuclear/missile attack and will provide all types of armed forces with intelligence data in the initial period of a war. The readiness of the aerial reconnaissance forces must correspond to the combat readiness of our strike forces and above all of our missile troops.

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In view of the fact that in the majority of cases aerial reconnaissance will be carried on under conditions of strong opposition from enemy PVO weapons and will be accompanied by significant losses, it is necessary to envisage the creation of special reserves for the period of the war, including those of the Supreme High Command, which are capable of ensuring reinforcement of reconnaissance forces on the most important axes of operations of our troops. During the course of operations, because of the sharply increased troop maneuverability, aerial reconnaissance must be marked by very frequent observation of (targets), which means conducting a large number of flights by manned and pilotless means.

Research, based on materials from training exercises and maneuvers of our troops, indicates that in the most typical front offensive operation in a developed theater of combat operations against a group of enemy armies consisting of 25 to 30 divisions, it will be necessary to conduct 650 to 700 reconnaissance flights per calendar day. In determining the overall number of aerial reconnaissance forces and means required by a front, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the average potential of manned reconnaissance aircraft consists of: 3 flights per calendar day for tactical reconnaissance, 2 flights for operational reconnaissance, and 0.5 flights for strategic reconnaissance.

The new tasks facing aerial reconnaissance also necessitate a change in the form of the structure of the entire intelligence system. In our opinion, the basis of the organizational structure of the intelligence system must be the idea of ensuring centralized direction and use of all forces and means. To accomplish this, it is necessary, along with the GRU, which does not embrace all types of intelligence, to have within the Ministry of Defense a single directing intelligence organ upon which should be levied:

--the working out and improvement of the system of equipping intelligence elements;

--the working out of a single organizational-organic structure of intelligence units and organs;

--coordination of the activities of the intelligence organs of the various types of armed forces and the organization of coordinated operations among them;

--centralized direction of all types of intelligence.

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The absence at the present time of such an intelligence organ does not provide an opportunity for the most effective use of our available forces and means of intelligence and is a serious obstacle to the creation of a single intelligence system within our armed forces.

The direction of strategic, operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance with the aim of receiving reconnaissance data for all of the interested echelons should, in our opinion, also be concentrated in appropriate intelligence centers. For this, the forces and means of strategic aerial reconnaissance of the armed forces, including satellite reconnaissance, should be concentrated in a special center of the air force, which would be responsible for providing intelligence data both to the Supreme High Command and to all types of armed forces. The forces and means of operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance should be concentrated in the intelligence centers of air armies (air forces (voyenno vozdushnyye sily--VVS) of fleets or groups of troops) which would be responsible for furnishing intelligence data to the troops of the district (front or fleet).

We consider the introduction of aerial reconnaissance units and subunits into the (TO&E) of combined-arms and tank armies premature for the time being, since a large number of service units and subunits would be required for airfield support. As a result, this would decrease the maneuverability of the combined-arms formations, would result in a dispersal of the already limited forces of aerial reconnaissance, would hinder combat support of the operations of aerial reconnaissance forces, and in peacetime would also significantly weaken the organization of combat training and the direction of reconnaissance units and subunits. As pilotless means for reconnaissance of a field of combat are introduced, means which do not require complicated maintenance, it will be possible to introduce them into the TO&E of combined-arms formations. At the present time, however, combined-arms and tank armies must receive reconnaissance data from the headquarters of the front, which, depending on the combat situation which is taking shape, will carry out operations by the forces and means of aerial reconnaissance on behalf of all troops and in accordance with the goals of the front operation being conducted.

It should be noted that the intelligence organs which exist in the main headquarters of the VVS, the headquarters of naval (voyenno-morskoy flot--VMF) aviation, and in air armies (VVS of districts and fronts) by virtue of their small numbers and organizational

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imperfection, will not be able to perform the tasks which we propose to levy on the intelligence centers of strategic and operational-tactical reconnaissance. Also, the separate reconnaissance squadrons created in the military districts (groups of troops) instead of aviation regiments, are not capable of fulfilling combat tasks to the required extent, and the extremely limited forces and means of aerial radio-technical reconnaissance are widely dispersed: 2 or 3 aircraft available in the special purpose (osoboye naznacheniye--osnaz) units of districts (groups of troops) and in the reconnaissance units of air armies.

It is perfectly clear that the existing dual subordination of units and subunits of tactical aerial reconnaissance (to the district and to the air army) and the dispersal of reconnaissance means, weakens direction of them and does not permit sufficiently efficient and purposeful organization of cooperation between operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance.

Therefore, it seems to us advisable to create aviation reconnaissance regiments in some military districts (groups of troops) primarily on the main axes, instead of having separate small intelligence subunits in each military district.

The question of having cadres of reconnaissance specialists for intelligence organs and units and subunits of aerial reconnaissance is also very important at the present time.

In connection with the increased demands of modern conditions, specialists of the intelligence organs of all echelons must have broad general and special training. However, this category of officer personnel has not been trained in military educational institutions in the course of recent years. As a result, a significant part of the intelligence organs and staffs of air regiments are still manned with officers who do not have the necessary theoretical knowledge and work experience.

The acute shortage of reconnaissance specialists can be eliminated only by establishing special training on a sufficient scale in the military educational institutions of the country. In addition, in the interests of maintaining permanent cadres of intelligence personnel, it would also be advisable to resolve the question of the material-legal incentives of the personnel of intelligence organs and units.

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Also of no small importance is the problem of improving the TO&E of reconnaissance units. In aviation reconnaissance regiments, for example, the position of photogrammetric interpreter is usually filled by privates and privates first class who are serving their normal period of compulsory military service. Taking into account that under modern conditions decisions for the use of weapons of mass destruction will be made on the basis of the interpreted materials of aerial photo-reconnaissance, we consider that it is advisable to assign to these positions officer-specialists and soldiers who are serving voluntarily beyond the required period and who possess high qualifications.

In conclusion, a few words about the preparation of intelligence organs and the training of intelligence personnel.

At the present time, the performance of reconnaissance tasks is not being achieved to the required extent because of the extremely limited training facilities, the lack of trained command posts for controlling reconnaissance aviation, the lack of proper opposition by PVO forces and weapons during training exercises, and also because significant limitations in the mode of operation of reconnaissance aircraft in flight cause serious defects in the training of units and intelligence organs.

In order to improve the combat training of intelligence organs and units, it is necessary above all to create an appropriate training facility which will permit the training of units and intelligence organs in the conduct of reconnaissance of weapons of mass destruction and determination of the coordinates of targets with the maximum possible accuracy. In our view, it is advisable to create within the armed forces specialized inter-district firing ranges with control and support means which provide targets which are mobile at firing positions both on the firing ranges and in areas outside the ranges.

In order that reconnaissance units perform their tasks during training exercises under conditions of strong enemy PVO, we feel that it is necessary during the training to create realistic countermeasures by fighter aircraft, by units of antiaircraft missile troops (zenitnyye raketnyye voyska--ZRV), and by radio jamming.

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And finally, in order to work out, during the course of the training of units, the whole complex of tasks in the collection, processing and analysis of reconnaissance data, and also for the transmission of these in the shortest period of time to the interested headquarters, it is advisable to employ the maximum possible number of reconnaissance units and subunits and the intelligence organs of all echelons in the troop training exercises and maneuvers.

* * *

Speedy resolution of the entire complex of problems facing aerial reconnaissance will ensure the elimination of the gap which has formed between its capabilities and the requirements of the troops. This will increase the effectiveness of the use of the new weapons of destruction and also the combat readiness and combat efficiency of all types of armed forces to a significant degree.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Question of Increasing the Stability of Troop Control", by Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh and Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted]ILITARY THOUGHT: "The Question of Increasing the Stability of Troop Control", by Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh and Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin

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SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Question of Increasing the Stability of Troop Control", written by Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh and Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1961 Third Issue was sent to press on 10 July 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The article by Major-General M. Ivanov referred to in the first sentence of the attached was disseminated as [redacted] on 5 April 1962. 1.3(a)(4)

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The Question of Increasing the Stability of Troop Control

In the article by Major-General M. Ivanov, extremely urgent questions of increasing the effectiveness and stability of the control of troops are raised.[1] In analyzing the existing structure of operational staffs and the requirements levied on them, the author reaches the conclusion that there must be a radical reorganization of control organs, the essence of which consists of the elimination of staffs of arms of troops and certain directorates and the creation in their place of several centers for planning and for troop control. Specifically, he proposes the creation of a nuclear/missile center as the organ for controlling all nuclear means of destruction, i.e., missile troops and the appropriate types of aviation.

In our opinion, it is impossible to agree with the organizational structure of operational staffs proposed by General Ivanov. He bases his thoughts mainly on the necessity for planning and only partially on control, losing sight of the other side of the activities of the chiefs of arms of troops and their staffs, which is training and thoroughly providing for the constant combat readiness of their subordinate units and large units. Even the control of, for example, the missile troops of a front, represents an involved complex of a number of measures.

In addition to this, the consolidated combined arms staff with various centers, which is proposed by the author of the article to replace the presently existing directorates and staffs of arms of troops, is also unwieldy and still does not eliminate the division of duties, and consequently, unavoidably requires appropriate coordination among the centers.

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1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961.

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It is perfectly correct that the element of time has assumed an extremely important significance and that timely collection of the most complete data on the situation, a comprehensive analysis of these, adoption of decisions and transmission of these decisions to the troops, and also control over the execution of these decisions, is required of staffs. However,,all of these tasks can be successfully accomplished with the existing organization of the staffs if certain modifications are introduced.

Preservation of the duties of the chiefs of arms of troops with their appropriate staffs or directorates conforms to the principle of single command and strengthens responsibility not only for planning but also for the training and education of personnel and for the support and thorough training of the appropriate arms of troops. Modern combat equipment is complex and in order to handle it specific know-how is necessary.

In itself, the idea of control of means of mass destruction, i.e., missile troops, aviation, and chemical troops, from a single center is not new. It was implemented in training exercises of the American Army, where a similar center was headed by the artillery commander.

Perhaps, such a system contains certain positive aspects, but to unify the control of missile troops and atomic bomb-carrying aviation is not appropriate, in our view, because control of the latter has its own specific characteristics and is the prerogative of the commander of an air army.

In the practice of combat training, fairly definite views have been worked out for organization of the control of missile troops and atomic-bomb-carrying aviation; they consist of the following.

The commander of the troops of a front determines the target and the procedure for the use of nuclear weapons, allocates missions among the missile troops and aviation and establishes the bases for coordinated action among them, and during the progress of the operation makes decisions concerning the delivery of nuclear strikes.

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The staff of a front jointly with the staffs of the missile troops and artillery and of the air army develops the plan for the use of nuclear weapons, organizes intelligence, determines the objectives for destruction, determines the yield of the nuclear warheads to be used against them and the types of bursts, and also the time for delivering the strikes.

The chief of missile troops and artillery and his staff must, on the basis of the decision made by the commander of troops of the front, plan in detail the combat use of the missile troops to be used to carry out the overall tasks of the front, and, in an army the overall tasks of the army, allocate fire missions and assign them to those who are to execute them and must organize the tour of duty of launch batteries, the timely delivery of missiles to units and also the preparation of these for launching. During the course of an operation, they execute maneuver by trajectories and the movement of missile units and their supply bases.

In order to control missile troops, it is necessary constantly to know the situation and condition of the missile large units and units and also the availability and degree of readiness of the missiles for launching. Control of missile troops and their fire must be carried out continuously, which can be achieved by means of constant readiness for their control from presently existing forward command posts (peredovoy komandnyy punkt -- PKP) and command posts (komandnyy punkt -- KP) with high operational and technical training of generals and officers, a clear-cut distribution of functional responsibilities with the existence of interchangeability, and also uninterrupted and reliable communications.

As a rule, the control of troops will be conducted from two points; these can be PKP or KP. In this, the personnel must be available at the PKP who are necessary to the commander of troops of the front in the process of working out a decision and in the control of troops, namely generals and officers from the combined arms staff and chiefs of arms of troops, including the chief of missile

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troops and artillery of the front with a small group of well trained officers. The remaining personnel of the staff and the field control headed by the chief of staff of the front are located at the KP. A constant reciprocal exchange of information between the PKP and KP must be implemented.

In his article, General Ivanov argued sufficiently convincingly for the advisability of having in the composition of the field control of a front and army two independent elements of control. Without raising an objection against this method of resolving the problem of control, we add that, in our opinion, the chiefs of the basic directorates of the staff and arms of troops with small groups of subordinate officers must be located with the commander of troops of a front in all cases, thus permitting rapid evaluation of a situation, adoption of a decision, and issuance of commands.

The opinion of the author of the article concerning the elimination of parallelism in requesting data on a situation is also perfectly correct. Obviously, the introduction of automation into the control of troops will eliminate such defects but even under the given conditions this system needs revision. All information received from the troops must be concentrated in one organ and represented on an overall map or map-screen.

This proposal does not exclude, of course, the necessity for interested command echelons to receive certain special information from directly subordinate troops (for example, for the staff of the missile troops and artillery to receive data on the movement of missiles and their degree of readiness for launching).

As is known, in view of the use of nuclear/missile weapons, the significance of intelligence has increased sharply, especially the timely receipt of reliable data. And in this regard we are in full agreement with General Ivanov, that the accomplishment of all tasks facing intelligence, primarily those on behalf of the use of nuclear/missile weapons, requires its centralization.

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Does the necessity for the staff of the missile troops and artillery to have its own intelligence department no longer exist? No, it still exists. In our view, it is needed in small complement, in particular for the organization and execution of preliminary reconnaissance of targets prior to delivery of a nuclear strike, and also for the organization of control, topographic-geodetic support, and other work. But its activities must be coordinated by the chief of intelligence of the front.

As a whole, in our opinion, the questions raised by General Ivanov regarding the reorganization of methods of control of troops merit further discussion.

Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh

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In our opinion, the article by Major-General M. Ivanov reflects correctly the deficiencies in the organizational structure of the staffs of operational formations, in the methods of control of troops, and in the organization of control points, and the author's practical proposals do not raise any fundamental objections.

However, in our view, one can approach a resolution of the problem of increasing the stability of troop control most correctly not from an examination of the organizational structure of staffs as does General Ivanov, but from a thorough analysis of the methods of control of troops and combat weapons, upon which in turn will depend the structure of the control organs.

New weapons of armed combat, and the nature of conducting combat operations corresponding to them, have a strong influence on the methods of control of troops and combat equipment, and the latter in turn makes definite, perfectly specific demands on the organizational structure of the organs and means of control. The anti-aircraft defense of troops, for example, requires such methods and means of control as to ensure the timely transmission of data on current aerial targets directly to the combat weapons, the instantaneous aiming of these weapons at targets which have been discovered, putting the combat weapons into action, and effectively destroying the target. As we see it, the main role belongs to the actual method of control.

The requirements on the organs of control which are listed in the article amount, in essence, to control over the readiness of combat means, regulating the activities of the commanders of arms of troops and the chiefs of special troops, and ensuring more purposeful work by appropriate departments in the collection and processing of operational information. These requirements are correct,but they do not include the main condition emanating from the use of modern combat weapons and from the nature of the conduct of combat and operations.

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The main element, in our view, is the fact that the control of troops, weapons, and equipment must ensure effective results from the use of all weapons of armed combat, primarily of nuclear/missile weapons, antiaircraft missile weapons, and the system of antiaircraft and antimissile defense as a whole. On this basis, particular requirements for the control of troops are determined. Besides those indicated by General Ivanov in his article, we should like to bring up some new ones in addition, such as:

-ensuring speedy reaction by the commander and staff to events (phenomena) as they occur, which depends, on the one hand, on the use in combat and operations of rapid-fire combat weapons and troops possessing high speeds of movement and, on the other hand, on the necessity for counteracting an enemy who has similar forces and weapons;

-ensuring maximum expediency in decisions and precision in the operations, especially of nuclear/missile weapons, the system of antiaircraft and antimissile defense, airborne troops and radio countermeasures means;

-ensuring thorough control over the timely readiness of nuclear/missile weapons, means of antiaircraft and antimissile defense, and also over the operations and situation of friendly troops and their materiel and technical support.

In our opinion, the requirement for control organs advanced by the author in regard to the concentration of data on the situation in one point (center) should be broadened. It is necessary to ensure the timely collection and processing and the reliability of information on the condition of combat weapons, troops, materiel and technical reserves, intelligence information on the enemy (in the first order, on objectives for nuclear strikes), and data on the radiation and chemical situation. Under modern conditions, the versatility and volume

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of the information which characterizes the combat situation, the increased number of directions from which it is received, and the sharp expansion of the area within which it is necessary to collect this information is noted. In addition, the collection and processing of information must be accomplished in very limited periods of time, consisting,in many cases,of minutes and even seconds.

We fully agree with the opinion of General Ivanov concerning the necessity for stricter centralization of troop control as a whole, including centralization of planning, control of fire weapons, and collection and processing of operational information, but we do not share his point of view on the composition of the field control of a front (army).

In our view, the creation of two separate centers, a main command-planning center and an operational center, is contrary to the concept of centralization of the control of troops. In essence, one center plans, and another concerns itself with the collection of data and directs combat operations. This can lead to parallelism and to the necessity for coordinating the work of these two centers and,in the final analysis, to loss of time. Would it not be better to have one center, an operational directorate (department), whose functions have been broadened in the sphere of unified planning,and the collection and analysis of all information on the situation of friendly troops and on the results of the use of nuclear weapons,and in the transmission of all instructions based on the plan for the operation,and on the progress of combat operations? In this situation, the concept of centralization of control will be effected more fully and the necessity for coordinating the work of both centers will no longer exist.

The designation "nuclear/missile center" also warrants comment. In proposing the formation of such a center, General Ivanov indicates that "the nuclear/missile center will be a unified organ for controlling the weapons of destruction of the front. All weapons

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of nuclear attack must be concentrated in the hands of the chief of this center, i.e., missiles of all types, bomber aviation and others, which will undoubtedly improve and expedite their use". It appears to us that it would be more correct to call such a center the "fire and chemical center" which will more fully reflect the content of its work.

In the composition of the field control of a front (army) proposed by the author of the article, a highly important organ is omitted, the communications directorate (department). Without this organ, none of the indicated centers can operate. To assign the organization of communications to each or to any one of them separately is impossible and moreover it is perhaps harmful.

The organization and support of communications is a completely independent branch of military affairs directly involving the use of numerous communications troops and various technical means. Therefore, it appears to us that one of the most important organs in a front's system of field control should be the communications directorate.

Without dwelling on the organization of the communications system of a front, let us examine the problems which, in our opinion, are of fundamental significance in determining the organizational structure of the field control of a front, and which were not touched upon in General Ivanov's article.

First of all, it is advisable to dwell on the designation of the organs that are in charge of the organization of communications. Taking into account the future development of technical means of control, it is advisable to have in the field control a mechanism (apparat) for the chief of communications troops and an automated system of control for the front. All the forces and means of communications, the automation of troop control processes and provision for secret communications,

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including cryptographic organs and means for making electrical signal communications channels secure should be concentrated in the hands of the chief of communications troops and automated control systems.

The chief of communications troops and automated control systems must organize a single system of communications for ensuring the control of the front's troops as a whole. All means, available at the present time to the chiefs of missile troops and artillery and to the PVO troops, and designated for the organization of an autonomous communications system, must be employed for the creation of a single system of communications for a front. It is also necessary to avoid using the independent high frequency (vysokaya chastota -- VCh) government communications units. The VCh government communications organs must have only station secrecy devices, operating on selected channels assigned from the overall front system of communications.

The above listed measures permit, in our opinion, a higher quality and more economical communications system for operational formations especially if one considers the development of multi-channel radio relay, radio, and wire communications systems and also the introduction of means of automating processes of control and means of communications.

At the present time, a sharp increase is evident in the requirement for communications channels for ensuring troop control and direction of the operational rear area. It appears to us that the basic direction in the development of means of communications, which permits most effectively provision for the increasing requirements is the creation of a single centralized system of communications with wide-scale use of multi-channel radio relay and wire means.

The effectiveness of this approach can be demonstrated by the following examples. The existing equipment for the multiple use of heavy field cable lines will permit receipt on one line of 4 or 5 telephone and one telegraph

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channel. Prospective means offer the possibility of having 12 telephone channels on such a line and the adoption of prospective voice-frequency telegraph equipment will enable us to replace each telephone channel with 12 telegraph channels. As a result, by the adoption of multi-channel equipment, the effectiveness of the communications system on telephone channels can be increased by 3 or 4 times, and on telegraph channels by several dozen times. A similar result will be achieved by the adoption of multi-channel radio relay and radio means.

Consequently, the widespread introduction of multi-channel communications systems permit provision for the increasing requirements for communications channels in operational control elements without an increase in the number of communications troops.

And now the last of the questions touched upon by Major-General M. Ivanov in his article. We fully subscribe to his proposal concerning control points. Actually, the existence of forward command posts along with command posts does not promote the assurance of stable control under present conditions, on the contrary, it leads to a dissipation of forces and means, weakens the capabilities of the main command post, decreases its role in the control of troops and gives rise to complications in the organization of the communications support of a front. The creation of two independent control points, one of which is a reserve point, can in many respects further ensure the stability of troop control under the conditions of a nuclear/missile war.

Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

13 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Fundamental Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation", by Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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30 JUN 1992

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cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
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The Fundamental Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation

by

Lieutenant-General V. Baskakov

The concept of the "fundamental scheme of an operation" is not familiar to our readers, so we shall define at once what we mean by it.

All operations of one war are waged by almost one and the same means of armed combat, and most often the organizational forms of troops in all operations likewise remain unchanged. Thus, within the extreme diversity of the specific features of the front offensive operations of the Second World War, one can discern specific traits characteristic of almost all of them. This was also noted in the operations of the First World War.

The substance of these general traits characteristic of all operations of a given war and taken in total we propose to call the fundamental scheme of an operation. By summarizing the basic characteristics of operations into a single scheme, it is easy to understand not only the substance and meaning of each of these characteristics, but also the mutual relationship and meaning of them in the operation as a whole. Such an examination of the basic characteristics of an operation of the last war is very convenient and makes it easier to establish graphically their suitability or unsuitability under modern conditions and to determine the fundamental scheme of an operation in a future war.

The fundamental scheme, put forth by us, of an offensive operation of a front in the period of the Second World War (diagram 1) is not a copy of any operation that took place. Nonetheless, among the great number of operations, there is none whose basic and fundamental characteristics would not be reflected on the given diagram.

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We shall make clear why the fundamental scheme of a front offensive operation in the last war was the way it was.

The basic features of an operation are determined first of all by what type of armed forces, what arm of troops is the main one and what constitutes the basis of their combat strength. As is known, in the last war the chief means for conducting military operations and the basic combat strength of the armed forces were ground troops, consisting of combined arms armies (which in turn consisted of rifle divisions) and partly of large units of armored troops (tank and mechanized corps organized by brigades).

Besides this, the level of development of industrial production, science, and of technology in many countries was, by the beginning of the Second World War, already high enough to guarantee production of a variety of military equipment and arms. This also permitted the belligerents to bring their operational art out from the stagnant position in which it found itself at the end of the First World War. At the same time, it was still impossible to bring about complete motorization of all ground troops, as a result of which the basic combat complement of armies and fronts remained the rifle divisions. The quantitative growth and the qualitative development of artillery, aviation, and other means of neutralization, the raising of their destructive capabilities, striking power and range of operation still could not essentially alter their roles as combat and operations support weapons.

The aviation, artillery, chemical, engineer, airborne and other arms of troops with all of their combat equipment only assisted in accomplishing major combat and operational tasks, but independently they could not completely accomplish them.

By virtue of this, the outcome of combat and of an operation depended mainly on the success of the operations of the infantry divisions, which constituted not only the basis but also the absolute majority of the forces of ground troops. The destruction of the most important groupings of the enemy's ground troops was

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the main purpose , the basic content of operations and of combat operations in general. In this, all attention was concentrated on routing the enemy in the tactical and immediate operational depth, where the significant part of his infantry divisions was located.

This was reflected in essence in the whole character of the last war and in the methods and forms of conducting combat operations, including the fundamental scheme for mounting an offensive operation of a front.

The depth of a front operation was determined by the disposition of the ground troops, the means for reinforcement, the control points, the rear installations and the basic forces of the tactical aviation of the group of enemy armies, and was 200 to 300 kilometers.

An offensive began, as a rule, with a breakthrough of the solid front of the enemy's combat formations on the most important axes and swiftly developed to the immediate operational depth, frequently leading to the encirclement of enemy troops. Such a method of conducting an operation was the only one possible, because the weapons of neutralization in that period, with all allowance for their concentration, could not by themselves destroy the enemy's divisions of ground troops and the means for their reinforcement. Our analogous divisions could rout, destroy, or capture the personnel of the enemy divisions only when they had the necessary superiority in forces and with advantageous operational preconditions.

Under these conditions, an important role in taking the decision for planning a front operation was played by the choice of the axes for the main and auxiliary strikes, the concentration on those axes of the necessary forces, and the establishment over the enemy of a superiority which guaranteed the success of combat operations. The theory of the main strike was fundamental in the operational art of the period of the Second World War. Therefore, the main strike also occupies the most important place on Diagram 1, which we cited.

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The exploitation of a breakthrough was accomplished by committing tank and mechanized troops into the battle, which assured high speeds for the offensive. The study of the operational exploitation of a breakthrough utilizing a mobile arm of troops, of the deployment of this arm of troops, and of the bases of the organization and preparation of its large units was also the most important in the operational art and in the military science of that period as a whole.

In the fundamental scheme of a front offensive operation of the last war there was shown the use of large units of armored troops for purposes of operational exploitation of a breakthrough and completion of the encirclement of the basic grouping of the enemy's troops.

Obviously, there is no need to prove that the fundamental scheme of a front offensive operation of the last war can no longer express the content of an operation in a modern nuclear/missile war.

Consequently, the problem consists of discovering in what measure the new fundamental scheme of an operation in a modern war differs from the former scheme, which elements from the old scheme retain their significance, which will disappear completely, and which will be transformed under the new conditions.

The degree of these differences is determined by the changes which occurred in the postwar period and which can occur in the future, primarily in the development of the productive forces and the political conditions of life in a society. The significant development of the productive forces of a society and of the weapons of armed combat cannot fail to cause a substantial change in the forms and methods of conducting combat operations in modern warfare and, certainly, introduces specific corrections into the fundamental scheme of a front operation.

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The basic means of armed combat and of the basic combat strength of the belligerents, as we have already examined earlier,[1] will not be divisions of ground troops and not ground troops as a whole, no matter how they might be supplied with the weapons necessary for conducting a mobile war, but nuclear/missile weapons and the troops which assure their use, the destruction of which is the main goal of the military operations of the belligerents.

In connection with this, the number of divisions in the complement of a front will decrease significantly, and additional large units and units which ensure the use of nuclear/missile weapons will be included. However, this does not mean a belittling or negation of the important role of ground troops in routing of the enemy. The role of ground and airborne troops will be determined by the need to complete the rout of an enemy who has been subjected to nuclear strikes, to take and consolidate an area, to establish the forward edge of contact with the enemy's troops, and to protect and defend the operational rear area.

The content of the fundamental scheme of a front offensive operation in modern warfare must also specify all of this.

Considering the nature of nuclear/missile warfare, one can raise the question: will a front offensive operation take place at all? Will the war not end with the conduct of the initial massive nuclear/missile strike in conjunction with the utilization of chemical and bacteriological weapons? Indeed, at the moment there exist bases for raising such questions. It is enough to cite, for example, the possibility of the complete annihilation of whole countries by nuclear weapons in short periods of time. Despite this, however, we consider that the operation as a specific form

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1 Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

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of armed combat is also retained in modern warfare. It is impossible to reduce a future war only to an initial strategic nuclear strike. Such a strike, unquestionably, is a definite part, a stage, of such an operation. After these strikes an attempt must be made to conduct simultaneously and successively a series of operations in various theaters of military operations and operational axes. The basic content of these operations will be the conduct of powerful nuclear/missile strikes and vigorous actions by ground and airborne troops, the Air Force, and the Navy.

The main purpose of a modern operation, as is known, is the destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons. The front, which operates in specific demarcated lines and under the conditions existing in one theater, cannot carry on combat against, for example, intercontinental missile bases located on different continents because it does not have the necessary intelligence organs and weapons of destruction. It is clear that it is necessary to call on the weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for combat against them.

In connection with this, the place of the front operation in modern warfare will be determined, in our view, by which enemy nuclear weapons the front must destroy, under the given conditions. It is known that the nuclear/missile weapons of the USA are distributed in groups: the weapons of operational-tactical designation for ground troops, with limited tactical-technical potentialities, the majority of which are located close to the line of contact of the troops, and a part not farther than 100 to 150 kilometers; medium range missiles (2,000 to 3,000 kilometers), which are distributed at a depth of 500 to 1,500 to 2,000 km from the line of contact of the belligerents; and finally intercontinental missiles with a range of 8,000 to 10,000 kilometers or more.

The front's composition will be changed, depending on which group (groups) of nuclear/missile weapons it must destroy. Thus, if the mission of a front is to destroy and annihilate the operational-tactical nuclear/missile weapons and the first echelon of ground

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troops, then its composition can be close to that currently accepted and the depth of such an operation will not change substantially in comparison with the experience of the last war. In this case, the destruction of the operational and strategic nuclear/missile weapons and the following echelons of ground troops, located beyond the limits of the depth of the front operation, must be accomplished with weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command or it will be necessary to organize either a group of fronts or a command and staff for the theater of military operations with the appropriate combat weapons to perform these missions.

In our view, the most acceptable version of the mission of a front is the liquidation of all nuclear/missile weapons designated by the enemy for combat on a given axis and distributed within the boundaries of a given continent. In this case, the meaning of a front as the basic level of command in the organization of armed combat is preserved and removes the necessity of establishing intervening levels (a group of fronts or a command for the theater of military operations is eliminated). The General Headquarters is thus freed from carrying out the missions which the front formations are able to perform. Besides this, destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons requires the immediate deployment of the operations of ground and airborne landing troops throughout the depth of the given axis. This will be more difficult for the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to carry out than for the front, which has these troops at its disposal and is able to organize their coordinated operations. In this case, the nuclear/missile weapons located outside the boundaries of the offensive zone and of the missions of the fronts and chiefly on other continents and on the ocean will be destroyed by weapons of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

In connection with this, the depth of a front operation must be sharply increased, and this will be its new identifying characteristic. It should be noted that the calculated depth of a front operation since the last war has grown repeatedly. In the postwar

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years it was 300 to 400 kilometers, with the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons it was 500 to 600 kilometers, and at the present time it reaches 1,000 kilometers and more.

It seems to us that the depth of a front operation, as well as the width of its offensive zone, must be defined on the basis of the role of the front in routing the enemy. Taking the above statements into account, we consider that the depth of a modern front operation must reach 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers. All enemy nuclear/missile weapons designated for combat in a given axis will be distributed within the boundaries of this area. The width of the front zone will also grow to 500 to 700 kilometers and more.

Thus, the front operation of the future must become an actual deep operation which meets the modern requirements for the simultaneous destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons throughout the depth of a given theater of military operations.

In the operations of past wars, simultaneous fire effect against the entire depth of the enemy's defense could not be realized because of the lack of sufficiently powerful and long-range weapons of neutralization (with the exception, of course, of aviation) and in practice did not exert a decisive influence on the outcome of an operation. Nuclear/missile weapons permit accomplishment of the simultaneous neutralization of the enemy at a depth of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, and the full motorization and mechanization of the armies and the mass use of airborne troops ensures the swift transfer of operations to the operational depth where the enemy's basic weapons of nuclear attack will be located. In connection with this, modern front operations will be distinguished mainly by the delivery of massive nuclear/missile strikes on the enemy's nuclear weapons and other important objectives and by the quick exploitation of the results of these strikes by ground and airborne landing troops.

An essential modification will occur, in particular, in the operations of the ground troops. Full motorization and mechanization

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of ground troops, it would seem, facilitates swift operations for the purpose of the most rapid penetration into the enemy's operational depth, of exploiting the results of the nuclear/missile strikes delivered against him, and of completing his rout. However, the possible speed of advance of large units of ground troops and the rate of the offensive (100 kilometers and more per 24-hour period) still will not guarantee the immediate gaining of nuclear and other targets of operational significance or their destruction.

Even the maximum speeds of a modern operation allow an enemy to reorganize to a certain degree, to transfer the surviving nuclear weapons to other regions, to bring up new forces from the zone of interior, and to organize resistance to the attacking troops. Therefore, we must look for something else, namely, for the operations of troops with significantly greater speed than that which ground troops have.

During the Civil War and the Second World War the assignment and skillful use of the mobile arm of troops as an independent operational category yielded great advantage, and there are no grounds to consider that in modern warfare this principle will not be accepted.

The conduct of deep operations and the transfer of vigorous operations to a significant operational depth of the enemy's formation in short periods of time will be more essential now than in past wars. Therefore, the significance of the mobile arm of troops not only does not decrease, but even increases.

The mobility of troops must be such that they can get to regions where the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons are located literally just a few hours after the delivery of our nuclear strikes and before the enemy succeeds in re-establishing his own combat effectiveness and in eliminating consequences of these strikes.

This can be achieved only by airborne landing troops, as well as motorized rifle units and large units, transferred to the

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enemy's operational depth by air transport. However, one must speak not of the dropping or landing of separate operational airborne landing forces into the enemy's deep rear area, but of the massive use in the operation of airborne and motorized rifle troops as a mobile arm of the troops.

Reviewing the fundamental scheme of an operation in modern warfare (Diagram 2), I should like to draw the reader's attention to the question of the principle of the main strike and its role in a modern operation. We examined this problem in detail in an article published in the first issue of the Special Collection in 1960. Under modern conditions, to attach the operations of the basic forces of the front and primarily of nuclear/missile weapons to a specific axis, even a very important one for the operations of ground troops in the front zone, is completely incorrect. The concentration of forces and weapons on a specific axis in an operation can no longer be a definite operational principle and must be replaced by the principle of concentration of the basic efforts of a front on the destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons and the basic groupings of his ground troops. In this, the ground troops of a front will function not as large groupings and not on a solid front, but on several axes as separate large units and even as units, while carrying out a broad maneuver during the operation.

As an example, I should like to note the decision taken by the commander of the southern side in an operational exercise in 1960. One of the most important characteristics of this decision, in our view, is that in it several new means of conducting an operation under conditions of the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons were shown. The need to create cumbersome groupings of ground troops which are a good target for the enemy's nuclear attacks is precluded by the solution in the operation.

Such will be, in our opinion, the basic characteristics of an offensive operation of a front in a future war which also must determine the outlines of the fundamental scheme of this operation.

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The diagram presented reflects these characteristics and can be looked upon as typical for a front offensive operation.

This diagram shows that the primary weapon for routing the enemy in an operation is nuclear/missile weapons and not ground troops and that divisions of ground troops and airborne troops are used only for purposes of completing the enemy's destruction.

The operation begins with a powerful nuclear strike on the nuclear/missile weapons and the basic groupings of ground and airborne troops, the aviation and the navy of the enemy. Simultaneously with this strike or immediately thereafter the troops of the first operational echelon shift to the offensive, and an airborne landing operation is carried out. Graphically the destruction of nuclear weapons and the defeat of the enemy's troops by the nuclear weapons of a front are indicated on the diagram by areas of complete neutralization and by zones with high levels of radiation.

The basic groups of missile troops and the fundamental apportionment of missions among them are reflected on the diagram. The use of medium range missiles with a firing range of up to 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers, which are designated for the destruction of the troops of a group of the enemy's armies and nuclear/missile weapons within the limits of this range, must be closely coordinated with the operations of the first operational echelon of the ground troops and airborne troops which have been thrown into the immediate operational depth. The use of long range missiles with a firing range of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometers must be coordinated with the execution of basic airborne landing operations in the operational depth of disposition of the enemy's troops. It is possible that the number of classes and groups of nuclear/missile weapons can also be different if this depends on considerations of an economic or technical nature. From an operational viewpoint, however, it is sufficient to have missiles of the indicated classes as the weapons of a front.

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The most important principle of a deep operation is expressed on the diagram as the simultaneous neutralization by nuclear weapons of all of the most important targets and primarily of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction, his ground and airborne troops, and his aviation in the entire depth of their possible disposition to the borders of the continent, in conjunction with the offensive of the first echelon of ground troops and with the operations of powerful airborne forces in the deep operational rear area of the enemy.

The ground troops have been represented as two echelons. The first operational echelon consists of two armies consisting in all of 12 to 15 divisions and designated for completion of the rout of the troops of the enemy's group of armies. The second operational echelon consists of one army with 7 or 8 divisions, whose mission is not to develop success in the operation, as was done formerly, but defense of the operational rear area of the front and combat with the operational airborne landing forces of the enemy during the whole operation. The large units of the second echelon of the front can be utilized in case of the need to augment the efforts of the attacking armies of the first echelon and also as operational landing forces. The divisions which have been operating in the first echelon and have lost their combat effectiveness are removed from combat and are used to fill out the complement of the second echelon.

The airborne landing troops are represented on the diagram as an airborne army consisting of three or four airborne divisions assigned to seize a landing area for the operational landing forces of the front, and also for coordinated operations with the first operational echelon of the ground troops.

On the whole, according to the diagram of an operation, the composition of a front consists of four army commands in all uniting 25 to 30 motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions. As is known, during the last war approximately 30 to 35 and more divisions were included in the composition of a front. Considering that now the front's zone will be increased by two

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or three times, the number of divisions of ground troops and airborne troops in a modern operation will be reduced approximately by three times.

As rough operational calculations show, a front needs approximately 250 to 300 nuclear (including about 50 hydrogen) warheads with an overall yield of 120,000 to 150,000 kilotons to accomplish its missions. Up to 100 missile launching mounts and about 30 to 40 delivery aircraft are needed by the front in order to utilize these warheads. With effective use of this quantity of nuclear/missile weapons, about 25 to 30 missile bases and depots of nuclear warheads, 30 to 40 airfields, 25 to 30 divisions of ground troops, 15 to 20 naval bases, and other objectives can be destroyed.

The forces and weapons of the front will be echeloned to a depth of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers. A depth of distribution of the forces of a front of 200 to 300 kilometers, as was the case in the last war, does not answer the new conditions.

A front control echelon of the existing organization will no longer be able to direct a front operation conducted according to the proposed scheme. The modern field control echelon of a front, besides a headquarters, must have commanders and staffs of the missile, ground, and airborne troops, antiaircraft defense, and aviation. This will correspond to the composition of the front and the particular features of troop operations in the operation.

A front operation, obviously, must be planned by stages. The first stage, for example, might include the neutralization and destruction of the enemy's main forces and weapons. The main content of it must be the repelling of the initial nuclear strike of the enemy and the delivery of the first nuclear/missile strike by forces of the front. The second stage can consist of completing the rout of the enemy's forces and weapons. Its content will be an offensive by ground troops, the execution of

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landing operations, and the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes during the offensive.

In our opinion, this is the way the fundamental scheme of a front offensive operation in a future war must appear.

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


Diagram 1: Fundamental Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation of the Period of the Second World War

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Legend to Diagram 1:

1. Reserves of a group of armies (5 to 10 percent of the forces).
2. Second defense zone and reserves of the armies (10 to 15 percent of the forces of the group of armies).
3. First (main) defense zone (75 to 85 percent of the forces of the group of armies).
4. Army - 10 rifle divisions.
5. 2nd echelon (reserve) of the army.
6. Tank division, tank corps, mechanized corps.
7. Army - 9 rifle divisions. 2nd echelon of the front.
8. Army - 7 rifle divisions.
9. 2nd echelon (reserve) of the army
10. Army - 5 rifle divisions.
11. Reserve of the army rifle division.
12. Rifle division.
13. Mobile group of the front - tank army (tank corps, mechanized corps).
14. Second echelon (reserve) of the front (army rifle corps).
15. Depth of a front operation - 200 to 300 km.
16. Depth of an army operation - 120 to 150 km.
17. Depth of the disposition of troops and rear service elements of the front - 200 km.

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Diagram 2: Fundamental Scheme of a Front Offensive Operation in a Modern War

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Legend to Diagram 2:

1. Airborne landing army - 5 or 6 divisions.
2. Neutral countries.
3. 1 army - 5 to 7 divisions.
4. Medium-range missiles (range 1,000 to 1,500 km).
5. Long-range missiles (range 4,000 to 5,000 km).
6. Echelon of airborne landing troops (airborne landing army- 3 or 4 divisions).
7. Tank division.
8. Tank division.
9. Tank division.
10. 2 army - 5 to 7 divisions. 1st operational echelon of ground troops.
11. 2nd operational echelon of ground troops (defense army of the operational rear area) - 7 or 8 divisions.
12. Depth of echeloning troops of a front - 2,000 to 3,000 km.
13. Depth of the front operation - 2,000 to 3,000 km.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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20 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Support of the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect to Transport", by Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
3 0 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Support of the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect to Transport", by Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov

DATE OF INFO : July 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Support of the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect to Transport", written by Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Third Issue went to press on 10 July 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The article referenced on page 4 was disseminated as [redacted]. The article cited on page 22 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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Support of the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect to Transport

by

Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov

Transportation support is one of the factors that exerts great influence on the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces. Nevertheless, in numerous works devoted to the theory of strategic concentration and deployment, the position and capabilities of transportation are not fully considered. While noting the direct dependence of the success of strategic concentration and deployment on the preparation and work of transportation and realizing the great probability of serious difficulties in carrying out shipments, many analysts do not, in their work, make even a cursory analysis of the conditions of transportation work during the period of threat; and at the beginning and during the course of a war, they do not arrive at any conclusions on the influence of these conditions on the organization of the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces in theaters of military operations and in internal areas of the country.

In this article, the dependence of deployment of the armed forces on the condition and work of transportation and also the basic requirements for preparing the transportation network for the purposes of carrying out shipments for strategic concentration are examined.

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The existing contradictions in individual theoretical problems give rise to the necessity for a preliminary clarification of certain initial positions.

First of all, it should be noted that the term "strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces" in the following text refers to the concentration and deployment not only of operational formations, troop large units, etc., themselves, but also of materiel (for example, munitions and fuel). In accordance with this, shipments of troops and the materiel necessary for their support are also included in the concept of "shipments for strategic concentration".

In speaking of strategic echelons, we mean that the first of these consist of the forces and weapons necessary for achieving the strategic aims of the initial period of a war; it is divided into several (not less than three) operational echelons. The first includes the troops and materiel that are in a full state of readiness for immediate operations, the second is the forces and weapons designated for increasing the efforts of the initial operations with readiness for proceeding to areas of concentration after several days, the third is the forces and weapons to be used only several weeks after the beginning of full mobilization, for the development of the subsequent operations of the initial period of a war.

In certain analyses,[1] three possibilities for the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces are considered. The first is most favorable, when it is executed in advance as the threat of war becomes more intense; the second, when concentration and deployment starts during the threatening period and terminates after the beginning of war; and the third and least favorable, when deployment takes place after the enemy has initiated military operations.

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1. Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhov, "Strategic Concentration and Deployment". Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Number 3, 1960.

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In this article, we shall consider transportation support of the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in the second situation, which is more convenient for analysis and is the most probable.

Many analysts distinguish the following periods in the course of the rise and development of military operations: the threatening (which may not even exist), the initial, and the subsequent. Certain authors emphasize the necessity for dividing the second of these into two parts: the actual beginning of a war and the subsequent phase of development of military operations during the initial period of a war.[1] This is motivated by the great difference in the composition of each of the phases of the initial period of a war. We share such a point of view and adhere to it in the following discourse.

To determine even approximately the conditions of the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces after the completion of initial operations is extremely difficult. Therefore, the following analysis of the problems of supporting strategic concentration and deployment in respect to transport is limited to the period of threat and the beginning of a nuclear/missile war.

* * *

In numerous analyses, the authors, while not rejecting the possibility of a sudden initiation of war, consider it no less probable that it will be preceded by a certain period of intensification of the immediate threat of war, a period of threat. It is necessary to use this period for increasing the readiness of the armed forces and the rear area of the country to repel the probable enemy attack and for creating conditions for the complete and final destruction of the enemy in a short period of time.

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1. General of the Army A. Gorbatov. "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat". Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Third Issue, 1960.

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In regard to the armed forces, such measures include bringing the forces and weapons of the first operational echelon (first of all--missile troops, armored and PVO troops) up to full combat readiness and making appropriate changes in their operational formation. At the same time, bringing the troops up to full strength, their provision with materiel, the movement of the second operational echelon to areas of concentration and deployment, and the delivery of various supplies to these areas are carried out. Full mobilization and the formation of new troop large units, units, and rear establishments to be included in the composition of the third operational echelon will commence.

At the same time, during the period of threat a transfer of the national economy to satisfy the requirements of an approaching war is accomplished, including partial mobilization of industry and transportation, increasing materiel reserves for the most important industrial enterprises, protection of the population, etc.

All of the enumerated measures are accomplished as secretly as possible, which narrows their scope. The period of time for carrying out these measures is directly dependent on the duration of the period of threat, which can presumably consist of several hours to several calendar days.

For an analysis of the capabilities of transport for supporting the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces, we are arbitrarily assuming an eight-day period of threat. During this time, it will be necessary to carry out a large volume of military (mobilization, for strategic concentration, operational, etc.) and national economic shipments.

The possible timing for commencing the shipment of any troop large unit (unit, establishment) depends on the readiness for this of both the troops and the transportation means. The estimated time for the completion of a shipment is determined by its volume, speed, distance, and the rate of movement on the given route.

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Rail transport is best prepared for carrying out military shipments; 24 hours after the declaration of mobilization it is capable of carrying out very large military shipments while simultaneously continuing its former operations and coping with new national economic shipments. Military shipments of relatively small dimensions can start several hours after the declaration of mobilization.

It should be emphasized that the use of rail transport for shipping connected with the strategic concentration of troops depends primarily on two conditions: the observance of secrecy in these shipments and the magnitude of other shipments being carried out during the very same period. These conditions assume special significance in those instances when troops are shipped for strategic concentration to a foreign section of the theaters of military operations, on railroads with West European gauge. Along with the special difficulty of ensuring the secrecy of shipments, it is necessary to consider that they will be carried out simultaneously with national economic shipments between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. At the present time, the volume of the turnover of rail cars at transshipment areas at the junctions of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges is already so vast that it takes up from 30 to 60 percent of the total traffic capacity of the railway sectors in these areas (Brest, Chop-Mukachevo, Ungeny). In line with the development of industrial communications between the countries of the Socialist Camp, the volume of turnover is steadily increasing. It is not possible to cease these shipments during the period of threat, since this will impede the work of defense industry enterprises and, in addition, it will reveal preparations for war. Therefore, we feel that shipments for strategic concentration during the period of threat must be carried out at comparatively low rates, not exceeding approximately 30 to 35 percent of the traffic capacity of the railroad lines.

Since it requires considerably more time to prepare water transportation means (river and sea) for military shipping than railroads, it is advisable to ship by water transportation (when it is possible to use it) those troop large units and units that require several days to prepare for movement.

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The timing for beginning troop march movements on any vehicular road is dependent on the speed in deploying refueling points on it and the creation of sufficient fuel reserves. In order to support the march movement of a motorized rifle division for 100 km, up to 450 tons of fuel are required, and for a tank division, up to 530 tons. The march movement of troops for long distances requires a well organized fuel supply system. The requirement for secrecy should be considered in determining the route speeds of movement of large units and units on vehicular roads. Observation of this requirement can often necessitate the execution of a march only during the hours of darkness.

Let us consider what is the permissible distance for shipments for strategic concentration executed during the period of threat.

The maximum permissible (calculated) distance of shipments carried out in the course of a definite period of time is determined on the basis of the calculated rate of speed along the given route, the expenditure of time for preparatory loading, unloading, and other work, and also for the march movement of the troops.

The permissible expenditure of time for the movement of an echelon from a loading point to an unloading point (Tdv)[1] is determined by the difference between the duration of the calculated (threatening) period and the expenditure of time for all other work, the march movement, etc., (Tup - ΣT).

The results of the determination of the maximum permissible distance for shipping a troop large unit (unit, establishment) under various conditions are listed in the table.

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1. Headquarters Comment. Probable meaning of Tdv - Time of movement of troops. See table on page 9 for probable meanings of subsequent symbols.

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The expenditure of time for the preparation of troops and shipping means, for a march movement to the loading point, and for the loading of the first echelon (Tpd) is established as within the limits of from 1 to 4 calendar days.

The expenditure of time for the dispatch of all echelons of a large unit or unit being transported from the loading area (To) is assumed to be from 2 to 4 calendar days.

The expenditure of time for the march movement from the moment of the completion of unloading of the last echelon of a large unit up to the completion of its deployment in the appropriate area (Tsr) is assumed to be within the limits of 1 to 2 calendar days.

The route speeds of movement (Vm) are assumed to be within the limits of from 200 to 500 km per calendar day. The higher limit is for favorable conditions of shipment by rail transport and the lower is for difficult conditions of shipment by river transport.

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Table for Permissible Distances for a Shipment

	Expenditure of time in calendar days															
Tpd	1				2				3				4			
To	2	3		4	2	3		4	2	3		4	2	3		4
Tsr	1		2		1		2		1		2		1		2	
ΣT	4	5	6	7	5	6	7	8	6	7	8	9	7	8	9	10
Tup -ΣT	4	3	2	1	3	2	1	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
Vm $\frac{\text{Km}}{\text{calendar days}}$	Permissible distance for a shipment in kilometers															
500	2000	1500	1000	500	1500	1000	500	--	1000	500	--	500	--			
350	1400	1050	700	350	1050	700	350	--	700	350	--	350	--			
200	800	600	400	200	600	400	200	--	400	200	--	200	--			

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1. Headquarters Comment
   Probable meanings of symbols:
   Tpd - Length of time for loading operations
   To - Length of time for dispatch
   Tsr - Length of time for strategic deployment
   Tup - Length of time of period of threat
   Vm - Route speed of movement.

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As can be seen from the table, the maximum permissible distance for a shipment does not exceed 2000 km. This distance can be achieved under conditions when the first echelon is dispatched from the loading area 24 hours after the start of the period of threat, the dispatch of all the echelons takes no more than two calendar days, and the time from the moment of completion of the unloading of the last echelon to the completion of deployment consists of no more than one calendar day with the route speed of movement of the echelons being transported being equal to 500 km per calendar day.

If, however, the total time expended for preparation, loading, dispatch of the echelons, unloading, and march movement consists of 5 to 7 calendar days, with the route speed averaging 350 to 400 km, then with a period of threat of 8 calendar days duration, the maximum permissible distance will be 400 to 1000 km. And since a decrease in the duration of the period of threat is more probable than an increase, it is advisable to consider the permissible distance for shipments to be 400 to 700 km.

Another computation will result in a similar conclusion. As is known, it is envisaged that the build-up of the efforts of the troops of a front during the first offensive operation will be achieved by means of maneuver by the nuclear/missile weapons and the commitment to the operation of the troops arriving from the zone near the front and the internal areas of the country. Let us consider the maximum distance from the border (front line) at which the operational formations and troop large units designated for increasing the efforts of the front during the progress of the operation can be located.

To explain this problem, we shall refer to the example shown on the diagram. The diagram is a graph of the movement of troops on which are indicated the possible time periods for "overtaking" ("nagon") the advancing troops of the front by the troop large units being transported.

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The distance of the disposition areas of the troops of an operational formation (combined arms army) designated for increasing the efforts of a front in an operation is approximately 1000 km. The first offensive operation must be carried out to a depth of about 800 km at a rate of 80 to 100 km per calendar day. The duration of the period of threat (calculated) is 8 calendar days. The duration of the operation is 10 calendar days.

The volume of shipment of an operational formation on available railways (West European gauge) consists of 360 troop trains (eshelon). The first troop trains can be dispatched on each of the railroad lines one calendar day after the start of the period of threat. The possible rate of shipment of an army during the period of threat is 30 trains (echelons) per calendar day, and at the beginning of the operation 60 troop trains. The possible route speed of movement of the troop trains during the period of threat is 500 km per calendar day, and 300 km per calendar day at the beginning of an operation, in view of disruptions of the work of the railroads. With this average route speed, troop large units can execute march movements following the advancing troops of a front. Reconstruction of railroads is carried out at a rate of 50 km per calendar day along each of the lines being reconstructed to the extent that the troops of the front move forward in an operation. Echelons of tanks and so far as possible other large units are dispatched to the forward unloading areas as they arrive. The march movements of troops are supported with everything necessary.


Thus, we create sufficiently favorable conditions for the execution of rail shipments and march movements of troops during the period of threat and during the course of the first operation. But even in this (see graph, diagram 2) during the period of threat, before the beginning of the operation, no more than 150 echelons will be able to reach the unloading areas, and the remaining echelons will arrive during the course of the operation and after unloading will proceed to "overtake" the advancing front troops by executing a march movement over long distances. The last echelons of the incoming large units will be able to "overtake" the advancing troops only on the ninth day of the operation.

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Graphic plan for shipment of a combined arms army in the threatening period and after the beginning of war

Conventional Signs

- Line of reconstruction of railways
- Lines of movement of rifle and tank troops
- Unloading areas on reconstructed sectors of railways

Key

1. Rate of shipments: 60 echelons per calendar day, speed 300 km per calendar day.
2. Dispatch by rail: rate 30 echelons per calendar day, speed 500 km per calendar day.
3. The preparation of troops and transport means for shipment.

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Thus, even under favorable conditions, it will be possible to use only part of the troops that make up the complement of the combined arms army for increasing the efforts of a front in the first operation. The other part, consisting of no less than 50 percent of the troops, as may be seen from the graph, cannot be used for this in view of the great expenditure of time for their transfer from areas of initial disposition.

One should not count on the possibility of decreasing the expenditure of time by means of a still greater increase of the rates and route speeds for shipments and march movements of troops since there are no sufficient bases for this. Consequently, it is possible to decrease the time for movement and shipment only by means of bringing the initial disposition areas of the troops closer to the border (front line).

In order to commit the troops of a combined arms army to an operation on the third or fourth day, it is necessary to execute parallel troop march movements along with and at the same rate as rail shipments during the period of threat, and to have the troop disposition areas at a distance of 600 km from the border.

The calculated distance for the delivery of technical equipment by rail, motor vehicle, and water transport during a period of threat of 6 to 8 calendar days' duration is determined within approximately these same limits of 400 to 700 km.

Consequently, if prior to the beginning of war we will have a period of threat of the duration assumed by us, then during the course of this period the shipment of troops for strategic concentration can be carried out only on a small scale and at comparatively slow rates; the permissible distance for rail shipments of troops whose concentration and deployment must be completed prior to the expiration of this period will consist of 700 to 500 km (and less). The distance of troop march movements is limited by approximately the same restrictions. It makes sense to include in the number of large units and units being transported only those whose readiness will enable them to begin to move not later than during the first two or three days of the period of threat.

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All of the remaining shipments initiated during the period of threat will be in progress at the moment of the start of military operations. It will be necessary to complete them during the course of the war, under completely different conditions. We shall turn to an analysis of these conditions later.

In certain theoretical works it is proposed to consider the beginning of a war as a special phase of its initial period, after which (in case of lengthy combat) follows another phase which is characterized by a different content. This position is sufficiently valid.

The beginning of a war is distinguished by the highest possible intensity of operations. Each of the sides will be striving to achieve victory in the shortest period of time and will exert the greatest efforts for this. Mutually inflicted strikes will be of maximum power, and their results will be unprecedented devastation. But for this very reason, the period of the actual beginning of combat cannot be lengthy. After several days of a nuclear/missile war, both sides will sustain such great personnel and materiel losses that to continue combat at its previous intensity will be impossible. The resources of even the powers that are strongest economically and which possess a large territory will to some extent be exhausted. It will become intolerable to expend forces and weapons on the previous scale; on the contrary, in continuing combat, it will be necessary to accumulate them as rapidly as possible for delivering powerful new strikes against the enemy. This is the way the next phase of the initial period of a war will ensue: stubborn, fierce, but lengthy combat under sharply changed conditions of the situation.

In the beginning of a war, during its first hours and days, very major changes will occur in the strategic, economic, and political situation in the theaters of military operations and in the rear areas of the coalitions that are taking part in the combat. Can one assume that they will not reflect on the previously prepared plan for the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces? Obviously, such an assumption is not correct. Is it advisable to amend this plan during the first days of a war? In our opinion it is also necessary to give a negative reply to this question.

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The situation at the beginning of a war will be changing so sharply, substantially, and rapidly that it will be extremely difficult immediately to take into account the changes that are occurring, to evaluate them correctly, and to adopt a decision to change the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces. In addition, it is doubtful that this is necessary since during the course of the next days the situation can again change sharply.

Consequently, changes in the plan for strategic concentration and deployment will be unavoidable, but to adopt a final decision on these changes and to proceed to put them into effect will be advisable only after the termination of the actual starting phase of the war and the advent of the next phase of its initial period which will have different characteristics.

If one agrees with this conclusion, still another question arises: should troop movements be continued in the first days of a war according to the previous plan or is it advisable to suspend these until necessary modifications have been incorporated in the plan? We feel that a general suspension of the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces is unlikely at the beginning of a war. Such a measure is completely possible, however, on certain axes, or in certain areas, under especially complex conditions.

The success of strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces under any conditions depends, to a large degree, on the condition and capabilities of transportation; but this dependence is especially intensified at the beginning of a war.

The beginning of a war immediately exerts the strongest influence on the condition and use of the transportation network in theaters of military operations and in the internal areas of the country.

Nuclear/missile strikes on major administrative, industrial, and power centers and on strategically important areas will bring about destruction of transportation centers and the annihilation of transportation installations and structures, shipping means, and reserves of fuel and materiel.

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Individual, most important elements of the rail network (developed centers, transshipment areas at junctions of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges, large seaports, sectors of locks on river ways, and major man-made structures outside cities) may, in some cases, also be independent objectives for strikes. The enemy will also execute attacks on relatively small objectives on the territories of the fronts: stations and wharves, highways, airfields, etc., Through traffic on rail lines, main highways, and canals will be interrupted at many points, often for a long time. A number of sectors of the transportation network will be contaminated. Frequent and sharp changes in the condition on the network, disruption of communications and coordination between transport and other organs of control will strongly complicate the control of shipping. Thus, from the very first hours of war, the working conditions of the network will become very complex and difficult.

But, simultaneously with the rise of difficulties in the working of the transportation network and the significant curtailment of its shipping capability, demands for shipments will also be curtailed with the beginning of a war.

In the first days of a war, when entire areas in the theaters of military operations and in the rear of the country will be subjected to massed nuclear strikes, mass economic, local, and intercity passenger travel will be significantly curtailed. It is highly probable that during these days it will be advisable to curtail the sizes of mass military shipments also, both of personnel and of goods, in order to avoid increased losses.

The volume of shipments executed in the first days of a war must be strictly limited. Major shipments at high speeds must not be planned. This leads to an accumulation of personnel, equipment, and goods at the approaches to destroyed centers, man-made structures, and in areas of the junctions of various types of transportation.

Along with a strict limitation of the volume of shipments, their distance should also be limited. We believe that

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shipments by land and water transport in the first days of a war can best be carried out at distances of 600 to 800 km.

In organizing shipments, it is unthinkable to count on filling to a high degree the traffic and hauling capacity of the routes of communication. In order to ensure the flow of shipping and also to accomplish urgent unanticipated shipments, it is absolutely necessary to have reserves of transportation means.

Thus, it may be concluded that in the period of threat, as well as in the first days of a war, shipments for the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces can be accomplished in relatively small volumes, at low speeds, and at distances not exceeding 600 to a maximum of 800 km.

Obviously, all this will exert an influence on the organization of the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces which, in our opinion, comes to the following.

1. In the period of threat, and even more in the first days of a war, it will be possible to accomplish shipments for strategic concentration and march movements of troops only at a small fraction of their overall volume and for relatively short distances.

2. In peacetime, the actual capabilities for accomplishing shipments and march movements of troops must be taken into account in determining the disposition of forces and weapons in the probable theaters of military operations.

3. Transportation capabilities must be strictly considered in determining permissible distances between the operational echelons of the strategic formation of the armed forces, between the areas of disposition, loading, unloading, concentration and deployment of troops and reserves of materiel in accordance with the plan for conducting initial operations.

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With the shift of military operations into the next phase of the initial period of a war, strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces will continue, but then according to a plan which has been altered in one way or another to accord with the new conditions.

Success in the further conduct of a war will depend to a significant degree on the periods of time needed to ready our forces for active and decisive operations; tremendous influence on this will be exerted by the degree to which transportation has been prepared for work in wartime.

Advanced preparation of transportation for war, primarily for supporting strategic concentration and deployment, assumes especially great importance today. The preparation of transport should ensure the viability of the entire transportation network and the continuity of shipping; a shipping capability sufficient to accomplish previously planned military and economic shipments at the beginning of a war, with the retention of considerable reserves for the regulation of planned, and the execution of unplanned, shipments; a capability for the rapid movement of flows of shipments and of transportation reserves; the constant readiness of transportation for working under the conditions of a war which has begun.

The following are the basic measures directed at fulfilling these requirements: organization of the comprehensive use of all modern types of transportation for military purposes, an increase in the operational efficiency of the control of their joint work; prior development of the transportation network, ensuring this by special means for preserving the continuity of shipping and the rapid elimination of disruptions in traffic; protection of the network from contamination by radioactive and toxic substances.

The necessity for the comprehensive use of all types of transportation for carrying out shipments in wartime and the organization of their preparation and joint work according to a unified plan and under unified direction has now been generally recognized. However, in the proposed solutions to individual problems in this organization, considerable diversity of opinion is encountered.

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Certain analysts, in appraising the possibilities for using various types of transportation in a nuclear/missile war, believe that rail transportation is poorly suited for work in wartime in view of the great probability of lengthy interruptions of through traffic at many points of the railway network, and that water transportation can be used only on certain axes. To this, they add that on sea and river channels and river sectors with locks, still longer interruptions of through traffic will arise than on railroads. From this, it is concluded that the basic shipping work in ground theaters of military operations and in the zone of interior must be accomplished by motor vehicle and air transportation.[1]

We consider such a conclusion to be incorrect. It is known that at the present time in our country, and in the overwhelming majority of the other countries of the Socialist Camp, rail transportation carries the greatest proportion of the overall freight turnover. It will play a leading role in the future also. According to the plan for the development of our transportation network in 1965, the specific proportion of rail transportation in the overall freight turnover will be 71.3 percent; sea, 10.5 percent; river, 5.1 percent; motor vehicle, 6.2 percent; pipeline, 6.8 percent; and air, 0.07 percent. Consequently, to shift the largest part of the shipping work to vehicular and air transportation in wartime will be simply impossible in view of their insufficient capacity for this.

In addition, on main vehicular highways and other important vehicular roads, the destruction of transportation centers, major bridges, etc., will also cause interruptions of through traffic. It will be necessary to conduct traffic along by-passes, to establish temporary passages and river crossings to overcome contaminated sectors of routes. All this will decrease the traffic-carrying capacity of vehicular roads and will increase the expenditure of vehicular transportation in carrying out shipping work.

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1. "Modern War", General Staff Academy (Akademiya GSh), Moscow, 1960, p. 71.

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The rise of lengthy interruptions of traffic at many points on the rail network does not at all mean that the undamaged sectors of the network remaining between these points cannot be used for shipping. On the contrary, it is completely possible to retain the working capacity of these sectors. The same also applies to sectors of interior water routes. Of course, destruction of centers, ports, major man-made structures, and the liquidation of part of the shipping means will lead to a significant lowering of the traffic and hauling capacity of railways and river routes. But, with proper preparation, they can carry out a considerable share of the shipping work in wartime, especially if it is considered that the required volume of shipping will decrease in comparison with prewar.

In wartime, the work of rail transportation in zones near the front both in theaters of military operations and in internal areas of the country must carry the greatest proportion. Because of this very condition, it is necessary to guarantee the comprehensive use of various types of transportation for military purposes.

A capability for their comprehensive use in wartime should be ensured beforehand both technically and organizationally.

The solution to this problem from the technical standpoint consists of mutual coordination in the development of various types of communications routes and their junctions, shipping means, means of transferring goods from one means of transportation to another and in the coordination of their joint work. Continuity of shipping is ensured by special measures in cases of destruction of transportation centers, power centers, major man-made structures, and other important objectives.

From the organizational standpoint, unified direction of the preparation and working of various types of transportation in wartime has the most important significance. As is known, in view of their specialization, not one transportation ministry or department and not one service of the armed forces can direct the comprehensive use of all types of transportation.

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Therefore, it seems to us that unified direction of the preparation of the transportation network and the use of it on the territory of each front and each district located in zones near the front and in the internal areas of the country should be accomplished by special organs. Obviously, the structure and functions of these organs can be determined only by governmental decisions.

Various solutions to the problem of securing unity of direction in the preparation and employment of the various types of transportation for accomplishing shipping on the territory of the front are proposed.

In certain works the idea is advanced of using for this purpose a control organization very similar to the one used during World War II. In view of the increasing complexity of directing shipments under the conditions of a modern war, it is envisaged to improve this organization by including the transportation department in the rear area staff of a front.

It is considered, however, that this department should direct only the use of various types of transportation, not for all types of shipments but only for transporting materiel and for evacuation.[1] Thus, direction of the preparation of all types of transportation for joint work and also of the execution of all types of shipments according to a unified plan are not included in the functions of the 3rd Department. As a result, neither unity in the preparation of the transportation network of a front as a whole nor unity in its working is ensured. The transportation services of a front will receive instructions on these problems from various control echelons. Obviously, such organization of direction cannot secure the comprehensive use of all the types of transportation of a front.

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1. "The Rear Area in Modern Operations," Rear Services Staff of Moscow District, Moscow, 1959, p. 293.

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Other authors consider that the 3rd Department of the rear area staff of a front is, by its very position, unable to resolve the practical problems of planning and coordinating the work of all the types of transportation of a front. Instead of this department, they propose the creation in a front of a unified transportation service (directorate) provided with the necessary authority for organizing the centralized use of all the types of transportation subordinate to the front and with appropriate powers for coordinating problems of military shipping with the necessary ministries and departments. To secure direction of military shipping, it is proposed to work out schedules and plans for shipping which are coordinated among the various types of transportation and to create a unified dispatcher control over shipments.[1] The given version of the organization of centralized direction of all types of transportation in a front, first of all, also does not provide a solution to the problems of preparation of the transportation network. Secondly, such a directorate is very unwieldy and inefficient: it will fetter the operations of the transportation services. Thirdly, the authors of the proposals do not indicate the subordination of the transportation directorate of a front, while the solution to this problem has considerable significance.

A third version of the organization of unified direction of the various types of transportation is proposed. The overall direction of the preparation and use of all types of transportation is centralized directly in the hands of the deputy to the commander of troops of the front for the rear area with the chiefs of the military transportation services directly subordinate to him. It is considered that the chief of the rear area of the front must be in charge of all types of shipments (including operational) and also of the march movements of troops along the military vehicular roads of the front.

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1. Lieutenant-General I. Kovalev, Major-General P. Bakarev, Colonel K. Pavlovich. "Problems of Transportation in a Modern War," Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 1960, Third Issue.

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It is proposed to accomplish the organization and control of mutual coordination of the preparation of the various types of transportation and their comprehensive use for supporting operations in the transportation directorate of the rear area staff of the front. Thus, unity of overall direction of the preparation and use of all types of transportation coincides with the known independence of each of the services, which are specialized according to types of transportation.[1]

One can agree with such a version of the organization; however, in our opinion, the transportation directorate should not be directly subordinated to the chief of the rear area staff of a front. It is known that up to the present time, the organization of military shipments of various types (for example, operational and supply) is charged to various organs (the staff of a front, the rear area staff of a front). In this situation, it is advisable to have the transportation directorate immediately subordinate to the commander of troops of the front. This guarantees unity of direction of the preparation of the transportation network of the front for the support of operations and its use for carrying out all types of military shipping.

New means of action against the transportation network give rise to the necessity for changes in the methods and means of ensuring the continuity of shipping.

In a modern war, a wider dispersal of shipping is required — i.e, dispersal of communications routes, of various technical installations, and of shipping means.

Parallel communications routes of various types should be dispersed so that in cases of lengthy interruptions of traffic on one of them, continuity of traffic on the others is preserved. Along with this, it is necessary to ensure a capability for transferring flows of shipments from a route put out of commission to those still operative.

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1. Works of the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation, No. 43, 1959, p. 184.

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In order to prevent lengthy interruptions of through traffic of trains and motor convoys resulting from the destruction of major cities (and corresponding transportation centers), railway and vehicular bypasses should be prepared in advance at a sufficient distance from these cities. Moreover, provision must be made without fail for the use of these for national economic shipments in peacetime which will enable us to avoid immobilizing capital investments. It is also necessary to prepare in advance rail and vehicular road approaches to places at which temporary bridges and crossings over major river barriers are constructed in case permanent bridge crossings are destroyed.

In the period of threat, and even more at the beginning of a war, the greater amount of loading and unloading work, the preparation of shipping means, support of transported troops, etc., must be taken beyond the limits of transportation centers in the shortest period of time. For this, it is necessary to prepare in advance appropriate stations, wharves, and airfields at their approaches and to provide support for them with forces and means.

In order to have a capability of using for shipping undamaged sectors of railways and internal water routes bordering on destroyed installations, it is necessary constantly to maintain an undiminished quantity of rolling stock, fuel, and materiel at these sectors in wartime.

At the beginning of a war, in order to effect reconstruction and construction work on routes of communications, powerful, highly productive means, capable of accomplishing these tasks under conditions of mass destruction and in contaminated areas will be required immediately.

The primary efforts of reconstruction personnel, especially in zones near the front and in the rear area of the country, are required in order to concentrate on overcoming large "barriers" which obstruct transportation traffic. The main task in this will consist of restoring communications between the sectors of the network bordering on "barriers". This task can be accomplished most successfully by the comprehensive use of

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the reconstruction, construction, operational, and shipping resources of rail, vehicular, pipeline, water, and air transportation for overcoming obstructed areas. All work in the reconstruction, development, putting into operation and use of the transportation network in each area should be accomplished according to a unified plan and be continually coordinated.

A very important role in overcoming "barriers" can be played by special means of transporting railroad cars: trailers with a large load-carrying capacity (up to 100 tons), special ferries, ferries made from barges and pontoons with rails laid on them for carrying cars across large rivers when bridges have been destroyed, helicopters with a large load-carrying capacity, etc.

The existence of such means permits a sharp reduction in the volume of work in preparing temporary shipment areas, the avoidance of duplicate shipments, and a significant increase in the speed of restoring communications between railway sectors bordering a destroyed installation.

It is obvious that the preparation of transportation for war and specifically for supporting the strategic concentration and deployment of troops has now become much more complex than before and has acquired new peculiarities. Among the most important of these are the following:

1. In the initial period of a modern war, as in other periods, shipments for strategic concentration and deployment can be accomplished only by the combined use of various transportation means. Therefore, close mutual cooperation and continuous coordination of their preparation for working jointly in wartime has become absolutely mandatory. One of the most important conditions for success in preparing and using the transportation network for military purposes is the organization of unified operational direction of the work of all types of transportation on the territory of each front, district near the front, and internal area of the country.

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2. Paramount significance is acquired by the maintenance at the beginning and during the course of a war of the viability and working capability of the network and continuity of shipments in theaters of military operations and in the rear area of the country. In the prior development of the transportation network for military purposes, it has become essential first of all to ensure a capability for wide dispersal of shipments, for carrying out freight and other work from transportation centers, for the rapid transfer of a flow of shipments from one type of transport to others, and for the restoration in short periods of time of communications between sectors of the network bordering on destroyed installations.

3. The role of special (reconstruction, construction, shipping) means of overcoming major "barriers" bordering on communications routes in the very first hours of war as a result of nuclear strikes has sharply increased. The creation of such powerful and highly mobile means during the advanced preparation of the transportation network is now much more logical than prior development of installations within centers, increasing the number of permanent bridge crossings over major rivers, etc.

This means that in solving the problems of strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces, it is absolutely essential to consider new indices of preparedness of the transportation network for work during the initial period of a war, the actual possibilities for the combined use of all types of transport, the maintenance of the necessary working capacity and mobility of the transportation network, and the continuity of shipping. Only on the basis of an analysis of these data can one make a correct estimate to provide for strategic concentration and deployment from the standpoint of transportation and derive from this estimate wholly valid conclusions.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: 1961 Fourth Issue Table of Contents

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of editorial notes and the Table of Contents of the 1961 Fourth Issue of the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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30 JUN 1992

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cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
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National Indications Center

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

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Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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Table of Contents

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From the Editorial Board

The articles of the Special Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" are published as a discussion and express only the opinions of the authors on the problems dealt with.

All articles for the Special Collection and also inquiries on its publication, replies to published materials, and remarks about them should be directed to the chief editor of the journal "Military Thought" with adherence to the regulations established for transmitting secret materials.

The present issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" is distributed to the commanders of armies and higher according to a special list.

Lieutenant-General N.A. Radetskiy,

Chief Editor

The Collection contains 128 pages and includes two inserts (between pages 46 and 47 and 52 and 53).

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Fourth Issue 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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15 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "On the Problem of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishing Them", by Admiral V. Kasatonov

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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cc: Military Representative of the President

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The Director of Intelligence and Research,
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The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
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DATE OF INFO : October 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "On the Problem of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishing Them", written by Admiral V. Kasatonov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

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On the Problem of the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishing Them

by

Admiral V. Kasatonov

In Admiral V. Platonov's article "On the Tasks of the Navy and Methods for Accomplishing Them,"* he cited several important propositions about naval operations in a future war. In our opinion, however, several of them are debatable, and in connection with this we want to set forth our opinion of them.

In examining the task of destroying carrier strike large units, the author expressed doubt that their combat activities would be carried out mainly on the open sea. We think there is no basis for such a doubt.

In the opinion of Western military specialists, besides the large units of fire of nuclear warheads (more than 100 nuclear bombs on each aircraft carrier), the strength of carrier strike large units is precisely their great maneuverability and their ability to deliver strikes with nuclear weapons on a broad front. It is precisely for this reason that they consider carrier strike large units a more reliable and stable means of combat in comparison with shore-based aircraft and ground missile units.

It is not without reason that the NATO command thinks that ground airfields and areas of missile launch sites can be reconnoitered even before the beginning of combat operations and subjected to powerful strikes by nuclear missiles in the initial hours and minutes of a war. Carrier strike large units, however, are capable of performing a maneuver of 1000 km in one calendar day in any direction and are less vulnerable. For the present they cannot be destroyed by missile strikes from the shore, and the reconnaissance of carrier strike large units on the sea and the directing of submarines and aircraft against them is a very complicated task.

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* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Issue Two, 1961.

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The experience of numerous exercises of the carrier strike fleets of the USA and the NATO joint naval forces proves that the basic method of operations of carrier strike large units is their delivery of strikes from areas on the open sea. In particular, at the maneuvers of the NATO joint armed forces which were held in autumn of 1960, aircraft carriers participating in the general nuclear attack delivered their strikes against very important objectives of the "enemy" from a distance of up to 2000 km in a zone with a front of up to 1700 km. Here the carrier strike groups constantly maneuvered within the bounds of the Norwegian Sea and combined the maneuver with measures of radio silence in the networks of long-range radio communication. The American 6th Fleet operated in a similar way in the Mediterranean Sea.

It is possible for the carrier strike large units to put in to shore waters, particularly into shore bases, only in particular cases. Usually the carrier strike groups put in to render direct support to ground troops, particularly to put ashore an amphibious landing force. For example, that was the reason why the strike aircraft carriers entered the Aegean Sea in the final stages of the concluding maneuvers of the NATO joint armed forces (OVS) in 1957 and 1960.

It should be borne in mind that by operating in shore waters with fiords, all other enemy ships can be camouflaged successfully against the background of islands or the shore, but aircraft carriers will be exposed when their aircraft take off. Besides that, they can be detected by intelligence agents. As an example of this, one can cite the constant surveillance conducted by our and the British intelligence during the past war of the large German ships in the Norwegian fiords. Under modern conditions, after having been discovered in areas which are too small for maneuvering, aircraft carriers can be destroyed with great accuracy by nuclear strikes from missile troops. It is clear that the enemy will try as far as possible to avoid such areas.

One cannot quite understand the author's idea that in remote areas of the ocean, "carrier strike large units can function only as cover forces for convoys or within

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the complement of hunter-killer groups of the antisubmarine defense" (Page 3). As is well known, the carrier strike large units, like the fleet strike force, are intended not to cover convoys but to deliver strikes against important military, industrial, and administrative installations and against ports and naval bases. They are also capable of delivering strikes against ships and vessels on the sea. From whom can carrier strike large units conceal convoys in remote areas of the ocean? It is obvious that such a task could be given the carrier strike large units only if the probable enemy could expect attacks against his convoys from large surface vessels, for example, from aircraft carriers. Because the probable enemy does not expect such operations from us, one can suppose that he will not charge the carrier strike large units with such tasks.

Covering convoys and carrier strike large units from submarine strikes is carried out by carrier hunter-killer groups which are especially assigned for this purpose, and at the basis of these groups are not strike aircraft carriers but aircraft carriers of the antisubmarine defense.

By using the carrier hunter-killer groups, the enemy, as was correctly noted by Admiral V. Platonov, of course will strive to clear our submarines from the areas where carrier strike large units are maneuvering. However, one must not overestimate his capabilities for accomplishing this task. The areas where the carrier strike large units are maneuvering are quite large and occupy hundreds of thousands of square kilometers. Moreover, one must inspect not only the areas of combat maneuvering but also the areas where the strike fleet is formed, where ships are refueled, waiting areas for servicing, and areas with the routes of the carrier strike large units and other operational groups of the strike fleet. Even the successive execution of preliminary searches in these areas to clear them of submarines would require bringing in tens of carrier hunter-killer groups of the antisubmarine defense, and this exceeds the bounds of the real capabilities of the probable enemy, particularly if one considers that such operations must be carried out simultaneously in several zones of the world ocean.

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For reliable, direct protection of carrier strike large units and convoys operating in antiatomic combat formations, one also must have a large number of antisubmarine forces and weapons.

Despite the fact that our probable enemies have at their disposal a developed shipbuilding industry, their capabilities for building the needed number of ships and planes of the antisubmarine defense to fight our submarines are not limitless. These capabilities can be limited even more as a result of strikes by missile troops and by missile submarines against the centers of the shipbuilding industry and the bases of the enemy's antisubmarine forces.

We are completely aware that the operations of diesel-electric submarines, particularly against carrier strike large units and fast, strongly protected convoys, will be conducted with great difficulties. However, even these submarines will be able to operate successfully against less fast-moving targets.

The operations of atomic submarines will undoubtedly be more effective. The great maneuvering capabilities and the enormous range of these boats make it possible for them to be used to deliver strikes against carrier strike large units not only in areas of combat maneuvering of the latter and in the approaches to them but also on the lanes used by the carrier strike large units in crossing the ocean and on the approaches to distant bases across the ocean.

Without being inferior in speed to aircraft carriers, and exceeding the speed of the fastest convoys by 1.5 to 2 times, the atomic submarines can attack them from any direction and avoid encounters with the hunter-killer groups of the antisubmarine defense which usually take up positions in forward areas of the movement of the carrier strike large units or the convoy.

The use of atomic torpedoes increases even more the combat capabilities of the submarines. Incidentally, we cannot agree in any way with Admiral V. Platonov in his negative evaluation of atomic torpedoes, much less

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the long range ones (Page 9.). The advantages of atomic torpedoes are obvious. Thus, to destroy a ship of any class, it is sufficient to strike it with one atomic torpedo within a semicircle with a radius equal to the radius of destruction of the given target. We note that to destroy any ship such as a strike aircraft carrier, we must hit it with no less than 8 to 10 torpedoes with conventional filling. As a result of the fact that to destroy a ship with an atomic torpedo, it is sufficient not to guarantee striking the ship directly but in a semicircle with a sizable radius, the probability of destroying the target with this torpedo increases greatly and in several instances approaches one.

Finally, one must keep in mind that in using torpedoes with conventional charges, because of their small radius of destruction, the firing is usually done by four-torpedo salvos, but in using atomic torpedoes the firing is done with single torpedoes. Therefore, if a submarine replaces conventional torpedoes with atomic ones, then with the use of the same number of torpedoes, the number of possible effective attacks increases by four times, i.e., the self-sufficiency of a submarine in ammunition increases by four times.

Considering the great self-sufficiency of carrier strike large units, which is reinforced by the mobile system for supplying and servicing them on the sea, the basic efforts by our Navy must be directed at fighting them on the open sea and ocean; at the approaches to probable areas of combat operations, directly in those areas, and also on the ocean lanes used by the carrier strike large units from remote rear bases and at exits from those bases.

We think that by using and clearly organizing a sufficient amount of forces and means of reconnaissance, the successful operations of our forces -- submarines and aircraft -- can and must be organized against the carrier strike large units on the open sea.

It is also difficult to agree with the author of the article on the evaluation which he gives of the long-range possibilities of atomic aircraft (Page 4). In our opinion,

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the insufficient range at low altitudes and the low self-sufficiency of modern aircraft, even the largest jet aircraft, is a serious hindrance impeding their use in distant areas of the ocean in coordination with submarines. The impossibility of long flights at low altitudes to a considerable degree causes the great vulnerability of modern aircraft to anti-aircraft weapons.

Apparently, aircraft using atomic energy will be able to fly for quite a long time at low altitudes and at any distance from their airfields, and they will be shot down much less frequently by antiaircraft weapons than were their piston and jet predecessors.

According to theory, , the atomic airplane can become an almost invulnerable and quite effective weapon of armed combat on the sea in conducting combat operations against a carrier strike large unit, convoys, and missile-carrying submarines.

One must keep in mind that a missile-carrying aircraft possesses a very valuable feature -- in launching its missiles it itself observes the objective of the strike and directs the missile to the target, i.e., it operates without any intermediate means, and because of this, errors in determining the location of the target by reconnaissance means are excluded, as well as any influence on the accuracy of the firing by the movement of the target during the missile's flight.

We basically agree with the opinion of Admiral V. Platonov about the degree of threat from enemy missile-carrying submarines and on the ways of combating them at the modern stage of the development of our antisubmarine defense forces and weapons. It is true that at the present time the real strength in the fight against missile-carrying submarines can be fast submarines of the anti-submarine defense which are specially equipped to accomplish this task. There is also no doubt about the methods of combat operations of antisubmarine submarines proposed in the article.

However, one cannot completely agree with the author of the article when he says that there is no other way to

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combat missile-carrying submarines. In our opinion, the use of a single weapon (the submarines of the antisubmarine defense) in the struggle against such a formidable enemy as missile-carrying submarines is an emergency measure caused by the status and capabilities of the antisubmarine forces and weapons at the given moment.

Although possessing several indisputable advantages in comparison with other forces of the antisubmarine defense, the submarines of the antisubmarine defense also have their shortcomings. The chief shortcoming is that even with the sharp increase in the range of detection of submarines by hydroacoustic means of surveillance, detailing submarines of the antisubmarine defense for the reliable accomplishment of this task must be excessively large and must amount to not tens but hundreds of atomic submarines. This, obviously, cannot be guaranteed for a comparatively long time. Moreover, having predominance in the world ocean in surface and air forces, the probable enemy can use, in his fight against our submarines, besides his own submarines of the antisubmarine defense, surface ships, dirigibles, and aircraft of the antisubmarine defense from land bases and from aircraft carriers. This will place our submarines of the antisubmarine defense in an unequal position with the enemy submarines, and this even further decreases the reliability of accomplishing the task of combating them.

On the basis of these considerations, it is extremely desirable to bring in other forces besides the submarines of the antisubmarine defense for the struggle against missile-carrying submarines. These should be forces which would be able as much as possible to compensate for the shortcomings inherent in antisubmarine submarines.

In this plan we do not share the very pessimistic evaluation expressed by Admiral V. Platonov regarding naval aviation. It is obvious that, provided the means of detecting submarines by aircraft are improved, and the flight range of aircraft at low altitudes is increased, aircraft will be able to increase the effectiveness of the struggle against missile-carrying submarines in coordination with submarines of the antisubmarine defense.

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Apparently, the new possibilities in accomplishing this important task may take into account orbital means of combat which are based on the use of artificial earth satellites.

In our opinion, the essence of the problem is to create effective means for the distant detection of submarines from the air which will make it possible to employ for their destruction the most effective modern means of destruction -- missiles with nuclear charges launched from submarines or aircraft and possibly also from shore launching mounts.

It would be incorrect to rule out the possibility of creating other means of detection. Considering the great seriousness of the threat of missile-carrying submarines for our country and the other countries of the Socialist Camp in the event a war breaks out, we must set such a task before Soviet scientists.

Thus, as the bases for accomplishing the task of combating missile-carrying submarines, we must place not just one means of combat, but a set of means, the main ones of which are submarines, aircraft, and possibly, orbital means of combat.

In examining the task of combating enemy ocean transportation, the author of the article maintains that under modern conditions the need arises to choose, as the main objective for strikes by our forces, not transports, but aircraft carriers (Page 8). We cannot agree with that statement. In our opinion, it is caused by an obvious overestimation of the capabilities of our probable enemy to cover and defend his convoys. For this purpose the enemy may use aircraft carriers only within the complement of carrier hunter-killer groups or for direct safeguarding to protect only a relatively small number of the most valuable convoys. A considerable number of convoys and transports will follow the ocean lanes without cover by aircraft carriers. (We have already mentioned that carrier strike large units have a very small bearing on the direct protection of convoys.)

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Moreover, it is quite difficult to guarantee the selective destruction of aircraft carriers among all the ships and transports of a convoy, even from a purely tactical viewpoint. It is obvious that submarines armed with torpedoes will launch their torpedoes against the nearest large ship or transport during an attack, and strikes by missiles with nuclear warheads from submarines and aircraft must be delivered against the main body of the convoy, i.e., against the transports, calculating on destroying as many of them as possible. Any other solution of the task is scarcely admissible.

Of course, when one has the opportunity to choose between attacking either a transport or an aircraft carrier, preference should be given to the latter. However, in principle, the main objectives for strikes by naval forces in combat with enemy ocean shipping, just as previously, remain the transports with troops and cargo, and the task of disrupting shipping can be accomplished only by destroying a definite proportion of the enemy's transport tonnage.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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24 MAY 1962

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Classical Military Art and Nuclear/Missile Warfare", by Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

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IRONBARK [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Classical Military Art and Nuclear/Missile Warfare", by Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Classical Military Art and Nuclear/Missile Warfare", written by Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze.

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Classical Military Art and Nuclear/Missile Warfare*

by Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze

The principles of military art which have been in existence for centuries and which have become classical and seemingly unchangeable must undergo basic changes under the conditions of conducting nuclear/missile warfare.

Moreover, among us there has arisen the idea that research directed at studying the nature of a future war and the special features of conducting operations will be done within the framework of the principles of military art which have already been formed and which prevail over military research and limit the extent and resolution of their scholarly and practical conclusions. In all works of theory which have been published, there is no lack of recognition of the significance of nuclear/missile equipment and of its main and decisive role. However, the whole meaning of the all-determining role of nuclear/missile weapons, a role which is recognized in theory, disappears when in practice these weapons are scattered among old arms of troops with the purpose of supporting infantry and tank operations.

That is why we consider it necessary to examine the problem of whether it is possible to put the new theory and practice of nuclear/missile warfare within the framework of classical military art or whether a new military art -- the art of nuclear/missile warfare -- must be created to replace the old one.

At first it should be ascertained whether the most effective use of new weapons can be made if they are in the complement of old arms of troops.

We are excluding this possibility. If motorized rifle and tank troops are given nuclear weapons, then

*The author has in mind that part of nuclear/missile war which is conducted within the framework of front operations, and he calls it field warfare.

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still, because of the limited capabilities of the infantry and tanks, they will not be able to use the powerful combat features of the new weapons.

As can be seen from Figure 1, 3 two-megaton blasts in combination with 8 half-megaton blasts can destroy everything living and for a prolonged period exclude the possibility of troop combat operations over an area where a field army of the USA is located (23,000 km^2).


It is obvious that after conducting such a nuclear strike there is no need at all for operations over the contaminated territory by infantry and tanks. However, according to all existing canons of classical military art, the infantry and tanks should operate under these conditions, because it is they who are called upon to destroy the opposing enemy forces and carry out his final rout according to the principles for waging armed combat which have been developed.

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Equivalent in TNT kilotons	Size and area of the path of the radioactive cloud			Troop elements of the army of the USA (area in km^2)			
	L, Km	l, Km	S, Km^2	Division 20 (10x20)	Corps 2400 (40x60)	Army 23,000 (180x130)	Group of armies 72,000 (360x200)
3	10	1.7	14	15	170	1653	5143
10	18	3.1	45	5	53	511	1600
20	26	4.3	88	3	28	260	818
50	40.8	6.8	222	1	11	104	325
100	57	9.6	438	1	6	53	166
300	98.5	16	1261	1	2	20	57
500	125.4	21	2107	1	1	10	35
1,000	177	30	4248	1	1	5	17
2,000	248	40	8134	1	1	3	8

Figure 1. The number of nuclear bursts needed for the radioactive contamination of ground with a radiation dose of 300 roentgens and a wind speed of 50 kph.

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How can one combine in the same area large nuclear bursts which create high radiation levels with strikes by the infantry and tanks? There is only one solution -- to limit the force of nuclear weapon bursts to levels which would not prohibit operations by our own infantry-tank groupings and at the same time would ensure their advance.

Thus, the classical military art of waging infantry-tank warfare forces us to employ a whole arsenal of small nuclear weapons, starting at one kiloton, and limits the use of large bursts. In connection with this, there arises the need to create large supplies of small nuclear warheads, thousands of which would be needed for an operation, and actually issue 200 to 300 to a front. As a result there arises the completely distorted idea that there is always a shortage of nuclear warheads, whereas correct technical and operational calculations on the use of large bursts show that there is a quite sufficient amount of nuclear weapons at the front to accomplish all the tasks in a true nuclear/missile war.

From Figures 1 and 2 one can see that a field army of the USA can be destroyed by 3 two-megaton and 8 half-megaton bursts or 1,653 three-kiloton and 20 half-megaton or 5,143 three-kiloton bursts.

In this it should be stressed that nuclear bursts of high yield make it possible to destroy troops over an enormous area, and thus eliminate the need to seek out and destroy each individual target. Small nuclear bursts, however, are used to destroy specific targets, and this actually is a return to the practice of fire of tube artillery.

Small nuclear weapons do not ensure the complete destruction of the enemy as a whole, but accomplish only a part of this task and leave the achievement of the ultimate purpose to the infantry-tank grouping, whereas, by using nuclear weapons of large yield, one can completely accomplish the task of destroying the enemy in a very short time.

Consequently, there is no justification for striving, by artificial limitation of the technical capabilities of nuclear weapons, to create conditions for simultaneous operations in the same zone with them and with motorized rifle and tank units and large units.

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It is inadmissible to have the large variety of small nuclear warheads now used in exercises, and their adaptation to the infantry and tanks simultaneously determines the large variety, also, of missile equipment. The correct technical and operational use of powerful nuclear bursts, however, limits the amount and variety of missile equipment and makes it possible to regulate its yields, having created a group of systems which is small in number.

The large amount and variety of nuclear/missile weapons and their adaptation to the old unwieldy system of controlling infantry-tank operations result in the need to create a large number of automated control systems which become completely unnecessary under the correct conduct of nuclear/missile warfare. Indeed, if the number of nuclear/missile weapons of great yield which are being used is not large, and if the functions of control of nuclear/missile weapons and infantry-tank groupings are clearly limited, then there will be very few installations for automating control of the new weapons, because one can control the old arms of troops without high-speed automated devices.

Thus, one can consider that to a large extent, within the framework of classical military art, the combat capabilities of the new equipment are paralyzed; the use of more effective and economic nuclear warheads of great yield is limited; unnecessary and expensive work is done to create an enormous arsenal of missile weapons which are adapted for the mass use of small nuclear warheads; and for all new and old arms of troops (despite the high speed demanded for this) there are being created numerous electronic machines, although there is no need to automate and complicate all the processes of controlling old arms of troops to an identical degree.

All this has a negative effect on carrying out a new military and technical program.

To give scope to the new military equipment and to determine the correct program for working it out and introducing it, one must decisively reject the use of obsolete canons of classical military art which obstruct

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
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Previous (until 1953) (motorized infantry)	Existing (mixed motorized-infantry and nuclear/missile)	Proposed (nuclear/missile)



10 Army
1 Army
1 Motorized Army
3 Army
Airborne forces
5 Army
4 Army
25 Army

6 Army
4 Tank Army
15 Army

Secondary zones with fatal does of radiation
Continuous single larger zone of nuclear destruction

Figure 2. Fundamentals of Military Art

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I and II

1. Each individual target is reconnoitered and destroyed.

2. Cooperation of all arms of troops consists of coordination of troop operations in one zone according to target, place, and time.

3. There is the massing of basic forces and weapons on one or two axes.

4. The system of controlling joint operations of individual arms of troops and weapons for combat is awkward; command posts are unwieldy, have little mobility, and are overloaded with support subunits.

5. There is the presence of millions of ground troops and an enormous amount of varied armaments and equipment within the complement of a front. There are enormous materiel expenditures and complexity in supporting operations.

Conclusions

1. There is no basic difference between former times and now in organizing and conducting troop combat operations and in the procedure and sequence of destroying targets. Despite the existence now of nuclear/missile weapons, everything remains at the level of prenuclear warfare (the only difference is that more powerful ammunition is used). The mechanical unification of the old and new military art has doubly complicated the conditions of conducting an operation, whereas nuclear/missile weapons objectively simplify these conditions.

2. The simultaneous operation of infantry-tank groupings and of nuclear/missile weapons in the same zone paralyzes the technical capabilities of nuclear weapons and gives rise to a shortage of small nuclear warheads.

3. The artificial subordination of nuclear/missile weapons to infantry-tank formations results in maintaining a large number of infantry-tank troops and old weapons of destruction and limits the development of new arms of troops.

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III

1. Groups of targets over a large area (in continuous zones) are reconnoitered and destroyed. Thanks to the use of large nuclear bursts, the possibility of a shortage of nuclear warheads will be eliminated.

2. Coordination consists of the most efficient distribution of the efforts of nuclear/missile and infantry-tank groupings according to zones.

3. A careful demarcation of tasks and the specialization of control of new and old arms of troops sharply reduces the organs of control. To control a nuclear/missile army there must be a single set of high-speed machines. Nuclear/missile strikes which are based on large bursts are simple in their planning and conduct.

4. Ground troops are sharply reduced. To combat a ground enemy one must have both a nuclear/missile and combined-arms army.

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the efficient use of nuclear/missile weapons. Instead of this, one should work out new technical, operational-tactical, and organizational bases for waging nuclear/missile warfare.

First of all, the new equipment itself shows that not every war which envisages the use of nuclear and missile weapons can be called a nuclear/missile war. Thus, if one uses small nuclear bursts for fire support of infantry and tank operations, this will not be a nuclear/missile war but a somewhat modernized infantry-tank-artillery war.

The calculations cited in Figure 1 show that the most effective energy equivalent for a nuclear burst under field conditions is an equivalent within the .5 to 2 megaton range. In our opinion, this indicator should be acknowledged as the technical criterion of a genuine nuclear/missile war. All the other, smaller bursts must be considered of an auxiliary and incidental nature.

The needed yields of large nuclear bursts and their combination will be determined basically by the accepted plan of radiation contamination of large areas and by the conditions of the combat and meteorological situation.

In the event that 3 two-megaton and 8 half-megaton nuclear bursts are used against a field army of the USA, continuous radiation zones will be formed (Figure 2) with deadly radiation levels. This ensures the reliable destruction of enemy personnel and completely excludes the possibility of his maneuvering, because the radiation zones will have the most fantastic shapes, forming an intricate maze.

The procedure for conducting nuclear/missile strikes envisages creating continuous zones of nuclear destruction of personnel over large areas with high radiation levels. The personnel of all arms of troops will not be able to operate on ground with such high radiation levels, and, consequently, even the conventional combat equipment will be useless. Under these conditions, there is no longer the need for additional physical destruction of enemy personnel by other means and arms of troops, just as there

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also is no need for the destruction of the basic part of his combat equipment. Over the enormous areas of the continuous zones of nuclear destruction there is the need primarily to conduct operations of a checking and reconnaissance nature by the forces of bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft in combination with the operations of special groups of airborne forces. Special motorized detachments equipped with special vehicles, equipment, and protective devices can be used occasionally in this area.

The basic task of checking and reconnaissance operations must be to detect and destroy enemy nuclear/missile weapons operating with the aid of remote control and automatic systems without human assistance according to a prior given program.

The procedure and sequence of combating enemy missile troops will also change: at first, antiaircraft guided missiles will be destroyed and then surface-to-surface ones. This will open the possibility for the operations of all arms of air reconnaissance, whereas now antiaircraft guided missiles exclude the combat work of reconnaissance aviation, and this paralyzes all the reconnaissance activities of the front.

Thus, by creating continuous zones of nuclear destruction, the nuclear/missile troops are capable of independently performing the basic task of destroying the enemy over large areas. It is our profound conviction that the operations of large infantry-tank groupings in these zones are inadvisable and even impossible.

Consequently, the need arises to limit the zones of operations of the nuclear/missile and infantry-tank troops according to area instead of the existing principle of joint operations of new and old arms of troops.

Nuclear/missile troops plan and conduct a program of large bursts which create the desired picture of the radiation situation simultaneously over the whole area where the enemy troops are located. The picture of the

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zones of complete enemy nuclear destruction will change depending on the given system of layers (sloynost) and t the zones of radiation contamination, as well as the combat and meteorological situation. Variations of the plan for nuclear/missile strikes will comprise the basis of the program for conducting large bursts. These programs may be fed into existing computers in advance, and in an instant one can receive the best solution corresponding to the specific situation.

Thus, over the enormous areas where enemy troops are located, one can create a radiation situation in the tactical and operational depth in which enemy personnel would be in continuous radiation zones and would be broken up by zones with deadly radiation levels.

In our opinion, the art of determining and forming such continuous zones of nuclear destruction over enormous areas comprises the basis of military art in nuclear/missile warfare.

In the zones of continuous nuclear destruction, one can provide special corridors free from radiation contamination for the operations of our own infantry-tank and other troop groupings.

These troop groupings can be set aside for occupying enemy territory which is free from high radiation levels. They use and develop the success of the enemy's defeat which was achieved by large nuclear bursts. Therefore, we consider that the main task -- the destruction of opposing enemy forces -- can be accomplished independently by nuclear/missile troops, but the occupation of enemy territory, the consolidation of the success, and support for conducting nuclear/missile strikes can be done by combined-arms groupings equipped with ordinary weapons.

In our opinion, such an efficient distribution of efforts of new and old weapons according to ground, target, and tasks guarantees success in waging nuclear/missile warfare. With this, it must be kept in mind that under the conditions of nuclear/missile warfare one must inevitably

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force from the battlefields the basic masses of infantry-tank and other troops equipped with conventional weapons and together with them their complex and unwieldy tactics and operational art and strategy, and one must confirm the new military art based on nuclear/missile methods for waging armed battle.

The purpose of any operation is to destroy the enemy. And we think that this destruction can and must be achieved, not by infantry-tank encirclement and splitting enemy troops, but by destroying them with nuclear weapons. The mighty combat powers of nuclear weapons simplify the strategy of destruction and, on the battlefield, remove the borders of tactical, operational, and strategic scales.

In delivering strategic nuclear/missile strikes, if one must select targets, then in the zone of combat operations of the fronts one must and can use their complete destruction by large nuclear bursts. We consider that we must put a decisive end to conducting front operations by old methods. Old arms of troops and methods of their combat use must be improved, and they must be adapted to the best use of the results of employing nuclear/missile weapons. But one cannot achieve decisive purposes in operations by expanding the capabilities of old arms of troops through equipping them with new weapons but by the unification of everything new (all types of weapons of mass destruction, missile and other means to deliver them, and reconnaissance means) into a single nuclear/missile army which is capable of destroying opposing enemy forces by crushing blows. Simultaneously with this, one must reduce sharply the troops equipped with conventional weapons, and unify motorized rifle, tank, and other conventional troops into homogeneous, combined-arms large units with a limited amount of armament. The basic tasks of these new combined-arms large units and formations will be to occupy enemy territory, consolidate the success achieved by the nuclear/missile strikes on areas free from high radiation levels, and to provide ground cover for a nuclear/missile army and for other troops on their own territory. Thus, the combined-arms large units will not be forced to wage battles and combat

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with the main enemy forces as this was understood in the past. There will have to be an occasional use of transport aviation to move combined-arms large units by air to cross zones with high radiation levels.

Large nuclear bursts will reduce to a minimum the number and variety of nuclear and missile weapons. Basically there will have to be nuclear warheads of three types: half-megaton, one-megaton, and two-megaton, and correspondingly with them, three types of missiles with a firing range of up to 1000 km. It is technically more advisable to use fixed strategic missiles for a greater distance.

Thirty to forty launching mounts are able to create a continuous zone of nuclear destruction on the scale of a front. As can be seen, the number of launching mounts with ready missiles is not large. However, for their reliable use and support one must have a whole nuclear/missile army which should include: nuclear/missile divisions, a division for comprehensive reconnaissance -- to receive and clarify reconnaissance data -- checking and reconnaissance divisions conducting special operations over the zones of complete nuclear destruction, divisions of field cover for nuclear/missile troops, and technical and supply units and large units.

Thus, all the basic forces set aside to fight against a ground enemy can be united into two armies: a nuclear/missile army and a combined-arms army. The decisive and leading role of the commander of the nuclear/missile army is obvious, and therefore he will have to coordinate the operations of these armies. Apparently, there will be no need to create an unwieldy front directorate with general control functions. It is enough to supplement the command of the nuclear/missile army by a coordination group to establish agreement for operations on land and in the air.

It is natural that the methods and forms of military art which are based on the principles for waging nuclear/missile warfare under field conditions will exclude several generally accepted classical propositions, and the old

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and new can be compared in Figure 2.

In our opinion, victory in field warfare will be achieved by that side which first goes over to genuine nuclear/missile warfare and takes advantage of the blunders of an enemy who adheres to the old principles of infantry-tank warfare. Thorough exploitation of enemy mistakes which stem from the old inherited principles of waging war, particularly in the initial period, will comprise a very important part of the new military art.

If we begin now to reorganize our armed forces in accordance with the principles of military art of genuine nuclear/missile warfare, then we shall gain several years and shall outstrip the most highly developed armies of the world in this regard.

* * *

The problems of combating missile and aviation delivery means in the flight trajectory in the air and space are the element of nuclear/missile warfare which has been least resolved.

Investigation of the nature and operations of a probable air and ground enemy and a comparision of them with the capabilities of our ground troops reveals a sharp discrepancy between our forces of counteraction and the forces of enemy air invasion.

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
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Table 1

Proportion of Air and Ground Attack of an Army of the USA and the Forces of Counteraction of the Ground Troops of the Soviet Army

		Means Used	Proportion of the strike and of the forces of counteraction to it, percentage		
			Field Army (Army)	Gr. of armies (front)	Avg. prop.
Proportion of the air attack of an army of the USA, percentage	Nuclear weapons	Cruise missiles Guided missile and free rocket aircraft	60	51	56
	Conventional weapons	Aircraft	46	35	40
	Average proportion of the strike		53	43	48
Proportion (percentage) of the forces of counteraction (antiaircraft troops of ground troops of the Soviet Army in relation to the whole complement of large units(formations) of ground troops			7.2	8.4	6*
Proportion of ground attack of an army of the USA, percentage	Nuclear weapons	Ballistic missiles; Cruise missiles Artillery	40	49	44
	Conventional weapons	Artillery	54	65	60
	Average proportion of the strike		47	57	52
Proportion of forces of counteraction of the Soviet Army			92.8	91.6	94



*This shows the average arithmetical calculation of the proportions of the complement of the means of the PVO (according to the number of weapons and launching mounts) motorized rifle divisions, tank divisions, heavy tank divisions, army, and front

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These calculations (Table 1) show that the proportion of means of enemy air attack in the use of nuclear and conventional weapons comprises 48 percent and the means of ground attack 52 percent, while our forces of counteraction to an air enemy on the flight trajectory (PVO troops) comprise only 6 percent of ground troops, and to the ground enemy, 94 percent.

Thus, one can observe an obvious discrepancy between the complement of our ground troops and the nature of operations of the air and ground enemy. The operations of the probable enemy bear a typical air-ground character with an almost equal ratio of the yield of strikes from the air and on the ground. The counteraction of our ground troops, however, essentially has a one-sided, ground nature, with an obvious shortage of the forces of counteraction to the air enemy.

One observes a different picture in examining the forces of counteraction of our probable enemy (the army of the USA) (Table 2).

The proportion of our means of air attack of a front in using nuclear and conventional weapons comprises 27 percent and the means of ground attack, 73 percent.

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Table 2

Proportion of Air and Ground Attack of Ground Troops of the Soviet Army and the Forces of Counteraction of the Army of the USA

		Means Used	Proportion of the strike and of the forces of counteraction to it, percentage		
			Army Field-army	Front (Group of armies	Avg. prop.
Proportion of the air attack of the ground troops of the Soviet Army, percentage	Nuclear weapons	Cruise missiles Aircraft	11	25	18
	Conventional weapons	Aircraft	30	40	35
	Average proportion		21	32	27
Proportion of forces of counteraction (PVO means of the ground troops) of the army of the USA			34.8	34.8	25*
Proportion of ground attack of the ground troops of the Soviet Army, percentage	Nuclear weapons	Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles	89	75	82
	Conventional weapons	Artillery and mortars	70	60	65
	Average proportion		79	67	73
Proportion of the forces of counteraction of the army of the USA			65.2	65.2	75

27.0 %

25.0 % Forces of enemy counteraction to an attack by our troops from the air

Means of attack of our troops from the air

75.0 %

73.0 % Means of attack of our troops from the ground

Forces of enemy counteraction to an attack of our troops from the ground

*This shows the average arithmetical calculation of the proportion of the complement of the means of the PVO (according to the number of weapons and launching mounts) of infantry divisions, armored divisions, [2 letters missing], infantry corps, and of a group of armies

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The forces of enemy counteraction to our means of air attack (antiaircraft guided missiles and antiaircraft artillery), however, comprise 25 percent of his ground troops, and to the means of ground attack, 75 percent.

Thus, the complement of enemy ground troops almost completely corresponds to the probable nature of our strikes against him. Taking into consideration the pronounced ground-air nature of the possible operations of our troops with a prevalence of ground strikes over air strikes by about 2.7 times, the counteraction of the enemy also has a pronounced ground-air nature with the predominance of the forces of counteraction to a ground attack over the forces of counteraction to an air attack.

Consequently, there is a sharp discrepancy between the complement of our ground troops and the nature of the possible attack from the air, something which is not observed among our probable enemy. This discrepancy which has arisen must be eliminated by a sharp increase in the PVO troops of the ground troops and in our means of air attack.

The air-ground nature of nuclear/missile warfare is a new, specific, and more complex side to the matter. The successful struggle in the air and the destruction of an air enemy is a decisive element in ensuring success in operations or campaigns.

PVO troops of a front who are equipped with modern nuclear antiaircraft systems act as the main force in the antimissile and antiaircraft struggle under field conditions. Antiaircraft defense of troops is now built and founded on the use of antiaircraft guided missiles. Therefore, all the old means of fighting against an air enemy can serve only as a supplement to the main PVO weapon - the antiaircraft guided missile - and in principle the new bases of the combat use of these missiles will determine the nature of the PVO troops as a whole.

Antiaircraft guided missiles make a start at creating a highly effective and constantly functioning zonal PVO system with which, instead of covering individual objectives (objective PVO), and periodic operations of fighter aviation, there is brought about simultaneously a constant cover of

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all the numerous objectives, and the numerous linked zones of destruction of the antiaircraft guided missiles form a whole system for the struggle in the air in the zone of the whole front.

Antiaircraft guided missiles of various types are capable of accomplishing independently the tasks of fighting against all air targets, and this excludes the need to use other, old PVO means in the zone of their operations. This simplifies the conditions of coordination. By its operations, fighter aviation must supplement the PVO of the troops outside the destruction zones of the antiaircraft guided missiles.

Using electronic computers, we conducted research on the effectiveness of antiaircraft guided missile operations and of fighter aviation in a single zone and in various zones. It was discovered that in limiting the zones of operations, the effectiveness of antiaircraft guided missiles increased by more than two times.

Consequently, also under field conditions, it is becoming possible to employ the most convenient and simple principle of coordination of new and old PVO means by limiting their zones of operations according to the terrain. In connection with this, the existing belief that supposedly no single means of fighting against an air enemy can accomplish independently all the tasks of the PVO of the troops, and that there must be close coordination between completely different types of means within a single zone, is losing its force. To give independence to the new weapons in an operational-tactical and organizational manner -- this, in our opinion, is the main task of military science at the new stage of development of our armed forces.

The experience of exercises conducted with the use of electronic computers proved the great effectiveness of a constantly functioning system of zonal PVO. Together with this, there arose an urgent need for centralized control of the large forces of the antiaircraft guided missiles. The experience of exercises and the results of theoretical research confirm once more, not only logically but also mathematically, the advisability of unifying all antiaircraft guided missiles and other troops of the PVO which form a zonal system into single PVO large units and formations.

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During recent years, however, there has been a process of reducing and splitting all troop large units of antiaircraft guided missiles and of forming separate subunits and units in place of them. Thus, there has been created a "scattering" of antiaircraft guided missile subunits of the troop PVO, and this excludes the possibility of creating a zonal PVO system. All this causes a sharp decrease in the organs and means of control of the PVO chiefs (nachalnik).

Right now the PVO of ground troops has been reduced to its minimum level for the whole history of its existence. What are the reasons for such a disastrous situation for the youngest and most progressive arm of troops?

In our opinion, the basic reason is that instead of a single, correct, integral theory for unifying and centralizing PVO troops, in practice there is being carried out a differential theory for their splitting and decentralization.

This has resulted in serious consequences -- the apparatus of the chiefs of the PVO troops of a front and of armies now must control masses of small subunits without having any resources for doing this. They were isolated from the troops and were transformed into secondary organs of combined-arms staffs, capable only of preparing the antiaircraft defense of the troops, but without being able to direct the PVO means to repel raids.

Such an imperfect organization of the PVO system for troops and of its control could not help but lead to an essentially incorrect use of the antiaircraft guided missiles -- the most reliable PVO means, which is called upon to put zonal cover into practice. Hundreds and thousands of missiles will be spent for nothing because, lacking an organizing principle and centralized system of automated control, some of the targets will be fired at by an unjustifiably large number of missiles and the next will fly with impunity over the battle formations of the troops.

By attaching the antiaircraft guided missile subunits directly to the cover objectives -- which actually also means including them in the makeup of divisions -- they are artificially transformed into a means of direct cover.

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As a system, zonal cover is excluded, and this weakens the PVO as a whole.

The creation of an automated system of centralized control of PVO troops is one of the most important problems of the present time. Its resolution is made much more difficult if there is "scattering" of the antiaircraft guided missile units. The movement, building up of the zone of cover, the replacement of units which have been put out of action, and distribution of targets are either all excluded or will be unsystematic and inefficient.

Despite scientific and actually proven principles, it is proposed that the antiaircraft guided missile models which have not yet appeared also be split among subunits, instead of using them in a centralized way on the scale of PVO large units and formations.

We consider that the need to create a system of zonal PVO inevitably confirms the need which arose long ago to create a PVO army as a powerful means for antimissile and antiaircraft combat under field conditions.

Under modern conditions, with the enormous satiation of PVO troops of fronts with antiaircraft missile means, it would be completely correct to examine the PVO of troops as the most massive missile arm of troops and as the first PVO echelon of the State as a whole, and to devote particular attention to its development.

We must create a special industry of troop antiaircraft guided missiles, of automated groups, and a system of control; a special institute for antiaircraft guided missiles and automation; we must accelerate the introduction of troop antimissile systems; and we must create computing centers, an academy, and ranges for the accelerated introduction of mathematical methods and machines for controlling PVO troops under field conditions.

Nuclear energy as a means of destruction, missiles as means of delivery, and electronics as a means of control, are the basic components of a technical base on which modern armed forces, including the PVO troops (for antimissile and antiaircraft combat), must rest.

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The change from an army intended to wage infantry-tank warfare to an army intended to wage nuclear/missile warfare must be understood not as a document but as a very serious process arising from several military reforms.

During the history of the existence of organized armies, never has one felt so sharply the need to make new military reforms as now. Despite the fact that nuclear/missile weapons caused the need to change from infantry-tank warfare to new, nuclear/missile warfare, and thus determined the basic changes in building the armed forces, in our opinion this far-reaching revolution was not marked or consolidated by appropriate military reforms. It is not out of place to recall that with the small numerical strength of the Red Army and its weak armaments, during the period of 1924 to 1928 military reforms were made under the direction of the military commission of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The course of military reforms and the five-year plan for building the armed forces were discussed at two plenums of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), at the 13th, 14th, and 15th Party Congresses, and at the 3rd and 4th All-Union Congresses of Soviets.

It is quite obvious that at the same high level one should make new and more complex and important military reforms to ensure the decisive reorganization of the armed forces and their readiness to wage nuclear/missile warfare.

We are convinced that military reforms can never be replaced by individual orders, ukases, or measures which make it possible to resolve problems which may be very important but which are still particular problems, expecially if this concerns the creation of new arms of troops. The formation of new types of armed forces and arms of troops must occur on the basis of a law and must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the role and place of old arms of troops, and this is possible only by making thoroughly based and, consequently, firm military reforms.

Military reforms must legalize the formation of new nuclear and missile arms of troops and must simultaneously determine the tasks and role of the old arms of troops.

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To wage field warfare one must create two new missile arms of troops (nuclear/missile troops and troops for antimissile and antiaircraft combat) and one arm of troops equipped with conventional weapons.

The tasks of the strategic armed forces and the tasks for waging field warfare must also be carefully defined by military reforms. The strategic armed forces are called upon to destroy and neutralize the enemy's military and economic potential and to protect our country.

As is well known, nuclear/missile troops and troops for antimissile and antiaircraft combat (The PVO Troops of the Country) will be organized on a strategic scale. Such a successful combination of new principles of attack and defense on a strategic scale, obviously, can and must be spread to the conduct of field warfare.

In our opinion, military districts, which long ago adapted themselves to waging infantry-tank warfare, also must reorganize themselves in accordance with the new conditions of nuclear/missile warfare. It is obvious that the internal districts must prepare themselves for strategic nuclear/missile strikes and for antiair defense, and the border districts must prepare themselves to wage field warfare with the aim of destroying the armed forces on the fronts.

The combination of strategic nuclear/missile strikes and antimissile operations conducted by internal districts with the nuclear/missile strikes and antimissile operations conducted by border districts will be one of the basic tasks of military strategy.

The complete independence of each district makes for their interchangeability and guarantees the reliability of fulfilment of any strategic and operational task, even when considerable forces are put out of action.

To ensure the complete independence and reliability of operations of each district, during the initial period of a war one must reject the existing methods of rear area support based on supplying the troops with all weapons, including missile weapons, before and during the battle

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and must change to the principle of early supply of troops with all types of nuclear and missile weapons. Early nuclear/missile supply and engineer preparation of troops in the Theater of Military Operations create genuine conditions for the successful and timely conduct of operations during the initial period of the war.

For the practical instituting of military reforms and transformations in the army one must decisively activate military science. All the problems touching the various areas of reality and practice are resolved now only on a scientific basis. In our opinion, military science is illuminating in a completely unsatisfactory way the path for the practice of military affairs, and to a considerable degree it is still concerned with the scientific basis of problems which have already been resolved. It appears to us that military science concerns itself more with studying the most general laws. It is no accident that a definition of military science is still prevalent according to which Soviet military science is the sole system of knowledge about the preparation and conduct of an armed struggle to defend the Soviet Union from imperialist aggression. In the highest degree this is a general definition. Military science must be the most specific area of knowledge, despite the fact that it relies on the highest and most complex achievements of technology and the intellect.

In our opinion, military science is the science for creating and constantly improving the technical program of armaments, a program which is combined with the most advantageous methods for employing the armed forces and the forms of their organization. The military science of our time fluctuates between the ancient past and the still unknown future. The matter is further complicated because the past stubbornly refuses to relinquish its positions. Under these conditions all our knowledge and experience must be united to work out a new and more intelligent doctrine of field warfare.

If one must put at the basis of this doctrine some expressed views, then it is our deep conviction that they should be the following:

— to save hundreds of billions of rubles by bringing about the best long-range military-technical program based on the recognition of the role of large nuclear bursts and

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by ceasing the production of unneeded and already quite worthless small nuclear, missile, electronic, and numerous conventional armaments;

— to reduce the armed forces sharply and to receive enormous economic benefits, and at the same time to make them incomparably stronger and more effective in combat;

— to simplify the art of waging armed struggle, to reduce the organs of control sharply, and thus to make it easy to control troops under the most complex field conditions.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 MAY 1962

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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The Director, National Security Agency

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov

DATE OF INFO : October 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War", written by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The articles cited on page 2 were disseminated as [redacted] (Gorbatov), [redacted] (Gusakovskiy), [redacted] (Babadzhanyan). 1.3(a)(4)
The Field Service Regulations cited on page 11 were disseminated as [redacted] The Malykhin article cited on page 14 was disseminated as [redacted] and the M. Ivanov article on page 19 as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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Preparation and Conduct of a Front Offensive Operation on a Maritime Axis in the Initial Period of a War

by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov

The theoretical elaboration of the actual problems of preparation and conduct of front offensive operations on a maritime axis is not possible without thorough analysis of the general nature of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war. Without a clear-cut definition of the types of military operations to be conducted on the ground, in the air and on the sea, not taking into consideration the influence of the weapons of mass destruction on the utilization of the types of armed forces in the first days of a war, and many other factors of basic significance, it is impossible to carry out preparation of troops purposefully and understand the situation in which the initial operations of maritime fronts will be conducted.

As concerns the general nature of nuclear/missile war, we agree with the opinion given in the pages of the Collection in the articles of Generals Gorbatov, Gusakovskiy and Babadzhanyan*. The strategic aspect of the initial period of a war will be determined above all by the nuclear/missile strikes delivered by both sides for strategic purposes. The elaboration of the theory and the implementation of such strikes, in practice, are not a function of operational preparation and a mission of the front. However it would be incorrect to be silent about this, because these strikes in particular will set the operational-strategic situation in theaters of military operations, and consequently, will also determine the nature of the tasks facing the maritime fronts.

In the operational-strategic activities of the missile troops, in our opinion, it is essential to differentiate between two types of nuclear/missile strikes: intercontinental delivered by large units of the missile troops of strategic designation, in the interests of the war as a whole, and strikes carried out by the missile troops, long-range missile-carrying aviation, and by the forces of the missile-carrying fleet, bringing in, in some cases, the missile weapons of

* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Third Issue 1960 and First Issue 1961./[redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] respectively/. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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the fronts to assist in armed combat in a given theater of military operations. Apparently, the latter will be very closely tied in with the utilization of all types of armed forces. In actuality, they will be the basis of a strategic offensive on the TVD (theater of military operations - teatr voennykh deystviy). Therefore, the thorough consideration of all aspects of the concept according to which they are conducted, of their makeup, and of the results expected, will be the foremost condition for the correct and purposeful planning of the front operation on a maritime axis.

It should be assumed that, under the conditions of the Western Theater of Military Operations, the attainment of the basic strategic goals will depend on the destruction of the main missile, ground and air groupings of the enemy in the internal areas of the European continent, where a large part of the most important military-economic and administrative-political centers of NATO are located. However, as experience of many exercises shows, it is only possible to attain these goals by means of simultaneous destruction of the troop groupings operating on maritime axes, most of which lead to important industrial areas. A series of political centers, large cities, centers of communication, military-naval bases and ports, and considerable stocks of materiel means in the areas of the bases, are located on the maritime axes. The most important routes, that connect the armed forces of NATO with their main military-economic base and reserves across the ocean, pass through them.

The significance of maritime axes increases mainly because our probable enemies have a powerful naval fleet, supplied with the latest combat equipment. For this reason it is not accidental that in a TVD the situation will depend, to a large extent, on the degree to which it was possible to disrupt the enemy's plan on the sea and in the coastal zone; to hamper his utilization of missile and air bases located in maritime areas; prevent strikes by carrier large units, missile-carrying vessels and submarines; disrupt naval communication routes and isolate the enemy troops located in the theater from the flow of additional forces and means from other continents.

In the fulfilment of these missions, an important role can be played by front formations operating on maritime axes.

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In coordination with the missile troops and the means of the fleet they will protect the strategic flank of the armed forces on the scale of the entire theater of military operations, to execute the deep envelopment of the basic groupings of the enemy, disrupting the forming up of his reserves in the maritime areas, and their transfer and forward movement to the main axis. The end result of the offensive operations carried out by the maritime fronts will be that more favorable conditions will be created for the rapid destruction of the most important enemy ground troop groupings and for the establishment of active operations by our fleet on the broad ocean.

The Anglo-American command, not without reason, supposes that the naval fleet, in comparison with the other types of armed forces, will suffer relatively smaller losses during the first days of a war and will retain its capability for immediate operations. This should be remembered constantly.

The NATO command will apparently use the strike forces of the fleet primarily to deliver strikes against groupings of troops and important operational-strategic objectives on the land sectors of the theater of military operations, where the fate of the war will be decided. The force and depth of the fire effect of the fleet in a case of this kind can be very significant. By using carrier strike large units, missile-carrying surface vessels, and submarines, the fleet is able to deliver strikes not only against coastal objectives, but also against those removed hundreds or thousands of kilometers from the coast.

In this respect the NATO exercise carried out in October 1960 was quite characteristic, during which, in the first 27 hours of military operations, 240 nuclear strikes were delivered by the means of one carrier strike large unit, including: 69-according to the plans of the high command, 96-for the counteratomic offensive, 47-to prevent the deployment of ground troops, and 15 strikes to prevent the deployment of naval forces. A total of more than nine-tenths of all the nuclear weapons were used to destroy ground targets removed up to 500 to 600 km from the coast.

Hence it becomes evident that under modern conditions the basis of an enemy nuclear grouping on a maritime axis may consist not only of the missile weapons of the ground

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troops but basically of the weapons of the fleet. That is why the situation on the sea, to a greater degree than before, will influence the development of front offensive operations, and its influence will spread over a considerable zone, having widened the area boundaries of the maritime axes.

Of course, not all the maritime axes will be equal in importance. Their role will be determined in accordance with operational capacity, the composition of enemy forces, the presence of important operational objectives, and other factors. However, in all conditions, by dint of all the above-mentioned circumstances, in the initial period of a war, an extremely tense struggle will ensue within the borders of the maritime axes in order to fulfil extremely vital and complex operational-strategic missions.

As shown by the experience of exercises, the basic principles of conducting an offensive on an ordinary axis are retained in an offensive operation of a maritime front. However, the special conditions for developing combat operations also present special requirements for conducting operations: the need to take into consideration all aspects of the situation at sea; determining the concept of the operation according to the nature of the adjoining naval theater, the location of naval bases, ports and other coastal installations. The scope of the operation is influenced by the depth of the continental part of the TVD and the balance of the forces in the naval theater.

Under such conditions, first of all, the range of operational missions accomplished by the front troops is widened. In particular, the need arises to seize straits, islands and peninsulas, to organize combat operations with the goal of capturing ports and military-naval bases, to aid the fleet in the destruction of carrier strike large units, and to destroy coastal missile weapons of the enemy. The fulfilment of these missions requires special organization of control, joint utilization of the various types of armed forces, application of distinctive methods of operations of the troops, organization of landing operations, and, mainly — close operational and, to a certain degree, tactical cooperation between the ground troops and the naval fleet.

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The nature of the cooperation will depend on the general conditions for conducting war at sea. For example, it is known that the decisive role in naval operations is passing to the submarine fleet, to missile-carrying vessels, and to missile-carrying aviation, operating in dispersed formations and delivering strikes from great distances with nuclear/missile warheads and homing (samonavodyashchiysya) torpedoes.

Of course, under such conditions there is no need to "attach" the fleet to the flanks of the ground troops. However it is completely apparent that together with the utilization of its basic forces on the open seas and oceans, on the sea communication routes of the enemy, as before, the direct cooperation of the fleet with the maritime front will have great significance in developing the offensive in the entire depth of the theater. The fleet must reliably cover the maritime flank of the front, to protect it from strikes from the sea, prevent the commitment of additional forces of the enemy fleet through straits into internal bodies of water, ensure the disruption of his sea transport, etc. Undoubtedly, the participation of the forces of the fleet will be essential in the neutralization by fire of enemy installations located on land, moreover, not only in the coastal zone, but also at a considerable distance from the sea.

We are convinced that the reduction of the forces of the fleet, the contraction of its missions, especially in closed seas, may place the maritime front in an extremely difficult position. In such a case, the enemy will derive major advantages. Any possibility of carrying out landing operations or sea transport to assist the front will be almost completely eliminated. The wiping out of enemy groupings pressed up against the sea will be made more difficult. The front must be constantly aware of a possible enemy intrusion from the sea, because it may be obliged to commit considerable forces to cover the maritime flank, and to organize along the coast a powerful system of antilanding and antiair defense, radio countermeasures, and intelligence, which will undoubtedly influence the tempo of development of the operation into the depth.

Therefore, in our opinion, the fleet of a closed sea, even in modern times, must be strong enough. Its qualitative composition is another matter. We do not

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attempt to make any recommendations on this score, but consider that the conclusions made on this subject in the article of Admiral V. Kasatonov deserve serious attention.*

The mission of securing the maritime flank will have to be fulfilled by means of a broad maneuver of nuclear/missile strikes in combination with the swift movement of troops by air and the creation of operational barriers (including the placement of nuclear mines) on the threatened axes. The pivotal element of the system of cover of a maritime flank, obviously, must be the mobile coastal missile units of the fleet, armed with short-range cruise missile systems and reinforced as necessary by motorized rifle subunits, as well as by air obstacle detachments (vozdushnyy otryad zagrazhdeniya) and separate antiaircraft missile (ZURS) units.

The most important condition for ensuring the stability of the maritime flank is maximum exertion in combat not only with the ground enemy, but also with the sea enemy, striving to inflict destruction on the carrier strike large units before they reach the line of launch of the carrier aviation, and also the disruption of landing operations being prepared, at the moment the landing force embarks on the ships or during their sea passage.

The framework of the operation and the actions of the front troops will be greatly influenced not only by the open maritime flank but by the shore line, the location of inlets, islands, and the nature of the operational objectives located in the coastal zone. In many cases these factors may greatly influence the choice of the form of operational maneuver, the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons, and the assigning of missions to the troops with the purpose of splitting up and liquidating enemy groupings pressed up against the sea.

Inasmuch as the ultimate goal of the front operation, in most cases, will be related to the completion of the

*Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Second Issue, 1960 [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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destruction of the maritime groupings of the enemy, the capture of harbor areas, supply bases, and the movement of troops to the coast, it is expedient to plan and conduct an offensive on a maritime axis in the entire depth of the theater of military operations — under the conditions of the Western TVD, to 1000 to 1200 km. Here it is extremely important, utilizing the results of strategic nuclear/missile strikes, to reach the Atlantic coast on the 9th or 10th day of the war, i.e., before the main reserves of the enemy begin to arrive from the American continent.

The arrival of strike groupings on the coast during this time period will be realistic with adequate effectiveness of massed strategic nuclear strikes against the enemy; the preservation of the forces of the front and their immediate transition to vigorous operations from the very beginning of the war, that deny the enemy access to our territory; the serious weakening of the enemy fleet, after which it will not be able to give effective support to its troops on the continent and the latter will not be reinforced at this time from bases across the ocean.

On a maritime axis the missile weapons, ground troops, aviation, and naval fleet can be utilized in various ways. However, in all cases, it is extremely important to prevent the enemy from deploying forces on the ground and at sea, and to start vigorous offensive operations as soon as possible. As experience of exercises shows, the maritime front is extremely interested in having the forces and weapons of the fleet that are cooperating with it used vigorously, offensively, and that successive strikes be delivered against the enemy at sea and at bases.

On the whole, joint operations of a front and a fleet must, in our opinion, be examined as a single operation conducted under a joint command with the purpose of simultaneously destroying the enemy on the ground axes and in the adjoining areas of the naval theater. Moreover, it is expedient to have the fleet of a closed sea, before it captures the straits area and exits its main forces into the ocean, under the direct operational subordination of the front. In the future, most often it will be utilized independently, but in this case it is essential that the commander of the front be able to assign missions to the fleet for supporting the offensive and to coordinate the

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operations of the forces on the ground and at sea.

The unified plan of the offensive operation, conducted jointly with the fleet, must determine the methods for destroying missile, ground, and air groupings and groupings of the naval forces of the enemy. In accordance with the plan, the system of the front operation provides for the delivery of a series of successive joint massed nuclear/missile strikes by the means of the front and fleet; the conduct of a swift offensive by small operational groupings of the ground troops on isolated axes toward vitally important areas and installations of operational significance on the coast; the systematic landing of tactical air and combined amphibious landings; fire support for the ground troop offensive by the weapons of missile units, aviation, and the fleet; the organization of combat with the naval forces of the enemy that are harassing the front troops; screening the maritime flank and the naval communication routes, and finally, the disruption of enemy sea transport.

Joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes are planned jointly by the commanders and staffs of the front and the fleet. As a rule, it is advisable to conduct a large part of the strikes on behalf of the front from the calculation of the use of their results by the ground troops. Moreover, the means of the fleet can be brought in to destroy the most important coastal installations, airfields, and maritime groupings of the enemy. However, sometimes the situation will require the organization of joint mass nuclear/missile strikes on behalf of the fleet. In such a case, the aviation and missile weapons of the front will be utilized, for example, for the annihilation of enemy naval bases, for destroying his coastal defense units, for supporting the penetration of missile-carrying aviation of the fleet, and for facilitating the creation of a favorable situation at sea.

The basis of ground troop operations is made up of swift, deep strikes on separate axes with the simultaneous delivery of enveloping strikes from areas distant from the sea against important maritime objectives. It is possible to create 3 to 5 independent tank strike groupings in the front, consisting of 2 or 3 divisions each, and also a grouping of forces for utilization as a combined amphibious landing. In a number of cases, one of these groupings will advance right along the coast. The main forces, because

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of the indentations in the coastline and the difficulty of forcing numerous rivers in the estuary sectors. will, as a rule, operate at a certain distance from the sea. The maneuver to the sea is possible with limited forces, because the action of the troops in a solid front along the entire coast is not expedient at the present time. In the coastal zone it is only necessary to capture the most important areas (ports, supply bases, and main road junctions), first breaking up the enemy groupings covering them, pressing them up against the sea and destroying them piecemeal. The basic objectives in the other areas should be suppressed or destroyed by nuclear/missile strikes, creating zones with high radioactive contamination.

It is expedient to combine systematically the envelopment of enemy maritime groupings from the ground with the sudden landing, on the flank and in the rear of the enemy, of combined (naval, air, and tank) landing forces. Some consider that in a modern war amphibious landing forces, because of their great vulnerability, lose their significance. But this conclusion is correct only if it is based on the old principles of organizing amphibious landing operations. Obviously, the dispersed formation of the landing detachments during the sea passage, and the higher tempo of the landing, will make their viability no lower than the viability of regular troop groupings.

It should not be forgotten that the utilization of nuclear weapons will greatly facilitate the overcoming of the antilanding defense and will permit landings with limited forces and in a short time, to fulfil missions to a great depth and with decisive goals. Therefore, we propose that combined landings (if the fleet gets the fast landing craft for their landing) can and must be used widely in the initial operations of a future war. They will permit the holding down of enemy reserves on a broad front, will make it difficult to utilize missile weapons deployed in the maritime areas, will permit more rapid transfer of ground troop efforts into the depth and will eliminate the need to pull in forces of the front from the main axes to capture coastal objectives.

In planning a front offensive operation being conducted on a maritime axis, special attention should be given to

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the correct assignment of the missions. The recommendations of the existing Field Service Regulations (Corps-Division) concerning this, in our opinion, are outdated. In keeping with the requirement of the Minister of Defense to carry out an offensive with an average speed of up to 100 km per 24-hour period, the depth of the tasks of the formations and large units, in comparison with the norms given in the Regulations, should be sharply increased. In our opinion, it is expedient to coordinate the immediate tasks of the troops with the range of fire of the missile weapons which are correspondingly available to the division, army and front. For example, for the tank division the immediate task can now be assigned for a depth of 25 to 30 km, the follow-up task for 50 to 60 km, and the task of the day for 100 km or more. A combined-arms (tank) army, conducting an offensive on a maritime axis, usually will get an immediate task to a depth of up to 200 to 250 km, and its fulfilment is calculated to take 2 to 3 calendar days. Tasks for groupings conducting an offensive along the coast should be assigned, and the method of operation should be pointed out, in the greatest detail, especially if they have to capture a strait zone in order to achieve maximum coordination of their efforts with the utilization of the forces and means of the naval fleet.

The great depth of the tasks and the necessity of continuous development of the offensive of the maritime fleet require constant concern regarding the preservation of the combat effectiveness of the strike groupings of the troops.

At the moment it is hard to count on the ability of the motorized rifle division to conduct continuous combat operations for more than two, and a tank division for more than three to four, calendar days. Under such conditions great skill is necessary to prevent the premature weakening of troop efforts. The commanders of the front and the armies must take the most energetic steps for the constant maintenance of the most important strike groupings at the minimum necessary combat strength. This pertains especially to the troops operating apart from the main forces, on islands, or those being used for amphibious landings. The maintenance of their combat effectiveness, obviously may be attained not only by committing to combat the reserves coming up from the zone of interior, but first of all by having friendly large units that have lost their combat

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effectiveness, put back into service quickly. For this the time limits for bringing a division to full strength must be drastically reduced: for a motorized rifle division, up to three, and for a tank division, up to four, calendar days.

The restoration of troop combat effectiveness must be executed according to the unified plan of the front in accordance with the actual concept of the operation. Moreover, in some cases it is expedient to give the salvaged materiel and personnel of the large units taken out of combat to the other troops in the first echelon, and to utilize the staffs that have been relieved thereby as reserve organs of control temporarily. In other cases, it is possible to create from a division a composite detachment-regiment designated for the continuation of combat actions, and to conduct the remaining units to the rear area to bring them up to strength as fast as possible by centralized maneuver of the stock of rehabilitated vehicles in routine maintenance and the bringing up of personnel brought in by aircraft from the depth of the country.

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The conduct of the first front offensive operation on the maritime axes demands all-round training of troops, great combat efficiency and deep insight in the work of all the organs of control, the ability of the commanders and staffs to resolve complex problems, that constantly arise for the troops, in a short period of time. Exceptional mobility in operations is necessary during the period when the forces are brought to increased combat readiness and at the moment the troops are withdrawn from under a nuclear/missile strike being prepared by the enemy.

In short periods of time the location of the anti-aircraft missile troops, radiotechnical equipment, and missile units of the front and army must be completely changed, aviation has to be dispersed, control points have to be moved, pontoon-bridge cover of the most important crossings must be organized; the dispersal of materiel reserves is carried out, etc. At the same time, in coordination with the fleet, screening measures should be carried out for antiair and antilanding screening of the

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maritime flank, and also aerial reconnaissance of the enemy should be organized in the direction of the sea. Subsequently, every 10 to 12 hours it is necessary to move not less than half, and after a 24-hour period, all units and fire means, without exception, to new areas, taking into consideration that in the maritime zone the enemy reconnaissance may be most active.

In our opinion, the dispersal of the rear services will present the greatest difficulty because of the lack of time and transport. Therefore, so as not to take on too much work, it is expedient to plan the fulfilment of this task in certain phases: the first - in 2 or 3 hours, the second - in 10 to 15 hours and the third - 1 to 1.5 calendar days. First of all, missile warheads and supplies of aircraft fuel stored in the open at airfields should be dispersed. Then begins the dispersal of the other types of ammunition and fuel, i.e., to unload part of them on the ground and keep the rest in the motor vehicle transport of divisions, armies, districts (groups of forces), on ships at sea and at railroad freight relays (zheleznodorozhnaya "letuchka") at small stations and runs (peregon). It is advisable in the beginning to leave materiel maintained in underground storage areas in place, because its destruction with the first strike is unlikely.

The development of the first front offensive operation on a maritime axis will usually be tied in with the moving out of forces from the depth. As a rule, this process begins with the initiation of military operations and will include the concentration of troops with their being brought out to a line 200 to 300 km from the border and the deployment of troops with the immediate creation of operational groupings. During concentration the large units and units, in most cases, will have to be brought out in extremely dispersed formations, in a broad zone and over a large number of routes, utilizing all types of transport. In the process of deploying, the troops must move out to the axis designated to them mainly under their own power, in a specific grouping and in full readiness to go into battle precipitately. The maximum increase of the speeds of march in order to approach the enemy attains great significance here because this will sharply reduce troop losses.

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It should be expected that on a maritime axis the enemy, using the capabilities of his fleet, will apply the maximum efforts to disrupt the moving out of our troops. For this purpose, on a number of lines and at large water barriers he can create "nuclear fire barriers", extensive zones of radioactive contamination, and also destroy permanent bridges over rivers such as The Western Bug, Vistula, and Oder.

As shown by the experience of many exercises for the timely creation of strike groupings it is essential that, under such circumstances, the troops moving out from the depth not be dependent on bridge crossings. In tank divisions, to be exact, for each tank regiment it is expedient to have a company of tracked, self-propelled ferries, to switch the motorized infantry to amphibious armored troop carriers; and in the combat-engineer battalion of the division, to have a landing-crossing company instead of one of the combat-engineer companies.

Besides, on the estuary sectors of the most important rivers that intersect the maritime axes, already in peacetime, we must carry out advance preparation of components for the construction of underwater bridge crossings, and mainly, for setting up 3 or 4 underground tunnel crossings for through railroad and motor vehicle traffic. With this purpose in mind, Colonel-General F. Malykhin proposes the construction of duplicate bridges (mosty-dubler) *. However, such bridges are no less vulnerable than the basic crossings, while the destruction of tunnels entails great difficulties.

One of the special features of moving the troops out will be the utilization of sea transport. The use of sea transport may play an important role in closed seas, and also when land communication routes of the maritime front are disrupted. Unfortunately, because of the lack of transport ships and the inability to concentrate them in advance at loading points, the movement of large units of ground and missile troops at full strength by sea is improbable in the first operation. The transport of materiel, combat equipment, and replacements may be carried out on quite large scales.

*Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Second Issue, 1960.

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The capture of the straits zone will be a very important mission of a maritime front in the operation of the initial period of a war. This will permit the fleet to exit swiftly into the open sea, to put into effect operations on enemy sea communication routes, and mainly, to assure more effective support of the advancing groupings of the ground troops over the entire depth of the theater.

The capture of the straits zone must be preceded by powerful nuclear/missile suppression of the enemy system of defense in the maritime zone, on islands and peninsulas, and also the weakening of the enemy fleet by strikes against his vessels at bases and on the sea. It is also very important to prevent the planned withdrawal of enemy troops from land axes, for which it is necessary, in the shortest possible time, to break through to the approaches of the straits, at least with separate tank large units.

The basic method for capturing the straits zone will be a determined offensive by the tank grouping of the combined-arms army combined with the landing of joint air and amphibious landings in the areas that ensure control over the straits. It is expedient to carry out the special landing operation taking into account the simultaneous capture of all islands and peninsulas in the zone of the straits. However, with a shortage of forces it is possible to use the method of their subsequent capture.

Experience shows that for the successful execution of a landing operation it is necessary to increase to the maximum the rate of embarkation, of the sea passage, and especially the debarkation, of troops on the shore, ensure effective fire support for the landing troops by the means of the front or army missile units, aviation and vessels of the fleet, and also their constant reinforcement by the forces and weapons subsequently delivered by air or sea.

In our opinion, the basis of a combined landing, when landing at considerable distances, must consist mainly of an amphibious landing, and in closed seas over limited distances (up to 25-30 km)—of a tank landing with individual means of flotation (type PSTU). It is true that at the present time the execution of a tank landing entails great difficulties because amphibious tanks, and even more so

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T-54 and T-55 tanks, do not have navigational instruments, are not sufficiently seaworthy, and require a considerable amount of time for demagnetization. But these deficiencies can be remedied.

It is expedient to execute tactical and, even more so amphibious landings over a broad front in several (at least 4-5) points at the highest possible speed, avoiding the gradual buildup of forces on the shore. For this, simultaneously with the start of the amphibious landing, it is necessary to disembark a helicopter landing force at a distance of 3 to 5 km, and an airborne landing force 25 to 30 km, from the shore. With the support of the missile units of the front and the fleet, the subunits that have landed must develop the offensive swiftly on the designated axes, or they will be wiped out.

In the course of an offensive operation on a maritime front, the main efforts must be concentrated on the destruction of the means of nuclear attack, and also the ground and air groupings of the enemy, with missile/nuclear and chemical strikes, operations of the aviation, and of missile-carrying vessels. Together with this it is necessary to organize the swift movement of tank troops to the siting areas of enemy missile weapons.

In the initial operation of a maritime front, combat with the groupings of enemy ground forces will most often take the form of large meeting engagements that will arise simultaneously on various axes and at various depths. Success achieved in these engagements must be utilized decisively. Enemy forces that were able to survive must be split up, pressed back to the coast, forced into zones of radioactive contamination and, by blockade from the sea, be destroyed with joint strikes by nuclear weapons, aviation, and the fleet.

For the decisive destruction of enemy maritime groupings, the high tempos of troop offensives will have special significance. In the maritime zone, the achievement of this, in the light of the complexity of the military-geographic conditions, entails great difficulties. But nevertheless, even here, it is completely realistic to bring up the question

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of speeds of up to 100 km per 24-hour period. This requires a further increase in the effectiveness of nuclear-fire support and the use of more expedient methods of operation of the ground troops, including increasing of the speed of the attack, reducing the time for deploying large units, the decisive utilization of intervals and gaps in the combat formations of the enemy.

It is known that in the past the average speed of a tank attack was approximately 8 to 12 km/hour. This was conditioned by the possibilities of conducting aimed fire from the old type tanks, and also by the need to maintain constant fire coordination between the NPP (close infantry support-neposredstvennaya podderzhka pekhoty) tanks and the infantry following them. At the present time this method of operation becomes unacceptable. The attack should not be carried out on a solid front but on axes, wherein the speed of the attack should attain up to 15 to 18 km/hour, because only in this way is it possible to avoid the destruction of troops at the lines of deployment by nuclear weapons and the fire of guided missiles of the enemy antitank means.

In practice the possibility of conducting an attack at a speed of 15 to 18 km/hour is predetermined by the presence of two-plane stabilizing devices for tank armament and the feasibility of operations of the motorized infantry when precipitately breaking through the hastily assumed defense in armored personnel carriers without dismounting. In any case, as shown by the experience of two divisional exercises with field firing that were conducted by the Northern Group of Forces, it is now possible to ensure fairly high effectiveness of destroying targets when moving. For example, at the autumn divisional tactical exercises of 1960, at an attack speed of up to 18 km/hour the tank battalions, operating in the first echelon, successfully fulfilled all fire tasks, having ensured the destruction of 83 to 92 percent of the gun and 81 to 86 percent of the machine gun targets.

The decisive utilization of gaps and breaches in the combat formations of the enemy may play a big role in increasing the speed of the offensive. However, such a method of operations cannot be stereotyped. The strike groupings or large units that have entered the breach may often find themselves in a "pocket" (v "meshke") and will

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be subjected to a mass enemy nuclear strike. Therefore, the offensive in the gaps of combat formations should be conducted in more dispersed formations, and mainly - with maximum speed.

The correct organization of fire support, and mainly constant coordination of the missile weapons of the front and fleet at their full range, attain primary significance. In particular, we consider that the fleet, using its high maneuverability, must give effective fire support to the strike groupings of the maritime front, not only the ones advancing along the coast, but also those operating at a distance from the sea. In our opinion, the basis of such support must consist of destroying the missile weapons of the enemy fleet with the forces of the navy, and also to destroy important ground objectives and reserves with nuclear warheads from great distances, in the entire depth of the maritime axes.

The complex nature of modern offensive operations requires fundamental improvement of the entire system of troop control of a maritime front. The principle of simultaneous direction of the combat operations of troops on the ground, in the air, and at sea from great distances, by technical means, electronic-computing and automatic devices, should be incorporated in the basis of control. It is also necessary to increase sharply the operational efficiency of the work of commanders and staffs, and to assure the possibility of their immediate reaction to the slightest changes of the operational and radiation, air, and naval situation.

Unfortunately, the existing system of control, as has been pointed out in print several times, does not fulfil the indicated requirements in many ways. Even before complex automatic systems of control are created, it is necessary to carry out a reorganization of the control points, put in order the collection, processing, and routing of operations and intelligence information at the operational and tactical levels, work out the system of "flash (tranzitnaya) information", create calculating-analytical and computing centers in the staffs, and ensure the quick assignment of tasks, and monitoring of the results of the strikes inflicted.

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In the light of what has been said, let us examine the proposals given by Major-General M. Ivanov in his article.* The idea of creating centers (command, operations-intelligence, nuclear/missile, and VVS and PVO control), as elements of the command post (KP) and the forward command post (PKP) of the front, was already worked out in the Northern Group of Forces in 1959, and was carried out in practice in three front operational command-staff exercises locally which were described in the Information Bulletin SGV. No. 1 (Northern Group of Forces - Severnaya Gruppa Voysk) in the beginning of 1960. The recommendations of General M. Ivanov resemble this system in form, but in substance distort its meaning and are inapplicable. The proposal "... to unite all the directorates and departments, all the services and staffs of the arms of troops which are concerned with the direction of troops into unified control centers" in practice means the elimination of staffs, which is unrealistic and wrong. No centers can assume the full volume of the functions of staffs, directorates and departments. In our opinion, it is impossible to replace the staffs with any kind of centers, either now or in the future. Centers should be created, not as replacements, but based on the staffs, as their organic elements, as combat teams called in to perform tasks of immediate direction of an engagement and the utilization of the means of the front.

It is also impossible to agree with the proposal to create a main command-planning center where, as General Ivanov maintains, "the entire planning of the operation" must "take place". The operational planning will be carried out, not by the center, but by the staff of the front and all the directorates of the arms of troops. Therefore a command center is necessary, and not a command-planning center, as the working area of the front troop commander for simultaneous unified direction of all means of combat, where, in the decisive moments of the operation, the chiefs of the missile troops and PVO troops, the commander of the air army and a representative of the fleet may be located, connected to their operating apparatus by selector and television communications.

* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961.

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Finally, it is necessary to note that the centers justify themselves only in the event they are properly equipped. For example, in the command center created in the Northern Group of Forces there are electrified registers (tablo) of the readiness of missile weapons and nuclear warheads, of fighter aviation and antiaircraft means; a signal-code device for transmitting commands, and also a screen of the operational situation and radiation situation - and of the situation at sea, the air and PVO situation and the situation of the control of missile troop fire. In a semiautomatic manner the screen gives the data about the situation of friendly and enemy troops. Moreover these screens are not used for observation, as General M. Ivanov recommends, but for making specific decisions based on them and for giving orders to the troops. The principle of organizing and equipping the command center is shown on the diagram.

One of the most important questions of control is the organization of coordination with the naval fleet. Under the conditions of the Western TVD, this coordination, in our opinion, must be organized mainly on behalf of the troops of the maritime front. Moreover, the joint operations of the fleet and front for the nuclear-fire suppression of the enemy on land and at sea, the conduct of joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes, support of the amphibious landings, and also all questions of intelligence, PVO, radio countermeasures, and operational camouflage must be coordinated with special thoroughness.

A strict method of mutual exchange of operations and intelligence information must be established between the staff of the front and the staff of the fleet. An orderly system for directing operations is also necessary, to ensure the fastest possible resolution of all matters concerning joint operations of the ground troops and the naval fleet during their simultaneous fulfilment of overall operational tasks.

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Fundamental Scheme of the Organization and Equipping of the Command Center

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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29 MAY 1962

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Combat Against Enemy Missile Submarines", by Rear Admiral O. Zhukovskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

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Combat Against Enemy Missile Submarines

by Rear Admiral O. Zhukovskiy

The application of atomic energy to the submarine has decisively changed the character of its activity: the operating range of submarines has grown immeasurably, and their speed, especially their submerged speed, their endurance, and their diving depth, have been increased considerably. The arming of submarines with ballistic missiles (ballisticheskaya raketa) with nuclear warheads makes it possible to use submarines extensively in a nuclear attack, assigning them missions to destroy important operational-strategic objectives in enemy territory from great distances. Thus, atomic missile (atomnaya raketnaya) submarines have acquired independent strategic significance, unlike other arms of forces of the navy.

The military leadership of the United States considers that in the next ten years atomic missile submarines will become one of the decisive means of combat at sea and will replace aircraft carriers as the main striking force of the navy. Therefore, the United States is devoting great attention to the construction of atomic submarines equipped with "Polaris" missiles. To allot the maximum possible amount of money for the construction of atomic submarines, the United States has abandoned the further construction of aircraft carriers for the time being.

In the United States there are now three types of atomic missile submarines in service and under construction: the "GEORGE WASHINGTON", "ETHAN ALLEN", and "LAFAYETTE", which differ somewhat in their performance characteristics (taktiko-tekhnicheskiye dannyye). According to the reference book Jane's Fighting Ships, in 1960-1961 the United States should have five submarines of the "GEORGE WASHINGTON" type, five of the "ETHAN ALLEN" type, and four of the "LAFAYETTE" type. In addition, it is planned to build seven more submarines of the "ETHAN ALLEN" type in the next few years.

In October 1960, there were the following atomic submarines in the US Navy: the missile (raketnaya) submarines "GEORGE WASHINGTON" and "PATRICK HENRY", the torpedo (torpednaya) submarines "NAUTILUS", "SEAWOLF", "SARGO", "SKATE", "SWORDFISH", "SEADRAGON", "SKIPJACK", and "SCORPION", the guided missile (UI

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submarine "HALIBUT", and the radar picket (RLD) submarine "TRITON". Of the submarines under construction, two should join the fleet at the end of 1960, and the remainder on the following dates:

--the missile submarines "T. ROOSEVELT", "ROBERT LEE", and "ABRAHAM LINCOLN" at the beginning of 1961, the "THOMAS EDISON" in May 1961, and the "J. MARSHALL" in June 1961;

--the torpedo submarines, five in 1961, seven in 1962, and four in 1963.

Data on the Construction of Atomic Submarines in the United States as of October 1960[1]

Type of Atomic Submarines	In Service	Under Construction	Planned for Construction	Total
Missile Submarines	2*	7	12	21
Torpedo Submarines	8	18	4	30
Guided Missile Submarines (PL URS)	1	-	-	1
Radar Picket Submarines (PL radiolokatsionnogo dozora)	1	-	-	1
Total	12	25	16	53

*There are now five atomic missile submarines in service in the US Navy.

Altogether, according to data from the foreign press, by 1970 the shipbuilding program of the United States envisages bringing the number of atomic missile submarines in the navy up to 45, and the number of antisubmarine submarines up to 100.

The main centers for construction of atomic submarines in the United States are:

1. General Dynamics Corporation in Groton, Connecticut.

2. Portsmouth Shipyard in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

3. Mare Island Shipyard in Vallejo, California.

1. The bulletin "Naval Equipment", No. 4, 1961. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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4. The New Shipbuilding Corporation in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

5. Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia.

6. The New York Shipbuilding Corporation in Camden, New York /sic/.

The missile submarines are being built primarily in Groton and Camden. The antisubmarine submarines are being built primarily in Camden, Pascagoula, and Vallejo.

At present, the missile atomic submarines of the US Navy are armed with type A-1 Polaris ballistic missiles with a range of 2000 km and a nuclear warhead with a trotyl equivalent of .6 megatons. Later they are expected to take on board for their armament A-2 and A-3 type Polaris missiles with ranges of 2800 and 3200 km and a warhead with a trotyl equivalent of three megatons.

According to data from the foreign press, experimental launchings of Polaris missiles from a submarine have shown that it is possible to use this weapon at a speed of 2 to 3 knots, from a depth of 30 meters, and with a sea state of not more than six balls, conducting the firing with an interval of 15 minutes between firings. Later on, it is proposed to increase the rate of firing, decreasing the interval between firings to 2 to 3 minutes. The accuracy of firing Polaris missiles from a submarine against ground targets with specified coordinates is sufficiently high. According to preliminary calculations, their average probable deviation from target at maximum range is three miles (5.5 km).

The complex navigation equipment of the submarines allows them to sail submerged for a long time and determine their own position exactly without coming to the surface, and this ensures the launching of the missiles against specified coastal targets.

The systems for biological protection of personnel from radiation, and regeneration and conditioning of the air, which are installed on atomic submarines, and also the quality of the outfitting of the internal quarters, provide the comparatively good habitability of the submarines and

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the necessary conditions for the crew of a submarine continuously submerged for almost two months.

According to the views of the military leadership of the United States, the use of missile submarines in a surprise nuclear attack should be sufficiently effective. The Pentagon believes that to achieve this effectiveness, up to two thirds of all the missile atomic submarines must be constantly at sea.

At the present time, American atomic missile submarines continuously patrol in the Northeast Atlantic area in readiness to deliver nuclear/missile strikes against previously designated targets in the territory of our country, just as the bombers of the strategic aviation of the United States, with their load of atomic and hydrogen bombs, patrol in the air. Thus, the atomic missile submarine (PLAR) "GEORGE WASHINGTON" arrived in the patrolling area for the first time on 24 November 1960 and returned to New London (in the United States) on 21 January 1961. This submarine carried out patrolling for the second time from 3 March 1961 to 27 April 1961. The atomic missile submarine "PATRICK HENRY" was on patrol from 28 December 1960 to 8 March 1961. The relief of submarines is carried out on station, and this ensures the continuity of the patrolling and the possibility for immediate use of the missiles. As new missile submarines are put in service, the number of patrolling submarines will be increased.

As a result of the ever-increasing importance of atomic missile submarines in the plans of our probable enemy, primarily in a surprise nuclear attack, combat against them must be considered one of the main missions of our navy. This combat must be a combination of offensive and defensive operations carried out in the entire depth of possible location of enemy submarines in a given sea (ocean) theater of military operations.

In our opinion, under modern conditions combat against submarines should envisage the following:

--destruction of the points of basing and construction of missile submarines, and also the destruction of the submarines at these points;

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--the searching out and destruction of missile submarines at the exits from bases, during sea passage, on the approaches to the launch positions, and in the area of launch positions (startovaya pozitsiya);

--frustrating and hampering the missile submarines in the use of their weapons;

--destruction of the forces and means of combat support of the missile submarines.

The experience of the past war testifies to the considerable effectiveness of strikes against the system of construction and basing of submarines. Thus, for example, despite several measures carried out by the German command to defend the points of construction and basing of submarines (construction at the shipyards of special concrete-covered shelters in which were carried out the construction and assembly of submarines, construction of shelters for the basing and repair of operating submarines, strengthening of the antiaircraft defense of the points of construction and basing, etc.), submarine losses sustained by the former German fleet at bases were very substantial. Directly at bases from the strikes of aviation, 63 submarines were lost, 150 submarines were lost in the process of construction -- at assembly yards, at outfitting yards, and in transport-- and 22 submarines were lost during trials and combat training. A total of 235 submarines were destroyed at bases, and in the process of construction and trials; this amounts to 25.2 percent of the total German submarine losses.

In addition, as a result of bomber strikes against German shipbuilding centers and other industrial enterprises cooperating with them, German submarine shipbuilding systematically failed to fulfil submarine construction plans. During the years of the war, this nonfulfilment reached 29.5 percent of the plan and amounted to 462 submarines. (See Causes of German Submarine Losses During Their Stay at Bases and in the Process of Construction and Combat Training, by A. L. Elfshits, published by the Naval Academy of Shipbuilding and Armaments i/n Krylov (VMAKV im. Krylova) in 1960.)

Thus, although the main German submarine losses were sustained during their conduct of combat operations at sea, even during the past war the tendency of a relative decrease

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of submarine losses at sea and a relative increase of submarine losses at construction bases became evident. In a future nuclear/missile war this tendency probably will become more evident. With the appearance of atomic submarines possessing high maneuvering capabilities and great endurance, combat with them at sea has become much more difficult and complicated than in the past. The nature of probable operations of these submarines differs sharply from the nature of operations of submarines in past wars, when they were forced to approach vessels and ships to the range of a torpedo salvo because the basic mission of submarines was to destroy vessels and ships, i.e., the destruction of sea targets. In approaching the targets being attacked, submarines were forced to break through the line of protection, exposed themselves, underwent pursuit, and some of them were destroyed.

As has already been indicated above, atomic missile submarines have as their basic mission the destruction of important coastal targets. Therefore, one can anticipate that while bound for launch positions to fire ballistic missiles they will avoid meeting any vessels so that they will not be detected prematurely. If it is taken into consideration that the launch positions and the routes of movement to them can be situated in vast spaces of ocean in areas where the operations of our antisubmarine forces are hampered, then the advisability of delivering strikes against points of basing and construction of missile submarines, to destroy the latter before they put out to sea, becomes evident.

However, it is necessary to keep in mind that the goals of combat against missile submarines cannot be achieved completely by means of strikes against bases and construction points, because a large portion of the enemy submarines (according to American views, up to two thirds of the effective strength) always will be at sea. Therefore, despite all the complexity of its organization and the large economic expenditures, direct combat against enemy submarines at sea continues to remain one of the main methods of combat against missile submarines, along with their annihilation at bases and the destruction of shipbuilding centers.

The missions of destroying missile submarines at bases and destroying naval bases, shipbuilding, and missile-building

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plants, and also other important industrial enterprises cooperating with these plants, can be assigned to the missile troops. It is obvious that the operations of the missile troops in fulfilling these missions differ in no way in principle from operations to annihilate or destroy other important targets; therefore, they are not being examined in the present article.

With the present state of coastal missile weapons, the destruction of submarines at sea can be carried out only by the navy. Taking into consideration the complexity of combat against submarines at sea, let us examine in more detail the basic principles of the organization and conduct of combat operations to destroy submarines by naval forces.

In view of the fact that it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish missile submarines from submarines of other types at sea, combat against them will develop into combat against all submarines. It must be waged in vast areas of oceans and seas, including even Arctic areas. This combat demands a considerable quantity of forces and vigorous exertion of them. . . . To destroy a missile submarine at sea or bar the use of its missile weapons against important coastal targets, it is necessary to detect the submarine even before the approach to launch positions and to concentrate antisubmarine forces for its pursuit and destruction in the area of detection. Of course, it is difficult to carry out a mission of this sort by haphazard operations of special naval antisubmarine forces without advance equipping of the sea (ocean) theater of military operations with various antisubmarine means.

We believe that combat against submarines at sea can be successful when the use of antisubmarine forces is supported by a previously prepared and continuously operating system of antisubmarine defense in the theater.

A continuously operating system of antisubmarine defense must be a set of measures for the special equipping of the theater and organizing the combat operations of naval forces directed toward combat against enemy submarines, and must include:

--stationary means and maneuvering forces used for antisubmarine observation and for warning about detected enemy submarines;

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--mine and net barriers, restricting the penetration of submarines into defended areas;

--antisubmarine forces used for seeking and destroying submarines on antisubmarine lines and in open areas of the sea, and also the means to control them.

Taking into consideration the threat of delivery of surprise concentrated strikes by missile submarines of the probable enemy which are continuously at sea, it is advisable to create and use a system of antisubmarine defense, of necessity, even in peacetime, like the system of antiair defense of the country.

In our opinion, the makeup of the system of antisubmarine defense must conform to the following basic principles:

1. Antisubmarine defense in a theater should be created to a depth of not less than the firing range of ballistic missiles from enemy submarines against important operational-strategic objectives on the coast and in the depth of the territory of the country.

There is no doubt that the best system would be one operating within the limits of the entire theater right up to the exits from the points of basing of the enemy submarines. However, actual capabilities are inadequate to create such a complex system of antisubmarine defense (PLO) over the entire expanse of the seas and oceans. Therefore, we speak of a depth of not less than the range of fire of the ballistic missiles as the necessary minimum. On various axes of the theater, it is necessary to determine the depth of the antisubmarine defense on the basis of the military-geographic conditions, the location of objectives being defended, the degree of threat from enemy missile submarines, and the capabilities and performance characteristics (taktiko-tekhnicheskoye svoystvo) of the antisubmarine forces and means.

2. Antisubmarine defense in a theater should be echeloned; this is achieved by the organization on separate axes of a series of successive operations of antisubmarine forces on several lines (in several zones).

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This principle is necessitated by the impossibility of reliably accomplishing the mission of search and destruction of enemy submarines on one line and is directed toward the achievement of higher probabilities of destruction of enemy submarines.

3. The density of the antisubmarine forces and means comprising the system of antisubmarine defense should correspond to the degree of threat of enemy submarine operations from various axes, and also with the capabilities of antimissile defense on these axes because the security of targets being defended is ensured by the destruction not only of the submarine missile carriers, but also of the missiles themselves.

This principle conforms with the requirement of the optimum of the system of antisubmarine defense, ie., the achievement of its maximum effectiveness, defined as the greatest probability of destruction of enemy submarines and the least damage inflicted on our coastal targets through the efficient disposition of antisubmarine stationary facilities and maneuvering forces in a theater.

4. Antisubmarine defense in a theater should possess high combat stability and constant readiness to repel a surprise attack of enemy submarines.

This is especially important for the initial period of a war, when the enemy will try to use simultaneously all of the strike forces of his fleet which have been deployed at sea beforehand to wage a nuclear attack.

The system of antisubmarine defense should be tied in with the reconnaissance and the patrol service and with the organization of observation in the theater as a whole, and also with the antiaircraft (antimissile) defense of the country.

Such are the basic principles for building a system of antisubmarine defense in a theater, and the observance of them, in our opinion, will ensure the success of operations of the naval forces for the destruction of enemy missile submarines at sea.

Who should exercise control over the system of antisubmarine defense in a theater?

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There can be only one answer to that question -- the commander of a fleet, for only he has sufficient means available and is capable of resolving the entire group of problems connected with waging combat against submarines within the limits of a theater as a whole.

In accordance with possibilities for using various types of weapons by enemy submarines and the performance characteristics of antisubmarine forces and means, the search for and destruction of submarines at sea is organized into near and far zones of antisubmarine defense.

It is accepted practice to consider that the near zone of the antisubmarine defense will be established in the coastal part of a sea. The basic mission of antisubmarine forces operating in the near zone is to defend its lines of communications, vessels and ships at bases and points of dispersal, and coastal installations against action by enemy submarines.

The search for and destruction of submarines in the near zone is carried out by antisubmarine surface vessels, aircraft, and helicopters. Fixed antisubmarine means are also widely used for combating submarines in the near zone.

The far zone of the antisubmarine defense includes the water space from the outer limit of the near zone of the antisubmarine defense to the maximum possible distance away of the launching line for ballistic missiles from enemy submarines against the most important targets on the coast and in the depth of the territory of the country. The basic mission of the antisubmarine forces operating in the far zone of the antisubmarine defense is to bar strikes by enemy missile submarines against coastal installations.

The search for and destruction of missile submarines in the far zone of the antisubmarine defense is carried out by antisubmarine submarines, aircraft, helicopters, and surface vessels.

Antisubmarine submarines possess a number of positive characteristics: a considerable operating radius, great endurance, and the capability to operate under ice cover.

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The antisubmarine submarines have means to detect enemy submarines and antisubmarine weapons to destroy them.

Such characteristics of atomic antisubmarine submarines as range of operation, endurance, and the capability of sailing under ice are practically unlimited and will depend mainly on the physical condition and morale of the crew and also on the presence of equipment for regeneration of the air. The range of operation and endurance of diesel-electric submarines are determined by fuel supplies, and their endurance and range of sailing under ice are determined by the capacity of their storage batteries.

The possibility of antisubmarine submarines' choosing sailing depth and low-noise speeds in a favorable hydrologic relationship contributes to more effective use of the hydroacoustic equipment for observation through the water medium and detection of submarines.

Surface antisubmarine vessels also have a number of favorable characteristics enabling them to wage combat against submarines both in near and far zones of the antisubmarine defense. Among such characteristics are the following:

--large sailing ranges and endurance;

--the capability of carrying out the search and pursuit of submarines under difficult hydrometeorological conditions;

--the availability of powerful antisubmarine weapons which, because of their weights and sizes, cannot be used by other arms of the forces;

--the opportunity to establish well-equipped command posts making it possible to control the heterogeneous antisubmarine forces directly at sea.

However, the combat use of antisubmarine surface vessels is hampered by a number of shortcomings. These shortcomings are: first of all, low combat capabilities to repel air attacks, and this makes it necessary to protect in a special way their stay at sea; less range of hydroacoustic detection in comparison with the hydroacoustic sets of submarines, and this reduces the effectiveness of

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their search for submarines; and little concealment of the operations of antisubmarine surface vessels from enemy reconnaissance, and this facilitates the selection of axes of movement for submarines' breaking through.

Antisubmarine aviation, having available modern airplanes and helicopters of long and short range magnetometric and radio hydroacoustic means of observation through the water medium, and with special types of antisubmarine weapons is capable of waging effective combat against submarines at sea.

The favorable characteristics of antisubmarine aviation are:

--the capability of searching, in short periods of time, large spaces of the sea to the entire extent of possible use of missiles from submarines by the enemy;

--high readiness for operations and the capability of arriving in areas where submarines might be located in the shortest time;

--the potential for quickly concentrating the necessary number of airplanes and helicopters on the required axis of operations.

The shortcomings of antisubmarine aviation, hampering its combat use, include the following:

--dependence on meteorological conditions and the status of airfield basing;

--the relatively low endurance of airplanes (helicopters);

--limited potential for carrying out combat operations in Arctic areas.

Planning the operations of the forces of a fleet to destroy enemy submarines at sea is done by the staff of the fleet, taking into account the combat capabilities of the enemy submarines and its own forces, their operational and tactical characteristics, and also the possibilities of supporting combat operations, and the military-geographic conditions of the theater.

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It is advisable to carry out combat operations to destroy enemy submarines at sea, particularly in the initial period of war, by enlisting the maximum possible quantity of antisubmarine forces and facilities of the fleet and also the ships and aviation of the maritime fleet, the fishing industry, and the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route, which are capable of carrying out observation of enemy submarines. In the period preceding the initiation of combat operations, all of the forces mentioned should be deployed in the zone covered by the system of antisubmarine defense in the theater, beyond the limits of this zone on the approaches to the points of basing of the submarines of the probable enemy, and on the routes of their movement into areas of combat operations.

The great difficulty of operations of antisubmarine forces in a theater during a period of threat is that, not having the right to use their weapons, they are, in point of fact, deprived of the opportunity to prevent actively the deployment of missile submarines of the probable enemy to launch positions or, in general, to any areas of sea located beyond the limits of our territorial waters.

In our opinion, under these conditions the use of antisubmarine forces should be organized in the following manner: Before the signal of the beginning of military operations, antisubmarine forces operating beyond the limits of territorial waters establish observation of every detected submarine, information about which is transmitted from some groupings of forces, individual vessels (ships), and means of observation to others located on the path of the submarine's movement. Such escorting of detected submarines must be done without the use of weapons until the signal of the start of military operations or until the moment of use of weapons by enemy submarines against our antisubmarine forces. Upon receipt of the signal for the start of military operations, attacks against all detected submarines are carried out by those forces in whose area of operations they are located.

With the start of military operations it is advisable to carry out immediately the establishment of antisubmarine barriers in previously planned areas in which they could not

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be established earlier because of peacetime conditions.

In our opinion, the sequence of operations of the antisubmarine forces to destroy submarines at sea is determined by the operational organization of the antisubmarine forces resulting from the decision of the commander of the fleet and depends on what area the initial detection of an enemy submarine is made in and what forces or means it is made by. By areas, the sequence of operations might be approximately the following:

Beyond the limits of the zones covered by an antisubmarine defense system, destruction of enemy submarines at sea must be carried out by our submarines deployed on approaches to the bases of enemy submarines, in remote areas of the sea, at exits from straits, and also on probable routes of movement of enemy submarines to launch positions.

Prior to the approach of enemy submarines to the antisubmarine lines and lines of observation, action against them can be carried out by our submarines deployed to fulfil other missions (operations against aircraft carrier strike forces and on the lines of communications) in areas through which pass the routes of movement of enemy submarines. In the operations of our antisubmarine forces in the Arctic, a systematic search for and destruction of enemy submarines must be carried out by atomic submarines under the ice and by antisubmarine aviation in open water areas in the ice (ledovoye razvodye) and in the open water areas beyond the landfast ice (zapripaynaya polynya).

With the approach of enemy submarines to the antisubmarine lines[1] antisubmarine submarines are moved to the sector of probable courses in accordance with information from reconnaissance and stationary means of observation. The antisubmarine submarines attack the enemy submarines in sequence and direct antisubmarine aviation and surface vessels against those submarines which have broken through into the depth of our defense. Aviation and antisubmarine surface vessels in tactical coordination carry out the search for and destruction of enemy submarines which have broken through within the limits of the areas assigned to them.

With the discovery of the axes of operations of the enemy submarines, a redeployment of forces ensuring a

1. The term antisubmarine line (protivolodochnyy rubezh) means an echeloned barrier of various fixed means and maneuvering antisubmarine forces, in relatively narrow axes of sea on probable routes of movement of enemy submarines.

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strengthening of efforts on the main axes should be carried out in the system of antisubmarine defense of the theater. In addition, in the areas of probable launch positions it is necessary to carry out systematically a search for enemy submarines which have broken through, with the goal of destroying them and hampering the use of their missiles.

The most crucial and difficult measure in combating submarines at sea is searching for them. There are various methods of operations of forces of a fleet in searching for enemy submarines. Specific selection of methods should be determined with consideration of the operational-combat capabilities of one's own forces and the enemy, the military-geographic features of the area of combat operations, its provision with antisubmarine barriers and stationary and drifting means of antisubmarine observation, and also the importance of the area in the over-all system of combating submarines in the theater.

In carrying out the search for and delivery of strikes against enemy submarines at sea, antisubmarine submarines can use the following methods;

--the position (pozitsionnyy) method (when carrying out independent operations on routes of passage of submarines through straits and narrows);

--the position-maneuvering (pozitsionno-manevrennyy) method (when carrying out operations jointly with other forces and when operating on the basis of data on initial detection of enemy submarines from stationary means of observation);

--and the cruising (kreyserstvo) method (when carrying out independent operations in areas of possible positions, in a zone of pack ice, and on approaches to points where enemy missile submarines are based).

Antisubmarine submarines on position search the areas assigned to them, running at low-noise speeds at depths providing the greatest operating range for their hydroacoustic means of observation.

After detection of enemy submarines, antisubmarine

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submarines determine the elements of the enemy movement and maneuver to take favorable fire positions with speeds and depths ensuring advantage in the operating range of their hydroacoustic equipment. After the attack, depending on the results of the attack, the antisubmarine submarines either occupy positions for a repeated attack or continue searching. Later, at the first opportunity, these submarines report on the attack, its results, and the further movement of the enemy.

The basic method of operations of antisubmarine aviation for the destruction of enemy submarines is active search by groups of antisubmarine airplanes, either independently or on the basis of information of initial detection of submarines by other arms of forces or from stationary means of observation.

Operating independently in assigned areas or on lines, hunter-killer groups of antisubmarine aviation carry out the following:

--the laying of barriers of moored radio hydroacoustic buoys (radiogidroakusticheskiy yakornyy buy), set out in lines perpendicular to the probable axis of movement of enemy submarines;

--the laying in open areas of the sea of drifting radio hydroacoustic buoys (radiogidroakusticheskiy dreyfuyushchiy buy) in the form of a zone of dense coverage (several parallel lines, in a circle or in a spiral), with the calculation of obtaining contact with a submarine at any point in the area of its assumed location;

--the laying of drifting radio hydroacoustic buoys in lines covering an area subject to search, with simultaneous search in the area with the aid of hydroacoustic sets lowered into the water by helicopters or of aerial magnetometric equipment (aeromagnetometricheskaya apparatura).

In accomplishing the mission of search and destruction of submarines on the basis of data of initial detection by other forces, it is most advisable to lay intersecting barriers of several parallel lines of drifting radio hydroacoustic buoys in the sector of possible courses of submarines detected earlier.

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To reduce enemy counteraction against antisubmarine aviation, it is essential to choose, when possible, areas of its operation and flight routes to these areas which are outside the zone of operation of enemy fighter aviation. After detecting enemy submarines, aviation hunter-killer groups attack them, using antisubmarine aerial bombs with a special charge or antisubmarine aerial torpedos to destroy the submarines. Airplanes which have not discharged their weapon loads or antisubmarine surface vessels located in the waiting areas are directed against the undestroyed submarines.

The basic method of operations of antisubmarine surface vessels is carrying out the search for and destruction of submarines as components of vessel hunter-killer groups. Taking into account the high maneuvering capabilities of missile submarines and their advantages over surface vessels in range of detection by hydroacoustic means of observation, surface vessels should be used for searching for submarines jointly with airplanes of the antisubmarine aviation and helicopters which are components of hunter-killer groups and also independently on the basis of data of initial detection of submarines by other arms of forces or by the stationary means of antisubmarine observation. After detecting enemy submarines, the vessel hunter-killer groups carry out a number of successive attacks against the detected submarines, using rocket (reaktivnyy) depth charges, ordinary depth charges, and antisubmarine torpedoes.

The basic principle of the use of antisubmarine forces to destroy enemy submarines at sea is their joint operations, which make it possible to carry out combat missions more effectively. Joint operations can be carried out by groupings of antisubmarine forces with the following possible combinations of heterogeneous forces of the fleet:

--antisubmarine submarines and airplanes (helicopters);

--antisubmarine airplanes (helicopters) and surface vessels;

--antisubmarine submarines and surface vessels;

--antisubmarine submarines, airplanes (helicopters), and surface vessels.

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Coordination between antisubmarine submarines and antisubmarine aviation and also between antisubmarine submarines and surface vessels consists of agreement upon time and location of search for enemy submarines carried out by these forces independently within the limits of assigned lines (areas). Coordination is achieved through direction, by the combat fleet command post (BFKP) of the commander of the fleet, of antisubmarine aviation or surface vessels against enemy submarines detected and not destroyed by our antisubmarine submarines and through the designation of demarcation zones between areas of operations of various forces.

Coordination between antisubmarine aviation and surface vessels consists of agreement upon time and place of search efforts and attacks against enemy submarines carried out by vessels and airplanes (helicopters) independently or jointly. Coordination is achieved through direct mutual direction of vessels and airplanes and determination of the sequence of attack during joint operations or through direction of hunter-killer groups against enemy submarines by the combat fleet command post of the commander of the fleet during independent operations. Direction of vessels against detected submarines by airplanes can be carried out by radio information (radioinformatsiya) methods, radio homing (radioprivod), leading (lidirovaniye), and with the aid of visual signals. Direction of airplanes against detected submarines by vessels is carried out by issuing information on their own location and the bearing and range of the submarine.

Combat against enemy missile submarines does not amount only to operations for the direct destruction of the submarines themselves, the carriers of missile weapons. It is also necessary to strive for the creation of conditions which hamper the control of the submarines and their use of their weapons. This can be achieved by the following:

--destroying the coastal control points of the submarines, the transmitting and receiving radio centers with the goal of making it difficult for the enemy to control his submarines at sea;

--destroying or putting out of operation coastal systems of radio navigation and destroying satellite (sputnikovyy)

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systems of navigation to make it difficult for enemy submarines to determine their position at sea and thus reduce the accuracy of their firing of ballistic missiles;

--radiocountermeasures (radioprotivodeystviye) against systems of control of missile weapons, radio navigation systems, and communications installations.

Preparing for an aggressive war against the USSR and the countries of the Socialist Camp, the military leadership of the United States began to devote great attention to the Arctic as a possible base of operations for a surprise nuclear attack. With this goal, the intensive study and mastery of the Arctic, primarily by atomic submarines, began. Thus, since October 1957, American atomic submarines have carried out a total of seven voyages, passing under the ice of the Central Arctic Basin by various routes. Considering the threat of the use of missile submarines from this axis, it is advisable to provide for the establishment of an anti-submarine defense in the Arctic areas.

Considerable influence on the organization of anti-submarine defense in the Arctic is exerted by its physical and geographic features. Bad meteorological conditions during the larger part of the year and ice cover hamper the use of antisubmarine forces, particularly aviation and surface vessels. Frequent magnetic and ionospheric disturbances complicate the organization of continuous 24-hour communications with antisubmarine forces. The presence of great depths, drifting icebergs, and the forward and rotating movement of icefields hinder the establishment of stationary systems of observation of submarines.

In addition to the measures enumerated earlier, the success of operations of the forces of the fleet for the destruction of enemy submarines in Arctic waters should be ensured by the following:

--use of antisubmarine submarines to search for and destroy enemy submarines under the ice;

--use of antisubmarine aviation to search for and destroy enemy submarines in open water areas in the ice and in the open water areas beyond landfast ice in areas of probable launch positions;

--establishment of antisubmarine barriers in straits and narrows on possible routes of penetration of submarines

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into Arctic areas to launch positions;

--wide use for antisubmarine observation of ice hydroacoustic stations in a zone of pack ice, and cable-connected hydrophone lines (kabelno-gidrofonnaya liniya), coastal hydrophone stations (beregovaya shumopelengatornaya stantsiya), and stationary radio hydroacoustic buoys near the ice edge, together with the antisubmarine forces permanently located in these areas;

--continuous ice, hydrometeorological, and geophysical reconnaissance, making it possible to predict ice movement, hydrological characteristics, and the transmission of radio waves of various length, and in accordance with this to correct the system of antisubmarine observation, redistribute antisubmarine forces by areas, and ensure uninterrupted communications with them by the proper selection of frequencies;

--the establishment of far forward ice airfields and points of material-technical support, making it possible to carry out a broad maneuver by antisubmarine aviation in ice areas in accordance with the mobility of the ice and the presence of open water areas in the ice and open water areas beyond the landfast ice;

--the establishment on the Arctic islands of remote control posts (vynosnyy post upravleniya) for the antisubmarine forces and repeater centers of communications (repetichnyy uzel svyazi), ensuring the possibility of controlling forces directly in areas of combat operations.

As is generally known, since November 1960 one or two American missile submarines constantly patrol in the area of the Lofoten Islands near the coast of Norway. It should be expected that they can take up launch positions among the Norwegian fiords. Therefore, it is necessary to devote attention to the organization of combat against missile submarines with launch positions in fiord areas of the enemy seacoast. The location of these areas outside the limits of our antisubmarine observation, in a zone of powerful enemy antiaircraft and antisubmarine defense, and also the difficult navigational and hydrographic conditions for sailing, hamper the use of our antisubmarine forces directly among the fiords.

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To hinder or eliminate the operations of missile submarines in fiord areas, there can be carried out systematically the concentrated laying of antisubmarine mines, the destruction of the system of channels among the fiords, and the search for and destruction of enemy missile submarines at entrances to fiord areas and in open reaches. The success of combating missile submarines in a fiord area depends to a great extent on the organization of agent intelligence (agenturnaya razvedka) and radio intelligence (radiorazvedka), which in this case partially perform the functions of antisubmarine observation.

Summing up this brief examination of the basic problems of organizing and waging combat against enemy missile submarines, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

1. Combat against enemy missile submarines is an intricate complex of combat operations and measures carried out not only by the navy but also by the armed forces of the country as a whole.

2. Successful combat against missile submarines at sea requires the creation of special highly effective antisubmarine forces and means and the use of them in a quantity which ensures high probabilities of destruction of enemy submarines.

3. Despite the over-all complexity of combat against enemy missile submarines at sea, it can be sufficiently successful if there are the following: a system of anti-submarine defense previously deployed during peacetime, high combat readiness of antisubmarine forces, and mobile use of them during combat operations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

4 JUN 1962

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Some Problems in Destroying Targets with Nuclear Warheads", by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Some Problems in Destroying Targets with Nuclear Warheads", by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.

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Some Problems in Destroying Targets with Nuclear Warheads

by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov

As is known, the use of nuclear weapons is making fundamental changes in the quality of fire and is increasing immeasurably the force of fire strikes against the enemy. The effectiveness of the destructive power of nuclear weapons can be judged by the fact that it is sufficient to deliver only two or three nuclear strikes with a yield of 300 kt each to destroy an infantry or armored division located in the concentration area.

The destructive effect of a nuclear weapon is greatly increased through the use of surface nuclear bursts, which result in an additional destruction of enemy personnel by strong radioactive contamination of the terrain following the drift of the cloud formed by the burst. Thus, with a surface nuclear burst with a yield of 300 kt and with a wind speed of 20 kph, the burst itself will destroy unprotected personnel in an area of 30 km^2. Because of the radioactive contamination of the terrain, however, one hour after the burst the unprotected personnel in an area of 80 km^2 will receive a dose of radiation of 200 roentgens. Thus, the total area of destruction increases from 30 to 110 km^2.

The significant radioactive contamination of terrain created by surface bursts and by a wind favorable to us permits a paralysis of enemy maneuver over a large area. But, if careful consideration is not given to the force and direction of the wind, then one can contaminate one's own troops or lower their maneuverability with one's own nuclear strikes. This consideration must be kept in mind when planning surface nuclear strikes.

The use of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear charges has increased immeasurably the depth of the effect of fire on the enemy. There cannot be a single enemy objective which can remain inaccessible to our nuclear strikes.

The great range of fire of missiles makes it possible to resolve the problem of fire maneuverability in a new

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and more successful way than formerly while conducting an operation. It is now possible to maneuver fire on a sufficiently broad scale and, thereby, quite effectively and quickly influence the course and outcome of combat operations. By using missile units and large units of front and army subordination to carry it out, maneuver by fire is possible along the entire offensive zone of a front and an army. Furthermore, missile large units and units may be used successfully to carry out missile/nuclear strikes not only in their zone but also in the zones of adjacent armies.

All the above-mentioned qualities of missile/nuclear weapons allow them to be used for primary missions of destroying the enemy and, first of all, for missions of destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack, his aircraft on his airfields, his missile and nuclear warhead depots, his control points, his first echelon troops and his operational reserves in concentration areas, and in unloading and other areas, as well as his most important objectives of the rear.

If a count is made of the number of objectives in the offensive zone of a front, the destruction of which can be assigned to nuclear weapons, it would reveal that they greatly exceed the possible allotment of nuclear warheads for the operation. Table 1 shows the most typical objectives of an enemy field army, the destruction of which objectives can be assigned to nuclear arms.

In order to insure success in an offensive operation, when only a limited amount of nuclear warheads is available, it is necessary to exercise great care in selecting the objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons. They must truly be the most important objectives, the destruction of which will result in achieving fire superiority over the enemy, a sharp change in the relative strength of forces in our favor, the loss of control by the enemy, and, as a result, the creation of most favorable conditions for operations by tank, motorized infantry and airborne large units and units in completing the total rout of the enemy. The first to be destroyed are the enemy's means of nuclear attack, his main grouping, including those troops occupying defensive positions in the tactical zone, his most important operational reserves, and his large control points.

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The experience of command-staff exercises and of exercises with troops shows that the staffs, when planning missile/nuclear strikes, often fail to take into consideration the nature of targets and the fire capabilities of missile units and large units. The yields of nuclear charges needed for the destruction of specific targets are estimated by eye (na glazok), without taking into account the actual characteristics of the missiles or the nature of the targets. Estimates of the expected result from each missile/nuclear strike and of the possible enemy losses suffered from a massed strike are not made. All this produces a wasteful expenditure of powerful means of destruction and, as a result, considerably reduces the fire effect upon the enemy.

When planning missile/nuclear strikes, the combined-arms staffs and the staffs of missile troops and artillery of a front or army and, in a number of cases, of a corps and division, besides selecting objectives for destruction, designating a missile unit or large unit to carry out each fire mission, and resolving many other problems, also have to select the yield of a nuclear charge needed for the destruction of each target and estimate the expected result of fire against each target by charges of a given yield.

The destruction of each of the targets shown in Table 1 calls for a nuclear charge of a definite yield. The latter depends on the nature and size of the target, the accuracy in preparation of fire, the effect of the nuclear charge at the target, and the assumed value of the index of fire effectiveness.

Accuracy in preparation of fire is the result of the total effect of technical dispersion of a given type of missile and of errors in the preparation of fire data. It is defined as a mean error determined from tables of fire or with the help of tables prepared in advance.

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Table 1

The Most Typical Objectives for Destruction by Nuclear Weapons

Name of objective	Element of objective to be destroyed	Distance from forward edge, in km	Area of objective, in sq km	Approximate number in field army zone
Missile means of nuclear attack	Materiel	50-150	-	35 (92)*
Batteries of 203.2mm howitzers and 280mm guns	Personnel in trenches	4-10	-	51
Infantry and tank companies of the first echelon of divisions	same as above	-	3	85
Battle groups and tank battalions of the second echelon of divisions	Personnel in trenches and tanks	10-30	12-25	19
Infantry divisions of second echelon of army corps (AK) and field army (PA) in areas of concentration	Exposed personnel	60-200	300	3

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Name of objective	Element of objective to be destroyed	Distance from forward edge, in km	Area of objective, in sq km	Approximate number in field army zone
Armored divisions of second echelon of AK and PA in areas of concentration	same as above	60-200	400	3
Tank battalions of Reserve of the High Command (RGK) in areas of concentration	same as above	25-70	12	4
Command posts of infantry divisions (PD), AK, PA, and army group	Vehicles in shelters	8-170	3-20	17
Field airfields of tactical aviation (TVA) and company airfields of army aviation	Aircraft	20-400	1-35	32
Control and warning centers and control centers for aviation in the sector	Radar in shelters	30-300	1-2	4

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Name of objective	Element of objective to be destroyed	Distance from forward edge, in km	Area of objective, in sq km	Approximate number in zone
Army supply depots, nuclear warhead supply points, and special weapons depots of the forward area.	Light type of blind-ages	30-250	4-25	13
"Nike"and "Hawk" SAM batteries	Materiel	10 and more	-	72

*Shown in parentheses is number of launching mounts.

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The effect of a nuclear burst at the target depends on the yield of the nuclear charge, the type of burst (air or surface), and the degree of target protection. The radius of the zone of destruction serves as the characteristic of the effect of a nuclear burst.

Numerical characteristics of probability are called indices of fire effectiveness and are used to help estimate the possible results of fire. In carrying out a nuclear strike against enemy means of nuclear attack, or against other small-sized targets, the result of the firing can be either full destruction (annihilation) or non-destruction of the target. Consequently, a probability of destruction of the target may be assumed, and is assumed, to be the index of fire effectiveness.

In firing on collective targets (infantry company, battle group, command post, etc) which occupy comparatively large areas, the results of fire may vary in each individual case. In some cases the target may be annihilated completely, and in other cases only partially destroyed, in which event its combat effectiveness may be lost completely, partially, or not at all. And, finally, the target may not be destroyed at all. Because of this, fire effectiveness against collective targets is estimated not on the basis of probability of destruction of the target, but on the basis of the size of its smallest part to be destroyed with a prescribed probability. In planning fire for annihilation, the size of the smallest part of the target must be such that as a result of its destruction the entire target loses its combat effectiveness.

Used as supplementary indices of fire effectiveness against collective targets are the mathematical expectancy of the relative value (percentage) of the destroyed part of the target and the largest possible percentage of the destroyed part of the target.

The location, nature, and size of the target are usually determined as a result of reconnaissance, but the distribution of individual elements within the target area is usually not known. Therefore, in computing indices of fire effectiveness, it is assumed that individual elements

of the target are evenly distributed over its entire area. Consequently, instead of determining the size of the smallest part of the target, the size of the smallest part of the target area covered by the zone of burst of a nuclear charge with a given probability is determined. It is considered that the percentage of the target area covered by a nuclear burst zone equals the percentage of the destroyed part of the target's elements.

When selecting the yield of a nuclear charge for a single missile launching, as well as when determining the expenditure of missiles for the destruction of targets if the yield of one available charge proves to be insufficient, it is necessary to know the value of the fire effectiveness index. The values of indices cannot be established on the basis of theoretical considerations alone. Their selection is based on combat operational experience and on various economic, production, and technical considerations. The accumulation of combat experience and the consideration of changes in enemy troops morale, arms, tactics, and technical equipment, and in production and economic capabilities, bring about changes in fire effectiveness requirements.

At the present time, when selecting yields of nuclear charges, the probability of destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack and of other small-sized targets is assumed to be 90 percent. This means that, when firing against such targets with charges of a selected yield, in 90 cases out of 100 they will be annihilated, while in the other 10 they will not be destroyed.

When selecting yields of nuclear charges for the annihilation of collective targets, the minimum size of target area which, when destroyed, constitutes the destruction of the entire target, is 40 percent. Thus, the probability of destruction of at least 40 percent of the target area is assumed to be equal to 90 percent. This means that, when firing charges of a selected yield on collective targets, in 90 cases out of 100, 40 percent or more of the target area will be annihilated, while in the other 10 cases less then 40 percent of the target area will be destroyed. In the future the minimum part of the target area with 90 percent destruction probability will be called the reliably destroyed area (nadezhno porazhayemaya ploshchad) and will be designated S_o.


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The physical basis for the rules of selecting the necessary yield of a nuclear charge for the destruction of small-sized targets is shown in Sketch 1, and of collective targets in Sketch 2.

Sketch 1



Sketch 1. Yield of nuclear charge necessary for the destruction of an individual target.

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
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Ground zero of nuclear burst will not be beyond the circle area of radius R, with probability of P=90%

Yield of nuclear charge q is determined by the size of the radius of destruction zone R, assuring the destruction of not less than 40% of the target elements



With this deviation of ground zero of nuclear burst from the center of the target, the number of destroyed elements of target equals 40%

Symbols:

Ts	Center of collective target (point of aim)
E	Ground zero (center) of nuclear burst
Rts	Radius of target
Rz	Radius of the zone of destruction



With this deviation of ground zero of nuclear burst from center of target, the number of destroyed elements of target is over 40%

Sketch 2. Nuclear charge yield necessary for the destruction of a collective target. (TR = tank company)

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When selecting the necessary yield of a nuclear charge, it is necessary, first of all, to determine the radius of the nuclear burst zone, R_z, which will assure coverage by the burst zone of the entire small-sized target, or 40 percent of the area of a collective target. For this, a circumference is drawn, using the aiming point (center of the target) as its center, with a radius, R, that would assure 90 percent probability of hitting within its circle in firing a given missile at a given range (Sketches 1 and 2).

The radius of a nuclear burst zone, R_z, which will assure the destruction of a small-sized target is assumed to be equal to the radius of the drawn circle (Sketch 1).

When determining the radius of a zone, R_z, which will assure the destruction of a collective target, a point on the circumference of radius R (Sketch 2) is selected as the center of a circle with a radius that would have the circle over 40 percent of the collective target.

Using the calculated radius of the zone R_z, it is possible, with the help of special reference books, to determine the yield of nuclear charge necessary for the destruction of a given target, depending on the nature and degree of cover of the target and on the type of nuclear burst (air or surface).

In practice, the yields of nuclear charges necessary for the destruction of given targets are determined with the help of previously prepared charts or tables. Charts P-1, found in the Information Collection of the Artillery No. 50, may serve as samples of such charts. The tables are found in the Manual of Firing and Fire Control of Operational-Tactical Missiles.

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
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Sketch 3. Chart of the Relationship of the Required Nuclear Charge Yields to Firing Errors and the Nature of the Target.

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Sketch 3, which was prepared for the typical targets listed in Table 1 and which is based on the average sizes of these targets, shows the relationship of the necessary yield of a nuclear charge, q, to the nature and size of the target and the characteristics of firing errors, when using the above-indicated values of indices of fire effectiveness.

With the help of this chart, on the basis of a known value of the characteristics of errors in fire preparation, r, of a given type of missile, it is not difficult to determine the yield of a nuclear charge of a given type of missile necessary to annihilate the target.

Example 1.
Determine the yield of nuclear charge, q, necessary for the destruction of a mount of a "Redstone" guided missile with an air burst, when firing a missile, whose average error in fire preparation is 540 m.

On the chart in Sketch 3, a perpendicular line is drawn from point r = 540m to where it intersects Line No. 28, which represents the launching mounts for the "Corporal" and "Redstone" guided missiles. The reading on the vertical axis opposite the point of intersection is q = 120 kt.

The above answer means that, when firing a missile with a mean firing preparation error of 540 m and a nuclear charge with a yield, q = 120 kt, a "Redstone" guided missile mount will be destroyed with a probability of 90 percent.

Example 2.
With the same conditions as in Example 1, determine the yield of nuclear charge necessary to annihilate a battle group in a concentration area.

On the same chart draw a perpendicular from point r = 540 to where it crosses Line No. 7, which represents a battle group in a concentration area. The reading on the vertical axis opposite the point of intersection is q = 27 kt.

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The above answer means that under the specified conditions a nuclear charge with a yield of q = 27 kt will annihilate not less than 40 percent of the target area with a probability of 90 percent.

A study of the chart showing the relationship of the necessary yield of a nuclear charge q to the nature of the target and the characteristics of firing errors allows the following conclusions to be drawn.

1. With an increase in the errors of fire preparation, r, there is an increase in the yields of nuclear charge necessary to destroy the target. For example, to annihilate a "Corporal" or "Redstone" guided missile launching mount with a missile, when the mean error of fire preparation is r = 100 m, a nuclear charge of approximately 2 kt is required, and, when r = 500 m, a charge of approximately 90 kt yield is required.

2. When firing missiles which have a mean fire preparation error of 0 to 300 m, the nuclear charge yield, q, necessary to annihilate a collective target depends on the nature and size of target and does not depend, or depends only to a small degree, on the characteristics of firing errors. For example, to annihilate a battle group in a concentration area (Line No. 7 of the graph in Sketch 3) with a missile, when the mean fire preparation error is r = 0, the required yield of nuclear charge is q = 18 kt. To annihilate the same target, but with a missile with a mean error of fire preparation of r = 300 m, a nuclear charge of the same yield, q = 18 kt, is required.

It follows that, based on the requirements for the destruction of collective targets, in creating new missiles, primarily those of an operational-tactical designation, the accuracy of fire preparation may be within the limits of 200-300 m.

However, in the course of combat there will be instances when the distance between small units of our own troops and the counterattacking (attacking) sub-units of the enemy, or the enemy's line of resistance, will be 1.5 to 2 km. In these instances, the nuclear charge yield and the mean fire preparation error must be minimal in order to insure a safe distance of 1.5 to 2 km for our own troops. Figures show that this requirement

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is met by missiles with a mean fire preparation error of not more than 100 m and with a nuclear charge yield of 1 to 2 kt. The aforementioned missiles will allow the annihilation to the required degree of destruction, of such most typically close combat targets as an infantry company on the offensive or on the defensive. These same missiles will assure the destruction of enemy tactical means of nuclear attack and certain other targets shown in Table 1.

3. It is evident from the chart (Sketch 3) that when there are large fire preparation errors, the nuclear charge yield necessary for the annihilation of a collective target depends to a large degree on the nature of the target and fire errors, and not on the size of the target. For example, with a mean fire preparation error of r = 1000 m, the same nuclear charge yield, q = 120 kt, is required for the annihilation of an infantry company on the offensive in an area of 1 sq km or of a battle group on the offensive in an area of 20 sq km (these targets are represented on the chart by Lines No. 1 and 2). To annihilate these same targets when they are on the defensive, and when the personnel are protected in trenches (these targets are represented on the chart by Lines No. 4 and 5), a nuclear charge with a yield of 500 to 550 kt is required.

It is evident from the examples cited above that missiles which have large errors in fire preparation and which have a maximum range of over 500 km must be armed with charges of large yields (from 100 to 600 kt) and be used for the annihilation of large collective targets. It is inadvisable to use such missiles and charges in firing on small-sized collective targets, because the employment of large yields of nuclear charges against such targets would be wasteful.

The chart in Sketch 3 may be used directly when planning nuclear strikes against various targets. Also, with the help of this chart, it is possible to prepare, in advance, tables of the yields of nuclear charges necessary for the destruction of various targets by a single firing of a missile of a given type.

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It is evident from the chart (Sketch 3) that the annihilation of the targets shown in Table 1 with the assumed degree of destruction requires nuclear charges of yields from 1 to 500 kt and higher. In practice, each type of missile has a small choice of nuclear charge yields with which all the missions for this missile must be fulfilled. For example, the missile R-170 has nuclear charges with yields of 10, 20, and 40 kt. Therefore, when planning missile/nuclear strikes and determining the necessary yield of the charge, one also has to determine the expected degree of destruction when firing on the target with a charge of a given yield, i.e., to find out what the value of the fire effectiveness index will be, if a given target is hit with a nuclear strike with a yield which is different from one selected in accordance with the chart (Sketch 3).

At the present time, this very important problem is solved with the help of previously prepared charts, ..., such as the ones found in the Information Collection of the Artillery No. 50. These charts permit, with realistically acceptable accuracy, the determination of the expected degree of destruction for any nuclear charge yield.

As previously stated, tactical and operational/tactical missiles have a comparatively small choice of nuclear charge yields; this makes it possible to draw up in advance for each yield quite simple charts of the relationship of the degree of destruction (the probability, P, of destruction of a small-sized target or of the reliably destroyed area, S_o, of a collective target) to the nature of the target and fire preparation errors.

Sketch 4 shows an example of such a chart drawn for a nuclear charge with a yield of 40 kt and for the targets listed in Table 1.

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
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Sketch 4. Chart of the Relationship of the Degree of Target Destruction to the Nature of the Target and Firing Errors

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Sketch 4. Chart of the Relationship of the Degree of Target Destruction to the Nature of the Target and Firing Errors

№	Nature of Target
1.	Infantry company of the first echelon on the offensive
2.	Battle group of the second echelon on the offensive
3.	Tank battalion on the offensive
4.	An infantry company and a tank company on the defensive
5.	Battle group of the second echelon on the defensive
6.	Tank battalion on the defensive
7.	Battle group of an infantry division (PD) of the second echelon in a concentration area
8.	Infantry division in a concentration area
9.	Tank battalion in a concentration area
10.	Motorized infantry battalion in a concentration area
11.	Armored division in a concentration area
12.	Field artillery battalion in a concentration area
13.	Tank battalion of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK), in a concentration area
14.	Division command post.
15.	Army corps command post
16.	Field army command post
17.	Army group command post
18.	Field airfield of tactical aviation
19.	Airfield of army aviation
20.	Control and warning center
21.	Sector aviation control center
22.	Army nuclear warhead supply point
23.	Tank battalion column
24.	Column of a battle group and a battalion of "Corporal" guided missiles
25.	Column of battalions of "Honest John" free rockets and "Lacrosse"guided missiles
26.	Launching site for "Honest John", "Lacrosse", "Hawk", "Nike"
27.	Launching site for "Corporal", "Redstone"
28.	Launching site for "Matador", "Mace"
29.	280 mm and 203.2 mm battery

_____ Means of nuclear attack
- - - - Command posts
-x-x Aircraft on airfields
-o—o— Crews in tanks
—.—.— Exposed personnel
—..—..— Personnel in trenches
—oo—oo— Personnel in light shelters

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Besides the expected degree of destruction, such a chart also reveals the largest possible percentage of the destroyed portion of a collective target. The expected degree of destruction is determined in a way similar to that of determining the necessary nuclear charge yield from the chart in Sketch 3. In order to arrive at the maximum possible percentage of the destroyed part of a collective target, r is assumed to be equal to 0, and the rest is done in the same manner as when determining the expected degree of destruction.

Example 3.
Determine the reliably destroyed area and the highest possible percentage of the destroyed part of a battle group in a concentration area, if it is planned to fire a missile with a nuclear charge of 40 kt yield and with a mean fire preparation error of r = 600 m.

On the chart in Sketch 4, a perpendicular line is drawn from point r = 600 m to where it intersects with Line No. 7, which represents a battle group in a concentration area. The reading on the vertical axis opposite the point of intersection is S_o = 44 percent. The reading at the point of intersection of Line No. 7 with the vertical axis (r = 0) is S_o = 65 percent.

The result obtained indicates that, when firing under specified conditions, in 99 cases out of 100 the destruction of the target area will be 44 to 65 percent. In the other 10 cases the destruction will be less than 44 percent of the target.

It may happen in practice that, in order to achieve destruction of a given target, a nuclear charge of a certain yield is required but that the only charges available are those of a different yield. If the yield of the charge is greater than is required, the reliability of destruction of a given target will be greater. Example 2 shows that in order to destroy a battle group in a concentration area, a nuclear charge of q = 27 kt is required. It is not difficult to determine from the chart in Sketch 4 that if the same target, under the same conditions, is hit with a nuclear charge of 40 kt yield, the reliably destroyed part of the target area will be 48 percent instead of 40 percent.

If the yield of an available nuclear charge is smaller than that necessary for the destruction of a given target, several nuclear charges may be used in order to fulfil the fire mission with the required reliability. The number of nuclear charges equivalent to one charge of a required yield may be determined from tables usually found in the manuals for firing and fire control of tactical and operational-tactical missiles.

It should be noted that if there is no tactical necessity for a simultaneous strike by all the missiles assigned to a given target, it is advisable to deliver the strikes successively. However, each successive strike is to be made only if the previous one failed to destroy the target.

Very often a target, especially such as the means of nuclear attack, will be destroyed by the initial firing with a nuclear charge of a small yield. Thus, Example 1 shows that the nuclear charge needed to destroy a "Corporal" guided missile mount must be 120 kt. If, under the same conditions, a strike is made with a charge of 40 kt, then, as is evident from the chart in Sketch 4, the probability of destruction of this target with the first strike will be 67 percent. This means that in 67 cases out of 100 the target will be destroyed by the very first shot. A second shot will be necessary only in 33 cases out of 100.

In conclusion, we wish to note that the above-mentioned problems of evaluation of fire effectiveness, although basically simple, are labor-consuming and take up much of the time and energy of generals and staff officers. Electronic computers capable of rapidly solving not only such problems as were mentioned here, but many other problems dealing with troop and fire control, are being developed at the present time and will be issued to the troops as they become available.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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7 JUN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tank Troops", by Major-General of Tank Troops G. Zavizion

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms 1.3(a)(4)

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tank Troops", by Major-General of Tank Troops G. Zavizion

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tank Troops", by Major-General of Tank Troops G. Zavizion.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The Zhadov article cited on page 2 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.

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Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tank Troops

by

Major-General of Tank Troops G. Zavizion

The necessity of constant study and research of the organizational forms of the types of armed forces and arms of troops is evoked by the rapid development of the means of armed combat and the changes taking place in the methods of its conduct. Therefore, it is no mere chance that in recent times, considerable attention is devoted to questions of improvement of the existing, and creation of a new, organization of troops in the pages of the military press, higher military-educational institutions and among the troops.

Quite properly, in our opinion, General of the Army A. S. Zhadov noted in his article that modern armies are more and more being equipped with the latest means of armed combat, which require corresponding organizational development, and that the problems of the improvement of the organization of the troops are now posed by life itself.[1]

At the Military Academy of the Armored Troops, a military-scientific conference was conducted, where the problems of the employment of tank troops and the prospects of the future development of their organizational forms were examined.

Marshal of Armored Troops P.A. Rotmistrov, in his lecture, convincingly showed the basic directions which the improvement of the organizational structure of the tank troops should take. In the course of the work of the conference this question was subjected to wide discussion.

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Second Issue, 1961.

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In the present article, taking cognizance of the opinions expressed at the aforementioned conference and in the periodical military press, we would like to present several proposals as to the paths of future development of the operational forms of our tank troops.

The organizational forms of the tank troops must conform fully to the conditions and requirements of the conduct of operations of a missile/nuclear missile war with effective use of combat equipment. They must raise the offensive capabilities of the tank troops, ensuring the independent delivery by tank formations and large units of deep and powerful missile/nuclear and tank strikes with the aim of maximum destruction of the enemy and successful accomplishment of operational and combat tasks of the most diverse kind and intensity.

First of all, it is necessary to raise sharply the firepower and the penetrating ability of tank troops, which now must be understood as the aggregate of powerful nuclear fire and the swift strike of tank large units and units. This can be achieved by saturating the tank troops with organic missile units and subunits, having as armament missiles with great range and accuracy of destruction compared with those presently in being, increasing their total number, and also by creating new tank armament, capable in the course of combat of successfully destroying enemy objectives and eliminating the need for conventional artillery to the extent that it has been present up to this time. In the composition of tank troops, along with missile/nuclear means, it is important to have, not the usual tube artillery, but subunits and units of rocket artillery, capable of delivering massed fire against objectives not neutralized by missile/nuclear weapons and deployed on such areas that their destruction would require calling for concentrated fire of entire artillery or tank subunits. It is self-evident that the organic combination of tank and missile troops by amalgamating them into one easily controlled tank troop organism will give the greatest effect, if in addition we replace the existent armored equipment with new, more mobile vehicles, having better roadability and maneuverability, and create missile means with smaller overall dimensions than at present.

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IRONBARK The increase of firepower, striking force, mobility, and maneuverability will ensure the high mobility of the tank troops and their capability to conduct combat operations independently to a considerably large depth, at high speeds. Namely, this must be considered the most important thing in the future development of tank troops, the basis of which must be tank subunits and units and the missile troops paving the way for them. Saturation of tank troops with missile/nuclear weapons and new tank equipment will bring about a reduction in the personnel and auxiliary equipment, not taking part in combat directly.

We feel, that further development of the organizational forms of tank troops should also take the line of considerably increasing their ability to survive under conditions of a missile/nuclear war.

In a modern battle and operation, the least vulnerable to nuclear bursts are the tank crews (ekipazh) and missile launcher crews, (raschet) covered by heavy armor. To increase the offensive capabilities of the large units and formations of tank troops, along with equipping them with essentially new tank and missile armament, it is also necessary that the auxiliary organic means not differ from the new tanks in their antinuclear stability, maneuverability, and mobility.

Primary in ensuring the tank troops' viability will be the increase of their nuclear power, which, in the course of the operation, will allow them quickly and to a great depth, to neutralize reliably the enemy's nuclear means of attack.

On a level with increasing the mobility and defensibility of the tank large units and formations from the destructive factors of a nuclear burst, improving the viability of the tank troops will also promote establishment of the maximum possible uniformity of their organization.

Uniformity of units and large units, under modern conditions, must be viewed as an indication of the strength and stability of the organization of troops. It is achieved by unity of the form of organization of tank troops, the presence in the units and large units of similar type tank subunits and the maximum possible equality of the mobility and defensive characteristics of the different

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auxiliary combat equipment to those of the tanks, and also the presence in them of the minimum number of mechanized infantry in the new combat vehicles.

The subunits of mechanized infantry, antiair defense, rear services, security and command in the tank large units also should have increased roadability and their personnel should be covered with armor with new defensive features. The interests of increasing the viability of the tank large units also require an organizational change in the supporting subunits. For example, there is an urgent necessity to centralize the antiair defense means in large measure, which will considerably simplify the control of them and will ensure more dependable troop cover in the course of combat operations.

For the purpose of maintaining the constant combat effectiveness of the tank troops and, consequently, increasing their viability, it is required that a constant reserve of subunits and units be included in their complement.

It is also necessary organizationally and technically to ensure the capability of the tank units and large units to liquidate independently and quickly the results of enemy nuclear and chemical attack. This need may be answered by training the troops to take the proper measures and equipping tank units and large units with special, highly efficient organic means.

Great significance under modern conditions is attributed to the capability of the tank units and large units to, repair in a short time, armored and other equipment damaged as a result of massed missile/nuclear weapon strikes and conventional means of destruction. In view of this, it is necessary to have repair-rehabilitation subunits and units, equipped with high-efficiency means in the tank troops.

Increasing the tank troops' viability and that of the ground troops as a whole, to a significant degree, will promote the radical realignment of the system of control with the introduction of means of automation and mechanization, and also alteration of the organizational structure of staffs, directed toward elimination of some

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levels and increasing the mobility of the control points.

Finally, the reorganization of rear services subunits, units, and installations, wider use of air transport for support of swift maneuver and accomplishment of the tasks of supplying the troops in the course of vigorous and continuous combat operations - is one of the most important conditions for increasing their viability. With this aim, we consider it necessary to reinforce the tank army with military-transport aviation means.

Such, in our opinion, are the general principles, on the basis of which the organizational forms of the ground forces can be developed practically and above all those of tank formations, large units, and units.

We feel that the tank army's prospective organization may consist of five tank divisions, one missile brigade (division), one PVO division, separate reconnaissance units, and units of rear support, and also separate tank and mechanized units of the reserve of the army.

In a tank division there may be four tank regiments; in a regiment - three tank and one mechanized battalion or five tank and one mechanized company. With such variations of organization, the tank division loses the need for a motorized rifle regiment in it.

In a tank battalion (in the case of battalion organization) it is expedient to have three companies of 10 tanks each. In the absence of a battalion level, a tank company may consist of 16 tanks. In a division as a whole there may, accordingly, be 380 or 320 tanks and 100 or 60 infantry combat vehicles.

Calculations show that the number of personnel and auxiliary equipment in the tank army and division of the proposed organization will be considerably reduced (though the army will also include one more division than at the present time). On the whole, this will give the division and army great mobility.

In the organization under discussion, a more efficient correlation of tank and mechanized subunits is foreseen.

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For example, there is one mechanized company to 3.5 - 4 tank, whereas in the present organization there is one motorized rifle company to 2.7 tank companies. In this, in the complement of the tank army the number of new infantry combat vehicles will not exceed 300 to 500 units, that is, there will be a considerable reduction compared to the number of armored personnel carriers (800 units), available at the present time.

The tank army of the proposed organization, in overall numbers of tanks, will exceed a US field army made up of nine divisions and our own combined arms army of two tank and three motorized rifle divisions. This will ensure it the capability of successfully accomplishing the tasks of modern operations, where engagements and battles will be predominantly of a tank nature. The presence of five divisions in the complement of an army will broaden its capabilities for delivering strikes and for participating in operations on two axes. For defeat of the enemy in a meeting engagement and accomplishment of other tasks it will not be necessary to call in all the forces of an army, which happens at the present time, with four divisions in an army. In addition, the army will be able to carry out wider maneuver with its large units.

The creation in the tank army of a reserve consisting of two tank and one mechanized regiment will provide the opportunity in the course of an operation for the timely reinforcement of one or another division and maintain its combat effectiveness, without drawing on units of the second echelon for this and without taking the whole division out of combat. The expediency of having a reserve will be seen especially in that case, when units of one of the divisions suffer heavy casualties from the enemy's nuclear weapons, in the operations of the army on a wide front, with great intervals between large units, etc. Do not forget, that the reserve regiments of the army will constantly be replenished from those units which are taken out of combat. Replacement of the personnel of reserve regiments should be carried out first of all by detachments of those who have recovered, and tanks - by tanks of the army maintenance pool.

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The mechanized regiment of the army reserve can be used as an airborne force and for the accomplishment of tasks which suddenly arise.

We have indicated above two possible variants of the organization of a tank regiment, with the battalion level and without it.

In our opinion, the battalion level of command in tank units should be abolished. We shall try to substantiate this.

First of all, let us note, that under the conditions of a nuclear/missile war the lowest tactical element which can accomplish tasks independently, and in the interests of which it is possible to employ nuclear/missile weapons must be considered to be the regiment. It, as a tactical unit, unites within itself the different arms of troops and means of combat, and has the necessary rear services. Now, when combat operations have become more maneuverable and acquired a clustered nature it is the regiment that must become the last level in which are carried out the most tightly coordinated operations of all forces and means and the direction of their efforts toward the fulfilment of combat missions. Therefore, the regiment is able to conduct combat operations on independent axes and considerably removed from the main forces of the division, cooperating during this, with tactical missile means and, when necessary, with aviation.

What, under these conditions is the role of the battalion level of command? Due to the fact that the combat operations of the battalion will be spread out over larger sectors than previously, the commander of the battalion will be unable to observe personally the course of combat operations of all subunits and directly organize and control the tank companies in combat.

Now the focal point of the organization of the attack and combat in depth has shifted to the company commander. The practice of combat training and tactical exercises shows that the commander and staff of a battalion, in organizing combat, basically duplicate all that is done by the commander and staff of a regiment. The battalion

has no organic support means so it is reinforced by regimental means whose tasks are determined by the regimental commander. Therefore, the role of the battalion commander is now reduced only to organizing the attack, which is the function of the company commander. Besides, for independent accomplishment of tactical tasks, the battalion always needs reinforcement and the constant presence of rear services subunits.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the battalion is an intervening level.

The tank battalion has three companies, always operating in the same "stereotyped" pattern of battle order, independent of the conditions of a situation as they actually develop. More often than not, in the first echelon, two companies operate, and in the second - one company. With considerable losses in tanks, the battalion battle order usually consists of one echelon (almost all the tanks "on the line"), with the detaching of several tanks to the reserve. In these cases the commanders of companies and platoons turn into commanders of regular line tanks. Consequently, the battalion cannot vary the pattern of the battle order, in connection with which maneuver in the course of battle is sharply restricted.

We must also contend with the fact, that the tank battalion is a compact and attractive tactical objective for delivery of strikes by nuclear/missile weapons. With any pattern of its battle order, a considerable portion of its subunits will receive hits from a nuclear warhead with a yield of 20 to 40 kilotons, after which the battalion will really lose its combat effectiveness. Combat effectiveness will also be reduced in the regiment in which, in this case, there are only two battalions remaining.

The tank regiment in the proposed organization, with five tank companies and one mechanized company in its complement, will be capable of carrying out wider maneuver of its subunits in the course of battle; concentrate its efforts on one or, if necessary, on several axes, and each time adopt that battle order which suits the actual conditions of the situation to the maximum degree. In

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case of destruction of one, or even two, tank companies by the enemy's nuclear weapons, the tank regiment will be significantly more combat effective than with the loss of one battalion in the present organization.

With the new regimental organization, without the battalion level, the time for organization of the battle will also be sharply reduced. The regimental commander, having made and announced his decision, will be occupied with the organization of the battle and the commander of the company directly with the organization of the attack. This organization will be more acceptable for future tank troops with fundamentally new tank weapons and improved missile means.

The chief factor determining the development of the organizational forms of the troops is nuclear/missile weapons, with the employment of which are created favorable conditions for the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations. The nuclear/missile means now available in the tank division and tank army do not fully answer the requirements of modern operations and combat qualitatively. Of the six (R-170) missile mounts comprising the army missile brigade, it is conceivably possible to have not more than three constantly ready for launching, which, with only eight (R-30) missile launchers (raketnaya ustanovka) in the divisions, does not allow reliable destruction of the enemy in the zone of the army with missile fire. The inadequate maximum range of the organic (voyskovaya) missiles has an adverse effect on assuring the rapidity of operations of large units of the army and their independence in accomplishment of combat tasks, and also makes their participation in a massed army nuclear/missile strike more difficult. For this reason, organic missiles are obliged to move about unceasingly, within the combat formations of units, with the result that the effectiveness of their fire is sharply reduced, and they themselves are constantly under the threat of destruction by the enemy's conventional means.

In our opinion, for the successful conduct of modern operations, taking into account the trend of future development of nuclear/missile weapons, another solution

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to the question of the availability of nuclear/missile means in the tank army is required.

First of all, the quantity of tactical and operational-tactical missile troops must be increased and their quality improved.

In the tank division it is necessary to have that number of missile mounts, which will ensure the conduct of independent combat operations to a considerable depth and at high speeds. Together with this, the missile means of divisions must be capable of executing maneuver by fire along the front and in the depth for the purpose of delivering massed nuclear strikes against the enemy jointly with army missile units. In our opinion, it is necessary to establish tank-missile subunits in the tank divisions, that is, to have tank missile mounts as armament.

Keeping in mind the prospective organization of tank large units, we figure that in each tank division the missile battalion (raketnyy divizion) must be replaced by a missile regiment (polk) of three tank-missile companies, with 4 to 6 mounts in each company, with a range of fire up to 100 km. A rocket battalion (reaktivnyy divizion) (three or four batteries of mounts of the "Grad" type) also should be included in the complement of a division.

In the army, instead of the missile brigade, it is necessary to have a missile division (brigade), composed of 3 or 4 regiments (battalions) of 4 to 6 mounts in each, with a range of fire up to 500 km.

Such an increase in the range of fire of tactical and operational-tactical missiles fills the requirements of supporting the combat operations of tank divisions to the depth of the task of the day, and of the tank army - to the depth of its immediate task (300 to 400 km), without changing, or with only a single change of siting areas, and also the execution of maneuver by fire along the front and in the depth. In addition, this will promote high tempos of offensive, closer fire coordination of division missiles with army missiles, and of the army's missiles with those of the front.

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An increase in the number of missile mounts in the tank divisions and the tank army will, on the whole, raise the power and effectiveness of the nuclear destruction of the enemy and will make it possible, in the course of an operation, to deliver massed strikes of missiles with chemical and conventional filler against him. The proposed number of missile mounts will increase their number in the present tank army by four times, which, in conjunction with their increasedrange and effectiveness of fire, significantly increases the capabilities of the prospective organization of the tank army. Calculations show, that with this number of missile mounts, it is possible with one salvo to inflict overall incapacitation on personnel in tanks, in an area of up to 270 km^2, which considerably exceeds the nuclear power of an army corps of the US Army, reinforced to the maximum with nuclear means of attack.

The proposed centralization of the means of antiair defense (PVO) in the tank army envisages their concentration in one combat large unit, for example, in a PVO division, directly subordinate to the army commander. This will allow reliable screening of the troops of an army from enemy strikes from the air and will reduce the number of intervening levels of command of these means. A large unit such as a PVO division should take entirely upon itself the function of protection of the troops of the army from the air. With this, the necessity for having an intervening level of command in the person of the chief of PVO troops and his apparatus disappears, as all control of PVO means will be concentrated in the hands of the commander of the division.

The organizational structure of the PVO division should ensure the possibility of its employment both in its entire complement as well as by portions of it, and its technical equipment should ensure successful conduct of antimissile and antiaircraft combat.

As already mentioned, an important role in the improvement of maneuverability of forces and means of a tank army in the course of an operation should be played by its reinforcement with a group of military-transport aviation. In the complement of this group it is proposed to have the prospective transport aircraft and helicopters with

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a large payload capacity, with which it would be possible to carry out the maneuver of the forces and means of a tank army by air.

Maximum use of the capabilities of the new armament depends on the availability in the tank large units and formations of improved means of reconnaissance which ensure the continuous conduct of radiotechnical, aerial, deep and ground reconnaissance. Subunits and units of ground reconnaissance should be air transportable and have tanks with special equipment in their armament.

The increase of the capabilities of reconnaissance to ensure effective delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy entails the necessity of including new reconnaissance units and subunits in the complement of the tank army, namely: a regiment of aerial reconnaissance, separate radio and radiotechnical battalions and a company of deep reconnaissance. Furthermore, in a regiment of aerial reconnaissance it is advisable to have pilotless means of reconnaissance, and subunits of aviation and radiation reconnaissance. In the divisions, it is necessary to establish reconnaissance battalions with the means of ground, radiotechnical and deep reconnaissance.

The new organization of the tank troops will require introduction of substantial changes in the methods of troop control in a battle and an operation, and along with this, a review of the organizational structure of the organs of command. By now, in comparison with World War II, the methods and forms of conducting a tank army operation have changed considerably and new trends in the employment of tank troops are noted, but the methods of troop control have actually remained as of old. The organizational structure of the staffs of tank large units and formations, above all, should ensure mobility of troop control. For this, in an army and division, it is necessary to abolish the large number of small, incompetent, and secondary staffs, departments, and services.

We cannot disagree with the repeated statements in the press that the mobility of command can be increased if only the chief of staff, the chief of missile troops, the chief of rear services and tank-technical services

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are left directly subordinate to the commander of the army. This will free the commander from the solution of secondary questions and will assure him the opportunity of occupying himself in greater detail with the command of troops in the course of combat operations.

In the army staff it is advisable to have an operations-reconnaissance department, consisting of three sections, (planning, information, and regulation of the movement of troops); a communications department; and an engineer-technical department.

In the operations-reconnaissance department the officers of the planning section are called upon to plan the combat operations of troops and the employment of all means of combat. The responsibility of the officers of the information section should include the collection and collation of data on the situation and provision of timely operations-reconnaissance information to troops and staffs. The section for regulating the movement of troops is necessary for the organization of those numerous displacements of troops which take place in the course of the whole operation. The engineer technical department should carry on the preparation of data for the chief of staff on the combat capabilities of the engineer and chemical troops, and also supervise the accomplishment of tasks assigned to them.

An increase of the mobility of the work of the staffs will greatly promote the most rapid introduction of the means of mechanization and automation into the control of troops, and later, also the complex automation systems with electronic computing machines.

This general examination of the organizational structure of the staff of a tank army has in mind the creation of two equal and interchangeable command posts (CP Number 1 and CP Number 2) and a rear control point (TPU). In this, the means of communications of CP Number 1 and CP Number 2 can move along the primary axes of troop operations. The commander and the staff of the army can work at that CP where it will be most convenient for them at any given time, according to the situation. When the commander is working at CP Number 1, his deputy and a

group of officers are working at CP Number 2, ready to take over the control of the troops.

The fundamental postulates expounded in this article on the further development of the organizational forms of tank troops and their staffs can be fully substantiated only by providing them in special and regular troop and command-staff exercises.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

11 JUN 1962

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "A New Combat Vehicle", by Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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IRONBARK

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

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Intelligence Committee

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "A New Combat Vehicle", by Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "A New Combat Vehicle", written by Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The Rotmistrov article cited below was disseminated as [redacted], the Babadzhanyan article as [redacted] and Zhadov's article as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.

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A New Combat Vehicle

by

Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko

Recently, in our military press and in the military press abroad there has been wide discussion of the role of the armed forces and the arms of troops in a future war and of the directions of future development and improvement of combat equipment and armaments. A significant place in this discussion is devoted to determining the role of tanks in a modern battle and operation. This is not accidental because the firepower, armor protection, and mobility which are combined in tanks have always given them certain advantages over the other arms of troops and permitted the successful conduct of combat operations.

At the present time tank formations and large units also have the greatest mobility and resistance to destruction by nuclear weapons; therefore, in modern operations too they are able to fulfil the quite complex and responsible missions that are assigned to them.

But this does not mean that the modern tank must be considered the ultimate in the perfection of combat equipment and that it is fully suited to conducting combat operations under the new, complex conditions. We share the opinion of Marshal of Armored Troops P. A. Rotmistrov* about the need to increase the relative proportion of the tank troops at the front level and in the armed forces as a whole, and we consider it advisable and feasible to create and introduce into the ground troops, instead of the tank, an armored vehicle of a new type that, in its characteristics and utility, would

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* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961.

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fulfil the modern requirements to the maximum.

With the appearance of antitank guided missiles with shaped charges (PTURS) that have high armor-piercing capability, tanks lose one of their basic qualities — effective protection from the fire of these new weapons.

One cannot disagree with the opinion of Colonel-General A. Kh. Babadzhanyan*, who maintains that in single combat with an antitank missile launcher a tank will be defeated, and with the adequate saturation of the troops with these launchers, any tank attack may be broken up and a large part of the tanks participating in it destroyed, together with their crews.

It is true that antitank missiles have not yet been tried in combat and still have several shortcomings, but this is one of the types of weapons having the best long-range prospects and one which will be constantly improved. Therefore, there is little justification for the attempt by Marshal of Armored Troops P. A. Rotmistrov to prove that the new antitank missile weapons, with the availability of weapons of mass destruction, are not very dangerous for tanks and that their use allegedly will not greatly influence the employment and operations of tank troops.

In the near future, antitank missiles will comprise the greatest danger for tanks with any armor protection, and the use of the PTURS on armored vehicles and the improvement of the means of guiding the missile to the target will make them even more menacing weapons.

Should we pose the problem of further increasing the thickness of tank armor under these conditions? Of course not. One should speak of a sharp increase in the firepower of the tank by replacing the gun with a missile launcher.

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* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961.

A correct solution of this problem is offered by General of the Army A. S. Zhadov*, when he speaks of the need to arm the modern tank with the most advanced missile weapons, that ensure the destruction of any enemy tanks or other objectives at great distances during combat.

As far as the mobility of the tank is concerned, it is relative, and does not fully meet the requirements of a modern operation and battle, which are conducted at high tempos. Just as before, water barriers are a serious obstacle for heavy and medium tanks.

Therefore, destructibility by the fire of new antitank weapons, the comparatively weak firepower, and the inadequate cross-country ability and mobility of the tank demand its replacement by a combat vehicle of a more improved type, which is capable of performing comprehensive combat missions.

In a modern battle and operation, success is achieved by the joint efforts of the missile, tank, motorized rifle, artillery, and other large units and units in close coordination. But the fact that at the present time each arm of troops has different combat capabilities, unequal protective capability against the destructive factors of nuclear weapons, and therefore is not suited for the fulfilment of all the comprehensive operational and combat missions independently, can lead not only to the disruption of coordination but in several instances to the loss of the combat effectiveness of formations and large units.

That is why it is necessary to have a combat vehicle that, at the very least, would combine in itself the combat features that are inherent in tanks, missiles (artillery), and motorized rifle subunits. Such a vehicle must ensure the successful fulfilment of various combat tasks successively accomplished in the offensive and on defense, have maximum protection from weapons of mass destruction, and at the same

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* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Second Issue, 1961.

time serve as a means of transportation for personnel and armament. Firepower, armor protection, and mobility have to find a new balance in it, in the presence of a new quality — versatile, universal utility.

The new combat vehicle must have the following:

--improved means of reconnaissance and communications permitting the detection of enemy targets and objectives at great distances and the maintenance of reliable communications between vehicles, subunits, and units;

--powerful armament capable of destroying enemy personnel in armored vehicles and outside them and also various combat equipment at considerable distances;

--an adequate amount of ammunition, calculated for 1 to 2 calendar days of combat operations.

The speed of such a vehicle must reach up to 80 kph on roads and up to 50 kph off roads, and must have a supply of fuel for 700 to 1000 km and high cross-country ability, including rapid crossing of zones of radioactive contamination, water barriers, and various obstacles and obstructions.

Armor protection and hermetic sealing of the vehicle must ensure reliable protection of personnel from small-arms and fragmentation injuries and from the effects of radioactive and toxic substances, bacteriological agents, thermal radiation, and, if possible, the shock wave.

It is proposed to have the vehicle hold 7 or 8 persons, preferably with means for digging themselves in: a crew of 2 or 3 persons and a combat team of 4 or 5 persons having the capability of conducting fire directly from the vehicle in motion, and when necessary of performing combat missions after dismounting. At the same time, the team is assigned the duties of operating instruments, servicing the vehicle, concealing it, etc.

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Consequently, unlike the tank, on which riflemen can operate only as riders, in the proposed vehicle the team is an integral part of the vehicle, as well as of the combat element. It is planned to have the new combat vehicle simultaneously replace the tank, armored personnel carrier, and partially the gun with a prime mover.

Lieutenant-General N. F. Slyunin* also speaks of the need to create a new combat vehicle to replace the existing tank. However, he examines it from slightly different positions, taking the concept of atomic resistance as the basis for its creation and defending the retention of the combat vehicles for the infantry and artillery (for example, an artillery regiment remains in the division, etc.). Naturally, a vehicle of this type will not be a universal vehicle, but an improved armored personnel carrier which cannot eliminate the existence of tanks.

In the combat vehicle it is not absolutely necessary to have large stocks of foodstuffs and water, much less bunks to provide rest for the personnel, as proposed by Lieutenant-General N. F. Slyunin.

It appears to us that, besides the proposed combat vehicle, it is necessary to have vehicles capable of performing more complex fire missions. For this purpose, the means for using nuclear weapons, and also antiaircraft weapons, are mounted on such vehicles. The creation of groups of such vehicles in companies and regiments will strengthen the fire support of line subunits, give them great independence, and will ensure the successful fulfilment of combat missions.

For the firm and continuous control of troops, it is also necessary to have command combat vehicles with modern armament and equipped with the necessary means of communications.

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* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (56), 1961.

The basis of the combat formations of subunits and units under these conditions will be made up of line, command combat vehicles and a certain number of special combat vehicles comprising groups of fire support.

At the modern stage of development of Soviet tank building, the amphibious tank or the amphibious armored personnel carrier serve as the basis for creating a universal combat vehicle.

The introduction of a new type of combat vehicle into the armament of the troops will fundamentally influence the organization of the troops. First of all, the need ceases for arms of troops such as tank, motorized rifle, and artillery. To replace them, it is necessary to create unified armored troops with subunits, units, and large units of a unitary type.

The crew and team of each combat vehicle may be a squad, and 5 to 7 squads (vehicles) comprise a platoon. In the line vehicles of the platoon, it is advisable to have means for combating personnel, including those located in shelters, and enemy armored vehicles, for which it is possible to use missile weapons, large-caliber machine guns, and grenade launchers. It is desirable to have PTURS mounted on all vehicles.

In the company, it is advisable to have three platoons and a fire group (2 or 3 vehicles, including the commander's vehicle) with means for using nuclear weapons.

At the present time a tendency exists to have one or two intermediate levels between the company and the division. It appears to us that a division should consist of regiments in which it is advisable to have companies, but excluding the battalion level. The elimination of the battalion level with the presence of new combat vehicles of one type will not have a negative influence on the fulfilment of tasks by the regiment, even though the battalion, with the loss of combat effectiveness by two companies, will obviously lose its independence. Troop control and their dispersal during

combat operations will also become simplified. Besides that, the battalion level is not directly tied in with materiel and technical support measures.

With the introduction of the new combat vehicle, the regiment can consist of up to five companies, a fire group, means of combat support, and corresponding rear services.

The regimental commanding officer's fire group must include missile launchers, antiaircraft guns for combat with low-flying enemy airplanes, means for combating radio-technical equipment, and special vehicles for conducting reconnaissance. Special subunits to eliminate the after-effects of an enemy nuclear attack should be introduced into the regiment.

The unitary division may include 4 or 5 regiments having the same composition. This number of regiments will permit the execution of a broad maneuver on the battlefield, form the most diverse combat order, and disperse the troops even more, especially in depth. Naturally the division, apart from the regiments, will have the means of combat, materiel, and technical support. A division with the proposed complement will have a total of 500 to 600 combat vehicles, and it will have a strength of 6000 to 7000 men. Such a division will surpass a modern tank, and, especially, a motorized rifle division, in fire and striking power, and also in mobility and maneuverability.

In our opinion, the army must mainly have divisions with identical organization. When necessary, separate divisions may vary from the standard organization — for example, divisions intended for operations in a mountainous area, as an airborne force, etc.

We consider that for the timely reinforcement of divisions, wider use of airborne forces, and for performing other tasks, it is necessary to have one or two reserve regiments – 12 to 18 companies – in an army.

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These are our proposals for troop organization. At the present stage of development of the organizational structure of troops, the creation of new large units may be carried out on the basis of tank and motorized rifle divisions. For example, from two tank and two motorized rifle regiments it is possible to create a division composed of four regiments, with four companies in each regiment. Initially, the company can have 10 to 15 tanks, 4 or 5 armored personnel carriers, and fire support weapons. At first the basis of the combat power of such subunits will consist of tanks.

Closer coordination of tank and motorized rifle subunits is ensured with such organization. These will be detachments of a special type, having high maneuverability, great striking force, and the capability of performing combat tasks that are more varied in nature. Moreover, the faults of modern tank and motorized rifle regiments are eliminated, and measures connected with the dispersal of troops and increasing their viability will be conducted with greater success.

At the same time, the army may include separate divisions with a complement of modern motorized rifle regiments, but without tanks, with an adequate quantity of antitank weapons and more powerful weapons to neutralize the enemy with fire. Such "light" divisions may be designated for the consolidation of lines, for conducting combat operations in populated points and on terrain that is difficult for tanks to transit, and also may operate as airborne forces.

The proposed organizational measures permit the use among the troops, during combat training, of new methods of combat operations which meet modern requirements.

Only general questions of the creation of a new combat vehicle and the improvement of troop organization are set forth in this article. It seems to us that the time has come for a broader discussion in print of problems pertaining to this field of military theory and practice.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 JUN 1962

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The "FALLEX-60" Maneuvers of the Armed Forces of the NATO Aggressive Bloc", by Colonel-General S. Ivanov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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IRONBARK

Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The "FALLEX-60" Maneuvers of the Armed Forces of the NATO Aggressive Bloc", by Colonel-General S. Ivanov

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The "FALLEX-60" Maneuvers of the Armed Forces of the NATO Aggressive Bloc", written by Colonel-General S. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Ivanov's article on Exercise "SIDE STEP" was disseminated [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.

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The "FALLEX-60" Maneuvers of the Armed Forces of the NATO Aggressive Bloc

by Colonel-General S. Ivanov

From 20 September through 1 October 1960 maneuvers were held by the armed forces of the NATO aggressive bloc under the provisional name of "FALLEX-60". They embraced the territory of Europe, North Africa, the Central, Northern and Eastern Atlantic, the Baltic, North, and Mediterranean Seas, and also the territory of the USA and Canada.

Taking part in the maneuvers were the command elements and staffs of all the combined armed forces of NATO in Europe, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Theater of Military Operations, the command elements and staffs of formations and large units of ground troops, air forces and naval forces, aviation units of combined and national air forces, warships, ships, and land-based aircraft, ground and airborne troops, missile units, and atomic artillery - in all about 200 staffs, up to 5000 aircraft, 580 warships and ships and more than 200,000 men of the combined armed forces of the bloc. In addition there were involved in the maneuvers the general staffs and staffs of the branches of the armed forces, the command elements and staffs of air defense troops and territorial troops, the central directorates or departments of the ministries of internal affairs, transport, economics, communications, health, etc, of all the member nations of NATO, with the exception of Portugal and Iceland.

At the beginning of the maneuvers the armed forces of all the NATO member nations were brought to heightened combat readiness, as were all their organs of military leadership and a considerable number of civilian departments. These maneuvers pursued not only military, but also political, goals.

As is well known, reactionary circles in the USA and some other imperialist countries, frightened by the possibility of the establishment of a lasting peace, were striving

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feverishly in 1960 to increase international tension, together with the arms race and preparation for a new war. The ruling circles of the USA committed openly aggressive acts against the Soviet Union in the form of the incursion into our air space of reconnaissance airplanes, and disrupted the Paris Summit Conference and the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The American imperialists, together with their partners in the bloc, organized intervention against the Congo and Laos, and tried by force to stifle the revolution in Cuba.

All these actions of the reactionary powers, which were dangerous for the cause of peace, received a decisive setback on the part of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries; the aggressive plans of the imperialists were disrupted. By the autumn of 1960 the Eisenhower administration was in a position of international isolation. In this situation the Soviet Union made the proposal to hold the XVth Session of the General Assembly of the UN with the participation of the heads of state, to settle the most important problems for the strengthening of peace.

The ruling circles of the USA and other imperialist nations adopted measures for keeping N.S. Khrushchev and the heads of government of the other Socialist nations out of the General Assembly and for hindering the discussion in the UN of the unresolved international problems. Among the measures designed to attain these ends were the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers.

The maneuvers, since nearly all the member-nations of NATO took part in them, also had the goal of demonstrating the strength and "unity of the free world" as a defense "against the threats of Communism". This was considered all the more important under existing conditions when growing contradictions were gradually eating away the aggressive bloc. The "FALLEX-60" maneuvers must therefore be assessed as one of the major provocations of the aggressive imperialist powers, in pursuit of definite political goals - to enflame the world situation and aggravate international relations. But the provocation failed: the XVth General Assembly of the UN took place with the participation of the heads of government of the majority of the nations of the world. The tireless activity of N.S. Khrushchev at the

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session was crowned with notable success. N.S. Khrushchev advanced important proposals on the questions of disarmament, the liquidation of colonialism, changes in the structure of the leading organs of the UN and on other topics, directed toward the strengthening of peace. All these proposals met with the support of many nations and the warm approbation of the progressive forces of the world.

The military goals of the maneuvers were to check the preparedness of the command elements of the headquarters, the national organs and the combined armed forces of NATO (principally of aviation, the navy and missile units) for carrying on joint operations, especially nuclear, in the initial period of a war, and also to check how far the operational-strategic plans which had been developed correspond to reality, and thereby to increase the overall combat readiness of their armed forces. In the maneuvers there were worked out in essence all types of modern operations: offensive and defensive operations of air forces, missile units, ground troops, and the navy.

The "FALLEX-60" maneuvers consisted of approximately 20 exercises, conducted under an overall concept and against the background of the situation determined by the political goals outlined above. The concept of the maneuvers consisted of exhibiting itself as the "victim of aggression", of launching a "counterblow" against the enemy with nuclear weapons, of gaining nuclear superiority and supremacy in the air, and thereby creating conditions for the seizure of the strategic initiative and for the ground forces to pass to the counteroffensive, and thus to destroy the opposing forces of the "aggressor". Under this concept the goal was pursued of concealing the real plans of the NATO leaders, which are based essentially on an offensive doctrine, a pre-emptive strike and direct attack on the nations of the Socialist Camp.

The "FALLEX-60" maneuvers were two-sided. On one side was "Blue", the armed forces of NATO, and on the other was "Orange" the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. The maneuvers were divided into two stages: in the first stage were worked out the first operations of all branches of the armed forces under the conditions of the initial period of war, as planned in peacetime; in the second stage were worked out the subsequent operations of this period, on the basis of the conditions which develop

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during the course of a war after it has begun.

The initial situation preceding military operations was a lengthy period of worsening relations between the member nations of NATO and the member nations of the Warsaw Pact. From February on, both sides were carrying out secret preparations for war. At the end of August the NATO countries secretly began partial mobilization, and transferred French divisions from Africa to Europe. From 6 September the movement of naval forces from bases in the US to the northeast part of the Atlantic began. Five days before the beginning of military operations (16 September) the "military alert" signal was given, the NATO striking fleet was formed, the forces of anti-submarine defense were deployed in the Atlantic, and tactical aviation was transferred to bases in Norway and Greece (one squadron in each). Ten hours and thirty minutes before the start of military operations, a simple alert was declared. From this moment all the armed forces of the bloc began to be brought to complete combat readiness. In 15 minutes almost all aircraft were in the air and the missile units and atomic artillery were brought to readiness for the use of nuclear weapons. At 0519 hours on 21 September the general alert was given - the beginning of military operations.

A similar buildup of the situation before the beginning of a war has been a feature of other exercises held earlier, among them "MAXIMUM TENSION" and "SIDE STEP". However, in past exercises for bringing the armed forces to complete combat readiness it took up to two days, while in the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers 10 hours and 30 minutes were spent. This could be achieved because the striking forces (missile units and aviation) were already at combat readiness in peacetime, while the ground forces were at half strength and had a corresponding quantity of ammunition and items of equipment in the hands of the troops.

In the first stage of the maneuvers, nuclear strikes were launched against "Orange" with strategic and operational-tactical means, i.e., in the terminology of NATO, a nuclear offensive took place, which lasted about seven days. This constituted the main component of the first stage. The ground troops conducted operations with the purpose of supporting the nuclear attack (defensive operations) and

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got ready to go over to the counteroffensive. The navy also participated in the nuclear attack, and conducted operations to destroy the "Orange" naval forces and to protect the sea and ocean lines of communication.

The principal exercise of the first stage was Exercise "FLASH BACK-1". in the course of which were worked out problems of nuclear attack and the conduct of operations by groupings of ground troops and air forces in the European theaters of military operations (cf. Fig. 1). For this there were deployed:

--in the Central European Theater of Military Operations- the Northern Army Group, consisting of four army corps (12 divisions); the Central Army Group, consisting of the Seventh Army (US), and the First Army (France), comprising six army corps in all (13 divisions); the Second and Fourth Combined Tactical Aviation Commands and the Third Air Army (US), comprising in all 2,342 aircraft of tactical aviation and 200 aircraft of strategic aviation; 60 intermediate range "Thor" missile launchers; 30 "Mace"and "Matador" cruise missile (krylataya raketa) launchers; and 45 battalions of tactical missiles and atomic artillery;

--in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations- an Italian army group, consisting of two armies (four army corps and separate large units, 12 divisions in all) and a missile command (five "Corporal" and "Honest John" battalions); the First Greek Army, consisting of three army corps (10 divisions) and two "Honest John" battalions; the First Turkish Army, consisting of three army corps (nine divisions) and two "Honest John" battalions; the Fifth and Sixth Tactical Aviation Commands and the British Mediterranean air forces (1,226 aircraft in all) and the US Sixth Strike Fleet.

The concept and course of the maneuvers confirm the previously held view that the NATO command considers the Central European Theater of Military Operations as the theater of paramount importance. It is here that the main forces of the bloc are deployed, the overwhelming part of the means of mass destruction are used and the solution of the basic tasks of a future war is contemplated. For this reason the NATO command has devoted great attention to the preparation

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of this theater and has created in it the necessary supplies of materiel for the conduct of a war. In the plans of NATO the Southern European Theater and, even more so, the Northern European Theater, occupy a secondary place.

The "FALLEX-60" maneuvers show once more that the aggressive bloc of imperialistic nations base all their calculations for the attainment of the goals of a future war on the mass use of nuclear weapons. In these maneuvers, as in others, the basis for the operations of the various branches of armed forces was the so-called nuclear attack. It was carried out with the goal of gaining nuclear superiority and seizing the strategic initiative from the first days of the war. In the course of this attack the following tasks were worked out: destruction of the enemy's nuclear weapons and means for employing them (aircraft and missiles); disruption of a possible "Orange" attack; destruction of groupings of ground troops; disorganization of troop control; interdiction of the approach march of reserves by creating obstruction zones; and destruction of communication routes.

The first nuclear strikes (in NATO terminology the counterstrike) were launched 14 minutes after the beginning of a war supposedly unleashed by "Orange". However, 15 minutes before the start of the war, almost all the tactical and strategic aircraft were airborne, and the missile units and nuclear artillery had been brought to complete readiness. Therefore, part of the "Orange"nuclear strikes were launched against vacant places. In this way the NATO leaders wished to show that their intelligence has the most precise information.

For the launching of the nuclear strikes the following were involved: 200 strategic bombers (approximately); 820 aircraft of tactical and carrier aviation (approximately 50 percent of the tactical bombers and fighter-bombers are delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons); 60 "Thor" intermediate range missile launchers, which were being used in exercises for the first time; 30 "Mace" and "Matador" cruise missile (samolet-snaryad) launchers; and 55 battalions of tactical missiles and atomic artillery.

All tasks of the nuclear attack, according to the calculations of the NATO command, were fulfilled in 60 hours. It should be noted that in past exercises the fulfilment of such tasks took 72 hours. The depth of the strikes reached 1,000 km and more. According to incomplete data

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there were launched in all approximately 1,660 nuclear strikes, including more than 210 in the Northern European Theater, about 1,100 in the Central European Theater and 350 in the Southern European Theater. In comparison with earlier exercises an increase can be noted in the number of nuclear strikes, especially in the first twenty-four hours.

More than 2,000 aircraft actually took part in flights. The light bombers launched strikes one at a time at intervals of 15 to 20 minutes. The enemy antiair defense was breached at high altitudes. For training purposes they made the run over the objectives not less than twice from various directions. Fighters launched nuclear strikes from altitudes of from 11,200 to 11,800 meters, either singly or in pairs, and to a depth of 1,000 km and more. The flight to the targets was accomplished at medium and low altitudes. Great attention was devoted to the launching of nuclear strikes with the aid of surface radar systems to direct fighters to the target from great altitudes and at distances up to 260 km.

The strategic aviation of the US, intended for the conduct of the "Counter Actions" operations and the strategic aviation of Great Britain did not actually participate in the flights. The subunits of American strategic bombers were in a state of increased combat readiness at air bases in Great Britain, Spain and Morocco. From the American bases located in Great Britain nine bombers in all actually sortied. The flight course passed over the Bay of Biscay, Spain, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia and France. The flight was carried out by groups of three aircraft each at altitudes of 9,000 to 10,000 meters and with 30-minute intervals between groups and one-minute intervals between aircraft in a group. The aircraft approached the targets by different routes, and released their bombs from altitudes of 11,000 to 11,500 meters. Each crew was assigned one basic and two or three alternate targets.

Special attention was paid in the maneuvers to the problems of the organization and support of the nuclear attack. According to calculations of the NATO command the basic goals of the nuclear attack for the destruction of the enemy's groupings and his military-economic potential were attained. The operations of strategic aviation and

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of the "Thor" missile units were declared to be especially effective.

It is obvious that the nuclear strikes planned by the NATO command can cause enormous damage to our country and armed forces unless measures are adopted to disrupt these strikes. The possibilities for disrupting such strikes are quite real. The main body of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons consists basically of strategic, tactical and carrier aircraft, as well as cruise missiles. It has once again been confirmed that up to this time the USA and its allies are considerably behind the USSR in the development of missiles, especially those of strategic import.

Inasmuch as the basic means of nuclear attack is aviation, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that it is necessary to combat it in the air with PVO forces and also to destroy it on the airfields.

In the first stage of the maneuvers the ground troops worked on problems of defense with the aim of screening the areas where the nuclear means are based and of holding the line for the subsequent offensive.

The main forces in the Central European Theater were deployed on the line Hamburg, Bremen, Felsberg, Bamberg, Regensburg, east of Munich, at a distance of 50 to 130 km from the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The screening forces and reconnaissance were operating forward.. The majority of the divisions were linearly deployed on the main line. In reserve were four divisions in all (out of 25). On the average a division was allotted 23 km in the sector of the Northern Army Group and 35 km in the sector of the Central Army Group. The main task assigned to the troops of the first echelon was to hold the forward line for at least 48 hours, i.e., the time the NATO command calculates is needed for accomplishing the main tasks of the nuclear attack.

During the course of the defensive engagement, groupings of ground troops were created for the subsequent transition to the attack along the main axes. For the Northern Army Group these groupings in the zones of the offensive comprised

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West German and British army corps, and for the Central Army Group, the Third West German Army Corps and the Seventh US Army Corps. The reserves moving up from the rear area were intended for use in the offensive. It is clear that the NATO command hopes that in the course of the nuclear attack the enemy will sustain such destruction that the ground troops will be able to go over to the attack along these axes.

The defense of Turkey and Greece was organized along the international boundaries.

In this exercise, "Orange" had taken the offensive along all axes from the first days of the war. The rules of the course of combat operations were so drawn that, in the first three days in the Central European Theater, "Orange" achieved quite insignificant success. Only on individual axes were they able to drive a wedge 25 to 35 km into the forward line of the NATO troops. By the end of D plus 7 "Orange" had pressed back the NATO troops to a depth of 200 km, and their average rate of advance was 10 to 20 km per day. Here the "Orange" attack was checked.

In the Balkans the "Orange" forces advanced 60 to 120 km in the first three days, and were forced to go over to the defensive. Here the average rate of advance reached 25 to 35 km per day.

In the opinion of the directors of the exercise, by D plus 8 "Orange" suffered considerable losses: in aviation 80 to 85 percent, in personnel 30 to 60 percent. NATO troop casualties in comparison with those of "Orange" were manifestly lower. Not one of their divisions was put out of action, and up to the eighth day of the war their troops retained a higher combat effectiveness than those of "Orange". The troops of both sides conducted combat operations with their large units, taking into account losses from nuclear strikes. It should be noted that in the course of defensive operations provision was made for maneuvering by forces and weapons and for the launching by them of counterattacks.

Thus the exercise "FLASH BACK-1" shows that the NATO command counts on the mass use of nuclear weapons in the first days of a war to disrupt the enemy attack, to preserve

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their own forces, and to ensure that they will be able to go over to a determined offensive following the nuclear strikes.

Combat operations in ground theaters were played out in a similar way even in earlier exercises, particularly exercise "SIDE STEP" (1959). It is obvious that such a version of combat operations has been foreseen in NATO plans.

There are weaknesses in this plan, which must be taken into account. All calculations of the NATO command are based on the use of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear strikes can be disrupted or weakened to a significant degree at the beginning of a war (and such a possibility exists), then favorable conditions will be created for carrying out an attack with decisive goals. In the screening zone the NATO troops will not be able to offer any serious opposition to the attacking large units. NATO groupings on the main line can be crushed by nuclear strikes even before the attacking troops reach them. In the troop formations on this line there will be gaps measured in hundreds of kilometers. The "patchwork" composition of the divisions (made up of the troops of various nations) also does not contribute to the steadfastness of the troops. If all this is considered, then the conclusion is inevitable that the optimism of the NATO command, as revealed by the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers, is, putting it mildly, ill-founded.

Deserving of serious attention is the naval Exercise "SWORD THRUST-1", which was carried out in the first stage of the maneuvers by the forces of the US and British strike fleet in the Norwegian Sea. Here there were deployed the US Second Fleet and a British fleet, which were composed of four strike carriers, one heavy carrier for antisubmarine defense (PLO), two cruisers armed with missiles, two light cruisers, 12 submarines (including two atom-powered submarines), and 300 carrier aircraft. The fleet began to move into this area on 6 September. Two days before the beginning of military operations, the operational buildup of the fleet was complete, and in seven hours it occupied a maneuvering area in the central portion of the Norwegian Sea, from which it was supposed to launch nuclear strikes.

The fleet was to launch nuclear strikes against 183 targets. Carrier aircraft completed one sortie per day,

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and launched strikes to a depth of up to 1,100 miles. The strikes were launched mainly by single aircraft and in daylight hours. The plan of nuclear strikes was fulfilled, according to calculations of the leadership of the exercise, in 36 hours. This is a very important circumstance. In past exercises it usually took 72 hours. The decrease in the time for launching the planned nuclear strikes was attained by increasing the quantity of means used for this purpose and in maximum exertion of them. It is evident that the NATO command considers that carrier aviation can operate more successfully even in comparison with tactical aviation. No special differences in the methods of operations of deck-based attack aircraft in comparison with strategic and tactical aviation were noted in this exercise.

The formation of the naval forces in the maneuvering area deserves notice. The fleet consisted of two operational strike groups: the American (two strike carriers with 160 aircraft) and the British (two strike carriers with 100 aircraft), which were drawn up at a distance of 45 to 90 miles from each other. In the center of each group were located the strike carriers, with intervals of 20 to 60 miles. Around the strike carriers at a distance of up to 60 miles were located the forces of the antisubmarine and antiair defense. Air cover was provided by deck-based fighters, which patrolled in the air in two tiers, with groups of two aircraft each, and with the groups at intervals of 15 to 60 miles from one another. At a distance of 120 to 150 miles the aircraft, submarines, and destroyers of the radar patrol were operating.

Thus, two operational groups of the fleet were located in an area measuring approximately 100 x 200 miles, or, if we include the elements of the radar patrol, 165 x 270 miles. This area was saturated with a large number of warships of various types. The forces of the Sixth Fleet, operating in the Mediterranean Sea, had approximately the same formation in the maneuvering area. In fact this fleet was drawn up somewhat more compactly.

In the formation of the forces of the NATO strike fleet in the maneuver area there were a number of weaknesses, which must be noted in order to organize measures for combating them. If the radar patrol elements are destroyed or neutralized, then the local security forces will not be able to defend the

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strike carriers successfully from strikes by long-range bombers armed with the K-10 or, especially, the K-20, or from submarines armed with the new missiles. The operational groups are in the maneuvering area for 36 hours, which facilitates combat against them. It is important only to make a prompt determination of the maneuver area in order to establish the position of the attack carriers in the combat formation and to ensure the guiding to them of our own strike forces. One must also take into account the vulnerability of attack aviation to modern means of antiair defense. In a word, there are substantial possibilities for disrupting nuclear strikes launched by the forces of the carrier fleet of the NATO bloc. After fulfilling the task, the fleet withdrew to the Iceland area to take on supplies. The vulnerability of the strike fleet is increased even more during this passage, and especially in the area where supplies are taken on.

These are the most important exercises of the first stage of the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers.

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The situation created for the start of the second stage of the maneuvers is marked by a broadening of the scope of military operations. Austria has been occupied (supposedly by "Orange"). Yugoslavia has suffered an attack by "Orange" and has entered the war on the side of NATO. Spain is ready to enter the war. The situation has become aggravated in North Africa, the Middle East and Indochina, and on the border of the Chinese People's Republic and Nepal. Thus, according to NATO calculations, a new world war must break out. The directors of the maneuvers strove in every way to shift the entire responsibility for the broadening of military operations onto the Socialist nations. But behind this clumsy camouflage it is not difficult to see the true aggressive plans of the imperialists for fanning the flame of world war. Even at the very beginning of the war they did not hesitate to violate Austria's neutrality. The maneuvers show that in case of war the NATO command intends to use Yugoslavia on their side. The aggressive imperialist circles consider that even at the beginning of a war they will succeed in spreading military operations to Africa, the Near and Middle East and to Southeast Asia, so as to revitalize or strengthen their domination in these areas.

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In the course of the games at the beginning of the second stage, which corresponded to the eleventh day of war, both sides had suffered considerable losses, and there had been formed large zones of destruction and high levels of radioactive contamination. The NATO armed forces, however, maintained nuclear superiority and achieved supremacy in the air, mainly with carrier aviation. As for the "Orange" forces, their attack was broken up and their stocks of nuclear weapons were exhausted (or else they were holding them back). The NATO troops therefore went over to the counterattack. This constituted the main feature of the second stage of the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers.

Exercises "FLASH BACK-2" and "HOLDFAST" were held in order to work out problems of the counterattack (cf. Fig. 2). The NATO troops went over to the counterattack in the Central European Theater and in the Balkans. In Italy the defensive operations continued.

Reliance on nuclear weapons as the basic means of conducting a war was also reflected during the second stage of the maneuvers. At the beginning of the counterattack, an additional allocation of nuclear weapons was provided for, especially for the troops operating in the Central European Theater. Support of the ground troops was switched over to the carrier strike large unit employing its nuclear weapons. Provision was made for nuclear preparations for the counterattack, for the destruction of the enemy's remaining nuclear and air potential, and for the creation of obstacles on his lines of communications, with the goal of interdicting the moving up of reserves and delivery of material. These were the tasks set for the direct support of the attacking troops by nuclear strikes.

There is some information on the reinforcement of the groupings of ground troops in the Central European Theater. At the beginning of the counterattack here there was an additional deployment of 10 divisions: three French divisions were transferred from Africa, one division was transferred from Great Britain, four divisions were mobilized in France, and one division each in Belgium and Holland.

The main goal of the counterattack was to complete the defeat of the enemy's troop groupings in the theaters, to

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restore the position on the front and to create conditions for the seizure of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and for the transfer of military operations to the territory of the USSR. The plan made provision for the launching of strikes by groupings of ground troops to a considerable depth. In the area of the Northern Army Group the basic mission was carried out by West German and British army corps, and in the area of the Central Army Group by American and West German army corps. The main forces were concentrated on the Berlin and Dresden axes. On the Balkan Peninsula the main strike was carried out by the Turkish army.

The troops went over to the counterattack on the Balkan Peninsula on the eleventh day of the war, and in the Central European Theater on the thirteenth day of the war.

In the course of the exercise the counterattack in the Central European Theater was completely "successful". By 1400 hours on the fifteenth day the position along the whole front had already been restored, and the NATO troops were advancing at a rate of 70 km per day (we should remember that the "Orange" forces had advanced at a rate of 10 to 20 km per day). An invasion of the territory of the GDR was further contemplated, but this was not played out in the exercises.

The counterattack in the Balkans likewise developed "successfully". The First Turkish Army advanced at a rate of 35 km and the First Greek Army at 25 to 30 km, per day. In the area of Alexandropolis an amphibious landing was played out (two divisions).

Among the groupings of ground troops in the Central European Theater the first place in number of divisions involved belonged to the Federal German Republic. This demonstrates the ever-growing role of West Germany in NATO. Also in partial testimony to this is the fact that in the maneuvers there was created a West German armed forces high command, which, in comparison with the other participants in the exercises, tried to occupy a more independent position from the NATO command.

The leadership of the Bundeswehr strove during the maneuvers to have the FRG troops operate on the main axes,

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and in this they were successful. In comparison with past exercises the West German command in the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers exerted a considerably greater influence on the adoption of solutions for the operation, in the selection of targets for nuclear strikes, and on the direction of troops in the course of military operations. As an example, one West German army corps was assigned the task of securing the flanks of the NATO armed forces from the direction of the Bavarian-Czech and Austrian borders. The Bundeswehr command did not agree with this task. It employed the main forces of the corps for an attack on the main axis, and for covering the flanks of the whole grouping it allotted only a part of the forces. We must note that the American command did not oppose such pretensions of the West German revanchists, but encouraged them in every way.

The Bundeswehr general staff in its conclusions on the maneuvers emphasized above all that the FRG troops ought to be used on the axis of the main strike of the NATO combined armed forces, and for this reason in comparison with the other allies, they should be best supplied with personnel and material-technical means.

The Bundeswehr general staff does not rely on the ability of the USA to support NATO troops with the necessary materiel means in the course of a war, and therefore raises the question of advance creation of stockpiles in peacetime. With this goal the FRG has created in Western Europe its own bases, and also wishes to transform them in advance into its rear area in case of war. In the conclusions on the maneuvers it was also mentioned that the headquarters involved in the exercises were cumbersome and insufficiently mobile, that the means of automation, the television apparatus and other technical means of control were not suitable for field conditions. Obviously, the West German military will adopt measures to eliminate this important, in their opinion, shortcoming.

The Bundeswehr leaders also note that the military preparedness of the FRG is inadequate, that its military potential is still low and that there has still not been created in the FRG either the moral or the economic or legal prerequisites which would permit the Bundeswehr to "defend" itself, along with the troops of the other member nations of NATO which are located on the territory of West Germany. It is clear that what is meant is the activation

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of the military preparations of the West German revanchists, the strengthening of the Bundeswehr and its transformation into the basic striking force of NATO, which would furnish them at any favorable moment with the possibility of realizing their predatory plans which are directed against the Socialist countries. These plans and actions of the West German revanchists demand the most acute attention from our side.

The naval exercise "SWORD THRUST-2" was conducted with the goal of working out the support by carrier strike large units of the operations of ground troops in the Central European Theater. The NATO command obviously considers that tactical aviation at the present time may sustain heavy losses, as a result of which it is not in a position to give effective support to the operations of ground troops. Carrier aviation, on the other hand, can maintain its combat effectiveness, and therefore it is advisable to switch to it for the support of ground troops during military operations.

In the Bay of Biscay was deployed the large operational strike unit which had accomplished the maneuver from the Norwegian Sea. This large unit consisted of two strike carriers, a heavy carrier for antisubmarine defense, two cruisers armed with missiles, four submarines and more than 150 aircraft. During the course of the counterattack the carrier large unit played out 155 nuclear strikes in the Central European Theater.

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In addition to those mentioned, a considerable number of other exercises were conducted in the course of the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers.

On the Jutland Peninsula there took place a two-sided troop exercise, "STUBBORN DEFENSE". On the defending side were two divisions (FRG and Denmark) and on the attacking side a British division and parachute brigade. Simultaneously with these, exercise "BONE DRY" was conducted in the Baltic Sea to work out the combat operations of the navy of the FRG and Denmark for cooperation with ground troops in an actual amphibious landing in the area of the straits of the Baltic Sea.

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At the same time two exercises were conducted on the territory of Norway and in the northeast section of the Norwegian Sea ("COOL TIME" and "SWORD THRUST-2") with the participation of Norwegian troops and a British carrier strike large unit. In these exercises were worked out antilanding defense and support of ground troops by a carrier strike large unit.

Exercise "BLUE SHIELD", which was conducted in the area of Iceland and the Faeroe and Shetland Islands, is deserving of serious attention. Its main goal was to work out antisubmarine defense. Involved in the exercise were 17 submarines and 50 coastal-based antisubmarine aircraft. These forces operated along an antisubmarine line with a depth of 350 to 400 miles with the mission of preventing "Orange" submarines from breaking out into the Atlantic Ocean. In the center of the line, deployed in positions, were eight antisubmarine submarines. For the aviation patrol zones were designated, in which three to five aircraft operated continuously. Each aircraft was in the air an average of 10 to 12 hours.

A considerable number of exercises were held to work out the protection of naval lines of communication: exercise "FIRST and SECOND WATCH" in the area of the English Channel, the Central Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay; "TIGER GRIS 1 and 2" in the southern part of the North Sea; "PROTECTION 1 and 2" in the Mediterranean; "BALLAST" and "COFFERDAM" in the area of the Azores and the Straits of Gibraltar. In the first stage of these exercises were worked out the dispersal of ships and warships, and their evacuation together with the withdrawal of a considerable number of ships to bases on the US coast. In the second stage problems were worked out of guaranteeing naval lines of communication and of escorting convoys and single ships. Up to 40 convoys were actually conducted, each convoy consisting of two to four ships plus security forces. Considerable naval and air forces were involved in securing lines of communication. All these exercises demonstrate that the NATO command attaches great significance to the protection of its sea lines of communication, especially in the Central and Eastern Atlantic and in the area of the English Channel and the Straits of Gibraltar.

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Simultaneously with the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers, and against their operational-strategic background, the US Air Force carried out two exercises for strategic aviation and for the combined air defense command of the North American continent under the provisional code names "SEPTEMBER-1" and "GREAT EFFORTS".

In the first exercise, which was conducted in the continental USA from 20 to 23 September, operations were worked out for strategic aviation in the first air operation of the initial period of a war, in cooperation with the nuclear attack of the NATO armed forces. According to the concept of the exercise, strikes were launched against rear area objectives of our country.

The second exercise with the participation of this type of aviation took place in the northern and Arctic areas of the USA and Canada from 28 to 30 September, i.e., at the beginning of the counterattack in the Central European and Southern European Theaters. As a result of the operation the strategic aviation inflicted great damage on the "Orange" forces, but exact data on this have not been brought out. The directors of the maneuvers are in agreement that the military command of the US did not have precise information on the results of the strikes of strategic aviation. Despite this it was acknowledged that it was necessary to carry out a further operation involving the launching of nuclear strikes against rear area "Orange" objectives by the forces of strategic aviation.

* * *

A brief analysis of the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers permits us to draw the following basic conclusions.

The "FALLEX-60" maneuvers were a vast training measure of the aggressive NATO bloc, in which were worked out problems of the conduct of war by the bloc against the USSR and other Socialist countries. Essentially all the armed forces of the NATO bloc, all the organs of military control, and a considerable number of civilian agencies were brought to increased combat readiness for the organization of the maneuvers.

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The maneuvers were conducted under a single strategic concept, they embraced all the main theaters of military operations, and envisaged employing the forces and means at the disposal of the bloc with a strongly centralized leadership. In the maneuvers as a whole were worked out the basic problems of conducting military operations on a strategic scale. Actually participating in them were considerable forces of aviation, the navy, ground troops and the forces and means of antiair defense, all of which supported the working out of the methods of conducting military operations and of the problems of cooperation of the various arms of forces of the NATO member nations. All this testifies to the fact that the NATO military leadership is striving to find the most effective methods for preparing their armed forces and organs of control and for increasing their combat readiness in order to achieve definite superiority of the NATO armed forces over the armed forces of the Socialist nations. This must not be underestimated.

The maneuvers testify above all to the fact that the NATO command is ready to begin a war with the forces which have already been formed in peacetime, in order in this way to camouflage a sudden attack on the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp. In addition, the NATO leadership, as before, is relying on a powerful strike with nuclear weapons in order to create superiority in forces and means and to seize the strategic initiative from the very beginning of military operations.

The maneuvers also demonstrated that the basic strategic and operational-tactical tasks will be accomplished by all the previously existing branches of the armed forces and arms of troops. From this it follows that modern war requires mass armies.

Despite the large scale of the maneuvers, they did not introduce anything essentially new to the theory of the military art of the imperialist powers. The maneuvers were only a confirmation of earlier established views on the conduct of war. Such an important problem as the creation of superiority of forces is solved by an old method - by increasing the number and power of fire strikes. The fact that aviation constituted the main striking force in

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the maneuvers did not permit a full exposition as to how they will solve the problem of cooperation between missile units and aviation.

A typical feature of the maneuvers was an increase in the tempo of the offensive, which can be explained by the mass use of nuclear weapons.

For this reason the conduct of the so-called nuclear offensive is deserving of very acute attention, as carried out by the forces of strategic, tactical, and carrier aviation and by missile units.

Despite the use by the directors of the maneuvers of such terms as "counterblow", "defense", "counterattack", etc., documents on the maneuvers show distinctly that the military doctrine of the NATO bloc has an aggressive, offensive character and that the bloc command are supporters of the pre-emptive strike.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IRONBARK

19 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Question of the Organization of the Organs of Troop Control", by Major-General N. Reut

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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The Director, National Security Agency

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Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Question of the Organization of the Organs of Troop Control", by Major-General N. Reut

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Question of the Organization of the Organs of Troop Control", written by Major-General N. Reut.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: The articles cited on page 2 were disseminated as follows: M. Ivanov [redacted] A. Morozov, N. Lyashchenko, and V. Arkhipov [redacted] K. Pasbuk [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

"Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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The Question of the Organization of the Organs of Troop Control

by

Major-General N. Reut

The necessity has long been apparent for discussing the problems involved in improving the system of troop control (upravleniye voyskami) and the administrative-organizational structure of the control organs. It is known that the existing organs of control are unwieldy, insufficiently flexible, and do not ensure the mobility necessary for control of troops during abrupt changes in the situation and in keeping with the highly maneuverable nature of combat operations.

The articles of Generals M. Ivanov, A. Morozov, V. Arkhipov, and Colonel K. Pashuk, basically, correctly uncover the flaws in the existing organizational structure of control organs, and the inability of the latter to ensure firm control of troops. However, a significant portion of these authors' proposals for improving the organization of the control organs is directed, actually, toward slightly modernizing the organizational structure and adapting it to modern requirements. In our opinion, such an approach cannot lead to the eradication of the flaws in the organization of troop control uncovered by the authors.

In the existing structure, as well as in the structure of the control organs proposed by the authors, there are still a few organs, acting parallel to one another, and directly subordinate to the combined-arms commander, among which the functions of troop control are divided. The combined-arms staff and the numerous commanders of arms of troops (special troops) and services are such organs now. In General M. Ivanov's proposals, the control functions are divided between a main planning center, operations, intelligence, and nuclear/missile centers, and a PVO control center. The other authors are for maintaining the apparatus of the commanders of arms of troops (special troops) and services, and by so doing, concur in the existence of numerous control organs.

Indeed, this "overgrowth" of the combined-arms commanders by control organs operating along parallel lines is the very thing which brought about loss of flexibility, since it has forced them to spend much time and

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energy directing the activities of a large number of directly subordinate officials heading the specific control organs.

In our opinion, in order to eradicate the flaw noted, it is necessary to have only one organ of troop control, directly subordinate to the combined-arms commander. Such an organ should be a staff, since only the latter is capable of evaluating a situation thoroughly and objectively, determining the combat capabilities of friendly troops and the troops of the enemy, proposing to the combined-arms commander an expedient solution to the problem posed, determining the forces and weapons needed for it, and also, quickly coordinating the efforts of the large units and units. This will permit the combined-arms commander to spend a minimum of time adopting well-founded decisions. The other organs -- commanders of arms of troops (special troops) and services, and their apparatus, can be abolished, because they only complicate the process of troop control by their autonomous existence, and have actually lost the role which they played in the years of World War II and after its termination. During the course of training, many commanders of arms of troops (special troops) are found to be hostile to troop control and, to a certain extent, are a burden to the control points.

It is known that in order to perform operational tasks in the course of a modern operation, the combined-arms commander allots a specific quantity of forces and weapons, including combined-arms large units (units) and units of arms of troops (special troops). Each one of such groupings is headed by a subordinate combined-arms commander and is designated for operating on a separate axis and for making independent decisions regarding the tasks confronting him (using, of course, the results of strikes by weapons of mass destruction, if they are delivered by the senior commander).

Each combined-arms commander who leads such a grouping of troops is given the right of independent command of the forces and means assigned to his jurisdiction, and is charged with most effective use of them in performing the assigned tasks. In this case, it becomes superfluous to have supervision from above; this often arises because of the tendency of the commanders of arms of troops (special troops) and services to plan operations and issue orders about the manner of using the units and subunits which are within their competence, but which are subordinate to the lower-ranking combined-arms commander.

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It is the removal of this supervision which creates favorable conditions for the combined-arms commander to practice intelligent initiative and make best use of forces and means in a situation which arises.

It is also known that each combined-arms commander keeps a certain quantity of the means of destruction under direct subordination to him (large units and units of missile troops, aviation, and anti-aircraft missile units); these allow him to exert decisive influence on the course and outcome of combat operations, creates reserves for reinforcing the main troop groupings, and for performing unexpected or suddenly arising tasks; finally, he also has units (large units) of special troops, which he designates for the execution of the most vital measures in the interests of supporting the operations of all the troops in the formation.

Thus, during the course of the operation, the combined-arms commander must direct the lower-ranking combined-arms commanding officers who head up the groupings of troops designated to execute independent tasks on separate axes; he also directs the above-mentioned means of destruction, reserves, and units (large units) of special troops left under his direct subordination. What role, in troop control, then, in these circumstances, will be played by the commanders of the arms of troops and special troops?

Recently it has been recognized that there is need for wide use of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction in an operation; the firing capabilities of the units (subunits) having these means have been increased, as have the ranges of fire, and the need has arisen to increase the speed of delivery or retargeting of fire strikes against the enemy. All this substantially influences the use of means of destruction in a modern operation. In our opinion, it is necessary to change the organization of the control of these means, because it no longer ensures fast delivery of fire strikes, and does not correspond with the new principles of assignment of missions by the combined-arms commander.

Actually during World War II and after its termination, the combined-arms commander designated only tactical tasks for the means of destruction, and in this connection there was need for control organs for these means. These organs were occupied with determining the fire tasks and distributing them among the numerous artillery groups (units, subunits), planned

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the execution of these tasks, and also organized the control of the most effective massed artillery fire, which called for bringing in many artillery units which were subordinate to various levels of command. This justified the interference of the commander of artillery of the operational formation (combined-arms large unit) with the operations of the lower-ranking combined-arms commanders, and the bringing in of the artillery units subordinate to them for carrying out massed fire on behalf of the operational formation (combined-arms large unit) as a whole.

In addition, these organs of control were charged with organizing reconnaissance of the enemy's system of fire and carrying out combat with his main means of destruction -- artillery and mortars. All this taken together permitted the commander and staff of the artillery of the operational formation (combined-arms large unit) to resolve independently the particular sphere of problems connected with the combat activities of the artillery and, as a result, the above-mentioned control organs were quite necessary.

In modern operations the combined-arms commander assigns not tactical, but actual fire tasks to the missile troops, indicating the objectives to be destroyed by nuclear (chemical) warheads, the yield and quantity of the latter, the time for delivering nuclear strikes, and the type of burst. In other words, at present the combined-arms commander is charged with the planning of fire, which is closely related to planning the operations of troops. It therefore follows that the combined-arms commander no longer has any need for those organs which would be occupied specifically with the planning of fire, and there is no need to duplicate his work and the work of the combined-arms staff.

At the same time, under modern conditions, the basis of the combat formation of the enemy -- his nuclear means -- can be discovered only by the combined efforts of all types of intelligence. In turn, the destruction (limiting the operations) of nuclear means of the enemy is also attained by the coordinated efforts of missile troops, aviation, PVO troops, and radio countermeasures, in conjunction with a swift offensive by the combined-arms large units and units. As a result, the organization of intelligence and combat with the nuclear means of the enemy can only be in the hands of the combined-arms commander. It follows, therefore, that the combined-arms commander has now become the organizer of combat with the enemy's principal means of destruction, and not the commander of missile troops and artillery, as many think.

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Everything which has been said, in our opinion, deprives the commander of missile troops and artillery of independence of action, and turns him into a direct executor of fire tasks, which are specified by the combined-arms commander, and limits his activity to the control of the units of missile troops and artillery left directly subordinate to the combined-arms commander.

In connection with this there arises the question of whether it is advisable to remove the commanders of missile troops and artillery and their staffs from the commands of operational formations, and to turn over to them the command of the missile and artillery units which are directly subordinate to the combined-arms commander. This will increase their responsibility for the status of the units directly subordinate to them, and will permit them to exercise full command of the latter; it will also eliminate the possibility of interference with the operations of the lower-ranking combined-arms commanders.

The fast-moving nature of combat operations, and the need for rapidly delivered strikes by nuclear and chemical weapons require immediate transmission of the fire tasks to the executors. This can be attained to the best degree by direct communications between the combined-arms commander and the executor, i.e., the commanding officer of the missile or aviation unit (subunit) directly delivering these strikes. However, an excessive number of such executors complicates the activity of the combined-arms commander in controlling them, and necessitates intermediate organs capable of ensuring firm control.

Under the existing administrative-organizational structure of the control organs, there are, between the combined-arms commander and the executor -- the commanding officer of the missile or aviation subunit -- three intervening relay organs. In the missile troops, these include the commanding officer of the missile troops and artillery, the commanding officer of the missile brigade, and the commanders of battalions; in aviation, there are the commander of the air army and the commanders of aviation divisions and regiments. In our opinion, it would be advisable to abolish the brigade level in the missile troops and the divisional level in aviation, because there is no independent use for them during the course of combat operations. This step will significantly speed up the process of troop control, cut down on the quantity of documents to be processed, and lower expenditures on the maintenance of the control organs.

The conditions under which a modern operation is conducted, and control of troops during its course evoke the need for review of the organization of control of the means designated for combating the air enemy, because the current subordination of these means to two commanders -- the commander of the air army and the commander of PVO troops -- does not ensure unity of command, nor their effective utilization. The need arises for the combined-arms commander to coordinate directly the operations of these two levels, which leads to an unwarranted waste of time, which is so precious during the course of combat with the highly mobile air enemy.

Perfecting the ground means of combat with the air enemy, and increasing the combat capabilities of antiaircraft missile units, allow for creating zones of continuous destruction along the entire area of operations of the troops of a front. In their turn, such zones ensure centralized use, on the scope of a front, not only of the fighter aviation, but of antiaircraft missile units, as well as the means for reconnaissance of the air enemy, and radio countermeasures, all under the direction of a single control organ.

In this connection, we suggest that antiaircraft missile units be taken out of the makeup of combined-arms large units and the primary operational formations, in order that they may be used in a centralized and more effective manner on the scope of a front. In this way there will be no need for coordinating the combat operations of aviation with the numerous levels of command to which antiaircraft missile units are subordinate, and it will become possible to use them more effectively for destroying the air enemy.

As suggested by us, shifting antiaircraft missile units to subordination to a single control organ of the front will permit painless elimination of the intervening control organs -- the chiefs of PVO of the combined-arms large units and the primary operational formations, which, at these levels, have almost no bearing on the course of combat in the air; it will also eliminate preparation of unnecessary documents.

Such a measure will free the commanders of troops of the primary operational formations (commanding officers of combined-arms large units) from organizing the combat with the air enemy, a subject to which they actually attach little significance, since the main thing to them is the defeat of the enemy's ground troops.

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It is advisable to assign the control of all the means designated for the destruction of the air enemy to the commander who controls the means of air attack. Such a situation is conditioned by the fact that, in the first place, this commander can organize the combat with the air enemy more easily, not only in the air, but on the ground, and in the second place, he can coordinate more promptly the operations of fighter aviation and antiaircraft missile units with the operations of his own means of air attack.

Taking all this into consideration, it occurs to us that it would be beneficial to combine the means of PVO and aviation under the unified leadership of the commander of the air army. This will do away with duplication in the work of the chief of PVO troops of a front and the commander of the air army, and with unnecessary coordination, and will free the combined-arms commander from still another artificially created organ of control -- the PVO command post; the use of the latter in the course of an operation, in the light of the control system suggested by us, is highly questionable.

For combat with low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as for the destruction of the enemy's army aviation aircraft, it would be expedient for combined-arms large units and units to have appropriate antiaircraft weapons, which would be equally suitable for combat with the ground enemy. It is the versatility of these weapons which will permit effective employment of personnel in the course of a battle to combat the air or ground enemy, depending on the actual situation which has developed. The combined-arms commander can control such units (subunits) directly, without the help of the chief of PVO troops and his apparatus.

Uniting the missile and aviation means of destruction under a single organ -- a missile/nuclear center -- as is suggested by Major-General M. Ivanov, considering the clear-cut technical isolation which exists between the types of armament, is hardly advisable, because such an organ will be incapable of directing simultaneously the operations of the missile units and aviation, and especially of supporting them from the technical aspect.

The use of units (large units) of special troops and the organization of their control differ somewhat at the present time from the analogous situation during World War II. Specifically, the increased independence in operations of the combined-arms commanding officers has made superfluous the interference of the chiefs of the special troops attached to the higher

combined-arms chief in the use of units within their competence which have been resubordinated to the command of lower-ranking combined-arms commanders. In this connection there is no need to accomplish, at the higher level, the planning of various measures of support for operations of subordinate troops, to be executed by special units directly subordinate to the lower-ranking combined-arms commanders, since this problem can best be handled by the troops themselves. Freeing the chiefs of the special troops from these functions will allow them to spend more time on measures which the combined-arms commander expects to accomplish by the units of special troops left under his direct subordination, on behalf of all the troops subordinate to the formation (large unit).

Under these conditions, the combined-arms commander needs organs for controlling the units of special troops which were left under his direct subordination. In our opinion, this role will be filled best by the chiefs of special troops, which have become commanding officers of composite large units of special troops; they will gain independence of action, will have their own control points, and will be able to make decisions in order to perform the tasks assigned by the combined-arms commander. There will be no need for the chiefs of special troops to remain at the control point of the combined-arms commanding officer, and this will greatly increase the flexibility of this point.

Outfitting units of special troops with new combat equipment, increasing their combat capabilities, and the mechanization of work processes are conducive to decreasing the number of such units and the number of personnel therein. Thanks to new machines, many units (subunits) of special troops can perform the same work considerably faster than entire large units, using manual labor, could accomplish it during World War II. This makes it advisable to reduce the numerous intervening control organs and units of special troops for which no combat use can be found in the course of an operation.

Thus the headquarters of front and army engineer-sapper brigades and headquarters of sapper battalions in large units are becoming superfluous, since the direct control of units (subunits) within their makeup is really already exercised by the chiefs of engineer troops. The same applies to the headquarters of front and army communications regiments and headquarters of communications battalions of large units, since their subunits are under the direct control of the chief of communications.

At the same time, in our opinion, it is better to unite separate units of chemical troops under a single control organ, headed by the chief of chemical troops. This will eliminate the lack of control for these units which is presently felt by the chief of chemical troops, who has no communications means of his own.

After the suggested changes are carried out it will be superfluous to work out plans for the use of special troops in an operation, because these plans will actually duplicate combined-arms documents.

Summing up the foregoing, it can be concluded that the changed functions of the chiefs of arms of troops (special troops) make it possible to remove them from the system of control of the operational formations and shift them from consultants attached to the combined-arms commander into the actual executors of the tasks carried out by the forces and means left directly subordinate to the combined-arms commander. This will permit the removal of supervision of the lower-ranking combined-arms commander; also, by decreasing considerably the number of control organs directly subordinate to the senior commander, it will permit having one headquarters -- a single, highly flexible and numerically small organ for controlling the combat activity of all troops within the makeup of an operational formation.

In these conditions, staffs will be charged with the following functions: preparing information which will allow the combined-arms commander to make decisions, and drafting the necessary memoranda; planning combat operations and detailed support of the latter; collecting and collating of information on the situation and reporting it to the combined-arms commander and higher headquarters, and informing lower headquarters; transmitting tasks to the troops, directing and supervising their daily combat activities; directing restoration of combat effectiveness of troops and preparing them for performing impending tasks; and organizing points of control and communications.

The work of the staff will be most effective if the basis of its structure is the principle of independent execution, by each department (directorate) of a specific type of work for control of troops, without bringing in other departments. This will result in less time being spent in coordinating the efforts of the combined-arms large units (units), units of the arms of troops (special troops), and aviation, because all this work will be carried out by one department (directorate). At the same time, each department (directorate) will present the chief of staff and the commander an information summary on all the troops, forces, and means making up the operational formation.

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In our opinion, a staff should have the following departments (directorates):

-- the first -- which will take up the questions of organizing impending operations taking into consideration the situation as it takes shape; prepare recommendations for the combined-arms commander; carry out the planning of combat operations and their all-round support, and inform the troops of their tasks.

-- the second -- to direct the current combat activities of the troops in the course of performing the tasks assigned to them for collecting and collating information on the situation and presenting it to the combined-arms commander, and higher and lower headquarters, and also to transmit all current orders to the troops and undertake supervision of their execution; this department must have within its subordination all means of intelligence and traffic control.

-- the third -- to develop and carry out measures for restoring combat effectiveness and increasing the viability of troops, as well as their combat preparation for impending operations; units implementing activation of troops, and the training base should be subordinate to this department.

-- the fourth -- to organize troop control, that is, be in charge of establishment and movement of control points, and of their protection and defense of apparatus for communications between the points, and of control of troops by secure communications, and to supply them with topographic maps and charts; this department directs communications large units (units), and commandant's and topographic subunits.

-- the fifth -- to carry out the administrative and supply functions.

The makeup of each department (directorate) should include highly qualified combined-arms generals and officers, and generals and officers of the arms of troops (special troops) of various specialties. A combined-arms general (officer) should be at the head of a department (directorate). The organization of work in the departments (directorates) and coordination between them should be set up in the manner suggested by General M. Ivanov and Colonel K. Pashuk in their articles.

Such an organizational structure of a staff will eliminate another

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important deficiency of control organs -- simultaneous execution by the very same departments (services) of work relating to preparation of information for making a decision, the planning of combat operations and their support, and also in regard to the collection of information on the situation and the immediate direction of the current combat activities of the troops. At the same time there will no longer be the need to involve a large number of officers in controlling the troops; duplication of work, lengthy coordinating processes and the basis of numerous documents, duplicating each other, will all be done away with.

A staff so constructed will have two vital departments -- the first concerned with matters of planning impending operations, the second, directing the current combat activity of the troops. This will permit more purposeful distribution of the efforts of the staff personnel in the control of the current activity of the troops and, at the same time, in the organization of impending operations.

In our opinion, such a distribution of functions will attain the best results, since a definite number of staff personnel, headed by a combined-arms general (officer), are dedicated beforehand to the execution of each task. Under the existing system, however, the decision in these matters is arrived at with the participation of the very same officers. The experience of numerous operational exercises indicates that the basic reason for unsatisfactory functioning of staffs in the matter of troop control, during the course of highly maneuvering and swift-moving combat operations, is the inability of the same persons to perform both functions equally well.

The suggested staff structure allows the combined-arms commander to receive simultaneously collated information on the situation regarding the enemy and all troops of the operational formation, and to work out measures which will reflect the combined activity of all arms of troops (special troops). It will become feasible to reduce considerably the quantity of documents processed in the staffs regarding troop control, mainly those dealing with plans for utilization of arms of troops (special troops), as well as types of support, since these documents actually only summarize the basic measures which are spelled out in documents of the combined-arms staff. It will be possible to bring in considerably fewer personnel for the purpose of troop control than under the existing system, by bringing in, in turn, the first four departments, depending on the actual situation, and also by concentrating the basic work for control of the current activities of the troops in one -- the second -- department (directorate).

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The chief of staff is given the best conditions for performing his functions, because he is relieved of the necessity of coordinating the activity of officers not under his subordination, and at the same time he is given a greater opportunity to study the situation and to organize combat operations, and the all-round support of the latter.

In our opinion, such an organizational structure of the staff is more convenient for work at the control points, because only the first, second and fourth departments (directorates) may be located with the combined-arms commander, and the efforts of these would be quite sufficient for performing the main functions of troop control. This will make it possible to decrease the personnel at the control points, increase their flexibility, significantly ease the work of communications equipment, and decrease its quantity, because it abolishes joint location of the combined-arms headquarters and the control organs of the chiefs of arms of troops (special troops) and services in one area (point), as it was in the past. It will be possible to disperse the points of troop control more, which undoubtedly will increase their viability.

The new organizational structure of the control organs is, in many ways, conducive to reducing the expense of their maintenance, and allows more effective use of the work of personnel and employment of the means of complex automation and mechanization of control processes. In addition, there will be need of only one system of automation for the combined-arms commander, capable of receiving and transmitting collated information on the situation.

And finally, the organizational structure of control organs suggested by us will avoid piecemeal control of operations of the arms of troops (special troops) and services, and point them, to a large degree, to the performance of tasks by combined efforts, that is, make the organization of troop control conform with their activities in the course of an operation.

It is known that an important place in the work of the combined-arms commander is occupied by the problems of materiel-technical and medical support. For directing materiel-technical and medical support, the combined-arms chief, in our opinion, also should have one control organ. This stems from the fact that in modern conditions the troops will be equally incapable of combat whether they lack materiel supplies or whether their equipment is not serviced and put into combat-effective condition. In turn, if the troops have a great amount of various combat equipment, and its performance depends on the supply of materiel on one hand, and on technical servicing

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and repair on the other, then these types of activity are made into one process. This is the reason for the need to unite the direction of materiel, equipment, and other types of rear support under the chief of the rear, directly subordinated to the combined-arms commanding officer.

In this, centralization of control of the rear must be carried out not only in matters of the organization of the rear, transport of materiel and technical equipment, and medical service, which are now the responsibilities of the chief of the rear, but also in matters of technical support as a second inherent part of modern rear services, which at present is under the jurisdiction of the various chiefs of arms of troops and special troops (services) not subordinate to the chief of the rear.

Thus, it seems to us that an administrative-organizational structure of control organs more suitable than the existing one, or the one suggested by Generals M. Ivanov, V. Arkhipov, and Colonel K. Pashuk, will be one in which the headquarters and the chief of the rear with his apparatus will be under the direct subordination of the combined-arms commander. Each of them will be concerned with a specific sphere of problems which require independent decisions on the part of the combined-arms commander. In our opinion, in conformity with modern principles of the use of troops in an operation, an operational formation must have within its makeup: combined-arms (tank) armies and combined-arms large units, an air army, including PVO troops, a large unit of missile troops and artillery, large units of engineer, chemical and communications troops, as well as units and subunits of intelligence, commandant's service, traffic control, and others.

With such a structure of the operational formation, the combined-arms commander can charge the lower combined-arms commanders with the fulfilment of tasks stemming from the goal and plan of the operation, and also will have means under his direct subordination with which he will be able to influence the course of the operation as a whole. At the same time, the organization of troop control is considerably simplified, and many intervening and, in our opinion, needless, control organs are eliminated.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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26 JUN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Prospects of Development of Armored Combat Vehicles", by Major-General of Engineer-Technical Services L. Sergeyev

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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Department of State

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
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COUNTRY : USSR

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The Prospects of Development of Armored Combat Vehicles

by

Major-General of Engineer-Technical Services L. Sergeyev

Now, perhaps, no one will oppose the tenet that the tank troops are best suited for conducting combat operations under conditions of a nuclear/missile war, that they, better than other arms of troops, can exploit the results of our own nuclear strikes against the enemy and have the most protection from enemy nuclear counterstrikes, and that they have great striking power and high mobility, as a result of which they are the basic strike force of the ground troops. Obviously it is not necessary to prove the dependence of all these qualities on the level of development of the armored equipment with which the tank troops are armed.

At the present time, because there is a rapid development of military equipment in general, and armor in particular, the danger that may arise as a result of losing qualitative superiority over the enemy from an equipment standpoint becomes apparent. In connection with this, it is necessary to emphasize that the greatest differences of opinion concerning military-technical progress are observed in the definition and determination of the actual directions of development of armored equipment.

In this connection, the statements of several authors in the pages of the Journal "Military Thought"*, concerning questions of future development of tanks, deserve serious attention.

A lot of attention was also devoted to these questions at the military-scientific conference that was conducted at the Military Academy of Armored Troops at the end of May 1961.

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* Note: We have in mind the articles of Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rotmistrov and General of the Army A. Zhadov, Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1961, and Lieutenant-General N. Slyusin, Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought," No. 1 (56), 1961.

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This article will expound on the prospects of development of basic types of armored combat vehicles that meet the conditions of utilizing tank troops in a nuclear/missile war.

Tanks

Despite the fact that tanks, in comparison with other equipment, have turned out to have the greatest ability to withstand nuclear bursts, new tanks have to be created, mainly taking into consideration a further increase in the effectiveness of their utilization in a war with wide-scale use of nuclear weapons and missile means.

The basic data on modern Soviet and foreign tanks are given in Table 1.

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Basic Data for Modern Soviet and Foreign Tanks

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Type of Tank		Medium						Heavy			Light				
Country		USSR	USA	USA	UK	UK	West Germany, France	USSR	USA	UK	USSR	France	USA	USA	UK
Model		T-55	M60	T95	"Centurion X"	"Chieftain"	Experimental Model	T-10M	M103	"Conqueror"	PT-76	AMX13	M41	T92	Experimental Model
Weight in Tons		36.5	46.3	32	51	45	35	51.5	57	65	14	14.5	22.7	16.8	20
Crew, number of persons		4	4		4			4	5	4	3	3	3	3	3
Dimensions in meters	Length	6.3	6.9	6.4	7.6			7.3	7.0	7.9	6.9	4.9	5.8		
	Width	3.3	3.6	3.2	3.4			3.5	3.7	3.9	3.1	2.9	3.3		
	Height	2.4	3.1	2.3	2.9	2.3		2.4	3.2	3.2	2.2	2.1	2.8		
Caliber of Gun in mm		100	105	105	105	120	105	122	120	120	76.2	75	76.2	76.2	83.8
Penetreting ability at 1000m, in mm		185	300	300	300	370	300	225		370	80	150(600 for guided missiles)	150	150	180
Unit of fire, number		43	55		60	40		30	34	35	40	37(4 guided missiles)	57		
Rangefinder		-	+	+				-	+	+	-	-			
Stabiliser		+			+			+		+	+				+
Automatic loader		-		+	Ejection of shell cases			Rammer		Rammer, Ejection of shell cases	-	+	-	+	
Thickness of armor in mm	Turret, (bow)	200	203		152			250	200		10-15	40	51		Light alloy
	Glacis plate	200	264		152			273	250	250	10-15	40	51		Light alloy
	Side	80	90		51			80-120			10-15	20	25		Light alloy
Special anti-atomic protection (PAZ)		+	+		+			-			-	+			
Maximum speed, km/hour		50	46	55	35		55	50	34	34	44	70	64		65
Cruising range in km*		350 (500)	420		200	350		240 (350)	130	150	250	300	250	350	200

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* For the Soviet tanks the cruising range given in the parentheses takes into consideration the use of extra t

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The variety of combat tasks entrusted to tanks makesit necessary to broaden their combat qualities in such a way that they cannot be incorporated in one model. At the same time, because of economic and purely military considerations it is necessary to strive to reduce the number of essential tank types to a minimum.

Even though it is impossible to create a single universal type of tank in modern conditions, in the tank parks of all the armies a tendency is observed to find a basic type, the combat qualities of which would permit its utilization for performing quite a wide range of combat tasks. The other types of tanks will be more specialized in their characteristics.

In the foreseeable future, taking into consideration the development of armored equipment by our probable enemies, it is advisable to improve further our light, medium (basic), and heavy tanks, to develop artillery combat vehicles and also create infantry combat vehicles, which will probably replace the present armored personnel carriers in combat subunits of motorized rifle units and large units. Besides these combat vehicles, it is necessary to produce combat vehicles of special designation in more limited quantities (command vehicles, bridge layers, flame throwers, and others), built on the chassis of tanks.

A cutback of specialized production and a decrease in the inventory of spare parts must be achieved by creating a "family" of vehicles based on the components and mechanisms of mass produced types of tanks, with the maximum uniformity and standardization of components, mechanisms and other equipment both within the "family" and among the vehicles on which they are based.

The medium tank, being the basic tank and the one found in the greatest numbers, must fulfil the widest range of combat tasks. These tanks form the basis of the combat power of the major tank large units and formations, intended for performing independent operational tasks. In the composition of the motorized rifle units they are used for direct support of infantry. This great range of combat tasks being fulfilled makes the problem of determining the basic specifications of the medium tanks quite difficult and critical. The difficulty of resolving it is indicated by the fact that, for a decade (1937 to 1947), in the British army it was considered impossible to create one type of medium tank, as a result of which the major tank large units were armed with high-speed

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"cruiser" tanks and slow "infantry" tanks which were issued for direct support of infantry.

From the nature of the combat operations of medium tanks it is apparent that combat with enemy tanks will be unavoidable for them and will be one of the most important missions. Therefore the weapons of these tanks must first of all be antitank, capable of destroying the basic tanks of the enemy. Besides, it is called upon to fulfil many other fire tasks (for example, the incapacitation of personnel in armored personnel carriers and in shelters). Consequently, the armament of medium tanks must be versatile and multipurpose.

With the improvement of the means of antitank defense and the increase of the combat qualities of enemy tanks, firepower increased, the thickness of the armor increased, and the weight of medium tanks increased correspondingly. At the present time the weight of our tanks of this type has reached 36 tons, in West Germany (experimental model) - 35, in Japan and Switzerland - about 35 tons. In the USA and the UK, the combat tasks of medium tanks are fulfilled by 46 to 50 ton tank

Research carried out by industry and in the Military Academy of Armored Troops shows that with the retention of tube artillery systems for the armament of the tank, the optimum combat weight of a medium tank in the next few years will be approximately 36 tons. It is highly undesirable to increase further the weight of the medium tank. But it is also completely unacceptable to reduce the weight at the expense of its protective features.

Reduction of the weight of a medium tank, with simultaneous improvement of its protective features, an increase in its mobility, and the growth of its firepower may clearly be achieved by switching over to guided missiles. However, for the time being, the basic armament of a medium tank will be a gun. At the present stage of guided missile development, they still cannot satisfy two contradictory requirements - versatility and antitank effectiveness. In connection with this (as a stage in the assimilation of guided missiles), it would be interesting to combine a powerful antitank gun with guided missiles (URS). In this case the latter must be located inside the tank and be launched by means of a gun. They (URS) will be used for destroying enemy tanks at great distances, i.e., it will be a specialized supplement to the basic (gun) armament of the tank.

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In order to increase the firepower of the tank it is necessary to have a rangefinder and automatic loading, equipping it with a night sight and devices for night vision that work without special lighting.

The armor of the tank must ensure reliable protection from mass antitank weapons and the best possible protection from the basic tank and antitank guns of the enemy.

It is necessary for the medium tanks to have high mobility in order to ensure swift tempos of the offensive, the best utilization of conditions created by the delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy, and for rapid dispersal when there is a threat that the enemy will use these weapons. The necessary mobility, with the possibility of attaining average speeds of movement over the terrain of about 35 to 40 km/hour may be achieved in tanks with the utilization of improved transmissions with automatic or semi-automatic drive, and with the creation of a suspension that ensures a very smooth ride. Moreover, the maximum speed of the tank should be 70 to 75 km/hour, for which it is necessary to increase the power of the tank by approximately 25 HP/ton.

In order to increase the maximum effective range of the tank troops, the cruising range of the tank must be substantially increased in comparison with that which has been achieved in our modern medium tank.

The tank must have effective special antiatomic protection (PAZ) from all the destructive effects of a nuclear burst. Special attention should be given to increasing the biological protection of the crew from penetrating radiation.

Fundamental improvements in protecting tanks from all the various modern destructive means must be found in completely new elements, in particular the compact accommodation of a reduced crew. In this case, it will be much simpler to carry out the appropriate complex (armor and biological) protection of the crew, without detriment to the other combat characteristics of the tank.

The tank must be suited for moving along the bottom of rivers with the aid of simple equipment for underwater driving (OPVT) and for floating with the use of individual means of flotation.

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Heavy Tank. In modern conditions the heavy tanks that have, in comparison with the medium tanks, more powerful armament and considerably better protection, are a means of qualitative reinforcement of the medium tanks, and are the most powerful weapon for combating the tanks of the enemy.

The qualitative reinforcement of medium tanks, as is known, may be attained with the assistance of heavy tanks or assault guns created on the chassis of the medium tank and differing from it by having more powerful armament. The first method is preferable. The powerful armament of the heavy tanks increases the possibility of their combat utilization, especially in offensive operations.

With the adoption as armament, by our probable enemy, of 105mm rifled guns that have quite a high muzzle velocity of subcaliber projectile, as the basic artillery weapon of its mass-produced types of tanks, with the presence of various means for reinforcing them, it becomes necessary to create qualitative means for reinforcing our medium tanks in the form of heavy tanks or other combat vehicles that differ from the medium tank, at least by the fact that they have more powerful armament.

Since the basic task of the heavy tanks will be the destruction of enemy tanks, they will, to a greater degree than the medium tanks, be better suited for the installation of guided missiles (URS) as their main armament. The use of URS opens the most effective path for increasing the firepower with a sharp improvement in protective features.

The future development of the heavy tank depends on increasing its firepower, increasing its armor protection, and ensuring a more effective system of antiatomic protection than other types of tanks have. An increase of the combat qualities of heavy tanks must be achieved by implementing new decisions on specifics, based on the use of new armament.

Light Tank. The broadening of the sphere of tank use in conditions of a nuclear/missile war makes it necessary to have well-armed light tanks, among which it is possible to single out the following types: reconnaissance, antitank and tanks of airborne troops.

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Reconnaissance combat vehicles perform intelligence, combat security, pursuit, and communications tasks. Their distinguishing features are high mobility and cross-country ability. In order to achieve these qualities, striving to get low weight, firepower and protection are sometimes sacrificed. However it should be kept in mind that with the fulfilment of the task of security with such vehicles, it is often necessary to halt enemy tanks at favorable lines, and to be subjected to the effects of various fire means during pursuit.

Antitank combat vehicles are an important supplement to the heavy tanks, as a highly mobile antitank reserve. They can, in a very short period of time, be moved in a sufficient quantity to the point of an enemy tank breakthrough, for example, into the zone of a nuclear burst. The quickly created antitank screen will slow down the enemy advance before tanks with more powerful armament arrive. With the limited weight, these vehicles will have relatively weak armor protection and will be inferior to the medium (basic) ones in respect to firepower. If it is necessary to have multipurpose armament for the reconnaissance vehicle, then, for similar vehicles, it is possible to use guided missiles, even some of the simpler ones.

Airborne landing tanks are necessary for the airborne troops. A landing is an important target and will definitely be attacked by enemy tanks. It must be capable of maneuver and must have an adequate strike force to capture important objectives. Low weight and unavoidable limiting of armor and firepower are obvious for the airborne troops' (VDV) tank. At the same time it is assigned quite complex tasks. They need armament that is both versatile and quite effective from the antitank standpoint. The armor must provide protection from the fire of large-caliber machineguns and small-caliber automatic guns. It is very difficult to combine all these characteristics. But if an effective airborne landing tank is created, it will be able to fulfil the functions of both a reconnaissance and a light antitank vehicle. Obviously such a multipurpose light tank must have a 76 to 85mm caliber gun, capable of destroying the basic enemy tanks (mainly their side armor) at medium distances. As an additional antitank weapon it may have several guided missiles of the simplest design, located, for example, on the turret and guided by wires. The tank must have automatic loading and be equipped with a rangefinder.

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The maximum speed of such a tank must be higher than that of medium and, especially, heavy tanks. We should recall one of the lessons of the last war: light tanks, that were inferior to the medium ones in respect to mobility, were found to be useless for fulfilling combat support tasks. Seeing that their armament (37 to 45mm guns) did not constitute any danger for the medium tanks, not to mention the heavy, production of our light tanks was halted in 1943, and in Germany a year earlier.

The system of antiatomic protection of the tank being proposed must consist mainly of carrying out hermetic sealing, introducing a filtering-ventilating installation, pressurizing the crew compartment, and ensuring simple decontamination.

In this tank, ensuring flotation will be of special concern, as this is contrary to the striving for compactness and small size. It is possible that this question will be resolved with the aid of stationary blocks of foam plastic (penoplast) or by other means with which it is possible to attain a temporary (during the time of floating) increase in water displacement.

It is necessary to note that the most successful light tank will not be able to replace the basic tank in an offensive operation. Of course the light tank will be cheaper than the medium one, but it will remain a specialized combat vehicle that is inferior to the basic (medium) tank in the complex "fire power-armor protection" that defines the effectiveness of a tank in a fire fight.

Infantry Combat Vehicles

At the present time the explanation of the basic tactical-technical qualities of a special combat vehicle for the infantry deserves very serious attention, the need for which, in conditions of a war with the use of weapons of mass destruction, is apparent.

The difficulties in determining the basic features of such a vehicle are explained by the fact that it must be the combat vehicle that is mass produced in the largest quantities, with the requirements and limitations that arise there from, imposed, first of all, by economics. At the same time, this vehicle must ensure the conduct of vigorous combat operations during the use of nuclear/missile weapons, the requirements of which cannot be satisfied by regular armored personnel carriers that are just a means of transport.

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The variety of approaches cited for determining the basic features of the infantry combat vehicle makes it necessary for us to dwell on this question in greater detail.

Up to the present time the infantry is a necessary arm of the troops, even though its role and significance in the ground army has essentially changed. The basic strike force role passed from the infantry, first to the artillery (World War I), then to the artillery and tanks, and finally to nuclear/missile weapons and tanks. In examining the offensive operation, it may be said simply that the infantry is given the final functions after the enemy is subjected to strikes by the strike arms of the troops, and also the final assimilation of the captured territory.

The essence of combat utilization of infantry is the individual actions of individual soldiers within the framework of the organized collective. The infantry is capable of destroying the enemy to the last soldier, i.e., to bring the battle to an end, while the strike arms of the troops, as a rule, perform the cardinal, basic tasks of the battle, but do not bring it to an end.

Besides performing the functions of bringing things to an end, the infantry, in some cases, creates opportunities for using the strike arms of the troops, and carries out combat operations under conditions where the use of strike arms of the troops is not expedient (for example, when operating in mountains).

Under conditions of a nuclear/missile war, the infantry will not be able to fulfil its inherent functions with its old weapons. On the battlefield it must be mobile (motorized) and to a certain extent protected from a nuclear burst and its effects (armored). This can only be achieved with combat vehicles that are specially constructed for the infantry. It is of special importance to have such vehicles for the infantry in the tank troops.

Thus, infantry combat vehicles (PBM) are combat vehicles with the use of which the infantry retains its inherent peculiarities for conducting battle and acquires the protection and mobility on the battlefield that it lacks. In our opinion it is completely incorrect to examine the PBM only as a means for coordinating the infantry with the tanks, or as the means of transport to the field and partially on the battlefield. Infantry combat vehicles - are the basic infantry means

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for carrying on combat in modern conditions. Therefore they must be constructed in such a way as not to limit, but on the contrary, to develop the positive qualities that are inherent to the infantry, thanks to which the infantry varies from the other arms of troops and justifies its existence.

Maybe the best solution of this question would be the creation of individual armored mobile vehicles, equipped with weapons, for a single soldier. However, at the present time this solution is impossible due to technical and economic considerations.

Proceeding from this, it is possible to formulate approximate requirements for the modern infantry combat vehicle.

It is visualized in the form of an armored (it must be closed and hermetically sealed) mobile, amphibious vehicle having high cross-country ability and holding several soldiers. The crew (landing force) must, to a certain extent, be protected from the effects of a nuclear weapon and its after-effects (thermal radiation, radioactive substances and others). While in the vehicle, they must have the opportunity to use their individual weapons. It is advisable to foresee the possibility of convenient and covered dismounting.

Obviously it is expedient to limit the size of the crew (landing force) of such a vehicle to a squad - the minimal TOE unit. A smaller crew (landing force) will lead to an undesirable increase in the total number of such vehicles, and a larger one will turn the infantry combat vehicle into a personnel carrier, where, in a number of cases, incomplete combat use of the entire landing force concentrated in the vehicle will be observed, and with its destruction the personnel will suffer heavy losses. Besides the landing force, the PBM must have a mechanic-driver and an operator for the fixed armament. The latter must remain in the vehicle in order to give fire support to the dismounted landing force. Therefore, total size of the crew (landing force) will be 7 to 10 persons.

The armament of the PBM must ensure the destruction of similar vehicles of the enemy, emplacements, and personnel. The individual weapons of the landing force, even if it is possible to use it actively in combat, cannot fulfil all these tasks. It is only capable of incapacitating enemy personnel, and even then at an insignificant distance. Therefore it is recommended to have fixed, light armament on the vehicle.

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The fixed armament must be compact and have the ability to conduct all-around fire (360°), not require an increase in the size of the vehicle, and not decrease the ease of accommodating the landing force.

If such armament requires a special combat compartment with a rotating race (pogon) having a diameter of 1300 to 1500mm, this will complicate and increase the weight of the PBM, and will turn it into a combination artillery combat vehicle and armored personnel carrier. This will result in an unjustified complex vehicle which it probably will not be possible to create on a mass scale.

Apparently the most appropriate armament for the PBM will be a small-caliber automatic gun (20 to 30mm caliber) which will sometimes even destroy tanks. It should be kept in mind that fragmentation shells of a small-caliber gun give a substantially greater effect than a large caliber machine gun. The gun must be reinforced with a regular machine gun.

With light guns, it is possible to install several infantry-type antitank guided missiles (PTURS) at the sides of the turret.

For effective utilization of the small arms of the landing force, the riflemen can best be located along the vehicle, facing the sides, which should have ports and embrasures provided in them.

An infantry vehicle that is mass produced, compact, and if possible, light, cannot have armor capable of withstanding shells. It is advisable to protect the PBM from the fire of large-caliber machine guns, otherwise they will stop it just as easily as the standard machine gun stopped the infantry in World War I. The glacis plates of the PBM must have a design thickness of about 35 to 40mm. The sides cannot be the same, or the vehicle cannot be amphibious. However, 13mm sides will ensure protection from the fire of standard machine guns and, within the limits of a target angle of ± 30°, from the fire of large-caliber ones also.

The special protection of the PBM must include the hermetic sealing of the body and a filtering-ventilating system for the collective protection of the crew from radioactive substances, and chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is not obligatory for the PBM to have higher speeds (average and maximum) than the tanks, but in principle they are helpful. Obviously, the power rating of 20 HP/ton and a maximum speed of 70 to 75 km/hour will be adequate for it.

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The cruising range should not be less than for tanks. The cross-country ability of the PBM should be no worse than that of the tanks. Fundamentally this can be ensured with tracked or improved wheeled running gear.

Without going into detail regarding the advantages and disadvantages of tracked and wheeled running gear, we will only point out that a thorough analysis shows that it is expedient to use tracked running gear on the PBM. With tracked running gear it is possible to have a simpler transmission, running gear, and body, and it is considerably easier to make them buoyant by using ordinary caterpillar tracks for this purpose. With other conditions equal the vehicle has smaller dimensions and weight. On the whole these parameters for a mass-produced vehicle are decisive and the necessary assurance of a caterpillar track service period of 8000 to 10,000km is not a problem for a light vehicle. This problem can be resolved fairly easily by using rubber and metal couplings.

The comparatively low weight of the infantry combat vehicle permits making it amphibious. Since the attainment of high speeds in water is not an obligatory requirement of the PBM, its bucyancy in water can be achieved by using ordinary caterpiller tracks.

Seeing that the infantry combat vehicle must be the vehicle found in the army in the largest numbers, it is necessary to strive for it to be of minimal weight, simply constructed, and cheap, so that it would be possible to make wide-scale use of standard components of the automobile-tractor industry.

All this makes great demands on the space allocation (komponovka). If the quality of the allocation in the tank is evaluated by how much of the interior volume of the vehicle is left for the combat compartment, then for the PBM the largest portion of the interior volume should be devoted to personnel.

The space allocation of the PBM must be original. It is doubtful that the chassis of other vehicles (for example, of the reconnaissance tanks) can be used for it. On the contrary, it is more likely that on the chassis of this mass produced vehicle other vehicles in the same weight category, may be created.

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In principle it is possible to have two logical arrangements of such vehicles. The first - the motor and transmission complex and the mechanic-driver are located in front, occupying 1/4 to 1/3 of the vehicle length; the other space remains free for accommodating the landing force and armament; the rear is made in the form of a hinged ramp.

The advantages of this arrangement are the ease of accommodation and convenience of disembarking the landing force, and the wide possibility of using the chassis of such a vehicle without substantial alterations (thanks to the presence of vacant space) for command-staff, reconnaissance, medical, transport, and other vehicles. However, with this arrangement it is difficult, when the vehicle is floating, to distribute the weight of the heavy nose section to the rear. Besides, the vehicle becomes rather long.

The second arrangement - the motor and transmission complex are located in a narrow tunnel along the center line of the vehicle, with the motor in the rear section and the transmission in the forward part. The landing force is located along the sides of the vehicle with their backs to the tunnel. In order to decrease the width of the vehicle it is possible to turn the soldiers of the landing force slightly forward. The armament and its operator are installed in the forward part of the vehicle, along with the mechanic-driver. The rear is made in the form of a hinged ramp, the same as for the first variant. This arrangement permits obtaining the minimum length and floating balance, but it is inferior to the former in versatility (because of the tunnel along the center line of the vehicle).

Working this out with sketches has shown that the PBM in the tracked version, that fulfils all the requirements examined above, may be created with a weight of 8 to 10 tons.

It should be said that in the armies of the USA, West Germany and France, a considerable amount of attention is given to developing infantry armored personnel carriers.

So far the US Army is concentrating exclusively on tracked vehicles. It is assumed that all the infantry will conduct combat operations in armored personnel carriers.

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The Bundeswehr is only beginning to create a pool of armored personnel carriers and is also concentrating on tracked vehicles. Moreover, they make wide-scale use of the French and Swiss experience. In West Germany they also operate on the principle that infantry must operate in armored personnel carriers.

Several armored personnel carriers have been introduced as armament in the French army, but they are produced in a limited quantity. The appearance of the wheeled, armored personnel carrier "Panar" must be viewed only as an attempt to test the possibility of creating an armored personnel carrier on the chassis of the reconnaissance armored car "Panar".

So far the British army does not have any tracked armored personnel carriers. The basic vehicle of this type is the wheeled armored personnel carrier "Saracen". It should be said that in it, to a certain extent, it was possible to combine a moderately complex chassis with satisfactory cross-country ability.

Table 2 presents data on modern vehicles that are used for the infantry. The majority of them are still just a means of transport, and do not provide the infantry with the opportunity to carry on combat operations under the new conditions. However, some of the foreign vehicles mounting appropriate armament may approach the prospective PBM that we have examined.

Let us dwell on individual models of armored personnel carriers.

The Soviet wheeled, armored personnel carrier BTR-152 does not stand up to criticism. In the pursuit of an economic commercial chassis, a vehicle was created that does not satisfy the given requirements as regards cross-country ability, unit power rating, and several other parameters. The combat qualities of this vehicle equate with the level of armored personnel carriers used in the years of World War II.

The tracked, armored personnel carrier BTR-50PK possesses a more improved design, but neither does it satisfy many requirements. Without dwelling on its merits, let us note the faults. In actuality, this is a means of transport for carrying a landing force of 20 persons. The latter are accommodated in crowded conditions in the central part of the vehicle and, located there, they cannot participate in combat. Dismounting of the landing force is difficult. The vehicle does not have fixed armament. The glacis plate is not thick enough. The arrangement of the vehicle is poor

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for use as a PBM - with the large size of the vehicle the landing force is accommodated on a "postage stamp". This is a result of using the chassis of an amphibious tank. The special propellers for traveling through water are an unnecessary luxury for a vehicle of this type. On the whole the design of the armored personnel carrier is complex, heavy, and also quite expensive. Finally, its mobility (speed, cruising range) leaves much to be desired.

Some of the most successful foreign models appear in a much better light, even though they also have faults. Here we have in mind the vehicles M113 (USA, Illustration 1); "Hotchkiss" (France, West Germany, Illustration 2); "Hispano-Suiza" (West Germany, Switzerland, Illustration 3); and "Pirate" (Switzerland). These armored personnel carriers have the smallest size and weight. The landing force (approximately a squad) is conveniently accommodated in the enclosed body and can, to a certain extent, participate in combat. Convenient dismounting is provided through a ramp at the rear. They make wide-scale use of motor vehicle engines and transmissions. Some vehicles ("Hotchkiss", "Hispano-Suiza") have an automatic small-caliber gun (with a muzzle velocity of 100 meters/second). The others have a large-caliber machine gun in a rotating turret. Some of the models (AMX, "Pirate", M113) are equipped with a PAZ system.

The AMX armored personnel carrier cannot be counted with the best, despite a number of good features (for example, the armor), as a result of a somewhat excessive landing force and great weight. The wheeled, armored personnel carrier "Panar" has a very unique design, but due to its great complexity (which is probably not acceptable for a mass-produced vehicle), it is only interesting from the technical standpoint.

The PBM that our army needs must considerably surpass the best foreign vehicles that have been examined. Here, it must be considered that it will still only be under development, and that these vehicles are already introduced into the armament, and will probably be improved. Therefore, there should be a large measure of qualitative superiority in its makeup, such as: very small dimensions and weight with convenient accommodation of the landing force, armament (free rockets), that is even capable, if necessary, of destroying tanks, adequate armor protection from large-caliber machine guns, and together with all this, it should be amphibious.

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Table 2 [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Basic Data on Modern Soviet and Foreign Armored Personnel Carriers

Country		USSR	USSR	USSR	USA	UK	France	France	West Germany, France	West Germany, Switzerland	Switzerland
Model of armored personnel carrier		BTR-50PK	BTR-152K	BTR-60P	M113	"Saracen"	AMX	"Panar"	"Hotchkiss"	"Hispano-Suiza"	"Pirate"
Type of running gear		Tracked	Wheeled	Wheeled	Tracked	Wheeled	Tracked	Wheeled	Tracked	Tracked	Tracked
Weight in Tons		14.3	8.9	9.9	10.1	10.2	13.5	13.5	6.4	12.5	11.2
Dimensions in meters	Length	7.1	6.8	7.3	4.8	5.0	5.5	5.6	3.7	5.3	5.3
	Width	3.1	2.3	2.87	2.66	2.5	2.5	2.4		2.5	2.4
	Height	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.9	2.1	1.95
Landing force and crew, persons		20+2	16+1	15+1	10+2	10+2	12+2	13+2	5+2	9+2	11+1
Armament		-	-	-	12.7mm machine gun	7.5mm machine gun	12.7mm machine gun	12.7mm machine gun	20mm gun	20mm gun	
Thickness of armor, mm	Glacis Plate	10÷13	6÷13	6÷10		13	30	40		30	20
	Side	10÷13	6÷13	6÷10		13	20	15		15	12
	Rear	10÷13	6÷13	6÷10		13	15	15		10	10
Special antiatomic protection (PAZ)		-	-	-	+	-	+				+
Maximum speed, km/hour		44	65	80	64	70	60	100	65	65	65
Cruising range, km		250	550	600	320	360	340	600	350	300	300
Amphibious propulsion		water jet drive	-	water jet drive	Tracked drive	-	-	-	-	-	-

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


Illustration 1. Armored Personnel Carrier M113 (USA)




Illustration 2. Armored Personnel Carrier "Hotchkiss" (West Germany, France)



Illustration 3. Armored Personnel Carrier "Hispano-Suiza" (West Germany, Switzerland)

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Artillery Combat Vehicles

Despite the presence of nuclear weapons, artillery support may be necessary for successful operations by tanks and infantry, especially when they are separated from the other forces. Therefore, it is desirable for the tank troops to have mobile tracked vehicles with light armor, equipped with howitzer or rocket armament (free rockets) and designated for artillery support of the tanks. Such vehicles should not be confused with the turretless tanks with shell-resistant armor, the so-called assault guns (SAU) of wartime. Artillery combat vehicles (ABM) usually carry out group fire from concealed positions at a definite distance from the enemy.

The ABM, in conformity with the missions it fulfils, must have shells that have good high-explosive fragmentation action, considerable range of fire, capable of destroying area targets, good lateral and range fire maneuverability, and, moreover, a large unit of fire. The most expedient armament is the howitzer (larger caliber than on tanks) or free rockets (multiple launching mount). It is recommended that only part of the vehicles be armed with the latter, as a supplement, capable of creating a high concentration of fire. Howitzer armament must be located in a closed revolving turret. Bulletproof armor giving protection from standard caliber automatic fire, is completely adequate - such vehicles avoid direct contact with the enemy.

The arrangement and chassis of the ABM should be the same as for a light tank, only having a different turret. For stability there should be a spade (soshnik) and suspension idler wheels. The questions of antiatomic protection should be resolved in the same manner as for other vehicles having light armament - light tanks and infantry combat vehicles.

The ABM has been developed to the greatest degree in the US Army where the artillery battalions of tank divisions are armed with 105mm and 155mm self-propelled howitzers. As an example of a vehicle of this type, Illustration 4 shows a T196 self-propelled howitzer of the American Army. Its weight is 18 tons. It is completely armored (bulletproof). The 155mm howitzer is mounted in a revolving turret. The range of fire is 16,000 meters, and the unit of fire is 50 rounds. The vehicle overcomes water barriers afloat, under its own power.

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


Illustration 4. 155mm T196 Self-Propelled Howitzer (USA)

Besides the field-type ABM used in the tank divisions for direct artillery support of tanks, it is now necessary to have high-powered ABMs. Such vehicles are intended for inflicting nuclear or conventional artillery strikes at distances of 20 to 30km. Their design can duplicate that of the field-type ABM in many ways (in an enlarged form) and can be made on the chassis of the basic tank. Either 150 - 175mm caliber guns or medium-caliber free rockets (missiles) may serve as armament. A vehicle of this type is shown in Illustration 5. This is the 175mm T235 atomic assault gun of the US Army. Its weight is 26 tons, and range of fire is 30,000 meters. The mechanic-driver is located in an armored cab. The crew and an additional unit of fire are located in an auxiliary armored personnel carrier. The vehicle has quite a large cruising range (800 km).

High-powered ABM's may be attached to tank divisions or even included in their composition.




Illustration 5. 175mm T235 Atomic Assault Gun (USA)

Vehicle on an "Air Cushion"

Let us evaluate the prospects of military application of vehicles flying slightly above the surface of the ground by using supporting ("air cushion") running gear. In order to have such a vehicle travel above the surface of the ground and above water, the pressures exerted at its base are limited by values of approximately 50 to 100 kg/m^2. This means that a vehicle that weighs approximately 10 tons must have, with a fairly small expenditure of force, a base area of more than 100 square meters. The uppermost limit of the above-indicated pressure is applicable for some planned vehicles of greater weight, and the lowest has been implemented in various types of flying motor vehicles and in the British vehicle "Hovercraft".

The large length and width, with a comparatively small lift height (not over 0.4 meters) and the small size of slope negotiated (from 8° to 13° in prototypes) limit the possibilities of wide-scale application of such vehicles for military purposes, permitting them to move only over roads, unusually level terrain, and over calm water surfaces.

The advantages of utilizing supporting running gear consist of the fact that in comparison with the engines of aircraft (helicopters) it permits reducing the power from approximately 200 HP/ton to 80 to 100 HP/ton. Moreover, according to data in the foreign press, the useful load may reach 40 percent of the weight of the vehicle.

If we limit ourselves to a small clearance (of up to 0.4m), then the basic faults of a vehicle with supporting running gear will be: complexity of design, connected with ensuring control during movement, large size, and limited cross-country ability when moving over uneven terrain. If their clearance is increased, then the power necessary to lift it will grow rapidly and will attain values that modern aircraft have. The power limitations are approximately the same for "flying jeeps" that have ducted rotors. With an increase of the clearance, the load capacity decreases sharply, the expenditure of fuel increases, and the cruising range is reduced.

Taking into consideration everything that has been stated, it is possible to visualize two types of such combat vehicles:

-- small vehicles, intended for movement above land and water, which will be ground troop equipment; their intended combat use will be reconnaissance and communications; increasing the clearance will lead to unfavorable parameters of the unit power rating which, however, may prove necessary; therefore we do not rule out the possibility of utilizing a vehicle of the "flying jeep" type with ducted rotors;

-- fairly large vehicles that are a means of transport, obviously they will be used to advantage for moving over water, but also will be able to move over fairly level terrain.

* * * *

During the last few years, the combat characteristics and, above all, the firepower of the tanks of our probable enemies have increased significantly (see Table 1). The correlation of the combat qualities of our medium tanks and the basic tanks of the US Army has become less favorable than it was several years ago. Therefore, it is necessary to apply serious efforts to creating new models of tanks that would be superior to the foreign ones. It is also clear that successful ground troop operations are possible only if they are equipped, not only with high-quality tanks, but also with a number of other combat vehicles that answer modern requirements.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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29 JUN 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Field Commands", by Lieutenant-General N. Volodin

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Field Commands", by Lieutenant-General N. Volodin

DATE OF INFO : October 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Field Commands", by Lieutenant-General N. Volodin.

This article appeared in the 1961 Fourth Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1961 Fourth Issue went to press on 20 October 1961.

Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed since 1937. The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the end of 1961, 61 issues had been published, 6 of them during 1961. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960 and is also issued irregularly.

The Soviet critique of the rear services exercise mentioned on page 6 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Field Commands

by

Lieutenant-General N. Volodin

Recently, in the pages of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", consideration has been given widely to the problem of the organizational structure of operational headquarters. On this point a number of authors have properly pointed out that the existing organizational structure and equipment of front and army field commands require radical reexamination, as they are inconsistent with the changed nature of modern operations and the demands made on troop control. We are fully in agreement with this view.

Under modern conditions, control points (punkt upravleniya), as the organs for directing combat operations, are one of the important objectives for enemy nuclear strikes. This is especially true of the major operational headquarters - those of fronts and armies.

For this reason the most important condition for ensuring firm and uninterrupted troop control is, in our opinion, an increase in the viability, mobility, and maneuverability of headquarters. This can be attained provided the headquarters have few personnel and are well equipped with the latest technical means of control, and also with staff cars having good cross-country ability and suited for the work. Only under these conditions will a headquarters be able to move rapidly behind the troops, and more frequently change its location, and thus sharply reduce the possibility of its discovery by the enemy and destruction by nuclear weapons.

As already noted in the press, the front and army field commands in existence at the present time in accordance with the provisional TO&E, are too unwieldy, insufficiently mobile,

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and inadequately supplied with means of control and movement. By virtue of this, as has been shown by the experience of exercises in postwar years, the headquarters of a front is able to move not more than once in two or three days, and an army headquarters, once a day. It is entirely obvious that with modern tempos of attack of 100 km and more per day, such a situation is fraught with the danger of loss of troop control and may lead to failure of the operation.

Before taking a look at the organizational structure of the control organs, let us dwell briefly on the new technical means of troop control, by which we mean first of all the means of "elementary mechanization" ("malaya mekhanizatsiya"). In our opinion it is necessary to introduce more widely into all headquarters selector communications, communications scrambling devices, radio-commutation, photocopying devices, electronic-electric screens and plotting boards (these last particularly in the headquarters of missile troops and artillery and of chiefs of PVO troops), and it is also necessary to improve the sets of various stamps, etc. It is especially necessary to create models of staff cars and of field equipment for the work of headquarters. All this will play a positive role in increasing the operational efficiency of headquarters work.

As a positive example one may even cite the use in one of the exercises of the Carpathian Military District, in the spring of 1961, of the mobile photo-laboratory of an airborne army, for the reproduction of small graphic documents and diagrams. The laboratory crew of three men, headed by an officer, reproduced in a very short time hundreds of various diagrams, graphs, designs and schedules, substituting for the labor of no less than 30 officers and draftsmen. Positive results have also been achieved by the use of a field cartographic unit for the reproduction of documents supplemented by maps. Despite the duration and imperfection of the technological process, because of the improved organization of the work, the time for the issuance of the documents was significantly decreased. In one of

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the divisional exercises in the Carpathian Military District, a field cartographic unit, staffed by a small group of officers, NCO's and enlisted men, reproduced hundreds of graphic documents, a thing which was not within the capabilities of the entire district headquarters.

Passing on to the problem of the organizational structure of control points, we believe that the existing division of them into forward command posts (PKP), command posts (KP) and rear control points (TPU) is correct in principle, since this does increase the viability and operational efficiency of headquarters to a considerable degree. Such a system, however, does not fully guarantee the firm and uninterrupted direction of the combat operations of troops, especially of missile troops and the forces and means of PVO and of aviation. Such a system does not permit the effecting of coordination of the control points in case one of them is put out of action, and it leads to parallelism in the work and to duplication of one another.

The experience of exercises underscores the views expressed in previous articles of the Special Collection to the effect that the forward command post of a front or army, by virtue of its small staff and inadequate equipment of control means, cannot fully substitute for a KP when the latter is put out of action. In fact, how can one speak of such interchangeability of a PKP and KP when, for example, the missile troop and artillery chiefs of a front or army are at the PKP, and have the basic means for controlling missile troops at the KP and do control them through their headquarters, which is also located at the KP. Such a situation can occur also for the chief of the PVO troops of a front or for the commander of an airborne army, where the basic means of control are located at the command post of the front or airborne army.

Besides this, it is from the command post that the basic communications are maintained for coordination and communications with higher headquarters. Together with this, the attachment of almost all the responsible persons, the best and most highly trained generals and officers, and

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also a considerable part of the control means, to the forward command post, seriously weakens the command post, which, in case the PKP is put out of action, will experience great difficulties in troop control.

Therefore, in our view the personnel and equipment of control points must be such that in case one of them is put out of action, another can substitute fully for it.

The organizational structure which we are proposing for a front field command (Diagram No. 1) basically comes to the following.

A command post and an alternate command post (ZKP) are created within the front, which are capable of independently carrying out full and purposeful direction of troops. In addition, a rear control point is set up which will carry out the functions of missile, material-technical and medical support of operations, and in case of necessity may even temporarily assume control of the troops.

The command post and alternate command post of a front command are made up of personnel of directorates and departments of all arms of troops (or services) at reduced strength, which must ensure the direction of all arms of troops, as well as the organization and maintenance of uninterrupted cooperation among them.

In order to guarantee stability of troop control, each KP and ZKP must be provided with identical communications regiments, the forces and means of which will permit the organization of communications in two positions. The rear control point is provided with a communications battalion and a separate communications company of the missile rear. The makeup of the remaining communications units may be the same as that stipulated by the provisional TO&E.

Correspondingly the communications within a front are also organized into a KP, ZKP, and TPU.

Thus, all the control points of a front are equipped

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with autonomous communications, thus guaranteeing their independence and reliable communications with the troops and among themselves.

This system of organizing troop control into a KP, ZKP, and TPU was tested in the operational-rear services exercise in the Carpathian Military District in July 1961 under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov, and produced positive results.

As has been shown by the experience of this exercise, it is advisable to locate the ZKP 40 to 50 km from the KP, to the side or in front of it, and, in the interests of security, for a specified period of time complete radio silence is observed in it, and strict limitation of messages over technical means of communication. The ZKP receives all information on troop positions and combat operations from the command post by "VCh" telephone, by telegraph with a communications scrambling device, or by mobile means. During this period, part of the officers of the ZKP may be used for work with the troops.

If the KP should be put out of action, the alternate command post is automatically transformed into the command post and completely takes over troop control. During shifts of the KP, the control of troops may temporarily rest with the ZKP.

Because of the importance of intelligence in modern operations, all means of it are concentrated in the hands of the chief of intelligence of a front, in order to ensure the purposeful use of these means for the prompt and full acquisition of information on the enemy, and above all on his means of nuclear attack.

Missile, material-technical, and medical support, as already pointed out, is effected from the rear control point of the front. The building up to strength and training of the reserves are directed from here, for which purpose the TPU will have a deputy troop commander of the front

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

IRONBARK

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for combat training with a directorate of organization and replacements and a department of combat training.

In connection with the fact that problems of missile support have acquired exceptionally great significance and are one of the main tasks of the rear, it is proposed to introduce the position of deputy chief of the rear area of a front for missile support, subordinate to whom would be the directorate of missile and artillery armament and the missile fuels department.

As for tank-technical and motor-tractor support, the experience of the last war and of postwar exercises has shown that it is most convenient to solve these problems from the command post of the front, since it is from here that the planning of the operation is carried out, within which the problems of the use of armored and motor transport troops occupy a large place. Therefore, with the aim of increasing operational efficiency in the solution of these problems, it is more expedient to put the departments for armor and motor-tractor equipment in the command post, subordinating them to the deputy troop commander of the front for technical matters. Changes in the title of this position are dictated by considerations of eliminating varying interpretations of the problem.

In our opinion the positive aspects of the proposed organizational structure of a front field command are:

--achievement of interchangeability of control points, increase in their viability and stability, and ensuring uninterrupted troop control;

--decrease in the personnel of the field command of a front by one sixth in comparison with the provisional TO&E in force; the attainment of a greater reduction in the personnel of a field command obviously is not possible, since the means of automation and mechanization of control procedures are actually still only being developed and have not been tested in troop exercises; with the introduction of these means into troop units, the personnel of a front

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

field command can be further reduced by about one third;

--increase in the mobility of control points and in their capacity for rapidly changing their location, thus increasing the operational efficiency and flexibility of troop control.

The organizational structure of the field command of a combined-arms or a tank army can be analogous to that proposed for a front field command. Other forms, however, are also possible, one of which we have presented in Diagram No. 2. In essence it consists of creating two equal control points (the first and the second) in an army field command, which are capable of independently planning and carrying out operational troop control. A rear control point is also set up.

The basic directing nucleus of an army field command is the operations center. It includes the chief of staff, the chiefs of the arms of troops and of special troops (missile troops and artillery, engineer and chemical troops, PVO and communications), the chief of the operations department, the chief of intelligence, the deputy army commander for the rear, and five officers (three from the operations department, one for the rear, and one for the armored and motor-tractor service).

The operations center, which is headed by the army commander, will be located at one of the control points, and will direct the troops on the main axis, and the second control point will at the same time direct the troops operating on separate axes or cut off from the main forces. Part of the officers of the second control point can also be used to carry out occasional assignments in the troop units.

When necessary, an operations center headed by the commanding officer can quickly be transformed into the second control point. When one of the points is put out of action, complete direction of troop operations can be assumed by the second control point.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

IRONBARK

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

The rear control point carries out all the functions inherent in the missile, material-technical, and medical support of the troops of an army. If the first and second control points are put out of action, the TPU may temporarily assume troop control. With this aim, officer-operators from the basic arms of troops are included in its makeup, and communications and cipher sections are set up.

All three control points ensure autonomous communications with the troops and among themselves.

The method of organizing the control points of a combined-arms or tank army obviously has advantages over the existing organizational structure and is more responsive to modern requirements.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]


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DIAGRAM 1

[redacted]

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF A FRONT FIELD COMMAND

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)



[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)


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DIAGRAM 2

[redacted]

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF A FIELD COMMAND OF A COMBINED-ARMS (TANK) ARMY

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)



[redacted]

[redacted] Copy No. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

(81)

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY

[redacted] 6 July 1962

TO: Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Station, Moscow

SUBJECT: [redacted]/Meeting with [redacted] at Fourth of July Reception 1.3(a)(4)

REFS: A. DIR 0067
B. DIR 0072
C. [redacted]

1. Forwarded herewith is [redacted] report of his meeting with [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) in Spaso House during the Fourth of July reception held there. Here follows an account of the action taken here in preparation for this meeting and brief comment on the meeting itself.

2. The possibility of the meeting and the various contingencies with which we would be concerned if and when it took place were discussed with [redacted] when I returned from London. We decided that [redacted] would scout Spaso by 1.3(a)(4) himself for dead drop possibilities; this he did, for the last time on 3 July. The dead drop site finally selected was on the underside of the cover of the water tank of the only toilet in the men's room, and suitable preparations were made to accommodate a 9" x 4" x F package from us to [redacted] and a similar package from him to us.

3. To be included in the package from us to [redacted] were: 1,000 rubles in 25 ruble denominations; the operational note delivered here by [redacted]; the 1.3(a)(4) operational note received via reference A; and the addendum to the latter received via reference B.

4. [redacted] and I met, using the pretext of a security briefing by 1.3(a)(4) [redacted] in the secure room on 2 July. The entire meeting plan was reviewed with Mequis and, because we would not meet again until the morning of the 4th, he was briefed on the required action for a two-way pass via dead drop.

5. I met [redacted] on 3 July as agreed upon in London. He reported that, 1.3(a)(4) up to that time, there had been two meetings between [redacted] and [redacted] and that there would be no need for a two-way pass at Spaso; [redacted] might have something for us but he doubted it. I asked what had been passed by [redacted] to [redacted] and, from [redacted] account, it was clear that [redacted] had received everything we had for him. [redacted] also reported that [redacted] would not be available in the West per references A and B, apparently for the same reason which squelched his two earlier planned trips.

[redacted]

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31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

6. At a second meeting with [redacted] on the morning of 4 July (with [redacted] and [redacted] also present), the final plan for identification of [redacted] to [redacted] and, as an outside possibility, a pass from him to us, was gone over and made firm. 1.3(a)(4)

7. [redacted] and PETROCHENKO of reference C (hereafter referred to as Identity) appeared in the reception line at 1225, the reception having been scheduled 1200-1330. With [redacted] stragetically stationed in the immediate area of the reception line (Minister Counselor and wife) to recognize [redacted] as he entered, the latter was immediately recognized and the signal given to [redacted] As the attached report and reference C indicate, there never was a problem in recognition but only in managing some sort of separation, at least temporarily, between [redacted] and his companion, Identity. This was never accomplished to our satisfaction. [redacted] chose a less-than-one-minute-long interval to turn completely aside from Identity in order to tell [redacted] that he would have something for him next time and to receive [redacted] reply in kind, but this was apparently as far as he wished to go. From [redacted] and my own observations, he was seen at no time during the reception without Identity. While this was a bit of a disappointment to us, since [redacted] had been briefed to touch on future contacts if this became securely feasible, [redacted] quite properly did not force the issue. We are all certain that [redacted] had good reason for refusing operational contact beyond the single exchange, and I regret that there were no clues which came to our attention during the reception which will take us beyond speculation as to this reason at this time. 1.3(a)(4)

8. PETROCHENKO is also something of an enigma to us at the moment, in that we are not yet certain how his name found its way to the invitation list. It does not appear on the "working invitation list" and, when I briefed the Minister Counselor this morning on the happenings on the 4th, he was unable to account for Identity's pressence. It is quite possible that the name was placed on the final list by [redacted] after the Minister Counselor had indicated to him that [redacted] should be invited (one name was apparently deleted in order to accommodate PETROCHENKO; we are forwarding both the working and the final list by the next pouch.) The calling card which PETROCHENKO gave to [redacted] would indicate that he belonged on the list, and we do not necessarily view it as sinister that he and [redacted] remained glued to one another during the reception (we cannot be entirely certain of who was watching whom); however, this behavior does fit the unfortunate pattern of [redacted] interest in [redacted] and to this extent we find it disturbing. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
6 July 1962
page 3

9. I have the following comments on [redacted] contact report: 1.3(a)(4)

a. Para 2: [redacted] involvement with [redacted] was coincidental rather than contrived. He happened to be standing near [redacted] when Mrs. JONES when Mrs. JONES decided the time had come to spend some time with the Soviet guests, and forthwith introduced herself and [redacted] to [redacted] and his companion. (It is entirely possible that [redacted] recognized both names as connected with the [redacted] dead drop.) I should add that I observed [redacted] at one point in the reception, in animated conversation with [redacted] and his companion; I have not yet had the opportunity to debrief [redacted] but I will apprise you of any significant results as soon as I do. I find the coincidence which pushed [redacted] into contact and whatever it was that prompted the [redacted] contact, unfortunate, but there was so much mixing of the various groups and individuals within the groups that I do not believe these contacts should necessarily be viewed with alarm. 1.3(a)(4)

b. Para 3: From the limited opportunity I had for observation of [redacted] he was certainly in complete control of himself and on top of the situation. He demonstrated a willingness to mix with any and all, which he did. He was tastefully and neatly dressed, well barbered, and appeared to be in excellent health. I last saw him and PETROCHENKO drinking whiskey from shot glasses on the veranda at 1335, by which time the bulk of the Soviets--by no means all--had departed. 1.3(a)(4)

c. Para 3: The tobacco delegation mentioned here represents our first opportunity to get [redacted] and [redacted] together; we shall pursue it and keep you advised of any significant developments. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Attachment: [redacted] Report

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment to [redacted] 6 July 1962 1.3(a)(4)

SUBJECT: Meeting with [redacted] at July 4 Reception 1.3(a)(4)

1. [redacted] was among the last to arrive at the reception, not coming until about 1225. He was with PETROCHENKO. [redacted] spotted him and gave the signal (a wink) to [redacted] After about five minutes [redacted] began 1.3(a)(4)
moving in [redacted] direction, talking briefly to Soviets, as he had been doing during the whole reception. He introduced himself to PETROCHENKO and then [redacted]. [redacted] had his coat unbuttoned and tie-clasp showing. The three chatted briefly and then PETROCHENKO said he was looking for WOODS. PETROCHENKO and [redacted] invited [redacted] to come into the barroom (next door) and have a drink. [redacted] said he would just look for WOODS. He could not find WOODS, so went in to have the drink. Then he was introduced to D. M. GVISHIANI and Ye. I. LEVIN. (Note: PETROCHENKO did most of the talking. [redacted] was, thought [redacted] slightly deferential to him. All, of course, were deferential to GVISHIANI.

2. [redacted] then walked away, going into the other room, ostensibly to look again for WOODS. He came back perhaps fifteen minutes later and saw 1.3(a)(4)
[redacted] and Mrs. Bill JONES talking to [redacted] and PETROCHENKO. [redacted] approached the group, but as [redacted] said "let me introduce you", [redacted] was pulled away by a somewhat drunk TIMIRYAZEV, Agricultural Academy official, and asked to drink to their new friendship. [redacted] returned in a few minutes, at which time [redacted] took [redacted] glass to fill at the bar. Thus [redacted] had his first chance to talk to [redacted] alone. The conversation was innocuous for a minute or so, when [redacted] said, "I will have something for you next time." [redacted] replied, "We will have something for you next time." [redacted] thinks [redacted] may have preceded his remark with something about "yesterday" but can't be sure. It might have been "Because of yesterday" or something like that. After this brief exchange the conversation returned to the social level. [redacted] tried to say something else, that we would try to arrange social meetings, but could not, as [redacted] turned the conversation back to pleasantries immediately. [redacted] did not get anything said except the one sentence above. The whole exchange was very brief. [redacted] did not change expression or give any indication of a variation in the conversation. The room was noisy, but there were people as close as four feet away, namely PETROCHENKO who was talking to someone else. [redacted] could hardly hear [redacted] from 1 1/2 feet away, either in his social conversation or in the one sentence noted above. [redacted] tried to move so that [redacted] could talk to him further (i.e., [redacted] went back to a nearby serving table a couple of times. [redacted] did not follow or even turn around. After perhaps five minutes more talk with [redacted] PETROCHENKO and others who wandered by, [redacted] left. He did not see [redacted] again. (Note [redacted] also asked [redacted] while they were talking alone, if his wife were here. [redacted] said yes, but he did not know where. They probably did not meet, as Mrs. [redacted] was at the other end of the house the whole time.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment to [redacted]

 1.3(a)(4)

3. [redacted] seemed relaxed, not at all nervous, but rather morose and not very lifely. There was no indication that he wished to cut short his talk with [redacted] nor that he did not want to talk to Americans generally. He talked freely with many, and, at least with [redacted] always in English, even if [redacted] spoke Russian. He drank a fair amount but was not at all drunk. (PETROCHENKO also talked only English.) They both suggested [redacted] come to see them at work, and [redacted] said he might have business with them because tobacco delegations were to be exchanged. 1.3(a)(4)

4. [redacted] talked more to PETROCHENKO than to [redacted] PETROCHENKO seemed to be superior to [redacted] but they were apparently friendly. [redacted] stayed with PETROCHENKO the whole time, never straying from his presence. (It might have been vice-versa. At any rate, they were always together.) 1.3(a)(4)

5. [redacted] may have spent somewhat more time with [redacted] and PETROCHENKO than with other Soviets, but not much, if any. He talked to at least two other parties for about the same amount of time, and with many others for briefer periods. He talked to Soviets the whole time of the reception (1200-1330). He does not believe that his conversation with PETROCHENKO and [redacted] were out of the ordinary. They, in fact, were far more forward than most others in talking to Americans. 1.3(a)(4)

6. [redacted] is positive the brief operational conversation went unnoticed by others. At any rate, [redacted] initiated it, apparently preferring to say a few words under those circumstances than to try to get alone with [redacted] even by turning his back on PETROCHENKO or walking ten feet away from him. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(82)

[redacted]

FBI 1.3(a)(4)

Dep 15

July 20, 1962

#28

MEMORANDUM ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. CHICKADEE. Most recent reports were received July 4th and 5th, together with information leading us to believe CHICKADEE is in trouble. We conclude he is under suspicion, possible surveillance, and even might have been compromised to the point where he could be acting as a counter-agent. We therefore are studying his most recent reports which covered certain aspects of military doctrine most carefully, checking them against all sources available to us and are not disseminating them pending a judgment as to their bona fides.

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

(83)

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

26 July 62

Subject: Operational Review conducted between 20th & 26th July 62 by

[redacted] DCSR, SRCOP, CSR/9, [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

1. The operational review is summarized in the attached document, which is made up of the following parts:

   I. Security History According to Yoga's Statements

   II. Events of Security Significance

   III. Production Review

   IV. Conclusions

   V. Future Plans

   Also attached, but unnumbered, is an English language operational letter for [redacted] to be passed by [redacted] The text of the letter has been agreed between [redacted] and KUBARK for the next operational communication to [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

2. The entire text of the operational review has been reviewed and agreed between [redacted] and KUBARK.

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]
SR/9

CSR
DCSR
SR/COP
SR/DCOP
CSR/9 seen
DCSR/9
[redacted] seen
seen

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

(72)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

30 July 1962 .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Expenditure Authorization

1. On 26 July 1962 you were briefed on the possible necessity for underwriting jointly with MI-6 a total support expenditure of 30,000 pounds (about $90,000) for one special phase of operations under Project [redacted] You authorized this commitment to MI-6, subject to preparation of the necessary enabling support documentation. 1.3(a)(4)

2. Accordingly, authorization is requested to expend 15,000 English pounds under Project [redacted] to be used in support of the covert agent [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

HOWARD J. OSBORN
Acting Chief, SR Division

APPROVED:

Deputy Director (Plans)

Date

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

SR OBLIG

SR ALLOTTEE [redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. 1/2 Ken
2. 1/3 (XII)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IRONBARK

6 AUG 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): 1962 First Issue Table of Contents

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of editorial notes and the Table of Contents of the 1962 First Issue of the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
3 0 JUN 1992

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

IRONBARK

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

[redacted]

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

IRONBARK

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): 1962 First Issue Table of Contents

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENTS : Documentary

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Following is a verbatim translation of the Table of Contents of the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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Ministry of Defense, USSR

Top Secret
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Special Collection of Articles

of the Journal "Military Thought"

First Issue 1962

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Military Publishing House
Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Moscow - 1962

From the Editor

The articles of the Special Collection of the Journal "Military Thought" are published as a discussion and express only the opinions of the authors on the problems dealt with.

All articles for the Special Collection and also inquiries on its publication, replies to published materials, and remarks about them should be directed to the chief editor of the journal "Military Thought" with adherence to the regulations established for transmitting secret materials.

The present issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" is distributed to the commanders of armies and higher according to a special list.

Lieutenant-General N.A. Radetskiy,

Chief Editor

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1.3(a)(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IRONBARK

7 A[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Several Questions on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Basic Means of Antiair Defense of a Front, and Its Organizational Structure", by Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

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[redacted]

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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cc: Military Representative of the President

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Several Questions on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Basic Means of Antiair Defense of a Front, and Its Organizational Structure

by

Colonel-General of Aviation S. Mironov

The thinking abroad is that aviation will continue to be the basic means of delivering nuclear warheads for a long time to come, since the overwhelming majority of targets in the theaters of military operations are small in size and highly mobile, and the combat operations of both sides extremely mobile. The enemy's arsenal of means of attack includes flying apparatuses which represent air attack weapons with high combat capabilities. And, in our view, these characteristics should determine the nature of the requirements on the system of weapons of the PVO troops of ground troops.

As is known, among the basic tasks carried out by front PVO troops are: reconnaissance and destruction in the air of enemy means of air attack; neutralization of his ground and aerial radiotechnical means of control and guidance; destruction of airborne troops while in flight to the landing area, and at the landing area; and warning the front troops and the PVO of the Country about an enemy air raid.

To carry out these tasks, the front PVO has at its disposal radiotechnical troops, antiaircraft artillery, antiaircraft missiles, and fighter aviation.

It is completely obvious that any system of troop formation, including that of the front PVO troops, will attain the highest combat and operational effectiveness if the role and place of all basic combat means in the system are correctly defined.

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Therefore, it would be advisable to examine in detail the role and place of the basic combat means within the PVO system of a front, especially since the press has carried articles in which authors have presented contradictory views, sometimes highly praising one type of weapon while undeservedly depreciating the value of another. For example, in a number of published articles, authors proclaim the decisive role of antiaircraft guided missiles in destroying an air enemy, while clearly underestimating fighter aviation, which, even at the present time, in our opinion, represents one of the primary means of PVO, especially the antiair defense of troops.

It must be noted that in most cases such statements are made by authors without adequate grounds or concrete analysis of the combat capabilities of all PVO means.

It seems to us that it is fundamentally wrong to single out only one of the combat means in deciding on a system of weapons for the antiair defense of troops. Because any weapon, even the most sophisticated one, always has its weak points which the enemy can exploit to facilitate his own task of overcoming PVO.

Experience of armed combat very strikingly demonstrates the necessity of a harmonious combination of all means of combat, since in this way the most effective use is made of the strong points, and the weak points are compensated for, in each of these means, thus causing them to complement each other.

In this connection, we shall examine the basic tactical-technical characteristics and the combat and operational capabilities of the principal PVO means of a front and try to establish their true significance on the basis of specific calculations and on the experience gained from exercises.

In view of the fact that antiaircraft tube artillery now carries out only a limited number of tasks, namely, directly covering objectives from strikes by low-flying, low-speed

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aircraft and helicopters and also combating airborne landings, we shall dwell on the analysis of combat capabilities of antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation.

Antiaircraft guided missiles (ZUR) are a very effective means of antiair defense. Their probability of destruction of single targets represents an average of 0.80 to 0.85. They are less affected by meteorological conditions than other types of weapons of the PVO troops.

At the same time however, antiaircraft missile complexes possess a number of negative characteristics which reduce their combat and operational capabilities. The first of these is the low maneuverability of antiaircraft guided missile units. Thus, in a situation in which the ground troops are advancing at a rate of 80 to 100 km per 24-hour day, the full complement of guided missile units can participate in covering the troops only when the latter are in the initial position or when they are delayed by the enemy at some intermediate line; and only an insignificant part of the guided missile forces can provide cover in the course of a swift maneuver of troops.

Also contributing to the above situation is the great amount of time required to bring the antiaircraft guided missile complexes into combat and march readiness. For example, it requires 3 to 5 hours to bring a missile complex to combat readiness and 3 hours to dismantle it. Because of the great weight of missile equipment (up to 11 to 14 tons), its extreme sensitivity to road-surface irregularities, its limited capabilities of climbing and descending steep grades and managing sharp curves (the turning radius of a prime mover with a launching mount is not less than 10 meters), the speed at which a mount can be moved at night is only 10 km per hour.

Thus, in view of the high rate of advance of ground troops and the missile complex's limited effective casualty radius (35 to 50 km), the forward elements of troops will advance beyond the ZUR zone of cover every 5 to 6 hours unless the latter can effect a timely advance to new positions. In view

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of the above-mentioned shortcomings, it is inadvisable to make frequent shifts in the disposition of antiaircraft missile complexes over short distances. While they are deploying to a new position, the ground troops will have advanced an average of 15 to 20 km, i.e., they again will have moved beyond the protective zone of a given missile complex.

Even under the most favorable of circumstances, in which the missile complex is relocated only once every twenty-four hours, up to 19 hours will be required to dismantle, move and set it up. Thus, even under the most favorable conditions the maximum amount of time left for the combat employment of the complex in a 24 hour period is 5 hours. Even with a slower rate of advance by the ground troops, there will be virtually no increase in the time available for the combat employment of missile complexes because of the aforementioned reasons. Consequently, the existing antiaircraft missile complexes essentially are means of protection of stationary objectives; while in operations of fronts they apparently will be used only for the protection of troops in important operational positions, and, most effectively, during lulls in operations.

Antiaircraft missile complexes installed on chassis of assault guns will possess higher maneuver capabilities. However, even this will not ensure a rapid concentration of missile troops in a required area during the course of an operation.

The second important shortcoming of missile complexes which sharply reduces the combat and operational capabilities of antiaircraft missile regiments is the exceedingly great amount of effort spent in the preliminary preparation and checkout of missiles. The productivity of a technical battalion under field conditions is extremely low. Even with well-trained personnel working under favorable conditions, a technical battalion can prepare, with only a checkout of

the complex, a maximum of 20 to 22 missiles in a 24-hour period; while a checkout of missile-borne instruments in their complete program (using two lines) can be done on 10 missiles in a 24-hour period. In view of the fact that a technical battalion is not provided with a reserve supply of missiles, it will be compelled to carry out a full program checkout of missiles received from front and army bases. Thus, an antiaircraft missile regiment will be able to destroy only 5 targets from among the enemy means of air attack in a 24-hour period (on the basis of two missiles for one target), and this under the most favorable conditions and without taking enemy opposition into account.

Another shortcoming of antiaircraft missile complexes that should be mentioned is the fact that they can destroy only those targets flying above 3000 meters. Thus, a situation may develop in which antiaircraft missile complexes will be unable to destroy a large part of the air targets flying at low altitudes. It should also be borne in mind that, because of the characteristics of the methods of detecting low-flying targets, the complexes designated for destroying them have an extremely limited range of fire, and a large number of complexes will be needed to provide adequate protection for front troops.

The combat capabilities of antiaircraft missiles are also reduced because of the lengthy preparation for launching from readiness No. 2. Experience proves that to bring a complex from this condition of readiness to readiness for fire takes 8 minutes if the diesel generators are running or if some other power supply is being used and up to 13 minutes if the diesel generators are turned on when the command is given to prepare the complex for firing. It is evident that the amount of warmup time (passivnoye vremya) is quite great, and in order to have the time to launch a missile at a target flying at a speed of 420 m. per second, it has to be detected at the distance of 245 and 370 km respectively. For example, to destroy a B-47, which has the lowest speed of this class of aircraft, it is necessary to detect it at a distance of 130 and 200 km

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respectively. But since the search and target acquisition radar set, P-12M, detects a medium bomber flying at 20,000 m only at a distance of 240 km and a fighter at 180 km, there is not enough time, as a rule, to prepare the missile complex for firing from the moment the target is detected. Thus, the present antiaircraft missile complex, when in readiness No. 2, does not ensure the destruction of the most probable indicated targets; and when in readiness No. 1, it ensures the destruction of targets flying at speeds up to 1500 km per hour, and has a limited capability against those flying at speeds up to 2000 km per hour. Furthermore, a complex can remain in a condition of readiness for launching only 25 minutes, and at least 20 minutes are required to get the complex ready for another launching.

The short range of fire of antiaircraft missile complexes and the exceptionally high speeds of modern aircraft sharply limit the possibility of timely missile launchings. Thus, a target flying at the speed of 420 meters per second (1500 km per hour) is in the zone of destruction of an antiaircraft missile complex for 67 seconds, and a target flying at the speed of 560 meters per second (2000 km per hour) for only 50 seconds.

A number of the design characteristics of an antiaircraft missile complex limit its capabilities of reliably destroying any type of target. In particular, the destruction of a maneuvering target is possible when its angle of approach up to the moment of impact with the missile does not exceed 55 degrees. For the same reasons there are also prohibited areas at an azimuth of 40 degrees and an elevation of 45 degrees. The presence of a single guidance channel (tselevoy kanal) in an antiaircraft missile battalion ensures simultaneous fire against only one target.

Unquestionably, antiaircraft guided missiles represent a new, effective, and very promising type of weapon. There is no doubt that the continuous process of development and perfection will see an improvement in their tactical and technical characteristics and an increase in their combat capabilities. The antiaircraft guided missiles and controlling radar stations mounted on assault gun chassis, which are now being issued,

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have better maneuverability characteristics than the previous ones, while the creation of missiles with engines that operate on solid fuel will sharply increase their combat readiness. However, because of a whole series of specific characteristics of antiaircraft missiles, which exist in future systems as well, it is our view that we should not expect in the future to be able to concentrate, within short periods of time, their main effort in a required area in the course of an offensive operation and, especially, while an air raid by enemy aircraft and cruise missiles is under way. This is also determined by the short range of fire of missiles, by the comparatively weak protection against jamming, and by large limitations of a design nature in launching the missiles.

In view of all the abovementioned, we are not inclined toward considering antiaircraft guided missile complexes as the principal and decisive force in a system of antiair defense of troops of a front.

We shall examine the tactical-technical characteristics and the tactical and operational capabilities of fighter aviation.

Modern fighter aircraft armed with missiles of the "air-to-air" type also possess a high probability of target destruction (0.8 to 0.9) and can destroy one aircraft or one cruise missile of any type in one attack. Thus, the modern fighter in essence has become a highly maneuverable, flying ZUR launching mount, while retaining its most valuable and most important quality - the high probability of target destruction.

High maneuverability of fighter aviation constitutes its most important quality, which is needed especially in antiair defense, when the initiative in regard to the type of action and time and direction of the strike always belong to the attacker. It is perfectly obvious that only fighter aviation can be concentrated and employed in mass in the course of an air enemy attack that has already begun and at the exact place and time of the greatest danger and threat to the troops

and to the most important objectives of the front. With its long range of fire and by using a wide maneuver, fighter aviation is capable of providing the necessary correlation of forces in a required area to repulse successfully an enemy attack in any sector of a front and on the flanks of cooperating fronts. Ensurance of moving from one airfield to another (aerodromnyy manevr) by aviation along the line of the front does not present any particular difficulties. On the other hand, ensurance of such moves by aviation while following advancing troops at the present high rates of advance presents, just as in moves of antiaircraft missile troops, definite complexities and difficulties. For example, the volume of excavation necessary in the construction of a field fighter base on terrain of average ruggedness is up to 10,000 m^3. One engineer-airfield battalion can prepare such a field in 24 to 48 hours. As is known, the volume of excavation work necessary in the first stage of preparing an antiaircraft missile regiment's siting area is 8230 m^3 and can be carried out in 24 to 48 hours by the forces and means assigned for the work. Thus, the time necessary to prepare field fighter bases and ZUR siting areas is about the same. However, the time necessary to move them to new positions is different, just as the respective ranges of these PVO means differ. Moreover, the solution of the problem of vertical takeoff and landing will give fighter aviation a new quality - operating without airfields, which will immeasurably increase their combat and operational capabilities.

Fighter aircraft is the only means of antiair defense combining within itself the qualities of defense and attack. They can not only repel raids already under way, but can also disrupt them by combined bombing-strafing attacks against airfields and against launch sites for missiles and cruise missiles and by the destruction of enemy aircraft during takeoff and while assuming flight formation.

Fighter aviation is capable of destroying the enemy's radiotechnical means. Two fighters can completely put out of action a guidance radar station of any class or designation. Because of their great range of fire, fighters can destroy

"air-to-surface" missile-carrying aircraft which launch their rockets beyond the effective range of the front's ZUR, as well as, nuclear-weapon-carrying aircraft at distant approaches. Modern methods of aerial, radiotechnical and other types of reconnaissance permit the timely disclosure of the enemy's preparations for take-off or of aircraft already underway and the immediate dispatch of fighters to destroy them.

Until recently, the accuracy in directing fighters and intercepting air targets was not high enough, mainly because of the known physical limitations of combat crew personnel at command posts. With the issue of mobile, automated systems of control, which are now being mastered successfully in units and large units of fighter aviation of air armies, the accuracy of guiding and intercepting air targets is rising sharply, and the combat and operational capabilities of fighter aircraft as a whole are increasing.

Because of automation in the processes of collection, processing and transmittal of data, the warmup time is being sharply curtailed, the lines of interception are being moved toward the enemy, the capabilities for intercepting low-flying targets are increasing, the time necessary for the guidance process is being cut, and the capabilities of simultaneous guidance are being enlarged, as a result of which a fighter division consisting of three regiments with four command posts, using the communication channel for guidance, can simultaneously direct 21 to 25 fighters (groups) against 21 to 25 targets (groups of targets). The arming of fighters with "air-to-air" missiles which permits an air target to be attacked from any direction will greatly increase the capabilities of aviation to destroy the enemy at great distances from the front line. This is particularly important for carrying out intercepts at low altitudes, which at the present time are accomplished behind the front line over one's own territory, because of the limited range at which radar can detect low-flying aircraft and the necessity to direct the fighter against the target aircraft's rear (rear hemisphere-zadnyaya polysfera).

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It should be noted that fighter aircraft operations are dependent upon meteorological conditions to a greater extent than are antiaircraft missile troops. Under normal meteorological conditions, as well as below or behind clouds, and depending on the level of training, the full complement of fighters can participate in repelling enemy aircraft and cruise missiles; while in the clouds at night, only a part of the forces, in planes with radar and infra-red instruments, can participate. Thus, the combat capabilities of fighters to intercept enemy aircraft in the clouds are significantly lessened. In this connection, a continuous process is taking place in the armed forces of equipping air armies with all-weather fighters. In addition, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited capabilities of a probable enemy to deliver strikes from the clouds and at night, since his basic delivery vehicle of nuclear weapons, as has been previously noted, is piloted aircraft.

From the point of view of economics it would be interesting to compare the cost characteristics in the construction of each type of weapon in use.

It is known that the overall material expenditures in creating a combat-ready fighter regiment are significantly higher than for an antiaircraft missile regiment. However, after aviation and antiaircraft missiles have been used three times in combat to achieve a similar combat effect, the economic indices are in favor of aviation equipment. With further frequency of use, this difference becomes even more perceptible.

The experience from World War II, calculations of combat effectiveness and losses of aviation equipment, and taking into account the modern means of counteracting aircraft, show that the average number of missions per plane is between 30 and 50. These data permit aircraft combat means to be classified among the most advantageous from the economic standpoint.

A brief analysis of the tactical-technical characteristics and the combat and operational capabilities of antiaircraft

guided missiles and fighter aviation indicates that both these means have a number of positive and negative sides. Neither antiaircraft guided missiles nor fighter aviation is a universal weapon, guaranteeing the independent achievement of all goals and the solution to all problems of antiair defense of a front. In our view, both of these means should be combined in the front PVO system, complementing each other and reciprocally compensating each other's negative qualities and raising the effectiveness of each. However, the principal role should belong to fighters.

Let us briefly examine several questions relating to the organizational structure of a front's antiair defense.

As is known, control of the antiair defense of a front is the responsibility of the PVO chief of the front ground troops. At the same time, radiotechnical troops and the basic PVO means (that is, antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation) are in the T/O & E of the combined-arms armies, air armies and the front itself. Such a distribution of PVO forces and means between the types of armed forces and arms of troops significantly reduces the effectiveness of their utilization as a whole, since the organization of coordination is encumbered, the necessary efficiency of control is not assured, and serious obstacles are placed in the way of concentrating forces and means and utilizing them expediently. Moreover, the front PVO chief does not have the necessary forces and means to organize and carry out the control of antiair defense.

Control over the basic PVO means is organized in a rudimentary manner and carried out from various command posts: fighter aviation is controlled from the command post of the air army; antiaircraft missile troops are nominally controlled from the command post of the front PVO chief, but actually are controlled from the command posts of the combined-arms armies.

Experience from exercises in groups of forces and in military districts during 1960-1961 completely confirms the

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indicated shortcomings in the organizational structure of front PVO troops.

It is perfectly apparent that such organizational dispersion and lack of a clear system of centralized control contradict the basic principle of the necessity for mass utilization of PVO forces and means, hinders the development of a clear organizational structure of PVO troops in peacetime, and can lead to grave consequences in time of war.

In our opinion, it is advisable to centralize control over radiotechnical troops, ZUR units, and fighter aviation at the front level. This proposition is in keeping with the general principles for the utilization of combat means and will scarcely cause any doubt.

Naturally, the question arises as to how to organize most advantageously the direction and control over the PVO forces and means of a front. It seems to us that direction and the entire weight of responsibility for antiair defense of a front should be placed on the commander of the air army, according him the appropriate rights (without changing in this connection the direction of PVO in armies and large units). Such a proposal is based on the following reasons.

In the first place, one of the basic PVO means, fighter aviation, is under the direct subordination of the air army commander and, being a versatile weapon, it can be used for a large number of other tasks along with PVO tasks. At the same time, fighter aircraft can most effectively carry out their assigned tasks only when under centralized control and in mass utilization. Therefore, the solution, in which direction of the front antiair defense is carried out by someone else, for example, the front PVO chief, will naturally lead to the splitting up of fighter aviation forces, to decentralization of its control, and, consequently, to a sharp decrease in its combat and operational capabilities. Besides this, the means available in the air army for aerial and long-range radiotechnical reconnaissance can assure a high degree of efficiency in the control over all PVO means and completely satisfy the needs of antiaircraft missile troops (ZRV) for long-range radiotechnical reconnaissance data.

In the second place, a modern air army is mainly composed of fighters and fighter-bombers, which combine the qualities of the means for defense and attack and can, in the course of an operation, and depending on the ground and air situation, switch a significant part of its forces or its entire complement over to carrying out the task of antiair defense of a front or to the support of combat operations of ground troops, or, what will most frequently be encountered in practice, to carrying out both tasks simultaneously.

Along with this, as a result of the dynamism of a sharply and quickly changing ground and air situation in modern operations, it frequently becomes necessary to switch considerable air army forces which are already carrying out PVO tasks over to the support of combat operations of ground troops in exceedingly brief periods of time, even to the point of redirecting aircraft already aloft. Such a situation requires exceptionally efficient control, organization, and maintenance of coordination, which is possible only under strict centralization of control in the hands of the aviation chief alone, who is carrying out tasks of antiair defense of troops and support of combat operations of the front in an operation of all the forces of the air army.

In the third place, the commander of an air army has available to him a control apparatus in the form of a staff which has highly qualified specialists with considerable experience in directing aircraft in carrying out their diversified tasks, including PVO tasks. An air army staff and its command post are equipped with the necessary technical means and have specialized combat teams. Moreover, from the time they were created in the armed forces (1942), air army staffs have been carrying out PVO tasks at the front level, as a consequence of which the transfer of the direction over all PVO of front ground troops to the commander of an air army and his staff would be the logical continuation of a further improvement in the PVO system of a front, assuring the continuity of combat experience and tradition on a modern basis. Thus, the already available control apparatus in an air army, with the necessary T/O & E (command posts) and trained personnel, could

direct the entire antiair defense of a front with insignificant reinforcements of appropriate specialists. There is no similarly prepared apparatus in a front at the present time. Therefore, if it is decided to be done differently, it will be necessary to create a new, special control organ, which will entail the expenditure of large means and will significantly increase the T/O & E. And, what is most important, such a control organ will not be able to direct effectively the use of one of the basic PVO means -- aviation.

In the fourth place, as air armies are equipped with automated systems of control of fighter planes, the capability of intercepting the air enemy will be significantly increased, the time required for the collection and processing of intelligence information on air targets will be sharply reduced, and, with the further improvement of these systems, the automated control of the basic PVO means from command posts of the air army commander will become possible. Naturally, the utilization of an automated system of control also presupposes the unification of all front radiotechnical troops for centralized resolution of the tasks of detecting the air enemy and a sharp reduction in the time necessary for the processing and transmittal of the necessary information to command posts of PVO means, as well as the time required to alert the troops.

In the fifth place, great flexibility and uninterrupted control, with an extensive use of diversified and complex technical means, and the availability of a highly qualified control apparatus familiar with the specific characteristics and features of aviation, are necessary for more complete realization of high maneuverability of front aviation under a sharply and rapidly changing situation.

Thus, the problems of direction and organization of antiair defense of a front can, in our opinion, be successfully solved only if the front has, under the jurisdiction of, for example, the deputy front commander for aviation and PVO, a responsible person who has fighter aviation and radiotechnical means subordinate to him and antiaircraft missile units under his operational subordination. In this case, the most effective and

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mass use of each of the combat means, the efficient and precise control over them, and the uninterrupted coordination of all forces in a sharply and quickly changing operational situation will be assured, in accordance with the front troop commander's concept of the operation and his official decisions.

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31 AUG REC'D

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

28 August 1962

TO: Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Station, Moscow

SUBJECT: [redacted] / Forwarding of Material 1.3(a)(4)
Received 27 August.

REFERENCE: [redacted]

CSR
DCSR
SR/COP
SR/DCOP
CSR/9
DCSR/9

1.3(a)(4)

1. As you were advised via reference, a two-way pass took place between [redacted] and [redacted] at the reception given by IDENTITY I in his apartment on 27 August. [redacted] passed to [redacted] the ops message received from Headquarters (with postscript), and the document received from HE. Enclosure 1 to this dispatch is the material received from [redacted]. Enclosure 2 (with identities under separate cover) is [redacted] report of the circumstances under which the pass was made.

2. Time is short and the pouch closes within the hour. I will therefore keep my comments brief.

CSR
DCSR
SR/COP
SR/DCOP
CSR/9
DCSR/9

a: [redacted] did an excellent job. While [redacted] att. PETROCHENKO-[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
ops letter att. Satellite 1/4 pd.

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the pass did not come off as planned (via drop), it would not have come off at all if [redacted] had not decided to take the proper action. 1.3(a)(4)

b. [redacted] had been briefed to gently but firmly take the initiative with regard to the pass 1.3(a)(4) and to maintain it. Unfortunately, [redacted] did not exactly permit this to happen, and instead chose to go into a play which he had used in an earlier encounter with [redacted]. [redacted] had been prepared for this possibility, but we had hoped that [redacted] would be more inclined to follow [redacted] lead on the latter's home territory. We will utilize our two recent experiences with [redacted] to attempt to make our next contact with him a little more certain, if we can.

c. [redacted] was briefed to be alert to the 1.3(a)(4) opportunity to passively collect data as to [redacted] present circumstances and future plans within the context of normal reception chatter. Aside from [redacted] expressed hopes to travel to the US in the indefinite future, nothing of any consequence resulted from the conversation between [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted]

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2. The floor plan of [redacted] IDEN 1's apartment 1.3(a)(4)
is the same as mine. Considering the circumstances, I would be reasonably certain that [redacted] would see anyone who might be in a position to observe him rendezvous with [redacted] in the particular bathroom used. I therefore am inclined to believe he was not observed.

2. We are pleased that [redacted] and 1.3(a)(4)
IDEN 3 did not repeat their Gold Dust Twins performance of the 4th of July. You will note that Enclosure 1 includes photographs of PETROCHENKO IDEN 3 and samples of his handwriting. Accompanying messages yield no clue as to why.

3. [redacted] reports that GKKNR IDEN 2 officials 1.3(a)(4)
do not particularly like IDEN 1 and that they are now demonstrating a desire to deal directly with him ([redacted]). This is a most promising development and one we shall play in the hope that it will lead [redacted] in the direction we all want to see him go — toward more direct, adequately covered contact with [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] Pavlichenko Level 1.3(a)(4)

IDEN 2 was [redacted], IDEN 3, IDEN 4,
ULYANENKO DANILOVA
IDEN 5 and IDEN 6

[Enclosure 2 to [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. The exchange of packages between [redacted] and [redacted] took place at the reception given for the Tobacco delegation in IDEN 1's apartment. Present from [redacted] At least Soviet present were all tobacco specialists, except for 1.3(a)(4)
one young man [redacted] does not know, but who met the U.S. delegation at a lunch when the group first arrived and who is presumably a correspondent. He came with the tobacco specialists.

2. The first Soviets to arrive were the tobacco specialists, who came about 1815 (the reception was from 1800 to 2000). [redacted] arrived about 1830, and, [redacted] thinks, he came alone. He 1.3(a)(4)
moved toward [redacted] slowly and they talked
IDEN 6 DANILOVA
for a few minutes with [redacted] and Pete
Julien F. Macdonald MACDONNEL. [redacted] then moved off, and in a few minutes went in and hooked the drop (the package taped to the underside of the water tank cover of the toilet in one of the bathrooms - see below). He came out and rejoined the party from another door, and moved slowly toward the other side of the room, where [redacted] was still talking to MACDONNEL. The three talked 1.3(a)(4)
[redacted] together for a moment and then MACDONNEL moved off to ask someone a question. [redacted] then

[redacted]

said, in English, "I have a small package for you. Do you have something for me?" [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
answered "yes, yes to the ~~toilet~~ bathroom, through this door and turn right, under the lid of the toilet tank." As soon as [redacted] said "bathroom," [redacted] said "yes, yes." HACDONNEL and Dick DAVIES then approached, and the conversation turned to innocuous subjects. ~~after a few~~.

3. After a few minutes [redacted] said "this is a nice apartment. How many rooms? May I see it?" [redacted] and DAVIES said "yes", and the three moved off, [redacted] leading. As they passed the bathroom [redacted] said "this is the main bathroom." [redacted] went in, looked around, came out, & the three went into the hall, where IDEN 1 was DAMLOVA IDEN 1 showing the apartment. All went into the children bedroom, then out into the hall again, and past the bathroom. [redacted] said "May I use it?, and [redacted] and DAVIES said "of course." IDEN 1 and IDEN 6 by this time moved off, back to the party. [redacted] stood aside to let DAVIES pass, and he said "Go ahead Dick." DAVIES said "I guess he doesn't need any help in there," and moved off. [redacted] was left alone and went into the bathroom with [redacted] and locked the door. [redacted] gave [redacted] the package and said something like "for me," or "you have for me?" [redacted] said "Shh" and pointed to the toilet tank. [redacted] did not

[redacted]

move, as [redacted] took off the lid of the tank, turned it over and put it on the seat, and tore off the envelope and the extra tape which had been left for [redacted] to fasten his package with. [redacted] put the envelopes in his pocket, said "goodbye", and left as [redacted] unlocked the door. There was no one in the hall. [redacted] then relocked the door, flushed the toilet, put the lid back on the toilet, and stayed some 2 or three minutes washing his hands. [redacted] He then opened the door. There was still noone in the hall. He looked back and noticed that two hairbrushes which had been on the lid had been left on the sink. He closed the door, replaced the brushes, and left the bathroom. There was still noone in the hall. He walked back to the group in the living room via the long hallway, and entered the room at the opposite end from which [redacted] had entered when he returned.

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Comment: [redacted] was obviously somewhat nervous, obviously had not gotten the message about the drop, and was in too much of a hurry. As before (4th July) he talked only in English when talking about the operation. [redacted] thinks that [redacted] had his mind set on a pass similar to that used in the past and therefore did not listen to anything beyond where he was told the place of the exchange. [redacted] does not think any of this was apparent to anyone else, however

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
there were others
he looked to see if
[redacted]

[redacted] does not know of, during the past, the water faucet was turned on. It was on after [redacted] left, and [redacted] does not recall turning it on. In any case, it runs quietly. [redacted] remarks in the bathroom were made in a very low voice after the exchange 1.3(a)(4)

4. [redacted] returned to the room at exactly 1900. The rest of the evening was without incident. LEVIN IDEN 4 PETROCHENKO and IDEN 3 did not arrive till 1930. [redacted] talked many times with all the IDEN 2 people at the reception. All were in the best of spirits, including even [redacted]. They all left about 2030.

5. While talking to [redacted] and [redacted] said "We (two) will come to America." IDEN 5 [redacted] said "When? We will welcome you there"; [redacted] said cheerfully "sometime, sometime". He then said IDEN 5 "the [redacted] is my best friend." ULYANENKO

6. Plan of the apartment:



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5 SEP MED

Separate Cover Enclosure to [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

IDEN 1 - [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

IDEN 2 - GKKNR

IDEN 3 - PETROCHENKU

IDEN 4 - LEVIN

IDEN 5 - ULYANENKO

IDEN 6 - DANILOVA

CSR
DCSR
SR/CIP
SR/DCOP
CSR/9
DCSR/9

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Tasks of the Navy and the Methods of Performing Them", by Admiral N. Kharlamov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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[redacted]

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Tasks of the Navy and the Methods of Performing Them", by Admiral N. Kharlamov

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of "The Tasks of the Navy and the Methods of Performing Them", an article by Admiral N. Kharlamov.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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The Tasks of the Navy and the Methods of Performing Them

by

Admiral N. Kharlamov

The tasks of the Navy in a future war are a subject of theoretical as well as practical significance to the entire Armed Forces. There is still lacking the necessary unity of understanding among the command elements of the various types of Armed Forces regarding the role, place and significance of combat operations at sea, especially in the initial period of a war.

In the article by Admiral V. Platonov[1], the tasks which may be assigned to our navy in a future war have been examined in the main, correctly. However, these tasks are spelled out in general terms and are applicable to a war as a whole, with no consideration for the specific conditions of its initial period.

And yet, the nature of naval forces operations, the substance of the tasks being performed, the degree of their importance, and the sequence of their execution will differ greatly in the initial period of a war from the execution of these same tasks during subsequent periods of a war.

It is a universally recognized principle that the initial period of a war will have a decisive influence on the subsequent operations of each of the opposing sides. Obviously it is during this very period that both of the opponents will strive to use the greatest possible part of their nuclear/

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Second Issue, 1961.

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missile power amassed during the many years of peace. Here, from the very beginning of the war, a fierce struggle will be carried on to ensure the opportunity to use to the full the most powerful means of destruction available, or, as we say, the struggle for the strategic initiative.

The main point of this struggle for our Armed Forces will be to frustrate the enemy attack, deny him the opportunity of carrying out previously developed plans for the initial operations, and from using means of mass destruction readied in advance, and, at the same time, to deliver such a powerful strike against the enemy that it would appreciably reduce his capability to conduct subsequent combat operations.

The decisive role in the delivery of such a strike will belong to the missile troops of strategic designation, which are capable of hitting at the most vital enemy strategic objectives located on any of the continents.

A significant part of the efforts of the Armed Forces will have to be expended for the destruction of such delivery vehicles of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons as missile atomic submarines, carrier strike large units, and groupings of surface missile-carrying vessels, which are not only capable of delivering strikes at our coastal installations, but can also operate against interior areas of the country. The first strike against these forces of the enemy must also be delivered at the very beginning of the war, and must be calculated to take place before the enemy can fully use the capabilities available to him.

In contrast to the objectives of strikes by the missile troops which are stationary--thus permitting prior determination of all the necessary data and the creation of a grouping of forces for delivering

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a strike against them at any moment, naval targets have a very high degree of mobility. Therefore, for combat with enemy naval forces it will be necessary also to bring in mobile forces which have at their disposal the necessary nuclear/missile power. The only force actually capable of frustrating the first enemy strikes from the sea continues to be the Navy, and its basic task in the initial period of a war is to frustrate the nuclear/missile attack in the course of the enemy's so-called "all-out nuclear offensive" from the sea.

Just as the missile troops, by their first strikes against objectives on enemy territory, will destroy those of his means of carrying on a nuclear/missile war which are located on land, so the forces of the Navy will have to perform this task at sea.

This is why the basic and primary task of our Navy in the initial period of a war will be to destroy the forces of the enemy navy, which, along with other forces, comprise the basis of his nuclear/missile power. The first strikes of our fleet should be directed against such objectives as, above all, missile submarines, carrier strike large units, and groupings of missile-carrying vessels at sea or in bases.

The destruction of the strike forces of the enemy navy should be carried out within the framework of one or more initial operations. Operations against the enemy forces will have a single goal, and will be carried out simultaneously and according to a single plan. In connection with this, combat with aircraft carriers, missile submarines and groupings of surface vessels will be appropriate individual tasks of this overall operation. It will be carried out by specially constituted groupings of forces which will deliver strikes against enemy naval forces in the areas of basing, under way at

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sea, and directly in the areas of combat operations.

If the task of frustrating the enemy's nuclear offensive from the sea is successfully accomplished, it will have a direct and substantial influence not only on subsequent combat operations at sea, but on the course of combat operations along certain strategic axes. Therefore, in order to destroy the strike forces of the enemy navy at the very start of the war, it is necessary to allot sufficiently large forces, even to the detriment of the performance of other tasks, so that the first strike against the enemy is the most powerful. Only in this way can we be certain that the enemy will be incapable of parrying our strike, and that it will therefore be highly successful and bear important results.

Up to the present time, authors of many articles and scientific works, as well as the author of the article presently under discussion, maintain that such a naval task as disrupting enemy sea and ocean communication lines must also be accomplished in the initial period of a war. Moreover, Admiral V. Platonov writes that "combat with carrier strike large units on the ocean.....is only part of the task of disrupting the enemy ocean routes of communication, though it may be the most difficult part".

There is no need to argue the point that the destruction of the main strike groupings of enemy naval forces will facilitate the operations of our naval forces against the ocean communication lines of the enemy. The issue lies elsewhere--should combat against enemy communication lines be carried out simultaneously with the operations to destroy the main strike forces of the enemy navy; will it be justified to allot for this purpose a considerable portion of the forces to the detriment of the accomplishment of the main task of the initial period of the war---frustrating the enemy nuclear attack from the sea.

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There is no doubt that the disruption of ocean communication lines and interruption of enemy sea transport will have considerable bearing on the course of combat operations in all theaters, but the effect will not be felt immediately; it will become evident gradually, as the materiel prepared by the enemy in advance becomes expended and his armed forces begin to suffer seriously from lack of ammunition, fuel, materiel and personnel. It will take at least several months before such a situation is reached, i.e., after the first operations have already been completed.

Our probable opponents are amassing the required supplies of materiel in the theaters of military operations at a rate which, taking losses into account, will ensure the conduct of combat operations for a period of 3 to 4 months.

Due consideration must also be given to the fact that at the present time certain changes are taking place in the thinking of the probable opponent regarding the system of protecting his sea and ocean communication lines. Aware of the fact that ocean and sea ports will become targets for nuclear strikes in the initial period of a war, the NATO military command now considers that one of the priority tasks in the initial period of a war is the withdrawal of their merchant ships from the areas of nuclear strikes in order to preserve them for carrying out heavy shipments in the subsequent period of the war.

This task was executed in practice at the strategic command-staff exercise of the NATO Armed Forces, "Side Step", in 1960. During the exercise, within 48 hours after the beginning of military operations, almost all ocean-going vessels, with the exception of those in mothballs or undergoing repair, were withdrawn from major European ports and from the Atlantic coastline of the United States.

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Of 2242 vessels originally located in 68 major ports, 2002 were evacuated. Only 190 remained in European ports, and approximately 50 were left in U.S. ports. Those merchant ships which were at sea at the time were also directed to the western part of the Atlantic Ocean.

The ships were evacuated in convoys as well as individually. In all, 33 convoys were recorded in 5 days, each consisting of 10 to 45 transports; in this instance protection for the majority of the convoys consisted of 1 to 3 escort vessels. Six convoys proceeded with no protection whatever. During the same period records show that there was only one convoy departing the United States for Europe; it consisted of 13 vessels and was escorted by 6 war ships. The majority of the merchant vessels--approximately 66 percent-- were evacuated to ports of North, West and South Africa. The remaining vessels were directed to the area of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.

Such operations of the enemy corroborate once more that in the initial period of a war major movements of troops and freight from U.S. ports to the European Theater of War are not very likely.

Also, although the destruction of the transports while they are in process of evacuation will decrease the enemy's capabilities to organize subsequent sea shipments, it will have no direct influence on the course of combat operations in the naval and ground theaters in the initial period of a war.

If small convoys are detected delivering troops across the ocean to the European Theater of War, their destruction can be incidental to the accomplishment of the basic tasks.

Such is the situation regarding operations against enemy ocean communication lines in the initial

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period of a war.

We cannot rule out the possibility that in the first days of a war, our probable opponent may begin transporting troops by sea along coastal communication routes for the purpose of regrouping, reinforcement or evacuation of groupings pushed up against the sea, or for delivering materiel to them. Such operations are likely to take place in both the closed sea and ocean theaters of military operations. Such enemy sea transport will become the objective of operations of the inshore (blizhneye deystviye) naval forces, including missile-carrying surface vessels.

The main efforts of the Navy in the initial period of a war must be concentrated against the strike forces of the enemy navy. Atomic and missile submarines and missile-carrying aviation should be directed first of all at the destruction of those forces of the enemy navy which deliver nuclear/missile weapons. At the same time, and incidental to this, the task of disrupting enemy sea communication lines also will be accomplished in part. By destroying enemy naval bases and ports, the Navy will also destroy the transports and freight standing in them.

Although the task of disrupting sea communication lines and frustrating enemy sea transport is one of the main tasks of the Navy in the initial period of a war, it must be executed, in full scope, only after the nuclear/missile power of the enemy strike groupings has been undermined considerably, and his forces have lost the capability to deliver concentrated strikes against our Navy and its basing areas as well as against the rear area installations of our country.

In order to set up successful combat with enemy sea transport, prevent reinforcement of his ground

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troop groupings in the course of the first operations, cut off delivery of essential materiel, and frustrate the evacuation of valuable materiel from Europe to the other side of the ocean, it is necessary to take all possible measures for annihilating his carrier strike large units and destroying his missile submarines. This task must be executed by the fleet in coordination with the missile troops of strategic designation, and will make it possible, in a short time, to weaken enemy naval forces in the theater and will release our submarines and missile-carrying aviation for operation against enemy distant ocean communication lines.

At the time that large units of missile troops, while delivering strikes against vital objectives on enemy territory, including ports and naval bases, also are destroying the ships located therein, the navy will engage in combat with carrier strike large units, enemy missile submarines and their supporting forces directly at sea, destroy aircraft carriers, missile-carrying vessels and atomic submarines in the areas of their combat operations and on the approaches to them. Part of the naval forces will deliver strikes against the basing areas of the antisubmarine forces, airfields of antisubmarine defense (PLO) aviation, communications centers, control centers and the more important means of radiotechnical surveillance and navigation in the sea theater.

Regarding the actual methods of naval forces operations for destroying enemy carrier strike large units, in this matter we share the point of view of Admiral V. Kasatonov[1], and cannot accept as well founded the estimate of Admiral V. Platonov regarding the capabilities of our fleet in the

[1]Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Fifth Issue, 1961 /sic, probably Fourth Issue, 1961 -- [redacted]

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execution of this task, nor the evaluation of the exercises conducted to work out the methods of naval forces operation against enemy carrier strike large units.

Admiral V. Platonov writes as follows regarding one of the exercises of recent years: "It was artlessly and sketchily conceived, and carried out in a simplified manner". The actual case was somewhat different. This Pacific Fleet exercise was one of the first major exercises in which the operations of our forces were carried out at a great distance from their bases, that is, in those areas where enemy naval forces may be engaged in operations in a future war. The forces representing the simulated enemy carrier strike force (AUS) were deployed through the Korean Strait and proceeded to the east of Japan, to a distance of a few hundred miles. For operations against them, the submarine forces of the Pacific Fleet were deployed southeast of the island of Hokkaido. Aviation from the area of Sovetskaya Gavan delivered strikes against war ships at sea. Thus, in this exercise, simulation of the operations of forces was brought to a minimum.

During the exercise, only one version of the operations was played, and the most difficult one at that--when the carrier strike large unit is deployed within the operational area of aviation from remote bases, located in the Hawaiian Islands. In this version our navy will have less time for organizing a strike. Organization of reconnaissance and target designation will be particularly difficult in such a case.

If, however, the strike carriers are relocated (deployed) to bases in Japan, prior to the initiation tion of combat operations, and their aviation takes off directly from the bases for the strike, as Admiral V. Platonov writes, then the task of annihilating the carrier strike force can be achieved in the

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overall plan for destroying coastal objectives, and will be considerably easier than under conditions of carrier strike force operations in remote regions of the ocean.

It is obvious that in the course of operational training, different versions of naval forces operations may be worked out. As is generally known, during the Pacific Fleet exercise the concept and plan of naval operations envisaged action against objectives located on the mainland and on enemy island bases, as well as strikes against carrier strike forces on the ocean. For this purpose it was planned to use aviation, shore missile units and a unit of submarines. However, for obvious reasons, strikes against the bases and against objectives of the probable enemy located on shore could not be worked out in practice.

Admiral V. Platonov is in favor of eradicating simplification and sketchiness in the operations of the naval forces while they are working out methods of executing combat missions on the ocean in the process of naval training. Such a requirement is obligatory, and in order to fulfill it, much effort is needed on the part of the teachers and the pupils in all exercises conducted in the Navy.

However, it must be mentioned here that a tremendous gulf sometimes exists between requirements and capabilities of fulfilling them, and the fight against simplification in combat training can be carried on up to specific, sane limits, which, under present conditions, it is impossible to exceed.

Before, when the main weapon of a war ship was artillery, and that of aviation--torpedoes and conventional bombs, delivery of strikes against groupings of ships could be simulated by the actual use of the weapons against special targets, or even against combat vessels. True, even then full use could not be made of all the means of defense and protection of a ship repelling the strikes of

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"the enemy". Therefore, even at that time, concentrated strikes, combined attacks and single round firings on ships appeared far from what it would be in an actual combat situation.

Now, when missiles and torpedoes with nuclear charges are becoming the main weapons of war ships and aircraft, carrying out even a small number of experiments with the actual use of weapons is far from being always possible, and it is questionable whether the results attained would justify the use. The cost of the weapons, measures for ensuring security, the great expenditure of forces which would be allotted for this purpose, and other circumstances would require an even greater amount of simulation in the operations of the naval forces during combat training than is permitted at the present time without the actual use of weapons.

Nevertheless, even now, as more and more missiles of various designation are being used for naval armament, it is becoming difficult to find a naval exercise in which there is no actual use of missiles by submarines, aviation and surface vessels. It is true that, for obvious reasons, missile launchings at present are carried out at firing ranges, and not against vessels and aircraft participating in an exercise. From this point of view, some of our exercises are simulated to a certain degree, and the operations of naval forces in these exercises are conducted in oversimplified conditions, different by far from those in which even the first combat of a future war will be conducted. This is done because we still have not created perfected targets and means of simulating missiles which would permit us to work out their launchings effectively; thus, out of necessity, we have to use missiles only on special firing ranges, and not directly during the playing of tactical phases--the attacks and strikes of mixed forces.

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And although atomic and hydrogen bombs are not exploded at the exercises, and the piercing whistle of cruise missiles is not heard over the war ships, everything else--from the deployment of forces and the organization of strikes up to going into the attack using training torpedoes and various means of simulation--is carried out just as it will be under combat conditions. Therefore we cannot agree with the assertion that oversimplification in combat training and in the organization and conduct of exercises, and stereotyped use of forces, are prevalent in the Navy. As is generally known, our Navy broke away from the shore just a few years ago, and the main areas of its combat training became those seas and ocean regions which would most likely be used by the naval forces of the enemy in a future war. These areas are quite distant from our bases, airfields and coastline, and this fact in itself brings the conditions under which our naval forces will operate nearer to actual wartime conditions. In these areas submarines and missile-carrying aviation develop and check out in practice the most effective methods of operations and the use of their weapons in a complex situation.

At the exercises, in accordance with the particular situation, submarines are deployed in appropriate groupings in the most probable areas of operations of enemy carrier strike large units. In order to simulate the operations of the "enemy", war ships usually go out to sea and carry out operations in accordance with the views of the military leadership of the NATO countries which are known to us.

In exercises of recent years, the first strikes against the "enemy" war ship groupings were delivered by those forces which were the first to arrive in the area of "enemy" operations--in accordance with the principle "no one waits for anyone". In a number of instances the first to use their weapons

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were the large units of missile-carrying aviation. There were also cases when the first strikes against the "enemy" were delivered by submarines. Later the naval command usually strived to direct as many submarines as possible at the "enemy". Repeated strikes by aircraft completed the annihilation of his war ship groupings.

One of the shortcomings of exercises is that the simulated forces are not fully used in them. Their function is limited to that of simulating the enemy up to the time that submarines and aviation deliver a series of nuclear strikes against him. As soon as the naval forces execute the task of annihilating the enemy strike groupings the simulating forces return to base.

In a majority of the exercises conducted, not all of the submarines had time to attack "the enemy", and often began to return to base, on signal, without having made even one attack. Thus, although the exercises were instructive for the Navy on the whole, and permitted it not only to check out, but to perfect, the methods of operations of submarines and aviation, for those submarines which did not succeed in attacking "the enemy", the prolonged stay at sea, in essence, represented a routine, and not a combat, cruise.

We consider that all submarines proceeding to remote areas should have a chance to conduct at least a few attacks on the "enemy" in the ocean. This can be ensured comparatively simply. After the main tasks of the naval exercise are carried out, it is advisable to conduct the simulated forces, deliberately, through those areas where, toward the end of the exercise, our submarines are located. This will create the necessary conditions for working out the operations of submarines in remote areas of the ocean, and will provide opportunity to carry out a series of attacks under realistic conditions. The latter is necessary for the moral satisfaction of the

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submarine personnel, whose intense training during a cruise should be concluded by an attack, as it will under combat conditions.

The simulation forces should be used to the utmost in working out such matters as combat use of naval shore missile units, missile and torpedo patrol boats (kater) and various means of combat, in order that each naval exercise would actually be Navy-wide, and all the large units and units would have a real opportunity to conduct attacks against the enemy, thus bringing to a logical conclusion the long period of maintaining them at combat readiness.

One cannot but express amazement at the assertion of Admiral V. Platonov that "control of naval forces is presently undergoing a crisis" and at his proposal to unravel some "knot of contradictions".

Does everything regarding the control of the naval forces actually seem to be as it is pictured in Admiral V. Platonov's article? We are very far from accepting these extreme opinions and pointed conclusions as being fair.

If the logic of Admiral V. Platonov's reasoning is followed, when he suggests that there be two commanders of the naval forces--each independent of the other--the question automatically arises--why only two? If our Navy is carrying out an operation for the destruction of enemy naval forces, the forces of the former will be conducting operations along several axes, executing independent tasks. Part of the forces will carry on combat with carrier strike large units, another part will hunt out atomic submarines and destroy them, and part will perform tasks for the destruction of ports. and naval bases, and for putting out of commission the ships and vessels located therein. To this we must add that in order to support the operations of their groupings of

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strike forces, and also for the defense of the system of basing and for the execution of the greatest number of tasks by way of systematic combat operations, special forces will be needed which, at the present time, are the forces of naval bases and divisions (brigades) of the inshore defense (OVR - okhrana vodnykh rayonov). All these groupings will operate in different areas of the theater, their methods and duration of operations will vary, and the groupings will differ from each other in the composition of forces.

In other words, it turns out that for each grouping of forces engaged in executing one of the tasks of the operation, it will be necessary to have a commander of forces, who will be, in the opinion of Admiral V. Platonov, one of the independent commanders of the fleet. But since all these forces will execute their tasks in coordination, and organizationally are united into one Navy, it will be necessary to have still another naval commander over all the other commanders. Such an "improvement", in our opinion, would not lead to better control of the naval forces, but would indeed give rise to a crisis.

It is necessary to search for ways of improving the system of control of forces, not by increasing the number of commanders of each fleet, but in wide-scale automation of all the work of the command and staffs. At present this is the most correct and promising path, which, if followed, will open up great possibilities for ensuring dependable, uninterrupted and flexible control of all naval forces, operating in different areas of the theater and executing various tasks. And when the electronic-computing equipment takes its proper place in the work of our headquarters, it will fully assure the capability of a single commander to control all the forces while they are operating in any ocean areas.

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The dismal picture painted by the author of the resubordination of part of the forces of one fleet to another while both are executing the same task, is far from the actual true situation.

Actually, when two fleets jointly fulfill the same task, we work out the transfer of part of the forces of one fleet to the subordination of another. This means that the attached or supporting forces are being used together with the basic forces of the fleet which were allotted for the execution of a single task. They are under the direction of one of the fleet commanders designated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Experience gained in exercises has indicated that such use of the forces of two or more fleets for the execution of the same task fully justifies itself, and none of the awful situations with which the author attempts to frighten us has developed. And anyway, under present conditions, the development of such situations is impossible. The forces of one fleet are attached to another, not for operating in a specific area, limited by one of the parallels, but for the performance of a definite task. And only after this task is executed---regardless of whether it is below or above the 50° parallel, the attached forces can be redirected and consequently become resubordinated to the other commander.

Such resubordination is nothing to shy away from, but it should be worked out and mastered in the process of combat training, because this is one of the possible workable means of concentrating the efforts of two or more fleets for the execution of important tasks in short periods of time.

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Equally unfounded are the author's misgivings that the war ships operating near the boundary lines will not know to whom to report and whose orders to follow. This will not happen if the tasks are clearly assigned. We cannot seriously consider that the commanders of submarines being deployed several thousand of miles away from their bases will not know why they were sent there. Neither will they be required to report to various addresses regarding their operations, because we have adopted and operate on a unified system of communications for all fleets. And finally, we must bear in mind that the boundary lines between the zones of operations of adjacent fleets are fixed by the high command, which, in assigning a task to the fleets, defines the areas of their operations, and at any given moment, just as soon as needed, can shift the boundary line as required by the actual situation.

In a number of instances Admiral V. Platonov overestimates the capabilities of the probable opponent. He writes that if "... the situation forces the enemy to sally forth into open sea to deliver a strike, then the carrier strike large unit will see to it that a thorough preliminary search is carried out and that the area of its maneuvering is cleared of enemy submarines". We can hardly agree that the enemy will be able to destroy our forces completely in one or another area even before the accomplishment of the combat task. However, if the author of the article thinks otherwise, then he should not only have described this situation, but also offered some way out of it.

We are of the opinion that our forces are capable of operating in remote areas of the ocean and successfully accomplishing the task of destroying carrier strike large units.

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Also incorrect is the assertion of the author of the article that we still have not determined the main forces for the task of combat with missile submarines.

It is known that already in 1957, in connection with the accelerated construction by the United States of atomic submarines. armed with "Polaris" missiles, and the possibility of their being used from the ice areas of the Arctic, the Navy was assigned a new task--to prevent these submarines from delivering strikes against our territory. Special measures were taken for the most rapid construction of special antisubmarine defense (PLO) forces, as well as for working out the use. for this purpose. of the forces and means which were already part of the equipment of the fleet.

The fleets and academies were assigned the task of giving special attention during operational and combat training, and while conducting scientific research, to finding effective methods of combat with missile submarines. As a result of this, at the present time a system of antisubmarine defense has been worked out, as well as opinions regarding the performance of its tasks.

It is felt that combat with missile submarines is to be carried out with equal intensity in both close and remote areas. It will consist of strikes against missile submarine bases, the mining of their basing points, and destroying them in remote areas, prior to their approach to firing positions.

Admiral V. Platonov correctly affirms that the main force of the Navy in combat with missile submarines will be antisubmarine submarines. However, absolute denial of the capabilities of aviation and surface vessels in this combat must be considered incorrect. In the next few years surface

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vessels and PLO aviation will comprise the basis for combat with missile submarines in coastal areas. These forces will also have a definite role in remote areas.

In Admiral V. Platonov's article we come across other incorrect propositions. We fully agree with the criticism of them expressed in the article by Admiral V. Kasatonov.

The editors of the periodical "Military Thought" acted correctly in organizing a discussion of the most important issues of the development and use of the Navy in a future war. A broad exchange of opinions by the command personnel of the Navy and other types of Armed Forces on the issues touched upon will permit us to understand more deeply the significance and substance of the changes taking place in our Navy, caused by the adoption into its armament of nuclear/missile weapons and various combat means based on radio-electronics, and to work out unity of views on all the basic issues of the development and use of naval forces.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Role of Space Weapons in a Future War", by Lieutenant-General N. Korenevskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

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National Indications Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Role of Space Weapons in a Future War" by Lieutenant-General N. Korenevskiy

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

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SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Role of Space Weapons in a Future War", by Lieutenant-General N. Korenevskiy.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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The Role of Space Weapons in a Future War

(According to foreign views)

by

Lieutenant-General N. Korenevskiy

The space weapons which are coming into existence at the present time attract the intense attention of the government and military figures of the main capitalist countries.

The first leap into space, accomplished by our country on 4 October 1957, naturally presented the question of the paths to the mastery of space, the means necessary for this, and the primary goals to be pursued in this.

On the one hand, as was stressed in the speech of the President of the USA on 25 May 1961, thus began the "battle for men's minds" in which the United States strives for "great enterprises" capable of demonstrating to the entire world the capabilities of the country and its science and technology. In his speech Kennedy gave American science and technology the task of "achieving the flight of a man to the moon and his safe return to earth by the end of this decade." In his opinion, "not a single space venture of this period will be more exciting, impressive or important for the overall exploration of space nor so difficult or expensive." In order to achieve this goal he has already requested an additional appropriation of 531 million dollars for the 1961-62 fiscal year, having warned that in future years even more resources will be required. The total cost of the program of conquering the moon is estimated by the Americans to be about 40 billion dollars.

On the other hand, the beginning of the conquest of space gave an impetus to its study for purely military

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purposes, in which the space nearest to the earth is viewed simply as the arena of future battles.

This article represents a first attempt to state, in a systematic manner, the views of the American command on the role of space weapons and the possibilities for employing them in combat. The article does not pretend to be a complete elucidation of all questions connected with this subject. However, the information cited by us below attests to the need for serious study of the space weapons of the USA, the plans and intentions of the American command, and the possibilities of utilizing space devices for military purposes. The need for such a study is explained by the fact that, for some time now, work in this field has gone beyond the limits of purely scientific investigation; it has a very definite military nature and is being given very serious attention by the highest American echelons, including even the President of the USA.

The ballistic missile proved to be the first means of attack through space and, even though, in itself, it does not relate to space weapons, its appearance caused the need to develop a series of purely space weapons systems. Special reconnaissance earth satellites have been recognized as the best means for detecting launching sites and launchings of missiles. The exact tie-in of the geodetic networks of the various countries and continents, which is necessary for determining the coordinates of such targets, proved to be feasible with the aid of special satellites that can be observed simultaneously by optical and radiotechnical means from points which are within the networks being tied in. One of the basic tasks of so-called scientific satellites is to define more precisely variations in the gravitation of the earth, i.e., to produce the data

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necessary in preparing to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles. Artificial earth satellites--meteorological, radio reconnaissance, and communication--have been recognized as means capable of providing meteorological reconnaissance, radio reconnaissance and communications on a global scale.

Numerous projects for space systems for delivering strikes against ground targets, and for antimissile and antispace defense, appeared soon after the space support systems. The special significance of space weapons is also explained by the extreme difficulty of destroying space vehicles.

In confirming the adherence of the new administration of the USA to an aggressive policy, President Kennedy, in his special message of 28 March 1961, stated that the American government must have at its disposal strategic attack and defense weapons adequate to forestall any premeditated attack on the United States. In this connection, special attention is given to weapons launched from concealed, mobile, or invulnerable bases that will not be wiped from the face of the earth as a result of a surprise attack. Space weapons belong to this very category of weapons.

Until the recent past a special role in military strategy was allocated to the Air Force. However, in 1959 the American command had already included aerospace in the operating zone of its Air Force and announced the creation of the so-called aerospace forces. The aerospace forces are considered to be the fundamental U.S. strategic means, and include aerodynamic craft (airplanes and cruise missiles), ballistic missiles and military space devices. The basic principles of employing aerospace forces to achieve the goals of the American government are stated in the so-called Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the U.S. Air Force.*

*United States Air Force Basic Doctrine (Aerospace Doctrine). U.S. Air Force Manual AFM 1-2, 1 December 1959. Translation from the English, GRU Main Staff, Moscow, 1960.

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The aerospace forces are intended for operations in the total expanse beyond the surface of the earth without any limits in altitude. This expanse is considered to be, from the military standpoint, indivisible, and is called aerospace. According to the plans of the U.S. Air Force, made for a 15-year period (until 1975), the zone of combat operations in space will extend to altitudes of about 130,000 kilometers.

Aerospace forces are capable of operating anywhere and at any time. They have an unlimited range of operation, high mobility, great speed and firepower, and are capable of overcoming enemy defenses and conducting combat operations both in the atmosphere of any part of the globe or beyond the limits of the atmosphere.

Aerospace forces can conduct combat operations independently or in cooperation with other types of armed forces.

The most important principles in the employment of the aerospace forces are considered to be the principles of indivisibility and centralized control of forces, clarity and definitude of the task assigned to them, maximum display of initiative in all operations, concentration of efforts, insuring security, and close cooperation with other types of armed forces and with civilian and government components. The significance of the principle of surprise, which is acknowledged to be the determinant, is especially stressed, and every effort is to be made to attain it.

In a future general war, aerospace forces are given the decisive role. Therefore, attaining superiority in aerospace is made one of the most important tasks. It is maintained that "In general war the ultimate outcome would be a result of the decision in the aerospace battle at the outset"*

*United States Air Force Aerospace Doctrine, p.21. /This page number apparently refers to the Soviet translation of the manual. The quotation is taken from page 13, paragraph 2 of AFM 1-2./

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and supremacy in aerospace is already manifested in a capability "to destroy the military might of the enemy and concurrently protect the security of the United States of America and its allies."* The aerospace forces are capable of acting against the elements comprising the enemy's might, and, by having supremacy in the aerospace, they obtain advantages for all other types of armed forces in their performance of the tasks before them.

Bearing in mind these basic tenets of the American aerospace doctrine, let us now examine the question of supremacy in space and the role assigned to space weapons in a future war.

The significance that is attached to attaining supremacy in space was best expressed by the present President in 1960 when he was still a U.S. senator: "Supremacy in space will be the substance of the next decade. The nation that controls space will also control the world," Kennedy said then.** This assertion is consistent with the thesis of the aerospace doctrine, in accordance with which the ultimate outcome of a future war will be decided by combat operations in the aerospace.

The concept of supremacy in space differs from the earlier concepts of supremacy on land, on sea, and in the air.

In the opinion of the Americans the policy of supremacy is portrayed most vividly during combat operations on land. During combat operations on the sea, and especially in the air, this concept already has a limited application. Even greater limitations arise in its application to space. If the atmosphere ends at the maximum flight altitude of aerodynamic aircraft, then space is limitless and open for all countries. Even in that part of the aerospace closest to the earth, the possibilities for supremacy are considerably

*Ibid, p.19. /Page 10 of AFM 1-27
**"Missiles and Rockets", October 24, 1960.

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less than on land, on the sea or in the air.

However, supremacy in any environment remains as an ideal in the strategic concept by which one must be guided. Time and place become the basic factors under these conditions. In the opinion of General Power, the former Commander of the Strategic Air Command, "the existing concept of conducting combat operations in three dimensions of space will expand in time, if it can be expressed in this way, into the concept of conducting combat operations in four dimensions of space, combat operations in which the operational correlation between space and time will become the decisive factor."

In general, if it is impossible to control the entire aerospace in order to deprive the enemy of the capability to use it for his purposes, it is then necessary to resolve the simpler problem of controlling a certain part of it at a certain time. One of these most important parts is the aerospace directly surrounding the earth and extending to an altitude approximately equal to one radius of the earth. In the opinion of the U.S. military command, the significance of space combat operations, in a future war, will be determined by their influence on the combat capabilities of the enemy's ground forces and the operations of their own forces. From this point of view it seems realistic to deprive the enemy of the capability to use the indicated part of the aerospace nearest to the earth.

The special interest expressed in the USA in questions of military uses of the aerospace is explained, to a significant degree, by the weakness of the U.S. position in the conventional spheres of armed forces operations. By casting their eyes into space, the realistic U.S. military theorists proceed from the position that the USA has been unable to achieve supremacy on land, on the sea and in the air. Therefore, space is considered to be the only expanse in which the USA can still count on obtaining definite military advantages.

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Proceeding from the position that the goal of strategy in peacetime is basically limited to making a selection of the best types of weapons, which cannot be acquired in a finished form and which have to be created gradually on a selective basis, the military theorists and scientists of the USA are already studying questions of the possibility of creating various new weapons to conduct war in space.

In order to achieve supremacy in space, a whole series of space weapons systems is necessary, permitting the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. As the origin of the military use of space was established by the ballistic missile, which brought about the need to create a series of supporting systems of satellites, so for supremacy in space a bombing system is first required, to consist of a great number of nuclear bombs circling the earth in various orbits.

The idea of creating such a system had already been advanced in the USA in 1948. However, at that time the necessary technical means to realize it did not exist. At the present time these means do exist. They are the "Atlas" missiles with which the U.S. Air Force is armed and to which "Titan" missiles soon will be added, and, later (in 1964), powerful "Saturn"-type carrier missiles.

A second important question, which naturally arises in an attempt to create such a system, is the question of accuracy. Until the recent past, the expected low accuracy of such a system, together with the high cost of putting satellites into orbit, was considered to be the basic obstacle to the creation of effective carrier-satellites (sputnik-nositel) of nuclear missile weapons, but at the present time the problem of accuracy is already being resolved successfully. The most important phase in this line is the "Discoverer" program.

One of the goals in the "Discoverer" program is working out a system for the return from orbit of containers with various payloads. As of 1 December 1961, 10 containers had been recovered. These results are considered to be quite

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hopeful, and in the future the destruction of even comparatively small targets from space is considered possible.

At the present time certain requirements for a space bombing system have been formulated. The carrier satellites of this system must circle the earth in various orbits and must be supplemented by numerous decoy satellites (sputnik-lovushka). The creation of such decoys or dummy targets for misleading the enemy does not present any great difficulty. In order to hamper the radar or optical observation from the earth of each satellite of the system, it is intended to use antiradar covering and to paint them black.

Increasing the accuracy of nuclear strikes from space is planned by means of equipping the satellites, or the missiles launched from them, with homing guidance systems in addition to the programmed system, which must constantly be corrected from the earth. An infrared homing system is proposed as such a system.

The satellites of the space bombing system must, in advance, be put into orbits that pass over the territory of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the U.S. military theorists, such actions cannot be considered to be an aggressive act so long as there is no international agreement defining the boundaries of the sovereignty of states beyond the limits of the atmosphere, and so long as there is no legal status for space bodies.

The creation of such a system, consisting of hundreds and thousands of satellites, ready to attack previously selected targets at any moment, and whose destruction presents great difficulties, is a kind of apotheosis of the strategy of intimidation.

On the other hand, authors of the plans for creating space bombing systems examine them from the standpoint of the possibility of transferring combat operations into space without conducting them on the earth, on the sea, or in the air. Thus, we are speaking of a new version of the theory of limited wars. It is contemplated that the results of military

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operations in space will have a great military-political and economic significance for the countries participating in them and will be able to force the Soviet Union to make concessions.

The political significance of success in such a war will be determined by the fact that the country that achieves it will demonstrate its superiority in materiel-technical means, in its technological base, and in its theory, which will simplify the "conquest of the minds" of men, the recruiting of allies and the resolving of arguments with the enemy to one's advantage in various international organizations.

The fact that the system exists will supposedly force the enemy to take defensive measures which will entail huge expenditures. It will be necessary to detect, recognize, and destroy or render harmless, all such satellites one by one, including the decoy satellites.

Combat with carrier-satellites presents a very complex problem. It is considered that the direct destruction of satellites is unacceptable because it can lead to radioactive contamination of the expanse between the atmosphere and the lower Van Allen belt. Moreover, the remains of the satellite and antisatellite satellite will create a great number of dummy targets. Therefore, the enemy will be forced to install braking rockets on the satellites in order to have these satellites lose altitude and burn in the upper layers of the atmosphere. In order to hinder this work, booby-traps or other automatically operating defensive devices can be installed on the satellites in advance.

Further, it is contemplated that the enemy, i.e., the Soviet Union, will not limit itself to defense, and will orbit its own carrier-satellites. In turn, the USA will conduct a system of measures to combat them. As a result, the Soviet Union will be drawn into combat operations that will be conducted with a great strain on its forces, and may prove to be beyond the strength of its economy.

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The development of space bombing systems is already being conducted by the USA at the present time under the NABS (Nuclear Armed Bombardment System) program. This program includes a series of special projects. One of them envisages the development of carrier-satellites of "space-to-surface class missiles (project PCBS), orbiting at an altitude of about 200 km. The other projects (SLOB and SHAOB) envisage the creation of strategic satellite bombers in "low" (altitudes up to 36,000 km) and "high" (altitudes over 36,000 km) orbits.

The practical creation of a space bombing system is considered feasible in the near future.

An important role in attaining supremacy in space is allocated to guided, manned spaceships. This was especially stressed by the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Thomas White, who in 1960 stated: "In order to dominate aerospace it is necessary to have not only spaceships that can fly from one point of the globe to another, but it is also necessary to have men operate effectively in space."

The first steps in developing manned spaceships are the work on the experimental X-15 aircraft and the manned satellite of the "Mercury" project. In the near future flights of the X-15 aircraft are planned with the goal of attaining altitudes of 100 to 160 km, and in the beginning of 1962 the first flight of the American astronaut, Glenn, is expected, who is to orbit the earth three times.

Subsequent phases in this direction should be orbital gliding bombers and reconnaissance aircraft being developed in the "Dyna-Soar" project, and also, in the initial stage, by several leading American companies ("Lockheed", "Hughes" and others). The creation of manned space stations and command posts is planned for the future.

The moon is considered to be an important element of the U.S. "deterrent force" in aerospace. Its role from this point of view had already been stressed in January 1958

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by Brigadier-General Homer Boushey (U.S. Air Force). He said: "The moon possesses one advantage that has long been recognized by military science, namely, the advantage of altitude."

The possession of military bases on the moon will supposedly preclude the possibility of destroying the U.S. military might in case of surprise attack. The duration of a missile flight from the earth to the moon is about two calendar days. Therefore the simultaneous neutralization of a moon base and of targets on earth is impossible. During a strike against targets on the earth a potential for delivering a counterstrike from lunar bases is retained. On the other hand, a strike against lunar bases discloses the intentions of the enemy and provides time for preparing and effecting countermeasures..

The military significance of the moon is determined by the potentialities that unfold with the employment of lunar bases. Such bases can insure: --observation of enemy territory with the aid of telescopes; --detection of enemy ballistic missile launchings; --radio countermeasures against systems for controlling space weapons and space communication systems; --launching of missiles against ground targets from launching pads concealed on the hidden side of the moon.

Already, interest in the moon is not limited to a study of questions and a discussion of discovered potentialities. Specific projects are being worked out which propose the construction of various structures under the surface of the moon from the freight compartments of missiles, and also the employment of various versions of pneumatic structures. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and also various American companies ("Martin", "Aerospace", etc.), are conducting a great deal of work in this direction.

Parallel with working out the question of the military use of space for offensive purposes, considerable attention in the USA is being given to defensive space systems intended for antimissile and antisatellite, or, more exactly,

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antispace, defense.

The U.S. Department of Defense is already working on designs for a combat space system, SCWS-694E, which includes several thousand destroyer satellites (sputnik-istrebitel) to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles, and also for the "Saint" system, which includes several thousand interceptor satellites for intercepting enemy space objectives.

The creation of such antimissile and antispace defense means is already considered to be possible in 1966 or 1967. However, the generally accepted viewpoint in the USA is that in the near future space weapons systems will strengthen offensive, and not defensive, capabilities. Therefore, various versions of defensive space systems are considered to be less significant than plans for offensive systems.

A great deal of attention is also given to means of space reconnaissance. Such reconnaissance is completely feasible technically, not only for strategic but also for tactical purposes; it will greatly increase the capabilities of the ground, naval and air forces.

In accordance with the basic doctrine of the U.S. Air Force, aerospace forces must constantly be used to procure intelligence. It is recognized that in order to get intelligence information "a nation must be prepared to accept great risks when the risks of not having the information are considered greater."*

In the USA the various stages in the military mastery of aerospace are considered to be the following: --the first stage (1962 to 1965) - creation of military support satellite systems; --the second stage (1965 to 1970) - creation of carrier-satellites and means of antispace defense, flight to the moon and return to the earth, the creation of powerful carrier-missiles and manned space ships;

*United States Air Force Aerospace Doctrine, p. 9 /p. 5 of AFM 1-2/.

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--the third stage (after 1970) - the creation of autonomous space systems, manned space stations and command posts, and military bases on the moon. . .

In the first stage, space weapons still have an auxiliary significance and are intended for supporting the combat operations of all the types of armed forces of the USA. Control of them is effected from the earth. By the end of this stage systems of artificial earth satellites must be created for reconnaissance of ground targets, for detecting the launchings of ballistic missiles, for the precise connection of geodetic networks and geodetic tie-in of targets, for exact navigation of missile-carrying submarines and strategic bombers carrying "air-to-surface" class missiles, for global radio communications, for forecasting the weather, and also for radio-electronic intelligence and radio countermeasures. In this way a total of 7 satellite systems must be created, which, in the opinion of the American command, can be employed for the support of 13 basic operations of an offensive and defensive nature, conducted by all the types of U.S. armed forces.

The types of combat operations and the support systems of satellites that are planned to be used in them are represented in table 1.

The capabilities of employing a system of satellites can be examined with strategic air operations as an example. Reconnaissance satellites are to disclose the targets for such operations. Ultra-long-range missile detection satellites, in essence, determine the necessary degree of combat readiness of aviation for participation in the first operation of a future war, and in the future, together with other means, they will provide the warning to get aircraft airborne in a timely manner in order to prevent their destruction by missiles on the airfields where they are based. On the other hand, they will determine, at least approximately, the area of a missile launching, and, together with other reconnaissance means, will aid in locating the sites of missile bases so that they can subsequently be destroyed by aircraft and missile strikes. Geodetic

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satellites will permit the defining of target coordinates for delivering strikes against them from the air; navigational satellites will permit the delivery of more accurate strikes against these targets with delivery aircraft carrying "Sky Bolt" and "Hound Dog" type missiles. Communication satellites will support communications, meteorological satellites will insure the receipt of the necessary meteorological data for planning operations, and radio-electronic intelligence satellites will provide data on the radiotechnical means of the enemy that must be neutralized or destroyed either in advance of, or during the operation itself.

From the table it is apparent that reconnaissance, ultra-long-range missile detection, communications and meteorological systems will find application in all the indicated operations, which explains the special attention now being devoted to space reconnaissance and communications systems. The remaining systems will also receive quite widescale employment.

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TABLE I

Employment of Supporting Satellite Systems

in the Combat Operations

of the Armed Forces of the USA

Type of offensive and defensive combat operations	Branch of the Armed Forces			Supporting Satellite System						
	Army	Navy	Air Force	Reconnaissance	Ultra-long-range missile detection	Geodetic	Navigational	Communications	Meteorological	Radio-electronic intelligence
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Operations of an army corps of strategic designation	/	/	-	x	x	-	-	x	x	x
Operations of field armies	/	-	-	x	x	-	-	x	x	x
Landing operations	/	/	-	x	x	-	x	x	x	x
Missile-carrying submarine operations (with "Polaris" missiles)	-	/	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-
Operations of carrier strike large units	-	/	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Antisubmarine operations	-	/	-	x	x	-	x	x	x	x
Mine-laying and mine-sweeping operations	-	/	/	x	x	-	x	x	x	-
PVO operations	/	/	/	x	x	-	-	x	x	-

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TABLE I (continued)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Antimissile defense	/	/	/	x	x	-	-	x	-	-
Tactical air support	/	/	/	x	x	-	-	x	x	x
Strategic air operations	-	-	/	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Missile operations:										
intercontinental missiles...	-	-	/	x	x	x	-	x	x	-
intermediate range missiles...	-	-	/	x	x	x	-	x	x	-

Key:
/ - branch of the armed forces conducting the given operation;
x - military space devices employed in conducting the given operation;
— - the employment of the space devices in the given operation and for the given branch of the armed forces is non-characteristic

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The photographic equipment of the "Samos" reconnaissance satellites, including a container of film that can be returned to earth, should, according to the calculations of the Americans, insure the detection of ground objectives having linear dimensions of 6 to 18 meters, which is fully adequate for detecting such objectives and targets as missile bases, airfields, naval large units, concentrations of ground troops, industrial enterprises and others. From this standpoint, reconnaissance satellites are considered to be a reliable replacement for the special reconnaissance aircraft of the U-2 and U-3 type.

The operational "Samos" system must contain several (according to certain information, up to 20) satellites rotating in comparatively low orbits at an altitude of about 480 km.

The "Midas" satellites must provide for the detection of missile launchings in 1 to 2 minutes and warning 25 to 30 minutes before intercontinental ballistic missiles reach their targets (compared with the 15 to 17 minutes that are provided by the existing BMEWS ground radar system).

The operational "Midas" system will consist of 12 (from other data, 20) satellites constantly rotating around the earth in polar orbits at altitudes of up to 2500 km and higher. Besides detecting launchings, combat versions of the satellites will apparently be able to track, at least approximately, a certain section of the flight trajectory of missiles for target designation for ground antimissile defense (PRO) weapons. The immediate transmission of data acquired in this manner must be carried out through a network of communications earth satellites. The "Midas" program is being fulfilled according to proposed plans.

The program of creating systems of "Transit" navigational satellites and "Tiros" meteorological satellites is being successfully realized; the program of creating a global network of "Advent" communications satellites is being accomplished with a certain delay from the proposed

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plans, and preparation for launching the first "ANNA" and "SECOR" geodetic satellites in 1962 is being carried out.

It should be noted that the above-listed support satellite systems are to provide information which cannot be obtained by other methods, or if it can be obtained, with insufficient accuracy. For example, geodetic satellites should insure the tie-in of geodetic grids and determine the location of the most important targets with a permissible error of up to 30 m, while the existing methods permit tying-in of the geodetic grids of continents and islands with errors measured in hundreds of meters and even in kilometers.

According to available evaluation data, a system of from 4 to 6 navigational satellites will permit a determination of the geodetic coordinates of submarines and aircraft with an accuracy of about 160-200m, i.e., many times more accurate than all other known navigational systems. For comparison, it can be pointed out that the experimental American "Omega" radio-navigational system provides for determination of the line of position at a range of 9000km with an accuracy of about 1.6 km. The more precise radio-navigation systems being developed have a limited operating range, which reduces the possibility of their operational employment. Concerning inertial navigational systems, so far, under the conditions of prolonged submarine cruises they cannot provide accuracy comparable to that which will be given by the satellite systems.

In future military operations, meteorological satellites will be able to insure rapid receipt of information about the meteorological situation of huge expanses. They should become an effective means for receiving meteorological data for all types of armed forces under conditions where the receipt of such data from other channels is impossible or, in any case, made very difficult.

Besides the extensive work in creating support satellite systems, the "SPADATS" ground system, which permits the detection and tracking of all objects that are in orbit, has already been created in the U.S. and carries out observation of the aerospace.

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In this way, American plans to create military support satellite systems are, fundamentally, being realized successfully.

In the second phase, the arsenal of space weapons will expand considerably and will be reinforced by new weapons. In addition to the operational support satellite systems, it is planned, in this stage, to create space weapons for antimissile and antispace defense, which can be employed as a sort of shield preventing access to space and the carrying out by the enemy of his military space programs. During this same period it is possible that satellites to carry nuclear/missile weapons and space bombing systems will be created.

In this phase great significance is attached to powerful carrier-missiles which, according to American calculations, will be able to put the US in first place as far as weight of useful payload that can be put into space is concerned. For this purpose, three versions of the "Saturn" type missile and the "Nova" missile are being developed.

These missiles are to perform the task set by President Kennedy--to carry out the flight of a manned spaceship to the moon and return it to earth by 1970. They can also be employed to put heavy military spaceships with a man into orbit around the earth and to create military command posts in space. In this way the dependence of space weapons on ground systems will be decreased sharply, and the prerequisites for their autonomous employment will be created.

Therefore, in the opinion of the Americans, the second phase should create the necessary technical prerequisites for US achievement of supremacy in space.

In the third phase, the widescale employment of space weapons is considered possible, both for supporting combat operations on earth during possible local

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conflicts and in general war, and for conducting "limited" war in space.

During this period, military space systems will already possess sufficient autonomy, not only for conducting war in space, but also for delivering strikes independently against ground objectives and targets when destroying or putting out of commission ground means of control and communications. The creation of military bases on the moon during this stage will significantly increase the "deterrent power" of space weapons.

In order to control combat operations, the creation of space command posts and bases in space is envisaged during this period. The need to create invulnerable command posts was stressed by President Kennedy in his message to Congress on the budget for the 1961/62 fiscal year. In this message Kennedy stated: "Command posts and communications centers that are invulnerable and are permanently located in space are only the beginning of an important and absolutely necessary effort directed toward the creation of a genuinely unified, invulnerable national system of command communications at a high level."

The U.S. Air Force, taking these conditions into consideration, undertook a study of the possibilities of creating space stations that could be used as command posts for controlling the combat operations of all types of armed forces, especially of space weapons, and also for carrying out reconnaissance and supporting the operations of their space forces.

Already, the American command does not limit itself only to the development of various types of space weapons and to resolving the technical problems connected with this. As is known, the formation of the first large units and units of ballistic missiles of strategic designation had already been started in the USA in 1957, two years before "Atlas" intercontinental

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ballistic missiles were introduced into armament. Now the first aerospace large units and units are being formed in a similar manner. Their mission includes the combat employment of the space weapons being created.

In 1960 the special 6594th Test Wing was already created in the U.S. Air Force. This Wing is located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base and consists of the following basic subunits: a satellite launching support squadron; a squadron to insure the security of satellite launchings; a group for collecting reconnaissance data from satellites (the composition of this group includes a squadron to search for equipment capsules and photographic containers ejected from orbiting "Samos" and "Discoverer" satellites, and also of manned Project "Mercury" satellites.) The T/O of the 6594th Wing consists of approximately 3000 men. At the present time the Wing has about 2000 persons.

The formation of the 9th Antispace Defense Division was begun in August 1961. The composition of the division includes a squadron for control and observation of space, which directs the work of the "SPADATS" system and collects data on the situation in space for reports to the military command. So far the staff of the division, composed of 28 men, has been organized. In the future, the 9th Division is to serve as the basis for organizing other units and subunits of antimissile and antispace defense.

The first aerospace division has also been formed in the composition of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. It is based at the Vandenberg Air Force Base and at the present time provides training of the personnel for the missile units that are being formed. Apparently in the future this division will carry out the training of personnel for space weapon units.

In conclusion it must be stressed that plans for converting space into the arena of future battles are

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of a nature that is far from theoretical. The US government and the command of the U.S. Armed Forces are executing a broadly conceived program of military mastery of space, by which the scale and tempo of work in this direction will increase from year to year.

While advancing proposals on banning the use of space for military purposes, the government of the USA has at the same time developed a 15-year program calculated to achieve supremacy in space which requires expenditures of tens of billions of dollars.

It is impossible to discount the successes in this direction that have already been achieved in the USA up to the present time. By 1 December 1961 the Americans had undertaken 109 attempts and orbited 64 various space devices, including 39 artificial satellites that have a clearly military purpose. In addition, by that time there were already 24 American military-purpose satellites orbiting the earth, including "Samos" and "Midas" experimental reconnaissance satellites.

Preparatory work for achieving supremacy in space includes such measures as working out basic doctrines, organizing widescale military research work, creating a special command to develop new armament systems, with a T/O of about 60,000 men, and organizing large units and units of aerospace and purely space weapons.

All this requires further serious study of the opinions, plans and technical achievements of the USA in the field of mastering the aerospace, in order to retain and strengthen the leading position of our country in the exploration and mastery of space.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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9 SEP 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "American Military Technical Means of Combat in Space", by Major General of the Engineer-Technical Service P. Vysotskiy.

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted] Richard Helms 1.3(a)(4)

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure 1.3(a)(4)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 30 JUN 1992 1.3(a)(4)

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Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

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Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation
Center

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "American Military Technical Means of Combat in Space" by Major General of the Engineer-Technical Service P. Vysotskiy

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "American Military Technical Means of Combat in Space", by Major General of the Engineer-Technical Service P. Vysotskiy.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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American Military Technical Means of Combat in Space 1.3(a)(4)

Major General of the Engineer-Technical Service

P. Vysotskiy

The first scientific-research work on the creation of military space devices for the conduct of special types of reconnaissance (photo reconnaissance and radiotechnical reconnaissance), as well as for the delivery of nuclear strikes from space against strategic ground targets using satellite missiles (snaryad-sputnik), were begun in the USA in 1946, while the creation of reconnaissance apparatus (television, facsimile television, photo locator, and radar) for earth satellites was begun in 1950.

Direction and coordination of this work was assigned to the U.S. Navy Department, with the participation of forces and means from the Department of the Air Force. About 50 large firms were called on to cooperate in the work at that time. In order to create military space devices and systems, the Americans needed data on conditions in space and their possible effect on satellites sent into space. In July 1955, the U.S. Government announced preparations for launching artificial earth satellites with a variety of scientific research apparatus during the 1957-1958 Geophysical Year. Preparations for the launchings were carried out in a unified program by the Defense Department, the Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year. This project was designated "Vanguard". Responsibility for development of the carrier missiles, preparation of launching sites and launching of the satellites was placed upon the Department of Defense.

Fulfillment of the "Vanguard" program commenced in December 1957. However, the first attempt to launch a satellite into orbit proved unsuccessful. The "Vanguard-1" satellite was not successfully launched into space until 17 March 1958.

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This program was concluded in September 1959 and proved the most unsuccessful of the American space programs. As a result of 11 launch attempts, only three satellites were put into orbit, and they permitted the collection of only the most general data on the physical parameters of the outer layers of the atmosphere and of the space nearest the earth.

Failures in carrying out the "Vanguard" program forced the Americans hastily to work out the new "Explorer" research program on the basis of carrier-missiles, using "Jupiter" and "Thor" medium-range ballistic missiles as the first stages. (More recently, the specially created "Scout" research carrier-missile has been used for this purpose.)

The "Explorer-1" satellite, launched 31 January 1958, three months after the first Soviet satellite, became the first American satellite put into orbit around the earth. But this program also has not yet been completed.

In August 1958, the Americans proceeded to carry out the "Pioneer" space research program on the basis of carrier-missiles using "Jupiter", "Thor" and "Atlas" ballistic missiles as first stages, in order to study the physical parameters of space within the limits of the earth's orbit, as well as in the area of the moon and sun. But in this program also, not everything worked out successfully. Of the 9 attempted launchings, only two were crowned with success. The "Pioneer-4" and "Pioneer 5" space devices were, in the first case, put in orbit around the moon and, in the second case, in orbit about the sun.

Development of the first military earth satellites, and particularly the reconnaissance satellites of the "Pied Piper" project, continued simultaneously with preparations for the realization of scientific-research programs. In 1958, as a result of the lag behind the USSR and the numerous failures in satellite launchings, all space programs were reviewed in the USA and the decision was taken to expedite the creation of military space systems.

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On the basis of the "Pied Piper" project, three main projects for the creation of military reconnaissance satellites had taken shape by 1959: the experimental project "Discoverer" and the long-term experimental projects, "Samos" and "Midas", development and test launchings of which are being carried out at the present time. It was at this same time that intensive planning and development of other long-term military technical means of waging armed combat in space was begun.

At the present time, work in the creation of space weapons and space research means is being conducted on the basis of the program adopted in 1960 and designed for the period 1960 to 1975. A centralized governmental system of direction has been created for the fulfillment of the program. Responsibility for the development of military satellites has been placed upon the Department of Defense, and for the practical work, on the Air Force Weapons Systems Development Command. The National Aeronautics and Space Agency is responsible for work at the national level and for the fulfillment of a number of military programs.

The 15-year plan proposes the placing of about 970 space devices into space, of which about 570 will be of purely military designation.

At present, carrier-missiles and military space craft are being developed to accomplish the following basic tasks:

- the placing of light, medium and heavy research payloads and military space craft of various designation into space in various orbits;

- the support of various combat operations of all types of armed forces for the purpose of raising their effectiveness (military earth satellites);

- the conduct of armed combat in space and the destruction of targets on earth from space (carrier-satellites and space bombers with nuclear/missile weapons);

- the implementation of antimissile and antispace defense of the North American continent (satellites and maneuverable space craft).

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Let us examine briefly the projected military technical means intended for the conduct of armed combat in space.

Carrier Missiles. During the forthcoming 15-year period of exploration and mastery of space, it is planned that extensive use will be made of carrier-missiles which have already been developed and are currently in use, employing, as first stages, modernized "Thor" and "Atlas" ballistic missiles, with specialized second and third stages.

Such missiles include: - "Thor-Able", "Thor-Delta" and "Thor-Agena B". They are intended for placing 500 to 700 kg payloads into space. The weight of these carrier-missiles is about 50 to 55 tons, with a first-stage power-plant thrust of about 68 tons. The utilization of 210 such missiles is planned by 1975.

"Atlas-Able" and "Atlas-Agena B", intended for placing payloads of up to 1.6 tons into space in higher orbits. The weight of the carrier-missile is about 110 tons, with a first-stage power-plant thrust of about 170 tons. It is intended that about 590 such missiles will be used over the 15 years.

During the period 1963 to 1968, the Americans plan to conclude development and commence practical use of three new types of carrier-missiles, the "Atlas-Centaur", "Saturn" and "Nova".

The "Atlas-Centaur" carrier-missile will have as its first stage a significantly modernized and improved variation of the "Atlas" missile, and as its second stage, the "Centaur" missile, operating on liquid fuel (oxygen and hydrogen). The launching weight of this carrier-missile will exceed 110 tons, with a first stage thrust of about 176 tons. The thrust of the second-stage engines will be 14 tons. This missile will be able to put a payload of four tons in a 500-km high orbit, and deliver a payload of about one ton to the moon. The missile is now in the concluding stage of development and testing of its second-stage power plants. Practical utilization of the

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missile is planned for 1963, and it is intended that about 65 military and scientific-research space devices will be put into space by 1975, using this missile.

The "Saturn" carrier-missile is being developed in three versions, which are intended to place payloads of from 10 to 50 tons into space with a launching weight of 525 to 650 tons. The distinctive feature of this missile is that it is to be composed of five standard, unified stages, designated S-I, S-II, S-III, S-IV and S-V, which can be put together for C-1, C-2 and C-3 missiles in several variations to expand the ranges of payloads put into space.

The "Saturn C-1" carrier-missile has been under development since 1958, under the initiative of the Department of Defense and can have two- or three-stage versions.

According to project data, the first stage S-1 consists of 8 H-1 liquid-fuel rocket engines with 85 tons of thrust each. Its total thrust is 680 tons, length 24.5 meters and diameter 6.5 meters.

The second stage, S-IV, is a cluster (svyazka) of six L-10 liquid-fuel rocket engines with 6.8 tons of thrust each, operating on liquid fuel(oxygen and hydrogen). Thrust of the second stage is about 41 tons, length 15.2 meters, and diameter 5.5 meters. The third stage is a cluster of two RL-10 engines, with a total thrust of 13.6 tons, 16.2 meters in length and 3 meters in diameter.

The first launching of the "Saturn C-1" missile was carried out in October 1961, with a functioning first stage and dummy second and third stages. It is planned that 10 "Saturn C-1" missiles will be launched before 1964 as experiments. The Americans are expediting its development in every way. It is possible that the missile will be ready for practical use in 1964.

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According to calculations of the American specialists, the three-stage version of the "Saturn C-1" should assure the orbiting of space hardware of the following weights: 10-ton earth satellites in a 500-km high orbit, a 5.4-ton space craft in orbit around the moon, a 4.1-ton space craft in orbit around the sun and 6.8-ton "Dyna-Soar" aerospace craft (raketoplan) in orbit about the earth.

The "Saturn C-2" carrier-missiles (two- or three-staged) and the "Saturn C-3" (four- or five-stage) are considered more powerful than the "Saturn C-1" and will put loads of up to 50 tons into space. The completion of their development is planned for 1966 or 1967. The "Saturn" missiles are considered to be the basic American heavy missile, and the tentative requirement for them for fulfillment of military and research programs is 70 to 80 missiles.

The "Nova" carrier-missile is a five-stage system. It is to have a launching weight of 2100 tons, a first-stage power-plant thrust of 2700 to 4000 tons, is to put a payload of 70 tons into a low orbit around the earth and 20 tons into 24-hour orbit, deliver a 12-ton space craft with three astronauts to the moon, and ensure the return of a 3-ton capsule back to earth. It is proposed that a cluster of four or six F-1 type engines, operating on high-caloric fuel and liquid oxygen, will be used as the first stage in this missile. It is proposed that a cluster of F-1 engines will be used as the second stage as well. Subsequent stages (possibly three more) will use engines operating on liquid oxygen and hydrogen. Test launchings of the missile are planned for 1966, and practical utilization beginning in 1968. It is planned that 20 such missiles will be produced for the 15-year program.

There also exist more long-term projects for the creation of carrier-missiles during the period 1970-1980. They include "Arcturus", "Antares" and "Aldebaran", which, according to American plans, should ensure an even more extensive mastery of space. Only a few estimated data are known about these carrier-missiles.

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"Arcturus" is designed to have a launching weight of 1,000 to 1,600 tons, with a first-stage maximum thrust of 1,360 to 2,000 tons.

"Antares" will have a launching weight of 4,500 to 9,000 tons and should be able to place a load of 1,100 to 2,000 tons in orbit around the earth and deliver a load of 900 to 1,800 tons to the moon.

"Aldebaran" is a single-stage cruise missile weighing 50,000 tons, equipped with an improved-type nuclear power plant, and is designed to place a load of 9,000 tons in orbit around the earth and deliver a load of 3,000 tons to the moon.

The designs for these carrier-missiles are, for the time being, based on very approximate calculations; test flights are projected for 1973 to 1980.

The present lack of powerful carrier-missiles, capable of putting large payloads into space, makes the Americans quite feverish and impedes their general progress in the mastery of space and the development of carrier-missiles. It is no coincidence, therefore, that governmental scientific centers and a number of the larger aircraft and missile construction firms are proposing the most varied designs, which, to a significant degree, encumbers the development of space means of combat.

In this connection, preliminary research under U.S. Air Force direction has been conducted and is continuing on the feasibility of creating a single, long-term complex of carrier-missiles for the universal accomplishment of the tasks in mastering space. This entire complex of work has been given the general designation: Project "Phoenix". By now, the optimum dimensions and configuration of the carrier-missiles have already been determined; methods of assembly, transport and launching have been refined; and problems in the creation of re-usable missile stages have also been studied under this project.

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Out of all the carrier-missile designs, 10 types have been selected, mainly using liquid-fuel rocket engines (zhidkostno-reaktivnyy dvigatel - ZhRD) which operate on liquid oxygen and hydrogen, and a turbo-pump system of fuel feed.

Under the "Phoenix" project it is proposed to create five basic modifications of two-or three-stage carrier-missiles, with a first-stage thrust of 220 to 1,330 tons, capable of putting 6.8 to 42-ton payloads into orbit around the earth.

While the cost of putting one kilogram of payload into orbit costs $10,000 to $100,000 using the early types of carrier-missiles, the average cost is $2,200 for the missiles which are used at present. Missiles created under Project "Phoenix" should lower the cost of delivery into orbit to $220 per kilogram of payload.

The high cost of delivery is caused by the one-time use of the first and second stages of the carrier-missile. Therefore, great attention is currently being devoted to the development of re-usable first booster stages. Thus the feasibility is being examined of creating boosters with a parachute recovery system possessing wings and control surfaces, which can be recovered by means of gliding in the atmosphere before landing, with turbo-jet engines assuring vertical landing, as well as boosters using turbo-jet engines as the primary engines. It will be possible to create such boosters by 1970.

Earth satellites of military designation for the support of combat operations. The development of a number of satellites of military designation has been in progress since 1957 and 1958. They are intended for the collection of intelligence information on objectives and targets on the territories of the countries of the probable enemy, intelligence on the activity of missile troops, for assuring precise radio-navigation, geodetic tying in of the nets of various continents and strategic targets to geodetic nets, as well as for providing uninterrupted and reliable radio communications for the control of troop operations and the receipt of timely and precise meteorological information.

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The basic military satellites, projected for practical utilization in 1962 to 1965, include the "Samos", "Midas", "Transit", "Advent" and "Rebound" satellites; the "Tiros", "Nimbus" and "Aeros" meteorological satellites; and the "Anna" and "Secor" geodetic satellites.

The "Samos" satellites are intended for reconnaissance of ground targets (Missile and airbases, major industrial enterprises, areas of troop concentration, fleets at sea, etc.) as well as of radio emissions from ground radiotechnical facilities. These satellites are put into polar orbit at an altitude of about 500 km by means of the "Atlas-Agena B" carrier-missiles. Photo-television apparatus, photo apparatus, as well as radio intelligence apparatus, can be installed within these satellites.

Photo-television apparatus serves for reconnaissance of ground targets. It consists of a photographic camera, automatic apparatus to develop the photographic film on board the satellite, and a television installation to transmit the image received on the photographic film to ground television receiver stations, where the images are reproduced on the television screen and photographed a second time to obtain a photographic intelligence document. It is considered possible to distinguish objects on earth with linear dimensions of 76 to 152 meters on the first photographs using this apparatus, which are transmitted from an orbit of about 500 km in altitude. It is possible to sketch only the most general picture of the enemy's territory on the basis of intelligence information received from such apparatus.

The Americans plan to utilize photo-television apparatus capable of revealing objects with linear dimensions of 2.5 to 3.5 meters for detailed reconnaissance of previously noted areas in the enemy's territory from the same altitudes.

The Americans give first preference to photographic apparatus, since, if it is of high quality, it can provide the photographing of large areas of the earth's surface during a brief period of time. However, in this instance it is

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necessary to return containers with photographic films from orbit to the earth in order to obtain the intelligence information. Therefore, the photographic apparatus is located in the body of the second stage of the carrier-missile, while the container for receiving the exposed photographic film is located in its nose cone and is equipped with a system for separation from the missile and a parachute recovery system. Development of the system for return and recovery of the containers is being carried out by the Americans in the "Discoverer" experimental reconnaissance satellites. Of 25 such satellites placed into orbit up to the present time, 11 containers with experimental reconnaissance apparatus and photographic film have been returned.

Photographic apparatus with a resolution capability "optical-film" on the order of 40 to 100 lines to the millimeter is being developed to equip the "Samos" satellites. The use of photographic apparatus with focal lengths of 30, 90 and 360 cm will permit the exposure on photographs of objects having linear dimensions of 0.7 to 18 meters when photographing from an orbit of about 240 km. To illustrate what this means, it can be noted that aerial photographs used during the Second World War which were taken from altitudes of about 9 kilometers could reveal objects with linear dimensions of 4.5 to 6 meters on the photographs. Therefore, the employment of high-quality aerial films, and cameras with large focal lengths, opens up great prospects for photographic reconnaissance from satellites. Thus, it is known that in 1960 "Lockheed" and a number of other firms were assigned the development of the "Samos E-6" photo-reconnaissance satellite, weighing about 1400 kilograms. It was planned to include up to 12 photographic cameras with various focal lengths and several types of photographic film of varying sensitivity in the satellite's complement of equipment. The containers with the apparatus and the exposed film are to be returned from orbit individually or in groups, using the recovery systems equipment. The SNAP-8 nuclear power source, generating 30 kw and destined to function for one year, is being developed to power the equipment on board the "Samos".

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In order to decipher the great volume of information received from the satellites, high-speed electronic computers are being developed which should rapidly reveal objectives and targets, compare them with similar images, identify the nature and purpose of the objectives, and produce printed and graphic information about them which is suitable for utilization by the armed forces. Five C-130 "Hercules" military transport aircraft are being re-equipped at the present time to pick up photographic containers being returned from "Samos" satellites.

Reconnaissance radar sets, which would be capable of making satisfactory identification of major military and industrial objectives from altitudes of about 400 km, are also being developed to be installed on board the "Samos" satellites.

During the period 1960 and 1961, the Americans attempted four times to launch "Samos" satellites, but were successful in placing only two in orbit (with an effective period of service of about one month). Design work on the "Samos" is being carried on extremely actively by the Americans. They hope to obtain data, by means of these satellites, primarily on the disposition of intercontinental missile-launching mounts and air bases of strategic aviation. However, because of the complexity of the problem, the Americans were unable to fulfill their projected plans for 13 launchings during 1960 and 1961. For 1962, 20 "Samos" satellite launchings are envisaged by the plan, and subsequently 6 to 8 satellites are to be put into orbit annually for periodic reconnaissance of targets in areas of the enemy's territory which are of interest, and particularly in the arctic areas of the Soviet Union.

The "Midas" satellites are intended for reconnaissance of nuclear/missile strikes against U.S. territory while they are being carried out, with 25 to 30 minutes early warning before the missiles reach their designated targets. Ballistic missiles should be detected by the "Midas" satellites, 1 to 2 minutes after launching, by the intensive thermal radiation of their power plants during the active sector of the missiles' flight trajectory. The "Midas" satellite system is, therefore, more

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advanced than the system of radar stations for ultra long-range detection of missiles, which permits the detection of missiles only after they rise above the line of the horizon and enter the zone of the beam of the radar stations. The possibility of detecting ballistic missiles at an effective range of 16,000 to 24,000 km, when their strike may be directed at the U.S. by way of the Southern Hemisphere, where there are no ultra long-range missile detection radar posts, is considered to be another advantage of the "Midas" satellite system.

On board each "Midas" satellite there is an infra-red scanning mechanism, for detection of the fact that a missile has been launched (either individually or a mass salvo of missiles). The receiving element of this mechanism (in one of its experimental models) is sensitive to radiations in the wave band of 10-100 microns, and possesses selectivity which permits it to distinguish infrared radiations of intercontinental missile engines from emanations of other ground heat sources (blast furnaces, coke-conversion combines, forest fires, etc.).

On the basis of data from the scanning mechanism, the satellite's computing equipment must determine the missile's approximate direction of flight and the area against which the strike is delivered. These data and the alarm signal from the satellite go to a data-transmitting radio apparatus, then to special ground posts for observation of the satellites and the receipt of information. It is also considered possible subsequently to transmit the information from the satellites to ground receiving points through a network of special active communications satellites, which are being developed in the "Courier" and "Advent" projects.

A network of 20 "Midas" satellites, moving in orbits with an apogee of 2,500 km and a perigee of 320 km, will have to be created in order to provide uninterrupted observation of the enemy's territory.

The "Midas" satellites have been under intensive development by the Americans since 1958. "Midas" satellite launchings commenced in 1960. In all, 4 launchings were carried out and 3 satellites were placed in orbit. It is known, for example, that the "Midas 4" satellite detected the experimental launching

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of an American "Titan" ballistic missile two minutes after launching and transmitted the detection signal to earth. According to the estimate of the Americans, in spite of the intensive work, fulfillment of the "Midas" project is lagging about 10 months behind the planned schedule. The launching of 10 satellites annually with an effective duration of more than a year is envisaged for the period 1962 to 1965, according to the "Midas" satellite-launching program, drafted for 15 years.

The "Transit" radio-navigational satellites are intended by the Americans for the precise navigation of vessels and aircraft, and primarily for the existing missile-carrying submarines armed with "Polaris" missiles, and strategic bombers carrying "air-to-surface" class "Hound Dog" and "Sky Bolt" missiles. It is known that at the present time there exist a multitude of autonomous and non-autonomous(operating jointly with ground apparatus) navigational systems. However, they provide precise navigation only in equipped areas and require constant correction of their readings.

In turn, non-autonomous navigational systems, even those providing high precision in fixing coordinates, are considered by the Americans to be vulnerable, for even if only one station is put out of commission by the enemy, the system is rendered practically useless. The utilization of such systems to fix the launching point for "Polaris", "Hound Dog" and "Sky Bolt" missiles is considered unreliable as well. According to American calculations, the "Transit" satellites should fix coordinates for vessels or aircraft with an accuracy of about 200 meters.

Moreover, the Americans consider a system of radio-navigational satellites to be invulnerable because the means to combat such satellites have not yet been created.

The operating principle of the system, which consists of 6 or 8 satellites, is the following. The satellite, with a complex set of radio-electronic apparatus on board (a high-stability radio transmitter, a recording mechanism, a transmitter of the parameters of the satellite's orbit, and source of power) is placed in a calculated circular orbit at an

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altitude of 700 to 900 kilometers. The satellite's ground control station measures the precise parameters of its orbit once every 24 hours and transmits them to the satellite, where they are recorded on magnetic tape. Simultaneously, time adjustment signals are sent to the satellite. While moving in orbit, the satellite transmits to earth, at intervals of 1 to 2 minutes, a signal from its stable transmitter, data on the parameters of its orbit and signals of standard time. On the basis of all these data, the vessel or aircraft receiving-measuring and computing apparatus calculates the precise coordinates of the location of the vessel or aircraft. The precise coordinates of the location just before missile launchings of missile-carrying submarines (in submerged position and receiving the "Transit" satellite signals on a trailing antenna, fixed to a buoy), or a carrier bomber, are fed into the computer apparatus of their flight control system and serve as the initial data in firing against the selected targets.

"Transit" satellites have been under development by the Americans since 1957. These were the very first satellites intended for the creation of a radio-navigational net operating in actual practice. Of the seven satellites launched in 1960 and 1961, five were put in orbit. The last of them, "Transit 4A", is equipped with a "SNAP-3" nuclear reactor, which will provide electric power for the radio-technical apparatus on board for a period of one year. It is considered that it fully meets the necessary requirements in its tactical-technical characteristics.

It is planned that 12 such satellites will be put into space in 1962 and 1963. An operating network of them should include six satellites, of which four are to be put into circular orbits with an angle of inclination of the planes of their orbits to the equator of about 67°, while two are to be put into circular equatorial orbits at an altitude of 700 to 900 km. It is planned that 114 "Transit" satellites will be put into space in 15 years.

The "Rebound" and "Advent" communications satellites are intended for a global radio communications net, which will provide control of the combat operations of all types of armed

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forces and primarily for the strategic attack weapons of the USA.

It is known that the Americans are striving to develop reliable radio communications means in order to bring, primarily, strategic aviation, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine missile carriers up to combat readiness, and to control their combat operations. For this purpose, in addition to the creation of a global communications net, the Americans are conducting work on the search for radio communications means for control under exceptional conditions, using high-altitude missiles of the "Tattle Tale" project, and are also studying the feasibility of creating passive communications satellites and passive reflecting belts, located in orbits around the earth, and active communications earth satellites.

The "Tattle Tale" project envisages the creation of a battery of high-altitude missiles, which are to be lofted to an altitude of 1,600 km, carrying transmitting and relaying apparatus, when the normal functioning of other means of control has been disrupted. It is to transmit to command posts of all types of armed forces instructions to bring them up to combat readiness, and combat orders for the commencement of combat operations.

The utilization of communications earth satellites is considered a long-term prospect. Two varieties of communications satellites are being developed for these purposes: the passive, which reflect signals sent to them from transmitting to receiving points, and active, containing receiving and transmitting radio communications apparatus on board, which provide for the relaying of communications sent to the satellite from the transmitting to the receiving points. Depending on the height of the orbit, such satellites can provide ultra-short-wave communications at distances of thousands of kilometers, which will make it possible to dispense with the use of numerous earth relay stations, which are complex to build and are expensive.

The first experimental passive satellite was the "Echo 1", launched into space in 1960 and currently in orbit. It provides periodic radio communications between the east and west coasts

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of the USA, as well as between the USA and the countries of Europe. In appearance, this satellite is an inflated globe, 30 meters in diameter, manufactured from thin film, and covered with a thin layer of aluminum paint in order to increase its capacity to reflect radio waves.

A shortcoming of this type of satellite is, nevertheless, its low radio-wave reflecting capability, which necessitates the construction of great antenna systems at transmitting and receiving points, capable of automatically tracking the satellite during flight, in order to create reliable radio communications lines.

Work on the "Rebound" project is being carried out in this connection. The "Rebound" satellites will also take the form of inflated structures, but of lesser diameter, and in order to increase the reflection of radio waves, their outer surface will be filled out in the form of numerous conjugate corner reflectors (sopryazhennyy ugolkovyy otrazhatel). The launching of about 46 such satellites is planned for the period 1962 to 1965, but according to estimates of the Americans, even they will not accomplish the tasks of creating global radio communications nets.

For two years the Americans tried unsuccessfully to create an artificial reflection belt around the earth (in polar orbit) out of metallic reflecting dipoles. At first, the project for the creation of an artificial reflection belt bore the designation "Needle", but afterwards the designation "West Ford". This project envisages placing in orbit a satellite with a container holding reflecting dipoles, which, when distributed along the orbit, will create a reflection belt for radio waves and will be able to provide uninterrupted radio communications, particularly in arctic areas.

An attempt to create such a belt was undertaken with the launching in October 1961 of the "Midas 4" satellite, within which a container with dipoles was installed. Because of a series of malfunctions, the dipoles were not successfully dispersed along the satellite's orbit. It should be noted that

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this attempt bore an experimental character, and the Americans themselves had little faith in the possibility of organizing reliable radio communications by this method. Most probably this was a diversionary maneuver in connection with the "Midas 4" launching.

The more promising satellites for these purposes are the active communications satellites. Three projects ("Courier", "Decree" and "Steer") were being developed for the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy as experimental models of such satellites, but since 1960 they have been replaced by a single, overall long-term project called "Advent", the development of which will take place in three stages.

For the first stage it is proposed that satellites weighing about 450 kg will be created in order to carry out communications in the 1700- to 2400-megacycle frequency range on ten channels, with a transmitter of about 1 watt power and a transmitting antenna 50 cm in diameter.

For the second stage, it is planned that satellites weighing about 1,360 kg will be created to contain about 490 kg of communications apparatus. Communications will be carried out on the frequency band of 4400 to 5000 megacycles, with a transmitter output power of 5 watts. This apparatus is calculated for communications on six channels, with each channel having a band width of 100 megacycles. Each broad-band channel can be used for the transmittal of encoded information on 100 telephone channels, and on 1,000 telephone channels for non-coded.

For the third stage, satellites weighing up to 2,000 kg, destined for 24-hour orbits, will be created. The apparatus of these satellites will be calculated for operating on the 5,000- to 10,000-megacycle frequency band. These satellites will be equipped with inflatable parabolic antennas up to 6 meters in diameter. Miniaturized nuclear power sources are being created in order to extend the period of service of these satellites.

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It is planned to place "Advent" satellites in orbits up to 36,000 km in altitude by means of "Atlas-Centaur" and "Saturn" missiles. Two experimental "Advent" satellite launchings were planned for 1961, but this schedule was not maintained. Two experimental satellite launchings a year are planned for the period 1962 to 1964, while the creation of a global net consisting of three satellites in a 24-hour equatorial orbit will take place in 1965, using a "Saturn" missile, which is supposed to be ready for practical use by that time.

The "Nimbus" and "Aeros" meteorological satellites are intended for the creation of meteorological nets for weather reconnaissance in various areas of the globe for the purpose of precise weather predictions in support of all types of armed forces.

The first meteorological satellites were "Tiros" satellites, equipped with two television cameras capable of transmitting cloud-cover images to ground reception stations for one year. On earth, meteorological maps were compiled on the basis of these data, making it possible to determine the distribution of wind velocities at various altitudes, and of storm centers and the direction of their movement along the earth's surface. A great quantity of meteorological data were received from the three "Tiros" satellites placed in orbit during 1960 and 1961, for the analysis and processing of which attempts were made to utilize electronic computers. "Nimbus" and "Aeros" satellites with television, infrared and radar apparatus on board are being created in order to create a constantly functioning net of meteorological satellites. It is planned to put "Nimbus" satellites in orbits of about 1,100 km in altitude and the "Aeros" satellites with improved television cameras in 24-hour orbits. In all, it is planned to launch about 60 satellites of this type during the 15-year period.

Data received from the satellites will be processed by the use of electronic machines and will be transmitted to interested headquarters.

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The "Anna" and "Secor" geodetic satellites are intended for more precise determination of the earth's shape, for geodetic tying in of points situated on various continents and of geodetic nets, particularly the nets of the USSR and USA, by the spatial triangulation method, as well as for the tying in of strategic targets to these nets with an accuracy of 10-30 meters, for operations against them by nuclear/missile weapons of attack.

At the present time, two types of geodetic satellites are being developed in the USA: optical (Project "Anna") and radio range-finding satellites (Project "Secor").

The development of satellites in the "Anna" project began in 1958. It was proposed that by the end of 1960, satellites would be created weighing 50 to 68 kg, and 90 cm in diameter, equipped with sources for intensive light radiation, and which could be photographed against the background of stars, and on the basis of these photographs make a geodetic tie in of nets and targets, using astronomic calculations. The pulse light source is calculated for the formation at two-minute intervals of light flashes with a duration of 1 millisecond and with an intensity of 320 lumens per second. It was also proposed to install in the satellite a pulse-operating radio beacon with the same frequency and duration for automatic tracking of the satellite in the celestial sphere.

In connection with the fact that the development of this satellite was not completed in time, the program for the creation of geodetic satellites was reviewed at the end of 1960, and in view of its direct military significance, the responsibility for its fulfillment was placed on the Department of Defense.

The operating principle of the "Secor" radio range-finding system is based on the use of the method of sequential comparison of distances from four radio range-finding stations on earth to the radio satellite located in an orbit, the parameters of which are known. The component elements of the system will be: three ground air-transportable stations, equipped with special radio-ranging installations and located at points with known geodetic coordinates; a ground station which will be located at a point which can be tied in to a known geodetic net; and a satellite with the transmitting-receiving radio apparatus.

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The "Secor" system is to provide a range of operation (measurement of distance between points) of up to 16,000 km and operate on a frequency band of 482 to 512 megacycles. Ground transmitters are calculated for an emission power of 500 watts at a frequency of 512 megacycles. The ground receiving stations will operate on frequencies of 482 megacycles.

Experiments with the "Secor" equipment are being carried on simultaneously with launchings of "Transit" radio-navigational satellites, on which the appropriate testing apparatus has been installed.

The Americans propose to create portable units of ground apparatus which can be transported, as well as a unit of miniaturized apparatus for the fourth of the stations, which is intended for secret installation in the area of the target and which must be tied in to the other three stations. Such an apparatus can be thrown from a plane in the areas of the targets which are to be tied in.

The expected accuracy of distance measurement by such a system is about 0.5 meters.

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A number of major American firms and the Weapons Systems Development Command are conducting planning work on a broad front for the creation of offensive space bombing systems designed to destroy ground targets from space. It is considered possible to create such systems only after 1970.

It is proposed that automatic carrier-satellites and piloted space-carrier-bombers will be included in this system.

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Carrier-satellites for nuclear/missile weapons are being studied and designed under the general program, NABS. At present three projects under this program are known.

The first project, PCB, envisages the creation of carrier-satellites for "space-to-surface" type missiles for the destruction of ground targets.

It is proposed that three-ton carrier-satellites will be placed in an orbit 185 km high, with an orbital period of 90 minutes. At this flight altitude, the carrier-satellite will be within the limits of direct visibility from ground control stations for 18 minutes, from where commands can be issued for launching "space-to-surface" missiles. Depending on the size of the angle of direction of the launch in relation to the tangent to the orbit, it is considered possible to destroy targets at distances of from 9,000 to 30,000 km from the launch point. The weight of such a missile with a nuclear warhead can exceed one ton.

The second project, SLOB, envisages the creation of bomber-satellites for bombing ground targets with nuclear charges. It is proposed that such bomber-satellites will be placed in what, by American definition, are considered low orbits, at an altitude of up to 36,000 km, i.e. up to stationary, 24-hour orbits.

The third project, SHAOB, envisages the creation of bomber satellites for the destruction of ground targets with nuclear warheads from altitudes exceeding 36,000 km.

Piloted space carrier-bombers for nuclear/missile weapons are being studied and designed under the general program, "BOSS-10C". This program includes two basic projects: "Dyna-Soar" and "BOSS-10C". It envisages a feasibility study on the creation of non-combat space systems, of piloted combat systems, as well as of systems for support of the conduct of combat operations in space.

The "Dyna-Soar" project envisages the creation of experimental piloted glide or orbiting bombers "Dyna-Soar-1", which have a calculated flight range of 40,000 km when brought to a height of about

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160 km by the modernized "Titan-2" carrier-missile. This experimental glide bomber,with a crew of two men and a flight weight of 6.8 tons, will subsequently, according to American opinion, be the basis for the develöpment of the piloted orbiting bombers, "Dyna-Soar-2", "Dyna-Soar-3" and "Dyna-Soar-Mouse", which will be maneuverable space vessels weighing 6.8 to 10 tons.

In turn, on the basis of any of these, the Americans expect to create a space bombing weapons system for the destruction of ground targets with nuclear/missile weapons. Experimental gliders are already being created under the "Dyna-Soar-1" project at the present time. Later on, in 1964 and 1965, it is proposed that test and practical models will be built for flights in space with a crew on board. It is planned to carry out 24 flights over a period of 15 years, using "Titan 2" and "Saturn" missiles. Flights of "Dyna-Soar-2" have not yet been planned under this project, but "Saturn" carrier-missiles will be used to carry them out.

It is also known that the U.S. Air Force proposes, on the basis of the "Dyna-Soar" project, to create a maneuverable space reconnaissance vehicle with a crew of three men for the reconnaissance of ground targets, for the design of which a competition has been announced. According to the U.S. Air Force tactical-technical requirements, the reconnaissance vehicle must be placed in polar orbits at an altitude of about 400 km,with the capability of maneuvering to lower orbits of 160 km for detailed reconnaissance of ground targets. It is envisaged that optical, photographic, television and radar apparatus will be used as reconnaissance equipment. It is considered advisable to process the intelligence data on board the vessels and transmit it to earth. The task of creating such reconnaissance means is to be performed by 1966.

The "BOSS-10C" project envisages a study of the feasibility of creating bombing systems to operate at altitudes of about 36,000 km. It is divided in turn into two sub-projects with the designations P-79821 and P-79822.

The sub-project P-79821 envisages a study of the feasibility of creating piloted and automatic armed or reconnaissance space systems. Three versions, which have been designated A, B and E, are being studied. They will use ballistic or glide re-entry into the atmosphere and are destined for operation at altitudes

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of less than 1600 km. The designing of bombing weapons systems suitable in practice for operations at the indicated range of altitudes is being proposed on the basis of more realistic and long-term research.

The sub-project P-79822 envisages a study of the feasibility of creating piloted and automatic armed or reconnaissance space systems for the conduct of combat operations in the altitude range of 1,600 to 36,000 km. Two versions, designated C and D, are being studied, using ballistic or glide re-entry into the atmosphere. The practical design of a final version of the "BOSS-10C" piloted bombing system for the conduct of combat operations in the altitude range of 1,600 to 36,000 km is proposed on the basis of one of the more realistic versions.

It should be noted that all the projects for space bombing systems are in the very initial stage of study and research, with the exception of "Dyna-Soar", but certain of them are already being financed by the Government.

The development by the Americans of military technical means of combat in space shows that the imperialists are using technical progress mainly for military purposes and are preparing to turn space into an arena for destructive war.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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IRONBARK

28 SEP 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation", by Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

[redacted]

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Enclosure

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Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

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Deputy Director for Research

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Director, National Photographic Interpretation
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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation ", by Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation ", by Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation

by

Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

The experience of a number of operational and tactical exercises in recent years has greatly enriched the knowledge of our army's generals and officers in the field of operational and combat utilization of nuclear/missile weapons. At the same time, the exercises have revealed significant shortcomings in the organization and delivery of mass and group nuclear/missile strikes, both in the beginning and in the course of an operation. And such strikes are the very basis for achieving the goals of an operation.

One of the essential reasons for these shortcomings can be found in the imperfect organization of missile troops in the ground forces and the resulting difficulties of control over them by the chief of missile troops and artillery of a front (army).

At first glance it would appear that the currently accepted "harmonious" organization of missile troops in the ground forces, wherein missile units (large units) are included organizationally at all levels from division to front, should assure their most efficient combat ~~utilization~~. However, in reality this is not quite so.

Under the conditions which have evolved in the organization of missile troops of the ground forces, the apparatus of the chief of missile troops and artillery has been charged not only with the tasks of preparing, planning and directing the operational and combat utilization of missile troops and artillery,

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their combat and missile-technical support, but also of their fire control (nuclear/missile strikes).

In preparing and conducting an operation, the headquarters of the chief of missile troops and artillery of an operational formation (headquarters and service of missile-artillery armament) is so loaded down with the solving of operational problems that it is in no condition to supervise directly the preparation and implementation of nuclear/missile strikes and work on the whole complex of problems of controlling missile troops and artillery to the degree necessary.

As a result of this, the chiefs of missile troops and artillery, during a number of exercises, coped inadequately with the control of missile troops, especially during the course of the operation. But can it generally be otherwise with the existing organization of missile troops? Experience from a number of exercises shows that it cannot.

Apparently we assert in vain that the functions of a chief of missile troops and artillery have become altered to such an extent that he now controls his subordinate units and large units directly. It seems to us that the experience from the exercises objectively refutes this.

One cannot combine in the same control organ (in this instance, the headquarters of missile troops and artillery) the performance of both operational and firing tasks, including the uninterrupted control of missile units during the course of the entire operation. The modest number of personnel which headquarters of missile troops and artillery possess is capable of performing only part of the operational tasks relating to the preparation of documents for planning an operation and for the operational control of missile troops and artillery during the course of an operation, while carrying an abnormally heavy workload. The headquarters

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of missile troops and artillery works under the direction of a combined-arms headquarters and in cooperation with it and with the headquarters of other arms of troops and aviation in support of the operation as a whole. This is the only correct method of work, enriched by the experience of warfare, and especially by the experience of World War II.

In order that headquarters of missile troops and artillery might control the fire of missile troops directly with success, their T/O structure must be drastically revised. But try to bring the number of personnel in the headquarters of missile troops and artillery chiefs to a level where they include the T/O control points, are supplied with the necessary equipment and personnel calculated for a minimum of two positions, and you will become convinced of the inadvisability of this. In such a case, the headquarters of missile troops and artillery of a front would comprise more than 150 men, and would possess a large quantity of special vehicles and other equipment. Encumbered to the limit, it would cease to represent a part of the front (army) field command. Consequently, this way of solving the problem under consideration is not practical.

World War II gives not a few examples of successful organization of centralized control of artillery on a front and army scale. We have in mind the creation of front and army artillery groups. Thus, for example, a front long-range artillery group (FADD) was created by order of the commander of troops of the Voronezh Front in September 1942, which comprised two gun artillery regiments (152-mm guns/howitzers) and one regiment of heavy guns (203-mm). The task of this group consisted of delivering fire strikes on the decision of the front commander for the purpose of destroying enemy artillery, infantry and tanks on the major axes, which made it possible to hold Voronezh. The group played a prominent part in routing the enemy, who was striking toward the east bank of the

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Voronezh River. The group's concentrated fire, ordered by decision of the front commander, made possible the fulfilment of tasks assigned to troops of the 40th and 60th armies.

But there were also great difficulties in creating a front artillery group. First of all, it was necessary to form hastily improvised control of the group, since at that time there still were no artillery large units, while the front artillery commander was unable to direct the fire of a front artillery group because of the necessity to fulfil a number of operational tasks and his direct, daily responsibilities.

A front artillery group, mainly as counterartillery, was also created on the Leningrad Front. The commander of the artillery corps, rather than the commander of front artillery, controlled its fire. This is already a higher level of organizational form for the control of attached artillery. There were similar examples on other fronts as well.

The control of fire of the artillery of an army was effected in a manner analogous to this. During the entire war, artillery was under the immediate subordination of the commander of artillery of the army, but its fire was not controlled by the commander of artillery himself and his staff, but by the commander of the army artillery group; a commander of an artillery large unit was usually appointed to this position.

It is perfectly obvious that such a system of control is the natural one, for a chief of missile troops and artillery of an operational formation cannot be transformed into the person actually controlling fire. Departing from this system of control, which has been tested by the experience of the war, we lose the chief of missile troops and artillery as a chief on an operational scale and in the majority of cases exclude his participation in the solution by the commander of

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troops of the front (army) of very important and constantly arising problems in the preparation of an operation and during the course of it.

In our opinion, the experience of a number of exercises in recent years has persistently revealed the necessity of improving the organizational structure of missile troops.

Instead of front and army missile large units and units, which, by their composition and the feasibility of controlling them, fail to provide the necessary combat efficiency and precision in the delivery of massed nuclear strikes in the most important periods of an operation, we propose having missile corps and missile divisions in the ground forces.

A missile corps must be of such a composition that, when integrated into the composition of a front, it can fully cope with tasks assigned to the missile troops of a front in an operation.

A missile division must have a composition which assures the performance of tasks in the operation of a front which is functioning on a secondary axis, or in an independent army operation (of a separate army).

Where major missile large units are available, the chief of missile troops and artillery of a front will effect fire control of missile troops through the commander of the missile corps (division), while he himself, with his apparatus, can more thoroughly resolve problems in the utilization of missile troops and control of them in an operation, working with his apparatus within the field command structure of the operational formation. A missile corps, in our opinion, can comprise the following:

-- 4 or 5 missile brigades with a range of fire up to 300 kms;

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-- 1 or 2 missile brigades with a range of fire up to 600 kms;

-- 1 or 2 missile brigades with a range of fire up to 1200 kms (all three types of brigade would consist of three battalions)

-- 1 or 2 regiments of cruise (krylataya) missiles (five-battery composition) with a range of fire up to 800 kms;

-- a missile-technical division containing 6 to 8 PRTB /mobile technical-repair bases/ and two or three missile depot (parkovyy) battalions;

-- a regiment of pilotless reconnaissance means;

-- a regiment of radiotechnical intelligence;

-- a regiment of radiorelay and radio communications.

We propose such an organization of a missile corps as one of the possible variants. We base this only on the average possible conditions for the conduct of an operation in the West European Theater of Military Operations, and in keeping with this, on the possible tasks of the missile troops of a front.

The necessity for including reconnaissance means in the composition of the proposed missile large units is explained by the following. In order to perform tasks effectively with nuclear/missile weapons, i.e., exploit their possibilities to the utmost, one must know where, when and how best to deliver a strike. This is possible only when reconnaissance means are adequately represented in the composition of the missile corps.

But at the moment, a situation has developed wherein missile troops, which are the basic arm of troops utilizing nuclear weapons, receive only the

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coordinates of a strike and the order to fire (launch) in the vast majority of cases. Even the commander of a missile brigade does not know the target against which he is delivering a strike. This comes about because problems of reconnoitering targets (objectives) have been separated from problems of their destruction. Everyone is conducting intelligence collection in support of missile troops except the missile troops themselves, for they dispose of no intelligence collection means.

Such a situation cannot be considered normal, since the intelligence process must be organically linked with the process of carrying out a strike, and responsibility for the whole process must be placed on one specific person. At the moment, however, the credibility of intelligence data, continuity of intelligence collection, and its timeliness are not the responsibility of the element which carries out the strike. When this is so, that element cannot bear full responsibility for striking the targets.

Has one of the decisive arms of troops ever fought with closed eyes? No. It is all the more inadmissible to do this now.

In a future war, when events will develop with exceptional mobility, the coalescence of technical intelligence facilities with the means of destruction will become vitally necessary. That is why intelligence means of all types must be represented as fully as possible in the composition of a missile corps.

Sometimes it is considered that pilotless means of reconnaissance can be under immediate subordination of a chief of missile troops and artillery of a front, but the question of how and by whom these means will be supported technically remains open for the time being. This can be resolved with comparative ease within the framework of the proposed organizational

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structure of missile troops, to the extent that this question is most closely related to missile-technical supply.

The combat composition of the corps requires no special commentary: brigades with a range of fire up to 300 kms will be utilized as a means of reinforcing armies, while brigades with great ranges of fire will be used on the basis of the front commander's decisions.

The necessity of having missile large units with a range of fire up to 1200 kms in the composition of the ground forces should be emphasized. This is occasioned by the fact that part of the important objectives marked for destruction in support of a front operation are located beyond the boundaries of its depth. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that conditions for the subsequent offensive operation should be prepared during the course of an operation. The presence of missile large units with a range of fire up to 1200 kms within the composition of troops of a front will greatly expand the possibility of maneuvering missile/nuclear fire, not only in the zone of operations of their own front, but also in the zone of adjacent units, as mutual fire support.

The regiments of cruise (krylataya) missiles which are proposed for the composition of a missile corps will carry out tasks of front significance, destroying objectives which are suitable for this type of missile.

It is especially necessary to consider missile-technical support, because this question cannot be considered apart from the fulfilment of combat tasks assigned to missile troops.

Taking into consideration the experience of a number of exercises with the practical assembly and delivery of missiles to launching positions inclusively,

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and also on the basis of technical requirements and the capabilities of modern missile-technical units and large units, we come to the conclusion that it is practical that a missile corps contain a missile-technical division with the required number of PRTB's and missile depot battalions.

In our opinion, the proposed organization of missile troops will lead to the correct resolution of all problems connected with comprehensive support of missile troops in an operation, and facilitate overall solution of the problems of reconnoitering objectives (targets). It will increase responsibility for timely readiness and the effectiveness of missile/nuclear strikes, free operational staffs and organs of supply from performing inappropriate functions; and simplify the organizational structure of field commands of operational formations (front, army).

We have no doubt that such an organization of missile troops will afford a significant economy of state funds. It will require a smaller number of units being activated, since it will permit the performance of tasks on various axes by maneuvering missile large units. The existing organization of missile troops leads to the unjustified holding of missile large units in passive sectors of military operations or in the composition of formations in reserve, in the process of being activated, etc.

We are not touching on the question of the organizational structure of tactical missiles at all, as it has been solved successfully, in our opinion. Only the organization of missile-technical support of tactical missiles gives rise to doubts. It can also be improved by creating an army PRTB of the appropriate composition.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Problems of the Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces in Modern Warfare", by Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Problems of the Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces in Modern Warfare" by Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhov

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Problems of the Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces In Modern Warfare

by

Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhov

Our press has devoted adequate attention to the problems of strategic deployment as an important element of the preparedness of the armed forces for war. [1] The publication of a work entitled "The Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces in a Modern War", by a group of authors under the direction of Lieutenant-General K. F. Skorobogatkin, represents a continuation of efforts to study the problems mentioned.[2] With its appearance, the large gap which existed in the complete scientific elaboration of one of the most important sections of Soviet military strategy - the theory of strategic deployment - has been filled.

The book consists of an introduction and ten chapters.

The first chapter is devoted to an analysis of the strategic deployment of armed forces in the 2nd World War. In it are examined the strategic deployment of both sides in the German-Polish War of 1939, on the western frontier in 1939-1940, and the strategic deployment of the German-Fascist troops and of the Soviet armed forces in 1941, to which the main attention is devoted.

One of the important conditions in the strategic deployment of the German-Fascist Army, arising from the aggressive nature of German imperialism, was the camouflage by all possible means of military preparation for aggression, and

1. Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 1 (45), 5 (49), 6 (50) in 1959; No. 3 (53) in 1960 and "Military-Historical Journal" No. 12, 1959.
2. "The Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces in Modern War" Editor-in-chief [redacted]: Lieutenant-General K. F. Skorobogatkin. Military Publishing House, Moscow, 308 pages, 3 diagrams, 1961.

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the protraction of the process of strategic deployment. For example, the strategic deployment of German-Fascist troops on the German-Polish border continued for about two months, while in the west, against France, and in the east, against the Soviet Union, it continued for 5 to 6 months.

The build-up of the German-Fascist troops on our border was carried out gradually. Troops destined for the offensive on the first day of the war were brought up in four echelons (from 4 February to the beginning of June 1941). Movement was carried out exclusively at night, with the strict observance of camouflage measures. By 21 June, the German-Fascist troops were ready to take up the offensive.

Thus, a new factor in strategic deployment during the 2nd World War was represented by its protraction over an extended period.

In speaking of the shortcomings in the Soviet Army's strategic deployment in the summer of 1941, the authors make a number of most valuable critical comments, which are useful even today. The reality of the threat to the Soviet Union posed by Fascist Germany called for the adoption of appropriate measures to strengthen our defense. This was all the more true, since, when "... German-Fascist troops were brought into Rumania and Finland, as early, that is, as Autumn 1940, our country found itself in a threatened position. The enemy was able to forestall us in strategic deployment and to catch us unprepared to ward off a sudden blow. Yet, decisive measures to bring our armed forces to combat readiness were not taken. Instead of a full, planned and concealed mobilization of large units and units, which could have been carried out in different military districts at various times for the sake of camouflage, we began hastily to call up those who were registered (pripisnoy sostav) in the internal military districts in May 1941 and to transport to theaters of military operations divisions which were not yet cohesive, which were inadequately prepared for combat operations, and which were without rear services and transport..." (page 41). Further on, on pages 42 to 56, the

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authors examine the basic shortcomings in the strategic and operational deployment of our border military districts on the western border and evaluate the condition of the types of armed forces, the extent to which they were equipped, and the degree of their combat readiness. From this, the conclusion is drawn that: "The experience gained from strategic deployment of our armed forces in 1941 shows that deployment has acquired decisive importance under modern conditions and has become a most complex and crucial measure for the State." (page 56).

It should be noted that the lamentable experience of the preparation and deployment of our armed forces in 1941 is fully taken into consideration by the Central Committee of our Party and by the Soviet Government. "The tragedy of the first months of the 2nd World War, when Hitler attacked the USSR after assuring himself of superiority in combat equipment, is too fresh in people's minds for this to be permitted now", — states the Declaration of the Soviet Government of 31 August 1961. Therefore, in view of the reinforcement of the armed forces of the U.S.A. and of its partners in NATO in Europe, and the performance of other hostile actions in response to the proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German nations, our Government was obliged to undertake a number of grave measures to reinforce the security of the USSR and to heighten the combat readiness of the armed forces. This found concrete expression in the temporary retention in the army of some contingents due for discharge in the autumn of 1961, in a partial call-up for service from the reserve, in the reinforcement of troops of the border military districts (groups of forces), in the conduct of maneuvers participated in by all arms of troops, including troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, and in the resumption of experimental nuclear explosions.

The second chapter is devoted to a brief study of the nature of a future war and of the probable deployment of the types of armed forces of the imperialist aggressive blocs in the respective theaters of military operations. Naturally, the contents of this chapter are of a conjectural nature, since the real plans of the imperialist blocs are kept in

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strict secrecy, while the numerical composition of the armed forces in the various theaters changes periodically. Nevertheless, a correct orientation is given on the major theaters of military operations, on the probable forces and means deployed in them, and on the possible nature of armed combat by the enemy during the period of strategic deployment.

The third chapter, "The Essentials of Strategic Deployment", is, in our opinion, the main chapter in the book. Its value lies in the fact that it reveals the content and essence of the modern concept of strategic deployment, based on criticism of concepts of strategic deployment which have grown up historically.

The author's point of view can be summarized by the statement that "... strategic deployment is the process of the setting up--by the beginning of a war, of strategic groupings of armed forces, including their concealment, mobilization, concentration and deployment" (page 91). In principle, such a definition characterizes quite completely the content and essence of strategic deployment. It emphasizes that strategic deployment represents the single process of setting up groupings of armed forces, by the beginning of a war, in which there are separate, individual elements which are closely interconnected.

In the view of the authors, the entire process of setting up strategic groupings under modern conditions presupposes, in the first place, that part of the peacetime armed forces is at full combat readiness and is capable of repulsing a sudden attack by the enemy, of delivering an immediate strike and of conducting the first operations, and, in the second place, that full mobilization, transport (concentration), and deployment of new contingents of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations are carried out in accordance with the operational plan for the war.

The relationship which should exist between regular troops, ready for immediate operations, and those troops which are being mobilized and transported to the theaters

of military operations can be debated. But the nature of this relationship will not change the essence and content of the strategic deployment itself. Whatever the conditions (here we are thinking of a modern world war) it is not possible to reject the carrying out of mobilization entirely or, consequently, the need to transport and concentrate troops into various theaters of military operations and to set up the groupings necessary for the performance of strategic tasks.

The objection can be made that under modern conditions strategic deployment will not always be carried out according to the proposed plan.

There are regular large units of various types of armed forces which are maintained above strength or at wartime strength in peacetime and ready for immediate operations. Consequently, the process of mobilized deployment does not, in essence, apply to these troops. This can be explained as follows: in the first place, the regular troops mentioned comprise only a part of the first strategic echelon deployed in accordance with the operation plan; in the second place, even these completely combat-ready troops will, in some cases, need the supplementary mobilization of some rear units, establishments, communications or service units and subunits etc.; in the third place, the mobilized deployment of the regular large units mentioned has actually been carried out in good time, i.e., long before the time for the strategic deployment of our main armed forces. Thus, the presence of regular, combat-ready large units and formations of types of armed forces actually deployed in theaters of military operations and in the depth of the country, does not contradict the definition of strategic deployment given by the authors in their book.

In our opinion, greater emphasis should have been given to the dual nature of the process of strategic deployment, which includes on the one hand the deployed forces and means of groups of forces, of border military districts and of the other regular formations in the country which are ready for immediate operations; and on the other hand,

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of the mobilization and formation of new large units and units, of their transportation and concentration in theaters of military operations, and of their combat deployment independently or within the composition of regular troops already there. This, essentially, is the first strategic echelon of the armed forces.

The whole process of creating strategic groupings occupies a secondary position, and it must not be transformed into something self-contained, equatable with a plan of war, as was done by Professor Melikov in his work "Strategic Deployment".[1] Strategic deployment is planned and carried out on the basis of the general plan for strategic operations, which are the direct expression of the military-political goals for the initial period of war in any given theater of military operations. Its content is decisively influenced by the nature of a future war, by the military doctrine which has been adopted in a given country, and by the plan for impending strategic operations. Strategic deployment is the concluding act of peace and the initial act of a war.

The essence of the operational plan is shown in the boldest relief by the nature of strategic deployment. Thus, from the very beginning of a war, the plan finds its material expression in the deployment, which, in turn, is carried out in the name of those strategic operations which are provided for in the operational plan. In this sense, although strategic deployment is one of the most important elements in the preparation of the armed forces for war, it occupies a dependent, subordinate position in the theory of strategy, as well as in its practical realization. Nevertheless, elaboration of the problem of strategic deployment under the conditions of modern warfare is extremely urgent, and the value of the book under review lies precisely in the fact that the authors have elaborated this little-studied topic with sufficient fullness and have

1. Professor V. A. Melikov, Division Commander, "Strategic Deployment, 1st World War 1914-1918" Volume 1, Military Publishing House, 1939.

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presented their views on all the basic questions of the theory of strategic deployment.

The experience of recent wars shows that, as a rule, an operational plan undergoes changes during the course of its realization. An example of this is represented by the operational plan of the Polish command in 1939, and by our own plan, which underwent a radical change after the beginning of the war.

From this it follows that, under certain circumstances, strategic deployment, as a derivative of an operational plan (the plan for the first operations), can exert a substantial influence on the realization of the plan itself. It is possible to possess an ideal operational plan and yet to suffer defeat, if the armed forces delay in completing their strategic deployment.

It is known that in a modern war it may be necessary to mobilize a second, and possibly even a third, strategic echelon to reinforce existing strategic groupings or to set up new ones.

The experience of the world wars shows that strategic deployment in new theaters of military operations took place during the course of these wars (the deployment of the German-Fascist armed forces first against Poland, then against the West, and, finally, against us; our deployment in the west and, in the summer of 1945, in the Far East against Japan). Such a phenomenon is defined by the authors as a successive strategic deployment during a new war (page 92). This is, in essence, a new deployment in a new theater of military operations during the course of a major war. One cannot but agree with such a definition. In this connection, this is an appropriate place to examine the concept of mobilization and to elaborate upon the definition of strategic deployment.

A careful comparison between the concept of mobilization (page 96) and the formulation of the concept of strategic deployment (page 91) reveals a certain discrepancy.

It is envisaged that strategic groupings will be created by the beginning of a war or at its outbreak, while the concept of mobilization includes various measures which are connected not only with strategic deployment (for example, the creation of reserve troops for the replacement of losses and the establishment of new units to fill out existing strategic groupings). From what has been said, it follows that mobilization is a more protracted process than strategic deployment. The authors themselves take this point of view and give a stage-by-stage account of the entire process of mobilization. The reference to Professor Mikhnevich (page 90), stating that strategic deployment consists of the mobilization of an army and of its concentration in a theater of war, provides only a relative explanation of the thesis advanced by the authors that mobilization is an element of strategic deployment, since such a definition is justified to a certain degree only when related to the past. It is necessary, therefore, to emphasize that mobilization is a composite element of strategic deployment in its initial stage, i.e., while strategic groupings are being set up in accordance with the operational war plan. However, mobilization cannot be entirely incorporated in strategic deployment since the latter is a relatively short-term measure for the initial period of a given war.

Mobilization occupies a special place in a country's system of preparation for war. Since it provides for the bringing up to their authorized wartime strength of large units, units and establishments existing in peacetime and for the creation of new formations, intended to replenish and reinforce the groupings of the armed forces which perform tasks in the opening operations, this part of mobilization is to this extent a component element of strategic deployment. However, as we know, mobilization continues further. If we are not to take the point of view of "permanent mobilization", that is, of measures for mobilization carried out throughout the entire course of the war, then we must concede that mobilization can certainly not be enclosed within the framework of strategic deployment in terms of time and of the measures being

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carried out. In this connection, the authors should have elaborated upon the formulation of the concept of strategic deployment and its elements. In our opinion, when listing the elements of strategic deployment, instead of referring to "the mobilization of the armed forces", or simply to "mobilization", one should speak of "mobilizational deployment", understanding by this all measures for mobilization taken at the beginning of a war, in order to ensure the deployment of strategic groupings in accordance with the operational war plan.

As regards the mobilization and deployment of the second and subsequent echelons carried out during the course of the war, the latter will be intended for the reinforcement of strategic groupings already in existence. If the strategic echelons mentioned are intended to open a new front of armed combat, one can clearly speak of deployment in a new theater of military operations against a new enemy and, essentially, in a new war (during the course of a world war). Thus, the concept of strategic deployment as the creation of groupings by the beginning of a war is justified in this instance also.

In the fourth chapter, fairly detailed examination is given to the problems of the preparation for and planning of strategic deployment; of the preparation of a nation's territory for strategic deployment, and of the deployment of types of armed forces and of the rear services.

Chapter five reveals the elements of cover, which are understood as actions by a unit of the armed forces at a high degree of combat readiness to support mobilization, concentration and deployment in the event of a sudden attack by the enemy from the air, land or sea.

In past wars, cover was effected by large units which were especially assigned for this purpose. The tasks of cover became extremely complicated with the development of military technology, the appearance on a mass scale of air forces, of tank and motorized large units, of naval submarine forces and of airborne landing troops. Along

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with cover from land and sea there arose the necessity for cover from the air as well. By the 2nd World War it had already outgrown operational boundaries and had extended to a considerable depth into the territory of a country within the range of the bomber aircraft which existed at the time. Under these conditions, cover changed from something of local importance, intended to create a favorable setting for the deployment of troops in shallow zones of theaters of military operations, and acquired the significance of an important strategic measure throughout the entire country, especially for countries with small territories. Cover has become all the more complicated in the age of nuclear/missile weapons. It has become an important component of a country's defense. At the same time, cover, by performing specific functions to support the complete mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops, forms a constituent of strategic deployment. This dual nature of cover leads certain comrades into confusion: to negation of the particular functions of cover and to its equation with national defense as a whole.

It seems to us that in defining the concept of cover, the authors have, intentionally or not, expanded its functions. This is particularly noticeable in the section in which cover from the air is examined. Here a full picture is given of the cover (defense) of the entire territory by the antiair defense troops of the country in cooperation with other forces and means, but no emphasis is given to the special nature of cover which is carried out to help strategic deployment in the overall defense system of the nation. This should have been done, since incorrect views exist equating cover from the air with antiair defense in general, and cover on land and sea with the defense of troops in the appropriate theaters of military operations.

The fact is that, as an operation by a unit of the armed forces intended to support mobilization, concentration and deployment, cover has a specific purpose-- to support the deployment of one's own armed forces and, also, to create operational-strategic groupings for military operations in

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the depth of the country, in accordance with the operational plan. Upon the conclusion of strategic deployment, cover is discontinued and the troops detailed for this purpose go over to the performance of other tasks specified in the operational plan. In this sense, cover is a temporary military operation: it begins in the period of threat (ugrozhayemyy period) and ends when the major groupings of the armed forces go over to the performance of their tasks in an operation. It should also be noted that in various theaters of military operations and for different types of armed forces the boundaries of space (territory) and time and the forces and means for cover will vary. Because of this, the tasks of cover will be performed differently. Along those axes of a theater of military operations on which offensive operations by ground forces are planned in the initial period of war, the tasks of cover will be performed by a part of the forces carrying out the offensive operation: periods for the fulfillment of tasks of cover will, obviously, not be of great duration. In those theaters of military operations and on those strategic axes where it is intended to organize strategic defense during the initial period of the war, the basic forces for cover will, as a rule, be the same troops as are charged with the conduct of defense.

Tasks for cover in naval theaters of operations will be performed in a similar manner.

Cover from the air is being performed on a continuing basis during peacetime. At the outset of military operations the troops of the antiair defense of the country will perform specific tasks with part of their forces to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the armed forces at the same time as they are carrying out the tasks of covering the territory of the whole nation from air strikes. A significant proportion of the forces and means of the antiair defense troops will also be used for cover from the air.

The fundamental principles of the mobilization of armed forces are elaborated in chapter six. The authors

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regard it as the deployment of the armed forces to a strength which ensures the achievement of the political purposes of the war, and which includes bringing peacetime large units and units up to wartime strength; the formation of new large units, units and establishments based on concealed cadres; the creation of a large troop reserve to replenish large units who have lost their combat effectiveness and for the formation of new units.

In chapter seven, the authors make a detailed examination of the concentration of troops as one of the important elements of strategic deployment. Concentration is understood as the assembly of forces and means in theaters of military operations in order to bring the groupings of armed forces already there up to the required strength and to ensure their rapid deployment.

The concentration of troops in theaters of military operations from disposition areas or from areas of completed mobilization will be carried out by available facilities (svoim khodom) in organic truck transport and through the mass transport of formations and large units by railroad. When navigable rivers are available, and in coastal theaters, river (sea) transport can also be used. The authors emphasize that as a result of major destruction of transport from strikes by nuclear weapons and aircraft, strategic concentration under modern conditions is an extremely difficult and complex matter.

The process of concentration (transport and movement) is closely linked with full mobilization, with the preparedness of the troops for transport, and with the general concept of the initial operations — the idea of strategic deployment.

The implementation of transport, therefore, depends not only on technical conditions and on the degree of destruction of transport facilities, or the need to transport a large quantity of troops in a short period of time, but also on the preparedness of the troops for transportation and on those changes in strategic deployment which are unavoidable under modern conditions. The major problem of concentration is preservation of the viability of transport and the skillful

use of all its categories. The experience of past wars, the modern state of transport, and the various measures destined to strengthen our armed forces, show that the most probable procedure for carrying out strategic concentration will be a mixed one, by which concentration of a part of the armed forces can be accomplished before the beginning of hostilities, and of the rest when hostilities begin. It is clear that when a threatening situation arises (or even before this) a part of the armed forces will be fully mobilized in secret and brought to the theaters of military actions. Sometimes, the concentration of troops can also be carried out openly, with the aim of exerting pressure on the enemy, in order to force him to give up aggressive operations which he is undertaking.

In any event, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that a secret, slow concentration is not an end in itself. The international situation and the conditions under which a war breaks out can compel one to carry out transportation openly in the shortest possible time and in a massive flow, in order to forestall the enemy in the deployment of his basic strategic groupings.

In view of the need for the extensive and comprehensive use of all types of transport to achieve the prompt concentration of troops, the decision to concentrate the use of all types of transport, including trucks, in the hands of the Central Directorate for Military Communication, with unified planning as a basis, the decision, in other words, to have a single military transport center, seems to us a correct one.

Chapter eight of the book is devoted to the combat deployment of the armed forces.

The main substance of combat deployment is the creation, in theaters of military operations and in the depth of the country, of appropriate groupings of the armed forces, the assembly of strategic and operational formations and their occupation of departure areas in readiness to perform the tasks assigned by the operational plan in the opening operations

of the initial period of the war.

On pages 99-100 and in chapter eight (pages 229-255), the authors have introduced the concept of "combat deployment" ("boyevoye razvertyvaniye"), investing it with a wider connotation than that of operational deployment. "Combat deployment (as an element of strategic deployment) should be taken as meaning the creation of a specific assembly of forces and their occupation of an initial position for the conduct of combat operations of differing scales" (page 100). One could accept or dispute this definition. The one thing which is clear is that strategic deployment can only be considered complete when it has been brought to the stage of operational-tactical deployment and of the creation of groupings of troops for the performance of impending tasks.

We agree with the authors when, basing themselves on the principle of deep-echeloned strategic deployment, they divide the armed forces deployed in a main theater of military operations into two operational echelons. It has already been stated above that the first strategic echelon of the armed forces should consist of a number of operational echelons. It is natural that the first operational echelon should incorporate all the regular large units of the strategic missile troops, groups of forces, border military districts and naval forces, and of the antiair defense troops, which are at constant combat readiness. The formations and large units which are deployed closer to national boundaries will be made up of covering troops, while the troops located deep in the theaters of military operations will be made up of the main forces of the first operational echelon. The second operational echelon will be composed of formations and large units of the internal military districts and of some large units of the border military districts which need to complete their mobilization. Irrespective of the availability of troops comprising the first and second operational echelons, strategic reserves of all types, subordinate to the High Command, may be deployed in the theaters of military operations.

Depending on the plan proposed for impending operations, combat deployment must support the conduct of any and all operations. At the same time, combat deployment and the

creation of operational-strategic groupings must be sufficiently flexible to permit rapid transition to an alternate deployment plan conforming to new conditions at the beginning of a war if the proposed plans are nullified. The complexity of such a supplementary or new deployment is confirmed by the experience of the 2nd World War. It will be even harder to accomplish under modern conditions.

A theater of military operations, particularly one in a zone in which deployment is impending, must be prepared ahead of time so that combat deployment can be carried out in a compressed time period and in order that one's own armed forces may be used as effectively as possible at the beginning of operations. Missile troops, artillery, aviation, and combined-arms large units intended for an opening strike must have the advantage of being assured of deployment in good time (in engineering, communications and material-technical respects).

In chapter eight, the authors examine specific problems of the combat deployment of types of armed forces on the basis of experience from the 2nd World War, from postwar exercises, and from an analysis of the possible nature of deployment in a future war.

A great virtue of the book under review is that the collective authors constantly bear in mind the importance of material-technical support and of the rear area in strategic deployment. These problems are also examined in a special, ninth chapter "The Deployment of the Rear Area of Armed Forces".

By deployment of the rear area of the armed forces is meant the full mobilization of rear services large units, units and establishments, their concentration and deployment in the theaters of military operations for materiel, technical and medical support of the troops. It is explained that the deployment of the rear area should correspond to the concept of the operations planned, to the grouping of forces and to the degree of combat readiness of the large units and formations.

Thus, there should be a minimum of prepared units and establishments of the rear services in each border military district (group of forces) so that support can be given to the large units and formations in their opening operations, pending the complete deployment of the rear areas in the particular theater of military operations.

The tenth and last chapter is devoted to the problems of the control of armed forces in the period of strategic deployment.

As the authors correctly point out, the complexity of the control of armed forces in the period of strategic deployment lies in the fact that powerful nuclear/missile strikes will probably be being delivered and the formations of types of armed forces which are at constant readiness will probably be conducting the opening operations simultaneously with the full mobilization, concentration and deployment of the troops. During this period control must be exercised on the basis of plans drawn up in peacetime, taking into consideration the actual developments of the situation at the beginning of a war. Major difficulties in the control of deployment can arise because of great destruction of transport, or an abrupt change in the military-political and strategic situation. The operational plan in individual theaters of military operations may therefore be partially changed, and consequently the introduction of changes into the plans for concentration and deployment may also be required.

Thus, the entire system of control must be as stable as possible, in order to withstand strikes by modern means of armed combat and to preserve continuity at all levels in the complex situation of the initial period of a nuclear/missile war.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the book is written from the vantage point of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war, in the light of the requirements of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of our Party documents, and reflects modern views on the problems of strategic deployment in a future war with complete correctness.

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Some Thoughts on the Development of the Soviet Army Tank Troops", by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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30 JUN 1992

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Special Assistant to the President for
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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Some Thoughts on the Development of the Soviet Army Tank Troops", by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskiy

DATE OF INFO : December 1961

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Some Thoughts on the Development of the Soviet Army Tank Troops", by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskiy.

This article appeared in the 1962 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The 1962 First Issue went to press on 29 December 1961.

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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Some Thoughts on the Development of the

Soviet Army Tank Troops

by

Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskiy

The development of armored equipment attains exceptionally important significance under modern conditions, and it is completely natural that lately, in our classified military press, a discussion of this question has started. The fact that our prominent military leaders participated in the discussion of the vital problems of developing our Armed Forces, including the tank troops, should be welcomed. We should never forget that truth is born of controversy, and even more so when we use such a tested weapon as Marxist-Leninist dialectics. The discussion of these questions attained such an active nature that it cannot be disregarded. Therefore, we decided to join in it and to share some of our thoughts concerning this. It goes without saying that we have not assigned ourselves the goal of giving the final, categorical conclusions on all these questions.

The discussion concerns the problems of developing armored equipment, the development and intent of tank troops, their organizational structure, and methods of their employment in warfare. The most varied and contrary opinions have been expressed. The opinions of some comrades have split on several problems. Some boteheads consider that the development of tank troops has been turned into a serious problem, and one can even hear the voices of certain ultra-innovators who say that the tank has outlived itself and its development has reached a dead end. All this is quite understandable; we are living through such a difficult period in the development of military

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art that it is not so easy to find the right path, as it seems at first glance.

Lately, Soviet military art has been developing rapidly in connection with the creation of new combat weapons. We cannot lag behind this development. It should be taken into consideration that people always accept new ideas with difficulty, despite the fact that people are the creators of these ideas. Also, rash conclusions and categorical assertions having little validity should not be tolerated because they can lead us to large errors which are hard to correct. Therefore, it is essential to approach the problems under discussion profoundly and comprehensively, especially the conclusions that result from the discussion. Comrades should not be censured for their statements and suggestions that seem foolish at times ——(circa ½ page of original text missing).

During further development and technical improvement of tanks, the great potentialities incorporated in them for conducting mobile combat operations became evident. Therefore, in the period preceding the Second World War much attention was given to the development of tank troops in the major countries of the world. A great number of tanks possessing high combat qualities appeared on the battlefields of the Second World War. The massed employment of tanks, supported by powerful air strikes and artillery fire, permitted a successful resolution of the problem of breaking through the defense and developing an offensive to a great operational depth. As a result of this, the Second World War, with the exception of certain periods, basically had a mobile nature.

The main positive result of mass employment of tanks in the past war consists of this.

Simultaneously with the development of tarks, weapons for combating tanks, antitank weapons, were

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being developed. Over a prolonged period of time there has been a persistent competition between the tanks and the antitank weapons. During the years of the Second World War, despite the mass employment of fairly effective antitank weapons, the tanks stood up to them and retained their overwhelming superiority until the end of the war.

In order not to make a mistake in evaluating the combat characteristics of our modern tank troops and in determining the direction of their future development, let us briefly examine the path followed by them in the Second World War. This will also help us reveal some lessons of history that should not be forgotten.

The tank troops of the Soviet Army played an outstanding role in the defeat of fascist Germany's armed forces. Possessing such remarkable qualities as high mobility, great firepower, and good armored protection, the tank troops became the main strike force of our ground forces.

The skillful employment of great masses of artillery and aircraft to neutralize the enemy defense, followed by a massed tank attack in close coordination with infantry, ensured the successful breakthrough of the fascist German troop defense. Tank troops played an especially great role in developing the breakthrough and finally defeating the opposing enemy groupings. These troops were the leading force in conducting operations to a great depth at high speeds. Tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, led into the breakthrough and led by brave and courageous commanding officers, always decisively rushed into the enemy's operational depth, encircled and broke up his main groupings, routed the reserves, and captured important areas and lines. Such employment of tank troops gave a mobile nature to the operations of the Second World War, permitted the swift achievement of the defeat

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of enemy operational groupings, and the penetration of the operational formation of his troops to a great depth in a short period of time. The tank troops have the right to be proud of the results of their operations in the Second World War.

In the past it was said about the cavalry: "the glorious history of cavalry is the history of its commanding officers". This aphorism refers to the tank troops to an even greater degree: an indecisive commanding officer at the head of a tank army, tank corps, or tank division is a most frightening, a most fatal thing. No matter how perfect armored equipment is, an indecisive commanding officer at the head of the tank troops cannot ensure their successful combat employment. We should always firmly remember this condition. The decisive factor that ensured the successful employment of tank troops in the Second World War, however, was the high level of Soviet armored equipment. Socialist industry and our designers armed the tank troops with splendid tanks and assault weapons. It is generally known that not a single foreign state, that actively participated in the Second World War was able to achieve the same high level in the development of armored equipment as was achieved in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Army entered the war having three types of tanks: light (BT and T-26 and a little later the T-60 and T-70), medium (T-34), and the heavy (KV). The medium and heavy tanks were considered to be the basic ones. However, there were extremely few of these tanks, and at the beginning of the war the basic part of our tank pool was composed of light tanks that were obsolete by that time. This was already evident from the experience of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 to 1939. It is true that not all the highly placed military leaders understood this. Many of them considered that we did not need better tanks and that war could be conducted with the existing tanks.

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Such leaders hindered tank development but a sober calculation overruled them, and, as is known, before the war our tank troops began to be rearmed with new types of tanks. However, we were unable to complete this by the beginning of the fascist German attack because time was lost.

Our medium T-34-76 tanks and heavy KV tanks which were completely modern at that time and, with their comparatively powerful armament and better armor protection, proved to be more powerful in single combat with German T-III and T-IV medium tanks. They also suffered fewer losses from antitank weapons than the German tanks.

All this indicates that we took the correct direction in the development of armored equipment on the eve of the war. It ensured a qualitative superiority for us in armored equipment over fascist Germany at the beginning of the war. In the initial period of the war, however, because of a whole series of great mistakes connected with Stalin's personality cult and his military environment (voyennoye okruzheniye) which permitted the treacherous attack of fascist Germany, the Hitlerites were able to achieve considerable superiority in the number of tanks, especially on the main axes, and also in the methods of their combat employment over the Soviet Army. This affected the operations of our troops very adversly and led us to serious defeats in the initial period of the war.

It is essential to note that by the summer of 1943 the fascist army was armed with new "Panther" and "Tiger" heavy tanks and also with "Ferdinand" assault guns, which had better armored protection and more powerful armament while our tanks fundamentally remained the same. On the eve of the Kursk battle a certain qualitative superiority in armored equipment temporarily passed into the hands of

fascist Germany. It was under these disadvantageous conditions that this outstanding tank battle occurred which ended, however, with the greatest defeat of fascist Germany. The backbone of Hitler's Germany was broken in this battle.

The qualitative superiority of the German tanks over our tanks did not last long. Already in 1944 mass quantities of T-34-85 tanks began to arrive with an 85 mm gun that was good for that time. The new IS heavy tank, armed with a 122 mm gun and having powerful armored protection, arrived to replace the KV tanks. The German "Panthers" and "Tigers" and also "Ferdinands" could no longer compete with our new tanks. It is true that the T-VI-B heavy tank, the "King Tiger," which had approximately the same armored protection as our IS tank, became part of the German equipment. But the German tank was armed with an 88 mm gun, and its weight reached 68 tons as opposed to 46 tons for our IS tank. Besides, there was only a limited number of T-IV-B heavy tanks in the German Army. At the same time, a large number of assault guns, including heavy ones, became part of our army's equipment. All this ensured the reliable superiority of our armored equipment over that of the Germans until the very end of the Second World War. Our industry also ensured the quantitative superiority in tanks over fascist Germany and its allies.

The tank equipment of our allies in the last war — the British and American tanks — were also inferior to our tanks. The basic British tanks; MK-III (Valentine) and MK-IV (Churchill), had weak armament (a 57 mm gun) and low speed (26 to 32 km per hour). The American (M4A2 and T-26-E3) tanks were superior to the British tanks in armament (75 mm and 90 mm guns) and had a greater speed; however, they also were inferior to our tanks in maneuverability, armament, dimensions, and were

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very heavy. The Soviet tanks had powerful diesel engines installed in them, and at that time this was something quite advanced in world tank building.

Consequently, during the years of the Second World War, Soviet tank building firmly occupied first place in the entire world. It provided our army with remarkable combat vehicles — tanks and assault guns, which aided the successful conduct of war against fascist Germany.

Parallel with the development of tanks during the Second World War antitank weapons were being developed. As is known, we began the struggle against fascist tanks with bottles of flammable mixture, with antitank grenades, bunches of regular hand grenades, antitank rifles, etc, which, strictly speaking, required single combat of a man against tanks. We did not have any alternative. For that reason, we used divisional 76 mm and 107 mm guns, and also 37 mm and 85 mm antiaircraft guns together with antitank artillery to combat enemy tanks. But all these systems proved to be cumbersome and clumsy and little suited for combating tanks. In 1942, we had the mass production of 45 mm and 76 mm antitank guns and antitank rifles set up, and this strengthened our antitank defense. The 76 mm gun became the basic weapon of antitank artillery. In 1943, 57 mm antitank guns began to reach our army. In the same year the artillery received armor-piercing subcaliber projectiles for the 76 mm regimental guns and 122 mm divisional howitzers. In 1944, the delivery to the army of SU-85 assault mounts, armed with an 85 mm gun, and 100 mm antitank guns began in mass quantity. Field and antiaircraft artillery and aircraft with special antitank bombs, the so-called PTAB (ánti-tank aerial bomb - protivotankovaya aviatsionnaya bomba) which were successfully employed to destroy tanks, were brought in to combat tanks. A considerable number of tanks were put out of action

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with antitank mines. However, the basic burden of combating enemy tanks was borne by the antitank artillery, especially 45 mm and 76 mm antitank guns, which destroyed the greatest number of enemy tanks. Moreover, the basic shell was the armor-piercing subcaliber projectile. The shaped charge antitank shell (kumulyativnyy snaryad) showed great effectiveness; however, it was inferior to the armor-piercing shell as far as accuracy and range of a grazing shot. Of course, a large number of German tanks were destroyed by our tanks. During the years of the Second World War the tanks proved to be quite an effective weapon to combat enemy tanks.

It is essential to note that our system of antitank defense proved to be more successful in all respects in comparison with the antitank defense system of the fascist army. The bases of our antitank defense were the tank-destroyer brigades and regiments and also SAU regiments. Possessing great maneuverability, these large units and units were thrown into the axes of the enemy tank attack, quickly assumed firing positions, and fired at enemy tanks. Tank units and large units were also thrown into the axes of the enemy tank attacks, and they combated the tanks in coordination with tank-destroyer units and SAU units. It is quite understandable that in this organizational form these antitank units and large units, including both battalions and separate companies of antitank rifles, appeared to counteract the German tank divisions, against which we quickly concentrated these weapons. In the defense we skillfully created so-called antitank areas that fully justified themselves. The turning back of a great mass of enemy tanks was achieved in this way in the Kursk battle, in the battles near Budapest, and in other sectors.

The German fascist army also had a large number of antitank weapons, including powerful guided mobile

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mines, which not only were not inferior in effectiveness to our antitank weapons, but were even superior to them. The 75 mm guns and the assault mounts, armed with 88 mm guns with a high muzzle velocity of the shell, were especially effective. However, the basic mass of antitank weapons of the German Army were in infantry divisions, and it did not have such mobile and powerful large units and units as our tank-destroyer brigades and regiments.

The Germans created a fairly solid antitank defense on the offensive sectors of our troops but on different organizational principles. Their antitank defense was less adaptable for fast maneuvering and concentration of efforts on certain axes, and when they were subjected to our artillery and aircraft strikes they were put out of action faster. To restore the overwhelmed antitank defense the Germans had to bring in new forces and weapons, but often these did not exist. All this greatly simplified our breakthrough of the enemy defense. Of course, in this matter an important role was also played by such factors as the general artillery fire superiority of our army, initiative in operations, and higher military art.

Still, from this indisputable historical fact the important conclusion suggests itself: the success of combat operations is ensured not only by the availability of the necessary weapons of armed combat, but also by their skillful employment.

It is necessary to note that by the end of the war the Germans had succeeded in creating a menacing weapon against tanks — the Panzerfaust, based on the employment of shaped charge antitank shells. It was a mass rocket-firing weapon which was inexpensive to manufacture. Its range of operation was fairly small, and the infantry was armed with it.

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Any tank armor was burned through by the shaped charge shell of the Panzerfaust. True, it must be said that this weapon made its appearance not because of the easy life the Germans led, but it also appeared, in its way, as a weapon for single combat of man against a tank — that with which we started, the Germans ended with — but it was already unable to exert any noticeable influence on the outcome of the war because by that time the fate of fascist Germany was already decided; however, it indicated the appearance of a new effective close combat anti-tank weapon.

The successful employment of tank troops in the past war, the same as of other arms of troops, to a considerable degree depended on their organizational structure. In this question we were able to achieve a definite success. During the years of the Second World War the organization of the Soviet tank troops corresponded quite closely to the nature of war and the methods of employing tank troops in it, in comparison to the organization of the tank troops of other states. However, we did not arrive at it at once.

At the beginning of the war, in connection with the lack of tanks, we had to reject mechanized and tank corps. By the fall of 1941, the Soviet Army had separate tank brigades, regiments, and battalions which were used to reinforce rifle and cavalry large units. As the saying goes, it was necessary "to cut one's coat according to the cloth."

Already in the initial period of the Second World War, the progress of armed combat indicated the need to have more powerful tank large units to combat enemy tank groupings and to exploit one's success. In 1942, the mass production of tanks was set right, and this made it possible to begin forming tank and mechanized corps and then tank armies. In

1943, we established the organization of the tank troops which remained without any substantial changes until the end of the war.

The special features of this organization were limited to the following. The composition of the Soviet Army had a fairly large number of separate tank brigades, tank and tank assault (tankosamokhodnyy) regiments. They were all used mainly to reinforce the rifle divisions as tanks for direct infantry support. In the defense, they ensured the necessary stability of the combat formations, and on the offensive they played a decisive role in the successful breakthrough of the enemy defense. All the separate tank brigades and regiments were under the orders of the command of the fronts and the Supreme High Command, but in some armies, and even in corps, they had their own organic tank assault regiment. This provided us the opportunity to concentrate the tank troops on the main axes when carrying out offensive operations.

To develop the offensive and to conduct mobile operations in the operational depth, our army had tank and mechanized corps as well as tank armies. They were not assigned to task of breaking through the enemy defense; they were intended for entry into the breakthrough carried out by the rifle divisions together with the NPP (direct infantry support - neposredstvennaya podderzhka pekhoty) tanks, with artillery and aircraft support. This ensured the retention of tanks in these large units and formations to perform the main task of the operation - the rout of the enemy grouping in mobile operations in cooperation with and with the support of aircraft. But in practice, tank and mechanized corps and tank armies did not stop before the creation of a finished breakthrough and, as a rule, were brought in to complete the breakthrough of the defense with its subsequent development.

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The tank corps had three tank and one motorized rifle brigades in their composition. The mechanized corps included three mechanized and one tank brigades. Initially the tank army included tank and mechanized corps, rifle and sometimes cavalry divisions. But such a tank army did not exist for a long time. Soon only the tank and mechanized corps were left in its composition - a total of two or three corps, or just the opposite, tank and mechanized large units were withdrawn from their composition, and it was replenished with rifle divisions and was transformed into a conventional army.

The German Army had tank and motorized divisions that approximately corresponded to our tank and mechanized corps, although as for the number of tanks, they were inferior to the latter. There were also tank armies in the composition of the German troops, but until the end of the war tank and infantry divisions were included in their composition, i.e., they had a combined composition. Separate tank or assault battalions were added to reinforce the infantry divisions. In the British and American armies, there were armored or tank divisions; they did not have tank armies. Thus, during the period of the Second World War, the Soviet Army had the best organization of the tank troops, and in the Second World War this permitted us to achieve important superiority over the German fascist army also in the methods of employing tank troops in operations.

For the German Army it is characteristic that its tank divisions and armies operated in the first echelon from the beginning and until the end of an operation, and they received independent offensive zones, broke through the defense on an equal footing with the infantry divisions and the field armies, and developed the breakthrough themselves. In this, fundamentally they counted on tanks and aircraft;

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they did not have powerful artillery for the breakthrough, especially at the beginning of the war. This method of tank troop operations was successful at the beginning of the war when a firm defense and a solid front did not exist and our troops did not have experience and weapons to combat a great mass of tanks. However, in the further progress of the war, the situation changed fundamentally. The breakthrough of the prepared defense became the most difficult stage of the offensive operation. During a breakthrough the tank troops, if they were drawn in for this, suffered their greatest losses in tanks. However, the Germans did not change their tactics of employing tank troops. As before, the breakthrough of the defense was carried out by the tank divisions. That is the way it was during the entire 1942 campaign, then near Kursk and in the area of Lake Balaton near Budapest. It is natural that when breaking through a strong defense that is well saturated with antitank weapons tank divisions lost the basic mass of tanks and successes could not be achieved. Thus, during the war the Germans were unable to overcome their established pattern in the employment of tank troops.

Our tactics for the employment of tank troops differed from those of the Germans to a significant degree. First of all, the great massing of tanks on sectors of the breakthrough should be noted. Up to 80 to 90 percent of all tanks available in a front were usually concentrated on the axis of the main strike, and the density of the tanks reached 85 units per kilometer of the front, including up to 30 tanks and SAU for direct support of infantry. The enemy defense was overwhelmed by artillery and aircraft and was then broken through by the operations of rifle divisions, reinforced by separate tank brigades and tank and assault gun regiments. Mobile troops - tank armies or tank and mechanized corps were led into the created breakthrough, and they completed the breakthrough and

immediately rushed into the operational depth. The mobile troops were usually assigned the tasks of enveloping the basic enemy groupings and encircling and destroying them. In the last stage of the war mobile troops were often employed for a swift advance to a great depth with the goal of splitting the front, of dividing enemy groupings, of destroying them by units, and of capturing important operational lines and areas as swiftly as possible. As a rule, the mobile troops daringly detached themselves at a considerable distance from the remaining forces of the front and conducted decisive mobile operations in the enemy rear. The depth of the mobile troop advance sometimes reached up to 600 km (the Belorussian and the Vistula - Oder operations). The speeds of the tank troop advance fluctuated between 30 and 40 km, but in certain periods they reached 60 km per calendar day. In the operation to rout the Kwantung Army, the 6th Guards Tank Army, despite the difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain, advanced at a rate of about 80 km per calendar day. In those periods when the army did not meet organized enemy resistance, the speed of the advance reached 120 km per calendar day.

Thus, during the Second World War the Soviet Army achieved a very real superiority over the German-fascist army in the art of employing tank troops. As for the American and British army tactics of employing tank troops - they were not at a high level and were not distinguished by great mobility and swift operations.

The great experience acquired by the Soviet Army in the years of the Second World War, in problems of combat employment of tank troops, their technical equipping, and organizational structure, were taken into consideration by us both in the development and improvement of tank troops in the postwar period. However, we could not limit ourselves only to the experience of history in this

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important matter, and we were keen in searching for new paths in the development of tank troops.

II

The future development of Soviet military art must proceed not only and not so much along the path of interpreting lessons of past wars, even though they must be taken into consideration, as along the path of consistent and persistent investigation of fundamentally new methods for conducting combat operations which permit the fullest use of the combat capabilities created by the development of weapons of armed combat.

The development of armored equipment, the organizational structure, and the methods of combat employment of tank troops were decisively influenced in the postwar period by such factors as thegeneral scientific and technical progress in the country, the appearance of powerful nuclear/missile weapons, and the change in the nature and in the methods of conducting war. The swift development of antitank weapons also played an important role and continues to do so.

In comparison with the Second World War, a future war will be conducted with qualitatively new weapons of armed combat. The broad employment of nuclear/missile weapons and modern combat equipment has sharply increased combat capabilities, the strike force, and troop mobility. This led to the review of opinions on the nature of a future war, on the technical equipping and organization of the Armed Forces, and also the basic tenets for conducting combat operations and armed combat on the whole, which were established on the experience of the past war.

In a future war the objectives of armed combat will be not only the armed forces deployed in the theaters of military operations, but mainly the

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deep rear area of the warring sides - the industrial base, supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs, the system of state control, communications, and also strategic weapons of armed combat deployed beyond the limits of the theater of military operations.

Nuclear strikes against important enemy objectives at the front and in the rear and swift operations of forces and weapons on the ground, in the air, and on the sea, with the purpose of employing the results of these strikes for the final enemy defeat is the basis of combat operations of the armed forces. The combat operations of the ground troops will attain greatswiftness, dynamic quality, and mobility. In short periods of time they must be able to carry out a purposeful offensive over the entire depth of the theater of military operations. The decisive role in achieving the high speeds of the offensive will belong to the tank troops, who must possess high combat qualities. It is precisely on the basis of these requirements that we must proceed when determining the paths of future tank troop development.

The improvement of Soviet tanks and their armament in the postwar years mainly proceeded along the line of increasing firepower and effectiveness, mobility, of improving armor protection, of equipping them with a system of antiatomic protection, of providing them with the ability to cross water barriers on the bottom, of increasing their cruising range, and of increasing their service life. As a result of the large amount of work that was performed, new models of Soviet tanks have been built, that are superior to the latest models of tanks of the armies of the largest capitalist countries - the USA, Britain, France, and West Germany - according to several of their tactical-technical and combat quality features [redacted], and they have become part of our armament.

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During this period the heavy tanks IS-4 (1947), T-10 (1953) and T-10M (1957); medium tanks T-54 (1946), T-54A (1954), T-54B (1956), T-55 (1958), and T-62 (1961); and the light amphibious tank PT-76B (1957) became part of our armament. Work continues on several experimental models.

There is a 122 mm gun installed on the heavy tank which has a shaped charge antitank shell that can penetrate, in practice, any armor of a modern tank (up to 500 mm thick). The medium tank has a 100 mm gun installed for which a shaped charge anti-tank shell has been adopted that possesses great armor-piercing capability (up to 400 mm). The light tank is armed with a 76 mm gun that has a fairly powerful shaped charge antitank shell. By installing an armament stabilizer (stabilizator vooruzheniya) on all tanks, their firing effectiveness when on the move sharply increased. For example, the firing effectiveness of a T-54B tank at speeds of 18 to 22 kph reached 60 percent. The 115 mm smooth bore gun "Molot," installed on the T-62 medium tank, with a 1615 m/sec muzzle velocity of the armor-piercing subcaliber shell, has very high armor penetration. Besides these there are shaped charge antitank shells for this gun with even higher armor penetrating ability.

The tanks have new devices installed for driving and for controlling fire, including night sights (nochnoy pritsel). On the medium tanks the supply of ammunition is increased (from 34 to 43 rounds), the horsepower of the engines has been increased to 580, and the cruising range to 500 km.

All these and other improvements greatly increased the combat characteristics of tanks. Our medium tanks possess especially good combat qualities. They firmly hold the title of the best tanks in the world.

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The combat qualities of our tanks may be seen when comparing them with the tanks of our probable enemies. For comparison it is adequate to take the basic types of tanks which may include: in the USSR, the medium T-55 tank and the new T-62 tank; in the USA, the M48A2 medium tank and the latest new tank M-60; and in Britain, the MK-IX-X tank. The experimental models of medium tanks that have been built in France and West Germany are not finished and have not become part of their armament yet.

From the given data it can be seen that the T-55 tank with its 100 mm gun is superior to the American M48A2 tank according to several indicators: it weighs less, has better armor protection, more or less equal firepower, and a greater cruising range. However, it is inferior to the American M-60 tank and the British "Centurion" tank in firepower. This is explained by the fact that a 105 mm gun is mounted on their tanks for which there is a subcaliber shell with a muzzle velocity of 1475 m/sec. We do not have such a shell for our 100 mm gun yet. It is necessary to speed up the creation of a subcaliber shell for rifled guns on all types of tanks.

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	USSR		USA		Britain
	T-55 with D-10T2s gun	T-62	M48A2	M-60	"Centurion" MK-IX-X
Year produced	1958	1961	1956	1960	1959
Combat weight, tons	36	36.5	46	46.27	51
Armor protection in mm:					
hull-front	100	100	110	About 150	76
side	80	80	51-76	51-76	51
turret - front	200	200	178	178	152
Armament (caliber in mm)	100	115	90	105	105
Muzzle velocity of armor-piercing shell, m/sec	895	1615	930 1245 (subcaliber)	1475 (subcaliber)	1475
Armor penetration in mm at 2000 m with an angle of fire of 0° to 60°:					
armor-piercing shell	122-55	—	130-45	—	—
subcaliber shell	Being developed	270-100	200-60	220-85	220-85
shaped charge antitank shell	390-150	440-200	—	—	—
Unit of fire	43	40	60	57	70
Maximum speed, kph	50	48	45	48	34
Horsepower of engine	580	580	850	750	650
Cruising range, km	500	500	310	400	190

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As for the T-62 tank, it is superior to the American M-60 tank according to the basic features, especially in the range of grazing shot and armor penetration. It should be kept in mind, however, that the smoothbore gun has several important shortcomings; in particular, the metal body (sektor) of the subcaliber shell that shatters right after the firing creates the danger of striking our own troops operating in front of the tank. For a certain period this gun may ensure the qualitative superiority of our tanks over the tanks of our probable enemy. But we do not have the right to be content; we must decisively move ahead to a significantly greater distance in the quality of tanks from our probable enemies.

If we compare the T-10M heavy tank with the American M103 (1956) tank, then our tank has slightly better armor protection and a greater speed and cruising range. The British heavy tank "Conqueror" (1954) has more powerful armament, for the 120 mm gun mounted on it has a subcaliber armor-piercing shell with a muzzle velocity of 1550 m/sec.

We made an effort to achieve a qualitative superiority of our heavy tank over the American and British heavy tanks by installing a 130 mm gun on it. Experimental models were prepared. But because of this the tank became too heavy. It became necessary to give up further work on these models. Our T-62 medium tank may successfully wage combat against the heavy tanks of the USA and Britain. Also, the T10M tank possesses combat qualities that are not bad.

Our PT-76B light tank is inferior to the American M41A3 (1956) light tank in armor protection and firepower. But it is almost 10 tons lighter and is amphibious, which is very important for conducting reconnaissance, and has a greater cruising range. As for the other models of light tanks, the experience of the Second World War showed that it was inadvisable to use them, and we stopped building them.

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Heavy Tank Comparison Table

	USSR T-10M	USA M103*	Britain "Conqueror"**
Year produced	1958	1956	1954
Combat weight	50	54.4	About 66
Armor protection (in mm):			
Front - turret	250	127-136	200
Front - hull	120	127	200
Side - hull	80	51	90
Armament of tank (caliber of gun in mm)	122	120	120
Muzzle velocity of armor piercing shell (in m/sec)	950	1000	About 1000 (Subcaliber 1500-1550)
Machine gun (number), caliber (mm)	2x14.5	1x12.7 2x7.62	1x7.62
Armor penetration, in mm at 2000 m (armor piercing shell):			
at a 0° angle of impact	200	200	250-100 (subcaliber)
at a 60° angle of impact	65	70	—
Unit of fire:			
rounds for gun (No.)	30	34	35
cartridges for machine gun	744	7825	7500
Maximum speed (kph)	50	34	34
Cruising range (km)	250	130-160	150

* Until 1954 a total of 300 of these tanks were produced in the USA; tanks of this type are not produced any more. Modernization of the ones produced is being done.

** Until 1959, a total of 250 of these tanks were produced. A new 45-ton tank, the "Chieftain", with a 120mm gun and a 710 hp multiple fuel engine is being tested, but the armor of the hull does not exceed 76 mm.

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On the whole, it may be considered that our tanks possess better combat qualities than the modern tanks of our probable enemy. However, the difference in the combat qualities of the tanks is rather small. Can this situation satisfy us? No, naturally it cannot.

Some comrades consider that the improvements in tanks that were effected in the postwar period are adequate, that they ensured the creation of a completely modern combat vehicle, and that there was no special need to seek other, more radical ways to develop armored equipment. After all, our probable enemies also have not thought up anything special in tank construction.

It seems to us, however, that the question is somewhat different. Above we determined the combat effectiveness of our modern tanks by comparing them with the tanks of our probable enemy. But it is impossible to determine fully the combat effectiveness of tanks in this way. For this, it is necessary to take into consideration other factors as well, first of all the development of antitank defense weapons and also the nature and methods for waging armed combat in ground theaters.

The postwar period has been characterized by the rapid development of antitank weapons, based on the use of shaped charges (kumulyativnyy zaryad). In the first years after the war, recoilless weapons appeared together with the Panzerfaust type of antitank grenades. This weapon was not inferior to tube antitank artillery in armor penetration and even surpassed it. By the end of the 1950s at home and abroad there appeared guided antitank missiles with a tank-destroying range of up to 2 km and more. The shaped charge of the antitank missile is capable of piercing the steel armor of any tank. Moreover, the effectiveness of fire against tanks has sharply increased because the missile is controlled by radio, by wires and by a homing head (golovka). The antitank missiles are small in size and in weight and are mobile, and therefore it is difficult to combat them, but

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it is completely possible to do so.

During the discussion some comrades concentrated all their attention on the search for shortcomings of the antitank guided missiles. Naturally, antitank missiles, like any new weapons, have shortcomings. They are only beginning to be introduced into the armament of the armies, fire with them may be conducted within the limits of visibility, and technically they are not sufficiently reliable. For example, so far they have only been tested under firing range conditions, where nothing influences the operator and he is not subjected to any danger. In combat it can be different. The operator only needs to lose his presence of mind or even to flinch and then the missile in flight will "flinch"also; it will not hit the tank. This is very important. Moreover, the speed of the missile flight is too low, the dead space (mertvaya voronka) (up to 500 m from the launching mount) is too great, and there is the need to see the tank to be destroyed, something which is not always possible. Visibility is greatly influenced by the relief of the terrain,"on paper itwas flat, and they forgot about the ravines and that one had to walk through them," and it is possible that the missile will meet various types of obstructions before reaching the target causing the missile to explode, etc. All this lowers the combat qualities of the antitank missiles. But the indicated shortcomings will be eliminated, and it would be a serious mistake to underestimate this new type of antitank weapon.

We must consider the fact that modern antitank weapons are light, mobile, and very effective in armor penetration. On the battlefield they will be dispersed, and unavoidably part of them will survive, or new units will be moved out to replace the ones destroyed, even on axes where nuclear weapons are used. Therefore, the underestimation of new antitank weapons is very dangerous, and it may lead to

the fact that in a future war our tank troops may meet such surprises which may decisively reduce their combat capabilities.

It is necessary to recognize frankly that our development of armored equipment in the postwar period proceeded without due consideration for the development of antitank weapons. This is a serious lesson, and we must not ignore it. As a result of this, the antitank missiles and other new antitank weapons with shaped charges took the lead over armor. The old method for tank development has been exhausted, and we must find a new one, a drastic path for its future development. N.S. Khrushchev personally assigned us such a task, and we must accomplish it as soon and as well as possible.

III

What direction should the further tank development take?

At the present time this question is being actively discussed, but opinions on it have differed greatly. Some comrades consider that despite the development of antitank weapons the modern tank is a vehicle completely capable of combat, one that does not require fundamental reconstruction, at least for the near future. Others, on the contrary, say that the modern tank, especially the heavy one, has outlived itself, any mass tank attack may be disrupted, and that the production of a tank is not justified economically. Therefore, it is proposed to return to the light amphibious tank or to create a new armored vehicle with a wheeled running gear of the armored-personnel-carrier-type. The foreign press has carried statements that the tank is a weapon of the past war and that for a future war a vehicle with powerful armored protection is not required.

It seems to us that it is impossible to agree [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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with either opinion. Both now and, obviously, in the future we cannot reject the tank. It has several remarkable combat qualities that permit the successful performance of combat tasks under conditions of nuclear/missile warfare. Among all the other combat vehicles the tank withstands a nuclear burst best, mainly the shockwave and penetrating radiation. This is a very important quality under modern conditions. Moreover, the tank has great mobility and fire and strike force. At the present time the missiles of operational-tactical designation have become the main fire weapon of the ground troops. Tube artillery has ceased to be the "god of war." If the tank is removed from the armament, then the fire and strike force of ground troops will be sharply reduced. One cannot conceive this matter in such a way that all the tasks of fire destruction of the enemy in a future war will be performed only by missile troops of operational-tactical designation using nuclear weapons; many tasks will still have to be performed by conventional fire weapons. Tanks are the best weapons for this. When necessary they can be concentrated on definite sectors due to their high mobility, and this ensures the necessary fire density. Therefore, a tank-type combat vehicle must remain in the armament of our army.

At the same time, the modern tank has become vulnerable to new antitank weapons; is poorly protected from shaped charges; and has insufficient antiatomic protection. Therefore, we cannot remain at the level achieved under any circumstances.

Recent research showed that there are potentialities to increase considerably the shaped charge protection of tanks. This problem is resolved by installing special shielding (ekranirovaniye) devices, the employment of combined (kombinirovanaya) armor, and the use of appropriate forms of armor protection.

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This may greatly increase the viability of tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, it will not require an increase of armor protection and consequently an increase in the tank's weight.

Increasing the tank's antiatomic protection will have important significance. It is achieved by installing special "linings" (podboy) that reduce the flow of neutrons, and also an automatic system for hermetically sealing the tank, by removing radioactive dust from the air, by creating pressurization, etc.. This ensures the protection of the tank's crew from destruction by a medium yield (30 kt) nuclear burst at a distance of 400 to 600 m from ground zero.

Recently, increased combat characteristics of the 100 mm gun have been achieved. The muzzle velocity of an armor-piercing shell of this gun has been brought up to 1015 m/sec, the same armor penetration as achieved by the British 105 mm gun. The firing range of the new 100 mm gun with a high-explosive shell reaches 15 kilometers.

The presence of a large number of tanks with guns having powerful charges and a considerable range of fire in tank and motorized rifle large units permits their use for fire from concealed positions with the goal of performing various tasks and first of all of destroying the missile mounts, atomic weapons, and other enemy objectives both in open and in concealed positions.

The acceptance into armament and the assimilation of the T-62 medium tank with the new smooth bore gun will undoubtedly increase the combat capabilities of the tank troops. This tank may successfully combat any enemy tank, using subcaliber and high-explosive antitank shells. Therefore, it is advisable to have a definite number of tanks with a smooth bore gun.

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At the present time our designers are developing a new model of a medium tank weighing 34 tons which will have a 115 mm smooth bore gun with full mechanization of loading, and this will permit reducing the crew by one man. Subsequently, the tank will also have a rifled gun installed on it with mechanized loading. This tank will have a complete antiatomic, antichemical, md antibacteriological protection and also will have armor that ensures protection from high-explosive antitank weapons of destruction. The tank running gear will ensure an average speed over terrain (not over roads) of about 45 kph and a maximum speed over roads of about 75 kph.

A noticeable increase in the combat capabilities of tank troops may be achieved by accepting into our armament a medium tank with guided missile armament (range of fire 3 to 4 km), on the creation of which work is proceeding at the present time. This tank should destroy any enemy tank when on the move with one or two rounds.

After the new medium tanks with guided missile equipment are accepted into our armament and are assimilated, it will be possible to raise the question of replacing the T-10M heavy tank because the new medium tanks will have higher combat characteristics. However, it is necessary for us to take into consideration that our probable enemies, especially Britain, continue work on building heavy tanks with increased qualities in comparison with the existing ones.

We should concern ourselves with the problem of building a combat vehicle - a tank destroyer - with guided missile armament of the assault-gun type.

At the present time work is being done to build a half-tracked (or wheeled) combat vehicle with

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missile and small arms armament for the infantry. Such a combat-armored vehicle must have antiatomic protection and high mobility on the terrain, equal to the mobility of a tank.

This "combat vehicle", let us call it that, must have very strong armor protection, have high road qualities, and it must have a low silhouette (prizemistyy) so that it would be easy to camouflage it and would be less vulnerable to antitank guided missiles (PTURS). As for its capacity, it must carry a squad of riflemen (approximately 10 to 12 persons, including the driver and commanding officer. It must be capable of waging combat, i.e., of destroying the enemy with its own weapons, and when necessary the riflemen can leave it and in coordination with it, as well as with their own combat weapon, perform the tasks of an infantry battle. It must replace the armored personnel carrier and provide our tanks with an infantry assault group which it is now completely impossible to transport on the body of the tank.

Together with all this, we must speed up work directed toward the sensible reduction of a tank's weight, the increasing of its mobility, especially the increase of its speed and cruising range, the reduction of the crew while ensuring mutual replacement - the entire crew must know how to drive the tank, etc..

Special attention must be devoted to work on the use of plastics in tank building. Initial results received in this problem testify that plastics (plexiglass) (stekloplastika) may find broad use in building modern reliable tank-type armored vehicles.

The realization of all these primary measures will undoubtedly increase the combat capabilities of our tanks; will make them more reliable against

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modern antitank weapons and nuclear bursts; and this will permit the employment of our tank troops with greater success in a future war.

We have expressed some thoughts on the building of new tanks and combat vehicles in the near future. But this by no means reduces the significance of the tanks which we have in our armament. They are quite suitable for combat use and can perform combat tasks successfully. We are firmly convinced that certain statements which appeared in the press and which express doubt about the usefulness of the tank for modern warfare are wrong. The tank continues to be a powerful weapon of modern combat and, by developing, will remain so in the future. However, it is necessary to take into consideration new conditions for employing tanks on the battlefield, in particular the possession of very effective antitank weapons by the enemy. For this it is necessary to take measures in all cases for the decisive neutralization and destruction of these weapons of the enemy, in order to decrease as much as possible the effectiveness of their operation against tanks on the battlefield.

Above we spoke of the immediate task of improving tank equipment. But this is not enough. We must also look into the more distant future. No weapon can be developed successfully if at the proper time a prospective forward movement is not determined. In relation to tanks, this problem has become especially urgent at the present time.

It is quite apparent that despite the presence and development of nuclear/missile weapons mass ground troops will participate in future wars for a long time yet. To wage successful armed combat the ground troops will have to have combat vehicles which, as far as possible, must be able to resist nuclear bursts and protect personnel from light

radiation and penetrating radiation and also from destruction by conventional weapons i.e., these vehicles must be reliably armored. Moreover, we must have at least two types of combat vehicles: the first type is a vehicle with light armament to conduct an infantry battle ("combat vehicle"-((boyevaya mashina)); the second type should have heavier armament so that it could wage combat against any combat vehicles on the battlefield and achieve success.

The second type of vehicles of the future will apparently appear as a continuation of modern tank development. It is mainly intended for the swift exploitation of the results of using nuclear/missile weapons, for the final defeat of enemy ground troop groupings, and for the seizure of important areas and objectives. For this the tank of the future must be capable of waging successful combat against tanks and lighter enemy "combat vehicles" and of destroying his personnel and the fire weapons of the ground troops, including nuclear and antitank weapons.

It should be taken into consideration that in a future war the enemy may employ a large mass of tanks. They must be opposed by our tanks with such armament which would ensure the reliable destruction of enemy tanks. But in actuality, the combat capabilities of tube artillery are almost all exhausted. In the near future it will apparently be replaced by modern guided and homing missiles with powerful new charges.

However, antitank missiles may not be the only armament of the tank of the future. Antitank missiles are close combat weapons, which are intended mainly for combat against tanks. The tank of the future apparently must have weapons with the aid of which it would be possible to wage combat against enemy tactical nuclear weapons and neutralize the

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conventional fire weapons of the ground troops, first of all, naturally, antitank weapons over a fairly large area.

Tank troop operations will be supported by missile troops of operational-tactical designation. But in several instances this support may not be effective enough, especially when conducting mobile operations in the operational depth. At the present time the missile troops of operational-tactical designation are considerably inferior to the tank troops in mobility. We must decisively increase their mobility. If the battle formations of tank troops contain protected mobile combat vehicles of the tank type but which are capable of delivering nuclear strikes against the enemy, then the combat capabilities of the tank troops will grow immeasurably. We must work on building such a missile combat vehicle, and it should be built.

There are many other problems of a purely technical nature that require resolution: modern tank armament is becoming obsolete, and we must search for a new type of armor - lighter, economically more advantageous, and at the same time very stable and strong; we must improve the running gear of the tank so that it can ensure movement over the terrain at high speeds and great distances; we need a more powerful and more economical engine, etc. Right now we must work on the resolution of these problems.

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A discussion is also proceeding on the problems of the role of tank troops in a future war and especially on the organization of these troops. The most varied opinions have also been expressed on these problems. It is impossible to agree with some of these opinions because this would not move us forward but would push us back and would inflict

damage on the combat effectiveness of our ground troops.

First of all, let us discuss the role of tank troops in a future war. There is no doubt that an important role in a future war will belong to the tank troops. This arm of troops may use the results of massed nuclear/missile strikes for their swift movement into the depth and the defeat of the opposing enemy groupings more quickly and more effectively than the motorized rifle or other troops which are organized on unified principles. Together with this it would be incorrect to count on the fact that only the tank troops in their present existing organization would perform all the tasks on the battlefield, as some comrades maintain. Tank troops cannot operate successfully in a modern operation without missile troops of various designations and without close coordination with aircraft and motorized rifle troops in the main theaters of war. The successful conduct of combat operations in a future war will depend on joint, clearly coordinated operations of all arms of troops, first of all of the missile, tank, motorized rifle, and airborne troops. The tank troops played an outstanding role in the defeat of the German fascist troops in the past war, and we must not forget this. Now they must be prepared for operations under the complex conditions of nuclear/missile warfare and for the display of exceptional reliability and endurance.

On the problems of tank troop organization opinions are divided. Some comrades favor the liquidation of the tank army and the transition to a single army organization. There is also an opinion about a transition to a single division organization, the transition to the so-called unified division. These are very serious problems and cannot be simply and easily resolved. The further

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structure of the ground troops and the methods for their combat employment in the future will greatly depend on their correct resolution. Therefore, let us examine them in greater detail and more deeply.

Soon after the Second World War, and taking into consideration its experience, three basic types of divisions were created in the composition of the ground troops: rifle, mechanized, and tank; and the tank army was reorganized into a mechanized army. The rifle division, which included the tank assault regiment (tankosamokhodnyy polk), was intended for breaking through a prepared defense, and the mechanized division was intended for completing and developing the breakthrough. The mechanized army, the composition of which included tank and mechanized divisions, was intended for commitment into the breakthrough and for conducting mobile combat operations in the operational depth. This organization of the ground troops conformed to the methods for conducting armed combat in the ground theaters which were employed in the last war, and it was based on the experience of this war.

This we should not forget even now, because everything new arises from the experience of the past.

The development of the weapons of armed combat introduced changes in the methods of conducting military operations, and this in turn, naturally, required the introduction of corrections in the organization of troops. Nuclear weapons, which were received into the armament at the beginning of the 1950s brought about the most serious and fundamental changes in the methods of conducting military operations. Their further development and the appearance of missiles as a means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target and the mass employment of this weapon completely changed the method of

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breaking through the prepared enemy defense. Military operations acquired a swift and more mobile and dynamic nature, and broad possibilities for the employment of tank troops in the first echelon from the very beginning of the operation were discovered. By this time the complete motorization of the ground forces was achieved.

In connection with this, the decision was made to have one motorized rifle division, instead of rifle and mechanized divisions, and for it to have motorized rifle and tank units in its composition. The motorized rifle division is capable of successfully performing the tasks of breaking through the enemy defense, developing the breakthrough, and conducting mobile operations in the depth. Also, for operations on the main axes it was necessary to have a division with a more powerful strike force and at the same time a lighter one, a tank division, which could develop the offensive at high speeds to a greater depth and which would possess the best capabilities for waging combat against enemy tank troops.

The motorized rifle division was the basic large unit of the combined-arms army, which possesses almost the same combat characteristics, if not greater ones, as the mechanized army. Thus, naturally, the need for a mechanized army ceased. However, it immediately became necessary to have a large unit which would possess swifter, powerful breakthrough force and greater mobility than the combined-arms army. The tank army proved to be the best organization of this type. Its composition normally includes three tank and one heavy tank divisions, but its organization is not a set form, and its composition may be changed depending on the situation. The tank army is intended for performing the most important tasks in operations, which must be performed reliably in the fastest possible way.

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Lately, several significant corrections and additions have been introduced into the organization of divisions and armies. The number of personnel in divisions has been sharply reduced, and the number of rear services units and establishments in divisions and armies has been reduced, and this has lightened them and has increased their mobility. In this respect, however, everything has not yet been done.

We must find ways to lighten the divisions further. First of all, we must find new means to provide the divisions with everything necessary to wage combat and also new methods to deliver and transport everything necessary for daily living and combat. The fast development of industry, the appearance of new branches of production, and new discoveries create the necessary conditions for the decisive lightening of the organs and means of supplying and feeding.

Missile subunits, armed with tactical missiles with nuclear charges, and antitank missile subunits are included in the composition of the motorized rifle and tank divisions. Missile large units, armed with operational-tactical missiles with nuclear charges, are included in the composition of the combined-arms and tank army. All this greatly increases the combat capabilities of our divisions and armies and gives them remarkable new combat qualities.

We consider that the existing organization of the ground troops meets modern requirements and that it corresponds to the nature and methods of conducting combat operations in the ground theaters in the initial period of a future nuclear/missile war. In the near future a fundamental change in the organization of the ground troops will not be necessary.

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If we compare the organization of our ground troops with the organization of the ground troops of our probable enemy, it is not hard to come to the conclusion that we have achieved better results in this matter. Our tank division and the armored division of the USA have approximately the same number of tanks, but the American division has two to three times more personnel and motor vehicles than ours. To this should be added the better quality of Soviet tanks and the presence in our tank division of heavy tanks which the American division does not have. It is true that the American armored division does have more infantry and artillery, but this makes it more cumbersome and less mobile. It may be considered that in strike force and mobility the Soviet tank division is definitely superior to the American armored division and also to the tank divisions of the other NATO member countries.

Our motorized rifle division has 1.5 to 2 times less personnel and motor vehicle transport than the corresponding divisions of the NATO member countries. In number of tanks, it surpasses the American infantry division but is slightly inferior to the British and West German divisions. The American division has more artillery while in our division there are more guided antitank missiles. Thus, our motorized rifle division is more mobile and is less vulnerable to nuclear weapons in comparison with the divisions of our probable enemy, and is not inferior to them in strike force and firepower.

We also achieved the best results in the organization of the army, and this is especially important. The armies of the NATO countries include army corps and a large number of divisions and have a complex system of control and cumbersome rear services. Our combined-arms armies, which are

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intended for operations in the Western Theater, do not have a corps control element and have much less personnel and rear services units and installations, even though their firepower and strike force are only slightly inferior to the armies of our probable enemy. The fact that there is a tank army in the composition of the Soviet Ground Troops and none in the NATO army ensures a great advantage for us in conducting combat operations under conditions of nuclear weapon employment.

Thus, it can be considered that the existing organization of our ground troops stands at a higher level than the organization of the troops of our probable enemy and that it corresponds more closely to the nature and methods of conducting combat operations in a future war. Naturally, this does not mean that we must be content and rest on our laurels. During the discussion various proposals were submitted on particular problems of improving the organization of the tank troops; some comrades proposed having single type tank regiments in the tank division, i.e., remove the heavy tank regiments from its composition; other comrades proposed transferring the motorized rifle regiment of the tank division, by battalions, into the composition of the tank regiments of this division; and proposals were also made for liquidating the battalion echelon of control in the tank divisions. All these proposals deserve attention, and they should be thoroughly analyzed and studied, and all that is best which strenthens our combat effectiveness should be used. Such a problem as whether it is better to remove the heavy divisions from the composition of the tank army and to have them in the reserve of fronts or of the Supreme High Command, and to have a single type of division in the tank army should be weighed from all standpoints.

We must work continually on improving troop

organizational structure. But in this matter great caution and discretion must be exercised. Frequent changes in troop organization do not always promote increased combat readiness, more likely, just the opposite; it weakens them because any change in troop organization is painfully experienced by the combat organism.

Can one consider that the need has arisen to create unified divisions of ground troops, divisions with a single organization? It seems to us that there is no such need at the present time.

In a future war, our ground troops will probably have to operate in the most diverse theaters of military operations -- plains, mountains, forests, deserts, and in the Arctic. This fact itself already shows that there cannot be a single troop organization for all these theaters. It is also impossible to create one type of division for the basic theater, the Western Theater. This would result in dispersing of the basic decisive combat weapons such as tanks, missile weapons, etc., and it would complicate their massing on the main axes. The economic potentialities of the state should also be taken into consideration. It would be unrealistic, inadvisable, and completely wrong to provide all the divisions with the necessary amount of tanks and other combat weapons of a decisive nature.

During the discussion, the proposal to organize a third type of division was advanced - a light motorized rifle division without tanks so that it could be used for swift transfer by air. But we have such a division - the airborne landing division. We must work on the improvement of this division, and we must find new reliable and more effective weapons and means for its armament, transport, and landing. Apparently it is time to include the new SU-85 assault guns for armament in the composition of the airborne landing division. The existing

motorized rifle division can also be transferred easily by air transport it is true, because it has no tanks so far. Therefore, there is no need to create a light division.

Perhaps one hears the greatest number of arguments on the tank army. Some comrades propose that we abandon the tank army and have one type of army. The main argument that is advanced is usually that now there is no special difference in mobility and maneuverability between the combined-arms and tank armies and that the tank army will be unable to break away from the combined-arms army during the offensive operation. But this argument is not completely convincing. The tank army still has relatively more tanks than the combined-arms army, if we proceed from the same number of large units. But this is not the main thing. It has fewer divisions and they are all of one type, it is not as burdened with rear services and is more controllable. Consequently, in strike penetrating force, swiftness, mobility and stability from nuclear strikes, it has definite advantages over the combined-arms army, and it is impossible to disregard this. These qualities must be developed and used as fully as possible.

When resolving the problem of the tank army it is necessary to proceed, first of all, from the point of which method will be used to conduct future offensive operations. Apparently, first of all, the enemy troop grouping deployed in the theater will be subjected to massed nuclear/missile strikes. During this the front and army nuclear/missile weapons will deliver a strike over the entire depth of the enemy operational troop formation. The missile troops of strategic designation will deliver an incomparably more powerful strike against the strategic objectives in the depth of the theater. Undoubtedly this strike will also affect the groupings of the

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armed forces, especially reserves, airfields, rear services of groups of armies, the system of control, etc. We do not have a completely clear concept of what will happen as a result of such a strike. Some say that complete devastation will result and will be difficult to overcome; others say that there will not be such devastation and that considerable life and resistance will remain. Apparently both have to be taken into consideration, but mainly we must consider the huge destruction which nuclear/missile weapons are capable of inflicting and also all the consequences that arise from them. Right after the nuclear strikes the ground troop groupings will move to the offensive. These groupings will have to perform at least two basic tasks: the first, the main task, will be to advance swiftly to a great depth, into the area and beyond the area subjected to missile strikes by strategic designation troops in order to disrupt the mobilization, capture key areas and objectives, and to inflict destruction without allowing the enemy that survived to come to his senses; the second task will be to complete the total rout of those enemy forces that survive the nuclear strikes in the front offensive zones, with the same decisive movements into the depth of the enemy's country.

Today the best means for performing the first task are the tank armies in close coordination with airborne troops; this will be the basic strike force in performing this task.

The tank army may, with greater success than the combined-arms army, overcome areas subjected to nuclear strikes, rout the contacted enemy groupings, which are also very well supplied with tanks, in meeting engagements, and swiftly move to the deepest objectives for the final performance of the tasks of armed combat on the given axis. Our tank

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armies should prepare first of all for this very type of operation.

The combined-arms armies are also capable of delivering deep and swift strikes. Some of them will be directed toward achieving the final goal of the operation in coordination with the tank armies or independently. It should still be kept in mind that the combined-arms army may suffer great losses from enemy nuclear strikes and that it is larger numerically and consequently a little less mobile. All these are insignificant minuses and in no case should they 'dishearten and hold back our combined-arms armies which should not only strive not to lag behind the tank armies in the speed of the offensive, but should show even higher speeds and capabilities.".

It should also be taken into consideration that large enemy groupings will remain in the operational depth. They will be neutralized by nuclear strikes and broken up, but they will still be sufficiently suitable for combat so that they can cause our fronts serious trouble. It is essential to rout, destroy, or capture them, i.e., to perform the second task that was mentioned above. This is also an important task. Without having performed it, it is impossible to count on the successful conclusion of the operation. It is advisable to use the combined-arms armies to rout these enemy groupings,in this way freeing the tank armies for deep strikes.

Consequently, we come to the conclusion that to abandon the tank army at the present time would be completely incorrect. In history there already was an instance when without adequate basis large tank large units (mechanized corps) were eliminated. Reality made it necessary to form them again, but this cost us a lot and time was lost. We should

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not forget this lesson of history.

Tank divisions and tank armies possess high combat characteristics such as mobility, great strike force, and relative stability against nuclear strikes. They are better able than other divisions and armies to utilize the results of nuclear/missile strikes for the swift advance to a great depth and for performing tasks of armed combat with a speed of advance up to 100 km per calendar day or more, given the appropriate organization, support, and momentum. Despite the development of combat weapons against tanks and the changes of conditions and methods of employing tank troops, they will undoubtedly play an important role in the performance of the tasks of a future war, if we are not able to avoid it.

That is how we see the most important tasks of the future development of the tank troops, their armament, organizational structure, and methods of combat employment. The main task consists of broadly developing work on the creation of new types of combat vehicles and new types of armored equipment with powerful missile armament. Until this task is performed, we cannot lessen our efforts even for a minute to improve the existing tank equipment and to improve its qualities and viability. In the development of all types of armament it is essential to adhere closely to the rule: until a new weapon is created, the existing models must be improved. Only under this condition will the constant combat readiness of our armed forces be ensured.

In the area of improving the organizational structure of the tank troops we should proceed in the direction of increasing the firepower and strike force of the large units and formations and their mobility and independence in performing

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combat tasks. At the same time, we must approach changes in the organizational structure of the tank troops with foresight, but very thoughtfully in order to avoid mistakes.

The questions of tank troop development which we have touched upon in this article undoubtedly require further thorough study and practical testing during the everyday activities of our Armed Forces.

We should like to stress once again that to a very great degree the success of tank troop operations depends on the level of the operational training of tank commanding officers and on their courage and decisiveness. The courageous and brave tank commanding officer, leading a tank army, a tank division, or a tank regiment into combat, achieves success in combat, in an operation, and achieves victory over the enemy. The indecisive tank commanding officer who is weak hearted is the likeness of death. Their place is not in the tank troops. We proudly praise such outstanding tank commanding officers as Marshal.. of the Tank Troops P.S. Rybalko and S.I. Bogdanov, Generals T.I. Tanaschishin, P.V. Volokh, V.I. Polozkov, and many others who gave their life for our great cause. We also praise our outstanding tank chiefs, who are still alive today, for their renowned combat deeds in our great victory. We must cherish and preserve these glorious combat traditions of our valiant heroic tank troops and learn from their traditions - act courageously, bravely, and daringly in combat and in an operation. Figuratively speaking, if the combined-arms armies are a decisive swift battering-ram, then the tank armies are arrows released from a tightly drawn bowstring; they fly swiftly to the designated target. Such must be the operations of our tank armies.

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FN 34
Bop 16

10 December 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Negotiations with SIS
Concerning Letter to KGB/GRU

1. Mr. Angleton, Chief, CI Staff, and I have been negotiating for the past two weeks with Maurice Oldfield and through him with SIS Headquarters in London relative to possible action to be taken in conveying to the KGB/GRU the possibility of public revelation of certain of the information provided us by [redacted] as an inducement for more considerate treatment of [redacted] and the release of the British businessman WYNNE. 1.3(a)(4)

2. As you know, you approved originally an anonymous letter to the KGB/GRU written to this effect with the stipulation that it be passed covertly through British channels to the KGB and GRU. SIS objected unequivocally to this scheme and we informed them that we were disappointed with their position in this matter.

3. Quite recently in communications from SIS Headquarters in London through Maurice Oldfield, we were informed that they had indeed reversed their position and proposed discussions with the Foreign Office which, in the opinion of Mr. Angleton and me, went much too far and proposed a detailed expose of several categories of substantive information that [redacted] had provided during his tenure as a joint agent of SIS/CIA. Further, they proposed to make an official approach through local representatives of the KGB and GRU acting on behalf of SIS and CIA. Mr. Angleton and I objected vigorously to this proposal, pointing out that this Agency could not, under any circumstance, condone the establishment of an official contact with any intelligence organ of the Soviet Union. Further, we pointed out that the revelation to the Soviets of large areas of [redacted] substantive reporting would be counterproductive in that it would provide the Soviets with solid grounds on which to initiate a propaganda attack on both the U. S. and the U. K. 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4)

4. In subsequent negotiations and after preliminary discussions with the British Foreign Office, SIS proposed

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that it take official unilateral action including the consideration of the possibility of a mass "PNGing" of Soviet intelligence personnel in the U. K. We objected to this on the following grounds:

a. SIS cannot in realistic terms make any official approach to either the KGB or GRU unilaterally in light of the fact that the Soviet authorities have learned from [redacted] that this was a joint operation. 1.3(a)(4)

b. We cannot consider any proposal leading to the mass "PNGing" of Soviet officials because of the obvious and certain retaliatory steps which will be taken by Soviet authorities.

c. We cannot consider any official contact or approach to the KGB or GRU in London. We are willing to consider the use of written communications couched in general terms which will allude to the possibility of revelation of facts known to us from [redacted] concerning the use of official and unofficial representatives of the KGB or GRU abroad; or we are willing to consider the use of a cleared British attorney ostensibly acting on behalf of Mrs. WYNNE to communicate similar information. 1.3(a)(4)

d. We are of the opinion that we should include a request alluding to the safeguarding of [redacted] in addition to the release of WYNNE with the full knowledge that the threat insofar as it pertains to [redacted] will be little more than psychological but may serve to disrupt further relations between the KGB and the GRU. 1.3(a)(4)

5. We have reached the point in our negotiations with SIS, as represented by Maurice Oldfield, where establishment of an official Agency position is required and we are recommending that you approve the above. In this context, you may wish to inform the Director of these negotiations in the event that the matter is raised with him by Sir Dick White, Director of SIS.

Howard J. Osborn
Chief, SR Division

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Memo for Rec'd FW 9

3 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Possible Developments in the Trials of Oleg Penkovskiy and Greville Wynne

1. This memorandum defines the probable upper and lower limits to Soviet propaganda exploitation of the trial, now reported to begin 7 May in Moscow, and in the attached annex outlines tentative Clandestine Services planning for counter-action.

2. Minimum and maximum variants in Soviet propaganda exploitation:

a. Minimum exploitation: If the Soviet government so decides, it can try Wynne and Penkovskiy separately, the latter in a closed trial with no publicity except for an announcement of the verdict and sentence. The Soviets committed themselves, however, to an open trial for Wynne when they chose to cover his kidnapping from Hungary as an extradition action. (Recent press reports have specifically announced that the Wynne trial will be open.) In this minimum publicity variant, Penkovskiy would probably not appear as a witness in Wynne's trial and anti-U. S. and U. K. propaganda would be limited. The U. S. officials already named by the Soviet press but still in Moscow (Montgomery, Davison and German) might not be declared persons non gratæ.

b. Maximum propaganda exploitation: At the other extreme, a full show trial could be staged to provide maximum publicity to the exposure of American and British espionage activity against the USSR. Here, Penkovskiy would probably appear as a witness in open court and might even be tried before the same court or at a concomitant trial. In such a case, we expect that besides the U. S. officials already named in the pre-trial publicity, British involvement would be spelled out in appropriate detail; Penkovskiy's case officers would be identified (two of them, Joseph J. Bulik and Rodney M. Carlson, have served in the USSR [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
and Bulik has since travelled there [redacted]; and other evidence in Soviet hands could be surfaced. (For example, the full text of the letter we wrote Penkovskiy in July 1962, of which a small part was printed in the Soviet press in November 1962, contains accommodation addresses and telephone numbers in the U. S. and in the U. K.) PNG action against all implicated American

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and British officials still in Moscow would almost certainly follow such a trial. It should be noted, however, that beyond providing extensive documentation to the charge that a high-ranking Soviet official committed espionage in behalf of U. S. and British intelligence, there is little that could be exposed in the trial. Without extensive fabrication, allegations of sabotage, assassination, covert political action, etc., would be extremely difficult to substantiate convincingly.

3. Review of Probabilities: Available evidence is insufficient to predict which course of action the Soviets will choose although recent Moscow reports tend to indicate that the stage is being set for an open, maximum publicity trial. (The hall reportedly reserved for the trial of Wynne has a seating capacity of 300 and it has been announced that the trial will be open.) There is some reason to think that there have been one or more changes of plan or at least of timing since the case was discovered by Soviet authorities. The initial burst of publicity in November and December 1962 was abruptly cut off; the long delay in bring Wynne to trial cannot be explained by the need to complete the pre-trial investigation (from the counterespionage point of view, much of the investigation had to be done before the trap was sprung on Richard Jacob on 2 November 1962); pre-trial publicity and buildup (surfacing of the Popov and Olga Raus cases, etc.) has been sporadic and diffuse, something very uncharacteristic for the usually well-oiled Soviet propaganda machine. One possible explanation is that the Soviets have had second thoughts about the possible adverse effects that the publicity of the Penkovskiy case might have on the Soviet military establishment in connection with the recent important personnel changes in the military hierarchy (the dismissal and apparent arrest of General Serov, the replacement of Marshal Zakharov, etc.)

4. Evaluation of propaganda impact of Trial: Whatever course of action the Soviets choose, it appears that the Wynne and Penkovskiy trials will present more problems to the Soviets than to us. As far as U. S. involvement is concerned, the Soviets have already fired their biggest guns in the publicity following the detention of Richard Jacob; they can use the trial to document their charges, but they cannot add anything substantially new by way of exposure. The British situation is rather different in this respect. Besides Wynne himself, thus far there have only been vague allusions to the

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role played by British officials in the case. Wynne is in a position to implicate three or four MI-6 officers by true name and the revelation that the pregnant wife of a British Embassy officer was used for clandestine street meetings with an espionage agent may well have a strong effect on a British press still smarting from the treatment it received from the Radcliffe Tribunal.

5. Impact of the Trial in the Soviet Union: From the Soviet point of view, the problems presented by the Penkovskiy affair are much more serious and far-reaching. For one thing, in terms of damage to Soviet national security, the case is unprecedented in classical espionage history. It will be tremendously damaging to those who are held responsible and since Penkovskiy's circle of friends, patrons, and unwitting accomplices was large and highly placed, the struggle to escape or affix responsibility could assume considerable proportions. Although it is true that this struggle would take place in any event, a public airing of the Penkovskiy affair, no matter how carefully the facts are manipulated, is bound to feed oxygen to flames that are already reaching dangerously high.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment

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PLANS FOR COUNTER-PROPAGANDA IN PENKOVSKIY CASE

The following plans have been reviewed within the Clandestine Services and by a representative of MI-6. Although it is recognized that policy considerations and developments during the trial may rule out the actual use of any or all of the materials now being prepared, preparation is underway to ensure that if it is desired to implement the plans, the material will be at hand to do so.

1. General strategy: The purpose of our counter-propaganda will be to emphasize the following points:

a. Penkovskiy was a career Soviet Army officer who served with great distinction in the Soviet armed forces during WWII and was decorated for valor, and who apparently sees himself in the role of a twentieth century "Decembrist"--a Russian soldier and patriot working toward the establishment of a just and liberal government in his native land. He represents the exasperation and legitimate anger of the Soviet military establishment against the interference of the Communist Party and the Soviet security police, which has galled the military since 1918.

b. This trial should be viewed in the context of Soviet internal politics as they have developed since the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962. The failure of Soviet policy, both domestic and foreign, in recent months has greatly heightened the tensions among the Soviet leaders. Penkovskiy is a pawn in a deadly game of intrigue now being played among various factions in the Soviet leadership. Although only the trial can reveal the exact intent of the manipulators, it seems likely that the career officers of the armed forces and the military intelligence service are the most likely targets. It could be the curtain raiser in a campaign to destroy the present Soviet military leadership the way Stalin destroyed Tukhachevskiy and his cohorts in the late '30s.

c. Although it should be handled as a matter not directly relevant to the Penkovskiy case, the threat to the free world of Soviet intelligence operations and Soviet military intentions should also be emphasized.

2. Guidelines and Restrictions for Publicity: These plans have been drawn up with the following guidelines and restrictions:

[redacted]

[redacted]

a. No materials supplied to the press or used in the campaign will confirm the Soviet allegation that Penkovskiy was an agent of American and British Intelligence.

b. No information will be supplied that will tend to confirm Soviet allegations concerning intelligence activities on the part of U. S. officials or the citizens of Western countries whose names may be mentioned in relation to the case.

c. Information concerning Penkovskiy available to us will be used extensively within these limitations, ascribing its sources to persons in Turkey and unnamed persons in the West who have met Penkovskiy or are familiar with his activities, including an "unnamed former Soviet official who has defected to the West."

d. Certain documents pertinent to the general subject of Soviet espionage in the West will be released for surfacing provided it can be done without risk of direct attribution to Penkovskiy.

3. Specific Plans:

a. For Publication at the Beginning of the Trial: An article will be placed in Turkey which will cover Penkovskiy's biography as extensively as the ostensible sources will permit. A photograph of Penkovskiy in uniform with decorations will be printed with the article. The main subjects to be stressed will be Penkovskiy as a professional military officer, decorated for valor during WWII and dedicated to the best interests of his service and his country. His affiliation with the GRU will be spelled out.

b. Followup on Initial Article: The initial article will be replayed in major western media to the greatest extent possible. Articles of commentary and opinion in which the basic facts may be somewhat broadened, citing unnamed acquaintances of Penkovskiy's or an unnamed Soviet defector, will amplify the political aspects of the Penkovskiy trial, relating it to the internal political situation in the Soviet Union, the position of the Soviet Armed Forces in relation to the leadership of the Communist Party and the security police, etc. Penkovskiy will be cast in the role of a patriot struggling against tyranny, but not as a spy.

[redacted]

c. Defensive Briefings: Some western contacts of Penkovskiy's even though the involvement was to no degree compromising, who might be cited in the trial, will be briefed as to what they might say about their relations with him in the event that they receive publicity and are asked by the press for comment.

d. U. S. Official Statement and Release of Documents: In the event that the trial takes a strong anti-American turn in its propaganda, it may be appropriate for a high U. S. Government spokesman to make a comment. The outline for such a comment following the guidelines and strategy mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be prepared. In addition, two Soviet documents, GRU lectures on Soviet intelligence techniques in the U. S. and on the techniques used for conducting meetings with agents will be prepared for release to the press as documentary evidence of the nature of Soviet espionage. The first of these documents is particularly significant for its content, and the latter because the author is currently assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

e. Further Release of Documents on Soviet Military Plans: Although this proposal will require careful review in the light of our long-range publicity plans in addition to numerous other considerations, the question of the release of two other documents is also being given attention. One of these is an extremely belligerent exposition of Soviet strategy and the second is a description of Soviet chemical warfare planning. Release of these documents might be most appropriately effected through the Department of Defense. The release would go a long way toward supplying documentary proof of the aggressive nature of the Soviet regime.

4. Plans for Long-Term Exploitation: Preliminary discussions between the British and ourselves concerning long-term exploitation have taken place already. Our plans will be reviewed in detail in conversations to take place in London at approximately the time of the Wynne trial in Moscow. As presently foreseen, the major effort will be the preparation of the "memoirs" of Penkovskiy, based upon the voluminous information from contacts with him, to present as thoroughly and as carefully as possible Penkovskiy's own views on the nature of the Soviet regime, its history and its prospects. To accompany these memoirs, appropriate documents will be selected from those available to us for release to the public. These two items, the memoirs and the documents, would then be made public with the explanation that they had been left in

the West in the personal possession of a confidant who was charged by Penkovskiy with making them public in the event his efforts to struggle against the party dictatorship in the Soviet Union led to his arrest. This explanation will stress the idea that Penkovskiy's arrest and trial stemmed not from service as a western intelligence agent, but rather from his burning desire to fight the Soviet regime as currently established. In addition to other considerations, putting this plan into effect would have to await a final resolution of the fate of Wynne. In the meantime, however, preparatory work on the memoirs has begun in London.

[redacted]

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1.3(a)(4)
Doc 16
(88)

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

SUBJECT: Oleg V. Penkovskiy

1. This afternoon I handed you a draft plan designed not only to assure that word reaches many GRU and KGB ears that U.S. Intelligence is concerned about those who collaborate with us and who may be caught but also to grasp whatever slim opportunity there may be to save Penkovskiy's life.

2. On the first point, there is no doubt that many GRU and KGB officers realize that CIA was able to run a highly successful operation in a professional manner. Their respect for CIa must have gone up. They do not know what interest CIA has for the security and well-being of anyone who collaborates. If indeed word should be spread about that U.S. intelligence is trying to save Penkovskiy's life, this is bound to have a tremendous impact on many in the ranks. The need for other Oleg Penkovskiys, as the Director expressed to you, is greater now than ever. We must do all we can to achieve this.

3. On the second point, we all know of the tremendous contribution that Oleg Penkovskiy made to our Government and to our Agency. We were at one point prepared to give him an unusually large sum of money whenever it was feasible for him to defect. As a professional intelligence officer, he was well aware of the risks he was taking for himself and for us. I feel we owe him a tremendous debt. For us not to consider ways and means of saving his life is to me a reflection of low moral level. I do not suggest any reckless or ill-conceived means.

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31 MAR 1992

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4. As you know, last November 1962, I proposed this plan in written form to C/CI who turned it down with a reason I could not then, and cannot now understand or accept. I am addressing you formally on this point with the view of obtaining a formal reply which would include, should the proposal or any variation of it be turned down, the reason or reasons for the turndown.

Joseph J. Bulik

JOSEPH J. BULIK
Chief, SR Special Operations Branch

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14 May 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

SUBJECT: Plan for Informing Soviet Intelligence Services of U.S. Concern for Oleg V. Penkovskiy.

1. The following plan is designed not only to assure that word reaches many GRU and KGB ears that U.S. Intelligence is concerned about those who collaborate with us and who may be caught but also to grasp whatever slim opportunity there may be to save Penkovskiy's life.

2. On the first point, there is no doubt that many GRU and KGB officers realize that CIA was able to run a highly successful operation in a professional manner. Their professional respect for CIA must have gone up. They do not know what interest CIA has for the security and well-being of anyone who collaborates with CIA. If indeed word should be spread about that U.S. Intelligence is trying to save Penkovskiy's life, this is bound to have a tremendous impact on many in the ranks. The need for other Oleg Penkovskiys, as the Director expressed to you recently, is now greater than ever. We must do all we can to achieve this.

3. There is no question in our minds that the impact of the Penkovskiy compromise and trial will have a deleterious effect upon any Soviet citizens, in or out of the RIS ranks, who may have entertained thoughts of either defection or working in place. Following the trial, Yuri Zhukov, commentator for PRAVDA stated "CIA does not give a hoot about the fate of their agents. All the promises they made to Penkovskiy.....have been broken. The spy is caught and he has been written off the books." This is the sort of Soviet action that the proposed plan will counter.

4. The plan envisages four identical letters to be delivered to two KGB rezidents and two GRU rezidents in Bonn, The Hague, Copenhagen and Rome. A local indigenous person can be paid to deliver a sealed envelope containing the message to the Soviet Embassy in each city. The reason four points were chosen was from our point of view to insure that delivery is made, that the message is not thrown out as a provocation since the letter states that three other identical messages are being simultaneously delivered in three other Soviet Embassies and particularly to assure that by word of mouth that at least a minimum number of Soviets who see the letter will pass the word around to their associates without

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31 MAR 1992

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raising in Soviet minds that a flooding of many Embassies with such messages was strictly a CIA propaganda ploy. Not only to establish a bona fide with the Soviets but also to worry them regarding intent, a copy of the photograph of Penkovskiy with Chief Marshal S.S. Varentsov will be included.

5. The question of whether Soviet authorities would surface this message to embarrass us is considered to be most unlikely since publication would only serve to further our interests. There is, despite our optimism on this point, no genuine attributability which the Soviets would gain by surfacing.

6. The four cities were chosen because the fact that they are in NATO countries may have the proper impact on the Soviets, and have had no past relationship with the Penkovskiy operation, and the remote chance of any flareback would have minimal effects in these particular countries.

7. It is suggested that the Soviets be directed to respond to a Post Office box in New York, which could be laid on by Security. In the event of a flap, the Post Office Department could easily deny the true identity of the holder of the box.

8. Should the Soviet authorities respond to the message, an analysis of the nature of their response would dictate our next moves. Certainly the negotations in the beginning stages could be prolonged and vague. There will obviously be feeling out by the Soviets as to the nature of the "stick" and the "carrot".

9. It is recommended that this proposal, if accepted, be carried out without any reference to the British, in the light of the Soviet statement that "CIA does not give a hoot about the fate of their agents". In no way, does the plan envisage the problem of Wynne and Lonsdale.

10. Should the Soviet authorities refuse to respond, it is recommended that we carry out our threat by the appropriate publication in appropriate places of certain materials which Penkovskiy gave us relating to Soviet espionage abroad and to Soviet subversive planning and warlike views of the Soviet Government. There is much CA grist which can and should be pulled out and exploited by the West.

11. The Soviets will recognize this as a U.S. proposal and not a joint American-British proposal. This should in no way jeopardize whatever plans the British have for negotiating with the Soviets for the release of Wynne.

Joseph J. Bulik

George G. Kisevalter 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

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Copy 15

23 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Oleg V. Penkovskiy

1. There has been a lot of speculation in foreign and U. S. press as to the fact that Penkovskiy may have been a double agent and that the documentary material might have been disinformation.

2. In the event that this comes up in your briefing of the Vinson Committee, you might find the attached helpful and I am sending it along for inclusion in your package which Elizabeth is holding for you for this purpose.

Howard J. Osborn
Chief, SR Division

Attachment

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

[redacted]

Bona Fides of the Penkovskiy Operation

1. We have no reason to believe that Penkovskiy was a double agent or that any information he supplied us was wittingly provided to him as deception material by Soviet authorities.

2. Throughout this extraordinary operation, a recurrent question for us, and one also in the minds of analysts trying to cope with the resultant flood of classified Soviet documents, has been the possibility of Soviet deception. This possibility was given serious consideration each time we received new material from Penkovskiy. During the numerous long personal meetings we had with him we used subtle and varied tests of his loyalty and his information; we also checked the intelligence provided against all other information available to the intelligence community. He always passed all of the tests which could be levied on him personally and his information has stood the tests of time and comparative intelligence.

3. On the basis of ~~these~~ checks and counterchecks together with our familiarity with the methods and purposes of Soviet deception operations, we have concluded that there is no possibility that this case represents planned deception, build-up for deception, fabrication, or double agent activity. Rather it represents the most serious penetration of Soviet officialdom ever accomplished and one that will hurt them for years to come.

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Fw b
Dep. 17

8 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Penkovskiy case

1. You already have a memorandum giving our views on how we believe Penkovskiy may have been caught by the Soviet authorities, although we have to date received no precise information which leads us to believe that we have a definitive explanation. I would like to add the following information which we received the middle of last week from [redacted] during a controlled debriefing conducted by a staff officer of this Agency. 1.3(a)(4)

2. With respect to Penkovskiy, Source stated, "our people" in the United States realized that some important information was leaking out of the Soviet Union. A discreet investigation took place and by the process of elimination led to Penkovskiy. When pressed for details as to whether Soviet agents in the United States had learned of the information acquired by the United States, Source commented that he only assumed that persons (Soviet) in the United States had learned that the United States Government had obtained this information. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

X 3. Also, according to Source, Khrushchev mentioned in December 1962 at a gathering in Kiev attended by Tito and others, that Penkovskiy had done a lot of harm but also that he had done some good simply on the grounds that now the United States knows the strength and technological advancement of the Soviet Union.

4. Source also claimed that because of Penkovskiy there have been many changes made in Soviet defense but that these changes tend to be minor and not basic.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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FW 15

Dep 17

6 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Request Approval to Publish
The Penkovskiy Memoirs

1. Attached as Tab A is a precis of the second draft of the Penkovskiy Memoirs. The first draft was written in Russian by Peter Deryabin, assisted by the entire SR [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
As source material the tapes of all 45 meetings with Penkovskiy were reviewed. Other materials and reports submitted by Penkovskiy were also studied. The SR case officers who worked with Penkovskiy were consulted to get an insight into Penkovskiy as a person. The first draft of the Memoirs was then translated into English, preserving Penkovskiy's style (and often his exact words) and Russian flavor. Publication of the first draft of the Memoirs was delayed by objections of the British Intelligence Service, who were concerned about the effect on the case of Greville Wynne, then still in Soviet imprisonment.

2. After Wynne's release SR undertook to find a competent writer who could revise the Memoirs into a form more suitable for publication. Mr. Frank Gibney agreed to edit and rewrite the Memoirs. The second draft of the Memoirs was undertaken in accordance with the following premises:

a. The Memoirs were ostensibly smuggled out of the USSR after 25 August 1962, which date is the last one mentioned by Penkovskiy in the Memoirs. (At this time Penkovskiy already knew he was under heavy surveillance, and he purportedly smuggled out his Memoirs before his arrest, which we believe took place about 1 September 1962. For further comment on the plausibility of smuggling and other aspects of the ostensible acquisition of the document in the West, see Tab B.)

b. Clandestine operational details included in the story, which refer to the connection between Penkovskiy and the British and American intelligence services, come from overt sources. In December 1963 the Soviet Political Literature Publishing House in Moscow published the transcript of the Penkovskiy-Wynne trial.

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31 MAR 1992

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Our translation of this Soviet book not only provides the continuity for the Memoirs, interspersed as it is between the chapters; but it also provides us the basic information on Penkovskiy's espionage activities without the need to include any other specialized editorializing which could be attributed to CIA. The Wynne Memoirs published in the London Sunday Telegraph in September also provide valuable background and authentication material.

c. We should not try to glorify Penkovskiy. The picture of Penkovskiy-the-man which thus emerges is not only an accurate one, but also one which is interesting and believable.

d. Our fourth premise is that the placement of the book for both serialization and publishing should be done through commercial channels, taking into account the interest already expressed to CIA by certain media. (See Tab C for details on suggested publishers, syndicates for serialization, etc.)

3. Financing. We must early recognize that the financial income from the Penkovskiy Memoirs will be great. This includes income from newspaper syndication, the published book, foreign book rights, possible selection for Book-of-the-Month Club, and the very real possibility of an eventual movie or TV program based on the Memoirs. Mr. Gibney believes, and we agree, that a substantial sum should be charged for this material, because of the "If-it-is-given-free, no-one-will-appreciate-it" rule. After the normal deduction of the agent's fees, we believe the proceeds should go to a recognized anti-Communist organization. Problems relative to the allocation of the income from this book will be discussed the Office of the Legal Counsel and CDODS.

4. Timing. Publication of the Penkovskiy Memoirs has been complicated by the recent demise of Khrushchev. On the one hand, the press daily carries new comments and revelations about Khrushchev' downfall. It is clear that every hack Kremlinologist or purveyor of revelations will be in the act soon. As much of this horrendous revelation material begins to appear, it operates like an inexorable Gresham's Law to debase the currency in general. On the other hand, Penkovskiy's espionage activities were directed against the Khrushchev regime. The Chicago Tribune's recent American publication of Wynne's memoirs is good advance billing for our publication. The new Soviet leadership is still disorganized and might not marshal a good effort to discredit the Memoirs. We should take advantage of the news at this propitious moment to syndicate the Memoirs in a newspaper or magazine as quickly as possible. The earliest date we can expect for publication of the book is March/April 1965.

5. Approval Requested. Publication of the Memoirs was cleared by the DCI with Mr. McGeorge Bundy in 1963. We recognize that both the domestic and international political scene has been considerably altered since 1963. Therefore, we cannot assume that Mr. Bundy's early clearance for publication is still valid. However, we do not feel that the content of the Memoirs requires clearances from other U. S. Government agencies, such as State and the Department of Defense. Our early publication would be greatly expedited if we could limit further clearance within the Government to a new clearance from Mr. Bundy. Essentially, approva is requested for us to authorize Mr. Gibney to enter into negotiations for early syndication and publication of the book with the appropriate publishers we have suggested.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

APPROVED:

_____
Deputy Director for Plans

DATE: _____

[redacted]

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23 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with J. Bromley Smith

1. I met Mr. Smith at 1100 on 22 April at his office in the White House to discuss with him the inclusion of the Prikhodko Lecture in THE PENKOVSKIY PAPERS. I explained to Mr. Smith the importance we ascribe to the lecture as a part of the book in that it provides a unique documentary source for allegations of Soviet intelligence activities in the United States. I said that it was not only a convincing and impressive document but also one with several passages of considerable unconscious humor for the American reader at least. Mr. Smith appeared to accept the importance that we ascribe to the document without question.

2. I then informed him of the history of the document, explaining that Mr. Murphy had not taken it up with him earlier because at that time we had not received clearance on using it from the FBI, a clearance we now have. I then stated that approximately two years ago the release of the document by the Government, I thought by the Department of Justice, was contemplated, and the question at that time had been referred to the White House for a decision. I said that Mr. Helms's recollection of the circumstances was that President Kennedy had decided against releasing the document after consultation with Llewellyn Thompson, the basic reason for a negative decision being that the negotiations for the Test Ban Treaty were then underway with the Soviet Government. It was therefore considered inappropriate for the Government to release a document of this sort. I then pointed out that we considered that the circumstances of today are different in that negotiations of that type are not

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31 MAR 1992

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underway with the Soviet Government at present and, most importantly, that we now plan to incorporate the document in a book which will appear under private auspices rather than have it released by an official agency of the U. S. Government. I further said that in order to preserve the cover of private preparation of the PENKOVSKIY PAPERS, the lecture would be translated anew so that Agency participation in the preparation of the book could not be proved by comparison of the two English texts of the lecture. I noted that the introduction to this chapter says that it can be presumed that Penkovskiy also gave the lecture to his Anglo/American intelligence contacts.

3. Mr. Smith appeared to be favorably disposed toward the proposal, but said in view of the incident in 1963 he thought he ought to check with Mr. Bundy about it. He said that he would do so as soon as possible and let me know what the decision was by Saturday, 24 April.

4. I informed Mr. Smith that we were going to solicit Dean Acheson's support for the Penkovskiy Fund tomorrow morning. He asked that I call him to let him know how we made out. He said that he could not predict how Mr. Acheson might react.

5. (Prior to seeing Mr. Smith, I checked with [redacted] as to the advisability of raising the following item which I forgot to mention yesterday to the DDP. [redacted] urged me to take it up with Smith, and I did so.) I told Mr. Smith that Cornelius Ryan is a personal friend of mine and had recently telephoned me to say that he would be pleased to write or contribute to a speech for the President or some other high Government official on the anniversary of VE Day. Ryan's specific contribution would be a passage itemizing the massive extent of U. S. lend-lease to the Soviet Union during World War II. Ryan suggested that the subject might be led into by an observation concerning our current military aid to South Vietnam and the record of American military support to other countries fighting for their independence. Ryan has a complete itemized list of all the materials sent to the Soviet Union under lend-lease and believes that simply reading off major items on that list of materials would be a very impressive rebuttal of the frequently repeated Soviet charge that lend-lease was of minimal importance to the Soviet

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prosecution of the war. Mr. Smith said that he welcomed the offer greatly and that Mr. David Cline of his office was at present working on a draft of a Presidential speech for that occasion. He said he would take the matter up with Cline and ask that Cline call me about Ryan's participation.

Donald Jameson
Chief, SR[redacted]

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29 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

SUBJECT : Considerations re Declassifying Military Thought

1. Penkovskiy provided us with eight issues of the TOP SECRET version of Military Thought. These were published by us as a total of 74 CSDB reports (71 individual articles plus three tables of contents). He also provided us with two complete and one incomplete issues of the SECRET version of Military Thought. These were published by us as a total of 56 CSDB reports (53 individual articles and three tables of contents). These 130 CSDB reports are now classified SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD.

2. Of these 130 reports, 89 have been released to [redacted] and 61 have been released to other NATO countries plus a few others. Our decision to release them to liaison services was determined in large measure by the fact that because Penkovskiy had signed for these documents in the CRU Library, the Soviet damage assessment already included them. 1.3(a)(4)

3. Any downgrading of the classification of this material must be done in coordination with MI-6. We believe that, in addition to propaganda repercussions, the following probable ramifications should be taken into account in any decision to downgrade the classification to UNCLASSIFIED:

A. Intelligence Community Reaction: The Intelligence Community would probably react favorably (or at least not unfavorably) provided they received advance notice of the kind described in paragraph 4 below.

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31 MAR 1992

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[redacted]

B. Liaison Service Reaction: The net effect on liaison services would probably be negative for two reasons:

1) Declassifying reports passed to them would negate the purpose we allegedly had in releasing the reports in the first place, i.e., enhancing our liaison relationship by passing highly valuable, sensitive material. The negative effect of declassification would depend on what real effect the release had on our relationship. This will vary from service to service.

2) Liaison services would learn that we withheld a significant number of reports from them in a series which we had decided to pass. (The book, of course, implies the existence of still other material withheld.)

C. Soviet Reaction: Although our earlier release to liaison may very well have given the Soviets copies of the reports, declassification will insure their receipt of the series. This will upgrade the quality of their damage assessment of the case by confirming the consistent excellence of Penkovskiy's photography (98% read-out), thereby maximizing the damage assessment. Releasing the Russian language original to the general public (see para 3D below) would even further acquaint the Soviets with our photographic technique and its degree of success.

D. Public Reaction: Declassification would make a large volume of highly significant Soviet material available to students of Soviet affairs around the world, thus upgrading their competence to analyze subsequent Soviet developments. To be most useful to scholars, the Russian language original should also be released. This would require borrowing the Minox negatives from MI-6 and would have security ramifications (see para 3C above).

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. Prior to any overt downgrading of the classification of this material, an official notice should be sent to USIB agencies notifying them of our intentions and of concomitant changes in classification and dissemination controls of the intelligence reports. The CSDB reports per se cannot be downgraded lower than CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM because of their format and report numbers, but this much could be done along with notification to recipients that the substantive content could henceforth be treated as UNCLASSIFIED.

5. From a logistical standpoint, copies of the reports to be released outside the Intelligence Community would either have to be re-reproduced or physically sanitized by chopping off the top and bottom of each page and - for some reports - deleting various references scattered through the text. Time to be allowed for this would run from a few days to several weeks, depending on which method and how many copies were involved. It would make most sense to reassemble the material into its original sequence as it appeared in the various issues of Military Thought and present it in a single, coherent package.

[redacted]

Chief, SR/DB

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Distribution:
Original - CSR Division

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FN B
Copy 19

5 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: OF/[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

SUBJECT: Escrow Account, [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. The [redacted] trust account in the amount of $29,000 (FY 1962 - $23,000; FY 1963 - $6,000) can be liquidated. Please credit miscellaneous expenses.

2. Final settlement with the agent was made in FY 1966 and further communication is not anticipated.

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APPROVED [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Distribution:


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
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PLAN (DIAGRAM) FOR MARKING SIGNALS



APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

PLAN (DIAGRAM) OF DEAD DROP SITE AND ITS LOCATION



Description of Dead Drop Number 1

Address and Location:

Moscow, corner of Proezd Khudozhestvennogo Teatra and Pushkinskaya ulitsa. The dead drop is located in the main entrance (foyer) of Number 2, located on Pushkinskaya ulitsa--between the store Number 19 "Myaso" and the store "Zhenskaya obuv'."
The main entrance is open 24 hours a day. The entrance is not guarded, there is no elevator.
In the entrance (foyer)-to the left /upon entering therein/a dial telephone, No. 28, is located. Opposite the dial telephone /to the right as one goes into the entrance hall/ is a steam heat radiator, painted in oil paint in a dark green color. This radiator is supported by a single metal hook, fastened into the wall. /If one stands facing the radiator, then the metal hook will be to the right, at the level of one's hand hanging from the arm./
Between the wall, to which the hook is attached, and the radiator there is a space of two-three centimeters.
For the dead drop, it is proposed to use the hook and the space /open space/ between the wall and the radiator.


Method of Using the Dead Drop:

It is necessary to place and camouflage any written material, for example, in a match box, then, the box should be wrapped with soft wire /of a green color/, and the end of the wire bent hook-shaped, which will permit the small box to hang from the hook (or bracket) of the radiator between the wall and the radiator.

The location of the dead drop is on the unlighted right-hand corner of the entrance hall. In the entrance hall it is convenient to make a call on the dial telephone and it is very simple and easy to hang some type of small object on the indicated hook.

The site for placing the signal indicating that material has been placed in the drop, is located at a five minutes' ride from the dead drop /or a fifteen minutes' walk/. Thus the time that the material is in the dead drop can be held to a minimum.

I will await the signal indicating placing of the material in the dead drop after 12.00 and after 21.00 each day, beginning with 15.8.60.


лефон-автомат
батарея
место под-
вески мате-
риала,
крюк
Проезд Художественного театра
Магазин "Женская обувь"
Под езд №2
Магазин №19 " Мясо "
Книж-
ный ма-
газин
Пушкинская улица
Кузнецкий мост

В.76

КОРОЛЕВЕ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ ЕЛИЗАВЕТЕ 2.
ГОСПОДИНУ МАКМИЛЛАНУ

Совершенно секретно.

ГОСПОДИНУ КЕННЕДИ
ГОСПОДИНУ ДЖОНСОНУ
ГОСПОДИНУ РАСК
ГОСПОДИНУ МАКНАМАРА
ГОСПОДИНУ ЭЙЗЕНХАУЭРУ
ГОСПОДИНУ НИКСОНУ
ГОСПОДИНУ ГЕРТЕРУ
ГОСПОДИНУ ГЕЙТСУ
ГОСПОДИНУ БРАКЕРУ
ГОСПОДИНУ А.ДАЛЛЕСУ

Моя дорогая КОРОЛЕВА!
Мой дорогой ГОСПОДИН ПРЕЗИДЕНТ!
Мои дорогие ГОСПОДА!

В своем первом письме от 19.7.60. я уже сообщал о том, что по-новому осознал свое место в жизни, о своем решении и готовности посвятить себя Делу борьбы за настоящий, правдивый и свободный Мир для Человека. За это дело я буду бороться до конца.

Я прошу Вас считать и меня своим солдатом. Пусть отныне Ваши Вооруженные Силы увеличатся на одного человека.
В моей преданности, твердости, самоотверженности и решительности в борьбе за Ваше /теперь и мое/ Дело - можете не сомневаться.
Вы не раз будете довольны мной, не раз вспомните меня добрым словом. Ваше признание - я завоюю. Для этого не потребуется много времени.

У меня несколько личных просьб.

1. Прошу рассмотреть вопрос о предоставлении мне со временем гражданства США, или Великобритании.
Прошу также присвоить мне по Вашему усмотрению воинское звание армии США. Я имею достаточные знания и опыт, и не только сейчас, но и в будущем могу принести определенную пользу, работая непосредственно в США, о чем очень мечтаю.

2. Прошу Ваших указаний об осторожной, продуманной, конспиративной работе со мной со стороны Ваших работников.

3. В настоящее время я вручаю ряд материалов, собранных за последний год. Прошу Вашего указания об оценке их и об определении положенной суммы за эти труды, т.к. особых накоплений а меня нет, а деньги в будущем потребуются. Положенные мне суммы прошу поместить в один из банков США.

Таковы мои личные просьбы.

Еще раз заверяю Вас о своей безграничной любви и уважении к Вам, к Американскому Народу и ко всем тем, кто находится под Вашим Знаменем. Я верю в Ваше Дело. Готов выполнять любые Ваши приказы. Я жду их.

Остаюсь, всегда Ваш ....

14.8.60.
/см.н/об./ 9.4.61.
[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

П Е Р Е Ч Е Н Ь

посылаемых материалов и документов:

1. Список слушателей ВДА, приема 1960г.	(Управление) 1 лист+2 лист
2. Оперативный код	2 листа. Ор.
3. Описание ракеты "ЗР1"	2 листа.
4. Ракеты "ЗР2" и "ЗР3"	2 листа.
5. Ракета "ЗР7"	1 лист.
6. Устройство пусковой установки "2П2"	6 листов и 4 фотокопии
7. Устройство "2П5"	2 листа.
8. Устройство "2П6"	4 листа.
9. Разное к Т.Р.А.	2 листа.
10. Описание ракеты "Р-1"	3 листа (не полный).
11. Ракета "Р-2"	11 листов.
12. Ракета "Р-11"	7 листов.
13. Ракета "В-75"	6 листов. Ор.
14. Наземное оборудование управляемых ракет	12 листов.
15. Разное к управляемым ракетам	6 листов.
16. Некоторые факты о неблаговидной деятельности Хрущева	1 лист, 1 лист и 2 приложения о Мелехе + 1 лист.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

17. Личное письмо от 25.12.60 – на 1 листе.

18. Настоящее письмо – 1 лист.

Babb Johnson with GDX 04 0,1160

(50)

C: Ya proshu vas mne pomoch. As I recall.

B: Ya proshu

C: vas mne pomoch. .....and then he says ....

B: Did he give any reasons for what he was doing? His motivation.

C: This is what Henry couldn't understand and this is what bothered me at the time. We asked him why and his answer was probably that he was tired of the regime. In fact, we asked/him what life, are you a Communist. Just right out point blank, are you a Communist? And he says byl.

B: Byl.

C: Byl.

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3 1 MAR 1992

B: It means I was. What was the impression there--that he was a Communis in spirit or actually a member of the CP?

C: My impression was that he was a communist in spirit. I don't think he was a Party member. But this was the impression that I got. But Henry just turned to him and said point blank are you a Communist? And he says byl. And then he asked then he said he had very important information that to give to the government and he asked is it possible for us to give--these are not his exact words--but if it would be possible to give the information to a .....and

B: Did you respond?

C: Yes, I said if we could be of assistance we don't care, as I recall, I said that we didn't want to create trouble. Because at some time in the future we might want to come back to the Soviet Union but I think he said something about that he. We didn't have to know the knowledge ourselves or some such thing. But then he told us about this U-2 incident and I couldn't understand why unless he was trying to convince us about the importance of the information he had to give us and he made reference to these two letters. And then he started describing the U-2 incident and the RB-47 incident both. ..give us all the details of ...

B: Could you repeat this?

C: Yes. He said he described the U-2 incident first. He said the U-2 was shot down and there was never a direct hit. He said not one but 14 rockets were fired and in the process, well they destroyed one of their own planes that was tracking, following him. And it was some Lt. He didn't give the name. I asked him, did he know the name of the lieutenant and he said no. Therewas a lieutenant though killed in that flight.

B: What kind of a plane was it?

C: He said It was a fighter plane. I asked was it a bomber, fighter. He says fighter

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

but he didn't give me the type. I don't know.

B: Are you sure he didn't [redacted] say Mig?

C: No he didn't say--he didn't give the type. Except for the fact that he said it was a fighter plane "TOCHNO"

B: But he said fourteen?

C: Fourteen. I asked him [redacted] two or three times about it. I said are you sure. He said yes.

B: All right. May I ask you this now.

C: He said "chytirsatsad raket".

B: He didn't say what kind of "raket".

C: No. And he said that ....

B: Ground to air or air to air?

C: I asked him that - air to air? - I asked him "From the plane?". He said No, the plane wasn't equipped with rockets. Or, wait a while- did he say - no, I believe he said the plane wasn't equipped with rockets. That he had machine guns but the rockets - were any of them from the plane. He said no, they were all from the ground.

B: He certainly had a specific figure - 14. Not many or several or few but exactly 14.

C: This I couldn't understand either. He kept repeating the figure 14.

B:: Did he say where he had the information from?

C: I said Do you have direct access to this and he said no, from a friend.

B: Did he describe his friend - from the air force, military or anything?

C: No, he said he was a - how did he put it? - that's all he said "An officer friend". But he wouldn't tell me what service he was in or what his rank was.

B: He said there were no direct hits?

C: No direct hits. [redacted] He said that apparently either the concussion from one of the rockets came close and either the concussion caused the engine to malfunction or else perhaps some shrapnel - at least it came close and this - there was no direct hit.

B: Did he refer to engines or are you forming impressions now?

C: No, let me think now - most of this was in English except the RB*47. On the RB-47 he reverted to Russian. But when he came to the number, I asked him to repeat it in Russian and he verified this, he said exactly 14 rockets.

1.3(a)(4)

B: Did he use the English work "rockets"?

C: Yes, but he said it both in English and in Russian but re the RB-47, I don't believe he used one word of English on that - he used all Russian - he spoke English fairly well. In fact, I'd say almost - as far as military language, he knew more English than we did Russian.

B: Let me read this "One rocket burst near the U-2 causing it to go out of control and fall spinning to earth".

C: Yes, that's right. He said the pilot lost consciousness so he acutally knew nothing about the thing- what happened.

B: The pilot lost consciousness - right after the burst?

C: Yes, he said it went out of control and they claim the pilot made a statement as to what went on but he says he couldn't know because he lost consciousness.

B: Next statement is "As the U-2 went spinning to earth Powers ejected". That sounds as if he was conscious. You see, I don't have much faith in the transmission of information from individual A to B to C. That's why I'm asking you these questions.

C: This I couldn't understand either. How could he eject if he was unconscious. He said the pilot - how did he say it? - this may have been the case where he made the statement and we didn't understand it and he had to say it in English.

B: Is this correct then - the first statement I read "One rocket burst near the U-2 causing it to go out of control.." - why? The U-2 is a very delicate instrument, as I understand it. Was it just out of control by being thrown off just like a fellow who is running very quickly -give him a little nudge and he'll fall to the ground. Whereas no actual damage was received.

C: This is what I couldn't understand. Was it shrapnel or concussion or what? But he did say that Powers was unconscious - he was unconscious the whole time. But this had me puzzled too. How could he eject? Unless - is there an automatic mechanism that could kick the pilot out or - I don't know.

B: He was unconscious when he hit the ground?

C: He said that he was unconscious all the whole time - he couldn't have known what went on.

B: Did he say anything about the altitude at which Powers was flying?

C: Yes, he said it was strictly high - that the plane could not get up to him.

B: But the rockets reached at that altitude?

whistling on tape

C: I can't tell you.

B: What else did he tell you about the U-2?

C: He did make the comment "How could the U-2 receive a direct hit if it wasn't

1.3(a)(4)

torn up. He said if it would have received a direct hit - then it would have disintegrated.

B: There a statement here "There was a MIG-19 trailing the U-2 at a lower altitude".

C: MIG-19? Did he say that?

B: Did he say MIG-19 or MIG-17 or what. Before it was said that the RB-47 was shot down by a MIG-19.

C: This I remember - that the 19 was connected with the 47 but I don't remember that the 19 was connected with the U-2. He mentioned that the MIG-19 was at a lower altitude to the 47 now why .....

B: Were those his exact words "lower altitude".

C: Yes, yes. In the case of the 47, he said the 47 was out of the range of the 19. Which seems odd to me, I thought the 19 could go as high as the 47. But he made out like it could not. It was too high or it and couldn't use his machine guns. He had to use his rockets. And it the rockets that brought him down.

B: The RB-47 was brought down by rockets?

C: Yes but he said it was not over the mainland either. I asked him how far. He said many kilometers from the shore. Then I said "It glided to shore or what". He said yes - it was hit but it was not destroyed. I guess there were two or three survivors.

B: This is what he said or-----?

C: I asked him if anyone lived from it -- he didn't know.

B: But he did say the RB-47 glided to land.

C: Yes, I don't know if he said "glided". I remember the reference of being hit, the plane was lower, and that the aircraft was hit but I can't remember whether he said it glided all the way to land or not.

B: Did he say the RB-47 was over internation waters?

C; Yes, mezhdunarodnaya vodoi, I believe these were the words but he did use the word "international", though. Yes, and he said there was no question it was not over Soviet territory.

B: Was there anything else that during this whole conversation--did he? Well, he was on the train from Kiev, he said. Did he say that was his home? Did he give any clue? Why was he on the train? Was he on a vacation?

C: He was on a vacation, but I can't remember whether he was on vacation from Moscow or from Kiev. Seems to me he was on vacation in Moscow.

B: This we'll have to establish.

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

C. I can't. I absolutely cannot recall.

B: Well wait awhile he had been carrying these letters since

C: ..... Yes he was. It seems to me he said he had--no--I'm just kicking around thoughts here. If he weren't on leave in Moscow then how could hex set up a date to be met. The ?? runs in my mind that he wanted to be met on th fifth day. ....and advised him of.

B: Met by whom?

C: A representative of him. And he said it's not to take place on the 16th, not to take place on the 17th, 18th and on and on but how could he do that if he didn't live in the area.

B: Did he say these exact words that he would like to be met on?

C: Yes, he said it describes in one side envelope where I was to be met and at what time. And he said the sixteenth is the date. But apparently he didn't pu inside there that he would be there. He said that if everything is set up for the (sounds like) sixteenth.

B: And it's not the fifteenth, he said the sixteenth?

C: Yes, he said the sixteenth or the day after or the day after and I could almost swear that he said forever.

B: Oh really.

C: He said that the sixteenth, if it's not the sixteenth, the seventeenth then he says and so forth. I could almost swear he said ~~na vsegda~~. Na vsegda.

B: Na vsegda.

C: I could swear he said that but I cannot remember for sure. But my impression was that he was going to keep coming back to this same place, keep coming back until he made his contact.

B: Well this would lead you to believe that he lived in Moscow?

C: Yes. The leave must have been in Kiev but with his Ukrainian accent he must have been there at some time or other. But it runs in my mind that he must hav been on leave in Kiev.

B: Did he give any indication as to who he was? Or what he was doing?

C: It runs in my mind that he was connected with the military but what rank, he never quoted his name or like hex I say I could almost swear that I heard the word colonel used once but he said--oh--now I remember. He said. I said who are you and all these things, what is your rank and number. He these questions will all be answered at the Embassy when they see what is inside here. He said you won't have any trouble knowing who I am. He said they know me. And we asked if any time in the futre would he care to come to the West? He said he thought so maybe in a couple of years.

B: Did he give the impression that [redacted] come out or that he hoped to come out. A wish or fond desire or did he give the impression that he might go out 1.3(a)(4)

on a [redacted] kommandirovka or with some/ Soviet Embassy?

C: No. It was permanent. Flee to the West. I used the word pobezhat. Pobezhat.

B: Defect in other words./ C: Yes. And he said maybe in a couple of years.

B: And he didn't give any indication as to how?

C: No. And, of course, the thought that came to mind was his family. Maybe he would want--what would he dowith his family if he himself came to the West and I think I asked him what about his family and it runs in my mind that he was going to try to get them out with him but the question dropped. He said well this is not important--the important thing is to get this information to authorities? Then I asked may I give you our address. If you ever get outside the Iron Curtain/you can write me or call or [redacted] anything. Call long distance collect or whatever could we help. He said no. He was afraid to write, to record it, because if it was ever found that would be it. But he said you won't have any trouble knowing who I am because when you deliver this, everybody will know who I am.

and you need help

B: He gave you two envelopes?

C: Two envelopes.

B: They were sealed.

C: Yes. He said one contained a letter from himself, instructions and that sort of thing, and the other contained a very important document.

B: What color was the envelope?

C: It was sort of an off color green or ....green turquoise, or light blue.

B: Anything written on the envelope?

C: Nothing. Just sealed blank envelopes and there was no seal or writing?. He was very very careful and Iput the letters in my pocket and I never took them out or looked at them until I got to the Embassy. He asked that we not open them.

B: And you didn't?

C: And we didn't. We discussed at length and it was right near the [redacted] end of the rendez-vous that he finally did give us the envelopes. As far as the possibility of being photographed, if we were, it would have been from one of the buildings across the street. We walked along the path right next to the river and if we were photographed, it would have been from across the street where the telephone lines interran through--

B: You accepted the envelopes at what point now? You said you walked here and [redacted] then you retraced. Did you retrace the whole time?

C: No, just once.

B: And then where did the path take [redacted] along.

1.3(a)(4)

C: Around here I think. We went down and I think right along in there. In other words, we went down a ways and then back and then the path comes out there.

B: You received it then and then you walked a couple blocks.

C: Yes.

B: Coming back to his motiviation you pressed on it a bit--were there any personal reasons that you could detect? How did you phrase that before--fed up?

C: Yes. Let's see how did he --

B: Now this is the ___, now this is the bridge you were talking about here.

C: (Portion muffled). ....cigarette here on that corner there. The bridge was here? Yes. Balchuk was right in here. That doesn't seem right though./ There was a street here. There was a street car that runs along here.

B: You don't remember the names of the street or the street you went up?

C: No.

B: But you would say it was how many blocks from the bridge?

C: Well we didn't go anymore than--to this street here--no more than two blocks.

B: Maybe one?

C: It would have had to been an awful long block. I think that it was about two blocks unless it was an awful long one. I believe it was two.

B: Do you know where the British Embassy is?

C: No, Sir, I've never been there.

B: In Moscow?

C: No. If I was ever there, I don't remember it.

B: Well coming back to this motivation again--try to recall what he said.

C: I'm trying to remember if it was some single incident or process of years or he had a personal grudge or someone in his family suffered or what. I am at a lost here. ..... I don't think that I had indicated anything to the Embassy either as I recall.

B: Now this Soviet citizen claims to be an infantry officer. Did you say that, Infantyy. Who was formerly a Communist but is no longer one. We'll clarify that.

C: Yes. Infantry--no, I don't recall that at all. In fact, I don't even recall the word for infantry. What is the word for infantry?

B: I don't recall either. You see why I don't trust the . Could he have said Red Army?

C: I don't recall.

B: Well we're coming close to the end of the tape. Are you hungry. (Discussion about stopping for lunch).
Well did you have a feeling of conference in this guy? 1.3(a)(4)

I gather that you did.

C: Yes, I did, In the case of Mr. _____, I was more confident.

B: You had more time with Him?


C: Yes, more time. The .. of a halfhour meeting was more difficult. I mulled over in my mind and before I took those envelopes, I said well this is it. Is it worth the risk? I said well if the information is there then it is worth the risk. I took the envelopes. In other words if it had been a propaganda buildup well they just kicked a couple out and it was a very definite calculated risk. But I decided that if the information was there (END OF TAPE).

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

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
them, but Compass has little sympathy. The UOTurn is a dangerous one against traffic and Compass laid on the rule for State drivers on the simple basis of safety. As mentioned to Betty, the dispatcher of the drivers in the GSA office, Compass does not want to die in Moscow and at no time, under no circumstances, shall any State driver make a U-Turn in front of JIC. I didn't lose my temper although they might (the Soviets) have thought that I did. I was planning on regular noon-time, and dinner-time observation of Turchanin St. It was all based on safety reasons and Compass will stick to his guns for he neither wants a smashup of a car nor does he want to be smashed up, because of a Soviet driver's carelessness - for convenience. They can wash cars all day long as far as Compass is concerned, and not sit on their "what do you call thems" in the chauffeurs' shack at the Embassy.


9. Compass is lost as far as what he has reported on JIC as a drop site so will repeat what he thinks is necessary. The wall intersection - which can be identified from the plans previously forwarded - with the house proper, has a two bulb light just at this point. Compass would trust no one to say that there was or there was not surveillance, but would instruct the man - CHALK - to be prepared to make a quick heave over a twelve foot wall as though he were throwing away a package of "dirty pictures" or a book he'd prefer not to be caught with. He should practice with snow balls over twelve feet walls before he tries JIC. (Compass is not ignoring but taking into consideration your advices re the use of JIC but has not the time to analyse them all. What is now being said includes consideration of your objections and guidance.) The dog situation, the lighting of the back yard, the access of the back yard, can all be handled by Compass on the basis of being sick with too much drink, interest in the dog, loneliness, and anything else that will take care of getting out in the backyard at the right time and with a good excuse. Plan on the wall. If CHALK buys it we will know soon enough. Anything that comes over the wall, except for a person which has not happened since Compass has been here, Compass has all the reasons he needs to get the package to himself.


10. There are many personality conflicts, inter-service rivalries, and housing problems here in the city, and at JIC which complicate rather than simplify the problem. Realising the absolute need, despite the personal problems, Compass hopes that what is sent here will enable you to make up a plan for CHALK. Compass is as anxious, and perhaps more so than those of you at home, that this will work out.

11. The position from which CHALK works, however, limits his social and representational opportunities. Thank the Lord for that. Otherwise, I'd probably not be able to control my social mobility as well as Compass has been able to do recently. Just give the instructions for time and place and Compass will be able - almost without exception - to comply.

12. Des, 10 - I will be spending [illegible] can find more in addition to that here [illegible] typewriter. Prospect work [illegible]


CRANE
#1 ENTRANCE — APTS. 1-18(?)
BARRICADE FENCE ON SIDEWALK AS REPAIRS BEING DONE ON BLDG.
SHOE STORE
PUSH KIN ST.
#2 ENTRANCE - APTS. 18-26(?)
LOCKED ENTR. TO MEAT STORE
10 WINDOWS
#3 ENTRANCE - APTS. 26-35(?)
OFFICE SUPPLY STORE.
SOLE REGULAR ENTR. TO MEAT STORE #19(?)
MEAT DELIVERY, 4' X 4' SPACE NOT POSSIBLE FOR CUSTOMER ENTRANCE.
THEATRE ST.


MAP # 2
#19
#16
#15
KALUZHSKAYA METRO
#14
GORKIY PARK
"JIG"
BRIDGE - KRIMSKIY MOST'
METRO "PARK KUL'TURIY. IM. GOR'KOGO"
SHKOLA-INTERNAT #19 OF FRUNZE RAION. (PERMANENT OBSERVATION SITE OF JIG COURTYARD.


BRICK WALL 10' HIGH.
APT. HSE
DARK AREAWAY
CLASSROOMS
CLASSROOMS
IN THIS HSE. KROPOTKIN WAS BORN IN 1842. SEE
BOL'SHAYA SOU. ENTS
APT.
DRIVEWAY
RUSSIAN SCHOOL BLDG.
#28
VEHICLE GATE
PLAYGROUND
#26
SLIDE
KROP. PEREULOK
SHCHUKINA UL.
BIG APT. HSE.
KROP. UL.
PEDESTRIAN GATE

[redacted]

Box 6 Fr 32 (64)

1.3(a)(4)

SUBJECT: The 1 May U-2 Incident and Powers' Fate

DATE OF INFO : May 1960 - Mid 1961

SOURCE : A reliable Soviet source (B) who was in an excellent position to acquire this information

Note: The following is an expansion of [redacted] of 30 November 1960. The informant of that report is the source of this one. 1.3(a)(4)

DO transcript info

1. When the U-2 flew over the USSR on 1 May 1960, there were only two V-75 surface-to air missile battalions in the Sverdlovsk area. /SR/Report note: This statement is false; there were more than two according to aerial photography./ They were on alert because of the holiday. When they received word that a hostile aircraft was flying overhead, both battalions opened fire and 14 missiles were launched. No direct hits were made.

2. The U-2, which was already being followed by a MIG-19, did not fly directly over the position of the zone of fire of either V-75 battalion. /SR/Report note: Is this relevant?/ Nevertheless, it was within the radius of explosion of one of the V-75 missiles.[1] As a result of this explosion, the U-2's tail and wing assembly were slightly damaged and the pilot, Powers, sustained a concussion.[2] While parachuting down, Powers blacked out several times, He was unconscious when he landed and when everything on his was seized. (According to DPD, this last sentence is not true.)

3/ Powers was brought to Moscow by plane, where he was met by KGB Chief Shelepin and an interpreter. They took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, where he was fed and given medical treatment for his concussion. /SR/Report note: it was apparent from the trial that the KGB handled the case./

4. There was dissatisfaction in military circles that Powers was not turned over to the General Staff, since his flight was considered a military intrusion and his plane had been downed by a military unit. The GRU did not, however, become involved in the case.

5. Source expressed the opinion in mid-1961 that Powers would never be released except in an exchange. He suggested that an exchange with GRU officer

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[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

Igor Melekh might have been possible. [SR/Report note: Melekh left the U.S. on 8 April 1961, prior to source's comment.] [xxAccording to DPD, the concept of an exchange was being discussed between US and Soviet authorities prior to source's comments.]

1. Source Comment: Powers would have escaped if he had flown one or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path, not to the left.

2. Source Comment: The broken parts of the plane were not displayed at the Moscow exhibition.

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

(65)

[redacted]

Cop 6 FN 32 1.3(a)(4)

The U-2 Incident of 1 May 1960

1.3(a)(4)

The following additional information from the informant of [redacted] of 30 November 1960 expands that report. Parts underlined in red appeared in the earlier report.

1. Two V-75 surface-to-air missile battalions in the Sverdlovsk area, on alert because of the holiday, opened fire and launched 14 missiles at the U-2 which flew overhead on 1 May 1960. No direct hits were made.

2. The U-2, which was already being followed by a MIG-19, did not fly directly over the position of the zone of fire of either V-75 battalion. Nevertheless, it was within the radius of explosion of one of the V-75 missiles.[1] As a result of this explosion, the U-2's tail and wing assembly were slightly damaged and the pilot, Powers, sustained a concussion.[2] While parachuting down, Powers blacked out several times. He was unconscious when he landed and when everything on him was seized.

Powers U

3. Powers was brought to Moscow by plane, where he was met by KGB Chief Shelepin and an interpreter. They took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, where he was fed and given medical treatment for his concussion.

4. There was dissatisfaction in military circles that Powers was not turned over to the General Staff, since his flight was considered a military intrusion and his plane had been downed by a military unit. The GRU did not, however, become involved in the case.

5. Source expressed the opinion in mid-1961 that Powers would never be released except in an exchange. He suggested that an exchange with GRU officer Igor Melekh might have been possible. [Note: Melekh left the U. S. on 8 April 1961, prior to source's comment.]

6. On 5 May 1960, Khrushchev ordered a suspension of agent operations to avoid possible political ramifications. [Note: duration unknown.]

1. Source Comment: Powers would have escaped if he had flown one or one and a half kilometers to the right of his flight path, not to the left.

2. Source Comment: The broken parts of the plane were not displayed at the Moscow exhibition.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

(69)

Fn 22

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] OPERATIONAL PLAN

I. CASING OF DROP SITE

It is proposed that we brief [redacted] immediately, instructing him to case this area thoroughly. It is envisioned that [redacted] should first stroll past the drop site for external observations, and later, at an interval of several days, enter the site area and place a telephone call to a pre-arranged contact or absenteed Embassy acquaintance--whose absence has been previously ascertained. (See Annex I for detailed casing brief for [redacted] guidance.) 1.3(a)(4)

II. CASING OF SIGNAL SITE

After a thorough casing and examination of the proposed dead drop site, [redacted] should case the signal site proposed by [redacted] This casing can be done simultaneously with the casing of the dead drop site since it is believed that it is unnecessary to physically enter the signal site proper. In fact, the undersigned urges that [redacted] not enter the signal site area (to use the phone) for security reasons. A passing, external inspection should be sufficient. (See Annex III for signal site brief for [redacted] guidance.) 1.3(a)(4)

III. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WITH [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

A. Loading Pre-selected Drop

1. Upon receipt of [redacted] detailed casing information regarding site characteristics and [redacted] determination of [redacted] date of arrival in Helsinki, it isproposed that CSR/9 and/or the undersigned (or CSR/9's designee(s)) proceed to Helsinki for the purpose of briefing and further training [redacted] to put down the pre-selected drop. The actual drop will consist of acknowledgement of [redacted] first communication and a detailed plan designed to enable [redacted] to deposit additional materials in a drop selected and affording maximal control by CIA. (See outgoing communications from [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

*See Annex II for [redacted] background. 1.3(a)(4)

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2. The drop packet and contents will be prepared at Headquarters and should be hermetically sealed (to deter opening by [redacted] as well as to protect the contents) and colored to match the dark green radiator drop site. CSR/9 will hand-carry the packet to Helsinki for transmittal to [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

3. In Helsinki, [redacted] will be given intensive briefing on the general and specific locale, avenue(s) of approach, loading, security factors, aborting measures, possible entrapment including KGB M. O. against [redacted] if apprehended, use of telephone to call wife, exiting direction, and signalling technique and procedure. To give realism to the briefing, a building with foyer area, similar to the actual drop site, will attempted to be found in the Helsinki area and actual practice(s) will be performed. 1.3(a)(4)

4. [redacted] will then be given the packet to secrete upon himself as he returns to Moscow. (Note: [redacted] has a diplomatic passport and has previously reported that he has never been searched or asked to declare his personal items to Customs.) Upon arrival in Moscow, [redacted] will transfer the packet to his maximum security safe to which he alone has the key and combination. The safe is located in a secure building. (If preferred, the packet could be retained upon his body until the drop is effected.) 1.3(a)(4)

5. As soon as possible, [redacted] will make a dry run up Pushkinskaya Ulitsa for the purpose of external casing and orientation of the building drop site. At an interval of several days, he will make the actual drop preferably just before dusk, late in the day. It is suggested that consideration be given to [redacted] proceeding along Kuznetskiy Most, turning abruptly right onto Pushkinskaya Ulitsa, and, at his normal (fast) pace, proceeding directly into the drop site locale and emplacing the drop. An alternative method might be to proceed down Kuznetskiy Most and observe the window displays" in Meat Store No. 19, turning onto Pushkinskaya Ulitsa, (still window shopping in the Meat Store), pause and then proceed into the building site and place a call to his wife inquiring as to what kind of meat or kolbasa his wife prefers him to purchase. This would give him a convincing cover for the use of the phone, although his surveillants might be closer because he slowed down to window shop. 1.3(a)(4)

6. If, for any reason, [redacted] is obliged to abort the actual loading of the drop, then he should make, at this time, only one more attempt at an interval of approximately one week. If a second attempt must be made, [redacted] should use the alternate plan for approach and not the exact one as before. 1.3(a)(4)

7. After successful loading of the drop, [redacted] should allow at least one day to pass, but not more than two, before he puts down the pre-selected signal at the pre-designated site. On the basis of [redacted] casing report, [redacted] can proceed to this site and mark the loading signal with a red crayon or pen. 1.3(a)(4)

IV. OUTGOING COMMUNICATION FROM [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

A. It is proposed that in our message to [redacted] that we inform him of the following method in which he may communicate with us: 1.3(a)(4)

1. [redacted] will be instructed that the American House, No. 3 KROPOTKINSKAYA NABERZHNAYA, will be the locale for the drop. He will be instructed to proceed down the right side of TURCHANIN Ulitsa (toward the Moscow River) at a specified date and time, and as he passes the wall surrounding the American House courtyard, throw the drop package over the wall. [redacted] will be in place on the otherside of the wall to retrieve the package. (See attached diagram and 1955 photos of this area - Annex IV.) 1.3(a)(4)

2. Upon receipt of package [redacted] will secrete it upon himself and return immediately to the Embassy for inclusion of package in pouch. NOTE: Dependent upon the circumstances and [redacted] recommendations, it may be more propitious to use the Marine NCO (highly recommended by [redacted] for actual transport of the drop packet to the Embassy. Thus, [redacted] could leave empty-handed and upon safe-arrival at the Embassy could telephone [redacted] at the American House. This would be the signal for [redacted] to instruct the Marine NCO to leave for the Embassy. However, such action might not be amenable to [redacted] without Ambassadorial knowledge and concurrence. 1.3(a)(4)

3. The afore-mentioned plan is contingent upon [redacted] casing of the area and his recommendations for implementing the plan. (A briefing guide is attached as Annex V for [redacted] guidance.) 1.3(a)(4)

ANNEX I

1. As soon as possible, [redacted] should take a stroll up the right-hand side of PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa (going toward SADOVAYA) and closely observe Building No. 2, situated between the Women's Shoe Store and Meat Store No. 19, located near the intersection of PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa and KUZNETSKIY MOST. (See Attachment No. 1 - map of area.) 1.3(a)(4)

2. During [redacted] walk-by and visual inspection of Building No. 2 and the immediate vicinity, the following detailed information is desired: 1.3(a)(4)

a. What type of building does No. 2 appear to be? Apartment-house, shop, restaurant, warehouse, etc.?

b. Would a Westerner be able to enter the ground floor to use the telephone without arousing undue attention?

c. Is the telephone booth visible when walking past the building?

d. Are there any windows flanking the entrance which would enable passersby to look into the lobby or foyer on the ground floor?

e. Was the presence of any type of possible fixed security forces noted in the immediate vicinity?

f. Note surveillance patterns on [redacted] in this area and the closeness of [redacted] surveillants, if possible (without arousing their suspicions). 1.3(a)(4)

g. Did [redacted] note any people transiting (entering or departing) or loitering in the lobby/foyer of Building No. 2 as [redacted] passed? 1.3(a)(4)

h. What type of building is located directly across the street from Building No. 2 with respect to its adaptability as an observation post?

NOTE: To facilitate [redacted] ability to observe the numerous items enumerated above, it is suggested that [redacted] pause at several stores along PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa to "window shop." In fact, 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] might window shop at the [illegible] on the corner of PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa and KUZNETSKIY MOST (note location on attached map) and even enter and purchase a book. Upon exiting [redacted] could cross the street and window shop in Meat Store No. 19. With regard to the meat store, CIA would be interested in knowing if there is an entrance on KUZNETSKIY MOST as well as on PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa. Also what are the operating hours of the meat shop? 1.3(a)(4)

3. At an interval of several days, preferably at dusk, [redacted] should walk toward PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa past the PROEZD KHUDOZHESTVENNOGO TEATRA, turn right onto PUSHKINSKAYA Ulitsa and enter Building No. 2 and place a telephone call (telephone No. 28) to a friend in the Embassy. (This call should be pre-arranged to [redacted] or so arranged that [redacted] will know that the recipient of the call is not present to answer the call.) The location of the telephone is contained in the attached map and is situated to the left of the entrance. 1.3(a)(4)

4. The following detailed information is desired in conjunction with this casing/observation plan:

a. Surveillance: Number and pattern. Did any follow [redacted] into Building No. 2? Is it possible to enter Building No. 2 before the surveillance turns the corner? 1.3(a)(4)

b. Sketch and describe interior of foyer or lobby.

(1) Are there apt to be people loitering inside?

(2) Where are the stairs located?

(3) What color are the walls? Type of floor?

(4) What type of lighting is used in the lobby? How bright?

(5) Is phone booth illuminated?

(6) Note any other entrances or exits.

c. Particularly note dark green radiator near wall, opposite telephone booth, and to right of the entrance.

(1) Match green color as close as possible with colors from your chart. Is finish flat or shiny? New or old? Is it smooth or cracked and peeling.

(2) If [redacted] can determine a standard green available in Moscow, and visual observation confirms that this is the same shade of green as the radiator, he may possibly be able to duplicate it from Embassy stocks. 1.3(a)(4)

(3) It may be that the paint inside other Moscow building entrances is similar in color to that of the radiator site. Therefore, [redacted] may be able to get a sample, away from the site, after he has observed the radiator coloring. 1.3(a)(4)

(4) How high is radiator off of floor? Length?

(5) Note peculiar or distinguishing characteristics.

(6) What is the approximate distance between wall and back of radiator?

(7) What are the lighting conditions here?

(8) Is the hook visible? What color is the hook?

(9) Would a small packet, the color of the radiator, be visible to people entering or loitering in the foyer/ lobby?

(10) Are there knobs or dials for manual operation of the radiator?

(11) When will central heat be turned on in Moscow?

NOTE: In order to observe radiator area closely, [redacted] might, if he deems it secure, loiter just briefly near the radiator before exiting. [redacted] could be buttoning his coat, lighting a cigarette, blowing nose, etc.) 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

ANNEX II

The utilization of [redacted] in the project [redacted] presupposes that a risk assessment has been resolved in favor of using [redacted] instead of an unprotected American tourist. The involvement of [redacted] also is predicated on the fact that because of the prohibition on the use of American Embassy personnel, no active support can be rendered by CIA staff agents attached to the American Embassy, Moscow. The decision to use the services of [redacted] was based on the above premises plus the fact that [redacted] has diplomatic immunity, that he is trained in operational support tasks, capable, well motivated, and has already established operational patterns. Moreover, in case of a provocation, no American would be involved directly. On the debit side of the ledger, it should be noted that [redacted] is not CIA controlled (joint liaison operation), that he will probably render a full report of his operational involvement to his superiors, that [redacted] will become involved in this operation, and that [redacted] must be met in Helsinki in order to rehearse all steps of the plan and to give Subject the drop instrument.

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

ANNEX III

SIGNAL SITE CASING

1. Approach from Ulitsa GORKOGO going toward Ulitsa PUSHKINSKAYA via KOZITSKIY Pereulok. Walk on right side of street. Window-shop in vegetable-fruit store which is next to site (House 2, Korpus 8).

2. Determine type of installation where telephone is located.

3. Is telephone (and signal site) visible from sidewalk? Are there windows on ground floor level?

4. Would a Westerner have normal access in terms of using telephone or is telephone so hidden that passersby would never be aware of its existence? Are there any written signs or overt indications that there is a telephone booth in this location?

5. Observe any taxi stands or possible fixed surveillance/observation points near this building.

6. Notice if any people are loitering near entrance to building or situated across the street.

7. If you can observe interior through window or open door as you pass by, describe in detail interior arrangements.

8. Observe type of building(s) opposite (across the street) from signal site.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

4. The advantages of this type of outgoing communication from [redacted] is that, if this operation is being mounted by the KGB as a provocation, it puts the opposition in an extremely difficult position in terms of making a positive identification of [redacted] and of physically apprehending him. Thus it affords CIA stricter control of the drop and area than heretofore has been possible for internal drop unloading. 1.3(a)(4)

5. It is proposed that [redacted] be informed that "our man" will be available, i.e., waiting on the other side of the wall, precisely at 2300 hours (e.g.) on each Saturday for four concurrent weeks. "Our man" will be instructed to be in place at 2255 and remain in place until circa 2305. In the event that something is amiss, "our man" will give a danger signal, e.g., sing or whistle a familiar tune. Moreover, a precise spot along the wall will be located for [redacted] to throw the packet. 1.3(a)(4)

6. [redacted] will have the option of aborting the proposed action as he passes the drop spot. If the operation is clean, [redacted] only security worry will be the presence and/or location of Soviet citizens in the imme diate area. However, in the past, this street has been dimly lit and not subject to heavy pedestrian traffic. 1.3(a)(4)

7. Exact details and timing will be worked out upon approval of this operational plan by CSR/9 and the casing and recommendations of [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

SR/9

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] Compass had written a report concerning certain [redacted] and maintenance problems with an agent [redacted] true, but undiplomatic, since it [redacted] our official inefficiency was in no [redacted] variance with our direction of our work.

[redacted] detail of little importance, which Compass hopes has been re- [redacted] It did bring to Jones attention that he has been emotional in [redacted] reporting to you as well. The only excuse is that one has to let out [redacted] somewhere, but Compass is now impressed that he cannot afford such out- [redacted] of immaturity. If Compass were not considered an adult he would not [redacted], so he will try to at least act like an adult.

[redacted] problem of organization of letters referred to earlier in previous reports still [redacted] up the burden of organization will still have to remain with you.

Most recent information of importance concerning the JIB drop site is that [redacted] lights reported to exist at the edge of the river at the end of Turbanin street have been removed. They were double globe lights which were reported as being extinguished at midnight every night. They are gone completely. Compass regrets that he can not report when they were removed, their absence was first noted on Jan. 27, 60.

[redacted] double globe lights at the intersection of the JIB with the wall on Turbanin St. are still there and a check made at 2145 tonight indicated that with the snow cover on the ground, the dog pen is brightly illuminated from these lights.

A second double globe lamp is about fifty feet up the street from the light at JIB and wall intersection on Turbanin, and helps illuminate the area.


One of the military in the house mentioned that there must be a military installation on Frumenskaya Naberezhnaya since so many military seem to be on the busses and walking the streets in that direction. Compass has noted a fair amount of military officers walking from the bus stops and the Krimskiy Most Metro area, so believes that Chalk in or out of uniform should have no difficulty being in the area.

For the times contemplated and ignoring the dog problem, Compass can promise that he will be waiting for any packages coming over the wall on a Saturday night, on any Saturday night. Compass has managed over the past three months to establish both a pattern of social compatability and a pattern of independent action which should give him the required freedom to be anywhere required at any time, except awkward hours like these in the morning when very few people are afoot and it is unlikely that Chalk can be free to wander. If, however, such off-schedule hour wanderings are desired, they can be worked into Compass' independent desires. For instance, in any other city in the world Compass would wander at any time of the day or night, and while it is a mite unusual here, why not, if it is needed.

The problem with the dog, implied in the preceding paragraph, is that he has become an unmanageable beast of some 45 pounds with no discipline.

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[redacted] - Opy 1.3(a)(4)



[redacted]

(9)

MEETING #1 (LONDON), 20 APRIL 1961

1. The meeting was held at the Mount Royal Hotel. Participants in the meeting were:

Harold Hazlewood
Michael Fairfield
Joseph Walk
George McAdam

2. By means of a prearranged meeting set up through Mr. Greville WYNNE as organized by Mr. [redacted] (details of which are recorded elsewhere), Subject was expected at any time convenient for him to take leave of his companions under the pretext of turning in for the night. This was expected to occur at any time after 2100 hours. Subject's instructions were to report to Room 712 which was engaged by Mr. Hazlewood. Since Room 360 appeared to be far superior as a meeting place because it was much larger, with adequate seating capacity and, more important, it was an interior court thus avoiding street noises and in addition since a clandestine recorder could be more conveniently concealed in this room, it was decided to use Room 361. Mr. HAZLEWOOD, hereafter referred to as H. and Mr. [redacted], hereafter referred to as J., waited for the arrival of Subject in Room 712 for the purpose of escorting him to Room 360 where the other two members of the party waited. Subject arrived at Room 712 at about 2140 hours and after being greeted by H. and J. was told that a more adequate meeting area was set up in Room 360, to which room Subject was conducted. Subject arrived in Room 360 at 2150 hours. Upon entering Subject was introduced to G. and H. and all persons sat in a circle with a small serving table in the middle.

3. G: Would you prefer to speak Russian or English? S: I would much rather speak Russian because I can express myself much better in Russian. G: Very well, then. S: I graduated from the Military-Diplomatic Academy in 1953. In 1955 I went to Turkey. My working language there was English. I had many difficulties there and during the past four years I simply forgot much of my English by disuse. Well, Gentlemen, let's get to work. We have a great deal of important work to do. G: You have already introduced yourselves upstairs. S: Yes. G: Therefore you know now that you are in good hands. S: Yes, and I have thought about this for a long time and I have attempted to make this contact taking a very devious path about which I feel I must report to you in full. G: You must know that we are in receipt of your original letter. S: You mean the one I gave to the two teachers (the two American tourists). If you knew how many grey hairs I have acquired since that time; if you had only marked the signal just so I would have known that the message got into the proper hands. I worried so much about this. (To reassure Subject J. pulled out the original copy of Subject's first letter referred to above including the photograph he enclosed of Colonel Charles PEEKE, U.S. Military Attache, Ankara, at the time Subject served his tour there.) S: Yes, that is the photograph I sent and Colonel PEEKE was the Military Attache there. G: This was shown you to reassure you and in two words I can tell you why a response was not made to you immediately after

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[redacted]

[redacted]

receiving the letter. We deliberately delayed signalling you [illegible] a secure manner for a receipt of the materials you wanted to pass could [illegible]devised. This was done exclusively in consideration of your security. S: And, between friends, admit that you did not trust me. That is the most unpleasant and painful to me. G: No, it is quite the opposite.

4. S: I was exposing myself constantly to considerable danger. I was walking all around the American Embassy, but I will tell you all about that in detail later; thoughts are just jumping into my mind. I had expected to be met by an American representative - why do I say American? Because a good friend of mine was the Military Attache in Turkey, Colonel Charles PEEKE, and I also have many other American acquaintances among whom were the Naval and Air Attaches. On the British side I knew only the Brigadier who was the Military Attache and his Assistant. Due to this friendship I wanted to arrange with Colonel PEEKE some sort of a future plan that I already had in my mind but unfortunately just prior to my departure the mother of Colonel PEEKE's wife died and he and his wife flew to America for the funeral. Since he left I did not want to speak to any of the other attaches with whom I was not as well acquainted -- for example the Air Attache had only recently arrived and I did not know him too well -- and in addition when I left Turkey I expected to return. I thought I was going on leave but they held me up in Moscow and did not send me back. "They deceived me."

[redacted]

6. G: We know about this. Did you receive a telephone call (in Moscow)? S: Yes, I did, but this gave me absolutely nothing at all; I did not understand anything. The only word I understood in the whole message was the word "March". In a telephone conversation I do not understand English at all. Therefore, I requested that when a telephone call was to be made, that it be made in Russian. In addition the call should be made from a public booth. G: It was. S: The night before I was at a friend's house at a party and the following morning when the telephone rang I thought it was from him. My control time for the call was at 10.00 hours and the call came at 11.00 hours. G: That is correct. S: I understood nothing and I couldn't ask questions very well since my wife waswalking around. In addition, my mother and daughter

[redacted]

also in the room. Although they realise that I can speak English, to ...ge in a serious-type conversation would raise the question as to with ...om I am speaking. G: Is your wife absolutely unwitting of your intentions? S: No, she doesn't know a thing. I will tell you exactly who knows anything about it later. (This is in reference to the numerous contacts subject made, of which we are aware).

7. (Subject now begins his biography.) S: I was born in 1919 in the Caucasus. My father was a paruchik (First Lieutenant in the Czar's Army). My father's name was Vladimir FLORIANOVICH. My grandfather came from Stavropol -- maybe you would like to jot down some of this data since it would be hard to remember everything. (Notes were taken by all parties at least for the sake of appearances since Subject was unaware that the conversation was going to be recorded. Normal note taking was completely out of the question since Subject's manner of speaking was in a rapid-fire manner often jumping from subject to subject in incomplete thoughts. It had been previously decided to permit Subject to unburden himself in any way he was disposed to during this first meeting.) My grandfather's name was Florian ANTONOVICH and he was a well known jurist in Stavropol. Only recently I have been accused and confronted with having come from a background of nobility (dvoryanstvo). Allegedly this information came from one of the countries of People's Democracies. My mother brought me up alone -- I was the only son. My father had graduated from a Polytechnic Institute and he was a mining engineer and then he disappeared without a trace. Either he died of illness or was shot during the Revolutionary days since there were very violent conflicts in that district of the Caucasus. The town was formerly known as Vladikavkas. It is a tri-lingual city; its Ossetian name is [redacted] and now it is called Ordzhonikidse (later renamed again To STAVROPOL) → DZHAUDZIKAU

8. Well, both my grandfathers died; my mother brought me up alone. I finished ten year classes and immediately enrolled in the Second Kiev Artillery School. Since my father had vanished without trace it is not possible to state so simply in one's official records in the Soviet Union. One simply would be blocked for life from progressing in any speciality. They would not accept one in the Party and one would just about be a common laborer. Therefore, I worked out a legend that he had been killed in 1919. Actually we did find out from records later, and my mother knows this -- she is living with me now, -- that he was killed during the siege of Rostov and that he had been promoted to First Lieutenant in May 1919 -- Officer in the White Army. So everything was accepted and I had no difficulty. In my early years I decided I had better keep myself with enthusiasm to the Communist cause and, to be perfectly honest, I did serve quite faithfully. I am almost forty-two now -- in fact on the 23rd April will be my forty-second birthday -- that is this coming Sunday. G: We'll celebrate it. S: Thank you.

9. I joined the Komsomols and I considered myself a progressive young man of our country fighting for the idea of Lenin. My ambition then was to join the Party and in 1939 I was already a candidate for Party membership. Also in 1939, I graduated from the Kiev Artillery School. Immediately upon graduation I was taken for a twenty-day assignment to liberate the Western Ukraine and our action was in the direction Tarnopol - Lvov (at that time Poland).

[redacted]

that is between Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk on River Chulym

Politruk batarei
(Political commissar of battery)

At that time the Yezhovshchina (popular expression for the extreme NKVD purges in 1939) was acting in full force and there were many executions even of Army people. Since I was a Party candidate I was assigned, together with a lot of other candidates, to serve as a political Commissar (Politrobotnik) with various Army units. I worked in that capacity for four years. My rank was Senior Politruk. There was little loss of life in this campaign in Poland. This was in September and October 1939 and we were engaged in liberating Belorussia and the Western Ukraine. G: This was Polish territory. S: Yes it was, but we were liberating it, just as the Red Army liberated the Baltic states. At that time I was on what was known as the First Western Front.

10. G: Where did these troops come from? S: Primarily from Kiev, but also from other military districts. They were regular Soviet Army units which were engaged in occupation operations. Our Front occupied the territories including Lvov and then there was established a line of demarcation (with the Hitler occupation forces). I have been a cadre officer since 1939, upon my graduation from the Kiev Artillery School, and have served in the Army since 1937. After this operation I was transferred together with a number of my fellow officer to Achinsk which is near Novosibirsk. The 91st Rifle Division was deployed there and I was transferred to it. I was assigned the duty of working as a political worker in a battery. In December 1939, the war with the Finns began and in January 1940, our Division was sent into action on the Karelian Isthmus against the Finns. The Division was in reserve almost all the time, but two days prior to the arrival of KALININ -- who was to participate in the Peace Treaty -- our Division was thrown into action and only 10% of the strength survived. All regimental commanders were killed and I was fortunate to escape without a scratch. This was due to the fact that I was an artilleryman and our positions are somewhat behind the front line. Despite the hardships of weather and this conflict I was still full of enthusiasm and, as this war ended, I was accepted into the Party in March 1940. I am very glad that you have my original letter. My spirits have been buoyed up considerably and I am no longer tired.

11. G: Let me ask this brief question. Please tell us now how much time you have at your disposal? Can you get into any trouble for being away? S: I have received a special Intelligence mission during this trip now. I can leave at any time to do my own work and I will tell you later what my mission is. The other members of the Party realize that I am not an engineer or a specialist and that I am a member of this delegation because I work in the foreign relations section of the Committee (G.N.T.K.). They know that many Intelligence personnel work in this Committee and in fact in all ministries. All I need to say is that I want to go off. G: We ask you this out of consideration for your personal security. For example, if it is alright for you to go for a walk tomorrow you cannot again say, "I went out for a walk". We'd like to meet with you often but not every other five minutes. S: That's right. I would say that today I have about two hours' time. G: In addition, since you have a heavy beginning with tomorrow morning and are also tired from the trip today, you should have some sleep. S: If anyone calls me on the phone I will simply say I was tired and had disconnected the phone and did not hear it. I simply said "Good night" to the other

fellows and went to sleep. That's all there is to it. G: At any rate you must be on your guard constantly and it is difficult for us to determine what is dangerous for you and what is not. S: Yes, I have asked you to protect me and I will also protect myself. G: Enough dangerous risks have been taken by you already and by the grace of God everything turned out alright. Therefore, that is all the more reason for being extra careful now. S: Yes, after all the chances thank God everything turned out alright and thank you for your consideration.

12. S: After I became a Party member and the war with Finland was over, I was transferred to the Moscow Military district. My assignment there was Deputy to the Chief of the Political Section dealing with Komsomols in the Artillary School imeni [redacted] Later I will give you my complete autobiography in full chronological order as it should be done. I worked there until the beginning of World War II. I received a small room and brought my mother there. Previously my mother also had a room in Ordzhonikidze but we had to sell out there and lost everything. When the war began I was transferred to the Headquarters of the Moscow Military district. There I worked as a senior instructor in the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District and again this involved work with the Komsomols. I was still full of enthusiasm and was already a senior Politbuk and I was twenty-three years of age then. After one year I was transferred to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District in the section for Extraordinary Missions. At that time the Commander of the District was ARTEMIEV and he is now working in Sverdlovsk as the Deputy Commander. He had some previous difficulties -- his full name is Pavel Artemievich ARTEMIEV.

Artemiev Sverdlovsk NKD

13. The member of the Military Council was GAPANOVICH, Dmitri Afanasyevich, a Lieutenant General whose daughter I married and to whom I am married today. He died in 1952. I have been married now for fifteen years. G: What was exactly his position? S: He was a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. He was a prominent political worker and at one time he wore three rhombs. He died as a Lieutenant General -- two stars. He is buried in Moscow in the German cemetry. He was a very fine man; he helped me a great deal and he liked me. He saw that I was very enthusiastic, which was quite true at that time, and I do not deny this to you. I only make this remark now to explain why later I changed all my views and how I became more mature in my thinking.

14. I worked there until November of 1943. At that time the recapture of Kiev was being celebrated and I thought that the war would end very soon. Here I was with no distinctions or decorations. I received nothing for the Finnish campaign, only a commendation and a cigarette case. There were already a thousand Heroes of the Soviet Union so I submitted a request for front line duty and was sent to the First Ukrainian Front. I was assigned to a subdivision of this huge headquarters by VARENTSOV, Sergei Sergeyevich, a General who is now a Marshal. Note his name; I will tell you much about him

Krasinn

I was St. Soldiers

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later. He was at that time a Gen. Polk. (Colonel-General) of Artillery and was the Chief of the Artillery of the First Ukrainian Front. He liked me since I was full of enthusiasm and assigned me as the Commander of a training reception center for anti-tank artillery regiments. At that time we had twenty-seven anti-tank artillery regiments in action on the First Ukrainian Front combatting German tanks. Therefore the General gave me this assignment emphasizing how important it was to have a constant flow of replacement units to the front.

15. Later on when I'd like to mention our mutual future missions I will come back to this point. One of Hitler's greatest mistakes was that the eighteen mobilization and training centers in the USSR were never destroyed. These centers continuously fed millions of replacements to the front lines of the Soviet Army. These were all the mobilization and organizational direction units and it is the very soul of the Army. They control not only manpower but also all sorts of equipment and supplies. German bombing was disorganized, and pointless small diversionist groups could easily have destroyed these centers and paralized the Soviet Army, but we'll come back to that later. Primarily my work there was to reorganize heavily depleted anti-tank regiments. In intensive combat the life of such a regiment was often only one or two hours since the Germans launched many mass tank attacks. These depleted units were filled out and re-equipped by an abundant and constant flow of tanks and guns from factories in the Urals which Hitler neglected to destroy and which still maintained supply despite extensive food shortages on the part of the factory workers and the population. This was a fundamental error and I will discuss this further when we consider what must be done in the future.

16. In my assignment I had three training units one each in Kiev, Belaya Tserkov and Zhitomir. Regiments were re-equipped at these points and returned to front line duty. I worked there for three months and wanted to go on line duty and submitted a request. I was assigned as a deputy to a regimental commander for personnel matters. At this point my service as a political worker ended and I was again a line officer. I worked two months in this capacity under my commander, a Hero of the Soviet Union named TIKVICH. He was a good fellow but he was a drunkard. He assaulted a woman and was removed, so I became the Commander of the 323rd Artillery Anti-Tank Regiment of the Eighth Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade. The Brigade consisted of the 322nd, 323rd, and 324th Regiments. The Commander of the Brigade was CHELALAK, also a Hero of the Soviet Union, who died recently in Voronezh. Then I was wounded and was sent to Moscow in June 1944. I met many friends there and at that time the Military Council of the Moscow Military District included BERIA, PRONIN, who was then deputy of the Council of Workers of Moscow, [illegible], and my father-in-law, GAFANOVICH, as well as all the chiefs of the arms and services. This military district organization was at that time the most important one because it also controlled the Headquarters for the defense of Moscow. This defense included thirteen defensive rings extended from the Kremlin to Mozhaisk. These were organized after the Germans were thrown back. These circles were organized into strong points and later when they were transformed into divisions they were sent forward to the front lines.

17. S: I was hospitalized for two months, released, and prepared to return to the front. I was the youngest regimental commander on the front at that time. I then had two decorations; now I have, altogether, five orders and eight medals. G: What rank were you at that time? S: I was a Major at that time. Just as I was about to go to the front I heard that General VARENTSOV, who was en route to visit General KONEV, was injured in a tank accident and was flown to Moscow and placed in a so-called Marshals' Hospital on the Serebryannyy Pereulok. His hip was damaged and as a result one foot was shorter than the other. He was suspended by a pulley in a hospital for four months. Since he was my commanding officer I brought gifts to him. He already knew me well and he assigned me to be his liaison officer from him to the front. He wanted me to do this during his recuperation and said that then we would go back to the front together and he would give me back my old regiment. I told him that that would be fine and since the war would end soon and the Germans would be crushed, I would like to go to a Military Academy. He said he would arrange this. I went back and forth to the front a number of times and reported to him.

18. S: At this time his wife, mother and his two daughters were already in Lvov. On Pushkin Street during the time the Marshal was hospitalized, they had a hard time getting food and fuel. Therefore, I took care of the family since not only was the Marshal a very nice person but I knew that he would reward me tenfold for anything I did for him. The Marshal had been married once before and from that marriage he had a daughter, Nina. She committed suicide at the time the Marshal was hospitalized because her husband, who happened to be a Jew named LASHAK, and with whom she was deeply in love, was shot for participating in a black market ring. I sold my last watch and went down to Lvov to bury the girl, purchasing a black dress and her coffin. After I returned to the front with the Marshal and he knew what I had done, he said, "You are like a son to me."

19. S: Up to this very time he supports me, and it is partially due to him that I am sitting with you now since as of yesterday he was still hesitating to send me here. Although I had my visa from you on the 8th of April, they were still undecided in the Central Committee yesterday as to whether I should be sent or not. This is because my father was a White officer. On the other hand I have had a distinguished military record in three campaigns, have been decorated and have no black marks whatsoever on my Party records. If I were not to be sent for the reason of my father, I should be isolated anyway. In fact, I once was because I was slated to go to India as the Military Attache and was not permitted to go even though I was completely prepared to go. I will tell you more about that later. They did not let me go and transferred me instead to another section, namely, this Committee. Of course, the work is along the line of Intelligence, but of a more passive variety, namely, to work with foreign delegations, the purpose being to obtain information -- possibly to steal some documents of value, and, of course, the ever-present mission of recruiting someone in a foreign delegation. At any rate this latter mission thus far has been unsuccessful as far as I am concerned.

20. G: For which organization do you execute this mission-the NKVD? S: No, the GRU. I am an officer of Strategic Intelligence of the General Staff. G: Even up to now? S: Yes. They had no cause to shoot me or to

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arrest me. About a year ago I was called up by the Chief of the Personnel Directorate who questioned me about my father. He said, "This is what you have declared your background to be and this is what we have found out about your father. You said your father simply died." I replied, "I have never seen my father and never received a piece of bread from him." The General said, "But evidently you have concealed the fact." To which I replied, "If I had something to conceal I had a tenfold opportunity to run off during the war or on my assignment abroad in Turkey, and I did not do this. I was even in all of the countries of the Peoples' Democracies." G: Who was this Personnel Chief? S: The Chief of the Cadre Directorate is Gen. Leit SMOLIKOV and his Deputy is Gen. Major SHUMSKIY. The Chief of the GRU is General SEROV who was previously the Chief of the KGB. They asked me how long my length of service was and I said twenty-four years and in 1962 I will complete my twenty-five years of service. If I had already completed my 25 years they would have discharged me because for them I am politically unreliable. That is what I feel. Up to a certain degree they trust me, but they watch me closely. I believe they actually trust me because about a year and a half ago before they unearthed anything about my father they sent me to higher academic courses on new technology. It is from there that I wrote up all this material on rockets. In my opinion, had they already known about my father they would not have sent me there. However, they did not permit me to go to India even though I had prepared myself completely and had studied all the required codes and ciphers since I was to have gone as the REZIDENT.

21. S: Well, anyway, when VARENTSOV returned to the front at the request of KOREV I also went along and was given the command of another regiment, the 51st Artillery Anti-Tank Regiment, a G.H.Q. unit. This regiment was independent and not part of the Brigade; it belonged to the First Ukrainian Front. I commanded this regiment until the war ended. At the end of the war I wanted to go to an Academy but he asked me to work with him for a year with the occupation troops. At that time the Headquarters was in Baden, Austria. It was the Headquarters of the Central Group of Forces. I requested VARENTSOV to release me, saying that my bride, Vera, is in Moscow and has just graduated from the tenth class. At that time I had sub-let two rooms in Moscow which I had then changed for an apartment in which I have been living for the past fifteen years. G: Where is this apartment? S: It is on the NABERE ZHNAYA GORKOVA. It is about a two-minute walk from the Headquarters of the Moscow Military District, but I work at the General Staff on the Arbat. The General said "Go ahead".

22. S: I arrived two months after the courses began, but I passed the examination successfully and was admitted. Since I had commanded a regiment, I had no trouble passing a battalion commander's examination. So I entered and in 1948, I graduated from the Frunze Academy. Immediately upon graduation from the Frunze Academy I was offered the opportunity of entering the Military-Diplomatic Academy to study Strategic Intelligence. G: How long were you in Frunze? S: It was a three-year course. I consulted my father-in-law, General GAPANOVICH, who advised me to work for a year instead of transferring from one classroom to another at once. So I worked for one year in two places. My first assignment was as a senior officer in the

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Mobilization and Organization Directorate of the Headquarters of the Moscow Military District, where I had previously worked in a lower capacity. I worked there for six months and then I was transferred to the Headquarters of the Ground Forces. I was also there as a senior officer and was perfectly satisfied with the job, since it paid 200 rubles a month more. But I did have in mind to enter the MDA in 1949 and fortunately we have a regulation which says that the pay of an officer received just prior to entering the MDA is retained by that officer during the period that he is a student. Therefore in 1949 I was accepted at the MDA which is near the subway station SOKOL. G: Is it not 13 Peschannaya Street? S: That's exactly right and I need not say any more about that.

23. S: I studied there for four years from 1949-1953. It was then a four-year course but now it has been reduced to a three-year course. The Chief of the School is Gen. Leit KHLOPOV. He is a Gen. Leit. of Tank Forces and had previously been an Intelligence officer. I don't remember his name and patronymic at the moment. Prior to this assignment he had been the Chief of the Information Directorate of the GRU. There are six directorates in the GRU, in addition to the Information Directorate, but we will come back to that later. The reason he was given this appointment was because two predecessors died -- one was Gen. SLAVIN, who was a Military Attache to one of the Scandinavian countries, I believe Sweden, and the other was Gen BRADVIN who returned from Germany. He was at GRU at the time I graduated and was the one who signed my diploma.

24. G: Wasn't KOCHETKOV there also? S: KOCHETKOV was the Deputy Chief. He was also a Lieutenant General. He was the chief instructor of the Scientific Research Department and I believe he was then a Gen. Maior. At that time there were 98 students in the class and now there are only sixty. As I reported to you in the data I passed. I will tell you how I got this information. At that time I was working there as the chief of a class, but they also removed me from there when they assigned me to my present position. I was in charge of selecting students for the class as well as being chief of the class. G: Isn't that a General's T/O slot? S: Yes, it is, but here I am already walking around eleven years and a full Colonel. I attempted to have WINNE photograph all these documents, my various passes, my Party card etc. since these had to be left behind, but he simply said he was afraid.

25. S: After graduation I was placed in the Fourth Directorate of the GRU. This Directorate is the Eastern Directorate (Strategic Intelligence). There are other Directorates, for example the Anglo-American Directorate, the European Directorate and the First Directorate which is the Directorate for Illegals under Vice-Admiral BYKHENEV, about whom you probably know. We will come to all these Directorates later. Anyway I worked there for about a year on the Egyptian desk. I became familiar with the agent nets there and remember something about it yet. At that time the leader of Egypt was NASSER's predecessor who was Brigadier NAGUIB. General Maior KISLENKO, who was the Director in Chief, called me in. KISLENKO had previously been in Japan. At this time KISLENKO is still living, but he had been discharged. G: Does the Eastern Directorate include the Far East as well as the Near East? S: It includes everything -- at le at that time it did. I'll tell you what the new organization is later but at that time it included the Near East, Middle East and Far East. His Deputy at that time, whom I remember well, was Nikolay Mikhaylovich SOKOLOV who went under cover

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somewhere to the Near East. G: What is KISLENKO's name and patronymic? S: I don't remember.

26. G: Can you list me all of the other directorates of the GRU? S: The former structure or the present structure? G: The present structure. S: I will describe that all to you in detail later. General KISLENKO told me that they wanted to send me to Pakistan as the Senior Assistant to the REZIDENT. The Military Attache, who was REZIDENT, was my instructor at MDA -- his name slips my mind at the moment. I must be getting tired. Anyway I agreed to go, but when all my documents were prepared the Pakistani Government refused to grant me a visa. Another Assistant, a Lieutenant Colonel, also had his visa refused. Oh yes, the Colonel's name was DUBROVIN. The reason given for refusing the visas was that it was undesirable to expand the size of the Military Attache's office there. I will be remembering things from time to time, please forgive me for not being so alert since I have been so nervous. The visa was refused even though my appointment there was already signed off by VASILYEVSKIY. Therefore, I could not go and neither could the other assistant. DUBROVIN sat there all by himself with just his code clerk. and wife

27. S: I continued to work another several months on the Egyptian desk and KISLENKO called me up again and said, "We are thinking of sending you to Turkey". This was already at the end of 1954. Again I prepared myself to go and studied codes, the operational program, the economics of the country, the armed forces etc.. At that time a Military Attache in Turkey was Colonel KONDRASHEV. He is a little fellow who was an engineer. He is now working as an instructor in the MDA in the Area Studies Department. He had been in Turkey a long time - five years - but things were not going well for him. There were no REZIDENTURAS there and even now there is insignificant activity there. It was difficult to recruit Turks. Right now they bring in people from a third country for contact with the REZIDENTURAS in Turkey. I arrived in July of 1955 and became the REZIDENT. My official position was acting Military Attache and I took over the whole agent operation net. G: What rank did you hold - Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel? S: I was already a Colonel - let me clarify this. At the end of the war just prior to my entry to the Frunze Academy I was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and I was promoted to full Colonel in February 1950. I was already walking about eleven years as a full Colonel in February 1950, and they will never make me a General. They have already said so and they have said I was unreliable. (Jokingly) Maybe I will become a General in another army.

28. S: So I arrived in Turkey with my wife and took over the REZIDENTURA. During the course of one month KONDRASHEV turned over all the responsibilities to me and I had for my assistant CHICHERIN, the Naval Attache, and at that time there was no Air Attache. There was an assistant, YERIN, who was concerned with air matters although he was not the Air Attache. SEVEN ~~Five~~ months later Gen. Maior SAVCHENKO arrived, but he arrived under the false name of RUBENKO. Many of our people use false names; for example, the Scientific and Technical Adviser to the Ambassador in Japan is a Colonel SERGEYEV but that is not his real name. I don't remember his real name now. G: Do you remember General RUZANKOV? S: Yes, I know him. G: His real name is

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ROSHCHIN. S: That's right.

29. S: This SAVCHENKO was previously Military Attache in Afghanistan. This old man arrived; he was over sixty years of age. I turned over everything to him and he became the REZIDENT and I became his assistant. I worked until November 1956 and then we had a compromise. This took place three months after SAVCHENKO's arrival and it referred to Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay IONCHENKO. He was simply approaching Turks in restaurants and offering them money to work for him. S: IONCHENKO was attempting to purchase military manuals from Turks in this crude manner. Naturally the Turkish Counterintelligence was efficient and they noticed this. Now I will confess to you the following: My relations with the General and with IONCHENKO were extremely bad; they were trying to undermine me along Party lines. I will tell you the details of this later. (Note: This is a most salient theme in Subject's recent life and has contributed significantly to his decision to approach the West. Specifically it involves his life-long legend that his father had died of typhus in 1919. Actually his father was killed while fighting with the White Army against the Reds as a First Lieutenant in the City of Rostov. The significance of the fact lies in a KGB accusation that Subject had deliberately concealed the true circumstances and this accusation was a matter of record in his GRU file). I made an anonymous telephone call from a public booth to the Turkish Counterintelligence informing them of IONCHENKO's activities and specifying where his agent contacts were made. G: What was his rank? S: He was a Lieutenant Colonel; his first name is Nikolay.

30. [redacted] IONCHENKO was very bitter against me. Since he had [redacted] STUDIED the Turkish language at the Academy he was indignant that I with the English language was sent out to be the senior deputy to the REZIDENT instead of himself. He was very friendly with the General and they had become good friends in Moscow; both arrived in January 1956. They both were dead set against me and made my life so miserable that I wrote a letter to Headquarters requesting a transfer - anywhere. They replied that I should wait. By nature I am a vengeful person but at least on a basis of fairness. Even then when I saw how unjustly I was being treated I had already decided to come over to you. I want to take oath and to sign my willingness to serve you and spend the rest of my days, whatever they may be, in a new life.

31. S: Three months later IONCHENKO was compromised and was declared Persona Non Grata and I accompanied him through Istanbul and he went homevia Bulgaria. The General wrote a cable to Headquarters stating that the Turks and the Americans ran a provocation against IONCHENKO and while he was purchasing fruit he was seized. Incidentally, at this time the Shah and his wife were on an official visit and Turkish security and Counterintelligence services were intensively alert in protecting the visitors. We even had instructions from the GRU Chief, who was SHALIN at that time, not to run any operations during that time. However, the General permitted IONCHENKO to go out for an agent meeting since one was scheduled for the 10th of May. I remember the date since it is my mother's birthday. The incident actually occurred at the time that a Turkish lieutenant was handing IONCHENKO a military manual.

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32. S: I was sitting in his office when the Embassy Duty Officer reported to the General and said, "Comrade General, yourassistant has been detained by the Turkish Counterintelligence due to his attempt to obtain a military manual from a Turkish officer." The General was completely upset and told me to go to get him out. I said, "Why did you let him go to this meeting?" The operational funds in Turkish lira were in my hands, but the General gave IONCHENKO money out of his own pocket. Some 200 lira to pay the Turkish officer for the manual were given and this was done so that I would not know about it. This is a considerable sum and it was not taken from the operational fund so that I wouldn't know. But since this compromise occurred, the General admitted it to me. We had an argument. I told him that he had always accused me of being a bad operator, inexperienced, etc.. He was preparing a cable to Moscow and I asked him, "Are you a Communist?" When he answered yes, I asked him why he had to lie. He asked me to leave the office, saying the affair was none of my business, and I said that I would report on the matter through another channel.

33. S: Then I actually reported the incident through the KGB channel, our neighbor's channel. It was through YEFZIN who was then the KGB REZIDENT about whom I am reporting to you now as the recruiter at the University of these negroes who are sent here from Africa to study at Friendship University. They are going to form powerful REZIDENTURAS. YEFZIN was then a colonel. Now, I believe, he has already been promoted to General. He also had been the KGB REZIDENT in India and his cover position was that of counselor. My cable was received by SEROV, the same SEROV who is now chief of GRU. SEROV immediately reported this cable to KHRUSHCHEV since all compromises must be reported to the Presidium, but SHALIN brought in the cable from SAVCHENKO-BUBENKO. ZHUKOV was then the Minister and the cable went through the Chief of Staff, SOKOLOVSKIY. KHRUSHCHEV yelled, "Which fool is the liar? (Subject's true name) or the General? Figure this out and report." I had told the truth and all I could be accused of is having spoken coarsely to the General. But even then that was because he was always criticizing me unjustly. I did not receive any reprimand, not even along the Party line, but the General received a severe reprimand from ZHUKOV, incompetence in duty. Shortly after my departure from Turkey he was removed and recently he was discharged. He is now working in the Institute for Area Studies as a department chief. G: At that time SHALIN was the chief of GRU? S: Yes, yes. SEROV only came in after SHELEPENKO, and SEROV was then the chief of KGB but he had as of then remembered my name because of the cable. We call them neighbors and they refer to us as nearest neighbors.

34. S: Well then, gentlemen, up to November I was still working there. I called the Turkish Counterintelligence anonymously once more and at that time there was a Turkish military exhibit. There was an assistant case officer, you may remember him, his name was SAVIN, who together with some Bulgarian agents stole a military manual. The officer I spoke to on the phone said to me in clear English that I should drop in to speak with him, but I refused because at that time I was still undecided. I was not sure to whom I should appear, but of course if then they had made this accusation with respect to my father and had expressed political distrust,

I probably would never have gone back to the USSR even then. I called up this last time on the 4th of November 1956. You can check this since the call must have been officially recorded.

35. S: On the 6th I left Turkey by train toward the East entering the USSR via Armenia. Upon arriving in Moscow both SHALIN and KISLENKO jumped on me. Evidently this SAVCHENKO-RUBENKO is their close friend. He had sent them all kinds of gifts and they had drunk vodka and wine together. They were indignant that such a 'snot-nosed' young colonel could have behaved that way with respect to a general. They assumed that I wanted to trip up the general in order to be the military attache in Turkey. To tell the truth, when I was acting military attache there was more organization than under the general and I could have run the agent net effectively. But I swear to you that that was not my motive even though I would have liked to have been the military attache. (Note: Wine was served and, incidentally, a very dry, mild Liebfraumilch was the only beverage consumed throughout all meetings.)

36. G: Could you help me fill out some names and patronymics and to review the organization of GRU? S: Yes, I'll be glad to. First of all it is called "The Second Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff". The chief is SEROV. The deputies are now Gen. Leit. MANSUROV and Gen. Leit. ROGOV. G: Is ROGOV the one who is the deputy for all administrative matters? S: MANSUROV is the one responsible for administrative matters, but ROGOV is the one for operational matters. All cables go to ROGOV.

37. G: At one time did you not have a staff for Strategic Intelligence which was headed by a vice-admiral, but later this was changed again? S: Essentially we have strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and military intelligence (VOYSKOVAYA). Many generals and admirals have left Strategic Intelligence and have joined Operational Intelligence.

38. S: The First Directorate -- that is the directorate of EFIMOVSKIY. He is a vice-admiral. The Second Directorate - under a lieutenant general - is the one involved with strategic intelligence on Europe. The chief is Gen. Leit. KONOVALOV. This includes Scandinavia. G: What are their names and patronymics? S: I never tried to remember them. We always addressed them as comrade-general. But I will get them for you later. For a long time the deputy to Gen. KONOVALOV was Gen. Major MELKISHEV, an air force officer. But now - before - there was Gen. KISLENKO -- I'll tell you what happened about him later. That was still at the time that SHTEMENKO was chief and SHALIN was his deputy, and later SHALIN became chief again; he became very ill. SHALIN is still ill, but is still alive. KISLENKO was discharged.

39. S: Now, Gen. MELKISHEV became the chief of the Fourth Directorate which is the Eastern Directorate of Strategic Intelligence. He replaced Gen. ZOTOV. ZOTOV, Gen. Major, had been a military attache in Italy and in France and he will go as the military attache to Hungary on the 10th of May. Our Strategic Intelligence Directorates are all on the fourth and fifth floors. Now the Third Directorate is the Directorate of Gen. Major SOKOLOV. It is the Anglo-American Directorate. I am now under the T/O & E of this directorate because I am sitting in the Canadian Section of the

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Committee and our OTDEL consists of officers who are working under cover in Moscow. We have a total of 58 officers including myself. In all ministries which have any foreign relations, there are strategic intelligence officers. As members of these ministries and committees thereof they have contact with and conduct intelligence against visiting foreign delegations, tourists, lecturers, etc..

40. S: There is also a Fifth Directorate. The chief of this directorate is the former chief of the MDA of whom you (G.) have reminded me - Gen. Leit. KOCHETKOV. This directorate is concerned with the placement of REZIDENTURAS in all countries including the countries of People's Democracies, and the preparation of diversionists groups. This directorate studies all critical targets such as bridges, tunnels, etc. and analyzes drop zones for large scale operations for General Staff use as well as small group operations for behind-the-lines sabotage groups. G: Are they now engaged in sabotage activities? S: No, they are not now engaged in sabotage activities, but they do have the personnel trained and placed in critical areas where they will act when the order is given. G: In all countries, including the Democracies? S: In all countries, but in the Democracies it is of a different nature, like stay-behind, because we do not conduct active intelligence against the Democracies. We have a Tenth Directorate of the General Staff which deals with all matters of a military nature with the People's Democracies through the military attaches and this Directorate controls the delivery of all rocket weapons, in the countries of People's Democracies.

41. S: In this year all countries of People's Democracies must be furnished rocket weapons. VARENTSOV and his people are also working on the development of bases, storage areas, launching sites, and the training of cadres for the countries of People's Democracies. The rockets which we are now delivering to these countries are those which are now being mass-produced such as the R-11 about which I gave you a report. This one, and in addition all those which are on production lines, are being given to China and all other countries of People's Democracies. (Note: Later Subject emphasized that Albania was the one exception, due to the recent "revisionistic" attitude of Gen. Enver HOXHA.)

42. S: In the DDR we now have four brigades and of these two brigades already are equipped with atomic warheads. They also have special storage facilities and the engineers of the Artillery Academy Dzerzhinskogo are working on this. This Academy is now in the hands of MOSKALENKO, which occurred after the accidental death of Marshal NEDELIN due to a rocket disaster. That was not an aircraft accident. The report was a big lie deliberately reported to the world. But I will give you all details of this separately. I wrote a little about this but I must add to it because it is impossible to write all details.

43. G: Let me fill out the GRU organizational chart. S: I have given you five directorates, and there is no Sixth Directorate so designated. There is a separate Eighth OTDEL called the Coding Section and there are Rear Services units (SLUZHBY TYLA) which provide logistical support such as clothing and even diamonds and gold for agent operations.

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44. G: What number does the Operational Directorate have? S: Under SHALIN that was the Sixth Directorate, but now it is being changed. However, it is under SEROV and may not be of quite the stature of an UPRAVLENIYA now. They control all of the RP Points in all of the military districts and with the Groups of Soviet Forces and they have a dual subordination. They report to the headquarters of the various military districts and also to us in headquarters. But, as I understand the structure now, it is not of the same stature as an UPRAVLENIYA as it had been before. Often Strategic Intelligence officers are transferred to Operational Intelligence. I remember that MORGUNOV came to Turkey after I left and worked with this Gen. SAVCHENKO for a while and did something wrong with money and received a criticism along Party lines and was transferred to an RP Point in Leninakan. G: Is the chief still Gen. SHERSTNEV? S: Yes, that is right, but it is no longer an UPRAVLENIYA. I would call it a group (GRUPPA) of Operational Intelligence. I recently heard, however, that SHERSTNEV will not be there any longer. G: What is ROMANOVSKIY doing now? Will he be the new chief? Who is the new intelligence chief in Germany? S: I remember ROMANOVSKIY's name, but I don't know where he is. The new chief in Germany is a lieutenant general. I will remember his name in the course of conversation. It escapes me right now. He did not get along with SHTEMENKO who sent him out.

45. S: Let me see -- there are a number of other services, and the MDA is also under SEROV. Now the course is only three years and the present student complement in the incoming class is sixty students. The graduating class has ninety students and the second class has seventy to seventy-five students. This last class is the one for which I selected the students. When I was at the Academy there were a hundred students, actually ninety-eight since two were summarily dismissed for political reasons. Now the classes are smaller because there are a large number of MDA graduates already who are members of Strategic Intelligence. Now our neighbors, the KGB, take almost half of our graduates, at any rate, somewhere between 30 to 40%. The KGB does not have a formal academy of their own for training their intelligence officers, but they do have intelligence missions abroad, primarily along political intelligence and technical intelligence lines. They take cadres from our academy and in one case, I remember, they took up to 50% of the graduates. Quite a number of those who graduated with me were taken by KGB. I may be able to identify quite a number of them from photographs and I know what cover many of them operate under.

46. S: Well, having returned from Turkey, SHALIN and KISLENKO jumped on me. They accused me of having generated ill feelings with the general which was harmful for the GRU effort there and served no useful purpose. Basically, they said I was right, but I was not right to have behaved in a hooligan manner with him. They said further that no general in the GRU wanted to work with me because, "you are a tattle tale (KAPALSHCHIK). Furthermore, you went out of channels. Why did you report this to SEROV? You disgraced us in the eyes of our neighbors." So, since no one wanted to work with me, what should I do? I went to VARENTSOV. He told me to wait awhile -- until things blew over. I even went to see SHTEMENKO several times. He told me that he didn't know me and that I had made such a mess with my associates that he could do nothing for me. That was logical since, after-all, SHALIN was his deputy. He couldn't go against his deputy whom he depended upon for his operational experience. After all, SHTEMENKO had been Chief of the General Staff and previously had been a military district

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commander, but his knowledge of intelligence matters was so-so. Thus SHTEMENKO and SHALIN rejected me and KISLENKO was preparing to retire.

47. S: By the way, excuse me...I just remembered. After KISLENKO, the Gen. Maior who took over the Fourth Directorate - I'll remember his name in just a minute - he is now the deputy to KHLOPOV who is the Chief of the MDA. He is the deputy for scientific research there. Still earlier, before he turned over the Fourth Directorate of ZOTOV, he had been the chief of the Military Diplomatic Service Faculty of the MDA.

48. S: For a long time they kept me in the GRU reserves. They gave me intermittent assignments and then returned me to the reserves. This continued until the time KHRUSHCHEV removed SHTEMENKO. KHRUSHCHEV was afraid of ZHUKOV and SHTEMENKO was closely associated with ZHUKOV. And SHTEMENKO, without the knowledge of KHRUSHCHEV, on his own initiative opened a diversionists' school. ZHUKOV knew about this. When ZHUKOV stated, "The army will follow me", KHRUSHCHEV took action and it was discovered that SHTEMENKO and ZHUKOV had a large sabotage school in their hands. It was located near Tula. About two hundred specialists were being trained there and KHRUSHCHEV thought that these could be let loose against him. Somehow this did not get to KHRUSHCHEV since the Ministry allocated the funds and the information did not go up to the Praesidium. SHTEMENKO was removed and sent as the deputy commander of the military district with headquarters in Sverdlovsk.


49. S: I just remembered who this Gen. Maior was I mentioned earlier who had taken over the Fourth Directorate. It was Gen.Maior LYAKHEROV. G: Previously he had been a senior instructor at the MDA. S: That's right and later he became a department head. You know these people very well. G: Did you ever hear of a Col. PAPPE who is an instructor there? S: Yes, he is an instructor there, but he has recently been dismissed. By the way, SHTEMENKO who is now a General POLKOVNIK is the deputy commander of the Ural Military District with headquarters at Sverdlovsk and previously he was the commander of the Voronezh Military District. Four military districts have since been consolidated.

50. S: In September 1959 (at a later meeting Subject corrected this to September 1958) I was sent to the courses at the Military Academy imeni Dzerzhinskogo. These were called the courses of the General Staff for the study of new technology. Under NEDELIN the entire Academy Dzerzhinskogo on Salyanka -- you know where that is. Previously this was purely an artillery academy, but now it is an academy for rocket artillery and is under the control of MOSKALENKO. He came in after the death of NEDELIN and had been the former commander of the Moscow Military District. The Academy does not train any officers in conventional rifled artillery at all. There were four faculties at this Academy and now there are five. There is a new faculty on electronics and radio technology.

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
51. G: What is the formal name of the Academy? S: It is the Military Artillery Engineering Academy imeni Dzerzhinskogo. There are now 2,500 students there. Many capable young officers of the air force and of the navy who had some minimum technical ability were not demobilized in the general reduction program but were sent to this Academy. The students are trained as specialists and engineers in the employment of all types of rocket weapons. Specialists are particularly trained to service the rockets on their testing pads prior to launching. This training is under the direction of very experienced engineers of whom there are not too many - about thirty or forty. I graduated from these courses with distinction. The courses are given annually and are given even today, but the continuous duration of the annual courses is actually nine months.

52. S: I graduated on 1 May 1960 (later corrected to 1959). Immediately after graduation, BEROV, who had been informed of my progress, suggested that I go to India since India is considered to be our territory, that is, we might want to conduct operations in that territory in the future. Therefore, it would be desirable that an officer with my background in rockets should be sent there, since it is possible that in the not too distant future rockets may be given to India. I was almost completely processed to go. PAVLOV had been the military attache there - he has since been removed - and now there is a Gen. Major who is a troop commander there. I wrote about this new tendency of not having intelligence officers occupy the slot of military attache -- . And since the new military attaches do not need to have any intelligence background to fulfill their functions, they take people from troops -- just 'junk' who have no language or area knowledge, just a representative - a general to represent the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. So a general was sent there and his senior assistant was a classmate of mine. I'll remember his name in a moment. Just as I was all set to go I was called out by Gen. Major SHRACKIY who is the deputy to Gen. Leit. SMOLIKOV. The latter was just promoted to Gen. Leit. in 1960 and heads the large Personnel Directorate. He is also the chief of the Personnel Section of Operational Intelligence. He has a whole breakdown there. They are really NAPRAVLENIYE. The Personnel Directorate is another directorate just like the ones we have listed and is part of the GRU.



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56. S: There were all kinds of small changes in subordination and it is only by chance that one can find out what goes on in another department. For example, I cannot use my pass to enter the First Directorate of the General Staff the Operational Directorate.

57. S: Well then, they did not send me to India. I was very disappoir about this and was very worried. To be quite honest with you, my disaffection with the whole political system began quite a long time ago. I disagreed with many facets of life there -- I will not bother you by listing categories, but the whole set-up was one of demagogery, idle talk and deceit of the people. The people were waiting patiently for a long time and now they are tired of waiting and they are restless. Actually, KHRUSHCHEV to some degree has decreased the KGB controls. Many persons have been rehabilitated or received amnesties, and now one can say certain things, not everything of course, without being immediately arrested as was the case in the past. Of course, if this is done to excess a man can be ejected from the Party. He can be arrested and, of course, his working future would be limited.

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58. S: There is a difficult situation in the country right now. Everything is subordinated to the armaments race, and also a great deal of money, billions, has been spent to sustain the countries of Peoples' Democracies. China has been given a great deal and now everything is directed to equipping our forces with rockets. Everything is going for rockets. In this respect they have already attained a measure of success. Some rockets are already proven and some are not yet properly developed. The greatest deficiency is in the field of electronics. Our main launching test site is at Kapustin Yar and the impact area is in Kazakhstan. There were very many cases where rockets had struck railroads or a settlement because they had deviated from their assigned course.

59. S: But a great effort is now being made; they have mobilized scientists, the most outstanding ones. Some of them have received four decorations as Heroes of Socialist Labor, and these never appear in newsprint, photographically or otherwise. They may be seen only on occasion at Party Congresses. They constitute a small circle and are given no publicity. There are little settlements (GORODKI) near Moscow and there is one GORODOK in which German scientists live. These are the ones who were involved in the development of the V-2. These Germans are used to a great extent and they are very well subsidized with the comforts of life including automobiles. Their families are with them and they have special schools for their children. Similarly all other scientists are kept isolated and in secrecy.

60. S: When this accident befell KHELIN, they were testing a new rocket. It was a two-stage rocket. By the way, when the SPUTNIK was launched it was with a two-stage rocket. The fuel was liquid; I wrote up the composition of the fuel. The very first SPUTNIK was launched with the help of a cluster (PAKET) of rockets. The rockets R-11 and R-2 were joined together in a cluster. Later I will draw what this cluster looked like. The overall weight of the rocket was about 100 tons of which the weight of the fuel was 68 tons. An outstanding engineer told me about this when I was studying at the Rocket Academy. Boron was one of the basic fuel components and this was being tested for the action of a new type of fuel, namely, by the fission of atoms in one stage. The accident occurred because the upper portion of the rocket was ignited. This upper portion, upon being set off, fell toward the earth and an explosion took place. Many scientists were killed, and among them was KHELIN. Just now GAGARIN was launched with the help of a large two-stage rocket. They say that the overall length of such a rocket is 24 - 28 meters. They are erected by a special hoist and tower and have their own launching pads. These launching pads are special ones, not the type that I have described for the ordinary free rockets and guided missiles. This is the field of endeavor now.

61. S: Let me finish my thought now or I will be out of sequence. I was thinking of becoming a soldier in a new army, to adopt a new people, to struggle for a new ideal, and in some measure, to avenge my father and millions of other people who have perished in a terrible way - as well as for my close relatives, etc.. I thought that words are, afterall, just words, but I should bring something tangible from the place where I sat. I was the

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head of my class of eighty students. By 'head' I mean that though there was an assigned colonel who was the actual chief, I acted as the master sergeant of the class. At any rate I had a certain amount of authority. My own studies were outstanding; I had the opportunity of taking books as well as classified lectures from the special FOND (a classified library). By means of a pass, I had the opportunity of working independently. I had a notebook -- I even blocked the door by placing a chair under the knob -- and I studied by myself. If anyone knocked I would slide everything into my briefcase which was sealed, and I would simply say that I was studying. G: And this is the manner in which you wrote up all of your material? S: I copied everything down and, not having any camera, this writing took a very long time. G: And what time period did this cover? S: This was done during my courses. Everything was done consecutively and I did most of this writing in the evening. We were first taught free rockets, then guided rockets, and then all types of launching equipment and technical checking at various stages. Then we were given examinations. I graduated with distinction and received a certificate which I now have home and which I can show you, if you like.

62. G: Did you ever study ICBMs? S: No, we did not study them. But I can tell you this. There is nothing at all that is unusual about them. All these ICBMs and the rockets for launching humans into orbit are constructed in exactly the same way as the others except that they are much larger and have very large fuel capacity to give a greater thrust. The working principles however are identical. Thus this latest SPUTNIK was launched by a rocket of large size, working on the same principles. It was also a two-stage rocket, not a three-stage rocket.

63. G: Are the guidance systems for those large ICBMs not yet perfected? S: The electronics development is far behind. They are struggling with this. The foreign delegations who come to visit you, and now I must say that the American people are doing a very wise thing by cutting down on the number of scientific exchange delegations and contacts. The British are not yet doing this. There are still a great number of delegations going to England and a great number coming to us from England. Of course, I do not know, nor is it any of my business to conjecture on what benefit British Intelligence derives from these visits, but I can show you the technical reports which I have in my hands at the Committee. For example, there are twenty-two items (RATSIONALIZATORSKIKH PREDLOZHENII) exclusively on synthetic rubber which is of great interest to us now since we have had trouble in its production. The Canadian firm, the POLYMER Corporation, was visited and many problems were clarified.

64. S: We always get technical briefings for conducting technical intelligence. When our scientists and technicians are sent, they don't tell them to spy. They simply say 'to study' the problem and to adopt any useful process into their own industry. So they give them money, a free ticket, and send them off to study processes which can be usefully installed in our own industries. I can judge only by the twenty-two reports in my hands what shortsightedness and blindness there is to permit access

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of Soviet scientists to such important centers, especially when the scientists have been specially trained in such matters.

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66. S: How they will permit our people to attend electronic demonstrations here in England such as Plessy, Ferranti, and another one - I believe its name is Leo Something. Two members of my delegation are very experienced men in this field. They will certainly pick up something of value even though the firms will be careful not to divulge their secrets. However, since these people of ours are experienced and they will be shown various things, undoubtedly they will be able to find something of value. It astounds me how freely some of these things are shown in certain free countries. It is not for me to criticize, but since I now consider myself a representative of the Free World also, I feel that I have the right to criticize as I wish.

67. S: Well then, further, I will speak about the Committee in detail later with respect to its structure. The Committee has now become very large. Before, it was the Government Scientific-Technical Committee. Now it is the Government Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Coordination of Scientific-Technical Work. KHRUSHCHEV became the chief. He is the deputy to KHRUSHCHEV, that is, one of his deputies. What this means is a still greater effort is being made to assign missions with an improvement in administrative leadership in order to still further activate scientific intelligence through the overt legal scientific delegations of specialists. Therefore in the future if access is given to these people, I would consider this to be shortsightedness, although I understand that all of this cannot be broken off suddenly. After all, many firms are engaged in normal trade relations. However, there should be many areas that are of no scientific interest or value. For example, where do we permit foreign specialists to go? We have many open installations where very little, if anything, of value would be discovered by making a visit there. Therefore representatives of capitalist countries are shown worthless installations. If requests are made to see something that is really of value, all kinds of excuses are given such as a bridge is closed, or repairs are being made, or anything to serve as an excuse. The legend is sometimes so stupid that your people see through it, but just the same they are not permitted to see what they want. Even though your people may find something of value, I am sure that it is not comparable to that which our scientists pick up.

68. G: Would you know of the location of any missile bases which may be planned or under construction even though they are not yet in use, that is, bases which can theoretically be used as ICBM launching sites, whether they are fully equipped or not? S: As you must realize, such locations are kept in utmost secrecy. In our Directorate the only ones who would

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know about these would be SEROV and the directorate chiefs. I doubt if any subordinates would know it. However, our country is full of rumors. I have heard, for example, that bases and troops, that is, rocket troops, for use against England are located north of Leningrad, toward Murmansk, and to the north. The exact coordinates of their location are known to a very small group of people and the data lies in underground safes in the Arbat District. There are many things which I must report to you, and even though I may repeat certain items from time to time, at least I will expand on them. The General Staff of the Ministry of Defense is located in the Arbat area, that is, in the blocks bounded by Frunze Street, Gogolevskiy Boulevard, and Antipiyevskiy PEREULOK. (Note: See map of Moscow.) This should all be blown up with small, two kiloton bombs.

69. G: Please trace for me your path when you go to the GRU from the Arbat subway. S: First you pass through this little tunnel. Then there are three pass offices for various buildings. In the first building here sits Gen. Mayor SOKOLOV. He is the chief of the Foreign Relations Section of the Ministry of Defense. He is an intelligence officer and was formerly the chief of my class at the MDA.

70. S: By the way, the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense is connected to the Kremlin by means of a subway tunnel. You probably know that there are two Arbat subway stations, the old one and the new one. The tunnel leads from the new station to the Kremlin. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff have offices in the Kremlin adjacent to the government offices and they use these whenever necessary. When they are not making reports in the Kremlin their headquarters are in the Arbat area. They go back and forth either by car or by subway in a special subway car. There are underground safes here which can be opened only by registering. This material is accessible only to special general officers at the direction of the General Staff. The normal operational charts by military districts are maintained by operations officers in a separate area.

71. (Subject spotted on the Moscow map the headquarters of the PVO of the Country which is under Marshal BIRYUZOV.) S: The command points of the PVO are located in the basement of the Lomonosov University in the Lenin Hills, and another command point which is really the Command Point of the Moscow Defense Zone is on Kirov Street, next to the Kirov subway station.

72. S: In the same group of buildings with the PVO of the Country is the headquarters of GAU, the chief of which is now Gen. Polk. ZHDANOV. Formerly the chief was Marshal YAKOVLEV whom STALIN removed because of malfunctioning of anti-aircraft artillery caused by overheating. For about three years after the end of the war there were no adequate anti-aircraft guns. They had installed liners and had cooling systems, and in addition there were recoil springs which would constantly break. Due to these failures, regarding which YAKOVLEV was accused of deceit, he was removed. If at that time bombing attacks had been made, there would have been no adequate automatic anti-aircraft artillery to defend Moscow. Now they do have automatic AAA. At one time YAKOVLEV was the deputy to BIRYUZOV, but now he is being retired for reasons of health.

73. In these also are located the Engineering Directorate and the Chief Directorate for Military Training. The Chemical Directorate is also there. On Red Square opposite the Kremlin in the so-called "Second House", the Chief Medical Directorate is located, as well as the Rear Services Directorate such as Automotive, Quartermaster - in short, the Rear Services. The reason why I mention this to you now, and I will mention it again later, is that as a Strategic officer, a graduate of two academies, and having worked for some ti e in the General Staff, I know what the sensitive spots are. I am convinced that my viewpoint is absolutely correct, namely that in case of a future war, at H-hour plus two minutes all of these critical targets such as the General Staff, the KGB Headquarters on Dzerzhinskiy Square, the Central Committee of the Party which organizes everything and similar targets must all be blown up by atomic prepositioned bombs, rather then by means of aircraft bombs or rockets which may or may not hit the vital targets.

74. S: In our Soviet Army we have a five kiloton, a ten kiloton, and higher weapons, but they have not been able to produce a one kiloton weapon yet. Our scientists are still working on it. I know this exactly. Such weapons would not need to be set within the buildings themselves, but there are many adjacent buildings where they can be concealed. Dwellings and stores are adjacent. For example, there is a large GASTRONOM next to the KGB Headquarters. The KGB Headquarters has seven basements in which many people have been executed. They also have eight or nine floors above the ground. I don't remember how many.

75. S: A small group of saboteurs equipped with such weapons should plant them governed by a time mechanism in the locations from which all of these headquarters can be destroyed. Irrespective of what other attacks will be made at H-hour, these essential headquarters must be destroyed by planted bombs. All military district headquarters must be destroyed. These headquarters can be easily spotted in every major city. They are easy to find in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Voronezh, Novosibirsk - I give these as examples. All one would need would be one man to do this per military district. This would destroy the mobilizational and organizational directorates which are the backbone of the Army. If these headquarters of the General Staff and the OKRUGs are destroyed, this will reduce the combat strength of the Soviet Army to a very great degree. A number of months would be required to assemble more or less experienced men from the reserves. Furthermore, not all of these can be trusted like ones now sitting in the headquarters. The complete disorganization that would be created could permit the execution of a military decision.

76. S: It would be well to destroy also all of the VOYENKOMATY of the OBLASTS. These are all easy to locate. In these VOYENKOMATY are also located the records and personnel of the city, RAYON, and even settlement VOYENKOMATY. The latter are responsible for mobilizing the village draftees. Of course it is difficult to destroy a headquarters down to that level, but to destroy the headquarters of the OBLASTs, VOYENKOMATY - of which there are eighteen or twenty - and the prime headquarters objectives is mandatory. The

Germans did very little damage. A few minor fires and broken roofs and glass, but the staffs remained in operation. This was due to inaccurate bombing. But now possessing atomic weapons, small size weapons of one or two kilotons as required can destroy these vital targets completely. The exact timing for this destruction is up to the big people who have to make the decisions.

77. S: But please give me your opinion of a Strategic Intelligence officer, now your soldier, your worker ready to fulfill any missions you may assign to me now and in the future. All I ask is for you to protect my life and I only have three persons close to me, my wife, my mother, and my daughter. I would be happy now to go to England or America myself, but I cannot leave them behind. It would drive me insane in time thinking about this should I leave them behind. I have to prepare a basis for my future existence and I believe that I can serve you most usefully in place for at least a year or two, particularly if I were to work under a specific directive set by you to fulfill missions which would be within my capability to accomplish. All I have said above about destroying our headquarters is my opinion.

78. G: With respect to what you have asked us, we are completely prepared to grant you your minimum requests. Of this there is no question, and it is most gratifying to us to realize that you can still continue to work inside for a year or two. We can give you in hand whatever you need and the balance we can deposit for you in the bank. Not only will this be an accumulation of monthly payments, but after you have joined us, we will review your entire scope of activities. S: That's right. Just so I have a basis (nest-egg). I see in your faces official, responsible high stature workers, my comrades, and also being an intelligence officer I know how to vet people (ZAKREPLIAT'). There is no need to keep things in the dark. No one needs this. I wish that your governments, and I consider them both my governments, to trust me as their own soldier. It doesn't matter whether you confer the title of colonel on me or not. I am still full of energy, although as WYNNE may have reported to you I have been nervous recently; and I have this eye disturbance which I picked up in Turkey, although my vision is perfect.

79. S: My request to you is this -- set up for me a definite, material basis. In general, I am a man of some substance. I have been a colonel now for eleven years. Previously I received 5000 rubles per month; now I receive 4,500 (old rubles). I have an apartment with quite a few personal items. I have been a regimental commander, and I have also been abroad. Everything is legended normally for me to have something. I married the daughter of a General Leitenant who had given her a lot of money, and in general my standard of living is good. But I would like to live even better, and to provide luxuries for my family. This is all explained at home easily because anyone who has been abroad would normally acquire all sorts of things to bring back. These things are acquired from one's own savings. As you well know, there are many things completely unavailable in the USSR and others that are extremely expensive.

80. I would like to receive a certain amount on hand, about which I would like to consult with you. I was thinking of acquiring a DACHA just outside of Moscow. A modest DACHA is entirely normal for someone of my age

and status. This would cost about 10,000 rubles in new money. After returning from the Front, I had a Mercedes-Benz, but after riding around in it I sold it since I couldn't get parts and I was thinking about buying a VOLGA. All my comrades have cars. From my small savings and the money I have I usually spend quite a bit on my family and to go out to restaurants. I am not an ascetic . .

81. S: What I would like to do is to swear an oath of allegiance to you, to give you a signed statement and to swear an oath in order to formalize our relationship. Secondly, to work out a communications system with me without personal meetings -- providing me with dead drops where I can pass materials. I would prefer not to meet with anyone. I did have the desire before of meeting with an American or a British representative and to ask them to take me off somewhere overnight. Our Counterintelligence is not operating as intensively as it would seem. People are caught primarily because of crude errors. Now that we have met, thank God -- and I have begun to believe in God -- we can consult on all these things together, and frankly I would like to avoid personal meetings.

82. S: It would be well if I would remain with the Committee for the time being. I have planned a possible trip to Canada in about three months. In addition, on the 24th of May, MCCLELLAN is arriving from Australia. I also am assigned to that country. In the Fall they want to send me to Australia. Yesterday, however, they issued me a passport with great difficulty. They are undecided. Some believe in me and consider that I have been a reliable Communist since 1940, a man decorated in the war, a regimental commander and two higher educations. They even sent me to the rocket school. In addition I have a great number of friends and many of them high-ranking both in the GRU and in the Artillery. We are such close friends, VARENTSOV and I, that his wife serves me soup before she serves his. I already told you about this matter with Nina. At any rate, we are close friends. VARENTSOV even spoke favorably about me to SEROV.

83. S: Incidentally, neither SEROV nor VARENTSOV know anything about my father or that this archives material has been unearthed. They do not know why I was held back in Moscow. I said simply that the climate in India is bad, pretending that I didn't want to go there myself, although I had already given my consent to go. Others, however, waver and consider that it is not right that a son of a White Army officer should have extensive privileges. There is no such thing as the democracy they speak about. It is all a lie and a bluff. Thus far I can maintain myself because they know they cannot simply dismiss me for then I would have every reason to go over to the other side. They would have to isolate me and keep me under constant surveillance. Right now my work is going well. I am receiving commendations and even monetary rewards. I feel I must develop my work in order to show that I have extensive agent contact capabilities in the field of economics and science, as well as for the GRU.

84. [redacted]

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I do not have a document to support this, but I know this is a fact. G: Where did you find this out? S: The man who told me this is a civilian who works in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He stated that at a dinner party given by VARENTSOV. [redacted]

CHURAYEV

85. S: Another interesting matter -- I wrote in my list about Perkhushkovo. It is near Moscow. This town is now the headquarters of MOSKALENKO, the headquarters of Strategic Rocket Forces. Previously this had been the center for training political officers. This was high level people; generals would attend completion courses there. There were extensive residential layouts there in the woods. One would go there by train from the Belorusskiy Vokzal. The distance from Moscow would be somewhere from 40-50 kilometers. I have been there myself and that is where MOSKALENKO and his entire staff physically are located. VARENTSOV is now the commander of all rocket artillery of the Ground Forces. This is both guided rockets and free rockets. But the headquarters of all strategic rockets is in Perkhushkovo.

7. 86. S: Here is another interesting item. On the second of July 1960, a letter of the Central Committee was issued concerning raising revolutionary security. This letter contained a curious statement and I wrote it down. A scientist who came from the USA and who was visiting the USSR, was called by the GRU and the Atomic Energy Commission prior to his departure. His name was not mentioned in the letter but it stated that he received an espionage mission when he was sent to the USSR. He was briefed by scientific specialists on the work of atomic energy in the USSR. Possibly this scientist was broken upon his arrival in the USSR, or possibly there is someone working in your Atomic Energy Commission or, excuse me, in your GRU. But how else could this information have gotten to the Central Committee of the Communist Party? This is the warning in the letter that your scientists are being briefed for intelligence missions in the USSR. G: But they allowed him to depart? S: Yes. G: What was the name of your Central Committee informant for the information concerning [redacted] S: This was told to me by CHURAYEV, who is a good friend of VARENTSOV.

87. S: Another fact stated in the letter was that there was an English student in the Leningrad University who received the rank of Capt. Third Rank. He was conducting intelligence operations in the Leningrad University. This was an example of what kind of people are arriving in the USSR. My thought immediately is where is the leak? Either these people are broken, or there is someone working for us among those who brief these people. G: Were these cases accusations or did the individuals confess? S: He confessed.

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88. S: Let us go further. I made a note here on the RB-47. This was brought down by rockets fired from a MIG-19. This MIG is equipped with four rockets, two upper rockets and two lower rockets. The rockets have a homing device; their range is between four and five kilometers. The point I wish to make is this. When the plane rises to an altitude of between 18 to 20 kilometers, it still has the capability of firing an additional four to five kilometers higher. Therefore when KHRUSHCHEV said that our planes can reach over 20 kilometers, even though we have no planes which can do this yet -- they are still experimenting -- the striking ceiling is actually above 20 kilometers when one considers the additional four to five kilometer range of the rocket. Anyway, the MIG-19 fired a rocket at the RB-47, and I can say with full assurance since I have checked this with many sources, that the RB-47 did not violate our borders although it was close. It was actually over neutral waters. Our pilot had itchy trigger fingers and fired the rocket which knocked it down. The length of the rocket is three meters. Only the two upper or the two lower rockets may be fired simultaneously; otherwise the plane would break up.

89. S: There is a town called Klintsy, where atomic warheads are assembled. I told you earlier that there are rocket bases north of Leningrad directed against England. There is a city called Severomorsk. A PVO regiment is stationed there. This regiment is equipped with V-75 rockets.

90. S: When asked about Soviet intelligence officers, Subject said, "If you would only show me a set of photographs, we would do a lot of good work since I can identify a pretty large number, well over a hundred." G: Are you personally acquainted with any illegals at all? S: I can tell you about those who have returned from illegals' work -- for example, such as this man from the German area (SHCHERBAKOV) -- who are members of the present incoming MDA class. I can also tell you which of my classmates are being trained as illegals. But whether they were dispatched out or not I do not know. The GRU has many covert installations such as those used for training illegals. All of this is handled by the First Directorate.

91. G: If you have time it would be very helpful if you could write out the names, ranks, and what you know briefly about other GRU officers, particularly your own classmates because you probably remember them better than others. S: There were 98 graduates in my class and I can probably list a large number of these. Let me name a particularly effective and dangerous intelligence officer. He was previously in England in the APPARAT of the Military Attache and he graduated with me. His name is Col. FEDOROV. He is an artillery engineer. Right now he is Military Attache somewhere in the Scandinavian area. He has many agents. I will name a lot of officers who have extensive agent contacts. Then I am prepared to give you a list of 15 agents who are presently located in Ceylon, Pakistan, and India. Those in India are presently on conservation. I have all this material.

92. G: According to your time schedule you have about twenty minutes left. We can't cover everything in this session. I hope you don't mind if I interrupt you from time to time and ask a question. S: Not at all. That is a very good idea because it helps me to remember. Please prepare a set of photographs for me for identification. Now as to the tenth point I have on my agenda which I have already mentioned, that is, about what should be destroyed. If necessary I will take the mission upon myself to blow up the General Staff (jokingly).

93. S: Here is another new item. There is a new rocket. It is called the RK-14. It is a long-range rocket, over 1,000 kilometers. I have no data on it. (Subject repeats again how easy it would be to blow up the General Staff.) This rocket is fired from Kapustin Yar, and the impact area is Kazakhstan. The impact area consists of high wooden towers which are erected in a triangulation pattern. Soldiers man these towers and there has not yet been a case where a tower has been struck by a direct hit from a rocket. The rockets fall at different points which are then re-sected with optical instruments to determine the errors in lateral deviation as well as errors in range. There are radio communications for relaying the moment rockets are launched. I already mentioned that there were many cases where rockets struck buildings, railroads, etc..

94. S: Let's see what else my notes have ... Re NEDELIN's death, the second stage ignited prematurely. It broke through the lower stage and an explosion resulted which killed a large number of scientists. These scientists were the ones who were engaged in developing a new type of fuel which required a small storage space and operated on the principle of atomic fission in the rocket engine. This is what our scientists are working on now and they have achieved a small degree of progress. Although nothing has been perfected this is the basic idea on which they are working. The purpose is to eliminate the large space required for the fuel tanks and oxidizer tanks by substituting a lighter and smaller fuel component and possibly affording a larger warhead for conventional explosive as well as atomic types.

95. S: A very large rocket using atomic energy for motive power was being tested when NEDELIN was killed. He was in the shelter (KAMPONIK). I don't remember its exact designation, but it is a deep reinforced concrete structure where people sit during test observation. After ten or fifteen minutes he (NEDELIN) received a report that the rocket engine malfunctioned and he came out. But at that time the fuel system of the second stage had already ignited and an explosion occurred, killing a large number of service personnel as well as scientists. Please keep in mind this is a two-stage rocket and that basically all our rockets are two-stage. When you report this to your scientific experts, emphasize this so they won't have to guess. Even when NIXON was there a question was asked whether a solid or liquid fuel was used. Only liquid fuel is used. Thus far no type of solid fuel has been developed

which can propel a large rocket at a great range. A high-caloried fuel has been developed using Boron as a component. However, I do not know what proportion of Boron is used.

96. S: Another item I am reporting on is that military pensions are being reduced still further. Now full colonels will receive only 150 rubles per month pension, and generals up to 200 rubles (new rubles). The next item I have here is the electric drill.

97. J: Before he goes on to that, since he has been speaking of Boron maybe his memory is refreshed concerning what he said about the first SPUTNIK. S: I will repeat it again. The first SPUTNIK only was fired by using a cluster of rockets. There were three rockets below and one above, all clustered together. The overall weight was 100 tons. Of this, 68 tons were fuel - liquid - and the rest of the weight was the basic shell and all of the technical equipment.

98. S: Now I wrote about the electric drill. The reason I wrote about this is because some of your scientists have been coming to the USSR and have been surprised that we have already developed electric drilling techniques. Our scientists have been keeping this secret. The principle is as follows even though I do not know the dimensional details. There is a pipe the diameter of which is 200 - 220 millimeters. An electric motor is mounted within the pipe. The motor is immediately adjacent to the drill bit. Wires are fed down to the motor and the rotation takes place down below, not on the surface. That is the principle, but what is the failure? Recently Swedish technicians who are drill manufacturers from the well-known firm of Stipko were there (in the USSR). They have both diamond drills and hard steel drills, that is special steel drills ---.

99. S: Incidentally, I have as one (150) of my missions here the assignment of obtaining a steel called Nimonic #105. This is a heat resisting steel which is available here in England. They have various designation such as Nimonic #150, 200, 220. They are all in the catalogue. They told me to get about 100 grams of Nimonic steel #150. (Subject means #105. This is later clarified.) S: (Looking up his mission assignment notes) Here it is - Nimonic #105, excuse me, not #150. The firm that makes it is Henry Wiggin. Later I will tell you what my missions are. Maybe you can help me fulfill them.

100. S: Well, comrades -- since we are such in the Western sense -- these drill bits drill only some two and a half meters. Then the teeth break and they have to be removed and new bits put in. In other words it is all junk, even though they drill as deep as three thousand meters and more. They give you the impression that one drill goes through a hundred and more meters, and that the drilling problem has been solved by us, but that is not true. There is a whole pile of broken bits for every effort.

101. S: My next item -- the Sixth Breakthrough Artillery Division is located in the DDR now. Its designation is exactly that - the 6th ADP (ARTILLERISKAYA DIVIZIYA PRORYVA). Remember that in the Soviet Union there

are also artillery corps. This division has four brigades. I do not know the composition of these four brigades. But in addition there are four other brigades which are rocket artillery brigades. Two of these are equipped with atomic warhead rockets. The atomic warheads are not assembled on the rockets but are stored in special atomic storage depots. I don't know where these depots are, but it should be very simple for you to find out.

102. G: To whom are these brigades subordinated, VARENTSOV? Or are they considered GHQ units? S: They are under MOSKALENKO because these are considered to be strategic weapons. VARENTSOV is in charge of all rocket artillery of the ground forces which would include regimental, divisional, and corps rocket artillery. G: Even though these brigades are located in the DDR? S: Yes, even though they are in Germany. G: This would mean that they are GHQ units. S: No, but you see the General Staff in a sense complements the staff of MOSKALENKO. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff control MOSKALENKO, but this unit is not a part of the military formations under VARENTSOV. He is in charge of the Ground Forces Artillery which consists of rifled artillery and free rockets and guided missiles of a short range - tactical - but strategic missiles are under MOSKALENKO. He controls the ICBMs, the launching of SPUTNIKs, and this Strategic Rocket Brigade.

103. S: Then I gave you here a list of military districts and groups of forces. First there is the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Then there is the Southern Group of Forces and the Northern Group of Forces. The following military districts are active: The Zabaykal (Transbaykal) military district (M.D.); the North Caucasian M.D. with Rostov-on-the-Don as headquarters; the Belorussian M.D. with headquarters in Minsk; Sub-Carpathian M.D. with headquarters in Lvov; Odessa M.D., Hqs. Odessa; Kiev M.D., Hqs. Kiev; Leningrad M.D., Hqs. Leningrad; Transcaucasian M.D. Hqs. Tbilisi - Baku is also included here; the Pribaltiskiy (Baltic) M.D., Hqs. Riga. The Northern M.D., where I mentioned these rocket bases exist which are positioned against England, has now been transferred over to the Leningrad Military District. This Northern M.D. no longer exists. It was formerly commanded by Marshal MEHRTSKOV.

104. S: The Turkestan M.D., Hqs. Alma-Ata; the Volga M.D., Hqs. Kuybyshev. You better add this, that the Volga M.D., just like the Voronezh M.D. with its headquarters in Voronezh, are now considered to be incorporated into the Moscow Military District which is being expended considerably. During World War II the Moscow Military District stretched from Kalinin to Medselinsk in the East. In fact a big section of the RSFSR was included in the Moscow Military District. That is why such prominent people I referred to before, such as BERIYA, were members of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District. The Siberian M.D. Hqs. Novosibirsk; the Ural M.D. - I did not mention it here, but it very shortly will be incorporated into the Siberian Military District - Hqs. Sverdlovsk; The Far Eastern Military District, Hqs. Khabarovsk; and of course, the MVO, Hqs. Moscow. All of these headquarters must definitely be blown up. Please destroy these slips and notes of mine later as you wish.

105. J: Please ask him to clarify the impression he received earlier that he was the representative of VAZNYUKOV and possibly others who were dissatisfied with the regime. (G. repeats question as stated by J.) S: I mentioned this before and wrote in my letter that Marshal KONEV and Marshal SOKOLOVSKIY are absolutely healthy people and are VAZNYUKOV's friends. They did not agree with KHRUSHCHEV about his policy on reducing the size of the army.

106. As your soldier I must report to you that the Soviet Union is definitely not prepared at this time for war. All of this agitation for peace and intimidation on the other hand, which unfortunately many Western leaders succumb to, provesnothing. Back in 1956 when the Egyptian affair was going on the Soviet Union should have been sharply confronted, and even today this should be done. With Cuba for example, I simply can't understand why KHRUSHCHEV should not be sharply rebuked. I do not know what answer Mr. KENNEDY will give him, but he certainly should be accused of arming Cuba with Soviet tanks and guns, right under the gates of America. Czechoslovakia also sent considerable quantities of arms. KENNEDY should be firm. KHRUSHCHEV is not going to fire any rockets. He is not ready for any war. I respect and love the United States and I certainly, in KENNEDY's place, would be firm. Just as we helped the regime in Hungary maintain its power and everyone knew what we were doing, why shouldn't KENNEDY have the right to help the patriotic elements of Cuba, when you know what arms have been sent to Cuba from the USSR! This is my opinion and the opinion of many of our officers.

107. S: I didn't finish about these Marshals. When KHRUSHCHEV found out that they did not back him, he simply ordered them retired. They are living on a pension now, just like ZHUKOV. TIMOSHENKO was also retired, but he had started to drink heavily sometime ago. Many officers are displeased because many healthy generals and officers are being retired and because of the reduction in pay they have no other means of earning a livelihood. For example, a reduction from 5000 rubles income to an income of 2000 rubles per month is very difficult when one has a family.

108. S: I would say that of the total Communist Party strength of 7 to 8 million members, there are no more than two to two and a half million of strong, fanatical Communists. If a war ever began today on the scale of Hitler's war, even with conventional armament, countless numbers of officers and soldiers would simply desert to the other side. This is because all of these ideals for which many of our fathers, brothers and relatives died have turned out to be nothing but a bluff and a deceit. There is always the promise that things will be better, but actually nothing is getting better and things are only getting worse. I swear to you that only in Moscow and Leningrad can one even purchase foodstuffs decently. In Voronezh and Orel -- a friend of mine recently came from there and said that they are eating horse meat, nine rubles per pound by old prices. Even sausages are made of horse meat and it is difficult to get bread. Since there are no roads, this results

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#1 — distribution

in unbelievable transportation delays and breakdowns, and grain is rotting since it cannot be delivered. The country is large and can produce much wheat, but such a large percentage is lost because they cannot make equitable deliveries. Much cattle was lost due to lack of fodder.

109. S: Last December a delegation of Englishmen, thirteen of them, came to me and I was arranging to show them the refrigeration equipment of the Refrigeration Plant Mikoyan #1. They were from the John Thompson firm which manufactures refrigeration equipment in England. Suddenly I received an order to cancel this because the cattle which were brought there were just skin and bones, and they did not want the Englishmen to see this. They told the Englishmen that repairs were going on. You can check what I say with this delegation. They did not see the plant. I could tell you much more, my friends, and I'm sure you know a great deal more yourselves.

110. S: But I would like to emphasize one fact and that is that KHRUSHCHEV has not renounced war and is patiently awaiting the time when he can begin a war. He has given himself the mission of being the instigator of a war. He wants to make a "rain of rockets" under which, as he says, "to bury my imperialism". I am confident that my government-now the USA and England-with the other free countries of the world such as France and West Germany are sufficiently flexible to withstand the onslaught of Soviet rockets and arms. All will not be destroyed and recovery may be possible. But still it seems to me that KHRUSHCHEV should not be permitted to initiate the war. Today he will not begin a war. He will rant and rave and even send arms here and there just as he did to Cuba and possibly even send small caliber rockets there. In fact there was talk about this with CASTRO and possibly a few rockets are already there.

111. S: In the USSR the younger generation are dissatisfied. Their incomes are small. They have few decent clothes and when they see your tourists and your visiting delegations, and see how well-dressed the foreigners are, this has an effect on them. Our youths have no money and theft is common. All kinds of crimes for theft occur about which nothing is written. After all, the press is entirely controlled. The people cannot organize. There is no opposition to the regime, and when a small opposition does arise such as MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, etc., they are immediately eliminated. The people are afraid to do anything because if they open their mouths they will lose even the little bit they have. There is no money in the bank; there is no property, nothing from which to draw sustenance. There is internal dissension and Hitler was right when in his time he attempted to have minority conflicts. All of these weak spots must be exploited before the external blow is dealt during a war. Even the Soviet help to the countries of Peoples' Democracies may serve a good purpose in that it is draining the national treasury.

112. S: Valuable production results from our labor even though the individual worker gets only pennies. But all of these billions are going out of the country and it's becoming a serious drain. Relations are not always the best with the Satellites. For example, with China we are having difficulties

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#1 Soviet aid

Although we have given them foodstuffs and equipment, recently Mao Tse-Tung chased out our specialists. He said that his own specialists have now been sufficiently trained. It can even happen that if we stop supplying the Satellites more of them like Poland and Yugoslavia will be asking you for aid. There simply is no monolithic Warsaw Pact.

Sino Soviet relations

Soviet treatment officers

113. S: Now all of us are being squeezed more and more. Even of my present 4,500, I pay 500 rubles income tax. They took away allowances for household help for high-ranking officers. They took away privileges of those who are decorated who in Stalin's time were declared exempt from income taxes. All of this is done because they need more and more funds to build factories and other equipment for the manufacture of rockets. The discipline and moral of the Army has fallen greatly. There are countless cases of pilferage, drunkenness, and immorality. All of these things I mentioned must be considered. By itself it may not be a decisive factor, but it all adds to the general situation and can be exploited. Of course, I am sorry for the people, but they have suffered so much already that if they suffer just once more for the sake of a really better future, it would be worthwhile having this war. But in that case, let me know when I should be in Moscow.

factors for rocket X army morale

114. G: Therefore, you are not the representative of any group of disaffected persons? S: No, I am all alone. All I have is my mother, my daughter, Galya, and my wife, I am entirely in your hands. You can do with me as you will, and I wish only to work with you honestly. All the materials I pass to you are mine and all of my experience and intelligence training are at your disposal. I received a great deal of training earlier from the Soviet Government. I am associated with no one whatsoever. I would be afraid of this, and I do not wish it.

115. S: Therefore, I repeat I would like to have agent comms with you via a dead drop. Please give me a small Minox. I know it and I have worked with it before. I will not develop the film even though I have my own apartment, so that my wife nor anyone else would not notice. So I will deliver only undeveloped film to you and I will place it wherever you tell me to. I have many secret journals such as VOYENNAYA MYSL, manuals, and classified lectures by prominent people. I have a chance to get these items in my hands for possibly an hour, and I can photograph them. I would not have time to write. I wrote up this rocket material because I knew it was important. I did it carefully because I knew you would check every word and if it were perfect maybe I would get a decoration. G: That's fine.

116. G: Now the time is drawing close, let us plan for the future. S: That's right. I will leave in a few minutes. G: Now what is your program or your time schedule for tomorrow? S: (Looking at his schedule) Let us begin working together tomorrow at 2115 hours. I have a little change in my schedule. Tomorrow at 1700 hours our delegation schedule will be completed and I have to run to the Embassy because I want to see if I can extend the duration of this trip by five days. As it stands, we have come here for ten days. We received money for ten days and our passport notation states that we have come for ten days. However, there will be an engineering exhibition here in London up to the fourth of May and we have no delegation planned to attend it. They wish to pass on the assignments for covering this

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to us. Tomorrow I must go to see SOLDATOV, the Ambassador, and ask him to send a cable requesting that an extension of five days be given to myself and my delegation. This will give me the opportunity of working a little more with you, to get to know you better and to rest up a bit. I do not know whether this will work out or not. In the meantime you must plan that I would leave on the 30th because there is no permission to extend as yet. G: When do you think you will know? That is, when will a cable reply come in? S: I will know about the decision on Monday.

117. S: In addition we want to see what the firms Plessy and Leo Computers can show us because they deal with electronics which is now a first priority, and it would be an advantage to report even on some new screw. Things are not sufficiently developed in electronics in the USSR. Some work has been done and they have various integrators and computing machines, but it is far from perfection. You have no idea of how many failures and unsuccessful tests have been made. The Americans are honest people. They write about their test failures and admit when a rocket falls into the sea improperly. We don't write anything about this but, believe me, we have more failures than the Americans.

118. S: Well, this is about all I had planned to tell you tonight. Possibly much of what I have said did not follow in proper sequence. However, I hope that next time we will continue our talk with more concrete details. What I would like to do is to look over the materials I have submitted and explain whatever may not be clear and pinpoint details.

119. S: Now with respect to the agent net -- in Ceylon there is this diplomat who is working for the Soviets. His father is a Kurd, which fact he conceals. I have the names and addresses of all people. It is hidden in a dead drop which I have at a DACHA. It is the DACHA of my uncle; it is a little place. This uncle is my mother's brother. In the dead drop I have this list of agents, which includes the agents in India who are on conservation. There are two brothers there. Formerly, they were very active agents, but now they are on conservation because we are not conducting intelligence operations against India. This is because NEHRU is a fool and says everything anyway. In fact, the entire government is that way. There is a radio operator in this REZIDENTURA which is on conservation, and in addition to the two brothers there is a Major in the Army and other military men.

120. S: In Pakistan there are six agents, one of whom is a Turk, and there are two agents in Ceylon. In Ceylon one of the agents is a corporal who works in a headquarters. He obtains all kinds of United States military manuals. All this material I will pass to you. Don't forget to prepare a set of photographs for me to identify. I will tell you whom I know about, and who are dangerous intelligence officers who should be gotten out of the country. Any means should be used to expel them, including provocation, intensive surveillance, etc.. Let replacements come in because it

takes a considerable time for a man who just arrives to do anything.

121. S: Incidentally, there was an important moment I want to tell you about. Yesterday when I was leaving I saw MELIKH in the General Staff. Why did you let him go? This is something I do not understand. He is an out-and-out intelligence officer who has even been an instructor in English. I studied English under him. Yesterday I saw him just before flying here.

122. S: Another important matter, and please give this attention - please contact all people who have had dealings with me and make them sign secrecy oaths to preserve my security. Last August I was in Odessa on leave with my wife and daughter. On my way back through Moscow from Kiev I found myself in a railroad car in which were American students and instructors in the Russian language, also Americans. I could not approach them because I knew that there was an Armenian with them who is a KGB informant. For some time I stalked the American Embassy like a wolf, looking for a reliable foreigner, a patriot. Across the street from the American Embassy there is a tunnel-like archway and two benches. I sat there for a long time smoking. There were two militiamen walking around. One was at the corner. Dozens of cars were coming out of the Embassy. I even went to the America House. I saw them playing cards there and drinking whiskey, and there was a militiaman at the entrance. I was waiting for some American to come out so I could contact him and say, "Mister, you are a patriot. Please deliver this letter to your Embassy. Everything in it is self-explanatory." I couldn't meet anyone. No one came out.

123. S: These two instructors, one was tall and one was short. G: They delivered everything properly and you can see here your original letter. S: I had noticed them in the railroad car and remembered their appearance. I arrived in Moscow on the tenth of August and on the twelfth I spotted them as they were walking down to the river from Red Square. The tall man had an umbrella since it was raining. They were going to the bridge and I approached them. At first they were frightened, but I spoke to them at length and told them what a coincidence it was to see them again. They spoke Russian very well. I was so interested in the conversation, that, as an intelligence man, I made an error. I didn't say farewell to them. I had already given them the two envelopes, and it was high time to end the conversation. As we approached a PERVIAK, I saw two militiamen by accident. One was talking to a woman, and the other was walking. I told the Americans to go with me to an entrance way so at least we could say farewell and I could shake their hands, but they were frightened and started to walk away.

124. S: So I didn't say farewell to them, but they kept the envelopes and on the 15th of August they departed from Moscow. My feeling was miserable. I went to the dead drop; there was nothing there. There was also no signal on the booth. I have a friend in Moscow who is an Armenian. I told him "Leva, come with me to a hotel. I am looking for another Armenian

who was on a train. First I went to the Budapest and then to the Balchuk, on the pretense that I was looking for the other Armenian. At the Budapest Hotel we were told that no Americans had been there, but at the Balchuk, again using my Armenian as a cover, I found out that the Americans left Moscow on the 15th of August. After that I walked around for months and there was still nothing.

125. S: Earlier that Summer they had assigned me to the commission for accepting students to the MDA. At first I was to be the chief of the incoming class, but later was told that this is not compatible with my background, that is, my father's having been a White Russian officer. Then I was transferred to the Committee. But in the meantime I was writing up all the data on these students from their personnel files. There were many who came to Moscow from foreign assignments, and there was one illegal. I will think of his name in a minute. G: He is SHCHERBAKOV. S: That is exactly right.

126. S: After this, in December, the WINNE delegation came; [redacted] They were elderly people. I decided to approach them. I was determined to get all of this information as fast as I could to the American and British governments. I was undecided. You notice that at first I wrote the letter when EISENHOWER was president. I didn't rewrite the letter later and I added, you can see, the addressees, Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second and MACMILLAN. I approached them in their room at the Leningrad Hotel and appealed to them like to my fathers. I asked them to help me and simply deliver this letter. If Col. PEKKE had not departed from Turkey I probably would have established at least a contact to whom I could go when the time came. [redacted] were frightened. They said that they would consider it, but did nothing. They know about me.

127. S: In January, the Canadian, [redacted], arrived. He is acquainted with [redacted], the Second Counselor. I thought of [redacted] since he had a diplomatic passport, whereas [redacted] had a civilian passport. I asked [redacted] to introduce me to [redacted] since [redacted], as a Commercial Counselor, had official dealings with our Committee regarding scientific-technical matters. Therefore, I approached [redacted] and told him to please deliver my letter, to be a patriot; that to tell me down the river was in his province to do, but what would he get out of that? He took the letter, but two days later when I met him again to give him the package with all this rocket material, he returned my first letter. He politely, but firmly, told me to go. He said he was not concerned with such matters. A month and a half ago he received a new apartment in Moscow. I went to a reception with my wife and took all my material with me again. I met [redacted] and thought maybe he had thought the matter over and would accept the material. He greeted my wife and myself and then stayed away from me during the entire time I was there. I also request, therefore, that you obtain a secrecy agreement from them and request that they

[redacted]

forget all about me. These are the paths along which I meandered like an animal in order to make this contact. Now I thank you for this very much. Don't forget the Minox camera.

128. S: I request that you evaluate my submitted material with respect to its financial worth. I am certainly not going to bargain about it, and I am a soldier. Whatever you determine I should get, I will accept. Please place whatever you decide in the bank and I will request small sums as I need them. During this trip I will ask you for some money, not this minute but during my stay, since I have to buy quite a few things. Some of the things I buy I can take with me. I can even take two suitcases with me if it is necessary since it is entirely normal, or I can leave one suitcase behind with WYNNE and get them from WYNNE next time he comes to Moscow. I have many purchase orders to fill for my friends, my wife, etc.. I have complete trust and know that you will decide this properly. Basically, those are all my requests. G: I am sure everything will be arranged accordingly. S: Fine.

129. S: Well, these are all my requests and please now consider how to establish a system of dead drops. I think that we can arrange all this prior to the 30th of April and it seems that there may not be any reason making it necessary for me to meet with someone until five or six months after this. G: Are you planning to possibly return here again in the Fall? S: You see, that all depends. Tomorrow I will tell you all about my mission here and what data I have to get in terms of certain catalogues, so that they would see that I have obtained something and brought it back. Then there is another mission, that of turning over some of my acquaintances to local contacts. I will tell you all about that tomorrow. I will ask your advice and possibly your help in some of these matters. Then it all depends on how all this will be accepted at home. If they trust me, they may even send me with my wife and family overseas. This could be to the United States, to England, or to Canada. By my experience and maturity I am eligible, but it's a matter of whether they trust me.

130. G: How about your mother? S: No, they would not let her go. You will have to help me arrange how to get my mother out some other way. G: Could she get to the DDR? S: Yes, it is possible that she could go there as a tourist. G: In that case it will not be a difficult matter to get her out through East Berlin. S: That is a possibility. I have another possibility in mind. After I have completed all my assignments for you in Moscow, I could go with my family to live in Riga or elsewhere in the Baltic States. Then I could get out either by submarine or surface craft. This may sound naive at this point but it is still a possibility. G: It would be much better if she could go as a tourist to East Berlin and then simply get to West Berlin. S: Anyway, think about this. The only other thing I want to mention is that you will be satisfied with me. G: We are sure of this.

131. G: Now let us arrange about tomorrow. S: I believe that I can meet with you again tomorrow in the evening, late, between 2100 and 2200 hours. That would be the best time for me because the others will already be tired and will be falling asleep. G: Can there be any difficulty for you from anyone in your delegation? S: No, none at all. I am perfectly sure of this. Tell me, what danger do you think there can be? G: We don't know the exact circumstances, but we are afraid that if a pattern of your disappearance is noticed, someone will report this to your people. S: Nothing can happen. My room is locked. Here is my key. If the phone rings there will be no answer, and I will simply say that I was asleep. G: Suppose they keep knocking loudly on your door? S: First of all, there are double doors, and secondly, why should anyone knock on my door? I said goodnight to them quite properly, and said I would retire. I am positive none of them are surveilling me. G: We are raising these points entirely for the sake of your security. S: That is fine, and you can say anything with respect to matters that I am not aware of. But these things I know, so far as my delegation is concerned. G: We certainly are most happy to meet with you as much as possible. Don't misunderstand. S: I believe that we can work during the night. Tomorrow I will come here about 2200 hours. G: Yes, come straight to this room. S: This is about all I had in mind to tell you tonight.

132. G: Now I would like to be completely honest in my relations with you and I would like to formalize our relationship by an official AKT, so that you can properly report this to your top people. I will sign all necessary obligations, oaths, etc.. I want to have a clear soul, that I am doing this irrevocably for my whole life. These are not impressions as the result of one day. After all, I felt these urges far back in the days when I was in Turkey. Maybe the Turks even suspected, although I was never identified to them by name. Now that I've waited patiently almost one year, God has granted our getting together. G: That is why no further unnecessary chances should be taken from now on. True, God has protected you so far, but there is a limit to taking chances. S: Yes, God does not bless fools. G: No matter how much we want to meet with you for long sessions and often, we must be careful.

133. S: I asked WYNNE when he was leaving on the plane. I gave him my letter and one document. If he had taken all of the material you would have had a chance to examine it by now. It would have been important for you to have studied this earlier in order to have saved time, since there are many items there and no doubt many questions about them. After all, there are all kinds of details about the technical equipment, the organization, etc.. After all, these were not notes from lectures. The material was directly copied from written lecture material and from manuals. These were all Top Secret, of special importance. I put them into a briefcase which was carried in and out of the building with a special PROPUSK.

134. S: Well, then, let us say goodnight until tomorrow. Tomorrow I will come as soon as I can, but it may be as late as 2200 hours. G: Come when you can. We will be waiting for you. Let me take you out and show you a rear stairway of the hotel, right across from this room. You can go right up to the fifth floor without being seen by anyone. This will avoid taking the elevator. (Subject was given his key #566, and G. escorted him to the stairway. Subject left about 0103 hours, 21 April 1961.)

Addendum to Meeting Number 1

During the time that the tape was being changed during the First Meeting, the information below was not recorded on the tape. Fortunately, Subject had presented his agenda notes.- The items thereon having fallen within the short space interval of 3-4 minutes during which recording was not possible. This situation was inevitable due to the fact that at the very First Meeting with Subject, the tape recording was made clandestinely whereas, with Subject's concurrence, all tape recordings for future meetings were made with his knowledge. No business matters were covered during the short periods when the tape required changing. The following items follow Paragraph 89, Page 27, consecutively and precede Paragraph 90. Therefore, they will be numbered 89A, 89B, etc..

89A. There are rocket launching sites established in the area north of Leningrad toward Murmansk. Exact locations are unknown but these are in the Murmansk OBLAST.

89B. There is a production center and a warhead explosive storage area at Shchakhtinsk which is 180 KM from Rostov-On-The-Don. These warheads are specifically for the TRA which is the heavy rocket artillery for the Ground Forces Rocket Command under VARENTSOV.

89C. At Glukhovo (from Moscow) in the direction of Konotop, there is a training center for officers of the Rocket Command.

89D. At Kuzhenkovo and at Staryye Toropy, there are training centers for cadres to handle all types of warheads for rockets. These are for enlisted personnel rocket teams.

89E. In general, all training with live rockets has resulted in numerous casualties. The most notable of which was the explosion in which NEDELIN was killed.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(10)

Meeting #2, 21 April 1961

1. Subject arrived at 2125 hours on 21 April 1961. Immediately following hasty greetings Subject sat down and began to report on his visit to the Soviet Embassy earlier in the day. He had spent the early hours of the evening after supper with SHAPOVALOV, a GRU officer in the Soviet Embassy and admitted having consumed a half bottle of cognac with SHAPOVALOV. This was quite evident as the meeting progressed in that Subject digressed from his main thought even more extensively than usual. This is the only meeting, however, in which Subject showed any sort of alcoholic influence and he certainly was not intoxicated even at this meeting. As a matter of principle all participants decided to serve only a mild wine at meetings. This served to quench thirst which was stimulated by being forced to sit in a hot, stuffy, smoke-filled room for hours. (The windows had to be shut to keep conversation from being overheard.) Subject said he went to the Soviet Embassy to see the RESIDENT.

[redacted]

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

5. G: Do you remember you said it would be interesting for you to get this Nemonic #105? S: Ah yes, I'll tell you about that. Nemonic.... the firm is Henry Higgins. G: How did you think you would make up a cover story for getting this material...a fairly small quantity...150 grams? S: I'll tell you about those intelligence tasks which I fulfilled in my position as a worker on the Committee (GWIK). I'll tell you about the members of WYNNE's delegation on which they wanted character details -- those who live in London -- so that it's easier for a member of the RUKOVODSTVA here to work with him and later perhaps to recruit him. I mentioned three people in my operational report on the visit of WYNNE's delegation to Moscow in December 1960. I gave you a list of the seven people who were there.

6. G: Would it be a good thing for you if you were able to get the material? S: This is what I think about it. I'll tell you the tasks I've got to fulfill. If I can fulfill them, this would strengthen my position considerably, because it's worse to do none of your allotted tasks. I've been given four tasks and if I can do them all, so much the better. If I can fulfill just two of them I shall have done well. If I do none of them, they will either say "he's lazy" or "he doesn't want to work with us". G: (in English) Should I ask you if we can help him extend his stay? H: I wouldn't at this moment.

7. G: (in English) Shall I ask him to analyze his mission now? H: Yes. G: Tell us about your mission here. S: After WYNNE's delegation left in December 1960, I wrote an operational report on the operational task which I had been given, that is, to report on the people I met under the auspices of the GWIK. They told me to cultivate the acquaintance of people, to get on good terms with those who lived in London, or not far from London, or in a town near London, because our people here have to get permission to leave London. G: What sort of man were they looking for, a businessman? S: Yes, but it doesn't matter because every Englishman or American has, in our opinion, some possibility or other as an agent. Even if we don't use him directly we can get in touch with other people through him, select those who are of interest to us, and give them money. We don't give much. G: In other words, a contact or a spotter. S: I give you my word that I got into no agent relationship with any member of WYNNE's delegation. Quite the opposite, since I approached [redacted] and [redacted] with my own problem, with my own life.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

9. S: Now then, what tasks did they give me? To study these acquaintances again; to get to know them better; to work with them, estimate their value as agents, and if they have any value to report to the REZIDENT in London about their possibilities. The REZIDENT would assign an operational worker. His operational worker is Colonel PAVLOV. He is the son-in-law of VOROSHILOV. He is temporarily at the Center in Moscow at this time. Or he might allot SHAPOVALOV, who has a large mole on his right ear. He used to be a secretary in the APPARAT of the military attache in India. He's been in London six months. Or he might assign some other operational worker to the job.

10. S: I am to arrange a meeting with him and we might have a drink and so on. Then a further meeting would be arranged at which the Englishman's weaknesses would be explored -- perhaps he might be in debt, perhaps he might need money which he had lost gambling, etc.. He might ask for money himself. It might be possible to take advantage of these weaknesses, compromise him and eventually get him into a compromising position for recruitment. I should like, that is, another mission assigned to me is to make some new acquaintances, perhaps in the firm of Leo, to remember them and to report on them. Today the REZIDENT said to me that I should look out for new acquaintances at the Exhibition of Industrial Engineering and report on them to him before my departure, but about three days prior to my departure so that he can assign a case officer to whom I would introduce my acquaintances.

[redacted]

[redacted]

13. S: My second task is to determine the methods used by British Counterintelligence against me and my delegation, who is put on to us, any provocative questions, any anti-Soviet propaganda, surveillance methods on foot or from vehicles, the use of radio to report our progress from one block to the next, for instance, down Queen's Street. Those are the sort of things I should write about. Well, I'll write something.

14. S: The third task is the Nemonic. I told you about it yesterday. Incidentally, gentlemen, that reminds me, I thought about this in bed... I didn't sleep for two hours...today or tomorrow we ought to go through all my material and decide how you can use it freely -- through the press or through notes or however you like -- all the KHRUSHCHEV business and so on, but only that material which does not involve me.

15. S: I'll give you details on fifteen Soviet agents working in three countries, but don't arrest them now. Don't even put surveillance on them. Somehow we must cut them out in such a way that it won't do us any damage. As I said, in Ceylon a corporal is handing over all the American documents (USTAVY) for money. He has three children and needs money. He is not paid much but for him it is a material subsidy, according to his standards. But if you put this corporal in prison or shoot him as he deserves, then they will look at his file straight away. He has a pseudonym, "DICK" or "BOB", etc. and all the officers of Strategic Intelligence who have had dealings with him are listed: (Subject's true name), IVANOV, PETROV. They are called in and interrogated, has there been a leakage from these people who know that this man is an agent of Soviet Strategic Intelligence -- military, I emphasize. Therefore, this is a two-ended stick.

16. S: In India everything is frozen. They are not working now; they are on conservation. In Pakistan they are working, but producing only trifles. It is true there is one man getting material on computers (SECHETNO-RESHAYUSHCHIM USTROYSTVAM). He has access, but as I understand it, he is working through someone. Someone gives him the material as if he were interested in it, and this man sells it through a third person. The rest are worth nothing. They produce only scraps, nonsense. The material from Ceylon is valuable. It is always highly evaluated by the Information Directorate -- American documents, orders, and so forth. Incidentally, this government of Mrs. BANDARANAIKE is unsuccessful. It may be necessary to find a new regime. They are going a long way to the left. That is my personal opinion and I have the right and the duty to say these things. Well I ask you to think about all this and to come to an analytical, non-primitive decision, as one might say.

17. S: My next task is to get hold of as much information and material as I can which will receive positive evaluation. Incidentally, when KIRKWOOD was in Moscow, he gave me an overt brochure about obtaining fresh water from sea water. There are these evaporators. Our specialists were very interested because the methods we use to obtain fresh water -- this is in the Far Eastern Theater -- water for food, for drinking and for equipment, and water to drive equipment and tanks and so forth.....by our method the cost is six rubles (old currency) per cubic meter, but your method costs either one ruble five kopeks or ninety-seven kopeks. I don't remember exactly, but it was six times

cheaper. I got a good evaluation for this overt brochure. These types of visits give so many opportunities to our heavy industry, metallurgy, machine building, chemistry, artificial rubber.

KATZEL

18. S: Our specialists still haven't been able to work out how to fix artificial fur onto a fabric backing. In America there is a firm called Kapsel and in Canada, the Lion Fur Corporation. This Kapsel Company not long ago offered us a machine for doing this for $300,000 U.S. dollars. The factory is in Montreal and on the 15th of May three people are going to Canada to evaluate this machine -- two specialists and one interpreter. The name of the interpreter is NOZHIN and the head of the delegation is SAPZLEVSKIY and the third is a woman who is called KLYAKINA. I think, and this is my opinion, we will not give $300,000 for this machine but we shall study the process and perhaps steal the secret of the adhesive which sticks the backing to the fur. Why give $300,000 for a machine? Engineers, academicians, chemists and people like this are stealing all this from under your nose all the time.

19. S: I think the Americans do this the right way. They put very strict limits on the things these people can see. They show them very little. Our people go to Canada and we consider Canada a synthesis of the top scientific and industrial thinking of both the U.S. and Great Britain. The Canadians themselves have some clever people but they are working with American or British machines. You don't allow us to come to America and you don't allow us to do everything in England, but in Canada we go very freely and study them. We describe all the secrets and we say, "Thank you for letting us have everything so cheaply." The reports our scientists submit must be accurate or they are reprimanded. Irrespective of how the individual feels, even miserably, one has to do these things in order to survive in our system.

20. S: Well then, my task here is to get hold of materials which will be of interest on all those firms which have invited us. You, I think, should help me get this material without doing yourself any harm, of course. I won't be putting this material in my suitcase -- those are my orders -- but I shall be sending it back in the diplomatic bag through the REZIDENT, addressed to ROGOV - the small ROGOV. I've got it written down here, Vasiliy Maksimovich, not the Lt. Gen. ROGOV who is deputy to SEROV.

21. S: That's my third task, and the fourth is the Nemonic. This Nemonic, why give it to me? I don't think it necessary to give it to me. Why hand it over for chemical analysis -- or perhaps this is impossible. I'm not an engineer; I don't know. The REZIDENT said to me today that there are many Nemonics, 85, 120, 105, etc.. Through British Agents who are working for the Russians, they've gotten hold of one Nemonic -- which one he didn't know -- and he sent this off to Moscow by diplomatic bag on 17 April. H: I think that was Nemonic 90. S: Was it? I didn't know that. I'm only telling you what the REZIDENT told me.

22. S: I thought you would be bringing me photographs from which I could identify the REZIDENT. He's forty-five or forty-six. G: Yes, we'll get them for you. They're being prepared at this moment. I will have them for you tomorrow. S: I think this is a very important business. Yesterday you asked me to name all those officers with whom I studied. I will name all whom I studied with. There is this YERMOLENKO. You asked me about who worked as an illegal. He was in my class. Of course, he's gone abroad under a different name which I don't know, but I can identify his photograph, you understand? I will show you hundreds of these people and I won't make a mistake. I have a very good memory, but I did not want to clog it with a man's name and patronymic. I can tell you their ranks and surnames. You must do this now since we may not meet again for some time in the future. I'll show you which of them should be thrown out of the countries they are working in, so they'll have to bring in new ones. I will tell you about my classmates and graduates of other years. Incidentally the REZIDENT here used to be in America, and then he was sent to England.

23. G: Are those all your tasks? S: Yes, that's everything. G: Our question to you is whether if you fulfill these tasks, would it be a great plus for you? And if, perhaps as a reward, they would send you abroad again with other delegations? If so, this is the aim we should set ourselves. Exactly what would help you must be explained by you since it is clearer to you what would be most effective. S: If I do nothing, they'll say that I was just idle, that I came here only to see London and Great Britain, and to drink wine with the firm which gave us receptions.

24. G: We'll look into this. H: This is quite easy. I can get all the brochures he needs. S: Well I'll send the brochures by diplomatic bag through the REZIDENT, Col. ROGOV, not to the Committee, but straight to the Information Directorate, the former Second Directorate. H: Well, this is quite easy. I can get you stuff from all the firms. G: We're talking about the brochures. S: Yes, I want catalogues, valuable looking things with drawings, interesting things -- you know the sort of thing. G: We'll get you a whole heap of brochures. You can look through them and pick out the most important ones. S: Those dealing with electronics are the most useful if you can get them without damage to yourselves. At the Leo Factory they gave us a description of the Leo, II . Our specialists are very pleased with it. Today one of our specialists gave a lecture on the machine Minsk-1, the computer. Your specialists were not particularly interested. It was pretty old stuff for them. This man LOPATO, of course, knows a good deal about various big computers (STRELA) and the STRELA-4 which are kept in secret. (Note: These are Soviet models.) So I ask you to think about that and I ask you again to put me in touch with somebody suitable who could work with me properly. Later I can introduce him to a case officer of the REZIDENTURA here.

25. S: Do you understand how the list of code names I gave you is used? For example, 'yesterday I concluded a deal with Merchant B'. This means yesterday I had a contact with Agent B. This is how a dispatch or cable is

written up. Recently two couriers were killed. This happened not long ago, a few weeks ago. Sometimes they burn the pouches with this material and sometimes it may be intact. You may be able to intercept a diplomatic bag and, if you can do this, there you will find all the documents of Strategic Intelligence encoded with the code which I gave you. For instance, a "Merchant" is an agent, etc. You understand, when they are enciphering a telegram they use this code.

26. S: First of all, they disguise the operational words with this code and then with the help of ten-line figure ciphers, they encipher the message and send it off. (Note: This is a one-time pad.) In Moscow, they have a corresponding book and if in Ankara they subtracted, in Moscow they add, and get the true meaning of the message. So in order to decode a message, we need a code book which is kept in a safe by a code clerk. But, for instance, when I was REZIDENT I had access to the codes and did my own enciphering without the help of the code clerk. We've got these books at the Center. When I was getting ready to go to India, I went through all this in a separate room, and so forth and so on. It's important that we photograph two or three pages for the experts so that they can understand the order and frequency of the number sequences, and try to discover whether there is any higher mathematical rule in the structure of the whole. This is my future task which I will do when I get a suitable chance.

27. G: When you use the figures in order to send a message either by telegram or by some other means, surely you do not repeat the figures a second time in another message? S: No, because I subtract the numbers from another pad, and those sheets on which I've already crossed out numbers are burned in an incinerator by certification. In each REZIDENTURA there is a cipher room, in England and everywhere else where there is an oxygen tank and a device for the rapid destruction of cipher material in case of an incident. That is the general rule. G: What do you call these tables, one time tables (ODNOVREMENNYE TABLICHKI)? S: No, these are called RAZOVYE tables, on thin cigarette paper. (Subject gives an explanation of the system by which a word is encoded by syllables in alphabetical order; for example, the RAZVEDCHIK is encoded syllable by syllable.) S: And when I take the RAZ, 45855, I take pad No. 1 or I take pad No. 7, and they use pad No. 7 or No. 1 in the Center because they know which pads I have destroyed. Where I have subtracted, they add, and vice versa.

28. S: The operational code that I gave you is a fresh code (SVEZHIY). It is used in all REZIDENTURAs. It's a red booklet. At the beginning is the encoding section and at the end is the decoding section. It is in alphabetical order like a dictionary. I gave you some examples. I copied this booklet early in the mornings or when I was on duty. I kept it in my safe. I kept it together with my ciphers. But only this one code which was intended to make operational letters secure so that there were no words like intelligence officer, agent, safehouse, or dead drop. For instance, if I wanted to write Rome, I wrote "VILLONA".

29. S: I copied this list out on a piece of paper and then typed it out on a typewriter which I got from Germany when I was a regimental commander. I did this as accurately as possible. I wanted to insure that it was done more tidily than what I write on rockets, although that too should be comprehensible even though it is not beautiful. I tried to write out all the words in toto. I did want to copy the whole lot out on a typewriter but I would have needed two months to do that. My wife kept asking me what I was typing...we live in two rooms...and I always told her it was just a report, or (I would type) when my mother went off to my uncle's DACHA with my daughter. If I had had a camera -- a Minox or something like that -- then I certainly could have done it. G: You know how to use a Minox then? S: Of yes, I know how to make microdots, how to use secret ink, and I know how to develop secret-writing, that's all.

[redacted]

31. G: Have you eaten yet? S: Yes, I ate with SHAPOVALOV, with intelligence officer SHAPOVALOV. His English is very bad; mine is better. The REZIDENT was complaining to me about him today. The REZIDENT is an experienced and cunning man. He was in America. Incidentally he intends to take a TDY trip after PAVLOV, his deputy, arrives. He's going to go all around the country and if you put heavy surveillance on him he'll report on it to the Center. He'll begin to wonder why because there wasn't surveillance on him before, but since (Subject's true name) was here, surveillance began. You see, he'll get suspicious. Perhaps, on the other hand, he won't think about it.

32. S: Now we'll go through the papers which I have given you. I'll tell you what you can publish tomorrow in the papers if you like or in notes or on the radio on the "Voice of America" or on the "Voice of the BBC". Let's begin with the question of YERZIN, Pavel Dmitriyevich. I used to drink wine and vodka with him in Ankara. He was the KGB REZIDENT. He was a colonel there. Now he is the Prorector of the Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow. Incidentally, this University is in the building only recently occupied by the General Staff Academy imeni Voroshilov which is now being united with the Frunze Academy. It is not far from the crematorium.

33. S: Let us suppose it would be possible to expose YERZIN and to show these stupid Africans like Patrice LUMUMBA who are being prepared as a fifth column. Many of the students there have been recruited already. They take these people there who are poor and enraged, feed them, give them money and recruit them. They have lessons and Marxist-Leninist training, develop their political views, get a signature from them for material assistance and send them back to Africa to stir up trouble for you -- strikes, revolutions, etc. This university must be unmasked, and we can do this through this YERZIN

[redacted]

who is both Prorector and KGB REZIDENT, and who studies the prospects and does all the recruiting. Some have already been recruited. I heard this and believe it. However, if YEVZIN is exposed they would say, now who knows YEVZIN? A hundred people know that he is a KGB officer and on this list, of course, is my name because I worked with him in Turkey from the beginning to the end of his tour. I was with him for eighteen months. So I should like to unmask him but I am apprehensive about it at the same time. I had all this material ready at the time KHRUSHCHEV came to America and I should have liked to have been able to produce it then and to confront him with it and to say, "What are you doing?"

34. (Subject then gave a rambling monologue on political conditions inside the USSR with particular reference to the hunger strike in Voronezh reported in the written material.) S: KHRUSHCHEV should be confronted with specific instances of bad conditions within the USSR, of which he is fully aware but pretends otherwise. I wrote all this up. Now the individual KOLKHOZNIK's right to have a cow has been taken away. The order was given that the cows were to be taken to the KOLKHOZ. (Subject described miserable rural conditions -- no roads -- impossible to gather in harvests -- and the KOLKHOZ system completely failed.) G: Let us continue systematically. S: Please excuse me, my nature is such that I get carried away. I am afraid of forgetting when a thought comes into my head. (:))

35. G: All that you say is very interesting and clear and no one would quarrel with it. But our agenda....S: Excuse me before I forget, yesterday I began to tell you and I should like to emphasize this -- on the newspaper photograph which shows BIRYUZOV's headquarters, the PVO, and where I said GAU was -- Colonel General ZHDANOV of the Artillery is the head of the GLAVNOYE ARTILLERISKOYE UPRAVLENIYE which is the soul and heart of the rocket artillery and of what remained of the classical artillery. The place shown is the largest Chief Artillery Directorate under which are concentrated control of electronics, the production of all military rocket factories and the storage dumps. I ask you to remember that this building must be destroyed. It is the center where the planning and direction of the technical military machine is concentrated and control of the technical production.

[redacted]

37. S: Insofar as the agent situation for our workers in the countries I deal with -- now my adopted countries -- it is complicated. It is not particularly easy to work in them. AGENTURA is thin and in America -- and I will talk about America in particular -- at this moment there is a REZIDENTURA which

[redacted]

has direct contact with the center. It is illegal. The radio station is not outside Moscow like the station which received cipher telegrams from all countries but is directly on the Arbat in the General Staff. There is a powerful station and the agent and illegal REZIDENT whom they have sent off is in independent contact. They train radio intelligence workers. In Turkey I had GUS'KOV. He is now studying at the Academy. Nikolay... he's taking part in the first course of specialists.

38. S: We have two types of radio equipment which are sent out to our REZIDENTURAs -- large powerful sets and smaller sets. We set up large sets on the frequencies on which our radio stations originate and receive cipher telegrams, and this other smaller set listens in to the channels used by the Air Force and the PVO and to other military channels. If the message is of a civil or commercial nature from one town to another, let's say from Ankara to Istanbul in Turkey for instance -- that was where I had a radio station under my control -- he there changes the wave length and searches. He listens to all the channels used by aviation etc. transmitted by bases, as I remember it, and all the other channels. He intercepts them and he records or writes them down, or he makes a digest or a transcript of the conversation.

39. S: In this way they get a great deal of factual material. He can pinpoint deployments exactly because there are very many careless people, officers and others who give numbers in open text or ciphered numbers which can then be deciphered and understood. For example, an intelligence worker may go for a walk or go fishing and meet a soldier. He stops to talk and smoke a cigarette with him and asks him, "What unit are you serving with". The soldier says, "Oh, I'm in the 65th Infantry Regiment." Well, they have a different number which they use on the air, but we know that this is the 65th Regiment. The fool told us. In this case the agent would not say that he was a Russian. He would pretend to be a Yugoslav which is also in the Balkan Pact, and the fool soldier would believe him. This is a terrible business, your task and mine. Perhaps other people more experienced than you are in thinking out how to curb Soviet Strategic Intelligence, could figure how this could be done. This I can't tell you at the moment.

40. S: One thing I can tell you about is this is work with small radio transmitters which are carried in operational cars. Every REZIDENTURA has these operational cars. For instance, in London there are many. The car is specially equipped. The REZIDENT told me that your counter-espionage services have sometimes stopped a number of these cars and checked them. They are doing the right thing, but it is necessary to know what to look for and how to recognize them. This is an important matter. They are connected with radio intelligence. These cars should be confiscated. That is my opinion. Operational cars are given great significance.

41. S: Contacts are made, as a rule, in operational cars nowadays. Agents are picked up en route when the cars have shaken surveillance. Money and materials are passed and the agents are dropped off. You can stop the car and you would not know there was secret material in it. In a car there are a large number of places in which one can make hiding places. For instance with the upholstery, like the arm-rests, you can take off the upholstery and make a small cavity. You might have one already made in which there is a small pipe in which a cassette, like a film cassette, can be put containing material which is being taken from or given to an agent. There is an invisible cavity into which a flexible hose with a special head can be lowered. It screws onto the container hiddan there. This is made by the First Section of SHELYGANOV. More and more they are using the gas tank with a false section. They are even fitted out to enclose radio transmitters. They make a cavity inside the tank, completely sealed off, and they put the transmitter in there. Also, under the floor where the plating is, they use all the projections and exhaust pipes and portions of the car chassis as concealment devices. You must look very carefully, especially for places out of the line of vision, as I described.

42. S: To continue, they drop off an agent as the car moves. A switch turns off the brake lights as the driver brakes and no red light is seen in the rear. The surveillants think the car is moving, but he has stopped and unloaded the agent in the darkness. The stop signal had been disconnected. The same can be done with the interior lights when necessary. The door opens and normally the light goes on, but it can be disconnected so that when the agent is picked up or put down the car remains dark.

43. S: Operational cars, particularly foreign models, are kept at the AVTOBAZA on Gritsevets Street, the AVTOBAZA of the GRU. Yes, there are special instructors, drivers who have worked abroad, and they teach courses to new drivers and sometimes teach us. I studied there. I did thirty hours. I know where there are hiding places in the Pontiac, the Ford, the Mercedes Benz, for example, I told you the floor, and the arm rests. In front where the driver and the passenger sit, the floor opens up and there is a hole underneath. Sometimes when a car is followed, material can be jettisoned. If they held me up I could throw the material out. I throw the stuff out; I am picked up; I have nothing in my hands. They throw stuff out; they drop it. Therefore the cars are adjusted so that when the car stops or brakes, there is no red light at the back. The car is dark when picking people up or dropping them off and there are many hiding places. An operational car -- all operational cars -- are equipped like this. But such ingenuity! They take off the metal upholstery holders and make a hiding place. You would never guess that there is a hiding place there. You look at the outside surface under the seats. You must take the plating off and there you will find the hiding place. Knowing who the operational case officers are, you can spot their cars.

I just left SHAPOVALOV. He brought me here. I wanted to get the number of his car but that's easy for you to find out -- that's no problem.

44. S: On the question of radio intelligence -- great significance is attached to this. We have it here too. In the Embassy there is a powerful station which listens in to all of the channels. In all the capitalist countries there are huge stations and little portable ones. They switch on the station, search and listen to the channels, pick on one far away from the town -- a base or a storage area which has a radio link. They listen to it, write everything down, locate it, work out its designation and the matters which are being worked out. They hear very interesting, secret things. Thus without agents we obtain precise details from radio data about the location, about the formation itself, about those questions which I had on record -- that supplies are running short, that they have not delivered produce for three days to that division. We know its status. They transmit by radio -- here is Balikashyr, there is Samsun or Trebizond. Well, this is a very great asset of strategic military intelligence.

45. S: KGB intelligence also uses the facts which are obtained by radio intelligence on the subjects which interest them. What does the KGB do? They do surveillance of us and of all Soviet subjects and political intelligence. What sort of organization do they have? There is the First Directorate -- this is operational -- on Dzerzhinskiy. It is necessary to smother the KGB. They are very experienced people and they do a lot of harm to good people. It is a terrible business, a huge organization, flourishing and rich. They get large salaries -- more than we. Well, they also use this data. The First Operational Directorate (of GRU) is also split into sections (OTDELS). All our directorates are divided by areas, but theirs are divided by sections which are working groups against countries. Also in the sections there are directions (NAPRAVLENIYA). There are senior officers who are the heads of directions; that is also the organization in strategic intelligence. There are no sub-sections (OTDELENIYE). In the Directorate there are sections. But there, a section is divided into directions while with us a directorate is straight away divided into directions.

46. S: A head of a direction -- . Say in the Fourth Directorate there are three directions. Colonel ZASORIN, Konstantin Alekseyevich is the head of one. He was military attache in Syria -- you must know this. The other two are headed by Colonel DOLIN, military attache in Iran, and Colonel BLAKHIN. He was military attache in Syria after ZASORIN. He was there a long time. Those are the three heads of directions at the present moment -- they are all alive and kicking. With them I was a senior officer under ZASORIN and looked after three countries. I had SHAPOVALOV as an officer. He is now an intelligence worker here. G: What are these directions called? S: Near East, Middle East and Far East, and each direction has several countries. G: And working groups? S: And working groups.

47. S: There is a safe in which the personal files of the formation -- the files of the agents they are working on -- are kept, along with operational correspondence, the operational code which I gave you, a journal and accounts and a stamp for the documents which we type. We type all documents ourselves. I do a little typing myself. S: We do the typing ourselves and enter the number in a journal. This is seen by a sub-committee twice a month or at least once a month. We receive an enciphered telegram. I make a short entry and take the number. It is already filed. If I have replied I write a short outline of the reply; I write the answer on a red form -- a cipher telegram -- code it with that code, and the head of the direction signs it. He also has a pseudonym -- KAR, [redacted] -- like that, you understand. He signs it. I take it to the Eighth Section on the third floor, where the financial section is. The head of the Financial Section is Colonel TELEGIN and Colonel SHESTOV. Excuse me, TELEGIN is the head of the Financial Directorate. Colonel SHESTOV is the head of the Administrative Directorate. The head of the Medical Section is Colonel MAKEMOV.

48. S: Well, gentlemen, -- our task -- and this is what we work for -- clearly all our efforts are directed to the localization of Soviet intelligence connected with recruitment and agent work. We are not successful everywhere because they work skillfully to deceive counterintelligence. This is a science in itself. In America, in order to carry out a meeting, sometimes an operational worker will spend the night at his desk on a divan in his office in order to go out early when the militia is not there -- when the counterintelligence agent has gone to sleep because he is worn out or the policeman is drowsing. He spends the night in his office in order to go out early and to make his contact.

49. S: I ask you to pay particular attention to radio intelligence. This is a very vulnerable spot which they attack with great success. May I go on with my paper? G: Yes.

50. S: Well then, on the subject of operational intelligence work, SHERSTNEV's Directorate, I have heard, and I will check up on it, that now there is no directorate and I don't think the head of SHERSTNEV. We must look into this. G: SHERSTNEV retired in 1958. Nikolay Vasilyevich. S: Yes, I remember. Operational intelligence is in the hands of SEROV -- in the hands of Strategic Intelligence. G: The head now is KOCHETKOV. S: Quite right, but it is not a directorate. I'll check it. It is also not a section. It is a group which deals with operational intelligence, but it's not important what number it has. I shall find out.

51. S: The principle is this and this is very important. In each military district which borders on a capitalist state there are RP in which there are officers of our Strategic Intelligence. They run and dispatch agents but they have little depth of intelligence, penetration (geographically). These RP's are also engaged in radio intelligence. They listen in on the channels. They collect data on one question or another. So, let us suppose I send material from Ankara which I got from radio intelligence and they also pick it up in Tbilisi and in the Trans-Caucasian Military District RP at Leninakan.

(Razved punkt)

[redacted]



61. S: Incidentally, an interesting detail about Turkey -- it is interesting how little they value a man with us -- even a general. Major General KAZAKEVICH, the military attache in Turkey was chosen to be Secretary of the Party Committee in the Embassy at Ankara. There it is not called the Party Committee; for camouflage purposes they call it the Trade Union. These Party Secretaries are called back by the Central Committee once a year for "refresher courses".

62. S: He went back and said -- SUSLOV was in the chair -- "I want to express the opinion of Ambassador RZHEV -- that was our Ambassador in Ankara -- and of myself as Secretary of our Party Committee. We consider that the Soviet government is pursuing the wrong policy towards the Turkish Government and the Turkish people. The Turkish people are in a state of poverty. The lira has fallen, there is little wheat, everything is expensive etc.. The Americans are not giving as much as Turkey needs. We should make a large loan -- some tens of millions of rubles to the Turkish Government so that it moves away from the Americans". But SUSLOV

[redacted]

said, "What sort of experiments are these with millions of rubles? What assurance have you that we can give this loan and that the Turkish Government and people will turn away from America and come over to us!" He looked a complete fool -- "what assurance?" SUSLOV is a clever man, a clever politician. He abused him saying, "You want to make such a huge loan to Turkey at the expense of the people but what guarantee have you? They take the loan, they eat it, and how do we get them away from the Americans -- from their embrace?" as SUSLOV put it. Well, they told him that he politically shortsighted, illiterate. They removed him and proposed to replace him with ZASORIN, Konstantin Alekseyevich. But Colonel MAKHNOV -- I mentioned him not long ago -- examined him. He had pains in his liver and pains in his heart and he was rejected on health grounds. He's not going abroad now. He will work in the APPARAT -- perhaps for two years. Now they are looking for an attache to gothere. But SUDIN is preparing to go as a counsellor. Well, that was a digression. One thought leads to another.

63. S: Now about agents who are known to me -- I'll give you their full surnames, names, patronymics, even the years in which they were recruited. I have already talked about this a lot. You should consider how to locate them, but because I ran them, I am certain to be called up for questioning. Well, I asked you about this. I have told you about RESKIN. I have told you about YERZIN. Think about how to handle him. He is the prorector.

64. S: Now about agent work, and methods of work in the US and in England -- I'll tell you about America. What SERGEY told me -- he used to be counsellor, excuse me, First Secretary in our Embassy in America. Now he is a counsellor in India. They call him Sergey. I have forgotten his surname for the moment; I'll tell you. He was in America a long time and he knows English quite well. Sergey SERGEYEVICH. G: VURUKHIN? S: No. Well, I'll remember. He babbled away. We have people like that, too, who chatter to one another. How difficult it was for me to work while he yapped about how he spent the night on the divan in his office waiting for the dawn. In Washington the REZIDENTURA is under cover. The agents are old, they were recruited long ago, and they have little value.

65. S: In New York, there are two REZIDENTURAS, basically under UN cover. That was where the man (MELEKH) was whom you threw out. You should have shot him; you had so much proof. Incidentally, the American Counterintelligence knew he was a SVOLOCH -- MELEKH -- they had evidence. Then they wrote it all out, expelled him and resettled him. How can that be? I remember I said to [redacted] and [redacted] that in this material there are certain facts about MELEKH which may give a clue. I do not know what MELEKH said in court about where he was between 1950 and 1952. If he pretended that he was not working in the Military Diplomatic Academy as a

teacher, it would have been possible to show him my two pages and to say, "You are the author of a book on the English language and here is a no. 75033, the number of the Academy VCh, used in correspondence.

66. S: Just prior to my departure I saw MELEKH walking through the GRU corridors. I read that KENNEDY's brother who deals with legal matters ordered the case against MELEKH dismissed. When I approached [redacted] and [redacted] (if they had accepted my material) this data about MELEKH would have been known. You would have known that he is an intelligence man. (Note: Subject again repeats how he appealed to [redacted] and [redacted] to accept his material and how they feared it was a provocation.) Thus you probably did not believe me for eight months. If only you had let me know in two words. This hurt me a great deal. J: It's much more difficult to work in the Soviet Union than it is out here. S: Of course, you are right.

67. S: I recently listened to a lecture by a general of the KGB on the operations of American and British intelligence personnel in Moscow. He mentioned that American intelligence operations were observed to be concentrated in the Krasno-Presnenskiy Rayon of Moscow. Evidently the area was found to be suitable for conducting meetings there.

68. G: Was anything mentioned about an American attache who was PNG'd? S: Yes, I remember he spoke of a meeting in a bus where money was passed, a considerable sum, but I don't remember the details at all. I didn't pay close attention to it. G: Was the identity of the Soviet agent mentioned? S: No, nothing was said about that. You see, in a case like that the KGB immediately takes control. Maybe our GRU chiefs know about it, but the rest of us were not informed.


69. S: Let me ask this question. Why couldn't two words have been posted, stating, for example, that I should wait for eight months? G: That could have been done, but we deliberately refrained until we could give you instructions for a secure way of passing the material you told us you had. This was to provide maximum security for yourself as well as for our man. S: Did you not receive my first letter through those two Russian (language) instructors? G: Yes, we did as I already told you. We have it here. But we received it after a considerable delay. S: I made a mistake, as I told you before. I wanted to say farewell to them properly at the Naberezhnaya, but I went to the Pereulok and ran into the two militiamen. They saw that I was apprehensive when I saw the militiamen, which was a mistake on my part. When I told them in Russian to follow me into an entryway to finish our conversation, they became afraid and went on. They went along Osipenko Street toward the Baltchuk (Hotel) and I surveilled for a distance since I was afraid that they might throw away the material. Later, after there was such a long interval of silence, I began to think that although they did not throw away the material, they may have disposed of it later in the toilet of the hotel or something like that. Later I checked

(and learned) that they left on the 15th as I told you before. I used this Armenian friend of mine as my cover for asking about them.

70. S: Of course there may be questions here which are not any of my business, so you can simply tell me,("Subject's true name), this is none of your business." G: By the time the material reached us in Washington, some time went by. S: I asked them to deliver it to your Embassy that same evening. Did they do this? G: Yes, they did. They delivered it as you requested. S: Then they were fine lads. I wish them good health. Tell me this, did you understand at once what the subject matter was about and that I was (Subject's true name)? G: Of course we did, immediately. S: That's fine.

71. S: Now let me mention this, in the future if a telephone call is to be made to me, do not speak in English. This, of course, is in case our other means for communication are interrupted and you do know my telephone. By the way, what was the substance of what this man who called me at 1100 hours on a Sunday tried to tell me? All I could get was one word - "March". G: "March", of course is the month. He tried to say that during the month of March or April there would be a signal for you. Furthermore, he said that you should wait for this patiently and should not contact anyone until you see the signal. A signal will be placed and you will be called again. S: This all could have been said in two words.

72. S: Why couldn't you have placed this information behind the radiator? G: Because such a signal would say only one thing -- keep waiting. Then to go back again to the same dead drop with a complete set of instructions would create an additional risk of compromise. S: People go there all the time. G: Why should the dead drop be used for this purpose twice when one time would serve more securely? S: All that needed to have been done was for a signal to be placed and a note placed telling me to wait and that the material got into the right hands. I am sure that there is no surveillance on me at all at this time. G: Most probably not, but there is certainly surveillance on our man whom we planned for you to contact. Consequently this surveillance is also a source of danger to you. S: But you did believe me, that I had this other material that I wanted to pass. G: Of course we believed you because the material that you first sent made it very clear what the situation was. S: You checked all that? G: Of course we did. S: Another thing which confused me was how to convince [redacted] and [redacted] to accept my material directly. However, I won't talk about that anymore.



61. S: Well, you know what a mess I should have been in if WYNNE had not taken the material. I keep the material at home where my agentsa are. The material consists of typed sheets which are wrapped with insulation tape. G: So you keep it at home. S: No, in a hiding place on my uncle's MCHA. The position was ticklish. They might take me out of the committee for training to work under cover in the capitalist states of England or Canada, even the United States. May God grant that this happens because then I could play an important role. Everything would be in my hands, everything - ciphers, radio intelligence, people. This would be important to us. There is one agent -- I don't know whether he is in England or in America, but I'll swear by my life that there are agents.

62. S: Yesterday CHARDYNOV had an agent meeting. He told me about it yesterday. The man is somewhere on the other side of London. I got the impression that he is some kind of a clerk or a press worker as far as I could find out. I couldn't put direct questions to him but he told me enough about it for it to be understandable.

83. S: The question is what will my position be? Suddenly things will get bad for me. Some member of the Central Committee -- you know the sort of SVOLOCH -- will say "Such a man", as myself, "cannot be tolerated in the GRU. Let's finish with him." Besides, they know that the deputy of Major General SHOLDKOV -- the lame one I told you about yesterday, Major General SHUMSKIY, -- told me officially "This report has come from the KGB archives saying that Colonel (Subject's name) made a false declaration. When he reported on his father, it did not tally with the actual facts. His father Vladimir Floriyanovich was of noble descent." His father was my grandfather Florian Antonovich.

84. S: I have recently found a distant relative - he commands the Far Eastern Military District -- Colonel General (Subject's name). He is my great uncle but since he knows about our past he does not keep in touch with me. I see him on rare occasions. He has a wife and a son -- he is a fat man -- Valentin Antonovich. He was Chief of Staff to MALINOVSKIY when the latter commanded the Far East Military District and when they made MALINOVSKIY the minister -- this fool -- they will take him away. I wrote all this down. There is no suitable candidate. ZAKHAROV, the Chief of the General Staff, is ill. Incidentally ZAKHAROV was himself head of the Second Intelligence Directorate at one time. I have not seen Valentin Antonovich for a long time. I think he ignores me because of our past, and our noble background. He keeps a flat in Chistyye Prudy in Moscow. We meet occasionally and he says "How are you?" but no more and I do not seek him out either. He is the younger brother of my grandfather. My grandfather was a great jurist, a high-placed official. He had a rich home and everything was elegant.

85. S: They christened me -- I was born in Ordzhonikidze -- in Stavropol and my name is in the church register in Stavropol. They searched out the entry in the archives which were taken away by the Germans when they destroyed the city. They are still studying them. The KGB is studying every name in the archives. That's the way they work. Well, they turned up the fact that my father was a White Army officer, a second lieutenant, that in May 1919 he received the rank of first lieutenant in the White Guards, and that he was killed when his unit was surrounded near Rostov. That's what my mother heard -- you know these rumors -- and what she told me. But he said, "Your mother reported that he died of typhus during an epidemic". My mother did not want to wreck my life. She gave me this cover story and that's what I wrote at the beginning. I suspected

P. Baptized

of course that this was not true. My father was well born. He finished at the Lyceum, he was a mining engineer and then of course he joined the Whites and fought against the Soviet regime in the civil war. Well, I felt this. My mother never told me, the more so since I never saw him and never called him father. I was 4 months old when he last held me in his arms and he never saw me again. That is what my mother told me.

86. S: Well, SHRAYKIY said, "Well, there you are. Write me an explanatory note." I took a small piece of paper and wrote. My wife does not know about this. She loves me and I love her. She has a sister, a brother, and a mother. They are of proletarian descent. Her father was a POLITRABOTNIK. He died in 1952; he had three stars. He was a good man. He swore at Stalin; his family didn't agree with him but he criticized everything. He was a straightforward sort of person. I called my mother to my aunt's house. She (the aunt) lives on the fourth Meshchanskiy street. She is the sister of my mother. I called my mother there and told her what had happened. She said "Oleg, I knew nothing about this". I asked her to write me an explanation. She let me have a letter explaining that in such and such a year she had gotten to know so and so; he said he was an engineer and showed her his papers; they got married, the civil war began; she bore a son shortly after this and her husband disappeared without a trace. This two-page letter is now in SHRAYKIY's safe. Now, when I was filling out the form for the trip here I went to SHRAYKIY and said, "What can I write after what you have told me about my father?" He said, "Write just as you have always written".

87. S: The KGB supplement reporting all this was in the file, with a note on top stating "We trust Colonel (Subject's name)". That saved me from being dismissed from intelligence. They must believe me because they gave me my passport even though it was held up. As you know they gave everyone their passports except me. I got mine at the last moment. The Foreign Travel Commission of the Central Committee examined it at the last moment. SVOYCHII of the KGB sits there. If they hadn't given it to me I would have gone straight to the British or American Embassy and said "To hell with you. Good Bye! "

88. G: This Central Committee, is it a military committee?"
S: The Military Section -- the Moscow administration -- generals and all

P's wife has a brother + sister + Mother

the colonels. G: Did they take your Party card? S: That is for a PC3 but when I came to you I gave my card to the Party committee. I left it there and the Party committee put a stamp on it. G: And they give you another book? S: They give you a small coupon as a receipt. Well, that is my situation.

89. S: What do I want to ask you gentlemen? First we must think about and develop one or two dead drops. This is essential. I need a place where can I put a film -- undeveloped, of course. I repeat I will never develop them since I have no means to do this. G: Remember that the servicing of a dead drop by one of our people who is possibly -- probably -- under heavy surveillance is a constant danger. It can be done like this but nevertheless..For you to fill and clear a dead drop when there is no surveillance is no problem. But although you live in Moscow and although you are #2, I am sure that you can have no idea how heavy the surveillance of all our people in Moscow is. S: I do understand. G: Then double this understanding and you will be closer to the actual facts. This is a great danger. Understand me, we are not worried about our men. What can happen to him as a diplomat? A small scandal and he is thrown out. He will be alive and well but... S: I am gone. G: Thank you, that is right. Secondly, even with an ideal dead drop there is uncertainty if hot material is in it for any length of time.

90. S: Let us work in such a way that the drop is full for only five to ten minutes. G: If you are working with such a short time schedule, personal contact is more reliable. Since at least it would be known that the material got into the right hands. S: The meeting place I gave you by the statue of REPIN -- before the entrance to Lebyadinskiy Street, the Tretyakovskiy Gallery -- is a good place. You can change the times I gave you. I changed the series of dates. G: A signal is no problem. For example, you know the Novo-Arbatskiy Bridge. S: Yes. Foreign cars turn off there. They live on the Kutuzovskiy. I wanted to put a note in one of them (i.e, the cars) which said, "Give this to the American or British Governments". I was ready to do it.

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car pick me up along his road of travel? It's dangerous, I suppose. G: They would arrest you and the car. You would be surrounded by 5 cars. S: You know I was looking for a diplomatic car which had stopped outside the restaurant and which had the letter "D" on the back. I know the types of foreign cars. I looked for foreigners too, but they were all tourists. You know how tourists react -- like MOYNIHAN and MCBRIDE.

92. H: I think we've got to get it over to him that whatever is done, not only must he know that this is really going to be removed but that the material must be removed in the shortest possible time. This is the first thing. Now just to continue for a moment --. There are various ways this can be done. We've already mentioned a party at which he would be. He would know that the man who was going to pick up the material was there -- he would put it in place and the man would remove it. That's one method; the other is equally simple. If there isn't a party there are certain public places, restaurants and the like in Moscow where he and the man can be on given days. Even if there is surveillance there, they can still go to or pass through certain parts of the building within a reasonable time of each other. You have that variation as well. So even if he does get removed from his post and doesn't come to meetings on a given day of a given month you can still have the two people who are already known to each other and who recognize each other in the same area. Do you see what I mean? This is again a DLB and not a brush contact, but in fact has the same control as a brush contact. This is an extention of the original idea.

93. (Note: G translated the preceding for Subject.) G: The simplest thing would be if you and someone whom you know were in the same place. The essential principle is that the material is there for as short a time as possible. Other variations of the same theme might be like this -- in various public places it would be quite normal, if you know the time and date to be there, to leave some material in a given place and at a given time so that it could be passed though not by personal contact. Thus, you lose no time and you know that it is in safe hands. This can be arranged to be done in hotels, etc. Of course, the toilet is particularly dangerous -- this is well known. S: Yes, in the GRU we call it SORTIRNAYa TAKTIKA. G: But if there is a telephone booth in the entrance, you can go in an telephone and ...

94. H (In English): Couldn't you do it much more simply than that? Look, you go into a restaurant; our friend is there first of all;

he is sitting at a given table. He knows that he has got to finish his meal punctually at 7 o'clock or whatever time is agreed upon. At 7 o'clock he gets up and moves from the table. Somebody else comes in and sits down at the table. He goes off to pay his bill. The other chap sits at the table, puts his hand under the table and removes the stuff which is stuck underneath. There are all sorts of variations on this. G: If you have made your table bookings. H: Yes, these things can be done in this sort of way. These are just general ideas. (Note: G explains this in Russian to Subject who asks about surveillance.) S: Surveillance is very concentrated against your people in restaurants. H: (in English) The whole point is that you can do it with surveillance there because they can't see it. (Note: This is explained to Subject.)

95. S: I already have some material prepared for you. They are without classification stamps, top secret, and written for service use, not for sale. For instance, there is a new artillery instruction (NASTAVLENIYE) -- very interesting. In the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL on which is written in red "Only for Officers, Admirals, and Generals of the Soviet Army" there is an interesting article on future planning, training, and so on. These are big journals. I also have three small studies (POLOZHENIYA).

96. S: You should pay special attention to the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. I'll tell you more about it. There are 2,500 students studying there and more than 1,000 teachers. This is the blacksmith shop where rocket cadres are forged. The students are accommodated together. There is one set of living quarters on the territory of the academy on the Solyanka and the other is near the British Embassy on the Sofiyskaya Naberezhnaya at No. 36. The reception hall of the Minister of Defense is there and your embassy is three or four houses away. If your man stands on the bridge at eight o'clock in the morning he'll see all the officers going along with briefcases, crossing the bridge to Solyanka. Hundreds of them live there in a huge four-story building. Both bachelors and married officers live there -- they have small separate rooms -- "It is something terrible" (in English).

97. S: I have a very interesting description of the Academy; the principles of planning the duties of the departments (KAFEDRA) signed by a colonel general, the head of the Academy -- ODINTSOV. His initials are "G.F." but I don't want to give you his full name just now. This is what I have ready for you. A large hiding place is necessary for all this. But this is interesting. You will detect the principles on which the instruction process is planned. There is no mention of the word rocket,

KAFed

but you will know. Then there are diagrams giving the division of the various special classes -- which floor they are on -- departments with actual models. All the rockets are broken down in diagrams. That is the material that I have. And then I might be able to take from the secret library (GRU) any of our documents (USTAVY) on theoretical perspectives, in which wars are planned and concrete orders beginning with the ..lowest echelons.

98. G: Do you have classes once a week, or once a month? S: We have Commanders' training every Thursday. They give us lectures. And then one can work in the top secret library. One writes his requirements on a piece of paper, gives class and room number and are locked in and can study what one likes. I haven't done this yet myself because I thought ... G: This is of the greatest importance. S: Just listen. I will give you material... G: (to H in English) You know what this is? Every week since they are military and high ranking they must keep up with their military studies. They have commander days on which they are given the afternoon off -- they have lectures. But then they are going to be given examinations and they have practical, as he says, map studies. But in addition to this, because of the quizzes coming up which are registered on their efficiency reports for examinations they must have very highly classified reference material which is locked up in the secret room, which they, under receipt, are issued, not to take out but to sit down in a little study room and study for two or three hours on Thursday afternoons. He can copy from this, put the material there, return the books, and the receipt is okay, because he has studied and is authorized to do this.

99. S: Selected copies of all the lectures of the VPA which are kept in the academy safe at Sokol are brought to the general staff of our directorate so that our intelligence officers should read them and know what goes on. Whenever I like, I can take out a lecture on intelligence (SPETSPODGOTOVKA) -- on theory -- we in strategic intelligence consider this a science. G: (to H in English) Intelligence texts. S: And I could photograph all this -- they are all typed and bound. G: Can you take them away? S: Not out of the building. G: Is there enough light for photography? S: Well -- at the windows with a Minox -- the negatives might be weak -- you would have to strengthen them and develop them. The quality might not be very high, but I could not copy them out.

G: Returning to communications; - I have a suggestion. Football matches -- you go to a football match at the Lenin or Dinemo Stadium -- Hungary or someone else is playing. Our man buys a ticket...During the intermission at the half whole crowds go to the buffets for a glass of beer or what not. To break away from surveillance in this crowd is simple - and you meet our man at a very crowded buffet and brush-pass materials back and forth in relative safety --. S: This can be easily done.

100. J (In English):...Carry one of these (a briefcase) and drop part of it. S: Do you know why this is a bad idea? Because in the crowd there are many thieves. You put down your bag and they would steal it. J (In English) I wonder if as a basis we would get some idea of his movements -- of his normal movements -- where he lives, where he works, where he goes every day (explain to Subject). S: I live on this island GORKOGO NABEREZHNAYA NAKSIMA 36, Flat 59. The entry is from the courtyard, 3rd floor - 3rd entrance -- if there were no surveillance I could have you all as guests in my home for tea. There is a lift. The attendant is an old woman. J (ask him how high the building is) S: The building is new. It was built in 1944. It is a grey building with a balcony at the top. Nine stories -- a large building. And that is where all the big people live. In this alley is the headquarters of the Moscow military district. G: There? Also on the island.

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101. The headquarters is on Osipenko Street and Maxim Gorkiy Street. J: How many families are on the same floor? S: Four, each has its own flat, two of the flats have 2 room and two have 3 -- I have two rooms -- a good large flat, 45 square meters. Before I lived on Mayakovskiy Square. Not directly on the square -- you know the military political academy on Bol'shaya Sadovaya at No. 2. I lived at No. 6. There we had a common flat of 2 rooms. That was during the war. Well now, how do I go to work; -- along Ulitsa Osipenko to the bridge and across Red Square. J: This is on a daily basis - every morning? S: When the weather is good I go on foot. When it rains, I go either by cab or on a bus -- no. 6 bus along the Gorkiy embankment. G: Does it go over the bridge? S: It goes along Osipenko Street to the Balchug and past the British Embassy to Kamennyy Most, across the bridge to the Voyentorg and Kalinin Street. G: By the Kremlin? S: Yes. From there it goes to the Arbat and then along Vorovskiy Street where your embassy is, across Vosstaniya Street to Krasnaya Presnya to the Archangelsk cemetery and along Khorosheyskoye Shosse.

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
102. J: And where do you get off? G: On the Arbat? S: No, no, I work in two places. In the morning I must go to sign in at 11 Gorkiy Street beside the telegraph office and from there I go by Bryusovskiy Perenlok where the church is, behind the committee, to the Chaykovskiy Memorial. The conservatory on Gertsen Street. There I go left along the lane to the Voyentorg and from there straight to Frunze Street, where the General Staff is. I do to Entrance No. 5, which, as you go straight from Frunze Street, is on Gritsevets Street. Entrance 3 is on Gogolevskiy Boulevard where the pistol range is. The people who use entrance 5 from Frunze Street are the Minister and his Deputy -- as a rule though the minister goes through the gates from Gritsevets Street in his car -- a Cheyka. G: And then there is a square where they play volleyball. S: Quite right (in English), when you were in Moscow. J: Can you identify the block, according to this map, that he lives on. S: Excuse me, gentlemen, will it be difficult for me to get into America House. G: Do you need to go in -- by the side of it, yes, but not into it. S: Why should I go by the side of it? Just to throw something over?

103. G: Yes. That's just a variation, but excuse me, between which streets do you live? S: I live on and my windows look on to Gorkiy Embankment on the bridge. We have a yard with a thoroughfare which takes me from Gorki Embankment to Osipenko Street. I turn to the right immediately onto Osipenko Street -- the tram stop is there. [Discussion of exact location of house on map.] S: This is Usinskiy Bridge. There is the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. Here is the Kitayskiy Pereulok and here is the Solyenka. The academy takes up the whole block; there are many buildings there. In the first unit sits VARENTSOV and the staff of his ground rocket forces and the other buildings are for training, even storage, etc.

104. G: But which bridge are you nearest to? S: To this one, - about 200 meters, and to this is about a kilometer. Opposite my flat is a stop used in the Summer by the River Boat System. When I was at the academy, I used to get off at this stop by the bridge and come along past the mooring here. G: From the other side? S: Yes. I've lived in this flat for 15 years, since 1945 -- everyone knows me. Right behind by home is the garage of the Moscow Military District - an Avtobaza -- a large garage for all the command cars...the exit is onto Osipenko Street.

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watch us. KGB people always go to the receptions. If your man intends to go to them it will be necessary to go to the bedroom, to the toilet or to the kitchen where the wine is - close the door and to choose the moment. H: That's fine.



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The exact coordinates -- X and Y are not known -- of course this is difficult and will not be learned. This is why Khrushchev and his General Staff have set a goal -- to comb through huge areas with atomic and hydrogen weapons -- understand? To create a rain of missiles -- this is Khrushchev's own expression, and was told to me by Varentsov; I believe Varentsov as I believe Churayev -- who said that Cyrus Eaton has offered his services. Such dangerous people we are dealing with; -- how this is done is your business -- as far as my own safety is concerned --, as far as I am concerned, I have aggressive and iron will power and am just a cog -- especially now, in fulfilling new assignments.

114. S: It seems to me that (in spite of the tremendous tasks which are being done by the American leaders and the British and American military commands--) the evaluations are wrong -- too much giving in and compliance, and indifference. For instance -- whatever amount of dollars and pounds you expect to allot in your planning -- you must triple this amount in order to be really strong. Then, when you hear by your "grapevines" that Khrushchev is ready -- that he has many missiles (and I also will hear things through some of my channels--either in my present line of work or through other channels with which I have indirect contact--) then the first blow must be struck- a knock-out blow-and then we will be in a winning position. As I have said before, in regard to your thinking about the targets -- which we discussed -- you must be as sure as that 2X2= 4, that such targets don't exist.

115. S: If Hitler would have done this, he would have won the war. After all -- what did Hitler do? He wasted millions of tons of metal -- but did not destroy completely even one Headquarters. This I know exactly -- I read it in the reports of the General Staff, and heard it in lectures given us on military strategy. The Chief of the General Staff and his depty -- MALANDIN - a General of the Army - (4 Star) - the Deputy Chief of the General Staff -- I heard his top secret lecture about 2 years after the end of the war -- in 1947 -- . He had a lecture about Hitler -- not one of the Military District Headquarters which provided the front with the batallions, regiments, brigades, and divisions -- was destroyed by him. All the millions of people in the Moscow Military District from Kalinin to Kaluga were trained -- and all the time the Moscow District General Staff was located on Osipenko ulitsa and the Moscow Defense Zone was intact. If Hitler could have blown up

all this by commando groups -- if he would have done away with the core that does all the planning, that has the experience, the know-how, then the Soviet Government and military leadership would have been powerless.

116. S: That is why I insist that you consider these targets-- such as the General Staff -- the GAU, PVO, the CC/CPSU, where all the Ovolochi who rule everything are presiding -- all the inspectors who have the privileges of a Secretary of an OBKOM -- they have a salary, cars for their own use, and an allowance. I am not mentioning the bases and ammo dumps which are under ground, but the military districts -- there are 20 of them -- no -- 19 now -- in a few months I shall be able to report to you that there are even one or two less -- they are being consolidated --. It would be desirable to destroy the Headquarters. It would be good strategy to get rid of the experienced commands because they are the heart of the Army.

117. S: When this H-hour takes place -- then you need 2 minutes. Everything must be in readiness, by way of mines equivalent to one or two kilo-tons -- they can be put into a little suitcase (this is just my own idea) -- a little satchel, and left next to a house -- not inside-- you don't even have to go inside -- there are guards all around and you need a pass to get inside -- and if you don't have one you might get killed -- but put the things all around the building -- right next to the guards -- with a clock mechanism -- and let the whole establishment go up in smoke. Then, when the leaders, the framework of the working body--the framework of the general staff and the central directorates, which are the brains of each type of troops -- tanks, artillery, aviation, antiaircraft -- when these are all destroyed, then let's see them pick themselves up and recover quickly...Then they will have to use some old, sclerotic poets, not fit for military duty -- who will not be able to do anything. When you destroy all the operational documents -- not from the air -- not by rockets -- you know how many errors can be made by missiles and aircraft -- pray God the accurate missiles will be on your side -- now mine.

118. S: It is so easy to make a mistake with a missile -- a simple error in calculation -- a mischeck on one of the control mechanisms - and a mistake is made. Even while the rocket is being

wheeled to the launching pad, and after it is on the pad, checks are mandatory. One time Varentsov brought all the Artillery Generals together -- commanders of artillery divisions and Artillery in Districts and Groups of Forces and he made them measure and check all the control mechanisms with the help of special instruments, panels, voltmeters, so that they would be familiar with the work of their subordinates -- how many hours are spent on a technical check, so that when they give an order to make a check, they would know what they were asking. So he made the Generals climb up and down the ladders and find this out. He made them do this for several months. It was a good idea, this -- he was a very experienced man.

119. S: Now, what else, I keep harping on being an officer of the General Staff but now in your service; I know a good deal about it -- I studied a good deal about it, as I told you before. I would like to have someone report my idea -- the idea of a soldier in your service -- but that of an experienced soldier. This idea is, first: that we must penetrate to the command echelons so completely that we will be able to liquidate everything at once. Point number 2 is to cut all this discord and differences of opinion, and third to divert more money toward military preparedness, so that the level of our readiness is higher than that of the probable enemy. I know that in some aspects your "missile business" is going very well. We know that it's better than ours in many respects from information we got from our agents. We know it's better than we are doing in the Soviet Army. But, we also know that you are not entirely ready. We know that all the guidance assemblies are not perfected and that your scientists are still working out problems. God willing, I hope that my so-called "copied labours" will help your scientists, who, in the space of the next few months must study all this, assimilate it -- see how the problems are resolved; perhaps the information may not be all there (in detail) after all, it is condensed -- these were courses, not the Academy. I did not study 5 years as one does at the Dzerzhinskiy Academy -- but the push in the right direction is all there for the specialist who will study this.

120. S: Talk things over, you are responsible people. We are resolving serious government problems, from my vantage point, with my capabilities, much of what I have to offer is not complete, that is,

complete in the sense of being conclusive, but the basic information, which I have gleaned from my General Staff and from the people with whom I have contact, I entrust into your hands so that it can be fully exploited. Not only by you, but so that it will reach the very top level people in order that they may examine and evaluate the entire matter and come to a practical conclusion, otherwise its possible to lose all. All the gold, all the treasures, diamonds, everything of material value, all the plush economic abundance which your people really possess. After all, one can tell your people live well, just look at the way they dress. They may not eat caviar, but they have bread and vegetables and not just for today - but for tomorrow as well -- don't laugh -- I just use this as an example..

121. S: The government must become so thoroughly aware of the seriousness of the situation, and must, in this one respect take an example from Khrushchev and the Communist Party -- their ability to centralize and to extinguish contradictions. Look at the divergence of opinion which arose between USSR and China. They extinguished that. There are great differences, even discord, theoretical and even political, but I don't want to go into that now. But they know how to centralize so well. Things are not going so well with Albania. At the meeting of the Communist Parties, Hoxha took such a stand that Comrade Dolores Ibarruri said "Such a revisionist is second only to Tito". This was the comment made by Comrade Ibarruri. There was an interesting conversation between Khrushchev and the representative of the Chinese Communist Party, the deputy to MAO Tse-Tung there. You know this leader. He, as are all the Chinese, is defending Stalin and berates Khrushchev, and says that by his unwise, loud, public, world-wide disclosure and denigration of the personality cult, he has undermined the authority not only of Stalin but of the entire Communist Party. Stalin was the symbol of the Party and of the people, even of the people of other countries. Khrushchev became quite agitated and said "Take your Stalin out of here, together with his box". In other words - "Take Stalin's body". And you know, there was a time when they wanted to put Stalin into the ground, there was such a time.

122. S: I repeat, we must be able to resolve any major differences of opinion, we must come to an agreement, and this we must learn from our enemy. He knows how to do this -- the Central Committee,


the Presidium, Khrushchev himself. He is not so smart, but he is energetic and resourceful. He was the Minister of Agriculture for three days when he called in all the secretaries of the Obkoms whom he had appointed as secretaries of Obkoms -- they are all members of the Presidium -- (he had been appointed Minister of Agriculture by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich only three days before) and through the apparat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he was able to gather together, by plane, all the secretaries of the Obkoms to old Red Square, thus he had a quorum -- a majority of people who were candidates or members of the CC -- and they supported Khrushchev because he was the one who appointed them as Secretaries of Obkoms. The reason I bring this up now -- if he could not have called them all in on a moment's notice, then he would have remained among the ministers. Perhaps Molotov or someone else would have been seated, what would have happened later, I don't know.

123. S: There are many differences of opinion between the Satellites and the USSR, but Khrushchev knows how to localize these things and put them aside. Take a look - rocket weapons are delivered to all the peoples' democracies, without the (atomic) warhead, without the head, with the exception of the DDR -- the DDR already has this -- you know this. There are two brigades there and two dumps of atomic warheads (Soviet Army, not in the hands of the DDR). The Eastern sector there welcomes Soviet power the way I would welcome a well-aimed blow. Well, he knows how to handle such things. What is happening right now -- many specialists, such as engineers, have been sent to these countries. You know, you have your own channels, you watch such moves. There are all kinds of things going on -- construction of launching platforms, building up cadres.

124. S: Here is an interesting detail: recently, when Khrushchev was calling together all the leaders of the Warsaw Pact -- political chiefs -- all were chiefs of general staffs, and all defense ministers were there, and we have a great exercise (CPX) at the General Staff for about two weeks. All the ministers of defense and chiefs of staffs of the peoples' democracies were operating in maneuvers with ours. Offensive operations on maps against the foe, openly naming the targets which were open to attack from the air by the British, Americans, French and West Germans. The games were on a Headquarters level and

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lasted 2 weeks. The political leaders returned to Warsaw Pact meetings after about 2 days, but the military leaders all stayed behind. The games went on for 2 weeks. These were full scale maneuvers, centralized. Now war preparations are going on full scale - there are many disagreements -- much money demanded and squeezed out.



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127. G: The Second Directorate is ours. Then there is the large Organization - Mobilisation Directorate -- ORG-MOB. G: What number has it? S: You know, it has a number. It used to be the 4th Directorate, but now they are changing the structure, since the arrival of Zakharov. I will give you specifics later and an organizational chart. There is a Directorate -- called the 7th which is for Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare. Here you have the most important generals, specialists, and important chemists and bacteriologists. They have their own bases, in Siberia and other places. By the way, it is very important to bomb the Ural district - you must make a literal rain there. In order to knock out the brain, the all-powerful brain. The Urals are the forge -- the smithy. All the heavy industries are there, and factories are being built underground. I don't know exactly what kombinaty.

128. G: Is the radiological -- under the Chemical Directorate? S: Yes, it is under it, yes. G: I see, so it is like ours - CB. S: That's right -- absolutely right. Now then, there is the Code Directorate in the General Staff. We have (in GRU) the 8th Section-- but here it is a Directorate. The 7th is the CBR, then the 10th Directorate is the one which works with the Countries of the Peoples' Democracies. It controls the army there with a bureau of instructors - the weapons, brings their people here for instruction -- this is the 10th Directorate. G: This is in the General Staff? S: Yes -- in the General Staff. That is the structure of the General Staff.

129. G: Don't you (GRU) also have a Directorate for the countries of the Peoples Democracies. S: No we don't. We coordinate everything that has to do with countries of Peoples Democracies with the Tenth Directorate of the General Staff. We do not conduct intelligence operations against the countries of Peoples Democracies. G: How about the advisors? S: We have advisors who are intelligence

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officers of GRU who study the intelligence of the countries of the Peoples' Democracies and they are sent as advisors to the Tenth Directorate of the General Staff. They send the officers off from there and they control them and coordinate their efforts. We teach the intelligence people of the Countries of Peoples' Democracies thru our advisors.

130. G: I have another small question, before I forget to ask you, with respect to the missiles. The Russian language has a curse in printing since the letter "Z" and the number 3 are the same on a typewriter. Which designation belongs to the rocket you've described. The "Z" could stand for Zenitnaya. S: No. It is a three, and it couldn't be Zenitnaya since the rocketa are surface-to-surface. Let me explain: The 3R is a rocket designation and the second number such as 3U1, 3U2, etc., are developments of the rocket; that is, rockets with modifications. G: Why does it begin with 3R? S: That is because the adopted model was the third series and the additional numbers are modifications thereof. Furthermore, everything in the series beginning with 8 means that it belongs to rocket artillery. It is like a code designation and all auxiliary equipment if it has any designation at all will always begin with 8. G: How about the designation "P"? S: That is merely a designation for a launching installation (Puskovaya Ustanovka) for free rockets. They launch at an angle.

131. G: How about the SP-5? S: That is a rocket which was a special improvement of the submarine rocket P-5, which can be launched from a submarine or a surface vessel, and the SP-5 has been adopted for use by the ground forces. Frolkovenko, who was formerly my chief of staff, and who is now studying at the Military Political Academy and who was a senior lecturer at the Artillery Academy, told me about this, and they are now studying it. G: What does the A designation "P" mean here? S: That means submarine (Podvodnaya) and they added the letter "S" when this was adopted for the Ground Forces. I wrote all this up.

132. J: Does he know how many atomic submarines they now have? G: (Translates) S: We were told "up to ten". They did not say exactly ten, but I believe they were misleading us. G: How is that-are there less? S: I believe that there are more, maybe as many as twenty. G: Exactly when was this you heard it the last time? S: This was at the time I was

taking the courses over a year ago (Subject's courses ran from 1 September 1958 to 1 May 1959.) This construction is being pushed. Khrushchev has ordered a number of old naval vessels to be scrapped. However, much attention was always paid to submarines and these were never touched. They are not building any aircraft carriers; they are too expensive. This all began when Kuznetsov was removed. He is now completely retired. At that time he protested about the lack of vessels in the Soviet Navy but Khrushchev, supported by the General Staff, decided to reduce even the very small Soviet Navy. However, submarines are being constructed. What other questions do you have.

133. G: What do you mean by the term "Kren"? Is it a deviation from the course? S: Yes, it is a deviation from a set course. This takes place after the various stabilizers and rudders have brought the missile to a position of zero deviation and after the missile then completes its active period of flight and continues on toward the target, "Kren" is the amount of deviation, or turning, of the missile necessary to strike the target. G: In other words, "kren" must be established. S: Yes. It is a calculated deviation, and if it is not correct, the rocket will not hit the target. You see what I had planned was for WYMIN to have picked up all the material and have your experts analyze it prior to my arrival here. G: Do you feel competent to answer questions on this? S: Yes, I can, and even if something is not clear to me I can check it our later. However, I am sure that what I have written would be understandable to your scientists.

134. G: What did you mean by the term "Chislo"? I'd better find it for you in your original notes. Then you can see the original context. S: Please keep in mind that these large missiles are all two-stage missiles and advise your scientists not to look for three-stage missiles. G: (Shows subject his original notes.) S: I see what you mean. Here is how this works. This means that the control circuits operate in a specific pre-set sequence during the rocket's flight. I have drawn up how these control circuits work. At first there were difficulties in controlling the exact current impulse feed at the right time, but this has been solved. Another interesting detail is that the gyroscopes which are so extensively used in rockets are gold-plated to avoid corrosion by oxidation. Platinum is also used to be sure that delicate instruments do not corrode. G: Here is the diagram where the "Chislo" is indicated. S: What that means is that

at different altitudes the atmospheric pressure changes, it drops as the missile rises and this affects the thrust. To maintain the desired thrust, the fuel feed rate is made to vary to obtain the necessary thrust, and this is what is referred to by "Chislo". Your scientists will understand this. It has to do with altitude and this system of Pitot tubes, and the pressure regulator provides for the correct thrust and speed of the missile thru all phases of its active flight.

135. S: All this began from the original V-2 of the Germans, whose scientists are still working for us. Speaking of Germans, you have seen how often Khrushchev threatened to make a separate peace with the DDR. He will not do this because it could involke a war. He is not ready to fire missiles now and he will avoid a war at this time. Even though he is giving rockets and training personnel to the DDR, they are still far from being ready to use them.

136. S: Incidentally, I have heard something you should check on: The Turks have sent some secret military mission to Moscow. I hope that this may have been done with your sanction but you should check to see if the Turks are not making some secret deal with the Soviets. I can tell you exactly when this happened -- it was between two and one-half and three months ago. The Turks had requested some Soviet specialists from time to time, which doesn't seem significant, but you'd better check on this Turkish mission to Moscow. I know this because the man who accompanied this military Turkish mission was a MVD officer who formerly was GRU and who graduated from the MGIMO one year after I did. His name is VOSKOBOY. He is now stationed in Turkey and he accompanied the mission to Moscow. I was supposed to meet him because he was bringing some things for me from Turkey. They were for my wife. I worked in Turkey with him a little before. He was here four days and did not telephone me, but my secretary, PODTEREVA, who now works for the Min. of Foreign Affairs, saw him on the street. His name is Alekseev. She asked him what he was doing there and he said that he was visiting his parents in Leningrad; but he had not been in Leningrad and he came with the secret Turkish mission to Moscow for four days. He has been in Turkey for five years now and has still not been replaced. You should check on these Turks. Of course, if this is a planned mission, that is different; and if aid from the USSR goes to all countries, that is good for us since it is a strain for them.

SHAPOSHIKOV, Boris Mikailo

b. 1882 died 1945.

Colonel of Tsarist Army during WWI - colonel.

Marshal since 1940.

one time chief of General Staff (1928-1931)

again since 1937 - to 1940

then Deputy Peoples Commissar of Defense

1943-1945 chief of General Staff Academy

Died 3-26-1945

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137. G: Do you know SNOPOV or STAKH who were formerly in GRU and are now in KGB? S: No, I don't know them, but I told you yesterday that some 40% of the MIA graduates go to KGB. G: It would be very helpful if you could write up a list of your classmates and give all information about them as to where they went and what their present functions are. S: Show me a group of photographs and I will spot GRU officers for you. H: We will have this for you. S: Before my departure? G: Of course. S: Please try to arrange them in packages such as Soviet Embassy personnel in Turkey and also include the TORGPREDSTVO. By the way, I wanted to have a diplomatic passport just as I did when I went to Turkey, but they gave me only a service passport. (Subject shows his passport.) See, your visa was issued on 8th of April.

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139. S: I spent many years amongst generals and marshals, even my wife's father was a general and my grand-uncle also; but his grandson, me, I'm only a colonel. I'll never be made a general, since my father was a White Army officer. G: I wouldn't be too sure. Look at SHAPOSHNIKOV. He had even been a White Army officer himself at one time. S: They don't trust me; they'll never make me a general. My problem now is to do our work and be ready to fulfill your orders. G: I want you to realize that the most basic consideration we have toward you is humanitarian, irrespective of how important you may be as a source of information. We regard you as an individual first of all. S: I understand you and am very grateful for this. It is quite different with us and many good people have perished. G: The difference in the systems is very simple to understand. All government leaders in countries of the Free World are servants of the people. We even use the expression that a man is in the service when he is military or in government work. In the USSR the government is everything and the individual is nothing.

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140. S: I request that prior to my departure you have your experts look over the material I have submitted so that we can review it. We can work here together without sleeping and so can the experts. H: The problem is not only to find rocket experts but one who is a Russian speaker, and besides we are trying to keep this whole matter secure. G: We're going ahead very carefully with this even by consulting with experts, we must be sure that the knowledgeable people are kept to a minimum. S: In my opinion, this should be coordinated by someone high up in your general staff who understands how to handle this. Although there may not be many questions now, I'm sure they will arise later. G: You're absolutely right.

141. S: Tell me--do you think WYNNE did the right thing by not taking all my material when I offered it to him. G: Remember he is a simple mortal, and not an intelligence man. S: Don't tell him anything about this. G: Of course not, we are discussing it amongst ourselves. S: I gave it to him on the way to the airport. We were sitting in the back of the car alone and I knew that the car was "clean". He said he was afraid but he took the letter and one document. Later in the toilet he was frightened; he took it anyway but he wouldn't take anything else. Frankly, I was very disappointed in HERRIMAN and McBRIDE. They should have simply delivered my material to the British Embassy and their mission would have been completed.

142. G: By the way, do you know a man in your outfit called SOVVA. He only joined the GNIK recently and is presumably in KGB. S: I don't remember any such name. I know my own section perfectly but I don't know all the others. G: He's working in the German Direction. S: All their offices, some ten of them, are next to ours. I don't remember any such name. Our neighbors are everywhere in the committee--they are all over the place. G: Do you know who they are? S: Of course, I do. For example, their resident in our committee is Yevgeniy Ilich LEVIN. He is a colonel just like me. He is tall and handsome man. I know his depty.and I know his case officers. They also do the same thing that we do--I'm glad you asked the question. They and we coopt ordinary workers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade. They work for us; we pay them money; and they sign an obligation. We also do this with scientists and the women. I coopted MILOVIDOV. He is now working in the English Sector with BERDNIKOV. BERDNIKOV is the English Sector chief in our group of

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143. G: What is your program for tomorrow? S: My program is as follows: I will get up at 0700 hours; after breakfast I will pick up my professor (KAZANTSEV); and we must be at the Soviet Embassy at 0900 hours. My cable is there now and I must get it released so that we can stay in London longer, not only to see more of England but to work a little longer with you, which is important. I don't think the Ambassador will receive me before 1100 hours and at 1330 WINNE will come by with his car and we will go to see something or other. After that we shall meet with WYNNE for supper and later we will be able to work together. G: At what time will you be able to come here? S: When would you want me? G: You tell us when you will be free. S: You know I'd like to walk around London a bit -- I haven't walked five meters yet. There are very many fine things to see in the stores and my wife has given me a whole list of things to get. There are beautiful vases made of porcelain. They cost about 10 pounds. When I was a regimental commander, we liberated a porcelain-manufacturing town -- the center of the industry in Czechoslovakia, and I brought home all kinds of porcelain vases and other items. They even gave a crystal vase to Konev and to me. Anyway, I have many expensive things at home, including rugs from Turkey, and I live on a high scale for Communism.

144. S: This aide-de-camp Buzinov to the marshal (VARENTSOV) is always broke. He has three children and he often asked me to take him somewhere, so, having money that my wife doesn't know anything about, I buy him cognac. He knows that when one is abroad there are always extra allotments in foreign currency, so he is not surprised that I have all kinds of things--that is normal. I like to live freely and now and then take a lady out. I know how to approach them and I never drink to excess like Buzinov. I say all this to you because I feel you should know all about me, and if you ordered me to stop doing all these

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things, Id have to stop. You know what the moral views of our government are, and so far I've never been in any trouble, but all these activities require money for gifts, entertainment, etc.

145. S: Anyway, I got myself into debt and I wish you would consider how to reinforce my financial basis a bit. I've already thought of buying odds and ends here that I can sell at a profit there. I know some wealthy Jews in Moscow who can even handle diamonds. Whatever is too bulky, I may need to buy five or six navy sweaters and all kinds of other stuff. WINNE can bring that to me later, but if it is impossible, I would like to have more money to buy these things while I am here and as many rubles as you can spare to take back with me. Frankly, I have one debt of 1,020 new rubles. A good friend of mine gave me the money to get him, through my connections in Moscow, a suite of furniture. I ordered this and have the receipts to show but I spent the money gradually. How many rubles did you plan to give me? G: (Deliberately wishing to mention a lower figure than 3,000 we planned to give him, said about 1,000.) S: New rubles? G: Yes. S: Well you see that would just about cover my debt less twenty rubles and would leave me nothing at all. Well, I'll be able to buy the furniture since I have it ordered. I have just bought a new TV set, a Temp six, I used to have a Rubina. I thought of buying a small transistor radio here (Subject was given an operational transistor radio later). I swear by my daughter and my future work with you that I must do the following. I must bring each and every friend of mine some small item, since they know that I am going abroad. It does not have to be an expensive item in every case but it would be extremely bad to neglect anyone.

146. (Subject listed a long and wide variety of items such as fountain pens, neckties, ladies' nail polish, lipstick and a gamut of medicines for just run-of-the-mill friends, and more expensive specific items for influential friends such as generals, marshals, and colonels. As mentioned again in a later transcript, after this meeting was over Subject knocked on the door some 10 minutes after he left. He was dressed in trousers and his jacket over his undervear. He came to look for a notebook he lost, which fortunately, fell into the slot of the armchair in which he was sitting. This notebook was a most detailed, beautifully prepared list of items which

his wife prepared. It contained magazine clippings of all conceivable fine ladies' wear written out in red ink and itemized. There are also replicas of the actual foot sizes of his wife's and daughter's feet in the notebook. Subject elaborated on these items, which visually more than adequately supported his earlier statements concerning the items he was expected to bring back. In view of the fact that arrangements were made later for WINNE to bring back a suitcase full of items which Subject had planned to get through Customs with no check, it should be stressed here that many of these items would unquestionably have important operational significance, since they will be given to important Soviet personages who will automatically be valuable, unwitting informants.)

147. (In addition to friends Subject mentions who are prominent, Subject also had mentioned one assistant to Petukhov whose name is, Pavel Avrakovich OBOLENTSOV.) S: By the way, this name is famous, since he was the chief administrator under Molotov and now is the chief administrator for Petukhov. In my notes it says I should bring a light filter for his camera, as well as a hood. I am sure this will cost me 2 to 3 pounds, and although I did not receive money for this I cannot avoid bringing it. I've got to bring every girl and my secretary in all offices at least one item, even though it may be the cheapest lipstick in England. Even to GVISHIANI's secretary; I must tell you about him. He is my chief, he is married to the daughter of Kosygin. His father was a lieutenant general in the KGB. He was a Georgian. I think he is dead. His secretary, Valya, asked me to get some nail polish to match lipstick. If I don't bring this, probably Denis POLYAKOV, who is occupying a similar slot to mine, but in the US Direction will bring this. He has been in the US twice now with delegations.

148. S: By the way, I just remembered something important. We are conducting scientific intelligence against the US. For the assigned intelligence missions of the year, covering all conceivable types of industries, there were 150 specific intelligence targets listed. On each target there were supplemental questions - two, three, or more. The targets, broadly speaking, were non-ferrous metal industries, steel industry, all phases of the oil industry, etc. The interesting thing is that all U.S. targets were duplicated and transmitted to the

delegations going to Canada. I know this because I gave it to them with my own hand. Our letter specified that they should seek this in Canada because so much of basic Canadian industry uses US products. You should stop this. I will get for you, with all official seals, a complete list of all these espionage instructions given to our delegations. Other duplicate copies of this were also sent to other countries where US products are used.

149. J: I would recommend that we discuss his financial situation again tomorrow. G: Let us fix the time when you will come tomorrow. S: I just thought of something. If I could have a 1 carat diamond, exactly 1 carat, not more or less, I am sure that I could cash it in for 1200 rubles. Consider this, and possibly we can so work it out that you will not be concerned about passing any monies to me through contacts in Moscow for some time. G: We will consider all this and we'll talk about it some more tomorrow and will try to comply with all requests which are reasonable. S: Very well, I will go now and tomorrow let us plan on meeting between 2100 and 2200 hours. I'll try to come at 2100 hours if I can. S: Where is my key? (The correct key was found and given to Subject) (Subject left at 0140 hours on 22 April 1961) /

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Meeting No. 4 at Leeds, England, 23 April 1961

1. By prearrangement in London Subject was to walk into the lobby of the Hotel Metropole in Leeds during the evening of 23 April 1961 whenever he could conveniently find free time from his delegation. The delegation was staying at the Queen's Hotel only two blocks away. G met Subject at the entrance to the hotel lobby at 2220 hours and escorted him to Room 31 which had been prepared for audio recording and which was occupied by Harold.

Tape Begins:

2. (As soon as Subject arrived he said that he was almost hospitalized because he had stomach pains. After visiting British firms in the Leeds area Subject, with his delegation, stopped at a small restaurant and Subject drank a whole liter of cold beer. As a result of this he developed pains which were some sort of cramps.) S: I thought I had an appendicitis but since they examine all Strategic Intelligence personnel and GRU every three months, I knew that I should have no symptoms of this. MAKHNOV (GRU doctor) examined me. You probably know him. I suffered for about two hours and WYNNE called a doctor. The doctor said that I did not have an appendicitis but if the pains continued I should be hospitalized in Leeds. He diagnosed my pains as an extreme kidney irritation due to my having consumed a large quantity of cold beer quickly. I feel alright now except that I'm a little weak from the anxiety of this ordeal. I was terrified about going to a hospital since the people back home who were not too willing to have me go in the first place would probably criticize me for doing this deliberately. They would say, "Why did he have to go to a hospital in England when we have adequate facilities here?" Now I feel alright and I think we can work a little while.

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at night. S: I see. Then it is up to you to decide on the hours.

4. S: I have taken some notes here but they are incomplete since people knocked on my door while I was writing. First of all, here is a note about target #1 which must definitely be blown up by a bomb of one or two kilotons. As I mentioned before, a five kiloton bomb is the smallest we have developed. I know this for sure since the Marshal (VARENTSOV) told me so. They have computed a one kiloton charge, but they have not yet developed the practical adaptation thereof. Your scientists can determine exactly what size charge is necessary to destroy target #1 (the General Staff complex), but it should be designed for extensive subterranean damage which could probably be effected by a shock wave if placed in the right position. The timing for this destruction is very important and I suggest that it should be several minutes prior to H-hour because later there may not be an opportunity. This destruction could be the signal for an all-out attack by other means such as aerial bombs and rockets. Of course, it can be done a few minutes after H-hour or even simultaneously. The KGB structures are mostly old buildings although there are some new ones. In between the four main buildings are many private dwellings with dark entryways. It would be simple for anyone to place a suitcase, an urn, or a spittoon there. No one would pay any attention to it there. If they saw a spittoon they would simply spit in it.

5. S: The best time to set the explosion for would be between 1000 and 1100 hours because all of the Command personnel would then be in the buildings. We poor workers begin our day at 0900 hours, but Command personnel with late breakfast engagements, etc., don't arrive until about 1000 hours. All cables and reports for daily business are brought in about 1000 hours. Remember the KGB has seven sub-basements. I know this because KOVALENKO, who is now a colonel and was formerly the adjutant to Pavel Artemyevich ARTEMIEV, told me this. He lives next door to me. He is now a KGB colonel who is charged with the protection of the PVO of the country offices which are scattered in Moscow. He graduated from the Frunze Academy and is a good friend of mine. I have often invited him to go out for a drink, but when I do this I always pay for his cognac. All KGB archives are also located in their headquarters and the entire group of buildings should be destroyed by about three bombs.

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6. S: I will draw this up for you in detail and show you how easy it is to place charges in adjacent buildings, even in the GASTRONOM. A bomb could be disguised as a basket of fruit. (Subject then described the layout of the GRU buildings, Entrance #3, adjacent to the POLYKLINIK of the Ministry of Defense -- a three-story red brick building -- and particularly the pass bureau where packages, suitcases and the like must be checked in and left in custody while one visits the GRU offices.) S: An old lady takes care of this and there is even a toilet there which is little used. A suitcase could easily be left there since the toilets are in locked compartments. Then one could simply leave and it would be hours before anyone would notice it. Many packages are left overnight and during the day, officers even leave bags of groceries there to pick up when they go home. A simple round metallic tag is given as a receipt and the number of the tag is chalked on a suitcase until it is picked up. This would be a good place to plant a charge.

7. (Subject then continued describing the building complexes on Frunzenskaya and Naberezhnaya which house the PVO of the country, the GAU Headquarters, and other Defense Ministry Offices.) He suggested that two bombs would be sufficient to destroy this complex whereas four would be required to destroy completely the General Staff complex in the Arbat area. Subject then described the headquarters of the Moscow Military District only a few blocks from Subject's residence.) S: A huge underground shelter some 30 meters in depth with all living facilities and operating areas for the headquarters was built there during the war. (At meeting #6, 25 April 1961 Subject plotted all of these suggested targets and others, totaling 24, on a blown-up section of the Moscow map covering the center of the city.)

8. S: BERIYA was also brought to the basement of the Moscow Military District Headquarters, and was shot there by a Gen. KOZLOV in the presence of other generals. This building complex was surrounded by armored cars and tanks, all in firing positions, during the night when BERIYA was executed. There was some apprehension that BERIYA's KGB cohorts would make an attempt to seize this headquarters at that time. An important signal center is located in this headquarters now and there are switchboards for VCh lines as well as telephone machines. Incidentally, BERIYA's body was burned in gasoline in the basement of this building. (Subject then continued to briefly describe the other targets

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for destruction which were later sketched by him in considerable detail in the map referred to above, during Meeting #6. MOSKALENKO's headquarters at Perkhushkovo was also cited as a target for destruction. Subject again repeated the incident of NEDELIN's death, adding that KHRUSHCHEV should be confronted with the lie since a great number in the USSR know the truth. As an example, there was widespread mourning in Dnepropetrovsk due to the fact that many of the personnel working at the launching site who also perished in the explosion came from Dnepropetrovsk.)

9. S: The PVO headquarters of the Moscow Military District on Kirov Street should also be destroyed. I mentioned this building to you before and I will draw a detailed sketch of it. One mine should be sufficient to destroy it. There is a similar headquarters of the PVO in other cities as well such as Khabarovsk where my grandfather-once-removed is stationed. There is also one in Baku. Kiev also has one and it overlaps the PVO defensive zone of Lvov. The PVO defensive zones have a Corps structure. There are no divisions in the corps. They have brigades which, in turn, are composed of regiments. I think this structure has all been written up, that is, I described the exact military complement of the PVO rocket units.

10. S: Another important target is the KGB Headquarters of the Moscow Oblast. This is located near the main telegraph building on Gorkiy Street. It is a huge white building, designated as the KGB of the Moscow Oblast. And, of course, as I mentioned before, all the headquarters of the military districts should be blown up, as well as the headquarters of the Groups of Forces. To cover them all would require somewhere between 18 and 22, each one assigned to place one mine. One man should not be assigned more than one task since the distances are too great between the headquarters.

11. S: As I mentioned before, it would be well to destroy all of the regional VOYENKOMATY also, since they have all the basic requisition plans for mobilization involving equipment as well as personnel. I worked in the headquarters of the Moscow Military District at one time and I know exactly how detailed these mobilization plans can be. If the regional VOYENKOMATY are destroyed, this would paralyze mobilization completely for a period of at least from D-day to D plus 90. This is the planning time for the first mobilization echelon; D plus 180 is the planning time for the second mobilization echelon into which even physically unfit persons may be taken.

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15. S: I cannot arrange for WYNNE's expenses. He could get British industrialists to subsidize him, but even then I know we will buy very little at the exhibition. There are only two million dollars authorized to purchase specific items which are of interest to us, and that is all. They are restricting expenditures because money is needed for making rockets. WYNNE will hesitate to spend money advanced to him by the industrialists here since he lives on their small commissions. They give him only about 200 pounds per month. Therefore I wish you would consider this. It is an important matter. Please see if you cannot subsidize WYNNE. G: Don't worry about this. We will treat WYNNE very well. Everything will be taken care of, but do not get yourself involved in any personal dealings with WYNNE. We will take care of WYNNE separately. S: Of course, he asked me to help him, and he has turned out to be a very wonderful person.

16. G: Our clandestine relationship is one thing, but our dealings with WYNNE will be entirely adequate. It is something different and under no circumstances should you be involved in this. S: I felt it my duty to report this to you. G: Remember, he may inadvertently talk too much either here or in Moscow. S: He is afriad and will not talk. G: Remember he is inexperienced in clandestine matters. S: That's right, he is inexperienced. However, he did take my one letter and a document when I saw him off at the airplane. I prevented any KGB officer from approaching WYNNE at the airport since I had a pass and simply said politely that I was escorting WYNNE. Even though escorts usually stay behind the gates, diplomats are often escorted to the plane ramp, and I did also. He waved to me and I knew that the letter would be delivered. I even went to the second story of the terminal building and waited until the plane flew off. G: I assure you WYNNE will be adequately taken care of and everything you request will be included, but don't talk to him about this again. S: Very well, I won't speak about WYNNE any more.

17. S: I just remembered -- do you remember when I was looking at the picture of the KGB REZIDENT in London and I said VOROBYEV, Zhenya? It was actually IVANOV, Zhenya. However, there is a VOROBYEV there also. He is a naval man. The two resemble each other and when you show me the photographs again, I will point this out to you. IVANOV graduated from the Academy with me.

18. G: Now that you are through with your notes, let us proceed to our agenda. The first question is this: When you were at the Rocket Academy and studied the missiles about

which you have reported in detail, in this nine months course you say only tactical missiles were taught and no strategic missiles. Why is this? S: There was a general (OBZORNAYA) lecture on strategic missiles, but these were not called ICBMs. They were simply referred to as missiles with ranges above 1,000 kilometers. The Academy has prepared its courses for training officers in technical aspects of rockets employed by ground forces. These rockets are studied in great detail with all kinds of charts and diagrams.

19. G: Do you have a category of rockets which we call IRBMs which are of greater range than your tactical rockets but not as great as ICBMs; for example, say roughly between the ranges of 800 to 1500 kilometers? S: We have no such designation. We have only one division. Everything I have given you is under the control of VARENTSOV, and everything else including what you mentioned is under the command of the Strategic Rocket Command of the Land under MOSKALENKO. These are separate headquarters and they are always in conflict with respect to requests for budgetary allowances. The ones who decide are KHRUSHCHEV together with SUSLOV, and also MIKOYAN, etc.

20. S: Up to now VARENTSOV is still a Marshal of Artillery. Actually he should be by now Chief Marshal of Artillery, especially since NEDELIN's death. But they are not giving it to him. Incidentally, on the 2nd of September VARENTSOV will have his 60th birthday and my wife and I are invited to this celebration. SOKOLOVSKIY will be there and MALINOVSKIY will be there. There will probably be an overt order regarding the award of the Order of Lenin to VARENTSOV. Everyone will bring gifts. I already know which artists will be invited for musical entertainment. There will be souvenirs, albums, etc. I must also get him a good gift. His hobby is collecting watches. He has a collection of watches. I want to buy him a good, expensive watch, and have inscribed on it, "From the (Subject and wife's true name)". I'm going to be the major-domo, the bartender, etc., and the affair will take place at his house on the Frunzeskoy Naberezhnoy. He has a six-room apartment on the fourth floor.

21. G: To what extent were you told about the ICBMs? S: We were told that they exist and, as I have written, the basic characteristic is that they are two-stage rockets. Emphasize this to your scientists to spare them an analysis for more than two-stage rockets which do not exist. Next, the fuel capacity is much larger, and of course the overall space in the

rocket. There is more high-calorific fuel which is a liquid fuel. The only solid fuel we have is used for these free rockets which look like pencils. They must be very careful in handling these rockets especially when they are being loaded. There was an incident when a rocket had its frame slightly bent during loading and when it was placed in the launcher the friction ignited the rocket, causing casualties. G: Are they still trying to develop a solid fuel for rockets? S: Yes, they are trying to develop atomic energy fission. NEDELIN perished in such a test.

22. G: Are there any operational ICBMs at all, or are they only experimental? S: They are all experimental for strategic purposes except for the one I mentioned which is, as you said, of an intermediate range. This is the R-14 about which I wrote stating only that this rocket has now been included in our missile arsenal, that it has a range of over 1000 kilometers and that further data was unavailable to me. Otherwise the strategic rockets they have told me about, I repeat again, are two-stage liquid fuel rockets with a length variation between 18 and 24 meters. But I have never personally seen such a rocket or its installation. The basic objective is to have a high caloried fuel and to have all of the circuits and control mechanisms working properly with respect to each other; to reduce the deviation errors from the planned trajectory, or to correct the errors to a zero deviation position; and then the rocket can travel from one continent to another.

23. G: Now with respect to the rockets which are in production, where are their storage areas, manufacturing centers, etc.? You already mentioned that somewhere toward Murmansk there were launching sites. Do you know of any others? S: Regarding the bases (launching sites) in the general direction of Murmansk, only five or six people would have access to the location maps. One needs a special pass to go to the First Directorate (Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense). Even when I have to go to the Tenth Directorate (Countries of Peoples' Democracies), either I am met by the officer I am to see, after a phone call, or am told to go to a specific room or they may issue me a temporary one-day pass. Everything is done in a recorded manner. They are so strict about lost documents. There was one case where an officer was court-martialed for losing his working folio. Actually, two officers were enemies and one burned the working folio of the other and the one whose folio could not be produced was tried.

24. G: Did you have any inkling about rocket bases from conversation? S: This I can find out in the future now that you have advised me exactly what is of interest. If you will repeat this to me as EEI before I leave, I am sure I can find out. Even with VARENTSOV, conversation would not be as a direct answer to a direct question. But he tells me things like this -- "You know, they're not giving me enough funds. They even criticize me for having spent too much money for the erection of permanent-type protective shelters for artillery ordinance. Previously I was authorized to use canvas, but the canvas becomes weather-worn and disintegrates after a season, and that is a waste of money. So I built brick structures with permanent roofs, but the cost was criticized since the big priority for military expenditures is rockets." I have to approach him in a roundabout way, indirectly, to conversation we are interested in. G: As a suggestion sometimes this works well. One could mention that in the Western press one hears about accomplishments in new missiles, particularly in ICBMs, and the say, "Is it really true, comrade-Marshal, that they have everything and we have nothing?". S: That is right. He certainly would answer a question of that kind.

25. S: I give you my word, and I swear by my child, that he has so often told me "You know, (Subject's true first name), with respect to ICBMs, up to now we don't have a damn thing. Everything is only on paper, and there is nothing in actual existence." He was specifically referring to ICBMs. He continued, "For short ranges we can fulfill the missions, but beyond that what? There is nothing." G: I appreciate the fact that you probably would not have access to determining the exact coordinates of the launching sites, but would it be possible at least to find out from conversation that someone had been say, off-hand, at a place like Novaya Zemlya and who might say what an extensive rocket launching development there is there, should that be the case. S: There certainly could be conversations of that kind.

26. S: By the way, Marshal VARENTSOV is a very good administrator. He delegates many projected plans to his subordinates and then just corrects and supervises what what they have to do. I have friends in the Artillery Headquarters. Beginning with his Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Artillery, KARIAVILI, a colonel-general, Georgiy Spiridonovich. He recently had a 60th birthday but because of the fact that he had quarreled with ZHADOV -- his former name was ZHIDOV but Stalin made him change to ZHADOV because ZHIDOV sounded too Jewish. KARIAVILI lives across the river from my house on the

Kotelnicheskaya-Naberezhnaya. Anyway, on his 60th birthday he did not receive an Order of Lenin, but only a gold watch. Incidentally, VARENTSOV was also there and the artists who were present are the same ones who are going to go to VARENTSOV's birthday party. I just mention this because that's how I know who they will be.

27. G: You mentioned ZHADOV. S: Yes, he is the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. G: Is ZHADOV in any way related to KHRUSHCHEV? S: No, there is no relation there. G: How about Marshal GRECHKO? S: GRECHKO, yes. He is married to some relative of KHRUSHCHEV's, exactly whom I don't know. But KHRUSHCHEV is certainly pulling him along. They say he is a fool. He did well on purely military matters before, but now in his present position as a deputy to the Minister, he is called a fool. Anyway, this is how ZHADOV spoiled things for KARIAVILI.

28. S: Now I told you before about an aide-de-camp PORUCHENETS -- a very intelligent artillery colonel, Vladimir BUZINOV. He graduated from the Artillery Academy, and is a very smart fellow. He is the aide-de-camp to Sergey Sergeyevich (VARENTSOV). His problem is that he is broke. He has three children and receives less than I do. His wife drinks and also smokes. Her name is Anastasia. I know because I visit them at home. He loves to drink too, and often I take him out because he is broke. He can drink up a half liter of cognac at a time. When he is drunk he talks a great deal. It is so easy to talk to him. All I say is, "What was all this excitement about on your last trip?", and he would say something like this, "Well, there were maneuvers; KHRUSHCHEV came down and MALINOVSKIY, the Minister, made a speech saying that he is introducing to the comrades marshals and generals, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Union, KHRUSHCHEV." They call him that, even though his rank is still lieutenant-general. (Jokingly to G) - Just like your relative KHLOPOV. I promise to bring you his photograph. He looks just like you. This BUZINOV is not an adjutant who, in effect, is nothing. BUZINOV carries Top Secret dispatches and reports from VARENTSOV to the Central Committee. It is even possible for him to show me some of these items. Of course he would be entirely black in this respect, that is, unwitting. G: That is the only way he must be, strictly unwitting.

29. G: I have some more questions on subjects that need clarification. All these questions supplement the field of knowledgeability that you have already shown familiarity with. S: I understand what you want to know about rockets. All I can say is that the experimental effort now to make ICBMs is all based on those shorter range rockets which have already

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been proven except that all dimensions would be proportionately increased. G: I just have a few written questions left and then it will be time for you to go. S: Yes, I better go soon but tomorrow I will go as early as you like and we can work for a long time.

30. G: Please tell us now all you know about atomic submarines. You previously stated that you were told that there were up to ten submarines already produced in a serial production. S: This I found out several months ago. G: This means that the submarines operate on atomic energy fuel? S: Yes - just like the icebreaker, Lenin. G: May it be assumed that they are continuing to produce additional ones? S: This I do not know. G: Where are these being produced? Do you know? S: Yes, I know this -- that separate components for the atomic submarine are made at Menzelinsk on the Volga, ~~about 30 kilometers from KAZAN~~. (Note: ~~Subject corrected this and said it was not Kazan but~~ Zelenodolsk.) This is 30 kilometers west of KAZAN on the Volga. Menzelinsk is the town 200 kilometers east of KAZAN which Subject previously reported to have been the eastern town of the former Moscow Military District.

31. S: During World War II this little town had a naval base established there. All kinds of naval equipment was mounted on vessels there. I almost married the daughter of the rear admiral who was sent to this town as the chief of the base. His home was in Leningrad. I used to see the girl, Masha, there (Menzelinsk). Her father has since died. There were also very large artillery ordnance plants there and storage dumps. At that time the Moscow Military District had a transient hotel there and my friend Col. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich MARENOV introduced me. He is now the Deputy to the Chief of the Political Directorate of the advisors to Hungary. The Admiral's name was Nikolay NETSVITSKIY. Earlier, I worked together with MARENOV in the Moscow Military District in the Political Directorate and he was chief of the section of the Komsomols. He is not an intelligence officer.

32. G: Very well. They equip the submarines here -- then what happens-- do they take them up the Volga? To another base? S: No. The atomic equipment is shipped in large packing crates to an assembly point in the Leningrad Oblast. G: Where in the Oblast? S: I do not know, but I believe it is somewhere in Leningrad or somewhere just out of town. In addition to Leningrad, there is also an assembly base somewhere in the Far East. G: Do you know if there are bases in the White Sea? S: Yes, there are. G: Assembly points? S: Of that, I am not sure. There are docks which receive the material from

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Menzelinsk which are located in the Far East and somewhere near Leningrad on the Neva River. I just remembered something important. Near Leningrad they are digging extensive underground shelters for these docks or assembly points. They lead right to the water and are like pans, or rather like our Moscow subways. These are constructed very quickly.

33. G: How about the Belomor canal? Do they not take submarines up this canal to the White Sea? S: I don't know if they take them up the canal, but I heard that there are factories on the White Sea. A year ago when I was on vacation in Sukhumi at a sanitarium, I happened to stay at a former naval sanitarium. There are no longer any naval ones now because they have all been pooled together. However, there I met a certain first rank who lives in the very areas that you are talking about, north of Leningrad. I couldn't ask him exactly where, but he mentioned that near the sea there are secret bases where much activity is going on. Whether they build anything there or assemble, I don't know.

34. G: And do you know whether these submarines are equipped with rockets that can be fired even from a submerged position? S: Yes, they have rockets that can be launched from a surface position as well as from a submerged position. G: What are the ranges of these rockets? S: These are the P-5, and I believe that I have listed the range. The launching wave (BADISNAYA VOLNA) was determined. This is the wave which must be computed in order to eject the rocket through the water. They determined the height of this wave and under what wind conditions the rocket would deviate from its set course. G: Are there any other kind of submarine engines, other than atomic, that have recently been developed? S: The usual other motors are diesel but now they have very powerful ones. I know of no other types.

35. S: Incidentally, we were told that your scientists have not perfected the exact nozzle feed which permits the precise desire per second of fuel consumption with the admixture from the oxidizer. I described all kinds of nozzles in my notes. G: By the way, what do you mean by a SHNEKOVYYE nozzle? S: That is an orifice of a nozzle in which a float or a ball pulsates. G: I see what you mean now. It is like a ball valve. S: These nozzles operate to feed into combustion chambers through the space between the inner and outer wall. There must be an extreme precision because an imbalance in feed would cause a deviation from the desired rocket velocity. The work of these nozzles is to feed a constantly uniform mixture of fuel and oxidizer into the combustion chamber throughout the entire active portion of the rocket's trajectory. G: Do these

nozzles act as a carburator? S: No, that is a mixing chamber called a SMESITEL'. Then it goes to the FORSUNKI or pressure nozzles. I think I wrote all this up. This is the very soul of the rocket.

36. G: Would you have any idea of where atomic weapons of any kind, including hydrogen bombs, are stored? S: Where exactly, I do not know, but I have heard that there are two hidden storage areas in the DDR where atomic warheads are stored. Write this down. As to my source, Engineer Colonel of Artillery GRYZLOV, formerly the deputy to the chief of the 4th Faculty of the Artillery Academy imeni Dzerzhinskogo; there are now five faculties but at that time there were only four. Colonel PETRENKO is the chief of one of the Faculties also. GRYPLOV is now in the DDR and is the chief of the GAU there. This GRYZLOV is concerned with the establishment of these bases in the DDR. All of this is, of course, for rockets.

37. G: Now how about the bombs of any atomic type kiloton equivalents etc., what do you know about them and about where they are stored? That is the type that can be delivered by aircraft. S: I already mentioned that everything has been computed down to as low as five kilotons but nothing lower. There are 25 kiloton bombs and of greater TNT equivalent. There are also hydrogen bombs of greater than 25 kiloton equivalents which have been successfully developed and tested. G: Do you know where they are stored? S: I have no idea. G: Don't be disturbed. These questions must be asked.

38. G: Do you have any idea how many bombs have been produced at least in round numbers, say 10, 100, 1000 or more? S: I have no idea. All I know is that atomic warheads are stored in one place and the unloaded rocket shells in another. G: I'm not referring to just rockets. S: I understand. I also mean that all bombs of an atomic character, whether they be for rocket or other purposes, are stored secretly in various places. G: I realize that these are difficult questions to answer. S: If we could recruit SOKOLOVSKIY who is now retired, I think we would have our answers.

39. G: Here is an interesting question. How is your long-range aviation coordinated with your long and shorter range rocket commands? It seems that everything is subordinated so emphatically artillery, just how does long-range aviation fit in? S: I can say this, -- that KHRUSHCHEV has made an error which is in our favor. At first he emphasized an increase in aviation. I do not mean civilian planes or old models. All that is junk. G: I refer only to new strategic

aviation. S: He is still maintaining long-range aviation, but is keeping the production at a very slow pace. We call it our DD aviation, long-range aviation. He still maintains this, but even some jet fighter units have been disbanded. For example there was one in which MIKOYAN's son, a lieutenant colonel, was serving near Moscow. The entire division was disbanded. Capable, healthy officers were sent to the Dzerzhinskiy Academy to study rocketry. They are re-orienting some Air Force personnel to rockets. During the time I was attending there, they were still wearing their blue air force insignia before they changed to the black artillery insignia. You might say that today KHRUSHCHEV has now assigned a less important role to aviation.

40. S: In comparison to rockets, aviation now has a relatively lesser significance. However, combat strength of long-range aviation must be considered. They are still constructing long-range bombers, but not on the scale or in the numbers in which they had been building them previously, for example, under STALIN. STALIN had been all for aviation. G: Would you say that long-range aviation is being abandoned in favor of rockets? S: Definitely not. The fleet has been considerably reduced in favor of rockets, and much light aviation has been curtailed in favor of rockets. In addition, long-range aviation is not being built up as intensively as before.

41. G: Is the long-range aviation command entirely independent? S: Yes, they have their own headquarters. It is located as one goes past the crematorium and past the University of Friendship where YERZIN is an instructor. On the same street on the left-hand side is the aviation headquarters. Marshal ZHAVORONKOV is the chief. G: Is it not on the Leningradskaya Shosse? S: No, that is the Moscow airport and there is an air force command headquarters there. That is where at one time STALIN's son, Vasiliy, a lieutenant-general, was the chief of the aviation of the Moscow Military District. He has since been imprisoned. He is de-commissioned, miserable, and drunk. I'll tell you about him sometime and also about his (STALIN's) daughter. I know where they live. It is not far from the British Embassy. It is near the Novo-Arbatskiy bridge.

42. S: To sum up, aviation as a whole has been radically reduced in favor of rockets. G: However, is it correct to say that selected modern models of long-range bombers are still being produced and improved and kept up at least on a minimum basis? S: Yes, and their headquarters is on this street going toward the center of town. It is the Bolshoye Peregovskoye,

and across the street is the First Moscow Medical Institute. The statue of PEREGOV holding the skull is there.

43. S: Marshal ZHAVORONKOV replaced NOVIKOV. Remember NOVIKOV was removed just like KUZNETSOV, the former navy chief. I believe Marshal ZHAVORONKOV is also gone now. He became chief of the (GVF) which is also commanded by a Marshal of Aviation. I'll tell you who the new chief of the Soviet Air Force is. I can't remember now. NOVIKOV was retired for personal reasons. They don't simply discharge marshals. It takes a personnel action to do this. For example, ZHUKOV was dismissed, but by a personnel action by the Ministry of Defense, and was awarded a pension of five and a half thousand rubles. But the Soviet Air Force exists as an integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. However, it does not have the weight that it used to have under STALIN. Now everything is subordinated to rockets. G: However, the Air Force chief must have under his jurisdiction those rockets which are air force type equipment, such as air-to-air and air-to-surface? S: That's absolutely right. However, surface-to-air -- that is in the hands of the PVO. Rockets like the ones I described which the MIG carries -- that is all under the air force control. These are the rockets that can fire an additional four to five kilometers beyond the maximum ceiling of climb of the MIGs.

44. G: Have any attempts been made to develop an atomic energy aircraft engine? S: No. All they are testing now is how to have a rocket engine work on the fission of atomic energy.

45. G: This finished the list I have. How about our meeting for tomorrow? S: Let us arrange to meet tomorrow about 2000 hours. G: That's fine. Then we can begin earlier and we won't have to keep you so late. I'll meet you in the lobby again as I did tonight. (Subject said farewell to all.) G: I'll take you down out of the hotel. Remember it is not so good to come in and out of hotels late at night since this is a small town, not like London.

46. S: What a relief it was to me when I was lying in misery to learn that I didn't have to be hospitalized in Leeds. Just think how hard it would be for us to continue our work with me lying in a hospital. G: Don't forget your key again so you won't be running back between hotels looking for it. Also, note the room number just in case. It is 31. (Subject left at 2335 hours on 23 April 1961, and was escorted by G to the street corner. He proceeded to his own hotel directly and without incident.

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Meeting #5, 24 April 1961 in Leeds

1. (Subject entered at 2045 hours, having been met by G in the lobby of the Hotel Metropole. He said in English that they had visited the firms of Westall and Marshal and that WYNNE was now in the hotel shaving and getting himself ready to go dancing.) G: How about the other members of your delegation? S: Even on the 21st of April when I went to the Embassy and then met with you, the members of my delegation knew that I had intelligence mission assignments. In fact, it would be very awkward for them even to ask me where I am going. They also know that I am going to write up an efficiency report on them when I return and make my report on the trip. They even report to me. For example, when they were walking down the main street of London, Oxford Street, they saw WYNNE's wife walking in the company of a young man. Earlier when WYNNE had arranged the initial reception for us, his wife was present so my people had met her. They told me that I should know, and I told them that it's none of their business and none of my business. I recall that when I was sitting at the table with her she mentioned that she had two brothers. G: Very likely she was with one of her brothers, and I don't think you should pay any attention to that. S: Well, I thought I should report it to you. I didn't bring any notes because I had no chance to write anything this morning. I came to you now right after I washed up.

2. S: However, let me begin by telling you what's on my mind before I forget. First of all, in the Ministry of Defense there are twenty-eight thousand employees. In general they are distributed as follows: The General Staff on the Arbat, the three buildings on the Frunzenskaya-Naberezhnaya, the second house on Red Square, and the Air Force Headquarters on the Bolshaya Pirogovskaya. This complex has twenty-eight thousand persons, including officers and civilians (VOLNO-NAYEMNYKH). Of the latter, by my estimate, there would be two and a half to three thousand. This would include cleaning and household personnel, as well as stenographers and civilianized officers.

3. S: Many GRU officers who still have potential value have been retired at 40 to 50% pension pay, depending on their calendar length of service, and they are hired as civilians. For example, I have twenty-four calendar years of service including my officer training time, but my total service (L'GOTNYYE) is twenty-seven years because my war service in the Finnish War and in World War II are given double value. (with preferential terms)

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kind of pass, except that the cachets vary in terms of the pass permission to go into specific General Staff buildings. With my pass I can enter all the buildings. But in the First Directorate I have to be escorted from the reception desk, and for the Tenth Directorate I must make my appointment by telephone before I arrive.

7. S: Now, before I forget, the KGB complex at the Dzerzhinskiy Square including the large building above the GASTRONOM -- and this includes the personnel of the First Directorate there which keeps track of us -- I would say that together with civilian employees, they have between five and a half thousand and six thousand workers. This is not an exact figure, but I think it is a good estimate.

8. S: Now the APPARAT of the Central Committee has expanded considerably and it includes all kinds of sections. They have independent sections of light industry, heavy industry, military and administrative sections .....let me see, their exact title is sectors. That is what they are called. There is one for agriculture, electric power, and there is even a commission which handles all personnel who are being sent abroad. I was also interviewed by the duty officer there before I could go to England. Although the Committee is large, one, two or three interviewers question a particular prospective traveller, depending upon the importance of the individual and the mission. They brief people on behavior abroad and question them on what they expect to do. Then they fill out a Top Secret form.

9. S: The first page of this form is a declaration which I must sign. It reads something like this, "I, (Subject's true name), about to go abroad, promise to maintain the dignity of the Soviet Union as the representative thereof, promise not to enter into any contacts or discussions which are not authorized, and to maintain state secrecy." On the opposite page are all vital statistics on the individual. This includes his Party record. The whole document is Top Secret. The reason is that according to our advertised democratic principles, this type of treatment would be improper, so they make it Top Secret. The pretense is that a specific ministry simply sends someone and the Central Committee has nothing to do with it. But this is absurd. Of course, a ministry may nominate a person to go abroad, but then everything is checked minutely by the KGB. When their acquiescence is obtained, the Central Committee commission takes this Top Secret obligation from the individual and then permission is given for the issuance of a diplomatic passport by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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[illegible]ent times -- has at least 5,000 persons including officers.

40. S: The other OBLAST headquarters and the groups of forces may number up to 4,000. This also includes the headquarters security battalion which guards all entrances, safes, etc. of the headmasters. This also includes the headquarters service company and quartermaster elements serving the headquarters itself. We have eighteen to twenty-two military districts, say twenty for an average. Therefore there would be about 100,000 in all of the OBLAST headquarters together with the groups of forces. Let us now check the figures I have here: The General Staff of the Ministry of Defense - 28,000: the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR - 5,000: the KGB - between 5 and 6,000. Also add to this the naval forces and their GAU since I did not include them in the 28,000. At any rate for an average of this total group in Moscow, lump it together at 50,000. Therefore this total of 150,000 experienced generals, officers, and men of the headquarters in the USSR must be destroyed, according to the plan which I have proposed.

41. S: Please consider my plan and report it to your headquarters. No doubt destruction has been considered by them as an inevitable action in case of war. Perhaps my grasp of the whole problem may be inexact and requires much adjustment and reorientation. I am ready to accept any assignment to blow up what I can in Moscow (any assignment which may be given to me). Wiser and more experienced heads will probably come up with a better solution than I have offered.

42. S: I would like to suggest another possibility. This is something that should be prepared scientifically. Your scientists may consider this. The mines with TNT atomic equivalents should be concealed in a device for example, such as the standard Moscow refuse cans which can be found in every house entrance. A false bottom should be prepared in this. I should be able to set a time mechanism for the desired detonation time at the bottom of such a can which is loaded with an atomic mine. The materials should be obtained in a Soviet store so that these cans resemble Soviet cans. Then the prepared material can be sent by means of heavy diplomatic packages and passed to me through dead drops. Then assume that I can concentrate all this in the basement of my DACHA. These cans or spittoons I can haul either in suitcases or better yet in the trunk of my car.

43. S: If I were assigned the mission of blowing up seven targets, this may require some fifteen mines. I could run around and set all these in the proper places. It may require several trips to get them all placed. But I could run back

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forth as if I am shopping. I could even have some items placed in the suitcase. These I could leave at the baggage storage area I described to you or in the proper driveways -- with everything set by a time mechanism. This is what occurs to me. Maybe the whole scheme is very primitive in your eyes, but to me this seems to be one of the first essentials of our common mission. G: Your intentions are very fine and when the time comes to consider this, your proposition will not be ignored.

(44) S: The destruction of such a group of military and Party leaders as are included in the 150,000 I mentioned, would cause immediate capitulation. Of course this may not get KHRUSHCHEV who may be at a DACHA of his. He has three. One is near the Moscow University, another is on the Rublevskiy Shosse beyond Kuntsevo, and the third one is near Dmitriyevo. At any rate, the whole Party APPARAT and the General Staff can certainly be destroyed. The Praesidium is in session all the time, irrespective of where it sits. I will get you a copy of this internal telephone directory; I have it at home already. Even though you are interested in names and patronymics, at least you will have all the initials here.

(45) G: We have a lot of questions here we would like to ask you. Even though you may not answer all of them, just explain whatever you can. S: Very well, but first let me answer the two questions asked me yesterday which I did not answer. Yesterday you asked me about these nozzles or fuel injectors (FORSUNKI). In my report I wrote up very carefully and exactly in engineering terms everything there was about it. I don't know if you're testing me about this item, but all I can say about them is that the principle involved is for these types of nozzles -- which by the way are considered to be very reliable -- to feed the exact mixture of fuel ingredients into the combustion chamber of the rocket. These nozzles must feed in such an exact way that no overheating occurs which could cause premature ignition prior to getting the precise feed into the combustion chamber, that is, to permit the exact per second quantum of fuel to enter the combustion chamber. Failure to do this will cause an incorrect thrust throughout the active period of the rocket trajectory. Yesterday I didn't understand what you were asking me about exactly. But this is what I know, and further than that I cannot give scientific data since I am not an engineer. G: You explained this well, but yesterday all that was asked of you was to describe a type of fuel injector which was the ball-type and you did that clearly.

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coordinates of the target. In the past it would take us more than six days to complete this but now they have developed techniques for completing the topographic survey in two days. The second most complicated process is to test and check the rockets so that they will follow the indicated trajectory. There are four basic tests, horizontal tests, in the test area and then additional tests on the launching pad itself.

62. G: Were there any naval officers or air force officers in your class? S: Yes, there were. G: What would be the proportion of these to others in the army? S: They were fewer. There were either eight or ten air force officers and there were only a few naval men. But there were also engineers from the Kuybyshev Academy which is also in Moscow, not far from the artillery academy. The engineers are responsible for construction of shelters and protective partitions at the launching sites. But there were only a few engineers in this course. G: Would you call this a general course? S: Yes. G: Can't you remember any of the names of the faculty chiefs? S: I'll write this all up, but I'll try to tell you now those that I can remember. I suggest that you give me the names of all Soviet artillery men in the DDR and I'll tell you whom I know.

63. S: Yesterday I told you about GRYZLOV, a colonel who is there now. There are several Soviet armies in the DDR. One army is composed of armored forces. The commander of each army has his deputy for artillery. This artillery commander has his staff through which he commands rocket artillery, and that portion of rifled artillery which is still retained. Hero of the Soviet Union, Gen. Mayor of Artillery Ivan KUPIN at one time was the deputy to the Chief of Artillery in Lvov, the Sub-Carpathian Military District. For the past two years he has been the commander of artillery of one of the armies stationed in the DDR. That was the armored forces army. Now he has just been assigned as the deputy to Gen. Polk. FROLOV who is the chief of all Soviet artillery of the GSPG. In the field there is no such sub-division as chief of rocket artillery or conventional artillery. It is all under one command. He is in charge of all depots, firing ranges, ordnance shops, etc. and he has his own GAU for operating all this.

64. G: When you mentioned GRYZLOV who was sent to the DDR to organize these new rocket units -- to whom will they be subordinate? Will they be under FROLOV, or will they be turned over to the Germans? S: No, the Germans are receiving rockets

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...he Germans have their own artillery personnel ...rs. We are training them, but the Germans will ... own tactical rocket units. We have been training ... a long time now, and now they are receiving rockets. ...der states that they should have rockets in their hands ...he end of 1961. There are four groups of forces of ours, ...d there are many countries of Peoples' Democracies. We ...have advisors in all headquarters of the armies of the countries of Peoples' Democracies, but I do not count these. Special training units for rockets are being trained by our people.

65. S: I know that in our Soviet forces of the GSFG, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany there are exactly four brigades of rocket artillery. Two of these are designated as atomic weapon rocket brigades and the other two are normal rocket brigades, that is, high explosive. This is in Soviet hands and will not be given to the Germans. But the countries of Peoples' Democracies will have their rocket units trained by us and they will be armed with rockets, that is, with the exception of Albania. Possibly CASTRO has received some rockets also, but I am not sure. G: Do the other Soviet Groups of Forces have rocket brigades of this type or not? S: They do, but to a lesser degree. I don't know to what extent. I am glad you ask these questions since you are teaching me what is of importante for me to find out about.

66. G: Can you tell me what type of rockets were given to the Germans? S: Yes, I can. The R-11, and now they are giving the SP-5, and in addition, all types of free rockets such as LUNA, MARS, KORSHUN, etc.. G: They already have these such as the 3R-1, 3R-2, 3R-3 and 3R-7? S: Yes, they have all these, possibly as many as 10 types, but I don't know in what quantities. They are preparing tactical launching sites and they have already trained cadres to whom live rockets are being given. G: How about atomic warheads? S: No. These are not given. All we have there are these two atomic storage depots for our two brigades, which are hidden somewhere and are under the control of GRYZLOV.

67. S: Another officer I know there is Col. Georgiy KHOROSHILOV who graduated one year before I did, in 1938, from the Second Artillery School in Kiev. After the war he was a senior lecturer at the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy, in the tactics department. Now I have heard that he is the

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71. S: Anyway, the situation there is very unpleasant for our forces. For any relation with a German girl, a soldier gets shipped home at once and is punished. In addition, they have cut down the monthly allotment of marks given to officers. When I was in Turkey and was allotted 2,000 lira per month, I would buy all kinds of things, which I did. I brought them home, sold them and traded them. Although there are all kinds of goods in the DDR, the new reduced allotment in marks permits the officers to buy very little of value. Anyway, these are my friends who tell me of these conditions.

72. S: They always call me when they come to town. Gen. KUPIN stays at VARENTSOV's house when he comes here. His daughter has now given birth to twin boys so VARENTSOV is the proud grandfather of two five-year old boys. I also have to bring them little gifts. This is a must because when Gen. KUPIN goes to Germany he brings back a toy for my daughter. VARENTSOV's third daughter is Natasha. She is in the third grade with my daughter, Galina, who is about two months older than she is.

73. Yerlena's husband, Leonid, is a captain and he is now graduating from the Command Artillery Academy at Leningrad. Prior to that he had served in the DDR as a lieutenant. VARENTSOV arranged for him to go to the academy. He comes from Taganrog, and right now I can't remember his last name. He hopes to go back to the DDR after graduating, but he is well off since VARENTSOV gives his daughter a gift of about 1,000 old rubles per month. The boys are named Sasha and Serezha. The marshal lets them stay at his DACHA with his wife (grandmother), and when they go to Leningrad they stay at a common apartment. The marshal has two servants, flower gardens, and his own personal car.

74. S: Yerlena is spoiled since her father gave her everything, not like poor Nina who shot herself and whom I buried when the marshal was in a Moscow hospital. I didn't tell him anything until it was all over. He had a very beautiful first wife, Anya, who died of tuberculosis. Later he married his present wife, Yekaterina KARPOVA. He whisked her away from a Leningrad doctor to whom she was married at the time. It was when VARENTSOV was recuperating and KONEV was demanding his earliest return to the Front, the First Ukrainian Front, as chief of artillery, that Nina's husband was shot together with two others who were engaged in black marketing in Lvov. It was proven that VARENTSOV had no personal interest in the black market deal whatsoever, but he was accused of political shortsightedness in allowing this to go on under his nose. He was called before the Minister of Defense who reprimanded him. However, the Minister said, "Let us forget this whole matter; go back to the front." Three months later VARENTSOV received the Hero of the Soviet Union.

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75 S: When he was going to the front by rail I accom-
ied him, and it was then I told him about the unfortunate
tuation with his daughter. He was emotionally upset. When
we arrived in Kiev we learned that CHERNYAKHOVSKIY had been
killed at the front. He was one of the army commanders of the
First Ukrainian Front. He was a very close friend of
VARENTSOV's. This was in March of 1944. When we arrived in
Lvov he visited the cemetery once and never returned. Later he
gave me five thousand marks and said to order the best possible
monument in Vienna to place on her grave in Lvov. Anyway, that
is the story of a good friend of yours, that is, he is a good
friend of yours indirectly, through me. I am going to buy him
an expensive watch and inscribe it from my wife and myself. I
can photograph this watch and send you a picture.

76 G: Now we have some questions based on the informa-
tion you gave us that we would like to clear up. S: I tried
to present everything as honestly and completely as I could.
Let me finish one other question. You asked me how I got into
GNTK. I finished everything on VARENTSOV.

77 S: On the 5th of January 1960 General SHUMSKIY (Note:
Deputy Chief of GRU Personnel) called for me. He said, "Here is
the information submitted to us by the KGB on your father". By
the way I would appreciate it if you would check to see if my
father is still alive, since he disappeared without a trace.
We know that there was an encirclement at Rostov but it would
not be difficult to have escaped from there to Taganrog. G: We
will run a check. S: Secondly, possibly through your informa-
tion channels you may find out if anybody had reported on me
about my father. Thirdly, you may know that there were some
records in the German archives which fell into the hands of the
KGB and which they have been analyzing for years. Our people
don't know what to do with me about this matter. They can
openly discuss me without arresting me but if they did not give
me a passport to come here now I would have made a run for it
somewhere, possibly to your Embassy. G: If your father is
alive and is either in the US or in England, this can be
quickly checked. S: I don't believe that he is alive but
please check anyway and also let me know if you find out who
could have reported on me.

78 Anyway SHUMSKIY called me and said, "Your father was
a White Army officer and had a higher education and your
grandfather was a nobleman, a Judge in Stavropol." My uncle,
once removed, was also mentioned. He was once a commander of a
PVO regiment in the Far East, and at one time he was also in
prison because of his background. His name is Valentin

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Antonovich (last name same as Subject's). After he was released from prison he was then the Chief of Staff of the 21st Army during the war. Then he was the commander of the 6th Guards Army. NO Then at the end of the war he was sent to the Far East and he participated in the campaign against the Japanese Kwantung army. He remained there after that and became the Chief of Staff under MALINOVSKIY. When MALINOVSKIY finally was brought in to replace ZHUKOV as the Minister of Defense he left my uncle out in the Far East since he knew the area well. He avoids contacting me and I do the same since we do not wish to contaminate each other with our backgrounds.

79. S: When SHUMSKIY confronted me with all this he ordered me to write up my version of it. I told him that I could only write what I had always written before about my background but possibly my mother could add some supplemental information. My mother wrote a statement and I submitted it but they immediately stopped my processing to go to India as the RESIDENT. I should have gone as the military attache but instead they sent some general who has no diplomatic or other background. He has no higher education but he has a good war record. When this was done I had no assignment for a month, then two, and I was worried -- I was the GRU reserves. This all happened after I had finished the advanced rocket course. It was very lucky that I had been to these courses, otherwise I could never have gotton this information for you. You would have had information only about the GRU.

(80) S: I was sitting worrying during these two months and I felt that the big break in my life was going to take place. I had already stolen or copied the material from the academy. The reason I had done this was because I was already distrusted. They would not return me to my post in Turkey after I had this affair with General SAVCHENKO who had also made charges against me. I felt insulted by this and wanted to go to Turkey very badly since I had a wide circle of acquaintances, including Colonel PEEKE, within the diplomatic colony. I had already made up my mind to approach you, but was biding my time because I was taught to be careful. So I wanted to collect this material because I thought it would be useful in the future when I had the opportunity of approaching you.

(81) S: I became the sergeant major of the class since I was the senior colonel. There were six or eight other colonels in the class. The rest of them were lieutenant colonels, majors, and there were a few captains. So I copied everything word for word but had to use abbreviations. Later at home I

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wrote out all abbreviations so that you would understand them. The only place where I did any short-cutting was in describing certain launching site equipment because after describing one in detail the other types were similar.

82. S: Anyway, I was doing this for almost a year, and then one day when I was the duty officer, the POWERS incident took place. I told the students about this. When I was the duty officer I had all the room keys but not the safe keys, because the safe keys are submitted and placed in a sealed box. At that time I wasn't thinking of opening safes, but now if you can prepare me a similar seal I can open safes. That night I made my rounds and took turns with my assistant, sleeping. During this time I had some blank cable paper and I copied down the code names from the Red Book. Later at home I typed them up in the form in which I gave them to you. Of course they could trace me by my typewriter, but if it went to that extent, I would be shot anyway. I was nervous while copying though I was alone at the time. At any moment a special high-ranking duty officer such as a general from the First Directorate of the General Staff could come in. There were all kinds of special cables that could come in at night, but particularly dealing with information about your overflights. I knew when your planes were over Kiev.

83. S: Anyway, I was the duty officer during the night from the first of May to the second of May. The tour begins at 1500 hours. No sooner did I accept the duty when in came the communication saying that an American pilot had been taken into custody from a knocked-down U-2, and they described the circumstances which I know exactly. When POWERS was flying near Sverdlovsk, the poor fellow had the misfortune of running into a battalion of V-75's. He did not fly directly over the position, but slightly to one side of it and was already being followed by a MIG-19. The pilot was a lieutenant. The battalion on the ground was on an alert because of the holiday, and they opened fire. They were firing a defensive barrage since they were alerted that a hostile aircraft was flying overhead.

84. S: No direct hits were made, but only a slight damage to the tail and wing assembly. The damaged parts were not shown at the Moscow exhibition and your intelligence personnel should have spotted that. He was within the radius of explosion and as the result of the shock wave from the explosion, the plane was damaged and poor POWERS sustained a concussion. I don't know what he reported to his parents or others, but while falling he blacked out several times. He was

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not conscious when he parachuted to earth nor when everything on him was seized. The claims of a direct hit were, of course, absurd. I reported this to you already on the twelfth of August of last year, as well as on the RB-47.

85 S: POWERS was brought to Moscow by plane and the KGB at the moment didn't have an English interpreter. I was supposed to talk to him since I was the only one around who had some sort of understanding of English and I had already reported the incident to some generals. If they had not found a KGB interpreter at the last minute I would have been the first one to interview POWERS. They called up that I wasn't needed and the KGB chief, this young fellow who was the KOMSOMOL chief, and who replaced SEROV, SHELEPIN, wanted to make the report to KHRUSHCHEV personally. So he got an interpreter and picked POWERS up. But military people knocked POWERS down and POWERS was considered to be a military man. Therefore, he should have been turned over to us, the General Staff. But the KGB seized him, took him to Dzerzhinskiy Square, and made their own report. He was being treated medically since he was still in shock. You could have traded POWERS for this MELEKH whom you were in such a hurry to release.

86 G: How is it that SEROV had no influence? S: SEROV has none. If it weren't for the fact that he is remotely related to KHRUSHCHEV, he would have been shot for his past association with BERIYA. He was in a position of minister, but he had a chance to save his skin and was made chief of GRU. SEROV is not the most brilliant man. He knows how to interrogate people, shoot them, and imprison them. Although he has studied the intelligence situation, ROGOV, as his deputy, does most of the executive work. The other Armenian, MANSUROV, is simply in charge of the household and administrative functions. So I am glad to have the opportunity of telling you the true story about POWERS. If he had arrived in Moscow a half hour earlier, I would have been the one to interrogate him, even though the translation may have been cockeyed.

87 S: If we had only made contact sooner I would have told you all about MELEKH, that he was a Soviet spy and an intelligence officer, and you certainly should not have let him go. You could have sentenced him to be shot, and you could have traded him for POWERS. When the original bail money was put up KHRUSHCHEV made the decision, not SEROV. It was $50,000, even though it was later returned. SEROV can make a decision only for about $2,000.

88. S: SHTEMENKO did a great deal when he was chief of intelligence. He made a lot of wise reforms. He even had an

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elevator installed. However, he was a disagreeable man and was not generally accepted by other members of the General Staff because SHTEMENKO was a favorite of STALIN's back in STALIN's days. He did not fight on the front, but visited on the various fronts and collected decorations. After STALIN and BERIYA, SHTEMENKO was reduced in rank to a two star general. Only after he was made chief of the GRU did he receive his third star. Of course he was a good administrator and he did set up this sabotage school. Under SEROV, the directorate and section chiefs do all the work.

89 S: On the fifth of May after POWERS was knocked down, KHRUSHCHEV ordered a suspension of agent operations to avoid a possible flap. At that time I was running an agent about whom I will tell you everything. He was obtaining data on electronic computing machines through a third party and we were getting the material via dead drops. I had to stop this. There were many protests about dropping scheduled meetings and other contacts, but it had to be done. The REZIDENT in Pakistan decided on his own to pick up material from a dead drop which was already loaded in order to avoid possible compromise to the agent. He did this but was severely reprimanded by his superiors at GRU, even though he did the right thing. Thus KHRUSHCHEV ordered cessation of agent contacts during the period when he was going to capitalize on the POWERS incident despite the damage it did to the agent nets. That's all I have to say. I am ready to answer your questions.

90 G: Are the 3R-1, 3R-2, 3R-3 and 3R-7 now in serial production: S: Absolutely, and in addition, they already have atomic warheads developed for them. G: Were all these shown in the Moscow Parade of 1960? S: No, not all of them. I'll tell you which ones. They were the 3R-1, the V-75, the R-2, the R-11 and the 3R-7? I am checking these from the pictures. H: How about the P-5? S: This was not shown in the parade. G: Were you ever at the parade? S: No, but I was at the training areas where everything is prepared for participating in the parade in proper sequence. This is off Leningradskiy Shosse. The whole parade is rehearsed by sections under the direct command of the unit commanders. G: How long has it been since these rockets were placed in the hands of the troops? S: The R-2 existed even in STALIN's time, but it was not fully developed nor was it in mass production. These others have been in production relatively recently. I would say that they began to give them to troops about four or five years ago.

91 G: What is the principle allocation of these rockets? Is it to the front or the army, or what unit? S:

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In case of war, the units which operate rocket artillery of large caliber, long range, i.e. the battalions which are part of brigades similar to those now deployed in the woods near Moscow, not the PVO, but the strategic long range rockets, will be commanded by the Chief of the rocket forces of the General Staff, as is now established. These tactical weapons will be in the hands of the ground forces Commander and through him VARENTSOV, and their direct sub-units such as a Front, like FROLOV's in Germany and his artillery of the front, then the artillery of the army. The battalions will be parts of regiments which in turn will be part of a brigade. In case of war, the army artillery will have these weapons under its command. However, they will be exclusively of the conventional type because the employment of atomic weapons will be the decision exclusively of the Central Committee of the Communist Party through the Ministry of Defense. The atomic weapons will be deployed in such locations that, when their use has been authorized, the weapons will not be far from the units which could employ them.

92. G: The next question of course will be difficult for you to answer, but it states, Do you know of any actual locations where nuclear warheads are stored, or do you have any knowledge where production centers are located? S: Of course I do not know and one can find out only by chance conversation. There are, I have heard, assembly points for atomic warheads in the Klintsy area, but where I do not know. Generally, the hollow rockets are stored separately in entirely different areas and only when they are to be used with atomic warheads are both they as well as the warheads brought to some forward assembly point.

93. G: In your course at the artillery academy, were the P-5 and the SP-5 studied or were they merely referred to? S: I wrote about this as a supplement. We saw a model of this rocket, but it was not in a cross-sectional form. The data I wrote about was given to me by BUZINOV. G: However, are they included in the five-year course? S: Yes, they certainly are. G: Did you ever see the R-5? S: Yes, I have, and it is not in serial production. It is mounted in our laboratory and I have seen it in a canvas cover. I measured it by pacing and I estimate it to be between 16 and 18 meters long. This is a bigger rocket than the R-2 or the R-11. G: What unit will these rockets be assigned to? S: Will they be in brigades just like the other rockets? G: Were these shown at the parade? S: No, they were not. Just an old experimental model of the R-2 was shown. The largest test area is in south Siberia. The center is Kapustin Yar, and the impact is Kazakhstan.

94 S: I have an excellent source of information on this area a captain who is a friend of mine. I met him in the following way. The man's wife came to VARENTSOV's aide-de-camp and said that her husband had graduated from the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy and was being assigned to Kapustin Yar. He had served there in a junior officer capacity prior to having attended the Academy. The woman was a student at a medical school and wanted to remain in Moscow to finish her studies. In?

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addition, she would have to give up her room which was a nice one, since this was allotted to the family while the husband was at the academy. Her request was for help in getting her husband transferred to Moscow. His name is Vladimir KASHIN. He is an engineer-captain.

95. S: Well this BUZINOV, it seems to me, took a liking to the lady. He already had trouble in this direction once before. He flirted with some officer's wife in Leningrad, and the husband made a scandal as the result of which BUZINOV received a Party reprimand. If it weren't for VARENTSOV he probably would have been thrown out. Well anyway, I don't know how far his interest in this lady went, but it is common practice that all generals have girl friends, even Gen. Leyt. SMOLIKOV of GRU.

96. S: He came to me and said that this captain should be helped. At that time I was working as the chief of this acceptance commission for the incoming class of the MDA. I saw his personnel file and it was very outstanding. As a student at the academy he had even invented some device which was of value. To take a graduate of an academy who has specialized knowledge into the MDA where he would merely study languages and intelligence matters would be a very desirable thing to do. This is far better than to take an intelligence officer and try to make a specialist out of him in a field in which he could be given an intelligence mission.

97. S: Capt. KASHIN arrived in Moscow on a visit and with him came the firing range chief of Kapustin Yar, a colonel. He was just the post and station commander who provided administrative and housekeeping support. There are generals there who are in rocket testing in various categories. There are specialists who check various instruments and KASHIN, who is an engineer, is in charge of a small section there. Of course he knows what happens when they test rockets. I invited him to my home and found him to be a very fine officer. He asked me to help and I asked him if he wanted to be an intelligence officer. He said he wanted to very much. So now he is a candidate for the school. Whether he will be accepted or not, I don't know. I also told him that if he were not accepted in the MDA, I could get him an assignment in the laboratory of the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy. I think that he will probably be accepted by the MDA since his record is good.

98. S: In my discussions with him about what is going on at Kapustin Yar, he told me how often the guided missiles tested were way off their planned course. In the future I will know

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now how to ask him about the vital details which you are interested in. I will surely get him into one academy or the other. He will be my good informant since he has much respect for me and I am doing all these favors for him. I will get all the information out of him on Kapustin Yar. G: What is his full name? S: He is Vladimir -- I think his patronymic is Mikhaylovich, but I am not sure. It is hard to say where he will do us the most good. At the MDA he can't tell me very much except the names of some of his classmates and I can get information on the GRU myself. At the Dzerzhinskiy academy he may be able to tell me of new rocket developments. Anyway, so much for that.

99. G: Let's check the time. It may not be good for you to go home too late. H: Ask him if there were many people on the streeet when he went home last night. The question is going in and out of the hotel. G: You may be conspicuous if you come home late. What is your program for tomorrow? Will you have time for a meeting with us? S: Tomorrow we're going to look at a machine factory, but then we have a program in the evening. G: I better explain our future plans to you. We cannot meet the day after tomorrow since we both will be travelling to Birmingham, but you are going to a different town (Sheffield) on the day after tomorrow before going to Birmingham. Will you have time for a short meeting tomorrow? S: I can meet with you tomorrow during the day. G: At what time? S: Just a minute. Let me figure it out. (Note: Subject studies his schedule.) S: The more often we meet the better since we can work out all kinds of details that need clarification. I want to know your views because that is important for me.

100. G: Plan it to be secure because we don't want you to do anything risky. S: I don't want to take any chances either. Even if you give me the assignment to blow up the Moscow Military District headquarters, I must make plans to move my family and whatever junk I own out of the area because I live so close. We must meet tomorrow before the delegation group returns for the evening schedule. I will come here at exactly 1600 hours. G: Very well, and we will not detain you very long since you must get back in time to have dinner with them. I have a little time now yet. We don't want to keep you very long. You have answered a lot of these questions systematically. Let us just finish the few we have left.

101. G: Now with respect to the rockets R-2, and R-11. Are these rockets already issued to your troops outside of the USSR? S: This I don't know. But I know that it is planned to give all kinds of rockets to satellite countries by the end of

1961. G: How long would you say that these rockets have been issued to troops? S: After their final tests at Kapustin Yar and the last modifications were completed, they went into mass production. I would say that the R-2 first went into mass production three years ago and these have been issued to troops since then. The R-11 is more recent. I would say about two years ago, about the time when KHRUSHCHEV first bragged about them to NIXON. G: This is fine. You have answered the other questions on VARENTSOV earlier.

R2
R11

102. S: I would like to ask you if prior to my departure you will have worked out the role WYNNE will play and the various ways I should make contact at receptions in Moscow? G: All this is now being worked on and we certainly will have a completed plan for you before you leave. S: When will we meet in London again? G: We will have this short meeting tomorrow as planned. The day after tomorrow we will all be travelling in different directions. On Thursday, we will be all in Birmingham. We will stay in a hotel near yours and will give you the details tomorrow and we will set the time for a meeting in Birmingham. On Friday we will all be back in London and we will meet there at the Hotel Mount Royal. J: If case for some reason he can't make it tomorrow, should we not give him the details on Birmingham? H: That's alright. If he misses tomorrow, I can pass him the information on Birmingham through WYNNE.

103. S: Mr. Harold, what is the status of my request to formally meet a government representative? I want to present myself officially. It doesn't have to be a specific lord, and I don't expect to meet the Queen. G: Be assured. This is being taken care of.

104. S: Also, I will need some more money. The fifty pounds you gave me is not sufficient. I haven't spent them yet, but I know I will need more since I have many things that I must purchase. G: Do you need the money right now, or do you need it tomorrow, or do you want to wait until you return to London? S: It can wait until I get to London. I have already noted quite a few items there that my wife asked me to get. I want you to realize that all of these items I plan to purchase are perfectly logical for me to have. In fact, they can be obtained through our commission stores in Moscow, but at a very high price. In my status it is entirely proper and normal for me to have certain things, in fact, on a representational basis it is mandatory. Even when I returned from Turkey I had a large suitcase full of things. Nothing was said at all, and there was no customs check. Now I am returning officially with the Committee and there will be no trouble at all. (Note:

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listed a long itemized group of purchase requests. In [illegible] had a small notebook full of them including outlines of [illegible]sizes of his wife and daughter.) G: Do you plan to buy [illegible]thing here? S: Yes, I can go out with WYNNE. They have [illegible] things here and they are much cheaper. G: How much do you [illegible]ed now? S: Do you have fifty pounds with you? (Note: H. [illegible]assed Subject fifty pounds.) S: Please decide this question regarding WYNNE, and think of the other requests I have made.

105. S: Are you considering my DACHA? G: We are considering all your requests but whether it's purposeful for you to have a DACHA now or not is not so evident. S: I would like to know what value is being placed on the material that I have submitted. Each one should have what one earns. You told me that you have established a monthly salary for me for which I am very grateful. If you had set it at half that figure, I would not have complained. I am not a tradesman, to bargain. Everyone must try to attain something. I am sure that you are in the same situation.

106. S: I am thinking that everyone may have a black day. For example, I was thinking of this when I was ill yesterday. It could even happen that I could have died, and in the future I may perish in some way. In such a case I request that my wife and mother be approached, but in only one way since they have no inkling of what I am doing nor have I established any plans through any border for their defection. Simply say that I have withheld one fact from them. Say that prior to the death of my father, he had set up either a trust fund or left valuables in a foreign bank and since I am no longer among the living this sum of money is available for my wife. At least this way my daughter may have some subsidy until she is grown up. H: We will do this. S: My wife is totally unwitting of what I am doing and she has been brought up under comfortable circumstances as the daughter of a general. However, she knows what deceit and lies exist in our way of life, and she was very much impressed by Western life when she was in Turkey. She filled out this whole notebook with purchase requests.

107. S: By the way, please prepare everything as if I am to leave on the second of May. I have not yet received the authorization for extending our trip so we must play safe. I will know the answer as soon as we return to London. I request a Minox and I want you to plan on possible radio contact. G: We have planned all this and we will have a specialist there who not only will train you in using the Minox but will even check the actual frames that you take. S: To be honest with you, the last time I used a Minox was when I was in Turkey and that was five years ago so I don't feel sure of myself.

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108. S: We must work out plans on how to maintain contact in case WYNNE does not receive a visa to go to Moscow. Then there may be a possibility that I may be dismissed from the Committee. This is not likely, but it must be considered as a possibility. Then, what do we have? We have this good-looking lady with the children walking through the park. We already have agreed on the use of the telephone. G: All this will be prepared and worked out with you in London. We will not wait til the last day, either. S: I hope so much that they extend my leave until the sixth, since it is an advantage to stay longer in London and have more meetings together to work things out. In the meanwhile when WYNNE arrives you can either send anything with him or not, as you see fit -- I mean a message.

109. S: I have already prepared material at home to give to him which includes the details of the whole agent net which I once ran. But I ask you please not to take action against them because it will reflect against me at once, particularly this corporal in Ceylon. G: To hell with him! Don't you realize that we would not risk your security for something that is relatively worthless like that? We will touch no one. S: However, he should be made ineffective. Maybe you could have him transferred to some other place under some legendary pretext, possibly as if there is a threat to his wife or children. G: We are not going to fool with this and invite any risk to you. S: Of course if he fails to appear at a scheduled meeting with our case officers, they may think that something is wrong.

110. S: Write this down, Colonel GRECHKO, with cover as an engineer, is the REZIDENT in Ceylon. He was formerly in the GRU Personnel Directorate and somehow he wormed his way into this job. He is a complete fool. He does not know English. I don't know the name of the second case officer who is there now, but he is the one who replaced ALEKSANDROV, the former case officer. He had been the Second Secretary in Ceylon, but now he is working in the Fourth Directorate in the Direction of Ceylon working group for officers where he is an ordinary officer. If this corporal did not show up as scheduled, or a threat to him were detected, SEROV would demand that the agent's personal file be examined. My name would show up at once as having been a former directing case officer at headquarters. G: Stop worrying. We are not going to get you into trouble. S: You see, I want to help you, and at the same time I am afraid of this. For example, if the whole agent net in India were surfaced, it would alienate our government's relations with NEHRU. But give me a chance to get out of the country before this is done and I will show you how to do it. G: After you are in a secure position abroad, then we may consider doing something and we will do this with your advice.

111. S: I have thought a great deal about our illegal REZIDENTURA which is located in New York. In my opinion, I believe this REZIDENTURA is composed of our GRU illegals. They were brought in there after a STAZHIROVKA in a third country. Judge for yourself and see if I am not right. For example, why do you think SUDIN is now being sent to Turkey as a counsellor? He is being prepared to go now. We have not yet cracked the Turkish nut. Our agent operations there were not effective. He, specifically, is being sent there since he had always worked on illegals operations. (Note: In fact he was a NAPRAVLENIYE chief in the Illegals Directorate.) He is to create a REZIDENTURA there composed of illegals from third countries. I am positive of this. I know that those case officers who followed me to Turkey were not able to accomplish anything.

112. G: How many illegal REZIDENTURAs did you say there were in New York? S: I said only that there was one in New York, that is, an illegal REZIDENTURA, and there is an additional REZIDENTURA which is legal since the case officers therein use the UN positions for cover. G: Do you know the GRU people who are in the UN? S: I can find this out very easily, but I don't know offhand.

113 G: Do you know a Dmitriy POLYAKOV? S: No, but I know a Denis POLYAKOV. He was in the USA twice and he has taken over delegations, just like I am doing now, for the GNTK. He was also the interpreter, but in my case I was afraid that they (the British) might not give me a visa. H: If we hadn't known who he was, he might not have had a visa. S: I realize that you probably had something to do with this since you wanted me to come. Our people at GRU were pleased because they assumed that you did not suspect I was an intelligence officer. Why did you give SHAPOVALOV a visa when you know he is an intelligence officer? H: That is a big question. S: I understand. It is none of my business to know. I don't even want to know. My people at GRU thought that if SHAPOVALOV got through with a visa, maybe I would also.

114 S: Then I could fulfill GRU missions while heading this delegation. Therefore, I request you do all you can to help me fulfill the missions which I explained to you. I will write up an effective report. What I need from you is help in introducing an English acquaintance to the local case officer here in London. All that has to be done is to maintain some contact and possibly your man would pass some sort of material once in a while. The material can be worthless, and it would be good if your man would accept money once in a while. There is no need for the man to accept recruitment. All he has to do is to string the case officer along until such time as I defect. This

is how I visualize it. If necessary the man could be recruited, but he has to work properly. Otherwise it would be traced back to me as my man, and if they smelled provocation, they would put me away so you would never see me again.

115. G: Now, all of the problems you have raised in all operational plans are now being worked on and as soon as we return to London, we will accomplish everything. S: I understand this perfectly. I realize that you have more experience and scientific approaches and better heads than I have, even though I have been in intelligence since 1953 except for a short interlude thanks to being contaminated by RUBENKO. (Getting up to leave) It would be well if you could get WYNNE in contact with me for a couple of months. He doesn't need to be trained or told anything. He can be unwitting, but of course he knows who you are and that I am in contact with you. H: We will take care of all that. S: WYNNE may not be the sharpest man or the wealthiest, but he treats me very well and with respect and I would say that he is a good patriot and an honest man. G: Take your key. S: I wish I could have all of you in Moscow for a month. G: I will take you down out of the hotel and walk you to the corner. (Subject left at 0020 hours on 25 April 1961.)

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Meeting Number 6 (Leeds), 25 April 1961

1. Subject arrived at 1615 hours on 25 April 1961 to the Hotel Metropole in Leeds. Opening Greetings. S: Today representatives from the Ministry of Overseas Trade (Board of Trade) came. They asked what we were going to buy and said that we must buy more -- it was all about buying. What could I tell them? -- "It's terrible." (in English). G: You must be back by 7 o'clock; you can leave here at 6:45. S: I have one request; at the moment we are very well arranged in our hotel -- very compact. I have the funds and it is my job to look after their morale and so forth, but perhaps someone may be checking on what I am doing. I am not at all afraid of this. I say this soberly and definitely. As far as they can guess about anything, I am not a specialist or engineer. As I said, let them try and guess why I am here. This is good because I have been given a task and if they say to me, when I get back, "We were watching you and you were wandering about.." I could say, "Who will fulfill (the allotted task)? I was walking around, studying the environment, taking a good look at everything." That is good. Now I want to ask you to help me. (He explains how he would like rooms to be allotted in the hotel on the return of the delegation to London. The whole delegation is to be on the 5th floor, but not together. His room, as before, was to be on the staircase leading down to the room used for meetings. The "professor" (KAZANTSEV) was also to have his former room. The rest of the delegation were to be on the other side of the 5th floor, together, but all on the same floor.) S: You see this would remove any grounds for members of the delegation to report later about any unusual room assignments. G: Very well, we shall see what we can do.

2. S: I have another small question. WYNNE wants to take his wife with him to Moscow in May. She is absolutely unnecessary. It would be an unnecessary waste of money and she will just interfere. I request that she be left in London. G: Very well.

3. S: With respect to the main military objectives in Moscow which should be destroyed, you can logically ask me why I did not include the rocket Academy since rocket warfare is so vital. I do mean to include it and will describe how this can be done. (The blown-up map of the center of Moscow was shown to Subject. He was asked to mark every main objective on the map.) G: You sketch in the buildings and describe them and I will number them on the map and take notes at the same time in reference to the numbers. (Subject went on to locate on a map the objectives in Moscow, which he suggests should be destroyed with small nuclear sabotage weapons. All these points are marked in red and named on the map accompanying these transcripts.)

D. Read Moscow map.

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4. (Among subjects touched upon during this discussion were the following. See Map and accompanying identification list.)

5. S: The commanders of the Moscow military district, beginning with BUDENNY, were as follows: BUDENNY, TULENEV -- who now works in the General Staff; after him, ARTEMIEV -- who was replaced by a marshal who commanded in the Murmansk area; MERETSKOV -- after MERETSKOV was removed again came in ARTEMIEV. He was commander of the MVO twice. During the war ARTEMIEV was with the NKGB; his forenames are Pavel Artemievich. At the time of BERIA's execution, ARTEMIEV, who was a friend of BERIAs, was in command of the CHEKOON Division (special duties). Then came MOSKALENKO and then KHYLOV came after NEDELIN was killed and MOSKALENKO replaced NEDELIN.

6. S: Opposite the Frunze Street entrance to the General Staff is the department of Foreign Affairs, headed by Major General SOKOLOV -- an intelligence officer, who is both head of the department and a member of the General Staff. When I was studying at the Academy, he was the director of one of the courses -- not of mine, which was headed by Major General KHLEBOV -- now retired but still alive.

7. S: Off ANTIPIEVSKIY PEREULOK is a garage where Colonel AVRAMENKO sits. A large building there is the Hq of the Ground Forces. It has wide curved staircases. He is the head of the motorpool of the HQ of the Second Directorate and is in charge of the operational vehicles used by the Directorate. Recently, KHRUSHCHEV has taken away the big official cars and replaced them by CHAIKAS, which are regarded as more up-to-date and better than the ZISs which they had. However, SEROV, who lost his ZIS, only got a ZIM in return. BATURIN is still a Lt. Col. in the Supply section and is the deputy to Col. CHISTOV, who is the chief. He issued me civilian clothing, 2 suits and an overcoat. We get new issues every five years. Those who are sent abroad are issued civilian clothing but since I work with foreigners in Moscow, I was also entitled to civilian clothing issue. SHELIGANOV is in charge of the 1st OTDEL which is Radio Intelligence and your friend RYABOV, is also there in charge of radio agent training and radio development.

8. (Discussing the headquarters of GAU commanded by Colonel General ZHDANOV) S: There are discussions on the transfer of VAHENTSOV's outfit (KHOZYAISTVO) -- uniting it with GAU. In general, VAHENTSOV has wanted for a long time to have the commander of GAU completely under his subordination. As I reported to you, the commander of GAU at present works for both VARENTSOV and MOSKALENKO. G: What is VAHENTSOV's title? Is he a marshal?

S: No, he is a Marshal of Artillery (Marshal of the Soviet Union is quite different, of course). (Comment: Marshal VARENTSOV was promoted to Chief MARSHALL of ARTILLERY in May 1961 according to announcement in PRAVDA.) He commands the Rocket Forces of the Ground Forces. (KOMANDUYUShChIY RAKETNYMI VOYSKAMI SUKhOPUTNYKh VOYSK) That is his function. Previously he was Commander of the Artillery of the Land Forces, which comprised both conventional artillery and the rocket units. It was notlong ago - in fact about 3 months - that he received this new title. Although he has been waiting a long time - (He says, "I have earned it" - We know that he has earned it) - they do not give him the rank of Chief Marshal of Artillery.

9. G: And what about MOSKALENKO? S: He is Commander of the Rocket Forces of the land -- everything -- all the strategic rockets with atomic, hydrogen weapons. He commands all this destructive power -- the aviation and fleet are also included. The Black Sea fleet is also divided in its subordination. G: So VARENTSOV is subordinate to the overall commander of ground forces? S: Yes. GRECHKO used to command the ground forces. Now he is a minister. VARENTSOV got on badly with GRECHKO and still does; GRECHKO is not intelligent; he was young for command -- he is the youngest of them all.

10. S: The intelligent marshal ending in ...SKIY, who commanded the Polish Army-ROKOSSOVSKIY, has gone too, for health reasons. (I think I reported this). But I tell you openly it was not for health reasons that KONEV, TIMOShENKO or ROKOSSOVSKIY have gone but because of their disagreement with new military doctrines which KHRUSHCHEV is propounding and forcing on the other marshals.

11. S: They are cowards -- those who agree with KHRUSHCHEV and say "Yes - you are right, Nikolai Sergeich." This "rocketization" -- true, it is a threat, in its own right and -- he could shower you with rockets -- very easily but nevertheless war is decided by the united effort of all military forces and categories. This is a firmly established military war; offensive operations, occupation and then mopping up, etc. What are rockets by themselves? You could smash up almost everything -- then what?

12. G: The officer commanding GAU now is Marshal ZHDANOV? S: Not a Marshal -- Colonel General. He dreams of being a marshal, but they have not promoted him just yet. Earlier, the former commander was Marshal of Artillery YaKOVLEV, whom STALIN jailed because he said that there was no

adequate anti-aircraft armament...Actually they did have AA artillery, but the recoil springs would constantly break and the barrels would overheat. Now they've covered the barrel with a water jacket to cool the barrel. This VARENTSOV told me. G: What is the relation between GAU and VARENTSOV? S: GAU works for both VARENTSOV and MOSKALENKO. GAU comes under the Minister of Defense. But VARENTSOV wants to subordinate it to himself. In that case, they say that it will be necessary to set up an independent GAU for MOSKALENKO. It is necessary to set up technical supply departments including one for electronic equipment. ZHDANOV already has a directorate dealing with electronics and one for explosives -- for all the complexes of which the artillery components consists -- all the seperate parts. The factories producing this are all civilian, not military, but they are subordinate to ZHDANOV since they work for ZHDANOV. The factories in the Urals which produce tanks are under the command of the tank forces, Marshal ROTMISTROV. They deliver when they receive orders -- say for 200 tanks.

(13) S: He (ZHDANOV) is a Colonel General, an ill man. Not long ago he was ill with cancer. After having recovered, he resumed working. VARENTSOV was glad. ZHDANOV gets on badly with VARENTSOV. ZHDANOV used to cater to MEDELIN -- to the higher command -- and he wants to produce armaments for VARENTSOV according to plan only to deliver them and that is all. There is a struggle. Each commander realises that he needs as much technical equipment as possible and that there is no money forthcoming for this. So they swear at each other and the matter goes to the highest military council headed by the Commander In Chief, Nikita Sergeich.

(14) S: MIKOYAN was there and VARENTSOV told me how the meeting went. He said "Oleg, not a word about this". I'll tell you one interesting detail. At the last meeting which took place after the convocation of the plenum of the PRESIDIUM they talked about everyone's troubles with agriculture. After this, KHRUSHCHEV traveled all over the country dealing with his opponents at the conference in accordance with the decisions of the Plenum. He arrived in Tbilisi, you remember, and then went to the East, to the virgin lands -- talking about the great new territories and towns. All that time the military council were working on their plan -- SUSLOV and MIKOYAN participated. The Ministers made reports. KIRICHOV made his reporting on the questions of how they need more money and how rockets must be tested. There were numerous cases where the missions were not fulfilled; much new testing was necessary, and the problems must be looked into. VARENTSOV said, "Do you know that there was no one there who would support this! STALIN would just have banged on the table and that would have been that." You ought to give me small recorder

so that I can tape what Sergey Sergeich tells me. You should think about this. We have such a small machine; it works on wire, not tape. I can talk to him at the DACHA or anywhere -- ask questions of him. He talks to me about all sorts of things - about sessions, conferences.

15. S: When the heads of the Central Committees of the satellite countries came to Moscow with their Commanders in Chief, for instance -- after the political talks -- people left -- the Commanders stayed on and conducted military exercises. There were offensive and defensive problems and we always won. They ran extensive exercises using many brigades. There were calculations using TNT equivalents (atomic) against targets which are known to us. In fact, the game was not abstract. It went on a long time. The commanders stayed for about a week in Moscow. Details were not published. What was in the papers was the arrival of the Secretary of some Party or of such and such a member of a government, for example, ZHIVKO and his commander, Georgiy DESH.

16. (Subject went on to discuss the map of Moscow further.) G: (Discussing Naval Forces HQ). S: Speaking of the Navy -- it is a good thing that you prompted me. I have remembered the Captain 1st rank with whom I was on holiday 2 years ago in SUKHUMI. I have his address in my notebook. He told me that the dock where the submarines assemble is north of Leningrad. I'll give you his address. He was with his wife, and so was I. We got to know each other. We lived in the House of Rest -- the former naval sanitarium. There is a central sanitarium in SUKHUMI, but this is a separate building in the town by the railway station.

17. S: Well then, I will measure every objective by pacing it and I promise to do this by the time WYNNE arrives. I consider this my first task. I'll give you not only the list of Soviet agents which I have but also the First Secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow. I do not remember his name; he is already recruited and is working in Moscow. Incidentally, many diplomats from these countries have been recruited -- "the black skinned countries" as they are called. How did I discover this? I agree that our Counterintelligence works well and strongly against the representatives of America andEngland, but nevertheless there are weak spots and one can deceive them.

18.S:One must work carefully. Yesterday I did not finish answering one of your questions. How did I come to work with the English delegation? Well, after they sent for me on 5 January, I hung around for 2 months in the

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reserves. I did nothing but live and wait. I told myself, "Oleg, anticipation of pleasure is also pleasure!" Well, this is the pleasure I was waiting for. So on 29 February -- it was leap year -- an order came out that they had nevertheless decided to put me in a senior position on the operational directorate and they gave me India, Ceylon and Pakistan. I began to work in this Direction in the 4th Directorate. They put me in charge of military study training, since I had commanded a regiment. There were few others who had and I had been at the Frunze Academy. So in the 4th Directorate, I was always in charge of military training (Commander's Days). I conducted seminars and ran examinations on new field service regulations.

19. S: Then one day ZASORIN summoned me with other senior officers and said, "General ZOTOV is going to give you a lecture on operational training -- on communication with agents, theories, ideas, and new practices. Give (Subject's name) a notebook and he can make notes". I was given a notebook by a Lt. Col. of tank forces, a Hero of the Soviet Union who has just gone to Iran as assistant military attache. I will remember his name in a moment. He was working on Iran. We took notes on the lecture from actual cases. In lectures like this, they do not mention agents by name, but only general cases, without connecting them with a town. Although one knows which country they are talking about. Nor do they mention the operational personnel connected with the case. They mention the essential facts only as an illustration. I leafed through the notebook and found a letter written out for a typist -- some times we give a typist a letter to type, say to the KUB, and tell her "Leave out the mention of Mr. Richardson". So we put a line for Richardson. The typist writes out the remainder of the letter and sends it out as SECRET. Richardson's name goes by another non-operational channel so that he is not associated with the AGENTURA. A typewritten statement on agent operations mentioned "the 1st secretary of the Afghan Embassy in the USSR, etc.". A name which I do not remember had been written lighter in pencil -- it was abbreviated. I could not make it out. In other words, the 1st secretary on the diplomatic list is a paid Soviet spy, carrying out orders.

20. S: In addition, the 1st or 2nd secretary of the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow, about six years ago, was a Soviet agent -- that is what I heard. This man in the Afghan Embassy you can spot at once from the Diplomatic List. He is the 1st Secretary. G: And the Austrian Ambassador -- BISCHOF -- is he an agent of yours? S: I've heard his name -- he's in Moscow now. G: Yes,

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he's been there about 10 years as far as I can remember. S: I remember the name but I do not know if he is an agent. Anyway, in the notebook which came into my hands, the last page, which was to be typed, had this information on it.

21. S: Now with respect to the agent net (India, Ceylon, Pakistan) I'll give you everything. It's all typed out. Everything is there and clear, with initials and how long each agent has been working.

22. S: One Turk, ACHMED, had a Kurdish father whose mother was Turkish. He conceals the fact that his father was a Kurd and pretends that he is a pure Turk. He was a representative of the Turkish MID (Ministry of External Affairs) in Afghanistan and our people there recruited him. Judging from the information which he produced, he didn't give us much of value and he is not of great significance as an agent. Then he was moved from Afghanistan to Turkey and he is now in either Syria or Egypt. I've got it written down. He is used a lot by the Turkish MID for work in one country or another. Wherever he is he has contact with our people. They know who he is and wherever he goes and he works for Soviet intelligence.

23. S: Now then, once again I am worried -- the most dangerous place for us is in Ceylon. It's a pity that such a [redacted] exists there. How can things be arranged so that he is not alarmed? He has children. G: He will be left alone until you are in a safe place.

Map
Def Min
DMs

24. G: Give me the map. I have one small question. Where are the First and Third Directorates of the Ministry of Defense? The first is the most important because it is operations. S: You must not talk of the Ministry of Defense like that. There's no such thing as a First Directorate. The Ministry of Defense has main Directorates (GLAVNIE). There is a main Medical Directorate which is under the Minister and not under the General Staff, and a main Directorate of Services (TYL) also under the Minister, but there is no 1st Directorate in the Ministry. The First Directorate of the General Staff is the Operational Directorate. The Minister has a number of chief Directorates under him -- what has he? In the General Staff, there is a First Directorate. G: Then the First Directorate of the General Staff is there next door to you? S: Yes, we are all in the same "box" -- different buildings connected by entrances and walls.

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25. (General discussion of map) S: The General Staff is concentrated here -- with everything in the same complex but separate -- the Supply Directorate, Medical Services, etc. All these are subordinate to the

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General Staff. However, everything is not planned down to the last detail. The Main Medical Directorate plans how many hospitals would be needed in the event of war -- first, second or third categories -- and how many schools according to the organizational-mobilization plan would be turned into hospitals. Accordingly, I would say that the Organizational-Mobilization Chief Directorate is the heart of plans for every arm of service -- manpower, supplies, etc.

26. J: Will you trace the route you take going to work from your home? S: One interesting detail -- for some reason, after I had made contact with your students, English and American cars very often drove up and down Gorkiy Embankment. Perhaps this was not connected with me because they could not find out my address. My address -- which I gave you -- can only be obtained officially when I go abroad. My address -- if taken out of the passport list (PASPORT MOYEI PIS'MO) -- they would say, "He used to live here, but I don't know where he's gone to now". All this goes into a card index. A KGB colonel is in charge of the process. This is "PASPORTNYATsKYa".

27. S: I often saw high quality cars with the letter "D" going in front of my house and around the area. I enjoyed it. I thought to myself "Soon we shall be seeing each other." J: What were the numbers of these cars? S: I don't know. I didn't write them down. They went very quickly. I knew the cars and maybe they wanted to say "wait". But that is by the way. (Subject describes his daily route from house to work) S: Here is OSIPENKO Street. Here is a large 8 story gray building at the end of the alley I take, which belongs to the Ministry of the River Fleet and where the Minister SHASHKOV lives.

28. S: This is where I walked with our friends. From the power station -- opposite the academy where the FLAKhIN factory is. This alley -- here is the main entrance. We went in here and I went on ahead because the courtyard is illuminated. Here stood a woman and a policeman and here I turned around and, even though I am an intelligence officer, I didn't say farewell properly. J: And then you said, "So long?" S: No, I said, "Let's go". When we shook hands after we got there, the tall one with an umbrella said, "We will hand everything over". Then he asked me, "Are you a Party member?" He found it strange that I was suddenly very friendly. I said, "I used to be". There was no point in explaining and I wanted to reassure him. He said, "We will do something". I thought to myself

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"I embrace you mentally". The tall one with the Castro beard said "I will help you; I will do something". I wanted to part from them warmly but I had to go on past the watcher -- to part from them on the GRANITNIY Bridge was difficult. I wanted to say to them "Gentlemen, when you have handed over the material come here with a fountain pen and make an ink mark on the granite as a mark for me." I also wanted to tell them to watch for me in OSIPENKO Street while going to the BALCHUK Hotel, but there was such confusion. It all happened as I have told you. They went off very fast. I watched them go from this side and went after them wondering, "Will they throw my papers away?". I saw two militiamen and they must have seen them. They certainly saw one. Having looked around, one of the students put my letter in his mackintosh pocket. I said, "Control, please, 2 envelopes". (In English). They were good boys. After that, I walked along this embankment and went home. I dragged out the first meeting with them too long. I admit that this was unprofessional of me but; anyway all's well that ends well. (Description of his way to work and of route to dead drop and signal point. In the course of this, Subject mentions that he had thought it might be possible to arrange a meeting in BRYuSSOVSKIY PEREULOK between 9 and 10 PM. The cover story for a diplomat would be connected with the church there, which is in use. An alternative suggestion was the BOGOYaVLENIYE Cathedral in BAUMANSKIY Region near the BAUMANSKIY metro station.)

Pilot story (Riga)

29. S: Now about Riga, the headquarters there -- the Riga Military OKRUG -- a large headquarters -- and about the Baltic Region in general. The Baltic peoples live and wait for liberation. The mood there is bad, but good for us. I would, of course, be sorry if it were necessary to bomb or to annihilate the 3 Baltic Republics. This is a matter for great strategists but this is my point of view. However, the Riga headquarters -- to what is it connected -- perhaps sometime you will send me on a mission to Riga and from Riga perhaps I can come to you -- or perhaps from some other port. Anyhow, all I want to say is that is is not necessary to annihilate the Baltic peoples. That is my own opinion. (In English).

30. S: How did I get into the Committee and how did I come to England? Well, on 29 February, I received my orders to be a senior officer. I accepted the assignment, began to work, and conducted the officer military training program. My work was praised at the Party meetings. I write telegrams and work with agents. Then a reduction in staff personnel began. On the average, they removed the old men; the invalids; those who were unsuitable or politically unreliable. What supported me? I had been aggravated for a long time because of my father -- many knew about him.

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My great uncle -- they know about him -- a lieutenant general commanding a Military District. He benefited from the confidence they had in me -- which he needed too to retain his own position. I am married to the daughter of a distinguished political worker, GAPONOVICh, who must therefore have trusted me. I took part three times in the war. I've been a member of the Party for 21 years. I have no Party reprimands. I've twice commanded a regiment and did not surrender my regiment to HITLER. I did not desert and I fought. They wanted to pin me down and were not able to because I could have rebelled against them. They were afraid to take everything into account. Nevertheless, I saw that they were purging people all the time but they left me for about 3 months after that.

31. S: Then I went to the MDA but not as head of a course as promised, but as a senior instructor. As head, my earnings would have been high, as you well know. G: How much? S: Then, it was about 5,000 rubles; now it is 500. And it is a general's position -- I have the experience for such work. I commanded a course at one time and a regiment; it's within my character and ability. I began at first by working in the Mandate Commission and finally began to run the class.

(32) G: So that's where you got your information! S: Of course. At the beginning we selected the class. We processed 150 and took 60. Some were rejected for health reasons because the Special Medical Commission imposes very strict conditions for the MDA. Even though they had been passed by their Military Districts, some tens of people were rejected by us. Either chronic gastritis -- that's no good; or eye-sight defects -- 05 or 06. They do not reveal these requirements to the Military Districts, but they reject them on the spot if there is a precedent for turning down a man and sending him back to his unit. Well, 150 were processed and there were 6 withdrawals. I talked to about 50 of them and assessed each one, clever, well-read, a fool, energetic, experienced, etc. I chatted with them; we discussed everything. Then I wrote reports on them. They are assessed and they take an examination. One can obtain a "2" for foreign languages but if one has a knack and the ability to master the sounds of foreign languages they make a separate entry "has a great facility for foreign languages and in spite of the fact that he now has a 2, he will eventually get a 4 or 5 according to his ability". This is seen by the head of the faculty (KAFEDRA) and the language teacher.

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33. S: Incidentally, teachers are very highly paid. At present, a senior civilian teacher gets 3,500 rubles -- a very high sum. This is if he prepares students in languages for intelligence. (SPETsPODGOTOVKA) You remember General LISITSIN who was head of the department dealing with intelligence training? He has been retired now. G: Really. He was an authority. S: Very much so.

34. G: (interrupts) VARTANYaN. S: A lieutenant general. G: Is he still there? S: No, now he is in command of our GRU Institute (technical) near Moscow. G: I thought that was FILIAKh. S: No. At FILIAKh we now have the Operational Archives in the GRU. A colonel is the chief and they also have courses there. Well, VARTANYaN is not there. I know him very well. He was deputy head of the Academy. I know LISITSIN well too.

35. G: Is he a colonel or a general? S: A colonel -- he is an instructor there.

36. S: Well, we took these 60; told them they had passed and sent them on leave. This was 1 September. I felt at ease mentally. My friends came to see me -- GUS'KOV, who was in Turkey, your illegal; SHCHERBAKOV, the lieutenant colonel, the thin one. He asked me" Oleg VLADIMIROVICh, how am I to go out? Should I wear uniform or civilian clothes?" I had a special consultation. They gave him a room in which to change from civilian clothes so that he would not be different from the students -- when he needs to go into a service establishment. Of course, we have days when the whole class of the academy changes into civilian clothes; when they go into the town to clear dead drops, carry out meetings, make recognition contacts, etc. Each student has civilian equipment; a suit, a coat, shoes, etc. -- a civilian outfit. Otherwise, they wear uniform. I took to the work wholeheartedly I love to command; it's not a bad business. KHLOPOV -- your relative -- said "good-bye" to me and said, "Oleg Vladimirovich, you suit me. We will work together". The heads of the courses were all colonels (3 courses) -- the former Military Attache to Yugoslavia, a Colonel; the Military Attache from Afghanistan, Colonel TsAYEV; and (Subject's name). G: And KHLOPOV? S: Head of the Academy - Lieutenant General -- I can't remember his name. Don't swear at me for that. I will feelduty bound to find out for you. I know him very well. I know when his wife died. That was in 1955. I know that he was then married to another woman but that the marriage was not registered. He lives opposite the U.S. Embassy.

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37. S: KhLOPOV said to me "Go on leave". So I took my wife and daughter and went to Odessa. Returning from Odessa, I met your people. When I got back with the heads of the courses, we went to the house near SOKOL (the MBA). Well, I was all set to get down to some work. The higher category ranks me above senior officer and the salary is more -- this is because of its duty status. Of course, I had already made up my mind. The material on the rockets was already in my pocket, or rather in a hiding place. They told me that they decided to make me a senior instructor in tactics. I said, "No, I will not work as an instructor. What is this about?" They said, "With your training, with your experience, and with your education on the technical course, you would be very well qualified for a job as an instructor." I said, "When I am 60 or 60 years old, I will work as an instructor. Now if I had given you my agreement prior to my leave or if there had been any questions, everything would have been settled." But they -- without me -- they wrote an order appointing me as an instructor. I had the order number and everything, but I did not go. Major General SALODOVNIKOV -- he is at present head of the faculty of tactics -- met me on the street near the barracks and said, "Why have you not come to me?" I said that he had not talked to me and said straight out, "I will not work for you."

38. S: I was sent to SHUSKIY. He said, "What's all this about?" and he sent me to SMOLIKOV. SMOLIKOV likes to drink and he always has women about. He is friendly with another General who was a former director of a hospital -- who also had women around. They kicked him out for that. He has all sorts of furniture in his flat -- several pictures and a refrigerator. The refrigerator was given to him by SHTEMENKO. You should hear more of these things - what a spider's nest that is. It shows how everyone is caught up in this sort of thing. A high moral standard is demanded of everyone. People are persecuted, beaten, thrown out of the Party -- but this is how the SVOLOCHI themselves carry on. This crook was given a refrigerator by SHTEMENKO when they were playing cards in the General Staff. SHTEMENKO said, "I'll give you this refrigerator". The other thought that he would have to pay something for it, but there was no need. It was forgotten. KRUCHIVSKIY is a friend of SMOLIKOV. They share women and there is a flat. G: What does KRUCHIVSKIY do? S: He is the head of a course for medical nurses not far from the Committee. He receives three thousand rubles and a thousand rubles for each course, and he hides what he gets from the courses and drinks it up with girls. He lives on a Pension. He has a flat on Gorkiy Street, near the ByeloRussian Station. SMOLIKOV said to me, "How long have you served?" My knees were knocking. I said, "In 1962, it will be 25 years".

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Then came the question of my father and of the supplement. (Subject's statement about his father). He told me that was the reason I was not sent abroad but he still kept me. Now the Central Committee of the CPSU has a character sketch of me and the proposal for the trip to England put up by the Committee, as if I were a demobilized Colonel. And in addition, the GRU, the military section, informed the Committee of my good candidature and of my characteristics - there is nothing against me except my father. But of course this hinderedthem (GRU) from letting me get ahead. "It is awkward"... he told me "How could a man with such a past be an instructor of 60 future Intelligence Officers. It may mean nothing to me but the Central Committee is interested and checks on it. It is impossible to confirm you". When I was in Odessa -- in Kiev -- on leave, they changed my assignment to an instructor -- that would be acceptable. I would give lectures and instructions in methods of work. That is something, you know, for a man who is inactive in the sense of administrative obligations to superiors and to the Party. Perhaps they considered that they were showing me trust in that I was working as an instructor, but I refused categorically to work with them. It is no life, you understand. I decided to defect. Three times to risk one's life; to be in the Party for 21 years -- I don't know what I have not done for the country. Well, they put me back in the Reserve again and I began to look for operational work - "Give me some work in Pakistan or India". I showed them I could manage this. "We can't do it". In other words, they did not wantto have on the operational staff anyone with the slightest thing against him.

39. S: I went to see Colonel ROGOV - he is the head of this section of 58. A sort of large reserve, but an active reserve. The people there work and do small jobs and are taken out and sent off on missions. He went off and consulted SMOLIKOV who gave his agreement, otherwise, I would have to resign. I would not work on what they suggested. I would not go to Information. I don't like writing; I have neither the ability nor the desire.

40. S: And on the 15th of November -- I have the order at home -- I was appointed as an expert to the Department of Foreign Affairs - the (GKNIR) ✓ Committee, ~~the GKNIR~~. I joined the Canadian Section only. Within a month they added Australia. That is to say, I dealt with both Canada and Australia.

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41. S: And now write this down. You must check this although you love and honor me as I do you. One BERDENNIKOV went to America with a delegation of railway men in December 1960. He actually left on November 25, and took ten days traveling by sea. He left as I arrived. We have one large room - the English, and the American Sections. On the American desk is POLYaKOV - Denis Nikolaevich - one of our people with whom I studied in the MIM and we graduated together in 1953. He is married and was in India as a First Secretary. Prior to that he graduated from the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. He is an Artillery Lieutenant Colonel. He finished the Command faculty (KOMANDNIY Fakultet).

42. S: The Dzerzhinskiy Academy was split up, as I told you, 6 years ago. I arrived - there was a group of 5 of us from Strategic Intelligence - five out of the 58 in the GRUK. There are others in other Ministries which have departments of Foreign Affairs -- the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Transport, etc. I, POLYaKOV, ANDRIANOV - he was in Austria and must be in your card index. Viktor Nikolaevich, a Lieutenant Colonel, a Tank Engineer, who finished at the Stalin Academy (This is the Academy next to the Lefortovo Hospital where the head is KRUGHIVSKIY whom I told you about.) ...

43. G: Which of your Directorates is he from? S: He came from the Austrian Section. He knows German. Then there is FOMAKOVSKIY, who is now in Italy. Vadim Vadimovich. I came to England at the same time as he went to Italy with a delegation. He is a Captain Third Rank. G: Is he in Italy now? S: Yes. Or he may have just now gone back.

44. G: And BERDENNIKOV? S: He is an old worker of the Committee; the head of the English Section. POLYaKOV is head of the American Section; he has worked there for three years. Before that he was in Delhi. His wife, who is a beautiful woman, went to live with our trade representative in Delhi. As soon as they heard of this they withdrew POLYaKOV and his wife from Delhi within 24 hours and he landed up in the Committee -- three years ago. BERDENNIKOV went to America with a delegation of railway men at the end of November. He went for twenty days. He arrived in December.

45. S: His assistant stayed behind -- he is Igor MILOVIDOV, who is in your photographs. He went straight to the Committee when he got back from England. They said to me "(Subject's own name), WYNNE's delegation is coming".

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WYNNE had already been before, but he had not been to the Committee. I read reports and conversations about him by BERDENNIKOV and ALTUKhOV - WYNNE knows him, he is an engineer in the office. G: Is he one of yours? S: No. He is in the GNIK of the RFSSR. We have a Committee in each Republic. They said to me, "You will work with this delegation". I let all the Canadian business drop because I had to prepare all the lectures and to get together a panel of experts for each lecture -- engineers of this and that -- and send telephone messages, to summon specialists and others to attend the lectures of the English specialists. KILESOV, from Alma Ata, was there when Richards gave his lecture.

(46) S: I met WYNNE at Sheremetevo. I worked very well with the English delegation. All the lectures were organized, receptions. The specialists gave nothing but good written reports and the delegation was also pleased as you know. G: Was SHEREMETEV there? You mentioned him. S: I never mentioned SHEREMETEV - FORMAKOVSKIY, BERDENNIKOV and Igor MILOVIDOV who was in England. G: Is he on the English desk? S: Yes. And so is BERDENNIKOV who came along and said, "It's very good that (Subject's own name) has helped us". The deputy was swamped. From England there are very many delegations. Not so many come from you as go from us. I was brought in to help because BERDENNIKOV was not there. I worked from beginning to end with WYNNE's delegation and then took them out to the Airport.

(47) S: When we were there, on the 16th of December, I had the idea of suddenly handing over my materials to [redacted] in the aircraft and saying, "Here you are". It could have been done somewhere - in the toilet for instance - but he would just have repeated once again, "My business is cement". (In English)

48. G: Is MILOVIDOV one of your Intelligence officers? S: No. He was a straightforward worker who was coopted by the "neighbors" (KGB). He is not an Intelligence Officer and he is not ours. We wanted to take him on but .. there was already a case for his cooption. G: ANDRIYANOV, I know is one of yours. S: May I finish?

49. G: I should just like to recapitulate. FORMAKOVSKIY is yours too. S: Yes. Then POLYaKOV and (Subject's own name). G: You said that there were 5 people. S: Yes. There is a Captain... G: Not BERDENNIKOV then?

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S: No. He was coopted by the "neighbors". They have two categories -- those who work against foreigners and who watch us while we are abroad, and the local internal "domestic" (English) lot who look out for counter-revolutionaries, if there are such people, for a Fifth Column.

50. S: The Captain... G: ALTUKHOV? S: No. He is in the GNIK of the RSFSR, in a different building altogether. G: Not an Intelligence officer? S: No, I don't think so. He was invited by BERDENNIKOV, when WYNNE came, to draw up a program showing how many specialists there are in the Federation, and so forth. We coordinate.

51. G: But there is another one. S: Yes, the Captain ... was trained to work as an illegal in Spain. He was ready to go. He knows Spanish "exactly". He was on temporary duty in Spain for a short time with our specialists. I cannot understand how the Spanish let him in. Then I heard he came to the GNIK. Not long ago he was summoned and they said, "You are not suitable for Intelligence work". Now he has gone to the Institute of Foreign Languages. He has an excellent knowledge of Spanish. He did not go to the Academy. He was almost completely ready to go as an illegal to Spain. Captain... I will give you his name in a moment, I did not know him when I arrived. He finished the Academy after me and went straight to BEKRENEV for his training for Spain. Something was wrong - his parents or his relativer - which stopped him from going.

52. S: There is a certain FEDOROV in Turkey who finished at the Academy a year after me and who went to the KGB. He worked for a long time as a Second Secretary, then as a First Secretary in Turkey. His name is FEDOROV, Vadim.

53. G: Have you heard of KOSTYA SHESTAKOV? S: Yes, of course. But I did not know he was called KONSTANTIN. G: Where is he now? What is he doing? Do you know? S: No, but I know the name. G: Is he still an illegal? S: I don't know. I know him as an Intelligence Officer. I am still trying to think of the Captain's name; it is very important. G: It is not a question of your accuracy...I would very much prefer to have you give 5 rather than 4½.

54. S: Well, I accompanied WYNNE's delegation and thus the delegation knew me as a member of the Department of Foreign Relations. We were on close

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terms and drove about together, showed each other photographs..We got invitations from firms and began to get ready a delegation ourselves, which was limited at first to one body and then expanded to include theoreticians and so on. Well, that's how I came to work in England, in short.

55. S: This morning I remembered the surname of VARENTSOV's son-in-law, which I could not recall yesterday. He is called Leonid GONCHAROV; I don't remember his patronymic. He is a Captain who is finishing the Command Academy in Leningrad. After he leaves there he very much wants to go to the GDR (East Germany). G: But he was there earlier? S: Yes, he was there before the Academy. He came from Germany and married Yerlenn, had twins, and was sent to Leningrad to study. And he was acquainted with Yerlena when he studied the Tenth Class in Lvov. He is the nephew of Major General KUPIN. G: Was he ever an Intelligence officer? S: No, a Lieutenant. He was never in Intelligence.

56. G: Do you know another GONCHAROV? S: No, I know a Colonel. G: Is that a slip of the tongue? S: No, that is right. I made a mistake earlier. So it is GONCHAROV. I'll remember the name of the Captain and tell you later. I am just sorting out my thoughts.

57. S: One thing which I want to say quite simply -- as one who considers himself already your worker, your Intelligence officer -- I would like to express a few political thoughts. This is all connected with our work. I do not understand why now, so long after World War II, the Soviet Army has not once had to shed blood as HITLER so rightly did in his time through Finland. It would be difficult for the Soviet Army in the Far East. S: I am one of those who believe that from time to time there should be local wars which do not involve our own powerful leading countries. It is necessary to do something to wrench Finland away from the relationship she has with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to bleed them, to suck the Soviet Union dry of materials, using the morale factor, which as you know is unfavorable for them -- such local wars where atomic weapons are not used, only classical artillery and close combat weapons. Then you will see for yourselves the morale level of the soldiers and officers. The war should last 3 or 4 months somewhere, like the one there was in the Far East in the last decade. Blood must be spilt. Somehow the USSR must be weakened materially. It is good that KHRUSHCHEV sticks his neck out. Let him help CASTRO more. Right now CASTRO has almost used up his supplies. Let him give more -- a lot more. Of course, I would not have permitted him to deliver these arms but I am not the President. I am subordinated to the President -- but I am an Intelligence Officer and I have a little experience.

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58. S: You must excuse me for passing judgement on such large questions but I feel myself to be free. I am in the Free World. It is necessary somehow to drain the energy and to divert the great material and living strength of the Soviet Union -- not to bring about a great world conflict. I wrote all this down once and I am repeating it. I think it is necessary to have meetings, secretly conducted -- not Summit meetings, which KHRUSHCHEV welcomes. He will use the decisions reached at Summit meetings to increase his own prestige vis-a-vis the U.S. and England. And he uses them to his own advantage. This you understand very well. It is necessary to call together all the leaders of the Free World and to arrange first their coordination; secondly, their unity; and thirdly, the material sacrifices which they must make in the name of common victory.

59. S: If this is not done, there will be a great disaster. KHRUSHCHEV and the General Staff can leave you behind. He is throwing together these rockets and he can do terrible damage with them. But in my estimation and according to powerful people in the leadership, he will need two or three more years. But not longer, gentlemen, not longer, believe me.

60. S: Well, we will meet in Birmingham at the Midland Hotel at 2100 hours, the day after tomorrow. G: Very well. S: How about showing me some more photographs. G: We are getting more ready for you. S: Maybe I should call WYNNE and tell him I will not come. G: You had better not, since this may direct suspicion. This is dangerous. S: I have another 15 minutes or so.

61. S: Well, I have mentioned the First Secretary of the Afghan Embassy. He is an active agent, paid and everything.

62. S: Now, gentlemen, one thing which I wanted to tell you about. You know it but I want to confirm it. Not long ago SUDIN gave us a lecture. G: The same SUDIN? S: The same -- your friend -- about illegals. The Central Committee of the Praesidium passed a resolution pointing out the shortcomings and frequent mishaps of Soviet Strategic Intelligence -- both of the military (GRU) and of the neighbors (KGB) -- of the neighbors, more than the military. G: Excuse me, to whom did he give this lecture? S: To everyone -- the operational people -- not "Information" (English). Every Thursday, I go to Commander's training. G: Who took part? The second, third and fourth Directorates? S: No. According to each Directorate ... our group took part with the Fourth Directorate. Our group is attached sometimes to one Directorate, sometimes to another.

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63. S: The lectures are of a general character and are on the sequence of training of an intelligence officer (illegal) -- entry to, and exit from a country for preparatory training (STAZhIROVKA) as phases or periods of training in a third country. What is it composed of, this preliminary work in the Soviet Union? His dispatch to a third country for preparatory training -- the language, legalization with a passport, documentation, final polishing and everything. His training ends with his dispatch to the country to which he is assigned. The lectures are top secret, with concrete examples and theory -- but theory taken from life -- depersonalized theory. He (SUDIN) gave this last lecture. He worked on it and prepared it while he was working for BREZHNEV.

64. S: What I want to say to you now? It is very necessary to sharpen the weapons of the experienced, esteemed, long-established British Intelligence Service and of the young, militant, comparatively young American Service "compared with the English" (in English) and, in general, the intelligence services of the whole world. Everything that can be done must be worked out separately to neutralize the illegals which the Soviet Union is planting; to uncover them and destroy them. This is "the main idea of our future" (in English). G: Yes, we agree completely. S: For this, we are stealing from you. We buy up clean documents and all forms .. for instance, materials for passports, for legalization to settle into organized work.

65. S: That is one question I want to put to you. I know that in England forgery of money is a capital offense. That, as they told us in a lecture, a pound note has in it a metal wire which acts as an indicator to pick out a forged from a genuine pound note. Why can't such a device be used so that when passports are periodically controlled it can be determined whether the passport is also genuine, and whether it has been registered? Why, when you use a large number of people on registration of the population, do you not check the genuineness of passports. (Note: Two days before this meeting, on Sunday, 23 April, there had been a 10-year national census in the United Kingdom). This one job should not be done alone; it should be linked with government work on a national scale with our questions. The regime should impose a CE check. We cannot go wrong -- which is a genuine and which is a false passport. As a rule, passports for illegals are not issued by you but by Soviet Intelligence using all its experience in legalization. Surely, such clever, experienced people under conditions and before the face of the greatest danger, cannot allow Soviet intelligence to rely on illegals -- illegals which are sown throughout countries of interest; illegals who are perhaps recruited nationals of this country or another. It is very difficult to unmask the people who were born, say, in England and who were then sent to set up in an illegal REZIDENTURA.

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66. S: This is very difficult, but SUDIN is going to Turkey to take Soviet illegals and nationals of certain other countries and to set up or organize an illegal REZIDENTURA. It also seems that this Soviet REZIDENTURA in New York consists of Soviet intelligence officers who were filtered in from various countries -- merchants, firms, etc. -- that is what I think but I don't know exactly. SUDIN is going to the base where I was (I'm thinking of an intelligence base rather than a military one). Without any Turkish intelligence agents -- there was only FShIVIY about whom I told you, a little lieutenant who was in touch with me through GURIEV. GURIEV is not an experienced intelligence officer; he interpreted for me during the intelligence work in Turkey. I sat with my chauffeur and GURIEV sat behind with this MEKHTEST. He finished school there and gathered data by asking Turkish soldiers, "Where are you going -- to BAKhChISARAY -- to Istanbul -- to BALYK/FALYR?". And then he wrote down "This regiment ... that division ...". This data is fairly accurate because each person knew where he was going and talked about it. Later this lieutenant was moved to Istanbul and he is there now. I don't know, however, what may have happened recently. Perhaps he has been caught (NAKRYT) in connection with MARLAGIN's compromise.

67. S: What do I want to say? How we must sharpen our weapons so that we can think out and devise counter-measures so that we can catch Soviet illegals by our combined efforts and wipe them out. This is a terrible business. Soon, for example, you will receive through the MID (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) an application for a visa for SUDIN. Of course, it is absurd for the Turks to grant it; they might give it to him knowing that he is going as a Counsellor. G: Do you know his Christian name? S: You will get that from me straight away. Incidentally, I am on very good terms with SUDIN. He was sorry to see me go out of the Directorate when I was assigned to the Academy to head the course. He respects me as a worker. He does not know the details about my father. Well, he is getting ready to go to Turkey. In Turkey, there is nothing -- he will use his experience and he is not young. He was head of a Direction under BREZHNEV. And he is to take illegals who will be sent to him from Iran, Afghanistan, perhaps someone from the USSR, from Bulgaria probably (Bulgaria is a very good base for intelligence work against Turkey).

68. S: This you must take into account and think about seriously. (Interruption -- The maid tried to get into the room but the door was locked.) G: You didn't finish describing the lecture on illegals which he gave. S: I will tell you -- The preparation of an intelligence officer for dispatch from the USSR to another country for preparatory training (STAZHIROVKA) and the third stage of preparation of an officer after the preparatory training

for travel to the country in which he is to work. This was interesting and I will concern myself with this. I will photograph the lectures. I will include this activity in my work for you. All the materials there will be "the resources for thinking in the future". (In English). But I ask that I may work on this now because valuable time will go very fast. G: Do you take notes? S: No, I will photograph (the text of) the lectures. They only allow us "listening, questions, answering" (English). They do not allow us to take notes and the material is secret and the questions are top secret. Any notes would be secret -- you listen; ask questions; you are in an Academy. Why should you want to ask questions? Everyone should understand and grasp what is being said. These lectures are in the SPETSFOND. They are prepared in the Academy. When the split-up (RAZBIELENIYE) took place, and they sent a lot of BEKHTEREV's Direction chiefs to run illegals from the Area Directorates, a Lt. Col. KHLEBTSOV, one of the "easterners" (VOSTOCHNIKI) came to us. He was caught red-handed in Iran in 1955. He came straight from BEKHTEREV because his work in Iran was connected with illegals. I do not know if we have an illegal REZIDENTURA in Iran. I cannot speculate and I have no right to do so, but to this day KUPRIYANOV is occupied with illegals.

69. S: What do we have in each country? We have safehouses which are mail drops through which we support illegals. There are already quite a number of illegal REZIDENTURAS. G: Did you ever support illegals in Turkey personally? S: Yes, I filled dead drops for them. G: Do you know who they were? S: There was no personal contact with any of them. G: Was there a professor at the university? S: No. G: A German? S: No. I do not know. G: Were there any women? You could have known whether they were men or women. S: There was one illegal woman agent. G: A Russian? S: That's right, but that was before me. But women... G: Anyone with a shop, anyone like that, a hat shop or a clothes shop? S: No. She had a shop on Ataturk Boulevard, just beyond the Red Cross Building (BALYK FALYR), on the left side when going from the embassy. This is in Ankara. There was a shop there it is still there, of course, which sells silver things, dishes and candlesticks. By the shop is an automatic telephone into which I put 20 Kurush on the 4th of November, and phoned just before my departure. I had my passport and everything. I reported (to Turkish Counterintelligence) that a manual had been stolen from the Turkish exhibition. G: Did your people do this? S: Yes, our people and the Bulgarians. I told you about it. You can check it. Write it down -- with the Turkish Counterintelligence.

70. G: Did you know illegals by either a real or a false name? S: I don't remember a thing, I swear to you -- perhaps Nikolaevich (jokingly). G: Did you ever meet any? S: No. Everything went through a dead drop. I put in money. An operational worker would arrive and say that a letter would arrive through the diplomatic pouch, with an enclosed letter with instructions stating that the letter was to be put in a mail box in Ankara and that the police should not see this being done -- numbered sheets not to be separated or undone. I did this. Also, I cached money in places designated. This was to service BERGEREV's people.

71. G: Was the shop far from the embassy. S: Yes. Going on the left side from our embassy, you go past Red Cross House where there are sculptured figures of doctors and great medical workers. Immediately beyond this on the left is the little shop. I know that there was a Yugoslav there. They said to me, "We have a great interest in this shop. When necessary, this is a reserve -- then we shall use it". G: You know that there was a woman there? S: Yes, some woman -- I never saw her face or knew her name, or anything. I never met her or had any contact with her -- "absolutely". (English). During my 18 months stay, we worked to service them 3 times, loading money. Once.. G: Can you say approximately when you worked with them? S: I'll think about it. I can't remember very well at the moment. I remember one detail. We cached money for a courier (HARSHUTNIK) and they caught him, just at the Turkish frontier. I had been given all the recognition signals -- the color of his eyes, his name, and his forenames -- an Armenian. Through the Bulgarians, I found out -- there was no Bulgarian military attache there then. I don't know whether there is one now or not but the 2nd Secretary was military -- a major. He discovered at the time when he visited the jail - you remember they arrested a Bulgarian in Istanbul who was caught with a clandestine radio set. He had a diplomatic passport and they beat him. Whether they fed him or not, I do not know. They arranged his release. He said later when the Bulgarians contacted him that an Armenian had been brought into the prison and his description tallied with our man who had been caught and who was sent from the RP (Intelligence Unit) on the frontier and on whom I had been given recognition data. Therefore, they do not permit military intelligence officers to have personal contacts and why should they be allowed to? It is necessary to cache money or jewels or a letter and then go off. For anything else, it is none of his business; there is another channel for that. G: It is very good that you have told us this -- it is very interesting.

72. S: The shop I mentioned has all sorts of things -- trays, candlesticks, candelabras, huge dishes. Opposite is a confectioners - the name NADEZHO (phonetic), which sells ice cream. Show me the map of Ankara and I will spot it. G: Do you want him to see some pictures? H: How much time have we got? J: I don't think we're going to have time. S: Maybe I should not go. G: It is better that you go. S:..Because this is very important. H: We can go on for a few minutes.

73. S: I will finish off my thoughts. It is necessary to consider this. As an example take SUDAN, you must remember that ... once again I tell you that the Soviets have an illegal AGENTURA in their hands and KHRUSHCHEV, with the head of the General Staff and with SEROV has already begun to use this even more actively. They tell us that only with the help of diversionary groups and of the illegals can we seriously undermine the potential of the Americans and of the British -- our worst enemies. And their great defensive strength and economic position, etc., can be reported on by legals and illegals. We must consider this; learned men must be collected to consider this. We are faced by the fact that there are and will be illegals and once again I say that -- the military attaches are no longer the REZIDENTS. They considered that it was too easy to spot the REZIDENT, since he would quickly be identified by his official position. This is not hidden. Now, all legal REZIDENTS are under cover. They may be colonels or generals. Somehow passports are adjusted or changed frequently. You mustthink about this.

74. S: By the way, [redacted]EV is sworn at by SEROV. SEROV does not like him, so that you know. At a Party meeting in the First Directorate SEROV just tore him into strips. He said that he was not doing enough, that he should set up a strong illegal network. Why does he need this? It must be organized so that it could find out prior to "H" hour where there was an impending attack, so that we might be the first to act. The English and Americans are "the main task" (English). Therefore, the accent is on illegals to do this. You see, from the position of military or naval attache one can only get hold of journals and newspapers and nonsense--contredictions... These can continue to do this but the operational priority is given to illegals.

75. S: They are training illegals intensively now. G: What happened to your admiral? You remember you had a vice-admiral who was, as it were, a deputy for Strategic Intelligence. He had a special position as a deputy. I don't remember his name -- YeKOVLEV or something beginning with "Ya". What happened to him? Was he just removed? S: There was such an admiral. Yes, yes, he was removed. G: Was the organization somehow..? S: The system

was changed -- SUDIN said in his lecture that we were duplicatingour efforts, though I heard this before SUDIN. We were duplicating -- money and the best cadres were given to the legal REZIDENTURAS. They have the position.

(76) S: You know what a "legal" REZIDENTURA is? Of course, all work is "illegal". A REZIDENTURA is made up of a legal APPARAT with which agents are connected. We gave them the best cadres, money, attention - they have leadership and are directed in every step with operational letters, etc. We saw that this produces nothing -- no achievements, mishaps, etc. Therefore, they took out the intelligence officers and military attaches and switched them over, and now they are replacing them with fools from troops who don't know a letter or a foreign language, not a word. They make an impression alright, they are covered with medals -- to go to receptions. But direction is done from under cover.

77. S: In Iran, for instance -- Iran is a very dangerous spot. The REZIDENT and his deputy Major NIKOL'SKIY should be removed. Iran is the sort of place, you know, which is very dangerous for us. G: Do you know NIKOL'SKIY? S: I have written about him and spoken about him. There are two others -- one, a colonel, was operational deputy in the DDR. S: I don't know him. G: He appears to be in Poland. The other, the small NIKOL'SKIY was some sort of instructor, wasn't he with you in the MGB? S: He recently finished -- The NIKOL'SKIY about whom I wrote and whom I ask you to have thrown out of Iran. He knows another of the Iranian languages -- URDU, or is it the other? G: Farsi? S: Yes, Farsi. Then this effective FILIPPOV, a colonel, who was abroad before; he is the REZIDENT. NIKOL'SKIY helps him with the languages, knows the work well. He is a most learned person, operational, capable and a quiet slender fellow. His wife works as director of the school in our colony in Iran.

78. G: Do you know AMOSOV? S: Ofcourse. G: He was in America, in Poland, and received awards -- for what I don't know. He finished MGB in 1951, together with BERIYEV's men from England -- GUSKOV. You remember him. He also was two years before you. S: I know of GUSKOV but no details about him. I will check up on him and report.

79. S: Various matters are now clearing up. They have taken operational workers away from BERIYEV and given them to the Directorates, but BERIYEV's set-up remains for the special REZIDENTURAs which already exist. They have sent down people like KUZNETSOV, from Iran; and the Pasha, whom I have already

mentioned; a major, whose name I will remember; and SUDIN. They sit and work out how to set up illegal REZIDENTURAs in these three capitalist countries. Thus the task in Turkey is to get an illegal REZIDENTURA going. There is a base there and there are people who are in the USSR. A number can be moved from third countries and SUDIN, as an experienced intelligence officer, is being sent there too. Think about it -- should he be allowed to enter Turkey or not? This is an affair for the Turks -- I cannot decide it. I can only tell you that there are operations being planned there.

(30) S: I think it is time for you to go so you will not be late. Should anything happen to upset our plans in Birmingham so that we fail to meet, remember that immediately upon your return to London, the room at the Mount Royal, No. 360, has been retained for our meeting. S: And please don't forget to arrange rooms for us on the 5th floor, so that we will all be there even though my room should be slightly away from the others. We will meet the day after tomorrowin Birmingham then at 2100 hours. Will you prepare a Minox for me? G: We will not only prepare this but train you in its use before you return. S: I will take only negatives and give you the undeveloped film. I must work in daylight. There are no electric lamps available where the material is. Maybe reflex paper can be used to copy? G: We will cover all this during your training. S: Very well, we will meet at 2100 hours on the day after tomorrow. Subject left after 1900 hours.

[redacted]

(15)

Meeting Number 7, Birmingham, England, 27 April 1961

1. Subject arrived at 2100 hours at the lobby of the Midland Hotel in Birmingham and was taken to the meeting room. After greeting and sitting down - G: We have been thinking about your request to meet an important man. Now, tell us what you yourself have in mind, because to obtain such a person is no problem for us. However, you know yourself that prominent people who give commands do not all understand secrecy as we do. Perhaps nothing will happen and nothing will be said. Of course, such a man would not know anything personally about you, as one might say. But you understand -- it may seem like a small matter but the fewer people who know about you the more secure things are. But we can do it, nevertheless. S: I will try to explain to you and do your best to fulfill my request; I am very glad to confirm that we Intelligence Officers are working for the good of our Free World -- ignoring the fact that we are meeting today for the seventh time or that we have now worked together for 25 hours in all, as I have calculated. This is a long day, during which we have sat and not slept or eaten or gone out anywhere. I feel that we are on the same wave length. I have also prepared an answer for your question. I have expected your question. I am glad that I can think about it again and glad that you so deeply examine and understand me, and that I find myself in such trustworthy hands. This is very pleasant, and it encourages and inspires me.

2. S: I have prepared a small official declaration which I want to pass to you. This will be at the same time a reply to your question. A week has passed in which we have worked directly and in which we have had the good fortune to meet for the solution of great and important matters. I consider that I am not just some sort of agent - no, I am your citizen. I am your soldier -- a soldier in the direct sense and in any other, as you like. I did not come to you to do little things. If I had not had sufficient clandestine capabilities, in spite of my hatred and contempt for corrupted Leninism, perhaps I, as an Intelligence Officer and as one with a higher education, would not have dared to presume to grasp at such questions, or come with such requests and such definite demands -- believe me. I consider that I have such unusual and special capabilities and accessibilities for agent work, that I shall be able to prove this by helping my Queen and my President - as a line soldier. You must understand me correctly -- I have talked about this several times -- I am capable of great things. I want to prove this "as soon as possible". (English)

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31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

(3.) S: Now I enter with you on the second half of my stay in Great Britain. For as long as I am here you will accompany me and finally, to my regret, I will part from you. I ask you once again to hear me out and to try to understand me and to arrange this for the good of our mutual cause. I do not ask this for any high-flown personal interest of my own. No, I am far from this; I am a realistic person. I have realistically assessed my capabilities. I have realistically assessed everything which I have done in the past year and I consider that I am not contributing just one little grain that may be a little larger grain by doing something good for our common cause. I have not overestimated my strength and possibilities and I would like at the very beginning to ask that those people who helped me before -- and you, who are helping me and teaching me...Your frequent prompting is invaluable to me.

(4.) S: After every meeting with you now, my brains begin to work fresh and to contrive new things. I am now an inventor within the framework of the possibilities open to me. With respect to my desires -- you have nothing to say. I am face-to-face with you and you can decipher this for yourselves - whether this is my actual wish or whether it is artificial. What do I want? I want you as soon as possible to test me again; to try me out on important matters, on any task which is within my capabilities to accomplish using my education, my training and everything else which I represent and which I have shown you. I very much want you to test me, as quickly as possible. (Here G warns Subject to keep his voice down.) I do not say that you do not believe me -- you who are here and are already my dear friends, my comrades in battle. This I reject. But perhaps somebody who does not know me, who cannot look into my eyes like you, will say, "Perhaps he copies all this about rockets out of Pravda", or something like that. No, you must excuse me but you must understand me correctly -- I am a human being. I am mature. I am going towards fifty as are you -- maybe Mikhail and Joseph are younger, that is in age, but perhaps in experience they are older than me -- I cannot say. J: Thank you.

(5) S: What else do I want to say? How do I evaluate the situation? If the governments which I now serve -- the high commands which I serve and which I will continue to serve -- value a little more highly this effort of mine, which was done under conditions of exceptional danger, and of definite self-sacrifice, believe me... Well, thanks to my small intellect -- for it is small -- to my extensive experience and training and study, to a certain experience -- "I was creator", (English)- in a specific set of circumstances for myself -- and everything. Thank God, it has gone well for me. This is how I approach this, and if I am not right in this respect you must correct me in a comrade-like way and I will evaluate things differently.

TVORETS'

#7

(6.) S: How do I evaluate this for myself? If there is real value in what I have done already, God grant; and if you believe in my great possibilities and want to do things just as I do so that I can be useful to the end -- if I am not just an ordinary run-of-the-mill person for you, for your (our) commands and for your government -- then attention from above to me would be an appreciation of my work and of my desires for the future. That is how I see it. If the Americans who helped me did something worthwhile - reward them. If they earn a material reward -- this is an indication that you value me. If you do nothing for them -- or just a little -- well, then I am also only a little item for you now and in the future. In that case: simply say this to me; I will nevertheless work. Perhaps I am mistaken.

(7.) S: I talked to you of such high level material -- all this links our intelligence work with politics. I studied the laws of dialectics in this connection, and some laws are absolutely right from the point of view of not assessing things in isolation from the circumstances under which a person's ability and capabilities and desires are involved. In this connection, I think very progressively, I consider, for our time.

(8.) S: If you consider that I am "so-so", then I too will reach this conclusion because when I asked you to reward WIENER - already a week has passed and you have said nothing. I ask you to consider how he should be rewarded -- to give him money. I shall soon be going away and I do not yet know if you are going to reward him. Will you give him money or not? WIENER needs the money; WIENER has done everything to bring us together, so that I can completely fulfill my life's mission (with you). If you consider my opportunities, talks, ideas, abilities are small, you should say to me "Keep silent. Be more modest. Be quiet. You know you think a lot of yourself". I do think a lot of my opportunities and I think that I can do a lot. Of myself as an individual, I do not think very much, believe me. What I will have is enough for me together with that I will have with your help.

(9.) S: But I want to do such great things -- so that I will be your "Number 1" -- first of all for your governments and for your high commands and for the basic goal, which is the means for fulfilling our common tasks in the battle against Communism. This is what I wanted to say; therefore, you honor me I feel. You already love me in your way -- as a friend, as a comrade. You believe me. But all the other leaders are not here -- those who direct things. May God grant that you can convey to them all my wishes and possibilities. I am sure that this will be done. I am sure that time is necessary for this.

But you understand, my rebellious nature. You know that I am an extravagant, lively, energetic person. I feel that you are still taking my measure, still studying me. For me, this is a somewhat drawn out moment. Perhaps there is some contradiction about me in your eyes; if so, tell me. Perhaps I can clear it up, because I believe in my power and possibilities and in the truth - with a capital "T" - of all that I have told you, and am telling you and of what I will do and of what I have already done. In the light of this I ask you to evaluate me, to report my words. This is my declaration and my request. I ask that before my departure on either the 2nd or the 6th -- I will know tomorrow which day -- you will have evaluated me. I ask that you will say, "You know what? Everything with you is medium. You do not need to concern yourself about such great matters because others are thinking for you". When I decided to come to you, I did not think all this out lightly. I ask you to understand me, to evaluate me correctly, to believe in me, and to give me as quickly as possible a severe mission so that I can fulfill it. Perhaps then you will evaluate me differently. I want you to use me only for big things. All my demands and requests are subordinated to this.

(10) S: Now I will check through the thoughts which I have prepared -- and noted -- I think I have said everything. Then I will go on to some questions which I want to report to you and to listen to you. I said to you that I do not want to do only small things. (S trys to break in.) S: Just a moment, I will finish shortly. For me, the measure of your attitude will be the way in which the government assesses those two (Americans), WINNE, and yourselves as well. You can say to me "What business is it of yours how the government regards us?" Well, alright. We have come together and have worked together and will work together. It is not a matter of indifference to me how the work that you have put into our collaboration, for the good of the common cause, will be assessed. Let us hope that all will be well. May God grant materials, fortune, well-being. You understand that I only want to work on large principles, serious principles and let them be dangerous ones. I am sure that if I were to perish, if anything should happen to me, you would not forget my daughter, my mother, and my wife. You know my suggestions about this and you would contrive something, and you would not leave them in a material lurch.

(11) S: You know that in the Soviet Union the material side of life presses hard on everyone. Even a minister who receives 12 to 15,000 rubles a month -- if he has not saved something and if they get something on him and he is driven

out of work and he uses it up or drinks it away and has debts to pay or something else -- after this he just drags his life out. The minimum living wage of Socialism is now established and what sort of wage is it? It is really a gray and hungry life - believe me. I live in Communism-myself and my comrades and colleagues as I have already told you. But one must think of the people - the foolish Russian people. The Russian people are fools - they are good and fine - but foolish. They allow themselves to be easily tied up. Then they endure continuously -- perhaps there will be something better tomorrow, perhaps the next day. Thank God that there is bread and salt and that is all there is. The people are fools who cannot organize themselves. But if we can establish conditions under which the MVD cannot shoot them in the head from behind then these people will say that they have suffered enough and have been deceived too long. That is how Lenin came forward with such a jump in 1917 when the Tsar took such completely wrong attitudes to many of the peoples' questions. If there had been a more clever Tsar, there would have been no revolution.

(12) S: Listen, I can tell youall kinds of things. With us in the 7th basement where the MVD sits, there are chambers where Russians -- prominent people from the point of view of Patriotism, wise people -- were exposed to rats. I was told this by a man who knows. This was said by the former Adjutant of the MVD, a colonel under ARTEMEV. I have all his details. There is one special room which is completely glazed. Anyone who cannot be broken or who will not say what they want him to say, or who will not sign something, is put in the middle of this room. There are pipes leading into it made up of clear plastic. Through these - there is no exit above or below - they release dozens of rats which run around the man. Through a microphone they say, "Well, now, will you say with whom you are working". If the man does not confess or says, "I will not tell you who I was working with or anything", they open a valve which releases a single rat. The rat, who has not eaten for several days, begins to run about and to bite the man. Then they let in 2 or 3 more. It is terrible! People have gone out of their minds. When they want to they turn on water under high pressure and the rats are chased away, back to their cages. The Russian people have been tortured and shot. Everyone knows this.

13. S: KHRUSHCHEV can see that if in addition to this grey, half-starving existence is added the further (horror) of imprisonment or execution -- like it was in STALIN's time -- of course, STALIN had support all around -- then the people might really say "The hell with it!" This is why he is making little

inducements. For instance, he made a general amnesty for those who were chewed up by rats, or shot. To their families, he gave pensions. They get pensions -- not very large -- but they get something. Or he rehabilitated them for life, so that the son or daughter would not have to put down that their father was imprisoned as an enemy of the people. This would immediately incriminate them from the very start.

(14) S: I could tell you about some people from the GRU, perhaps you know some of them. We can talk about this some other time. I wanted to make some sort of statement -- a declaration. You have worked with me exactly a week. I beg you -- and I will be only grateful to you if you will tell me, "You know, (Subject's true name), everything is not as you are aiming for -- reaching for. It's sort of mediocre and we really don't want to use you; not in the various ways you have suggested. So, take it easy. The whole thing does not appear to us in the same grandiose light as you think". Or explain to me in some other way. I don't want to put my words in your mouths. I only ask you to use me for big things. I am ready. I am still strong -- comparatively young -- healthy -- and I consider that I have resources for "big things". What kind of big things? So far, I have offered (my ideas) to you. If you consider this all suitable - and as it should be - then I ask you to develop (the plan) and give me support and security so that I can execute it. Tell me, "You will arrive on the 6th and on the 15th you have to blow up the KGB". At 11: o'clock in the morning on the 17th, the KGB will cease to exist. Just give me the means to do this and there will be no KGB! Now I'm finished with what I have to say.

(15) G: On the things you have said - on certain points we can give you answers right away. In the first place, we trust you. In the second place, we wanted to not check -- but to find out why you desire this. I want to tell you that this will be done. In the third place, we want you to be perfectly at ease about WYNNE. After all, we are going back to London and everything will be done properly. S: (Interrupting) After all, I'll leave you now and I'll see him. He's really a wonderful guy. I am very much taken with him. Believe me, this is all very objective. There are no personal considerations of qualities which would be of help in matters of our mutual interest.

(16) S: Now WYNNE had organized a dinner. After sitting around a bit, I excused myself and said that I had to call London -- the Embassy. There's a line at the Telegraph office. Then I went for a walk; I left someone to take my place -

a professor. I told him to write up his reports. Yesterday they were looking at the entire laboratory. Today they were looking at the Walter ALLEN. After this, I will not call you. When I come back I will go to sleep. Breakfast is at 8:15. We get up at 7:00. They feed us well. We are all delighted with the hospitality -- at the largesse -- and this you have done all through WINNE. Who does all these things? You're not sitting there. WINNE is the one. Even though this is a small matter -- only a grain of sand -- it is part of the big thing we are all doing. G: We are aware of all this, but while he is running back and forth between you and the representatives it's impossible to tear him away, in any sense of the word -- even for 2 or 3 hours. When he comes to London, everything will be taken care of properly.

17. S: Well, I'm closing my "testament" with this paragraph. I want you to trust me completely, 100%. In order to gain this, I want and demand that you give me an assignment which will guarantee me full recognition. If at present you trust me 99% -- this is not enough for me. 99% is not enough; I want 100%, or nothing -- or kill me. G: How about 105%? Okay. Okay. S: Please understand me correctly, because we don't have much time. We have to make concrete decisions, or do you have some questions?

18. G: We will meet again tomorrow. S: We have not the right not to meet every day. G: You will let us know whether you are leaving on the 2nd or the 6th. If it's the 2nd, then we'll meet for the last time on the 1st. If it's the 6th, then we'll meet on the 5th. But beginning with tomorrow, we will have the full schedule worked out exactly.

19. G: Good! Now, what I wanted to tell you -- after all I can't say 50 words at once instead of one word, or 50 thoughts. I gave you a list of 60 people taking the first course in the Military-Diplomatic Academy -- future officers of Strategic Intelligence. But what I did not mention is the fact that after these people were accepted into the course, they were assigned to various directorates, and theatres of war. In other words, our student from the very first day receives (training in) the basic language with which he will be working. He is assigned the specific country for which he is being prepared and he is given training in the specific theatre of war with which that country is concerned. All the Chiefs of the Directorates, have been and will be members of the Board of Examiners (EKZAMENATSIYA KOMISSIYA). Each candidate is seated. There is a long table opposite - about where Mr. Joseph is sitting -- and there sits General SHOLIKOV. Next to him is your relative, KHLOPOV, and here all the

Chiefs of the Directorates. Here, the candidate sits and I am sitting here. Everyone is writing things about him -- what color eyes, what height, his appearance -- does he look like a Turk, for instance, or an Armenian or an (OSETIN) or like a Finn? No one says a word; they write quietly. Then they decide - IVANOV is accepted. I told you before 150 persons applied - 90 were sifted out and 60 were accepted. There were various reasons for this -- I won't go into all that now.

20. S: When all the students are accepted, by order of the Chief of General Staff, everyone is entered on the roll. Each one gets assigned to his place; then they are dismissed for a vacation until 1 September. Now all the Directorate Chiefs get together - I was there too- and the bargaining begins. For instance, some blond character might be desired by both the Finnish and the European (group). He is entered, in this case, in both groups. There are many cases like this. Then they bargain; the decision is based on seniority and usually is a just one.

21. G: Does it work on the T/O system? For instance, a large Directorate but no slots open; there are so many slots according to T/O? S: But we are not preparing them for a Directorate. We are preparing them for overseas duty. Those that are left over will find a spot temporarily even if it's not according to their designation (PROFILUY). For instance, I was studying Japan -- when I was in the Academy, when actually I had nothing to do with Japan. I knew everything about it, including the Tusearera Depression and its depth (VPADINA TUSKARORA). So, they divide up the people. They have a sort of plan - in perspective -- in numbers. The Chief of the First Directorate gets some people - in excess almost of all the other directorates -- that's BERZINIY. He got 18 people, among them your acquaintance - SHCHERBAKOV, who will be trained for two years.

22. S: SHCHERBAKOV knows two languages very well and has experience in agent work. He used to be an Illegal. What's the purpose in training him for three years? Why give him a language? They'll give him all the highest science, training -- whatever he needs. G: Why no more than two years? S: He doesn't need anymore; that's what BERZINIY said. If it's necessary, he can finish in one and a half years - in other words, half a course - and he'll be given a diploma - and a "pip" (ROMB). I've got two of them. G: Academy of the Soviet Army? S: No. The one from the Academy of Frunze says "Academy of Frunze" just like that; the other one has VASA (VOYENNAYA AKADEMIYA SOVETSKOY ARMII). Actually it is the VDA (VOYENNAYA DIPLOMATICHESKAYA AKADEMIYA).

MDA
VDA
VASA

Anyway, the Illegal has grabbed 18 people. Why? Because there is stress on Illegal Intelligence activities. S: He took the best people. Who were these 18 people? If you will give me a copy of the list (I have not marked it before), I can tell you who is in the first group and who is in the second. (Note: Subject listed 10 illegals in his first list but did not know about 8 others till later.)

23. S: Now who is picked for Illegal Intelligence work. They must be young and, as a rule, unmarried. There are 8 unmarried people in this course. G: What does young mean -- 28, 27 years old? S: Under 30. I said, young and preferably unmarried. Oh! This is the first requirement. G: Why unmarried? S: Because it isn't always permitted to take your wife along. As you know, according to our laws of socialism it doesn't do to break up a family. Of course there are married Illegals; they go abroad with their wives.

24. S: Now, let's go through these quickly. I've forgotten many of them already! You know what I did not mark down before in the list which I gave the American friends -- my "instructors -- interpreters" -- that list was not alphabetical. There I wrote the last name and the initials; I did not write out the entire name and I did not indicate where the man came from. There, I had the rank, last name and the initials. J: Education? S: Yes, education. G: Language and the country? S: That's right -- language and country. The language determines .. of the foreign languages .. and again there is an argument. Again they say, "What language shall we give to (Subject's true name)?" Some say, "Let's let him study Turkish." Others say, "No, better let him study English; he won't make it in Turkish". Do you have the first list? G: It's in London. S: In London? Let's do it in London then, so that we'll have them both together that way. If you want we can go through fast. G: No. It is better to be more accurate and thorough.

25. J: Just one question before we leave the subject. He had one man there -- Canada, United States or Japan. Maybe he can explain it.. S: I understood you. These are all BERKHEEV's people. He says "I'll either send him to this country, or to that one". That's why. G: BERKHEEV said this? S: BERKHEEV. He said, "He is suitable for this one or for that country." I'll be thinking about it. I already know (since I heard this) so I put him down for both -- so that he's between two. Because he might not be named for one country and then suddenly be sent to some other country later!

#7

26. S: Now, what I must say before I forget about it -- out of these 18 people, the ones to pass all the tests, checks, and meet all the conditions, God willing, there may be 5 -- out of all those 18. This is the proportion, and the relationship of the chaff and the wheat. The chaff will go and work for some other directorates. This is important to remember. Well, we've decided to work on this over there later because the list is there and we will do it completely.

27. S: When you were asking me yesterday about our group in the Committee, I forgot to give the name of the Captain. It is Captain PUTILIN, Boris. He was getting ready to go to Spain, as an Illegal. I was confused - he does not work now at the Institute of Foreign Languages, but is working in the Foreign Department of VOYENIZDAT. We have a VOYENIZDAT -- Military Publishing (House) of the General Staff -- and there we have a great deal of material in foreign languages. There are many instructors there from our Academy, and others. This is sort of a secondary echelon -- they let people work there who are not completely trusted. Maybe this will be the place where they will send the man who should have been shot in the United States recently but was let go - MELIKH.

28. S: The Institute of Foreign Languages is now being amalgamated (OB'EDINYAYETSYA) with the Military Diplomatic Academy and it will be under the direction of your relative; let's get KHLOPOV out of there. However, write this down -- this is very interesting - how things hang together logically and realistically. This course (FACUL'TET) INOSTRANNYY will be in Lefortovo. It will be under the Academy, but the Chief of the Academy and the training command (KOMANDA) will get into cars and go from the Sokol district to the Lefortovo district, Tankovyy Proyezd, House #4; right next to the BRONETANKOVAYA AKADEMIYA imeni STALINA (Armored Tank Academy name of Stalin).

29. S: What's more there is already in that House #4 on Bronе-Tankovoy Proyezd, a special Section which I forgot to tell you about. Now I remembered -- a Section of the Second Chief Directorate. The Chief is Colonel LEBEDEV. This Section only works on all the intercepted material -- all the Radio intercepts, and all other material obtained by Radio Intelligence which I told you exists in each country. All these materials flow into the hands of Colonel LEBEDEV, on Tankovyy Proyezd, Dom #4. G: And it's called Lefortovo? S: No, the district is Lefortovo. There is the River Yauza... G: And there is a big hospital there? S: Yes, it used to be called KOMMUNISTICHESKIY Hospital, but now it is the Hospital, name of BURDENKO. But it is also a military hospital, under SMIRNOV, General-Colonel, Chief of the Chief Medical Directorate and it is located in the second house.

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30. S: Remember the red-head? I had a certain connection with LEKSEEV when I was on the area desk. Remember I told you about the agent who gave information on the CHET-NESHATUSNCHIYE USTROYSTVAN (computing devices) from Pakistan - these materials wound up in his hands. He had two specialists there -- they were decoding experts. He asked me to ask the agent with what speed the discs turned, the frequency of number repetition, etc. I contacted the REZIDENT -- and the REZIDENT, through the operational officer, asked the agent (whom we are going to hang soon -- but only after I come out). (Joke) Thus, this LEKSEEV, Colonel, has a section -- not a sub-section. He works on intercepts, decoding, putting together intelligence reports (SOSTAVLENIYE informatsii) from intercepts, etc. G: To whom is he responsible? S: Directly to General of the Army, SEROV. Directly. But he coordinates his activities with your acquaintance -- the Colonel who is with our Radio Intelligence -- RIABOV. Their immediate supervisor is Lieutenant General (GENERAL-LEYTENANT) TRUSOV. This name is familiar to you? G: I know him. He was in Germany, the chief. S: That's right, that's TRUSOV.

31. S: I want to ask you people - my next point - to advise me; help me; to point out to me -- and what you direct will be my order - the listing and the priority sequence of all my assignments. Here is my idea of what I'm supposed to do when I get to Moscow. First - the working out and the details of plan #1. This is what we discussed before in connection with strategic targets. I'll make you an outline with dimensions, on each separate sheet of paper I'll repeat again data about the General Staff because the other data was somewhat abbreviated and possibly there may be a few inaccuracies. At that time I was working at high speed; this time I'll be doing it thoroughly. In addition to the basic area orientation, I will give the logical places, most suitable, which I think of for placing a large TNT equivalent, for the purpose of blowing up the targets when it is necessary to do so. This is the first thing which I should completely work out. As long as I am talking so much about such big things I must, from my end of it, give you sort of a documentary plan. Then I will take it upon myself "VSUY MOSKVU VYPOLNIT" to put the entire thing into action. If you say that this is too much for you to do, please give me another order.

32. S: May I continue? Secondly -- I'll be working now - and since working with you I understand it even better -- to collect all available materials in Illegal Intelligence (Operations) beginning with the theory; the lectures; specific situations (cases). The SOV-SEKRETNO (Top Secret) will go under a special category. Perhaps in this theoretical part we will find some keys in order for us to apply prophylactic measures. This is how I

see it. Of course, I do not promise you that I will get you the entire illegal AGENTURA. G: This will be a slow process and will take a lot of scrutiny. S: Yes, scrutiny as to who - what? I know, for instance, about SHCHERBAKOV; I know exactly. He's a big (or healthy) one. I know this will be - they may let him go out in one and a half years. He's been checked and trained before. They need a man like that - he is prepared in all respects. I will study this matter from all sides. I feel that this is a very important and big part of the work, because the basic threat to us comes from the direction of the Illegals.

(33) S: I also want to repeat that there is one task which confronts the Illegals especially, and all of us, including myself. Generally, the entire Strategic Intelligence has the basic mission - to warn the Supreme Command (KOMANDOVANIYE), the Central Committee and the Presidium about H hour -- of the start of an attack on the part of the Free World. This is the basic mission -- to warn the Command of the beginning of a war, even though a few minutes beforehand. For this purpose tremendous resources are being developed. This continues to stress the importance of the point I was making when I told you the meaning of Radio Intelligence. It is carried on here, in the U.S., and everywhere. This is their bread, because the AGENTURA is sparse -- there are not many valuable agents. Of course, there are some here (in Radio Intelligence); however, it's very concrete -- actually whatever is picked up can be recorded just as it is. For this reason methods have been developed so that with the help of these stations, duplicate radio intercept stations, the rest of the radio stations which are normal-working, cable transmitting stations. Signals can be sent to RPs, since they are closer -- the RAZVED-PUNKTY are also equipped with radio. There is such an alarm signal already worked out -- as soon as this signal is received, Envelop #1 (KONVERT NOMER ODIN) is opened. There is one at the RP for the duty officer, and the signal goes on further - to Moscow. It is relayed by all possible duplicate means -- VCH (High Frequency) - other radio stations - etc. S: I feel that my basic task at present is to alert "my" governments - "my" command. In other words, I consider the above as my mission in reverse; namely, to provide you with Early Warning. The other missions which I don't want to break down specifically are: methods of work; categories of science; various channels through which things are done -- whether it is Radio Intelligence, Illegal or Legal REZIDENTURA. I speak of it as Legal because it is operating under some kind of cover but not under the APPARAT of the Military Attache. This last I stress and underline again. All these things can be considered as supporting and developmental data..

(34) S: Now, thirdly, I want to undertake -- since I consider it very important for you to know -- all the methods used to train an Intelligence Officer in his work. I will collect all their lectures on Intelligence and

on Operational-Tactical matters, because there are some ideas inserted in between the doctrines. They have the (troop) density calculated for each kilometer of the front. How much of each type of weapons (SREDSTV)? How many people? What type of equipment. All these lectures I will get for you also. Now, Technical Intelligence -- with which I am connected directly at the present time is all in my hands. I can get you a suitcase of this material. What can I get for you? In the first place, I told you, there are 150 intelligence items listed. S: There are 150 intelligence requirement items. For 1961, these were sent as (TEKHNICHESKOYE ZADANIYE) (requirement missions) to the United States and duplicated to all countries. These also exist for each country. For instance, I have 30 intelligence requirements specifically for Canada. These are, for example, to get their methods for making artificial fur on fabric backing. Then there is also something on non-ferrous metals. Many requirements are scientific. Scientists assign them and then they are all gathered together in the GNTK. For the United States there are 150 requirements in all fields of industry, manufacturing, agriculture, everything. In the field of Agriculture there is even a requirement - it does not seem to work for us - how to grow vegetables not in the ground; but in artificial soil like sand and chemicals. It's some sort of discovery. The requirement is to determine what the components are. You see, even these assignments are performed by Intelligence - and we think that we can divorce Politics for Intelligence! How can we do this? We can't!

GNTK — Technical Intelligence requirements list for Canada

(35) S: Now, and I repeat this because this question may come up again, why are all these copies of the 150 requirements sent to all the other capitalistic countries? Because there is much of the British and American (science) in other countries of the world. If you can't get into the U.S. and you can't get into England - then clear up this question in Germany - that's all! That is the fourth point.

(36) S: The fifth -- as I said on the whole and generally speaking -- is to alert you through all channels available to me if, God forbid, they decide on some adventure - so I can warn (you). S: As far as counter-measures to take-prevention, this will be for the command and the government to decide -- we won't have enough brains for that!!

(37) S: I would like to add something - this is aside from the ACADEMY and the Academy, where you received training on rockets. That's all well and good, but when you have your VOYENNOKOMANDNOYE DELO (Military Command Training)

ACCESS. Military Command Training

can you get into the SECRETNIY FOND and get copies not only of lectures, but of some special Manuals -- the latest Field Service Regulations, for example. They will show us not only the philosophy, but any change in the doctrine regarding the use of atomic weapons. S: Concrete estimates? G: Concrete estimates - this must be given as a part of the training because the army is being developed and trained. S: The army is being prepared. G: Now, I don't know whether you are aware of this or not -- I had heard that you are doing away completely with the Corps structure within the army. S: KORPUSNAYA SISTEMA? G: That's right. The Divisions are directly under Armies. S: That is exactly right or they will be Divisions of the Reserve Command - RVK. (GEN units) However, some army corps still exist; they are doing away with it slowly but many have been already eliminated. That is correct.

38. S: Secondly, the Rifle Division no longer exists as such; it is now called the Motorized Division. S: You are already behind; it is called Mechanized - not Motorized. It is called MSD (MEKHANIZIROVANAYA STRELKOVAYA DIVIZIYA) -- the Mechanized Rifle Division. There is not a single horse in a division, and there is not a regiment or a battalion that will go any long distance on foot. Trucks are provided and ... auto-battalion, which is employed per movement plan. They load them on trucks, and one auto-battalion follows another, etc.

39. G: And similarly, your former Mechanized Division -- the Motor-Mechanized Division -- does not exist any more, but is called simply Tank Division. S: The Tank Division.. G: Is this right? S: Not quite correct. There is a greater percentage of Tank Divisions, but there are still some Mechanized Divisions which are comprised of Infantry Brigades. G: This sort of thing is very important to us - and it is possible that there might be some new use of atomic weapons. God knows what else there will be! S: I am sure that there will be new seperate Rocket units and where there are Rocket units, there will also be nuclear weapons. If there are no Rocket units, as I gave you already, there may be 320 MM mortars and a cannon, which fires atomic shells. G: This will explain many important things to us about rockets; that is, the subordination of the units, the allocations, responsibilities, etc. How they plan to organize the new military divisions. What the present status is. According to Tables of Regulations, this will show new military theory. We may find some tactical doctrines here. I will not call this the Number 1 mission, but it is high on the priority list of things which are of interest to us, especially, since all this is available to you. S: Absolutely. This is how I have already written this. Here,

I'll show you this place again - lectures on Intelligence, on Operational-Tactical matters, etc. G: You've written it down? S: Yes. I was writing this in my room -- operational-tactical matters -- just as you said.

40. G (lifting a glass) Well, here's to your health! S: Thank you. I am quite well! It will be sad for us to part, but we will think of each other every day. Let there be no day in which you will not think of me, or I will not think of you, even for a moment - not only when you receive the material from me, but anytime. G: Of course, certainly.

41. S: Here's what I've prepared. G: That's quite a list! H: Yes, it's quite a list, but I think...we can bring out all these other subjects later on, and refine it. G: Fundamentally, all this is fine as a basis; we will work over all these questions very carefully and make them even more specific. S: I wanted to ask you whether you might want to add something more to these. G: We'll add some more. S: Or, perhaps you'll say, "(Subject's true name), this Technical Intelligence, even though I have it down as point #4 - let it stay that way. But the lectures on Operational-Tactical matters, you had better put over here".

42. G: We will do just that. Now, here is a small question. What is the actual period when you were at the Rocket Academy. S: Military Engineering Academy, Name of Dzerzhinskiy. The courses are called VAK -- VYSSHIYE AKADEMII CHEESKIYE KURSY (Higher Academic Courses) under the Military Artillery Engineering Academy, name of DZERZHINSKIY. The courses were given by order of the Chief of the General Staff. G: When did you yourself enter? What month - and in what month did you graduate? S: I entered 1 September 1959. You remember, I was preparing for India for half a year and from 5 January to 29 February, I was hanging around in the Reserves. G: But you were still going to school at that time? S: No, not then. I had finished the courses then. G: That was 9 months of the course. S: They figure this way - they are calle called yearly (GODOVYYE) courses. However, the political preparation -- there was a bit of that then -- the history of ... not the Civil War ... Military Science (VOYENNOYE ISKUSSTVOO). All this was canceled for me because I had two diplomas. I only studied the technical equipment course, rocket firing. There was no political work for me, absolutely. But the rest, they had the full cycle. G: So you actually graduated in January? S: No, I graduated and received the diploma -- the certificate (SVIDETEL'STVO) -- on 30 April, on the eve of 1 May. I have a copy of an attestation (ATTESTATSIYA) for this period indicating with what rank I entered, how my studies went, evaluation and assessment. I have a copy; I will send it to you.

43. G: So, all the time that you were in Reserves, you were still going to school? S: I attended a bit, but I was relieved of all the Liberal Arts (GUMANITARNYKH NAUK) and was studying only the equipment and rocket firing. So, concretely, my studies are from 1 September 1958 through 30 April 1959. G: That's better. This is what was confusing me, now it's clear. S: I have the certificate with the seal - with OGENTSOV's signature as proof. You might think something amiss with me, but you have made the mistake by a year. G: I did not think it possible that you could be in the reserves at the Academy and getting ready for India - everything at once. S: I told you about the Reserves. I was still studying and working, but it was not according to schedule. This was by my own desire. Now, 1 May, I was off -- the order just came through to prepare me for the Indian area. Beginning with June, I was sitting for 6 months -- up to the New Year. I came in 1958, studied until 1959 and at the end of 1959 I greeted the New Year. On the 5th of January (1960) I was called in to SHUMSKIY - 2 months in Reserves -- then on the 29th of February I became chief officer for those three countries which I have mentioned -- until June. Then the examining committee (MANDATNYA KOMISSIYA) began screening candidates. This brings us into 1960.

(44) S: I was thrown out as the Chief of the course (NACHAL'NIK KURSA) -- to speak roughly. And 15 November 1960, I was in the Committee. Didn't I tell you before? I started (school) there in 1958, and I was going to school through 30 April 1959. I went (to classes) every day, and was the Chief Political Officer (STARSHINA PARTORGANA). G: We had figured out that all this was a year later. S: No, no, no. I was sitting on the area desk and took part in the examining committee. I may have accidently mentioned one year instead of the other. I beg your pardon. G: Now it is clear.

45. S: I repeat again - 1 September 1958, the order was already issued about my enrollment in the course and school started in September. As far as dates go, I saved myself 2-2½ months. Oh! -- another thing -- they also gave a little preparation in languages. That language which (the student) had studied before -- but very little, perhaps once a week for an hour, sometimes two, but this very seldom. I was relieved from this also even though I don't know English very well, but it is at least 100 times better than the rest who were going to school there.

(46) G: Shall we finish your notes now? S: We'll finish right away. I want to ask you not to attempt to work on the members of my delegation in an agent capacity (V AGENTURNOM OTNOSHENII). G: No - of course not - under no circumstances. S: There is some good material there that could be used, but better you don't. G: Of course.

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47. S: Now (reading notes), in regard to the photographing - to leave it or not. The members of my delegation, when they are traveling they quietly photograph things. On the outskirts of that town where I had trouble with my stomach, they photographed rockets which were standing to the right of the highway. Then further on there are airports. I've read that one of them is for the civilian Air Force of Great Britain. Then there is one -- I don't say it is, but I understand that it is for American Fighters. I don't say I know. Then there is one more airport, all on the right side if coming from there.

48. S: Now, yesterday morning I stopped in one of their (delegates) rooms -- no, it was day before yesterday at Leeds! His windows looked out on the railroad -- the train station at Leeds. There is nothing there but roofs, but you can see the tracks and observe the fact that it is a Railway Station, a terminal. That's about all. So I asked myself -- shall I leave them or not? They leave their cameras in their rooms -- perhaps I should take them (delegates) out somewhere, and then someone could go to their rooms and take them? G: No, that's alright. S: It's alright? Well, it was my business to tell you about it; it won't bother me at all. Of course, if I was doing the photographing, they would say to me"shame on you!" G: No, it is better to leave them. Let them go back with something to boast about - it will be better for you.

49. S: We'll talk about this some more. There are still some questions I want to ask in regard to my Intelligence Assignment. Do you think you can help me? G: Yes, yes. S: A little bit - and also we have to decide about the man ...can work out a legend -- where I met him. I can introduce him and leave him - the devil take him. It doesn't matter to me what goes on after the introduction, that's all that concerns me. Now here is what I request. Tomorrow I meet with the REZIDENT, in London. I have to report to him the results of the trip, what I saw, etc., whether there were any provocations, offers, etc. I wanted to confer with you on this matter. My task is to pass any information of the slightest interest, which I may obtain through acquaintances, or see myself, or steal, or stick in my pocket or my brief-case. This must be sent through the REZIDENT, addressed to the name of my Colonel, the Chief of the Section, ROGOV. G: The Colonel? S: Yes, the Colonel. All this will go on to AFANASIEV. G: Do you have the name and patronymic of the Colonel? One can go crazy with all the ROGOVS. You've got two of them. S: Vasiliy Maksimovich. G: This is Vasiliy Maksimovich. S: So, the envelop must be addressed as follows -- this would go via diplomatic mail - ROGOV, V.M. -- you see, I wrote it down ROGOVSKIY. This I must give to the REZIDENT. If I have nothing for him, then I have not fulfilled my Informational Assignment. So, I ask you to give me a little something which will not be

detrimental to our cause. G: You will see him not only tomorrow but the day after as well? S: According to the plan I am supposed to go and see him tomorrow, but I can manage not to go tomorrow if that is better. G: That will be better. S: I can go the day after tomorrow. G: That will be better. By that time we will receive some materials. You will look at him and you will be able to say to him with confidence that you have obtained such and such information on - and really know about it - and not be speaking about what you might get and how, etc. It will be difficult for you to explain from where or from whom you obtained it. It is better to get it first and study it. S: So, I won't go tomorrow. G: Tomorrow, when we meet, we will already know more about it all. S: Alright.

50. S: The next matter - I would like you to arrange for permission for us (the delegation) to take a very superficial, quick look at either the FERRANTI or the PLESSY Firms; this is because the Committee has received an official telegram that both the FERRANTI and the PLESSY would be available to the delegation. This helped me quite a bit at the time. It was WINNE who sent the telegram -- I asked him to whom he was in Moscow -- saying that "I confirm that both FERRANTI and PLESSY visits are available". It is not necessary (to see) both of them -- either one or the other, and show them just a little bit -- (in English) a few. Don't make a big deal out of it. Don't make up any stories -- just some little thing. Otherwise, there will be nothing in my report, or my specialist's report about either FERRANTI or PLESSY and both were promised as available, as WINNE confirmed. Just to give a general familiarization with one of the firms because it was promised. Here we were at LEO's and that is alright. What I have not mentioned to you or have not had time to say -- when I was having the chat with the RESIDENT, he told me, "I warn you, the British CI has assigned you Andrew, a translator, Andrey KARLOVICH. He is a SVOLOCH, such a man ...", and he went on to tell me what a dangerous person he is -- "be careful not to talk in front of him". I tell you all this for this reason -- as an intelligence officer he is a very good man. He knows the English Language very well and is a very pleasant man generally, an exceptional man. Of course, this is my own opinion - my feeling toward him although it is well masked. I tell you this because you must not ever use him again in the open. You let them "get onto him" right away. They all know him and are afraid of him. So if you ever assign him to someone again, they will say at once, "Here is the plant again". Let him work in the position of a third man -- but they know him. This is what I wanted to tell you.

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51. S: I wonder why there was a confusion over the dates. I thought I gave it right but you had it a year later. G: I suspected as much; this was just for the purpose of getting it more exactly. S: I think that you have put everything down correctly. I told you everything as it was. The courses are PERIODICITY from year to year. They always start on the 1st of September -- the basic and the supplementary ones as well. The courses are held under a directive of the General Staff, the announcement regarding them is made the beginning of July and they start screening people. I stuck my nose in there too, because I had heard that the situation was such that this would be helpful to me. I already had small plans for the future -- more concrete, but small -- and I went to school 4 months in 1958, and up to May 1959.

52. G: That is clear now. Here is a small question. As you see, we don't have too much work right now. You reminded us about some things yesterday and we have some more photographs ... you probably recognize these. (Subject looking at photographs.) S: Yes, I will see -- No, this is not on Red Square - this is the MANEZH; this is the Kremlin; this is the University; this is the MANEZH. This right here is the V-75, and this is the same thing. There were 5 or 6 rows of these -- and 4 columns to a row. No, this is the Bol'shoy Theatre -- no, no, it's the MANEZH. G: Since we are on the seventy fives, there are more photographs here. There will be some more like this, I'm sure. Can these be adapted for atomic use when necessary? S: No, these are only for Anti-Aircraft use. Why use atomic weapons against aircraft? This I have never heard of and have not seen any such instructions.

53. S: (looking at second photograph) Here is the second stage. Here is the dry fuel and here is the thing itself -- here is the pilot tube sticking up. G: That's clear. Now, how is it guided after the ground control guidance system is cut off? S: First, it goes up from the ground. I gave 2 systems for guiding and then, after it is guided to the trajectory on which the target is expected, the rocket goes by itself and the rocket detonates upon arriving within a lethal radius of destruction of the target. G: At what distance is this - is this controlled by a radio impulse or what? S: The distance is the computed one at which detonation would destroy the aircraft and this is automatically set in the rocket. Of course, it would also detonate on contact but this is not relied upon. G: In other words, it detonates on a type of proximity fuse. S: These are considered to be reliable rockets; they have been proven and they are being produced in quantity and are being given to PVO units. These are the rockets fired at Powers. They are considered to be a good and reliable rocket.

54. Q: What did you mean when you said that 96 can be fired by a battalion? Of course, this is not a salvo. Is this what you call a unit of fire? S: We call this a unit of fire (A MK or BOMBENSTELLUNG). For every type of rocket, in fact for every shell of every gun, the MK is different. Q: Therefore, this is the unit of fire for a V-75 rocket battalion. S: Yes. A certain number are on the starting pads and in the ready position and the balance of 96 are back further in reserve.

55. Q: What is the inter-relation between this type of battalion and anti-aircraft guns and fighter aviation? S: How do you mean this -- by kilometer of front -- or for a particular defense position? Q: Well, let us assume a defensive position such as the city of SVERDLOVSK. S: I understand. The ideal situation is not yet attainable for the simple reason that there are as yet not enough of these weapons. Theoretically, the defense of a target is computed on the basis of the size of the target's frontage which is to be protected. A rifle division should have at least one such rocket battalion to protect the division front. This is for computing purposes only and since there are no [illegible] forces at this time there are only strategic targets to be defended.

56. S: For example, when I was duty officer and on the 1st of May 1960, this incident with POWERS took place. I heard that for the entire SVERDLOVSK area, which is large, there were only two such rocket battalions. And, incidentally, the battalion whose rocket had damaged POWERS' plane was the second one of these two and had only been deployed a short while before the incident. You will not yet see in manuals exactly calculated numbers of these units per military formation. The basic estimate will be computed on the kilometers of the front. This, of course, will be flexible because the depth of the front and the dispersion of vital targets therein will play a role in determining the allocation of rocket battalions. Of course, from the viewpoint of administration and tactical control, the Army commander will have a number of such battalions under his control to allocate to the sectors as he sees fit.

57. S: Insofar as the PVO of the land is concerned, each commander places whatever rocket units are given to him in the best defensive position to protect the vital targets in his area to the fullest degree that he can. Until more units are available, he must do the best he can with what he has. There is no such thing as one battalion per ten kilometers of defensive front. Of course we would like this, but thus far we simply have not yet obtained it because we do not have enough units.

58. Q: Have any rockets been developed that can intercept a plane flying under 3,000 meters? S: No, there are no such rockets. Such planes will be defended against by anti-aircraft guns (up to the limit of their ceilings) and

by rocket-carrying fighter planes of the type I told you about. Since the MIGs can fire four to five kilometers above themselves with these rockets, you may consider that they can defend up to an altitude of 25 kilometers.

59. G: Still on this rocket - here is a theoretical question. Suppose planes are attacked from different directions. How does the commander of the battalion decide which target to engage? S: That is a difficult question. Today the PVO expects attacks against major objectives such as Moscow and Leningrad to come from what we call "star formations" or planes attacking from several directions at one time. To defend against this, rocket fires are assigned approach sectors to defend in, and they will engage the nearest plane which enters their sector. Of course, if simultaneous attacks are made from all directions they should be engaged by all units, but this is impossible because we do not have that extent of defenses yet.

60. G: Of all the equipment that you have listed for the V-75, there certainly must be special radar control units specifically designed to service the V-75 battalion. You did not give any details on the specific radar unit. S: In the organization of the PVO of the Land there are all kinds of early warning and radar stations which are integrated with each other and are used to control anti-aircraft fire, etc. These are, of course, integrated as auxiliary help for the rocket battalion. All I gave you in my description was the specific electronic controls and units indispensable to aid and fire the rocket. To have this completely integrated with the PVO radar system is what we are desperately working on. This is one of our greatest deficiencies, particularly where electronics are concerned. That is why such great emphasis now is being placed on the development of electronics.

61. S: In addition to this there is another great deficiency -- that is deficiency of personnel. I mentioned that we have added the 5th department of electronics to the rocket academy and even though 2,500 students attend the academy, we say that it will still take two to three years in order to have sufficient personnel in all branches -- in Radar techniques - in Technical equipment - and war heads, etc. So I say, KHRUSHCHEV needs at least two to three years in order to be ready in all the areas. All these "sausages" which they are assembling (KLEPATUPNYA) in the factories, simply because they are making so many of them, and which are stored under ground and in other areas, require personnel to service and maintain them from all angles. At present there are very few people like this. From the strategic viewpoint, the time to attack is now - a year ago would have been even better. Every day he strengthens his position.

62. G: There isn't much description of the (PELENGATOR) Radar, which services and belongs to these, the V-75. It just says that it is connected to the radar and that's all. S: Yes, we were given only the principles of this in our course. G: I see, you were not given details. S: You see, if I were really paying a lot of attentionto it ... I was more concerned with the technical equipment aspect of it - in its possibilities and construction. I still think that in these courses, there were more professional engineers, technicians - and of course there were some line officers. This technique is not new - this radar aiming computation for the rocket. I could get it but in the course I took we were given the technical equipment, the working principles.

63. (Another photo shown Subject, #2) S: This is a guided rocket. This top part can be taken off, and there are some assembled without this cover. G: I see, this little basket. S: It isn't a basket really. It's on this rotating swivel (VERTLIUG) and it actually holds this rocket. I think during the first parade two of these were shown - let's see, two, four, six of them.

64. S: This is not the R-2. G: Not the R-2? S: Not the R-2. We did not study this rocket operationally (AKTIVNO). Wait a bit - no - this was a very poor photograph. This is not a guided rocket; this is a free rocket, dry fuel rocket (PORCHKOVAYA RAKETA). That's right. This swivel comes off. This is the 3R-2. It isn't a guided rocket. This, by the way, is the base for the set-up which I was describing to you - the launching installation (PUSKOVAYA USTANOVKA) on the hull of the tank -- the amphibious tank (PLAVAUYSHCHIY TANK). G: T-76? S: That's right, T-76.

65. G: Are these T-76 tanks heavier than your new T-54? S: No, this is an old model. This is why they are considered so expendable. The turrets are removed; the frame is made over to make a launching ramp. Yes, this is an amphibious tank. They are considered to be in the middle category in regard to their trackability (PROKHODIMOST), etc. This is a free rocket. I couldn't make it out at first; couldn't see the head because the shadow of the jacket was in the way. There are no more of these. Let me tell you something - they put on this covering simply as a red herring (TEM' NA PLYTKEM' NAVESTI) so that under these covers (KOZHUKHI) one would not be able to see the locations and types of connections, unions and all the other equipment. They don't have this one any more and we did not study this assembly.

#7

66. S: (Looking at photo #3) Here - these two things - this is the R-2. G: This is the guided rocket? S: Yes, yes. This is the carrier which transports it from the storage station to the assembly point when it is already on the technical position. The carriers have a special lifting mechanism, and by this the rocket is lifted to the launching pad. Now to go further, it is attached in two places -- I wrote about it - there are bronze bushings (VTULKI) which hold the guying ropes until the moment of release when the rocket is given free flight (SVOBODNYY KHOD). This stuff shown here is, excuse the expression, junk, trash, -- as far as guided rockets are concerned. Their idea was to show something very large. This thing is very long. See, in other words, what a colossal thing we have! This is the old R-2.

67. S: (Looking further at picture) Here was the American Embassy - then the Hotel Nationale. These over here are all free rockets and here is the Anti-Aircraft unit (ZENITKA). Here were the famous KATIUSHI (rockets in racks). I described them before -- free rockets -- two rows of them. What kind of parade is this? These are all R-2 rockets. This we have already defined - here let me have the magnifying glass. Anyway, they showed R-1 and R-2 at the parade.

68. J: What's R-1? S: According to military SOP this shouldn't be like this - the columns are formed this way and these are formed later alongside and the order is from the smallest, the KATIUSHI, up to the largest - to these sausages. Very typical is the fact that the R-1 was not shown in any of the parades - or the Hawk (KOKSHUN). I haven't seen the free rocket with liquid fule. I saw only one parade with rockets, it's true. I was alone and I saw the preparations for the parade on the airfield on the Leningrad Shosse - near Sokol Airport. Three or four times they marched past beginning with the drummers, the band, and finishing with these things.

69. H: (In English) I think we'll go on at this stage of these questions here about various other ones of interest. G: Yes, you mentioned that there are other... S: Not 2, 3, - these are 7. I wrote in one note... G: Is there an R9? H: R9, 7 and 5? G: The R5 is there. S: I emphasized the R5, 7 and 9 because they are identical in construction and all are large in size (RAZMA) and in range. But the R7 and R9 rockets are not yet in serial production. Many are being made but not on a conveyer system, but of course machinery and rockets and technical equipment can be made in great quantities without a conveyer - not mass production. All the rockets are identical and have big range...I mentioned them because they exist but we did not study them. But with the R5, I saw it and opened the cover (CRYSHKOL) and looked into the cavities. It is formidable. G: But it is not in serial production. S: No. G: How about the R-14? S: I only referred to the R-14 but it is not in serial production. They mentioned it. The range is greater than 1000 - the R-14.

#7 CORRECTION

70. (G explains in English) Well, now what are they working on; what are the difficulties? One can enlarge a rocket our of proportion (RAKETU RAZDUT' NE PO MERKE), as they say -- in length and in width -- but then it is necessary to tie in (PRIVYAZAT') and to develop the corresponding electronic apparatus so that this rocket can be brought through the active phase with the necessary speed/direction. Recalculations begin and these lead to the foundation of new electronic techniques. This is where the blockage .... It is necessary to assemble the casing (NAKLEPAT' KOZHUKH); to arrange all the spaces with all these feeding devices, turbo connections and so on. This is no difficulty. The technical recalculation to make a larger combustion chamber is no problem -- the development of combustion chambers has progressed well, the deficiency is that the metal does not yet meet our requirements. They are working on high-heat, resistant steels. They have developed some that do not correspond sufficiently to the demands made of them. G: And the even numbers which are not completed -- what were these? Experimental? The R-6 or the R-8? S: Yes, experimental. They receive these numbers. They all existed. They go in order. They work -- perhaps there is some modification or addition and perhaps there will be an R-8 or R-10. If there is an R-14, there is an R-13. H: There is already? S: But they have not mentioned the R-13 to me, therefore, I did not mention it because I did not hear of it by ear, not once, and I did not see it.

71. G: When KHRUSHCHEV said that there are already rockets with a range of 2 to 4,000 kilometers and that they are even producing larger ones with a collosal range, was he right or not? Or have there been experiments in which they were fired accurately at a target? S: In such large questions of strategic rockets and attacks with strategic weapons, he lies and puts out what he wants as if it were true, believe me. You can check this as you like through other channels and you will hear the same. There are rockets like those which launched the Sputnik; there are intercontinental rockets with which one can fire from one continent to the other -- a warhead and its carrier. On accuracy, he lies like a gray stallion. I swear to you that these were the most exact data which I could collect on the vertical, the lateral deviating over a trajectory and on the deviations of accuracy (RASSEIVANIYE) of free rockets. And the position is very difficult because electronic technique is unreliable -- sometimes they do have successful experiments, but it is still not firm enough for adoption on a massive scale. He can fire a rocket at South America -- but to say it will fall on Cuba in support of our forces who are supporting Castro -- he lies like a gray stallion.

72. J: Excuse me, how do you know this? Is this your opinion? (In English) S: No, it is the opinion of Marshal VARENTSOV -- my opinion is not enough (in English). You know you are putting questions of an engineering nature to me. Even when I was on the course, I did not thoroughly understand because I have no basis for this, and I did try. I blindly accepted what was written down, what I heard, what was in my notebook, what was in the summary, what was in the manuals (NASTAVLENIYE). There were five manuals covering the whole course (POTOK) (SYLLABUS) and I, as leader, took one whenever I needed it. The data were absolutely accurate for that time. There are now working to decrease the lateral deviation and range deviation to attain greater accuracy. But I never did hear that there had been any progress made. VARENTSOV says, "There is not a damned thing, only talk." New models are made, tests are being run. In some particular aspects there are successes and elsewhere there are complete failures. But tests are going on everywhere; new parts are being designed, built, and tested. Cadres are being trained quickly and in large numbers, but there is still a mass of shortcomings. And when Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Nixon -- especially Mr. Nixon -- said that, "We know that you have been unsuccessful in developing this and that", ...of course they were absolutely correct -- and it would have been funny if he had been asked, "How did NEDELIN die?".

73. S: One small incidental point -- say you had gotton together and said, "Look, you (KHRUSHCHEV) seriously want to come to terms with us about coexistance, disarmament, etc., but how can you be believed, when in your own name and in that of the Central Committee of the Praesidium, you falsely stated to us and to the world about how NEDELIN died. What difference does it make how he died? It is a pity that he died, let us say in general, but how can we believe you when you lie about such a great man?". What would he say to you in reply? You could really expose him by confronting him with this fact. G: He would probably beat on the table with his shoe.

74. J: Ask him about the 3 at the beginning of the series. G: What is the significance of the number 3 which begins the series? S: Free rockets have the index 3, as the index 8 is used for all guided rockets about which I mentioned earlier. Even the heater, where the hot air is pocketed, begins with the number 8, since it is used for guided rockets. Thus it begins with an 8. But for free rockets this index is 3.

75. G: And your V-75? S: No, the V-75 has several variations, as I wrote. They also use 750. Why do they do this, while others in the Garrisons of the OKRUG say V-75? BIRYUZOV and his

staff say 75. But for study purposes they say 750. How did these contradictions arise? V-750 came originally from the DZERZHINSKIY Academy; the director there is ODINTSEV. They could tell your relative in the academy, "refer to this as V-75". I'm just giving you this as an example. Whenever camouflage designations are used, I'll give you both since I know what they are. G: Has it been in serial production for long? S: I estimate like this -- as I understood all the instructors -- that this rocket was already (developed) in 1956 -- the V-75. G: Probably there were improvements? S: Still again, I will repeat my thoughts, though I am not your professor. Every year they perfect it and they will continue to perfect it. But there will not be any significant changes from the basic model which they have. G: This answers the question.

76. S: Now I will ask you -- on engineering subjects -- do not put big questions to me. I said this from the very beginning. To present the material in the form I did was my idea -- I thought it best. I wanted to put everything about a rocket on one page -- length, construction -- all details, but I thought this must be known. I thought perhaps this way would give "my" scientists -- yours I mean, American and English -- a helping hand. Perhaps they think that the Russians are doing this incorrectly, or perhaps it is progress. For that reason I did it altogether and possibly I made a mix-up. This is a proper question you asked, to the point .. that the data on the V-75 guidance system is very general. I have not had them yet, perhaps I shall be able to get them in detail. Well, there is not much new. J: When he copied these documents, was it a complete copy or did he extract what he considered significant? S: I will tell you. The information on the R-11 rocket, I copied completely, but some of the sections on the other rockets I copied fully and others I copied as it seemed to me "the main idea" (in English). I wrote so much that I got a corn as big as this, on my finger .... then I copied it out. I had the idea of typing, but I would still be typing. And then I wrote it out twice, since you would never have deciphered my abbreviations.

(77) S: When SHUMSKIY summoned me about the unpleasantness about my father, about which I had worried so much -- then I was quite glad..... I was quite glad when they put me in an ops section because it showed that they trusted me. They gave me agent contacts, operational code, a seal, the red book -- everything. Well, during this period I deciphered all the material and copied it out. I already had a feeling of mistrust towards them, my intuition which has not deceived me. Sometime after November I went to the selection commission for the MDA course and after that in 1960 I went to the GNTK, and I tried to give you this material as quickly as

possible. It had been with me for eight months -- I am thinking of 12 August when I had my first encounter with foreigners. Already two months before this everything was typed and ready.

73. S: Once again I tell you that there is nothing additional that is particularly new on these rockets. Everything additional, as it becomes known to me, I will get to you in detail. That is what I wanted to say to you on this subject.

74. G: How quickly can the V-75 be combat ready? S: All rockets are normally kept "dry", as it is called -- you know the expression -- a "dry rocket". The fueling equipment and machines, booster, of course, the charges (SHASHKI) or "KONFEKTY" (candies) as they are called .... There are small KONFEKTY and large ones for the R rockets. These are all stored in hermetically-stored containers. I wrote down the sizes of the wooden crates for the rockets, and for dry fuel. There are large metal ones, air-tight. The fueling equipment is not badly worked out. Under pressure, the fuel is loaded quickly into the rocket compartments -- how many seconds it takes, I do not want to guess. All this already exists. The V-75 interests you, doesn't it -- just for preparation to fire?

75. G: How quickly can a second one be sent up after the first half has been fired? S: A rocket which is already charged and on its launching position .... As soon as the command "I "prepare to fire" is given, the crew begins to prepare the second rocket. They bring up the necessary equipment and begin. The rocket is brought up on its carrier to the launching pad. The sequence of command is like this. As soon as the commander has given the alarm, already from a distance of 3-400 kilometers, the radars transmit from one distance (GLUBINA) to another point closer to the position showing that the hostile target is approaching. The command is "IDET TSEL". They are already starting to prepare rockets. I wrote all about this preparation.

76. G: And do you think China is getting rockets? S: They are giving rockets to China. G: Already? Which type? S: They are giving them all the types that are in production. They are giving everyone free rockets and guided rockets. Mao Tse Tung had very outspoken talks about progress on this subject in Peking. He wanted us to follow his road. That's what it came to. That is what several people have told me.

77. G: Do rocket forces have special insignia? S: None at all. Only the artillery uniform with black (insignia) PETLITSY, cannons on the PETLITSY; if an overcoat is worn, the national emblem, stars, black piping on the cap. No special insignia. They have taken away the symbol which the anti-tank troops had, a cross.

There was no need for it. One can still tell parachute troops. They have a parachute designation and a metal tag to show how many jumps a man has made -- ten, twelve, one, three, a hundred....

78. G: Do rocket men not wear special insignia even in Moscow? S: Of course not. I saw a photograph of a man who has been made a Hero of Soviet Labor four times -- a rocket constructor -- and there have been many people who have been a Hero of Soviet Labor three times in radio or electronic equipment. They give them money and so forth secretly, but this is not published in the newspapers. Awards are constantly being given in secret and now KHRUSHCHEV says ..... Under Stalin, awards were given to excess. No, there is no distinguishing insignia -- in order to camouflage them and not to distinguish them differently in the Army. You could photograph the rocket people quite easily -- those who live in the dormitory buildings. Count them up and note into which entrance of ours they go. The others live on the Academy premises. But there is no special uniform.

79. G: The soldiers -- the signal troops, the engineers, etc., -- do they use their own service insignia? S: They are considered auxiliary troops -- the signals, chemical engineering troops are presently considered important branches of their respective services. G: Have they taken away their insignia? (ZNACHKI). S: They have left them their emblems (EMBLEMI); there is no change. There is nothing new about the uniforms as regards the insignia. There is one sort of uniform which has been developed for officers -- and is now being issued -- a jacket, with a split in the back. Both the parade and the daily uniforms are khaki. The parade uniform is worn with gold shoulderboards, and cap with gold braid and all that junk, and the rest is khaki. I know uniforms "exactly".

80. G: And the RB-47? How did you hear about that? Who was the source? S: I heard exactly that our patrol forces and our radar detachments, which were in that sector, detected an aircraft and located it, and put up our aircraft, one of which came close to it, and shot it down over neutral waters. We know this very well. But we could not admit to KHRUSHCHEV, "I am sorry. Excuse me, I am to blame -- I destroyed it at the wrong place. He hadn't crossed the frontier, but I bagged him". -- SVOLOCH. I was told this by Sergey SERGEYEVICH and by Vladimir FEDOROV who has now been in Germany for two years.

81. G: What is FEDOROV? S: FEDOROV now commands a brigade and was formerly the Aide de Camp to Sergey Sergeyevich. G: Of these same rocket forces? S: Yes, of course.

82. S: Perhaps I am exaggerating our possibilities but it seems to me that it should be easy for us to know everything that is going on in Germany exactly. Therefore, we can immediately set ourselves this task. We know that there are these four brigades because (Subject's own name) told us -- two brigades equipped to fire atomic missiles. Where are these brigades? Force a German to locate them for you. There are storage areas under ground. I was told this by GRIZLOV. Nevertheless, he said to me, "We have not enough protective devices to protect the personnel who work with these atomic weapons -- their hair falls out because of the radioactivity and the radiation to which they are exposed. People are afraid to go in. They are paid; they are told that everything is normal and fine and safe, but they are afraid. Within a short time -- a year or 18 months -- they become ill. Something is lacking. There may be safety measures under laboratory control but this has not been yet done for combat situations.

83. G: You also told us that there were earlier cases in which people like NEDELIN ..... Was this known definitely? S: Definitely. Mr. NIXON could have spat in KHRUSHCHEV's face when he asked whether there had been cases of unsuccessful launchings and KHRUSHCHEV said, "No, there were none. You are a clever chap, you have figured everything out". There are disastrous cases to this day. I give you my word of honor. At first they didn't send up a man but living matter, plants, biological specimens, etc. Then they sent up a robot which began to work in 10-15 minutes, with the help of signal impulses sent from the earth and which was the model of a man -- an automatic man. There are many volunteers who are keen to go!

84. S: Do you know about the sputnik which was lost? Well you know that they launched it at cosmic speed -- you understand cosmic speed; there is no need to talk about it? It is generally known. Well, it was launched and then they lost control of it. G: Did VARENTSOV tell you that? S: No, they say this quite openly in general discussion and I repeat this as rumors strung together. Everyone knows about them -- FEDOROV, BUZIN, VARENTSOV, several other generals. I will give you a list if you like.....

85. G: Are the Moscow defenses around the town all completed? -- the anti-aircraft guns, the rockets, etc.? S: I will tell you. We, the General Staff, believe that you see Moscow as target #1 on a list of 5 targets in order of significance -- Moscow, Leningrad, and all the oil districts like Baku, which is a special zone. The PVO has a center there. I mention this to you so you will know in general of the number of such defenses. These are excellently defended. There is emphasis on the Urals, where heavy industry is

defended. There are defenses in front of the Urals and behind the Urals. V-75s have been sent there because your aircraft have often been detected there. I give you my word of honor that when your first flight came over in the direction of Kiev-Kharkov -- there was one flight there that we knew about, where the Soviet air space was violated but there was nothing to shoot with. Now that the new rockets have appeared, KHRUSHCHEV has given the order to fire. So they shot at POWERS on the 1st of May. There were (defenses) before but not in quantity and they were not able to go into action as quickly as they can now. They existed, but not in the right direction..... BIRYUZOV was reprimanded because he had not correctly estimated the probable direction of the flights from the point-of-view of importance of the targets. That is to say -- they would have fired when this aircraft from Turkey flew over Kiev, but there was nothing to fire with -- the aircraft escaped. POWERS would have escaped if he had flown 1 or 1½ kilometers tothe right of his flight path.

86. J: To your knowledge, how many such U-2 flights were there that you heard of? (G translates). S: I know of five such flights -- I know exactly because I was told by someone who would not mislead me. I would work with him "in the dark" (unwittingly). He is Major General Andrey Romanovich POZOVNIY, head of the Political Directorate of BIRYUZOV's PVO, the former deputy to VARENTSOV in the Political Section on the 1st Ukrainian Front. VARENTSOV had him promoted to Major General.

87. S: Immediately after the war, VARENTSOV began on a series of jobs which I will try to explain. He commanded (the Artillery) of the Central Group of Forces, the artillery in Lvov in the Transcarpathian Military District, then the Artillery in the Transcaucasian Military District, Tbilisi, and then, when YAKOVLEV was jailed, and the late NEDELIN -- who was the commander of the artillery after VORONOV -- called him from Tbilisi and put him in charge of GAU, while ZHDANOV was a Colonel General. VARENTSOV immediately modified the gun which needed a cooling device, for which YAKOVLEV, a Colonel General, was jailed. POZOVNIY lost touch with VARENTSOV at that time -- they respect each other; go to each other's homes.

88. S: POZOVNIY lives near SOKOL. He has a flat and is married with two grown-up sons. POZOVNIY went to work in the PVO with Marshal BIRYUZOV -- in political work. Then he quarreled with BIRYUZOV and it is interesting how a big chief can bite a lesser one. BIRYUZOV is a Hero of the Soviet Union. In Lyubertsy, we have a sort of engineering base, in the hands of BIRYUZOV. He ordered them to make him ten duplicate Hero of the Soviet Union medals. The

original is in gold with a number but these were stamped out of brass in the same design and dimensions. He planned to wear them on one jacket or another in order to protect the real gold ones. That is what he wanted, but POZOVNIY came to Lyubertsy to inspect the garrisons and said, "What is all this about? Is this some sort of Mint? The Mint is in the Kremlin and in Leningrad. What are you doing?" They said it was for Marshal BIRYUZOV. POZOVNIY went too far. He reacted in such a way that they said, "You are making yourself look foolish. Do you think that some subordinate will wear these stars? Or will pass himself off as a Hero; will get some sort of reward?" This is not allowed -- forgery either of the national emblem or of medals and orders. He clashed with BIRYUZOV and was kicked out to be Deputy to the Commander of the PVO zone in Baku. I often meet POZOVNIY and I will bring him a present from Great Britain. He is a good person. He is a political worker in the PVO. He is just back from Baku. He didn't want to work there because he left a large 3-room flat in Moscow. In Baku, he lived in a hotel. His sons are grown up. His wife has moved into the flat. He has just arrived and has set himself up in Moscow. He will work in the PVO again somewhere. He is a great source for us. There are a good many people there.

89. G: Do you know whether they are preparing air-to-ground rockets of great power? S: Yes, they are preparing them from a fighter aircraft. They are working on them but I do not know anything concrete about any models. The one which was developed from the submarine rockets, the P-5, has been issued to the land forces already.

90. G: What about anti-missile missiles? S: They are working on them too. This is the type which intercepts a missile on its trajectory. They plot this trajectory from the moment of its launching to determine its course and to bring about impact at a certain point, as they try to with a V-75 and an aircraft. G: There is nothing in service? S: Nothing. Perhaps there is something on paper but they are working on it.

91. S: Now something else they are working on -- once again I draw your attention to it. It is the development of a fuel of the highest possible calorific value by means of atomic disintegration in the rocket and to launch the rocket with this fuel. If they do this, it will be "something terrible".

92. G: Does the Air Force have its own V-75's installed around its bases, which are subordinate to it? S: Why should the Air Force need the V-75's? We have battalions armed with V-75's under the PVO of the Land, which protect the Air Force and its bases. There is no reason to give theair forces V-75's organically. The PVO has them, as well as the aviation.

#7

93. G: On the R-5, does it need a launching platform or a foundation? S: A foundation is essential. Otherwise, it creates difficulties. Time is necessary and so forth. It is necessary to reinforce the ground. All launching platforms are also reinforced by means of guy wires. By the way, I can send you a part of the rocket. I have one which I put in my pocket with markings of #8 on it. It is a level magnetic plate. The magnetic plate is put in any position on the rocket in order to level it; it is particularly used to level the launching pad.

94. Presumably they are already building sites for bases for the R-5 or are they not often displaced? S: This is a very good and very correct question. Very many engineering troops are already building sites in predetermined directions in order that a firing platform and all equipment for rockets can be quickly set up. Whether this will be fully used, or whether it will be abandoned, that is question #2. But the construction is going on throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. Where the siting is exactly determined, construction is completed (SDELANO POTEMKINSKIYEM).

95. (Discussion between G, H & J on agenda and on the next question to be put.) G: We are trying to ask our questions in order. S: As I promised you, in the very near future you will be informed of the address where the Captain 1st Rank, with whom I was on leave in Sukhumi, works and near him, is the assembly point of all the parts (UKLON) which arrive from all directions -- a central control zone. All suppliers' deliveries are checked here and he is concerned with this business. You've assigned me this task; the name of the Captain 1st Rank and the town will be given by me. G: You have already mentioned the town where this assembly takes place. S: No, I told you the one in the East, but not the one in the North. There are docks that do this. I know this. "Exactly". I promise that I will work out this whole question completely. G: The town in the East is Mezmalinsk? Did you give the exact location? It is 200 kms east of Kazan. S: No, no. G: Here is the map, see for yourself. (Discussion of location of Mezmalinsk. It eventually transpired that Subject meant Zelenodol'sk, a town which he had visited twice and in which he had stayed overnight.) S: During the war U.S. ships (KATERI) were assembled there. At that time Rear Admiral NETSVITSKIY, now dead, was stationed there. The Armenian engineer General VARDANYAN lives there.(Subject explained that he must have mentioned Mezmalinsk in connection with the boundaries of the wartime Moscow military district and defense zone, which extended from Kalinin to Mezmalinsk. Discussion then turned to the location of Perkhushkovo, where Subject had reported MOSKALENKO's headquarters to be.)

96. G: Has he a big headquarters there? Approximately? S: It is a big headquarters numerically, but how many rooms are there? About 600-800. For each section (OTDEL), there are 2-3 rooms if it is a small one, and 3-4 rooms if it is a medium one. They are still building houses there. (Further discussion of exactlocation of Perkushkovo. Looking at map.) S: I remember I always took the electric train from the BIELORUSSKIY VOKSAL. There are several private houses there. It was formerly a country estate. This was always the center where the POLITSOSTAV (political personnel) carried out its retraining (PERESPOSOTOVKA). Even POZOVNYY studied here at one time. G: How many men would you say are there? 1,000? S: No. More. There is now a large cadre directorate. They have everything, administrative people as well, and they are still building large villas for the courses - grey granite and grey roofs. I was there. J: How many kilometers from Moscow? S: I must think about this more exactly. You must go through Kuntsevo in the woods. There is no Perkushkovo railroad station, and you must go from the nearest station by foot or by car, or straight by car from Moscow. G: If I said there are 1,500 on the staff? S: Probably, but I will not guess. I will find out exactly, because this is a basic headquarters. I will tell you the exact number of kilometers and will tie it in to these other towns. I will consider this essential and 1st task. Previously, my driver took me and he knew the road.

97. S: Can we now think about the question which I mentioned to you the day before yesterday? Give me a small recorder, so that I can put the questions which we need answered and record conversations with VARENTSOV and with other friends. Now there is a 2nd question to think about. Should you give me a pistol in the near future? I have no gun at the moment, nothing. I used to have a very good German officer's pistol but they took it away from me. One is not allowed to have arms. I had a German one with a red marking, a WALTHER. Now I have nothing. Is there anything to prevent me from having something like that? G: There is nothing to prevent you, but isn't it dangerous for you? Why should you have it? S: No. I will have a Minox or.....I ask you to think about it. I think I should tell you what I am thinking about.

98. G: Can you give us any details about this naval rocket -- the P-5? S: No. Everything that they told me was reported. G: Do you know how it is (launched) vertically or at an angle? S: Didn't I write that it can be fired inclined? G: Even under water? S: It is fired at an inclined angle by land troops. G: But one can launchunderwater rockets either at an angle or vertically. S: Absolutely right, on submarines - how is this done, what are they like? When this matter was taught, I put the question, "What sort of launch (START) does it have?" He (the instructor) said, "inclined". I said, "How is this solved?" Technically, when I was in the course they taught me

that for an inclined launch the launching installation (USTANOVKA) must be 4-5 times longer than the rocket. In other words, if a rocket is 8-10 meters, the launcher must be 40-50 meters. One could construct this, but it would require huge supports to keep everything rigid. He said, "(Subject's true name), they have solved this question technically". But how it was solved he did not say. G: On submarines? S: No, for land forces. I do not know how they do it on submarines.

99. G: When he told you about this how did he tell you? Did he say "incidentally, there is such a thing", or how? S: It came about like this. His wife said, "(Subject's true name), I am writing a scientific paper. I am doing secretarial work for a candidate paper of Volodya PARKHOMENKO, my husband. He is the head of the Staff". I asked, "What is the subject?" She said "Rocket forces". Well, what to do? He was a senior instructor instructor at the Military Political Academy on the Bol'shaya Sadovaya. I met him and he said, "We are beginning to instruct the new students in these rockets". I said, "What rockets? I don't remember such. . did not study them in the course". He knew that I was in the course. Well, so on and so forth .. As soon as he left I wrote it down, but it was my question, "What sort of launch? Vertical?" I put the question to him. He respects me and he told me, "inclined". I said, "How can it be inclined? I was told by engineers that an inclined launcher is used for guided rockets. This is simply done for small unguided rockets but it must go progressively -- the length -- the launching installation (USTANOVKA) for large rockets of a great weight". I said, "It must be 4-5 times longer than the rocket so that it can be launched". "This has been solved". That's all he said. G: What are his forenames? Vladimir Ivanovich also Fedorov. Is Vladimir Ivanovich the man who was in Germany, the former Aide-de-Camp?

100. G: Did this PARKHOMENKO tell you that there are about 10 submarines -- or was it at a lecture? S: I heard, in general, that there are submarines with this rocket, but they did not tell us about it or instruct us in it. I heard this from others in the General Staff. PARKHOMENKO never worked in the General Staff.

101. S: One detail about him which you can check -- after he had finished at the Dzerzhinskiy Academy, he married a girl called Ella. She has two daughters. This wife's stepfather was called SELIVANOV, a Colonel in the KGB who worked in Germany. There, he had an affair with the daughter of a Lt. General and she had a child by him. As a result, he set about getting a divorce from Ella's mother. Ella's father is dead; he is not her father. Olga Petrovna, the mother, worked in the General Section of the KGB. She is a member of the Party, a Junior Lieutenant. She was summoned and dismissed; they wanted to expel her from the Party. Why? They said that her husband, Col. SELIVANOV,

had gone over to the Germans. S: Olga Petrovna is the mother of Kila, the mother-in-law of Volodya PARKHOMENKO, my former Chief of Staff in the 51st regiment on the 1st Ukrainian front. Since then we have always kept in touch. I helped him (PARKHOMENKO) get into the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. There was great competition. I introduced him to VARENNIKOV.

102. S: So PARKHOMENKO married Kila and got to know this Colonel SKLIANOV. We can use this information one of these days. I do not remember SKLIANOV's forename. I know only that he worked in the NKB. He was in Germany on NKB business. You can write down exactly the year when everything happened. It was the year when I had a jaw operation. I had a concussion and my jaw was broken and, as you can see, they put in gold bridgework. It was the year when I had the operation that PARKHOMENKO came to me in the hospital and said, "(Subject's true name), something unfortunate has happened. SKLIANOV came to get a divorce from Olga Petrovna, but she would not give him one". They had no children. S: Well, why is this interesting? SKLIANOV disappeared. He is still not back. Then PARKHOMENKO came to me and said, "He has come. He asked Olga Petrovna to give him his things". He had sent many things from Germany. Incidentally, SKLIANOV is a friend of BEROV's. When BEROV was working for BERIA, SKLIANOV sent cases full of stockings from Germany to BEROV.

103. S: That is what PARKHOMENKO told me, and you tell me that I shouldn't bring back presents. Let me take a moment off for a laugh. (Subject shows his extensive list of items to purchase written in his "order notebook".) Well, SKLIANOV said that he was getting a divorce and demanded the things. Olga Petrovna said that she wouldn't consent to a divorce. I said, "To hell with it! He has become involved with the woman and has a child already, so agree to the divorce". He had a lot of money in the bank (NA KNIZHKE) that he kept in his name and she only had some junk. I told Olga to demand 25,000 rubles and let him go. "You can't hold him anyway".

104. S: By the way, their grandmother died recently and VOLODYA is consolidating this apartment where SKLIANOV lived with Olga Petrovna on Sadovaya Chernoyvseskaya UL. next to the Elektr RR station. He moved into a smallapartment in the Beloshuikaih area and wants to consolidate it into three rooms. The grandmother was buried recently. She was the mother of Olga Petrovna KIRSULIROVA. He (SKLIANOV) did not give her money or anything. He left her; took the young daughter of the Lt. General who I think already had a baby girl, and went to Germany. In Germany, he was arrested. He did not have time to escape. But later, (we) checked through all channels and there was no confirmation of the arrest. I think he escaped; we have to check this.

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105. S: This is Ella's stepfather (SKLIANKOV). G: An interesting person? S: A good friend of the pilots CHKALOV and TYUMENEV. He was as close to SKROV as I am to VARENTSOV. G: Where did he flee? The West? S: To the West; she was notified that he was arrested. There was, however, no official notice received.

106. S: She (Olga Petrovna) worked for the NKVD at Lyubyanka, as a Junior Lt.; she wore a uniform. She worked for 19 years; she lacked one year to get a pension. We get pensions after 20 years. Now she has a small job because she was reprimanded along the Party line for her short-sightedness, because her husband happened to be an enemy of the Soviet Union and because she did not discover and report his unreliability. They wanted to exclude her from the Party. Her hair turned grey. She is very patriotic -- a member of the Party -- a Communist, everything. They left her in the Party but gave her a strong reprimand. Not another word was uttered about SKLIANKOV.

107. S: There is one interesting detail -- PARKHOMENKO is in close contact with me and as I was planning to leave to come to England, he called and said, "Dear Oleg Vladimirovich, let's go look at apartments". He proposed to rent a 3-room apartment and occupy two rooms ... to share the apartment. It is hard to get apartments there, you know. But this is beside the point. He is a close friend of mine; he wouldn't lie to me. I had heard about the existence of the P-5 rocket in the Navy, but I did not know details about it. He gave me the details that I just gave you; they are his details.

108. G: Did the instructor tell you about the serial production of up to 10 submarines? S: I was never told this by instructors. I have friends in the General Staff. I will list them and... G: I want to write this down. It is a very important thing to clarify the exact source. S: You see, if this was said about 6 month's ago, it would be alright, but if it was said much earlier... G: I know, two years ago.. that is even more important. S: CHECHERIN told me about this. He was subordinate to me when I was there -- the Acting Military Attache in Turkey. He was assigned to the staff of VVS; I told you. He is a fool, in his ability, development, etc. Let's see, who else told me? Another high ranking supervisor, I can't remember who it was now and I don't want to guess. G: Don't. S: I don't have the right to. G: Okay, don't. This is such an important article that it was necessary to ask. S: I understand.

109. S: I will soon give you the name of the city where the Captain 1st Rank, with whom I was on vacation and the one who works on this matter..I told you that there are docks for the assembling of (submarines) in the Far East.

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I will tell you about the north. G: Wait a minute. You don't remember if he told you where he was located? S: I have it written some place. G: If I told you about the city name, would you recognize it? S: No, I have forgotten and I don't want to guess. No, please don't steer me away from what I know; there might be a second place that you know about. G: Fine.

110. S: I told you my biography in such detail that it was unpleasant for me. Why did it happen that for a year I was not accounted for? G: Probably because during our first meeting you told us everything so fast that it was missed. S: I told you, I've had the materials for over a year. G: Well, now it is 1961 already, more than a year. S: That is what I said, I tried to contact you, but did not get an answer. When I tried to contact you, I had all this in the trunk. G: Okay, all this is now clear.

111. G: Now a question that interests us -- this region of Northern Leningrad is not connected with the bases? S: Murmansk Oblast? G: Yes, Murmansk Oblast, but not connected with the bases? S: No, absolutely not. It is connected with the launching pads, made from reinforced concrete, with rockets deployed there and aimed at England, not at France. G: Fine. What type of rockets are these, type R5? S: Exactly, R5, R-7, R-9. G: They are of 2,000 KM range? S: Yes, they have to be because the distance is so much. They are of this series of rockets. The commander of these rockets is clearly MOSKALENKO. S: They were commanded by the deceased NEDELIN, and now by MOSKALENKO, who inherited this command. VARENTSOV has nothing to do with these.

112. G: Do you know the areas where rockets R-2, R-11 and R-5 are deployed? S: By rocket designation, nothing is known to me. G: Yes, I understand. S: In my understanding, they are deployed against all directions of threat, all around in the Far East, against Iran and Turkey. Here against England, a countries closer than England (Scandinavia), especially against Turkey. When the American troops landed in Lebanon--when ROKOSSOVSKIY was appointed commander... this was all done for pomp as well as propaganda. At this time VARENTSOV was there all the time. VARENTSOV was there in the Trans Caucasian Military District, as commander of the Artillery. S: VARENTSOV was in that area all the time, in Tbilisi and traveling in the area, because KHRUSHCHEV ordered everything to be in battle readiness.

113. S: VARENTSOV was there also at the time of the protest to Pakistan and Turkey about the POWER's flight. They expected another flight and would have fired at it, but not with an atomic warhead. They wanted to have another case of penetration of (Soviet air space). They wanted to say, "Look here,

another penetration!" But then he was afraid, afraid to start a war. But they were ready. These battle positions exist, launching pads fully equipped -- maybe the actual missiles are not standing there but everything else is ready. All this is nearby, underground, in bunkers (in shelters) and all camouflaged. Battle readiness implies that when necessary the (rocket) can be set up and loaded; there is no readiness whereby everything is loaded and ready to fire. Maybe the/solid-fuel/(missiles) are ready to be fired -- I have been told that in some places we have solid-fuel missiles. For example, those against England. But liquid fuel missiles are not ready for firing. I told you how the liquid oxygen evaporates, how the fuel leaks, etc. Missiles cannot stand being fully fueled in the open, only in a semi-hermetically sealed, dry place. I know this type of detail.

114. Q: When you write your reports to us, can you give us the names of the twenty students that were taking the course with you in Moscow and who went to MOSKALENKO? S: Yes, I can do this.

115. S: I have a good friend, Colonel L.P. FILIPOVICH. He is the Chief of the Permanent VAKA connected to the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. He was my chief. I don't remember his name and patronymic. He lives on Ulitsa Gorkogo, opposite the telegraph office. I visited his home. He has one daughter who took the examinations to enter the (medical) institute three times, but was not accepted. VARENTSOV wrote a letter and helped her get into evening school at the university, which she attends now; she works during the day at a hospital. He is a good friend. You will see his signature on the copy of the evaluation (KHARAKTERISTIKA) that he gave me upon completion of VAKA. It is typed and has the seal of the Academy. Q: We have this. Here it is. To whom is VARENTSOV, as commander of the artillery, etc., subordinate to? S: The commander of the Ground Forces CHUIKOV. Q: Only? Is it considered to be a separate staff? S: Yes, the Ground Forces staff. Q: And under this staff, is it subordinate to the CHief of this staff, or is it separate? S: The staff of the Ground Forces together with the Commander and his staff, also together with the commanders of the Main Directorates and the commanders of various Arms of Ground Forces -- they are all subordinate to the General Staff and then to the Minister. Q: I understand. S: An ARM of troops is a category. MOSKALENKO has an ARM of troops and so does VARENTSOV, a category defined by the responsibilities and conditions.

116. S: The chain of command is, for example, MOSKALENKO, Chief of the General Staff; the Minister (of Defense); KHRUSHCHEV, Commander in Chief, Lt. General Nikita Sergeyevich (sarcastically). VARENTSOV is the commander of Rocket Troops of the Ground Forces and is subordinate to CHUIKOV; the Chief of Staff, ZHADOV -- formerly ZHUKOV -- and that is the chain of command. When you ask how the command goes beyond that item, you must have in mind the Chief of Staff, his Deputy, and the Minister of Defense, etc. VARENTSOV is unhappy that he has double subordination. He is responsible to the Chief of the General Staff, his Deputy, and the Commander CHUIKOV. Q: Both ways?

S: But organically, his command is part of the Ground Forces. G: I understand, and he is on the same level as other ARMS, such as Tank Forces, etc., under Ground Forces exactly? S: Yes. G: VARENTSOV would like a higher command but they won't give it to him because when BERZLIN died, the highest military Soviet met with your friend KHRUSHCHEV (laughs). He is such a mean wretch, this impudent person who seized power right out from under the nose of everyone. He was upheld by the Secretaries of the OBKOMS. He was Minister of Agriculture for almost 3 days .. appointed by MOLOTOV and MALENKOV. There was this military Soviet to decide whom to appoint (to replaced BERZLIN). The first candidate mentioned was VARENTSOV. They wanted to appoint VARENTSOV. He has many enemies. He is a very severe CHEKIK, very fair, a very honest and good man. He puts his soul into his work. But VARENTSOV does not have enough education, especially highly theoretical; he has not finished a single academy. He didn't graduate from Dzerzhinskogo, Frunze or Voroshilova General Staff Academy. He only attended courses for a year someplace at the General Staff Academy like the General Staff courses I took at the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy. But he studied at the VAK of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (Note: The Voroshilov Academy has been transferred to Frunze.) -- where your friend is now recruiting Negroes and is establishing an agent network in order to let our Soviets establish their domination there.

117. S: This should be eliminated through all possible means, and I don't think there will be any threat to me if we say that we know about this and explain to the Negroes not to go. Then the University will be closed. (People's Friendship University) G: You think they will go to study there? S: No, only Whites will go to study there. VARENTSOV was named as a candidate. In the past, he was always supported by his former Commander-in-Chief KONEV, former Chief of the General Staff Sokilovskiy. When they left, they became ill -- but they are healthier than many. But VARENTSOV did not get support here this time. VARENTSOV was on very good terms with KHRUSHCHEV since the time when KHRUSHCHEV was a member of the Military Soviet of Vatutin on the 1st Ukrainian Front where VARENTSOV was Commander of the Artillery. I have a photograph as a keepsake that shows Nikita Sergeyevich, SOKILOVSKIY, VATUTIN and VARENTSOV standing together. G: VATUTIN was killed near Kiev, was he not? S: Yes, he was killed when he was in command of the First Ukrainian Front. G: KHRUSHCHEV was very well disposed towards VARENTSOV. Being a turbulent person by nature, I learned a lot from VARENTSOV regarding this.

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118. S: He wrote a letter to KHRUSHCHEV saying that there was a mess (BARDAK) in the management of the Armed Forces -- certain rockets were held back, funds were not given, support was not given, etc. He wrote it a series of Top Secret material in a letter to KHRUSHCHEV. He wrote it because it is impossible to get an appointment to see KHRUSHCHEV. He contacted an important person who has direct access to KHRUSHCHEV and asked him to give it to KHRUSHCHEV, but at that moment, suddenly, KHRUSHCHEV left Moscow and the letter went to SUSLOV, member of the PRESIDIUM, and the Secretary of the Central Committee. SUSLOV read the letter; it did not mean anything to him. He called in MALINOVSKIY and told him, "Your Commander of Rocket Troops brings up general matters and problems in a sound manner and correctly". The existence of this letter was reported to KHRUSHCHEV much later but the letter was not given to him. The Minister of Defense, MALINOVSKIY, asked VARENTSOV, "What are you doing? Why are you reporting about me behind my back? Why didn't you come directly to me with these ideas and questions?" The Commander of the Ground Forces also wanted to know why he went around the Chain of Command, because they were questioned regarding these matters in the letter, since they are responsible for them. VARENTSOV is a very good worker, and to bite at him directly, they could break their teeth -- but they knife him constantly. When NEDELIN died, VARENTSOV was not appointed to his position. On Artillery Day, everyone expected VARENTSOV to be awarded the title of Chief Marshal of Artillery, as VORONOV, but he did not receive it. They were holding everything back from him. Let's see what happens on the 2nd of September. Will they give him the Order of LENIN or not. (Note: VARENTSOV's new title of Chief Marshal of Artillery was announced in PRAVDA in May 1961).

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119. G: Who is in charge of, for example, the adoption of new rockets? Where are they developed, assembled, etc? You understand, not only the quartermaster part but the engineering, new developments, etc. S: I understand. The first scientific center, the brain of rocket technology, is considered to be the Academy in the name of Dzerzhinskiy. Major Generals of the Engineers, the Artillery Engineers and Technical Services are concentrated there. Also Major Generals are department (KAFEDRA) heads; two of them are strong theoreticians who develop designs as heads of the faculties. I told you earlier that there are 4 generals and 1 colonel in the 4th faculty.

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120. S: PETRENKO -- you see how I remember names, and you say I start mixing everything up at midnight. G: Is he a general? S: No, PETRENKO is a Colonel, the only one. The rest are generals. There they plan and create scientific laboratories and theoretical doctrines which are later reported. Besides this, there is the Scientific Soviet of the GAU -- it is called Military Scientific Soviet of the Main Artillery Directorate (Voennyy Uchenyy Sovet pri Glavnom Artilleriyskom Upravlenii ya). The main artillery administration and the head, Colonel General ZHDANOV, as I told you before, has concentrated in his hands all equipment production, all the non-military plants of the country that work for the army. He also has a Scientific Construction Directorate, very large and powerful, where all the theoreticians sit.

121. S: Then there is a second center, the Rocket Academy. I did not start with the Academy without reason -- for there they concern themselves directly only with one item -- rockets. At GAU they have many directorates -- electronic equipment; various other equipment, on fuels, explosives, etc.

122. S: The third, in the hands of VARENTSOV, and now, also in the hands of MOSKALENKO -- there are the NII, Scientific Research Institutes. There is more than one. One of the institutes is located on the premises of the Academy in the name of Dzerzhinskiy, it has a separate head and carries out scientific research only. They get what is invented at GAU and transfer it to blueprints, put it on paper. Then the new process goes to the plant for production of the prototype, for testing, etc.

123. S: The second NII is at SOKOLNIKI, not far from the American, now British, Exhibit. It is beyond the SOKOLNIKI Park, about 8 kilometers from the SOKOLNIKI Metro Station. G: Who directs this and which are subordinate to VARENTSOV? S: No, it is MOSKALENKO now. The Academy is no longer subordinate (OTCHISLA) to VARENTSOV. VARENTSOV himself is located at the Academy now, but is to be transferred to Frunzenskaya Nab, to GAU. There the scientific research ideas are being developed very actively and concretely.

124. S: Further, there are many Engineering-Artillery schools where the lower ranking officers are prepared-lieutenants; they study up to five years. This is because the Artillery schools are now also engineering schools where they have Scientific Research departments. In other words, the command pushes all cadres, no matter where they work or study, to think, invent, and create as long as they are in this field (rocketry). Then all these (ideas and thinking) funnel into the Academy, to GAU and to the NIIs. A proposal from the Artillery-Technical School in Rostov-on-the-Don would go along these channels. I don't remember if I told you that there is such a school there and also in Odessa and Riga. Then they analyze what has been produced -- can anything else be done, or not? Perhaps you go into a new field. With this unified effort by all the scientists from all sources, everything is collected and screened. Valuable ideas are developed, and tested, first on paper and then on metal. This is the structure of the Scientific Research work; there is no scientific research in one place.

125. G: Who coordinates all this? S: GAU. This is the highest coordination, but GAU also gets this from the NIIs and the schools. G: I understand. S: And close to Moscow are the towns with the Germans that I told you about -- special technicians. They test things and sometimes get something from them. This is

coordinated by the Scientific Research Directorate. It is like the highest Soviet, which incorporates all the scientists from all the scientific research institutes, academies and schools. It is the coordinating organ.

126. G: What was the reaction when it was announced in the USSR that America had solid fueled rockets which could be launched from RR cars? S: We collect all information about rockets in the American, British and German armies and we are beginning to collect information on the French rockets. We consider France of secondary importance because they use your experience. Yes, we heard of what you anticipated. G: It is called the Minuteman. S: We have heard. It was mentioned and I saw it. I saw a large diagram and if I get a chance I will photograph it, so you will know the Soviet General Staff knows about your rockets. They know almost all the names. Then there are blank squares, some of which are filled in with figures in a pattern similar to checkers, technical data.

127. S: We have some films about your rocket made by the Strategic Military Intelligence. I am sure you didn't present or sell them to anyone. There are films on Redstone and Corporal missiles -- how they are fired; the servicing personnel, I even remember the part of the personnel wear glasses. This was all photographed, filmed. I don't know where it came from; I was never interested. I have heard about the (Minuteman) missile that is fired from a platform. It can move as soon as it fires, which makes it impossible to hit since by the time its position is plotted it is gone. I heard this at official lectures. G: Where did you hear this? S: Oh yes, from whom -- Major General of the Engineer Troops VYSOTSKIY, an intelligence officer, works as Chief of the Directorate. G: Oh! Another old friend. S: This VYSTOSKIY was also on the Mandate Commission by the way. G: He was in the old Bureau of New Technology, ZHUKOV was there; VYSTOSKIY was there; OSOKIN was there. S: OSOKIN was the former military attache to that negro HAILE at Addis Ababa. He got fired. G: And what was VYSOTSKIY's name and patronymic? S: I don't remember but I know him well.

128. G: Is it still called the Bureau of New Technology? S: No. VYSOTSKIY now works on Gritsivets St. in the Information Directorate, as head of one of the Information NAPRAVLENIYE. It is no longer called the Chief Information Directorate or the Second Information Directorate as before. It is just called the Information Directorate of the 2nd GNU, G. Sh. (Vtoroye Glavnoye Razvedatel'nogo Upravleniye, Generalnogo Shtaba). His job is to utilize new technical advances. He lectured to us and told us about this rocket that fires from platforms and is movable and unmaneuverable. Honestly, he had so many diagrams hanging everywhere -- and such junk, nothing concrete. There is only very sparse information. I'll get this information as a supplement, in order to give you a complete and sound engineering understanding of what we know about your rockets.

129. G: Where did he lecture to you? S: At the 5th entrance (POLYNZD) on the 2nd floor. G: You see what important lectures are given there. This means a lot; we did not expect this. S: If I had this thing (recorder) ... 100-150 persons attend the lectures; I would switch it on in my pocket and would listen. It would be easy for me; I would not have to write or think and you would have it all. I understand if I had photographed the whole show there wouldn't be so many questions now. I tell you directly that it is hard for me to grasp fully all the things dealing with engineering -- even though this is what I have written. I am not an engineer, I just write it down mechanically. G: You are completely right. We will keep away from such questions and only ask general questions. S: And you will get general answers. G: Fine, but here, as you have heard, we have an explanation and a clarification. This is also important. S: This about the rays (radar) -- how, where, the parameters, etc., I can't do this. G: I understand. S: There will only be a mess.

130. S: I have a question for you. G: Yes. G: When can we plan to have a meeting at which I can take all the materials, look them over, and give you additional comments? G: For next time, let's prepare the following in order of importance. Then you can present your additional comments and clarifications. S: I can recall many things when I see the material.

131. G: We will meet tomorrow. At what time? You know where. Let's decide first when. You said, not too long a meeting. We will talk for a few minutes now and will decide on tomorrow. You remember Room 360. S: I know this. G: What time is best for you? S: I don't know when WINNE will drive us over. You see I sit next to WINNE; he is a wonderful driver. You have to give him credit for driving me around carefully and taking good care of me despite the traffic. G: Yes. S: And I hear you don't want to give him anything. G: Quite the opposite, we promised to take care of this. S: If you evaluate anything that I have as insignificant, then there is no need to make such sacrifices. G: Definitely not. S: Then tell me so I will understand all this in a different light. G: This will all be done correctly.

132. S: Another question must be considered in view of new circumstances. It is necessary that I be given a telephone number, in case I have to make contact in a hurry. In case I have some unpleasantness -- a threat or something else. Anything could happen. I ask that you give me a telephone (number); I don't care which one. G: We will give you this. S: Fine, so this is definite. This worries me. (The number) should contain a 3 or 11; but don't give me a Number 13. (Laughs) G: Fine.

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133. S: Now, we have to finish with the photos. G: This is planned; we have a whole schedule worked out. S: Fine. G: Tomorrow plan to come at 2100 hours. If you are late, we will wait for you.

134. S: Let me see - (Looking at his schedule) what do you think we should do? What is the program? Tomorrow we visit two firms. G: It is not more than a three-hour drive from London. S: These are refrigeration plants, and CHANNING. G: Here in Birmingham? S: Yes. G: Is this in the morning or afternoon? S: WYNNE and I can do this either way; we can do this first. G: It does not make any difference which way you do it. S: How long does it take to drive to London from here? All: 2½-3 hours. G: Three hours in heavy traffic. S: Alright, we will count on three hours; I don't allow him to go fast. I have to becareful. G: It is about 120 kilometers. S: That's a lot! G: Kilometers! S: Oh! Kilometers. I thought it was miles. Here, a Colonel MACKAY gave me a ride at 110 m.p.h. to Westpool. Let's say nine o'clock tomorrow. G: Fine, let's decide on nine. S: Today I could have come over at eight thirty and sat waiting until nine. G: That is unfortunate. S: I sat and waited. M: Tomorrow this won't happen. You have to go to two places tomorrow and, in addition, drive to London.

135. G:(In English) How about rooming arrangements? Should I tell him that? M: Yes. G: Here is a small but important matter. It has been arranged that you will all be staying on the 6th floor. S: I, also? G: Yes. S: Is it convenient for me to go downstairs? G: Yes, very convenient. S: I won't have to walk along the corridor? G: No. S: I will be in the same wing as you? G: Yes, very close. S. This is very important. M: That's right. He is going to be in room 644. You're in room 360 and that's the same corridor. He will be quite near the back steirs, to come down. All the other people will be in another corridor. S: I don't want to cross thecorridor where my people might stick out their heads, or go to drink beer. I want to step out of my room and dive here. G: Here is your room -- 644. (Subject is shown the location of his room, the stairs, the elevators, etc., on a floor plan of the hotel.) G: All further meeting will take place there -- in room 360 -- tomorrow, day after tomorrow, etc. You will meet the prominent person. Everything will be done. Even WYNNE will be taken care of, but never discuss operational matters with him. The most important thing -- you will go to Moscow; he will bring you things. That is fine as far as you are concerned. He will give you a little note like this. You will give him something and a conspiratorial situation will develop. S: Teach him a little. G: Of course, but you be very careful. If he talks too much or becomes scared, a danger will be created for you.

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136. S: You know something interesting! You will be happy to hear about the behavior of MERRIMAN whom I met yesterday and today. Today he gave us a deluxe dinner; I figure he spent 50-60 pounds -- a quart with ZAKUSKI, various wines. There were many people there. The 76-year old director was there, by the name of William COX. S: I gave quite a speech "on behalf of my delegation" but MERRIMAN did not say anything. Everything is going well. G: Yes. S: But he looks like he knows. G: Oh, yes. He is a solid person. S: Maybe he guesses, but basically he is very reliable. S: He didn't say a word, yesterday. We arrived, I had dinner. WINER was not there. I told my delegation "Let's go to the movies". We went to the movies yesterday. Today the cutlery manufacturer gave a dinner. He gave us gifts -- a set of cutlery "of the best steel" for my wife. Everything was nicely presented. All the members of the delegation got gifts -- manicure sets, scissors, knives -- allmade from good steel. Everything was well organized. We looked -- and nothing. Not a word, as though nothing happened. That's the way it should be. G: The cultural way!

137 G: We are sitting here in England. We can joke, but under no circumstances should you make any mistakes in Moscow. For example, let's say WINER becomes scared and they break him -- because of some little thing that should not have happened. S: He should be warned! G: How can you warn him? S: It can be a provocation. G: But a person like that can be made to break, you understand, since he is inexperienced. You should act in a careful manner so as not to bring this on. Do what can be done; don't do what should not be done. Here you can run around (together), joke, buy things (for each other), treat (each other) etc. This is one thing. In Moscow, you will do the official entertaining. When it concerns conspiratorial matters, and one is inexperienced, he cannot be taught in five minutes. You, thank God, have had experience all your life. S: I understand. G: This is a dangerous thing. S: You will warn and prepare him.

138 S: Will you listen to me? You are not too tired? G: No. S: I am not tired yet. Let's work some more. Look here, I have some material ready that I can give to you in a hurry. Three journals, Military Thought (Voennaya Mysl) -- one of the issues has a very well done, interesting article by VASILEVSKY. The following is written on it, "Only for Officers, Generals and Admirals". G: What size are they? S: Like this (about 9" x 12"). G: A package like this? S: I was afraid to take it; it is large. G: Yes.

139. S: Let me tell you about SUSLIN. He is being assigned to Turkey as a Counselor but will really establish an illegal RESIDENTURA there. He is small 5'6", wears glasses, is practically bald, and his few dark hairs are greying. He has gold teeth, a red nose, a wide mouth and he is chunky. He graduated from the MGIMO in 1951 or 1952. He was always friendly to me. At one time before his being sent to Turkey was fixed, he sent for me. He is a fine fellow; treats me very well; and tells me many things, which I really have no business knowing. In other words, he trusts me.

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140. S: When he found out about what I could get done concretely, from ZASOKIN's example -- I helped him (ZASOKIN) twice, with Agrelovka and also Rabushkins housing -- ... So, I went to the office of the Chief of the Directorate -- and there was the office of GUDIN. There is a hall -- the fifth floor -- here is ZASOKIN -- here was (Subject's true name)'s office. GUDIN said to me, "Do me a favor. Prepare a paper for me as if for a Delegate of the Supreme Soviet. I can't breathe without a telephone". Really! He's a Deputy to the Chief of a Directorate and he has no phone to receive calls on. There's really no possibility of putting one in -- either the lines are overloaded there or they have not been run up to the new houses. He lives in an old house, right across the street from me in General Major KHALIPOV's apartment. KHALIPOV, a political worker in PVO, moved to the next house, to a larger apartment. When they fire KHALIPOV, they'll tell him the apartment is too large for him. That's the system!

141. G: What does KAPALKIN do now? S: The General is retired. He does nothing -- drinks Vodka and plays cards. The tall one -- a good-looking man, Sergei (Seriozha) used to work in the Council of Ministers. There was a group there before, in BULGANIN's time, and he worked there coordinating such matters on Intelligence which were of Government interest. He was not the chief of a section; the chief of the section was an Intelligence Officer, a General, and he works in Information Directorate now -- like VISSOTSKIY, the Chief of a Direction.

142. G: BERZLIN? S: No, not BERZIN. G: BERZIN was Chief of a Direction. S: There he was; so were other Generals. G: The devil take them! They change them so often. S: He only became General recently; he was a Colonel. I took an examination under him.

143. G: VASIL'EV? S: No, we'll leave it for a while -- maybe the name will come to me. KAPALKIN, then, worked in BULGANIN's group. Then they liquidated BULGANIN and dispersed the group and KAPALKIN was thrown out, together with this General and one other man. There were three from GRU. KAPALKIN was given the post of Chief of a Direction, with your friend BERZHKOV. Then he had an argument with BERZHKOV. This is a very difficult man -- he recently dismissed Colonel IVANOV, the one who was a RESIDENT in Istanbul when I was there in 1955-1956 - the one who went to France. G: PROKHOROV? S: PROKHOROV. When I was leaving the Academy, turning over the course, KAPALKIN was called by GRIBKHEV. Now he works in this school for Illegals. This school was under BERZIN, the one who is now the military attache in Japan. G: Together with MEDVEDEV and all that bunch? S: That's right. I remember his wife used to wear her hair piled up high on her head. G: What is his brother doing? Vladimir (KAPALKIN). S: I really don't know anything about Volodya.

144. S: Let me tell you a story. KUKOV's son studied with me - Gelly. His father is Ivan, so he is Gelly Ivanovich. He was tall, liked women a good deal, was an avid motorcyclist and bet on horses. He was really living it up. In 1949, he graduated from the Institute of Foreign Languages. This is the same Institute which is now being combined with the Academy. That year, I entered the Academy and he entered it. Here we were, going to school together! (Tape not clear -- something about his having an accident on his motorcycle, and Subject's concern that someone had been killed.) I said to KHLEBOV, the Chief of the course, "KUKOV is behaving like a hooligan!" G: When was this? When you were attending FRUNZE? S: No, it was at the MDA in 1949. G: So he (KUKOV, Gelly) went to the MD Academy? S: He graduated -- he has the button -- but he is never allowed abroad because he is the son of a Marshal. In the USSR, all the sons of Marshals have graduated from the Academy -- SHAPOSHNIKOV graduated; KUKOV graduated, SEMASTOKHOVSKIY's son graduated. They all find some sort of job but they are not allowed abroad. They are trying to be sent abroad. G: What year was this, about KUKOV? S: In 1949. I was the senior student in charge (STARSHINA KURSA). He graduated in 1953; now he is a Captain. He entered the Academy as a Lieutenant; he graduated as a Senior Lieutenant ; now he is a Captain. He's always walking around with a puffy face; visits the restaurants daily. He's really living it up.

145. S: Had you heard that SOKOLOVSKIY's son has been sentenced to 25 years? G: No! S: A gang of these sons and daughters of the Marshals got together at a summer cottage (DACHA), and raped a young girl who came for a vacation from Leningrad to Moscow. She is the niece of some Minister. I don't remember either the Ministry or the name now. When she was trying to fight them off in the car -- they were taking her some place through the Belorusskiy Station and were all drunk -- the car was weaving this way and that way and a policeman noticed it and stopped the traffic. One of them drew a revolver and fired a blank -- because he was drunk. Nevertheless, the car was detained and they were tried. STALIN said (This was still in STALIN's time) "Putting aside all ranks -- even though I have great respect for SOKILOVSKIY -- we will have a trial". And they were tried. Of course he was arrested and worked his time. Then he went to the University in the Lenin Hills. Altogether, he was imprisoned about three years. Then he developed ulcers and was quickly set free. This son of KUKOV is in the same type of crowd.

146. S: Now he is working in the Directorate of Information. He works in the American Section, by the way, and knows English very well. That's Gelia -- Gelly Ivanovich. His father, the Marshal, was the Commander-in-Chief of the First Ukrainian Front. After the war was over, he left Gelly's mother

(his first wife who had borne him Celiy and a daughter Irena). The daughter, Irena, is now married and has children. Anyway, he left them and married the manageress/directress of the cafeteria (STOLOVAYA) of the Military Council of the First Ukrainian Front. He is still living with her and now has a little child from this manageress/directress of the STOLOVAYA.

147 G: Do you remember a VASIL'EV at the Academy? S: Our Academy? G: Yes. Vasiliy Nikolayevich VASIL'EV, a Colonel. He is bald. His alias (KLICHKA) was PETROV. S: There was a VASIL'EV. The name is passing through my brain. I've told you my alias, haven't I? OLKHOV? J: It is -- after one o'clock. S: Alright. Tomorrow we meet at 9 o'clock, right? (Subject reviews a list of purchases he is to make for his wife.) S: A between-season coat, red with white buttons. They take advantage of me. She likes to dress well and, of course, I spoil her. I'm going to such a "wealthy" country - what am I going to do, bring her a little blouse? I'm going to have to scurry around and look. My progress is here, I've given you all the papers. Right? So, tomorrow at 9 -- no earlier? J: It can be earlier. G: Let's say 8:30. S: You'll be there by 8:30? G: Yes! S: Well, alright then. Tomorrow, we'll work some more. Goodnight -- until tomorrow... (Subject left at 0105 hours on 26 April 1961.)

[redacted]

(16)

Meeting No. 10 at London, England, 30 April 1961

Subject arrived at 2005 hours on Sunday, 30 April 1961. After greeting Subject, he sat down and said--

(1) S: Today we went sightseeing. We saw Windsor Castle. I have some questions to ask you. Let us assume that I arrive in Moscow on 6 May. Let us assume that I have arrived with no incident, and in any case you will give me a telephone no. to call in Moscow, I will ring it at a designated hour and just let the phone ring--say 3 times--and engage in no conversation. This would signify that all is in order. In a minute I will make 3 rings again and that is all. I will call from an outside booth. If I make more rings than 3 that will signify that something is not in order and I will attempt to advise you in some other way as I can. Possibly surveillance on me of some sort - as an example. G: Translates above into English. S: I can call up at any time in the evening from a phone booth. G: Prior to your departure we will provide you with the number and tell you when to call. S: I should think that you would want to know that all is well with me. G: Of course, we would. S: Things could be worked out simply: If I did not get every thing from you prior to my departure or if WYNNE couldn't bring it. Anyone speaking Russian, man or woman, could call me from a phone booth and say anything irrelevant. G: Yes, but the point is that we do not wish to cut in unnecessary people to have knowledge of you. S: I understand this and am grateful to you for this. That is proper.

2. Please consider the two places I gave you. One, the dead drop site and the other, the meeting site. It is very good to meet on this NABEREZHNAYA near the TRETYAKOVSKAYA Gallery. I know every nook there and even the women custodians. Those Americans acted very well. When we were talking in Russian and occasional passers-by came near, mostly women, they cleverly changed the conversation, admiring the moon, etc.

(3) S: My second question: I am trying to find out a way to contact [redacted]. Thus far I simply have had no chance. Can you help me in this? Tomorrow, I have an appointment at the Soviet Embassy and will probably meet the RESIDENT for a short time. I'll also have a drink or two with SHAPOVALOV. I need basic personal data on [redacted]. There was no opportunity for me to get this in Moscow. G: You mean data as evidence that

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you have studied the man. S: Yes, I need only a little, not much. G: You know, just looking at his visiting card. All sorts of titles, decoration, etc. are listed on it, and you need to report such data as if you got it yourself. S: Yes, that's all and some basic biographic data, date of birth, marital status, children, address, telephone number.

(4) S: Tomorrow morning I will not go with the delegation. They know I have to go to the Embassy to arrange for money allowances and make all other arrangements for our extended stay. I'll not go there until 1100 hours. In the morning will go to stores with WYNNE. My delegation members are all very happy. They will be able to buy all sorts of junk with the money they saved on their per diem since they were fed everywhere. I'll meet them at 1500 to 1600 hours. They are happy with me since they feel I have organized everything well for them personally. There hasn't been one word of criticizing to date. I even told them that if they write good reports on their work here and do good work they will come here with me again in October. This is very attractive to them. I told them I would also write a favorable report and they are all happy.

5. S: I need this material on MERRIMAN - just brief information. G: Very well, when can you drop in tomorrow morning? S: I am going to the stores with WYNNE. Yesterday we already made the arrangements. I will leave my purchases with him and what he can't bring to me on his coming trip he can bring me later, in 2 or 3 months. However, I want to purchase everything myself since I have a whole notebook full of items to get. This will take me 2 or 3 days. Then I will go to the Embassy to receive funds. The approving cable has come in as well as cable approving funds less 40 pounds; they are economizing. The outgoing cable was well worded. It stated that the delegation will look into electronics, and the approval went through the Central Committee.

(6) S: They want to learn about every little electronic detail. I have seen many reports made by visiting delegations. Copies are duplicated for dissemination to the various inst'tutes and academies. I will get you copies from the originals and your scientists can see what our delegates are after and what they get. Your people are not shown our factories of significance. Only certain ones are offered for inspection. We were supposed to take [redacted] to see a cement factory. At

[redacted]

first they said, only the electric train can be used not the highway, since too many PVO installations can be seen from the highway. Later they cancelled the trip saying the area is too muddy in Winter. They show very little or things of little value. Why do you not restrict our delegations? Of course, not the ones which I lead. (Laughter) Seriously, you should restrict this, the Americans are already doing this on a reciprocal basis only. On the 9th of May a seven-man delegation on hoisting and transport equipment is coming here. SCHWARTZ will be the interpreter who is co-opted by KGB. He is on our Committee and is a half Jew. There will be a conference here and they will be received by BERGER who operates like WYNNE, and goes to Moscow often. This delegation has been given numerous specific missions and the personnel come from interested industries. The GNTK conducts the negotiations and is the instrument for effecting scientific intelligence. They got 22 patents for synthetic rubber from Canada. This is vital for war material. KHRUSHCHEV has understood this and has made a powerful committee of the GNTK.

7. H: Who is the GNTK subordinated to? G: We would like to ask you about the GNTK, but first of all - excuse me - tell me when can you drop in, tomorrow? You see we have to contact MERRIMAN because he may be out of town and you will not be able to reach him. S: Then it can be the day after tomorrow. G: That is all well and good but it is necessary to determine when he will be available. S: What I need, from MERRIMAN, is to speak to him. Of course, we have trouble understanding each other. All I need is to speak to him for 5 minutes, then I will go to the Embassy and pass them the basic data on him. I believe they may even assign the man who is returning, PAVLOV, to contact MERRIMAN. Or they may assign GENERALOV. I have not met him yet, but he is a case officer working in the technical group. The group consists of three: PAVLOV, SHAPOVALOV and GENERALOV. G: We will get this information on Merriman for you. S: I can then simply introduce him on the 4th or 5th of May. G: At this introductory meeting, MERRIMAN can give you some materials and promise to deliver the rest to you via the case officer you have just introduced. S: That's right, just half the material and promise to deliver the balance later. The contact will drag on for several months. When I told SHAPOVALOV how old MERRIMAN was, he said that we don't work with old men as agents. The requirement here is that the contact be a resident of London, a British citizen and younger. The old man would not be recruited, but treated as a trusted informant.

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[redacted]

8. S: Now about the newly organized committee. KHRUNICHEV, a deputy of KHRUSHCHEV and a minister of USSR has more stature than PETUKOV, the former chief. KHRUNICHEV has 5 deputies and he has the Committee under his control. The Committee is like Soviet of Scientists like a Praesidium. There are about 15 Committee members. These will include chief specialists, chiefs of directorates. This is the top echelon. Thus he has under him the Directorate of Foreign Relations, the Chief of which is GVISHIANI -- who remains as chief. If they made me his deputy, then I would have greater freedom of action since I could attend meetings, receptions, etc. to all countries not only those I have to do with now. G: This is a Directorate? S: It will be by the new Table of Organization. It is now an OTDEL. The Directorate (Upravieniye) has three OTDELS: The OTDEL of Foreign Relations; the Information OTDEL and the Foreign OTDEL, like a Protocol OTDEL. G: What do these do?

9. S: The OTDEL of Foreign Relations consists of sectors such as the American Sector which includes all American Countries (NORSO); the English sector, under BERDENIKOV, which includes Canada and Dominions; the third is the Africa-Asian sector including the Near, Middle and Far East. Each OTDEL has a chief inspector and an expert who is in charge of one or two countries - thus each sector would have 12-15 experts. Lt. Col. TRAVKIN, who worked in the UN in New York, is a Strategic Intelligence officer. He was there six months and was removed, that is normally, and he was appointed as an expert in the American sector. He is subordinate to the Sector Chief, Denis POLYAKOV. I graduated from the Academy with POLYAKOV and he had been in America with a delegation just as I am here now. One by one, I am remembering my classmates. Originally there were 100 but 2 were dismissed. One had a father who was a KULAK and the other was dismissed for some reason that I can't remember. I may be in a similar situation now but they must suffer me there or shoot me, one of the two.

10. G: You say that you expect to be the Deputy of the Directorate? S: Yes, if nothing happens, the Deputy to GVISHIANI. His full name is Pchernen NIKHAILOVICH and his is married to the daughter of KOSYGIN. He is a member of the Committee and is not a stupid man; he is well liked, and he is very pleasant to me

[redacted]

He is a Georgian. Of course, he is also feared because of his father-in-law. One complaint to him and the man is gone.

11. G: How about theother OTDELS? S: The Information OTDEL has in it 15 chief specialists. These specialists are experts in their industrial fields such as electric power, black metalurgy, electrical equipment, steel, etc., in short, all of the main industries. But of these, the most authoritative specialists are also members of the Committee. Whenever delegations bring in material, it is turned over to the Information OTDEL and the specialists will determine where it should be sent. For example, to a specific industry if it is needed at once; to an institute or academy, or to a ministry. They also evaluate the material. G: Do they also have military specialists? S: Yes. These who are concerned with war production. All our people are civilians but they coordinate their work with the military.

12. S: The Foreign OTDEL consists of the Protocol Sector which deals with the reception of foreigners and are agents for their accommodations, etc. Prominent visiters are often granted all accommodations at government expense. Another sector plans the tours for visiting delegations; determines who will accompany the foreign delegations and sets up conferences. Then they determine who will attend the return invitations to the various embassies. These sectors are really called working groups in this OTDEL. Two or three people do the planning for tours; they call the chiefs of industries where visiting delegations would like to go and get permission to visit whatever is permitted. Another group arranges for the guides and interpreters. A third group takes care of protocol for conferences, etc. In short, all of the personnel in this Foreign OTDEL service foreign delegations. Each area sector is represented by a group which accompanies foreigners from these countries. G: What is the total personnel strength? S: I can tell you exactly. There are twenty persons in this OTDEL in which there are three groups and each group has five officers not counting the chiefs.

13. S: In the future, the Information OTDEL will also be a group of OTDELS headed by our specialists to whom all materials will be given for evaluation and who will give directives for matters of scientific interest according to orders from KHRUNICHEV and the higher committee. They also will evaluate the materials received and pass them on as directed.

14. J: (In English) Something is not clear to me. I have seen American delegations go to the USSR. For example, agricultural delegations -- and they dealt directly with the Minister of Agriculture. S: But now they will go through us. Our specialist on agriculture will arrange for all the visits to Kolkhozes and arrange all conferences. For example, on the 12th of May the Ontario Province agricultural chief, Mr. SPOONER, will arrive. Prior to my coming here I gave instructions to the Protocol OTDEL, specifically to ULYANENKO who had been here before. Everything goes through us but we order the foreign section of the Ministry of Agriculture to prepare an itinerary to visit forestry research centers for the things SPOONER is interested in, i.e., forest fire protection, insect control and fisheries. We do not order these sub-sections of Agriculture but deal through the Minister of Agriculture, which has its own foreign section.

15. J: Does this include the pure sciences and the Academy of Science? S: The Academy of Sciences has all kinds of comparable activity, but we coordinate everything. They will also examine materials obtained from you and will resolve contradictions and determine where prime interests lie.

16. G: What is the overall strength of your OTDEL? The OTDEL of Foreign Relations. S: Now we have seventy persons, but in the future we will have between 120 and 130. G: Are you speaking of the Directorate of Foreign Relations or just of your Foreign Relations OTDEL? S: I misunderstood. The Foreign Protocol OTDEL has twenty; then the Information OTDEL has, in addition to the fifty specialists, about twenty-five REFERENTY. This may include some stenographers. The largest OTDEL is our OTDEL of Foreign Relations, so there would be

about sixty there. About ten of these would be chiefs of working groups and deputies and about fifty workers. A group of 3 or 4 of these may be cadre personnel who maintain liaison with our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, there will be a group of about 5 persons, now there are only 2, who will project plans for our visiting delegations. They maintain liaison with the Soviet Travel Commission of the Central Committee. First of all, they consult with us and ask which individual members of a proposed delegation we recommend on a quarterly basis.

17. S: For example, I planned two delegations for Canada this Spring. This is submitted to this group which reports to the Central Committee. For example, we have planned to send 22 delegations in the first quarter. Of these, 2 are to go to Canada, so many to England, etc. At the same time, we already have tentative plans for delegations to be sent during the other 3 quarters of the year. All this is submitted to the Central Committee for analysis and in the proposed delegation are included KGB officers and GRU officers, but if the delegation issmall and only a few specialists can go, then there will be coopted specialists of GRU and KGB or both. This group is really an OTDELENIYE. All of this is, first of all, based on the scientific intelligence mission plan. Specific items of information are then set forth as missions for selected specialists but, of course, this is to supplement intelligence obtained through agents since delegations cannot answer all questions of interest.

18. G: Since this group is also under GVISHIANI, is it correct to say that the Directorate consists of three OTDELS and this planning OTDELENIYE? S: Yes. This Planning OTDELENIYE or Group is also called the Planning Center and they sit in a room all by themselves and select members of our delegations by name.

19. H: How is this coordinated with the agent work? S: After the name is submitted to the Central Committee Exit Commission and they check him out completely through KGB and Party records, and grant him permission to go abroad, if we as GRU have specific intelligence information which we want the delegation member to obtain, he will be called directly

into GRU Headquarters and be given a mission briefing. When he enters the mission, which we always call the Scientific-Military Mission, he then signs a secrecy agreement under penalty of punishment. This man would now be called a specialist coopted by GRU.

Talent spotting for specialists as "illegals" for scientific intelligence

20. S: I, myself, and others like me in the Committee, also have a mission of spotting young, promising scientists in civilian status who could be used as illegals by BEKRENEV. He would have to be a specialist, however, and this is an indication of how intensively they are stressing scientific intelligence. Thus far we have not found even one such specialist. At least not since I've been with the Committee, but we are still looking. Should we find an acceptable person, he then would be taken for illegals training and this is, from their viewpoint, a desirable thing since after all in the GRU we do not train specialists or scientists.

KGB 2/MP Sup's Y.I. LEVIN →

21. G: What does the KGB do? S: They do exactly the same thing. G: What are the functions of the KGB personnel who are directly assigned to your Committee? S: The Chief of the KGB group there is LETIN, who is a colonel, just as I am. His Deputy is a lieutenant colonel, whose name I don't recall, and he also sits in the same OTDEL where I do. They have a total of about 15 people in the Committee and, in addition, they have about 20 KGB coopted persons.

Security external & training abroad

22 G: Do they report on the others? S: Absolutely. The coopted ones are all conformists who will report if anything is said against KHRUSHCHEV. I cannot go to a reception without one of them accompanying me. This KGB officer will watch me but he will do stupid things a hundred fold more than I will. He will get drunk and he will behave in a non-KULTURNA manner. He will still report on me, however, even if he doesn't know the local language. G: In addition to this do they not have intelligence missions? S: Of course they do. And I believe that this man who came with me, LOPATO, is a coopted KGB worker. Their mission is primarily political intelligence, although they do have secondary missions of general intelligence and, of course, they report on all others of the Soviet delegation. For example, last December when I invited Wynne to a reception, I also invited some of our specialists. Since the food and drink were free, they got

[redacted]

drunk. The KGB report said that these specialists should not be invited again since they don't know how to behave before foreigners.

23. J: There is a State Committee for Defense Technology. What is the relationship between that committee and your committee? S: Absolutely right, there is such a committee. And it is under the Council of Ministers -- entirely separate. J: There is also a Committee for Radio Electronics. S: These committees are purely scientific, and they contact us for information in their fields. They may provide one of their members for inclusion in one of our delegations. They give us this man for training to obtain intelligence information desired by the committee. The committee itself consists of very highly trained and trusted individuals but we handle their intelligence requirements for them. Our efforts are saving the Soviet Union much money and are giving them very valuable information. I would suggest that your big people consider this problem. I realize that it is not possible to cut off all delegations, since they fit into the scheme of things of diplomatic relations and politics, but ways should be revised for making our visiting delegations ineffectual. That is by systematically limiting them to very ineccuous information.

24. S: Now I will send you an organizational chart of the GNTK and a classified telephone directory, which I can get with ease. There you will find the full name and telephone number of all the members. In addition, I have locked up in the right-hand drawer of my desk reports of all my agent material. I would have brought it this time in my suitcase but I was afraid to do this. I knew it would not fit into my pocket. I wouldn't like to trust it to a suitcase and, though they would never search unless I was under suspicion, it is possible that they may request to see the contents of my suitcase. Although to date, that has not been done, since they knew that I am a colonel. If they ever did I'd have to run to one embassy or the other, I don't know which one. (Jokingly) G: I would suggest you run to the nearest one. (Jokingly) S: It irritated me to realize that I live on

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the same street where the British Embassy is located, and that I sat across from the U.S. Embassy, and nobody would walk out to whom I could give my material.

25. G: Chalk off your notes, you will receive a telephone number to call upon your arrival in Moscow and we will set a proper time. S: Presumably you will give me all kinds of instructions and requests before I leave. G: Of course we will. S: I could very easily make a phone call after I arrive. I'll walk out to get a glass of beer and go to a phone booth. Then you will not worry if all is well or not. Regarding Merriman, I will drop in tomorrow. G: What time will you come? S: Let me figure it out; I will tell you before I leave tonight. I could even arrange it that if later someone would call Merriman in my name that would be sufficient to receive materials which I have arranged for. G: It would be better if you had introduced him personally. S: Of course it would. I only suggest this other means as a variant. G: Have you studied your one-time pads yet and instructions for coding by numbers? S: Yes, but we shall review this again. H: Let us do the small things now because the doctor will be here in 15 minutes. (G translates.)

26. S: Please explain to me the signal plan procedure for radio transmission. Why is the number repeated again after the first transmission? G: That is an order to repeat the entire message the second time and to indicate to you that it is the second transmission. S: Oh, I see; I did not understand that yesterday. When the instructor comes again and brings the one-time pads which I requested, I'd like to review the procedures of which groups come first. G: As soon as the larger pads are obtained, I will show you this. It is very simple. (G illustrates to Subject how the book indicator and the line indicator is used. Subject understood.)

27. S: I have written out certain questions for the doctor about medicine that I have to bring back. These are not for me. Is it alright to give them to him since I wrote them in my own hand? G: We will translate it all. S: Is it alright that I took my own photograph with the Minox while I was practicing? G: Of course, it is. The photographer is our own man and we have the negative. S: I was worried. G: Well, I'm trying to reassure you that there is nothing to fear from that direction.

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28. S: When I was leaving to come here, the Chief of the Personnel Section of the GNTK asked me to bring back the following medicine for him: It is called cripaneza in ampules. It is a medication inthe treatment for cancer. Some one of his relatives needs this. We can get it in the USSR but with great difficulty and it is said to be very effective. G: What quantities do you need? S: Just a small quantity. It is used as an injection. Another man asked me to get tablets to restore vitality. I also need a medicine for relief of kidney stone pains. G: This should be simple; what type of trouble. Is it stone or infection? S: It's for stones and it is called Reeatinex. It is manufactured in West Germany. We get it in small quantities in the USSR. S: The Chief of the Protocol Sector of our committee is suffering from headache spasms. He used to work for MOLOTOV at one time. He requests hydrocortecone. This is for exzema. There are some tablets one takes for this. Also there are salves.

29. S: Now for myself -- I need some effective salve for conjnctivitis. This may be in liquid form or a salve. The doctor can look at me and see what I need. My eye sight is perfect but I get this red inflammation which I picked up in Turkey. I also need some dental plastic plates. When I was wounded, my jawbone broke, andhere I have some plastic teeth which have broken. If I could get a dental plastic plate to match the color of my teeth, I have an excellent dentist in Moscow who can replace the broken pieces. G: In other words, you need the material to match your teeth and your dentist will do the work? S: That's right. G: Do you knew the kind of dental material. Is it acryllic? S: I don't know. What my dentist said was that there is a set of plates in a box and when the proper color is matched from these the proper teeth shape is stamped out and that is all there is to it. One more small favor -- I need a supply of these little chocolates. G: That is very simple. That is only Ex-Lax. S: Yes, but we have much difficulty getting it in the USSR. This is what I request. G: We'll get it for you. The doctor will write out a prescription for whatever can be obtained directly. S: But I can't get a prescription myself. G: We will get it for you.

S: This is my entire medical list. We have all of these things from time to time in the USSR but they are hard to get. Anyway this is what I've written out for the docter. Sergey SERGEYEVICH (VARENTSOV) asked me to get him the vitality pills. I also have to get a light filter and a hood for a Leica. You don't know how it is. When they know you are going abroad, everyone asks for a particular item. So I am honestly telling you what they requested me to do and I ask you to help me. H: Very well, we will get it for you.

30. S: I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the way you have supported Wynne materially. Yesterday, he mentioned it to me and appeared to be very very pleased. I thank you for this and it indicates to me that you value me highly for having done this. I can't imagine saying farewell to you and not meeting again with you inthe near future. Possibly I'll fly to Canada and you will meet me there, or in Canberra in Australia. I know what to do now. I will send back with Wynne the material that I have and I will be able to photograph many documents and manuals with the Minox. Then your people will have no doubts about me whatsoever. If only Wynne will make no mistake. G: Don't worry about him. He will pass the material to the Embassy at once and it will be in safe hands. But we want to advise you not to take needless chances and if you see that it is too risky to get complete material, take only what is safe to get and let the rest go. Your personal security is of greater value to us than every last bit of information. We are not greedy for intelligence if it involves unnecessary personal risk for you. S: Thank you for that and if I do my work in an outstanding fashion and Wynne fulfills his part, will you give him a decoration? G: That is possible but that would be determined after he has accomplished his work. We don't promise one something prior to his having done it. S: He looked very pleased yesterday. He is making a small addition to his office. It's very neat and modest but he doesn't even have money to finish it. He has a neat place but lives on a modest scale; his wife is also modest. Yesterday they took me out to three clubs and then she prepared a very fine dinner and we had lots of toasts. G: Where do you get all this energy and at the same time no sleep? S: I even

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danced yesterday but then I relaxed and had a fine dinner. When I saw what was served I couldn't help but think how impossible it is to get these things in the USSR. Even tomatoes are extremely expensive. Everything there is built on a pack of lies and the people are surpressed by a powerful force which is nothing but demagoguery. If we had a democracy an opposition party would develop at once but it is a police state and when MOLOTOV, who was supported by a number of intelligent people, said something against the regime they were all squeezed out at once and they were not far from being shot. Although these days that is not done, as it had been before. G: The doctor will arrive in a few minutes. S: SHÉPILOV was a very intelligent man.

31. G: Since you mentioned him, a very important question comes to mind. Tell me, in analyzing intelligence missions on a world-wide scale, with respect to GRU and KGB, at what level are the missions brought together for analysis and assignment? Where is the level and who participates in determining the assignment of missions; the review of mission progress periodically; the assignment of personnel of GRU and KGB according to priorities? S: It's like this -- KGB does not know about our agent nets and we do not know about theirs. All information obtained from clandestine sources goes forward to the appropriate interested committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party -- That is matters dealing with specific industries, war production, etc. Political information goes to the Political Committee of the Central Committee. The overall Central Committee is an enormous organization. They decide everything since they control the entire industrial structure of the USSR. All decisions are made by them and by the Praesidium.

32. G: Is there a committee called the Coordinating Committee for Intelligence Activities? S: No, not as such, but since the individual committees of the Central Committee are the brains for each particular field of interest. They decide what missions should be assigned to the GRU and which to the KGB and in case of a dispute between the GRU and KGB

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regarding slots, the Central Committee makes the decision. The Central Committee has a louder voice than KGB and KHRUSHCHEV had reorganized the KGB as a Committee to keep closer control of the KGB under himself. Previously under BERIA many matters were held up by the KGB without the knowledge of the Central Committee.

33. Q: Let us take an example -- assume that in London the GRU REZIDENTURA has 20 men and the KGB has 15; who had determined this allocation of slots as well as the specific covers given to each? S: The Central Committee determined this and the slots were provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as directed by the Central Committee. Everything is done by the Central Committee; for example, when McClellan was to come and they wanted to allot say 3,000 rubles for his expenses including automobiles, etc., the Central Committee decided this. If SEROV wanted a slot of counseller in some embassy for a GRU officer, he would request the Central Committee to instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide this. The Central Committee is enormous; there are 5,000-6,000 people there.

34.G:Who does the Central Committee call for consultation on such matters, the Directorate chief or NAPRAVLENIYE chief? S: No, here's how it works. The Central Committee workers concerned with the GRU come directly to the GRU headquarters. These are not the chiefs in the Central Committee offices but they are called instructors. Remember that the instructors, however, from the Central Committee enjoy the privileges and power of a regional committee member of the Communist Party. They have vehicles, DACHAS, and all kinds of fancy food allotments. They have tremendous stature due to their Party position. The word of such an instructor is everything for even a minister. It is law. Since the instructor represents the opinion of the Central Committee. This is particularly true for ministers who are straight government people and not members of the Central Committee themselves. SEROV cannot demand three counseller slots; he must submit his request to the Central Committee who will make the decision.

35. H: How do they trace agents? S: If a prospective agent is contemplated by the GRU, they check his name with the KGB. If there is a prior KGB interest, the KGB simply states that there is a prior interest in him and to break off contact. G: Do they check their prospects with you? S: No, because they know if we have an interest or not since we have always checked our agents with them earlier. If we have an agent and they approach him then we may send a report of complaint based on our priority.

36. (The phone rings and the doctor who has entered the lobby is being met by agent.) (Subject speaks about his heart and G reassures him to tell the doctor all his symptoms and he will have his examination. There is no security problem since the doctor belongs to the intelligence service. While waiting for the doctor, Subject speaks further on the topic above.)

37. S: All name traces are conducted in Moscow by the KGB. Remember that all intelligence personnel, whether they are GRU or KGB, attempt to get all of the information, as well as recruits, that they can. They have one common mission and that is to determine as soon as possible any indications on the part of a potential hostile country of any preparations for hostilities. This includes, of course, troop movements, redeployment of troops, etc. Conversely, this is now my mission with respect to you. I will advise you any way I can of any impending moves which may indicate hostile intentions. I think we'll be able to do a great deal for you in the future. G: We will go slowly and you work over a long period of time but when the time comes for you to move out, we will consult with you on preliminary measures to get your family into a position from which they can escape easily. For example, if they could get to the DDR and visit

East Berlin it would be simple to cross to West Berlin by subway. But, of course, with no suitcases, since the East German police could stop anyone with a suitcase. That is just one means and we will figure out others as time goes on. S: In case of hostilities, I would like to know several months beforehand so I could move my family out of the area where the Moscow Military District Headquarters is, and would be blown up.

38. (At this moment the doctor entered and was introduced to Subject.) H to Dr: I shall leave you for a short while to George and the patient. Dr: First of all, I'd like to ask him a few questions. G: He mentioned two particular things that he is concerned about. One was a question of getting a dental plate for his teeth. He was wounded during the war and needs some teeth to replace the broken ones on his prosthetic. Dr: Fine, we can get together on that later. G: The other matter is that he thinks he has conjunctivitus. Dr: How old are you? (G translates all questions.) S: 42. Dr: Did you have any serious illnesses since you were 4 years old? S: Pneumonia at 10 years old. Dr: Since then? S: No, Dr: What else? S: Mumps, I never had typus or anything else. Dr: Any operations? S: Only on the jaw and nose after being wounded. I was also shell-shocked. Dr: Any nervous illnesses? S: I am nervous by nature but not as an illness. I have had angina, but since my tonsils were removed 8 years ago I have not had it any more. (Further medical data as follows: 6 teeth lost after being wounded in jaw; had carbuncle removed. Has carbuncle on arm which Soviet medics attribute to malnutrition in youth. Smokes rarely; does not inhale. Drinks normally, not to excess. Mother is alive; father killed in revolution. Both were healthy. Is married. Wife healthy; daughter 15, healthy. No symptoms at the moment; occasionally has slight spasms of heart, (showing left side of chest, not where heart is), which Soviet doctors told him were early symptoms of arterial sclerosis. The spasms began irregularly since the war -- for 15 years. Spasms begin when highly tense nervously. Has good appetite, no indigestion, sleeps well. No shortness of breath.) S: My only trouble now is the redness in my eyes. I contracted this 5 or 6 years ago when I was in Turkey. It comes and goes. Lack of sleep aggrevates it. (Dr. examines his eyes.) Dr: That is all I need for questions. Now I'd like to examine him.

39. (Subject was asked to disrobe to his underwear and to lay down on the bed for examination. While Subject was disrobing, the doctor was shown the list of medicines requested by Subject for others and the list of alleged purposes the medicines were requested for. Subject was very thoroughly examined by the doctor primarily for any symptoms of heart trouble. Blood pressure was taken and stethoscopic examination

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made. With the lights out, Subject's pupils were examined with an eye instrument.) S: (Returning after dressing himself again) Thank you very much for your attention to me. Dr: Will you explain these requests for medicines which I see on this chart (prepared by H). G: These are the medicines requested and these are the reasons given. Dr: I'll check on this TRIPANOZA. It may be an Italian preparation. I doubt if it is made in England or the USA. I'll check on this but it may take time to order it. G: The next item is ROVATINEX for kidney stones. This is a West German preparation. Dr: We will try to get these two medicines but it may be difficult. G: The next one is Hydro-Cortesone 2½%, a salve, for exzema. Dr: Yes, I can get that. No trouble. This is for external use. G: He asks if there is any medicine that can be taken internally, as drops, for exzema. Dr: This cannot be taken internally for exzema but I will get some tranquilizer pills to reduce nervous tension which he says produces the exzema and then applying the salve may alleviate it. I'll also get him an eye salve which may not cure his condition completely but will alleviate it and in time it may go away completely. I'll have to see a dentist about the dental material he requests.

40. Dr: So far as my examination can tell, tell him this. He definitely has no arterial sclerosis and whatever doctors told him that he did were very nasty. First of all, since he felt his spasms on the left 15 years ago, he would have been only 27 years of age at that time. Arterial sclerosis never starts at such an early age and he certainly shows no signs of it now. Secondly, I looked into his eyes, not only to examine the redness which is completely external and which will go away in time, but there is no sign of blood disturbance in the retina of his eyes which is a strong indicator. In general, his blood pressure, pulse and everything else is entirely normal. Thirdly, for his information, his heart is not where he thinks it is. It is right in the middle, not on the left. The spasm he feels when nervous are not abnormal. Other persons feel reactions from nervous stress in the form of headaches or indigestion. He feels a nervous spasm or twitch on his left side. That is all normal. I'll have a report on the urinalysis later but everything looks quite normal to me. Subject thanked doctor for his attention and H escorted the doctor out.

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41. S: Well, I guess we should get back to work. G: I'd like you to look at some pictures of rockets taken from the parade a year ago. But I'd like to wait for H to return. S: You understand everything about the work of my committee then? G: Yes, S: You should gradually restrict the activities of our delegation. G: Let us start from this very important question. What did VARENTSOV say on the subject of ICBMs after KHRUSHCHEV made the statement that you had all kinds of ICBMs in readiness? J: This is a very important question. That is why we are going over it again. S: The basic idea of this on the part of KHRUSHCHEV is to take the initiative and to impress upon the minds of Western leaders that he already possesses in large quantities these missiles which he either does not have at all, or has only a few of.

42. S: Often there are tests of one character or another which in many cases are even successful, but he already yells about this as an accomplished thing. Thus the whole idea of KHRUSHCHEV and of the PRAESIDIUM is to demonstrate and to illustrate in one way or another such as launching of a SPUTNIK, even of a man in space, in order to impress your military leaders that the Soviet Union has everything. This is to force your government leaders and military people to do their planning on the assumption that the Soviet Union already has a tremendous military potential, when in reality it is only being developed. And even Sergey Sergeyevich (VARENTSOV) remarking directly on the words of KHRUSHCHEV said to me, "Oleg, we are only thinking about these things, only planning, even though we have had some successes here and there. But in order to get anywhere one has to increase production tremendously and to train cadres."

43. S: Thus beginning with the idea of training cadres, the Artillery Academy (now Rocket Academy) Dzerzhinskogo has a student complement of 2,500 and the annual graduating class will vary between 450-600. And even though this is only this one academy, the graduates will still require several years of practical experience and training before they can be effective. With respect to this the effort is significant and the scale of operations is also significant. Billions of rubles are being economized elsewhere in order to develop rocket technology. I mentioned this earlier and gave proof and indications thereof and I also know what to seek for further proof, and despite the fact that VARENTSOV has constantly said that there is an enormous amount of

work to be done not only with cadres, but also with equipment, rocket-types, etc. KHRUSHCHEV is yelling that we already have all this. He says all I have to do is to wave a hand and he can fire rockets in the direction of Cuba----but why is he not doing this? This is a bluff - ..

44. S: Sergey Sergeyevich (VARENTSOV) said that they can hit the continent of North America, but to hit a target at this great distance, no. G: Exactly when did VARENTSOV tell you this? S: He told me this at dinner and at his dacha; this year alone he mentioned this three or four or even five times. He said that we have in our arsenal operational, that is, tactical rockets, and we have rockets that can reach South America, the United States, or Canada, but not accurately. G: Are such rockets deployed at missile bases already? S: These test rockets, which are still undergoing further tests are not on bases. They do not have the capabilities of even firing one or two. They do not even have hundreds in a testing status. They may have only tens in that category. Even in sending up a SPUTNIK or a man in space they have all of the scientists and rocket technology mobilized for the effort, and before a SPUTNIK is launched they have several failures. Several men were lost in their efforts to put a man in space. You probably even heard that the dogs were lost somewhere in the ether. I was told that there were several unsuccessful tests with humans. J: When did you say that VARENTSOV said this? S: Several times this year in 1961 and also a number of times in 1960. He also complained that more money is needed for rocketry.

45. S: The main idea now of KHRUSHCHEV's statements is to create an effect on external ears, but the preparations are being carried out intensively. The tendency is to attain mass production. Those tactical rockets which have already been developed are being produced in great quantities, and they can be launched at any time to the extent of their operational ranges. But with respect to ICBMs, they have had one failure after another. They remain silent and they continue to throw millions into the effort and if they have one success then it is used to impress you people by pretending that there are hundreds of these. But there are no such hundreds. That is only idle talk. However, keep in mind that one day they will be there. This must be assumed since the entire economy and politics are geared for such development. The basic problem is to develop a huge rocket with respect to

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the war head size, but with a high calorie fuel which requires little space. On paper they even have some success there and when one considers that millions of men's efforts are directed in this work and that the entire economy of a nation as directed by a one-party system to which all is subordinate, they can do this. And eventually they will work out such rockets and they will be made ultimately in mass production. In my own opinion, and my opinion here plays a very insignificant role because these are very important matters and my opinion does not count even though I am an officer inthe general staff -- after all, I breathe this air of rocketry and I would say that in two or three years they will have such rockets developed. There will be definite developed types in production.

46. G: What was the thinking back in 1957, when NEDELIN was put in charge of the so-called Rocket Directorate? S: Simply for the purpose of centralizing control and to separate the Ground Force weapons from the Strategic weapons and that NEDELIN would have no interference in his work for which he was allotted billions in money as well as factories and scientists to do this work. Even now it may be possible that somewhere in the Far East or in Kapustin Yar there may be some rockets which could reach other continents and even detonate with an atomic, even hydrogen-type explosion. But such launchings would be completely unplanned, uncontrolled, and certainly not of a mass variety. Of this I am entirely sure, but in two or three years there will be a different picture. This is because such a tremendous effort is being devoted to this. I even saw with my own eyes at the end of 1959 an order which said that the monies to be economized as the result of various dismissals from the army and people put on pension would be designated for 'kindergartens' (Note - This is slang for rocket construction.)

47. G: Do the students at the Artillery Academy wear distinctive insignia S: No, under no circumstances. All wear the basic military branch insignia. Most of them wear the black insignia of artillery troops, that is, the conventional rifle artillery. Do you remember the data I gave you about atomic artillery? That is, the technical data I passed you concerning an atomic cannon and a mortar. At the parade in Moscow (1960),

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he dragged out two cannons. They were enormous. These were the 310 mm cannons. It was a rifle cannon. There was even an order by KHRUSHCHEV to impress the Americans and the British and to show these cannons as if they were in mass production. They do not usually take off the covers. Anyone who does not have a permit to enter House No. 1 cannot see these weapons unless they are covered. But at this parade the covers were removed and photography was permitted to impress the observers. After all, the technical details were not revealed. These were shown at a time when there were very few of them to give the impression that there were more of them, but since then quite a number have been produced. G: Does your long range air force have any jurisdictional control over rockets? S: No, they don't, but they will have control over the atomic bombs that they can carry.

48. G: That is clear. Now in order to clarify a question on the V-75. Remember you said that the combat table of equipment consists of 96 units. S: Let me see my original notes. (Subject was shown notes.) I wrote here that at the launching pads and to the immediate rear there are 96 combat-ready rockets. This is for a battalion. G: However, how is this allocated? The battalion has six launching pads. There is a mounted rocket and one ready to fire. S: That's right and the rest of them are echelened back ready to move up as needed, but the total is 96. H: How is it then that if there are six on the pads and six ready, totalling 12, how is it that they manage to get off 14 shots as he reported? In other words, with six firing and six ready to fire, how could they have time to get the other two into place? (G translates.) S: That's easy. In the first place, in the Sverdlovsk area there were two battalions, not one, and both fired at POWERS. It so happended that the new battalion that was just deployed there was the one which hit POWERS but the other was firing also.

49. G: That makes it clear. But tell me, are there only two battalions for the Sverdlovsk area? S: That's all there are and they cover a wide space but when your planes flew by five or six times before, they were far enough away from the rocket installation to be out of range so they were not fired at.

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At that time BIRYUZOV received a reprimand for not being able to protect important installations from hostile aircraft. Since then the defenses have been reinforced but they are still very insufficient to protect such a large area.

50. G: Let me cover these small details, which are very important on rockets. Then we'll show you the pictures. When the designation 8A61 is indicated, what does the 61 mean? S: Whenever the prefix "8" is written, that is the designation for a guided missile, and the correct designation but classified is the R11 for the missile you mentioned. But the 61 has reference to some production model serial, exactly I do not know how it refers to this. G: Similarly, the R1 is called the 8A11, and the R2 is the 8ZH38. What does 11 and 38 mean? S: There is no way of determining the relationship of these numbers to the rockets. G: How about the R-5, R-7, and the others -- Do they have similar equivalent designations? S: Of course, they have definitely similiar designations, but I don't know what they are. The significant thing to remember is that the prefix "8" designates guided missiles. G: What do the letters, such as A and ZH mean? S: Possibly they mean shop design indexes, but I do not know. G: I think I have found a copy or typographic error. Please tell me which is correct. Is the T.G.-02 for R-11 the same as TGO-2 of the V-75? This deals with fuel and logically would be the same. S: That is clearly a copying error. It should be TG-02 for both of them. Sometimes this fuel is simply called TONGA with a number behind it. G: Here is another question. You wrote here about the weight of launching fuel, PUSKOVOGO GORYUCHEVO; exactly what is it? S: This is an igniter fuel which is first set off and which, in turn, through its 3-set sequence, ignites the main fuel mixture. It is called the initial fuel and has its own separate tank. G: Is it used to heat up the other fuel prior to movement of the rocket? S: That is exactly right.

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R11 Range varies with W/L weight (incl)

51. G. You give a range here of between 290 - 300 kilometers, but only 150 kilometers when the rocket has an atomic warhead. Why is the range cut down with the atomic warhead? S: That is simply because of the weight of the atomic warhead, whether it's of one plutonium type or of a hydrogen type, is much heavier. But the fuel quantity thrust and the fuel quality is the same. Therefore, it is simply a matter of physical principles and the same charge is used in all of these free rockets. Therefore, the range is cut down almost by one-half when atomic warheads are used instead of conventional ones. In order to have the longer range using warhead, either the size of the rocket must be increased to permit a greater quantity of fuel or a more highly caloried fuel must be used and they do not do this.

rocket warhead repeats Warhead Const-

52. G: Is the warhead container the same in construction and size for atomic as well as for conventional warheads? S: They are different because they require different shapes. This is primarily due to the temperature regulating equipment which is required for atomic, as compared to conventional, warheads. There are all kinds of intricate heating and cooling instruments and piping for Winter and for Summer use.

OK-201

53. G: Another small correction -- at the launching site you gave a designation for the oxidizer as OK-201. Later you wrote AK-201. Presumably the AK should be an OK. S: It should be OK, since OK stands for OKISLITEL. Incidentally, all of the data in chart form are exact since I copied them directly from manuals.

Supply base a launch point

54. G: How many launch points can be served by one supply depot? S: Say the main supply depot is 100 kilometers away and brings up the rockets by rail to a point 50 kilometers away. This is the immediate supply base for a given size unit such as a battalion. There is no limit after the number of rockets held in reserve at this supply base. They would have the minimum organizational rockets for the unit supported but the tactical situation or the expected rate of fire will dictate how many rockets are at the supply base at any given time. This is determined by the higher command.

R11

55. G: On your sketch an element of doubt came up -- the R-11 rocket information says that the battalion has three batteries of two pads each for a salvo of six rockets, but on the sketch only three launching pads are shown. S: (Examining his notes) I made this sketch to illustrate the deployment distances between pads, the technical position and the supply base. There are three other pads further off but I did not show these.

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56. G: With respect to the R-2, the minimum range is 200 kilometers and maximum is 610 kilometers. An average of 560 is also given. What does this mean? S: This is the exact design range which is computed on the basis of the fuel and its thrust. The rocket can be fired at shorter ranges and it can attain a maximum of 610.

57. G: Is this done by varying the volume of the propellant? S: No. The quantity is always constant and so is the operation, but it can be cut off at an earlier point in its active phase and the rocket will then fall at a shorter range. The balance of the unused fuel is simply wasted.

58. H: Can we show the new photographs of rockets now? G: I only have one photograph here to be rechecked and we can add this to your others. S: (looking at photograph no. 1) This is a free rocket and I believe it is the "FILIN", the 3R2.

59. (looking at photograph no. 2) S: This is the typical R-2.

60. (looking at photograph no. 3) S: This is a developmental model. It is a rocket that had been constructed but had been rejected after tests. It had never been produced in quantity nor given to troops. It is not the R-11 and it appears to be some intermediate experimental rocket which was shown to confuse the observers and to pretend that such rockets exist. I don't know its exact designation. I think I have seen it before and it appears like a development of the R-2.

61. (looking at photograph no. 4) S: This is a free rocket, dry fuel propulsion and looks like the 3R1.

62. (looking at photograph no. 5) S: This is also a free rocket, dry fuel propeller and looks like our "Mars" or the 3R2. Now the rocket does not have its basket-like cover but the launchers are the same as in the earlier models.

63. (looking at photograph no. 6) S: This is a free rocket with dry fuel charge. It is not a two-stage rocket but consists of two sections. There are nozzles emerging at two sections of the rocket.

64. (Subject looking at photograph no. 7) H: This one he has seen before but there is some doubt about it since he said it was the (3R1) before. S: This is a free rocket with

[redacted]

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a dry fuel charge and it is the 3R1.

65. (Subject's notes were examined together with him and the following clarifications were made. The expression K X Cal. Kg Grams was explained by Subject to mean K a heat coefficient per kilogram multiplied by calories per gram.) S: Generally, Russian letters and terms are used throughout except when internationally accepted Latin abbreviations are used such as "Q" here for a heat value.

66. G: On the 3R2 and 3R3 reports there is a missing or illegible word in connection with the magnitude of the powder charge. How should this value read? S: This should be kilogram meters per kilogram. I'm sorry it isn't clear. You should have seen how furtively I had to write this when I heard footsteps coming. G: I am not balling you out, I only want you to clarify it. G: When atomic warheads were mentioned, were their yields stated? S: This depends on what the tactical mission is and how far removed ground zero is from friendly troops. G: What I mean when they give you the R2, R1 etc., did they state what atomic yields each rocket is designed for? S: They have variable yields. I'm glad you asked this. Although we have not yet developed a very small yield atomic weapons such as 1 and 2 kilotons, we do have them 5 kilotons and up. Rockets can have atomic warheads mounted on them which have several different equivalents. G: You are assuming then that a warhead that can accommodate a certain yield of atomic charge can also accommodate a greater yield within the same space. S: Yes, there are warheads which can have various atomic yields in the same space. I remember working problems with the same rocket which had two different atomic yields. They are now working on having numerous atomic yields for the same size warhead. By the way I got photos of the launching installations because the instructor who was an expert on these had been at the test sites and had taken a number. He had some extra copies and told me to paste it into my working folio as an annex. At the end of the course our working folios were picked up and destroyed but I did not paste in the photos, and kept them.

67. G to H: I just have two more short lists to ask him about. Please find his notes on the TRA and on miscellany. G: To what extent are spare the components of missiles provided by industry and to what extent does the army build the missiles? S: Everything is built by industry. They then assemble the parts at the rocket bases and store them as dry rockets

[redacted]

(unarmed). The army conducts all repairs and maintenance. This is done at the GAU bases but nothing is manufactured by the army. We receive everything completely. Very extensive repair would also be done by the factory.

68. G: You wrote about arsenals and mentioned the 3rd type as a mortar arsenal and the 4th type as a storage arsenal and then you gave an example of this system in a military district. Is that correct? S: (reading his notes) Yes, you read that correctly and this refers only to free rockets and there are entirely different bases for guided missiles. (This question was to clarify the writing in Subject's notes)

69. G: It says here that there is a 420 millimeter mortar. Was there not also a 400 millimeter mortar? S: Yes, there was. G: When was it operational? S: This is an old model which we had at the end of the World War II and it conducts slow fire but the 420 is a new one. G: Is the 400 now obsolete? S: No, they are still being used but they are not making them any more.

70. G: Where did you get the information under the heading "miscellany"? S: Mostly from documents. That is the specific document for the specific rocket the note refers to.

71. G: What is this anti-tank missile - PTURS? The "U" infers that it is guided. S: That's right; it is a guided missile which is guided by a wire. The wire is rolled off of a drum and guides the missile. I will give you all the details of this missile later. It is a very powerful missile but it is clumsy to use with the wire. G: What is the purpose of using the wire? S: That is to get a perpendicular hit on a tank instead of a glancing blow. It is still being developed; it is not perfected yet.

72. G: What is a DURS? S: This means long-range guided missile and to this class belong not only strategic missiles but pilotless missiles.

73. G: Are there any other aircraft-missiles besides the P-5? S: No, they are still being developed. G: Are there special missiles? Doesn't that just mean atomic? S: Yes, of course. It is sometimes said that way.

74. G: How about free anti-aircraft rockets? S: We do not have them yet but they are also being worked on.

75. G: Do you recall when they were firing long range missiles from Siberia or from Kamchatka to some point in the Pacific Ocean where they even requested an area cleared in the impact zone? What was the success of this? S: That was nothing else but luck. A complete fake. This seems to be KHRUSHCHEV's policy. I believe that some of these wild statements not only are not believed by our military people but also not believed by your scientists and leaders. But the idea is to impress the people of England and America.

76. G: Do you know a young designer named SUKHOV? S: No, I don't. G: What happened to GURYEVICH? Remember he was the partner with MIKOYAN as the designers of the MIG. S: I don't know.

77. G: Did you ever hear of a YAK 27? S: There is such a plane; I have heard of it. It is a jet and it is designed by YAKOVLEV. Remember I told you that once I was ordered to destroy a MIG-15 when I was in Turkey. I rode all over Turkey for 28 days and received a commendation for this. What happened was this -- Just after being repaired in ROSTOV this plane, a MIG-15, was en route to BAKU. It followed the wrong railroad tracks near the Turkish border and crashed in Turkey. A cable from Moscow ordered me to investigate the wreckage and to remove the "SRO" equipment if any was on board (IFF equipment for identifying friendly planes). I went down there with a colonel from the KGB and found out that no such equipment was aboard, so he left and made the report. Then I was ordered to destroy the plane, so I arranged to do this after having had the flyers released and escorted back to our territory. After the fires were out the plane was still whole; all it did was to get charred. The cable from Moscow told me not to worry since the Americans had already obtained a MIG-15 out of Korea but that I should destroy it anyway. So I got TNT, wired it up and set it off and again the plane was whole even though the individual parts were scattered. Finally, after removing all parts of any value, I only had 5,000 lire left to complete this job so I hired local workmen to hammer the remaining pieces and the pieces were then put on a small barge and towed out to the Black Sea and dumped. Even then the fishermen complained that the nets would be torn. Of course, before I sank the

pieces I photographed the remnants and sent them to Moscow.

78. G: Do you have any special questions for him or do you want to show photographs? I still have some questions on the PVO that it would be well to ask if we have time before going to the pictures. In considering the PVO districts, first of all they definitely go across boundaries of the OBLAST military districts, do they not? S: Of course they do. They encompass a number of military districts. G: Do you know how they are organized? S: Let me tell you those I remember by name. The Moscow OKRUG, then the Leningrad OKRUG, the Sub-Carpathian OKRUG -- there is no Baltic OKRUG. Then further east the Baku OKRUG. Then there is the OKRUG that covers the entire Ural area; I can't remember its name. And there is also an OKRUG in the Far East. These are the RAYONI and each has its own headquarters (Subject uses the word RAYON loosely; it should be defense district). There is a PVO with troops throughout the whole country and when I said that there is no PVO OKRUG for the Baltic States, they still have a PVO with the troops there. The PVO with troops are subordinated to the commander of the military district but the PVO OKRUGs are independent.

79. G: Do they have their own organic aviation? S: Yes, they do and they are part of their tables of organization.

80. Did you ever hear of the latest fighter planes with designation SU -- the numbers are low, such as 2, 3, 4, 9 or T3? S: I have never heard of these. G: Are the factories at KOMSOMOLSK, OMSK, NOVOSIBIRSK, GORKY and TBILISI? S: These factories are all in operation but in addition they have factory departments which also manufacture rockets. After all much of the structural work is the same.

81. G: Does the PVO still depend largely on anti-aircraft guns? S: Absolutely, and they have guns with a pretty high effective ceiling but in addition they are reinforced.

82. G: Is the 130 millimeter anti-aircraft gun the largest caliber? S: I know we have developed the 100 millimeter gun to a high degree of efficiency and I know there is a gun of a larger caliber but I don't want to guess what that caliber is. There are none larger than 130, however, and another very effective gun is the 57 millimeter anti-aircraft gun which is automatic and operates effectively against low-flying aircraft.

83. G: What do you consider are the weaknesses of the PVO of the land?// First of all, they do not yet have sufficient numbersof trained personnel. Now they have their own schools -- a technical and a command school. Two years ago, in KALININ, they opened an academy for the PVO of the land. This was the old installation formerly occupied by the rear services academy imeni KALININ. The old academy was broken up and its cadres were sent to various other institutions. For example, the quartermaster service had a portion sent to Leningrad and another portion to the FRUNZE academy. The new PVO academy is under BIRYUZOV and has both a man and technical faculties. (In discussing how the names of towns are changed at the whim of the Soviet chief of the time, Subject mentioned that CHKALOV was removed at the whim of STALIN just as recently MOLOTOV was renamed PERM. Subject then drew a sketch of bewhiskered circles indicating a Soviet joke about the progression of Communist leaders since MARX.)

84. S: I now know what you would like to obtain about rockets and if you have a very tiny wire-type tape recorder I could even copy down everything VARENTSOV says, but it should work perfectly. We have such but they are not perfected. G: We would rather work effective communication means and remove compromising material from you as soon as possible. An instrument such as you describe would be certain evidence of clandestinity.

85. G: Since it's getting late, let us look over a few more photographs and we'll end this meeting with that.

86. (looking at B-2) S: He's a colonel in strategic intelligence. He is now working in KONOVALOV's Second Directorate, the European Directoate in Moscow. I don't remember his name. He graduated before I did; he is much older.

87. (looking at M-6) S: This man is from the KGB.

88. (looking at M-12) S: This is PERVOUKHIN, the [redacted] ambassador. He is considered to be a very intelligence man.

89. (looking at N-5) S: This is one of our people in GRU; he is in Strategic Intelligence.

90. (looking at N-4) S: This one is also ours and is also in Strategic Intelligence. I saw him in Moscow but that was sometime ago. He may have been sent overseas since.

91. (looking at F-31) S: This is KOSITSIN. He was replaced by SESKIN, who is now the REZIDENT in Japan and is also military attache, which job KOSITSIN formerly had. Now KOSITSIN has become a chief of NAPRAVLENIYE (Anglo-American) under BEKREMEV, and he replaced Colonel IVANOV. IVANOV was sent to the MDA as an instructor and he formerly had been in Istanbul as the REZIDENT.

92. (looking at F-60) S: This is our GRU man in Strategic Intelligence.

93. (looking at F-63) S: This is also our GRU man in Strategic Intelligence.

94. (looking at F-64) S: Here is this SERGEYEV who has two names. He is a colonel and SERGEYEV is not his right name. He is a Navy man, very experienced, and is now in GRU.

94. (looking at F-65) S: And here is Mr. SESKIN! He is the former chief of the Illegals school and is now military attache in Japan and is the REZIDENT.

95. (looking at F-67) S: And this is SESKIN's assistant. He graduated from the MDA.

96. (looking at F-74) S: This man is in the KGB.

97. (looking at F-78) S: This man is in Strategic Intelligence GRU in Japan, but he is not an assistant to SESKIN. He is under some other cover.

98. (looking at F-85) S: Here is a very dangerous man. He is now working in GRU in Strategic Intelligence. I don't see the assistant to SESKIN who is the air attache. He's a lieutenant colonel and he has already left Japan.

99. (looking at Q-14) S: This is a Strategic Intelligence Officer of the GRU.

100. (looking at Q-24) S: He is a naval officer working in GRU in Strategic Intelligence and he graduated from the MDA but is not my classmate.

101. (looking at Q-31) S: This is the second time that he has gone to France. He is a classmate of mine. He graduated from the MDA with me. He is a naval officer. His wife is an

instructor in foreign languages at the MDA. He married her there and she is five or six years older than he is.

102. (looking at Q-32) S: Here is a Hero of the Soviet Union. He is now a colonel and he studied at the MDA with me and graduated in the class of '53. He was the senior assistant to ZOTOV when ZOTOV was the military attache to France. He is now a senior instructor at the MDA in the tactics department.

103. (looking at Q-44) S: This man is KGB; I have seen him often.

104. (looking at Q-89) S: He is an intelligence officer, GRU.

105. (looking at Q-109) S: Here is an aviator. He had been in Paris; now he is working in Moscow. He is in the section of Foreign Relations of the GNTK. He is a GRU lieutenant colonel and is working for the little ROGOV just as I am.

106. (looking at Q-113) S: Here is a KGB officer. I believe he is working under newspaperman cover.

107. (looking at Q-116) S: He is a Strategic Intelligence Officer of the GRU.

108, S: Let me look at some other pictures during the daytime tomorrow when my head will be fresh. Now about tomorrow, I will drop in to see you in order to pick up the information on HERRIMAN, and I'll have to go to the embassy in the evening. Is it alright if we do not meet tomorrow evening? G: Of course it is. If you're expected at the embassy, you'd better be there. S: I will drop in a little after 3 tomorrow afternoon but I can't tell you the exact time. G: We will wait for you. S: I'll be able to stay a half an hour or maybe as long as one hour. Let us work very intensively on the second of May. G: Since you plan to go shopping tomorrow in order not to be squeezed for time would you rather come at 4 o'clock instead of at 3 o'clock? S: No, 3 o'clock is alright.

109. S: By the way, did you take an advance for me from my account so I would have enough to make my purchases? I want to leave everything with WYNNE. I only plan to take with me one suitcase with purchases. WYNNE can bring me one

suitcase next time he comes to Moscow and possibly the other one on a later trip; however, I want to buy all the things myself. What I want to take back with me now is this: a whole mass of small inexpensive items, then an expensive gift for VARENTSOV and the items which I promised to bring back to my wife. For this reason, I request an advance from my account. H: How much do you want now? S: (laughing) How much is there? What I want to buy now are some earrings, a small diamond --. G: Remember that we also plan to give you a fairly good sized quantity of rubles to take back with you. S: Very well, at least I'll have my debt covered and have you thought any further about the desirability of my purchasing a DACHA? G: How do you plan to do this? On a gradual basis; to pay it off piecemeal; or what? We think it could be conspicuous for you to show up with a large sum of rubles suddenly. S: Nobody would know that I did not have it saved up from earlier days. G: However, if you have this immediately upon your return from England... S: I would not buy it at once. I would be looking around for an economical DACHA for a period of two to three months. I can even register it in my mother's name. G: Well, as you receive income from your monthly earnings with us, you can put aside partial sums to pay for this. In fact, I'll tell you in advance that we had planned to give you 3,000 rubles Out of this you can settle your indebtedness and put away a portion. Later as we give you more money you can gradually save. S: I hate to get money gradually because money melts away from me. I was thinking of getting a modest DACHA, possibly an old one repaired or a new one with time payments. In my present condition by rank and age, it is perfectly normal to have a DACHA. Maybe I don't understand the situation; tell me quite frankly how you are planning -- are you awaiting for additional materials from me on the basis of which you will evaluate how much to pay me? Or possibly I am not authorized to make the request that I am making. Please explain this to me.

110. G: In the first place, ever since we have been working together you have been put on a regular monthly income basis. This has nothing to do with the quantity or value of materials that you bring. S: Very well, that part of it I understand, and you have been generous in the salary you allocated and I thank you. But the material which I passed to you you do not regard in terms of any

financial remunerative value? G: Thus far we have simply established an escrow account for you on a continuing basis and your account will grow, less your withdrawals, as time goes on. It makes no difference whether you are here or in Moscow. S: So this has been the decision with respect to my request to evaluate my materials. G: Yes, but that does not mean that a bonus or a reward that we may evaluate for you, based on your overall work with us, would not be given you at the time that you feel you should come over to us to stay. S: However, when I come to America I will have to have something as a nestegg to start from. I'll have to buy a house and a car and a yacht. (laughing) I understand you, but right now I need a certain minimum sum in order to buy the things I should. I must buy a few very small diamonds, two watches and a decent gift for VARENTSOV.

111 H: How much has he got now of that which we have given him? G: Remember we want you to buy what you need but you must get rid of every pound here before going back. How many pounds do you have now? S: I have £90 now. H: Isn't that enough for just tomorrow? Will he be able to spend the £90 in one day? S: If I have to buy diamonds, £90 will not be enough. Even a small ring and a couple of earrings will cost more than that. Is it difficult for you to provide pounds? Did you already give WYNNE what you promised to give him? H: It must be explained to him that our payments to WYNNE must be done very carefully because there is the matter of taxes. We have to account for this so we have arranged for a way so that he doesn't get taxed. S: You see I'd like to buy just a few things, but good things are expensive. G: Well, tell me exactly what you mean? S: I feel ill at ease at asking for the money just like that. But tell me if I'm doing this right or not. G: We'll give you another £50 now and we'll see how you get along with that and what you have, then you can tell us what else you need later. S: Fine, I'll bring you all my receipts and you can see for yourself. (Subject then bade farewell and left at 0045 hours on 1 May 1961)

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(17)

Meeting #11, London, England, 1 May 1961

1. (Subject arrived at Room 360, Mount Royal Hotel, London, at 1502 hours on 1 May 1961. Immediately upon entering Subject saw the medicinal preparations on the table which had been acquired by the doctor for Subject.) G: These are your medicines, but we will change the labels so that no name will appear thereon. S: Why can't I simply say that I bought it at the pharmacy? Can't I say that? G: No, because it is a prescription. S: And if I rip the whole thing off? G: No, we will take care of it, then give it to you. S: So this is the situation. Business first. G: Not to get these medicines mixed up. S: Very well. (All laugh.) G: You must know which one is the tranquillizer. S: Okay.

2. S: Yesterday there was a closed party just for our Soviet people, a small one. This morning per schedule, up to 1500 hours at the premises of the Tengpredstvo -- I have never been there: it is in another section of London -- they will have childrens' plays, sports and dancing. There won't be anything else today. We will work today if you wish. Today is the first of May, a holiday, so we have to work. I was told that the parade was very pompous; they showed rockets. One was a large rocket from which space men jumped out, and then the other rockets. They say a lot of rockets were shown, but I think nothing new was shown. That's what I was told, but it has to be checked, as I did not see it. G: We may be able to show you some photo shots that were made from the TV presentation. S: Good, as a check, I will tell you if there was something new, or if everything was old. Tomorrow at 2000 hours, a movie, "The Blind Musician" will be shown at the Embassy and at 1900 hours there is an excursion to the London Museum. We won't go to the museum, because we have work to do with the delegation. So we will work a little earlier.

3. S: Now the day after tomorrow, the 3rd, I am meeting the PRESIDENT -- I don't know exactly when but I will find out tomorrow. He will set the time. PAVLOV flies on the 6th, not the 5th, and we return on the same plane. We take off at 1235 hours London time. We leave the hotel at 1100 hours on the 6th. I will be in Moscow at 1805 hours. In Moscow, within an hour, I can call and report on my flight there and everything. H: Yes. S: There in Moscow -- leave the things on Saturday and go for a walk. I won't use my telephone at home. H: Okay.

4. S: The new hard line America is taking towards Cuba has everyone talking at the Embassy. They are alarmed by it! They say if America undertakes anything on her own, not using the Cubans in the USA, then we will be in a difficult position. Why! Because we can only send food, weapons and gold. There are no

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[redacted]

ment. If we give them rockets then there will be a war. I spoke to the Counsellor, people from the office of the Military Attache. Their thinking is -- It seems that the Americans will adopt a very severe course of action and we will be in a very difficult position because we will have to do something. Tomorrow I promise to find out something from SHAPOVALOV about the report. I won't force him: it wouldn't seem normal. But I will get at least a slight report.

5. S: I propose that we work tonight: I can be free at 2100 hours tonight, but tomorrow, not. G: Fine. S: Tomorrow possibly during the day, if we leave Ferrante early ... By the way I called today at about 1400 hours and no one answered. G: Strange! You weren't connected? We were sitting here. S: No, I said "360". But when I called to tell you about the TV presentation, I was connected at once. Only at this time in the morning did I realize that it was necessary to go there, back at once to the Embassy. Now, I had this idea. Think about this. There is an awfully large number of persons at the Embassies in America, Great Britain and the other Western countries. We can make great difficulties for the Soviets, starting with the MID, the KGB, and our Strategic Intelligence. This should be checked to see if it is practical -- to have only one Counsellor, one 1st Secretary, one 2nd Secretary: to cut them down and cut down the number stationed in Moscow if it is possible. I don't know all the existing problems. This is not my task. My task is to offer suggestions based on the actual situation. There is a huge number of people -- Look at London! Why are so many people kept here? And I think there are more Soviet representatives here than (Western) representatives in Moscow. G: So what is your schedule for tomorrow? When will you be at the Embassy? S: Tomorrow evening at 2000 hours, there is a movie there but, of course, it is necessary to go there at 1900 hours. G: Of course. S: During the day we will go to Ferrante. G: Okay.

6. S: And tomorrow I want to contact MERRIMAN. G: Very well. S: To prepare everything with MERRIMAN, I will write down everything that you prepared. H: He ought to try and do this, because MERRIMAN is a very busy man. He should ring MERRIMAN about 0900-0915 hours tomorrow morning. G: Tomorrow, call MERRIMAN at 0900-0915 hours. Write down everything. I will give you all the information. I have all the information. Write down as much as you wish.

7. S: Let's finish the other thing. It is necessary to check on the diplomatic channels. If we have fewer representatives in Moscow then, through proper channels, we ask why they have more than

we do? But not remove the low rank'ng persons (DVORNIKI), but the others. This would create a very difficult situation. Who will be removed? Everyone is either connected w'th someth'ng or has special ass'gnments. A struggle for supremacy w'll commence. Let's el'minate from the Strateg'c Intelligence. The KGB will apply pressure and SHELEPIN will ask KHRUSHCHEV to leave his men. We, in turn, w'll apply pressure and will ask that our men be left. If the (representation) 's not equal, then this should be done. If the (representation) is equal, it may be possible to remove one sect'on. We should say, "Let's discuss this. Why should we have so many representat'ves, both yours 'n our (country) and curs in your (country)." If this won't do us any harm.. (Present) it in this way. G: Very well, we w'll consider this.

7. G: Here is the information about MERRIMAN. S: Okay. I will wr'te it down -- MERRIMAN. What is h's name and patronymic? G: Arthur Douglas. Age 69. Wife and two children -- son and daughter. S: That is not necessary. Two children is enough. G: Yes. He likes his little grandch'ld (girl) who lives 'n Kent and whom he visits often. S: That 's not necessary. G: Educat'on: Secondary school 'n Manchester. Then he attended two univers'ties -- Cambridge and Durham. S: So he has two higher educations? G: Yes. Next he has awards and honors. S: How many awards? The names are not needed. G: He has two of the h'ghest awards. The George Cross. M: Tell him what he got it for. G: He got it for -- he fought in the Army dur'ng World War I (1914-1918). S: Such dates are not necessary. G: And the Order of the British Empire in 1942. He got the George Cross for d'smantling the f'rst German magnetic mine. S: Is he an engineer by profession? G: Later he was a consultant for all types of mines for the durat'on of the war. The disarm'ng of all kinds of new mines. He is a spec'alist. S: That is clear. G: His military serv'ce: During World War I, he was in the Royal Army Ordinance. S: This is not necessary. He part'cipated 'n World War I. G: In 1939-1945 he was in the British (Army) Engineers. He visited the USSR in 1944, as Scient'fic Advisor to General ALEXANDER. This is important because they can check this and find out about him. S: Is he Lord ALEXANDER? M: Yes. He is a Lord now. He was not a Lord at the time. G: You have h's positions -- the first t'me he was connected with military ordnance; and the second t'me with the engineers. Now his educat'on... S: Two universities and secondary school. G: Now the ranks he received and what famous organizations he belongs to. S: The organizations are not necessary. G: Let me give you an example. He is a Fellow in the Royal Society of Edinburg, Companion in the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, a Doctor of Science. S: A highly educated person! G: He has a third degree. S: A Doctor of Science. G: In the city of Lisle. S: The city is not needed -- a Doctor of Technical Sciences. G: He is also a Master of Arts and he 's a Compan'on of the Inst'tute of Technological Engineers. S:

So by education and work experiences, he is an engineer; he is a member of prominent engineering organizations. Does he have any inventions? G: Let's see. Also, he was with General PAVELL; he was his scientific advisor. He does have inventions. Write this. S: This is very good. We never give it so completely. G: He invented a process by which he can silver-plate objects in such a manner that they won't tarnish or corrode. He won't sell this patent and keeps it for himself. He is very proud of the fact that he plated a small ship, that belonged to the Duke of Edinburgh, in such a way that it does not tarnish. Before this it was impossible to clean all the small parts of the ship. Now it stands as an example of scientific achievement. S: Preserved it for ages. G: This is an example. S: I understand.

9. G: Now a personal description. S: Now more about him. G: Of course you can describe him. He is short, wears glasses, a bit fat -- you know this yourself. S: I know this -- bald, glasses. G: He is a member of the City Delivery Company. Is that transportation delivery? H: No, no. You can't explain that in any other language. This is one of the old city companies. I don't know how you can explain this. G: What does it do? H: It doesn't do anything. This is a sort of honor. There are a lot of city guilds and things in the city. G: Oh, I see. A member of the London Council. S: Of the Deputies of the Workers (laughs). H: It is an honor to be elected to one of these city companies. G: You understand, it is a special recognition. H: It is not public at all. G: It is an honor for his accomplishments. S: Ah! An honorary member of the London Council. G: By character, he thinks a lot of himself. He knows what he knows and wants to convince others. You know he thinks a lot of himself. S: Yes. G: He likes to talk about all the important persons he knows. S: So he has a wide circle of friends and likes to talk about them. G: Exactly. J: That is an important point! S: Wide circle of contacts and friends. G: And wants to enlarge this circle, and to improve himself technically. S: In other words, he continues to work! G: And wants to go further. S: Yes, further ... G: And he has plenty of initiative. S: And is highly loyal to the Soviet Union. Can I say this? (Laughter). G: He is the author of many books and technical publications. S: He is the author of many technical publications. The subjects are not needed. This is very detailed. They will say you know him like your father.

10. G: Recently he published a Metallurgical Dictionary. S: Author of a Technical Dictionary on Metallurgy. G: It is more like a textbook than a dictionary. S: Metallurgy. Very good! Very good! They will show interest in this at once. They will say, "Give us the address! How is the address written in English?"

Because there is Chelsea .....like the calling card? G: Yes. S: I left the calling card in Moscow; I have his calling card. G: And all his titles are printed on it. S: They are all written there. G: And you will be able to explain what they are because you now know. The first is an order, GC: the second, an order: then the medals. G: O.B.E. is the Order of the British Empire. S: Get his calling card. H: Okay. S: The RESIDENT will ask me for it because he will be considering this in terms of who to assign to contact him. G: Now the last-- this might be important. S: So I wrote the address, I will put a colon and you will give it to me in addition.

11. G: There is only one more detail about him. Despite all his important achievements and friends he still lives very simply, out of town, in a modest apartment that looks out on railroad tracks. S: Not in a fashionable neighborhood -- very modestly. G: Very. Not far from Streatham Hill Station. S: Please give me the address, I have his telephone but I can't ask him for his address because I will be all mixed up. G: How do you go there? You see there is this railroad station..... H: So he lives by Streatham Hill Station on the District line. S: Fine, now I have something to talk about. G: Is it enough? S: Yes. Plenty.

12. S: I want to report to you what I did today. Mr. and Mrs. WYNNE and I went to Harrods where we spent three hours. G&H: Aha! S: The best! I consider that it was right that KHRUSHCHEV was not taken there when he was in London. He should look at the garden, singing birds, the fountains! I was sorry I couldn't take VARENTSOV with me: he would have bought all the roses. (All laugh.) I should have loaded up a car and sent it. We looked at everything. Things are expensive there. Mrs. WYNNE helped me greatly and I made a decision and bought her a suit for 24 pounds as a gift. She was delighted. Because she helped. So I am minus 24 pounds. WYNNE has all the bills and receipts. G: We don't need the receipts. S: No? So that you can check? G: Who cares if it is more or less. S: It is just that one of your people might think that I took more pounds than necessary. I have three pounds left. H: You have three left? That is good. S: I didn't buy much. I bought my wife a regular Spring-Autumn coat, a coat for my daughter, a suit for my wife -- like the one I bought for Mrs. WYNNE, the same price, quality and color -- salad color. I bought one white blouse, bathing suit and bathrobe for my daughter -- two kerchiefs, two bottles of perfume, four lipsticks. I bought some after-shave lotion for myself. But things are expensive. Coats 25-26 pounds: suits 24 pounds; a few other minor things and three pounds remain. Please take some money from my account and give it to me. I have not bought the watch or the ring,

not a single pair of shoes or the purse for my mother. G: But you did get a sizeable percentage of the things. S: Yes. G: At least in quantity. S: WYNNE has everything. I did not bring anything here.

13. G: How will WYNNE carry this for you? It is dangerous. S: For whom? For WYNNE? G: Yes. He can be seized as a speculator. S: Who will seize him? G: At Customs. S: I can guarantee that WYNNE won't have his luggage inspected. G: How? S: I will meet him. G: He won't go through Customs? S: No, his suitcase will go through Customs, however, they don't look. They have never inspected his luggage during three years of his travels to the USSR. G: What would happen if they looked? S: If they opened it? Bringing various things for friends. A speculator is he who brings twenty sweaters -- then it is for speculation. When it is two, three things -- a coat, shoes, handbag -- he is bringing things for his friends in the London Embassy. I am 100 percent sure they won't open it. If they crack me, then it will be bad for WYNNE also. But I am not afraid -- I am a brave worker. G: But in case you don't meet him for some reason? S: This can't happen. I'm not going on TDY any place. G: No. We know that. S: Nothing will happen to him. They are nice to WYNNE. He has not compromised himself in any way. G: But at Customs they might make him pay duty. This can happen, no? S: He should say, "I am bringing things from London to people at the British Embassy in London -- their things. A handbag for one, shoes for another, etc." G: And if he is asked for his courier documents? Or something? I just want to make sure that we don't have any trouble. S: Heaven forbid! What courier documents?

14. G: If he appears with suitcases and your suitcase, how will he give the things to you later? S: Very simply. He will travel with his one suitcase -- one with two compartments, a standard one. I have seen it twice already. That is all. A raincoat on his arm. G: So you take the suitcase..... S: No. The porters take it. I meet him at the plane. The porters take everything there. I go to the captain on duty there and ask him to pass this man quickly. He will answer, "Yes sir!". I will present my document from the Committee. The second captain checks entry documents and stamps them. I will ask him to hurry him through. I will say the car is waiting. I will take a car, not from the Committee, but from one of my many friends with cars. I will drive him to the hotel. He will enter with his suitcase and mine will be left in the car. H: That's not too bad. G: No. It's alright. But we must check this out. S: Thank you. Thank you for worrying so much but I will work well for another two-three years. Then I will run (defect). G: So it would be better if you took less and WYNNE took more? S: One suitcase will be taken by WYNNE and one by me.

15. S: Now another thing -- I have another legend. Many in the Embassy are asking me to take packages to the USSR for them. Of course I will take two, three, but will refuse the others. I will take the REZIDENT's, SHAPOVALOV's -- SHAPOVALOV has a mother-in-law, a mother and sick father that he sends medicines to. These I will take, but to the others I will say, "I have one suitcase filled with my things and the other will be full of packages from here." I have already prepared them for this. They know already. Who will investigate or what will my delegation think? They will not come again in October. I won't come again either. I have them all bought (the delegates). Otherwise, in October none of them will come. H: That's a pretty good idea. S: Departure by air is at 1235 hours; at 1805 hours I will be in Moscow. Prepare seven shillings and six pence per person for airport tax. Everything is written down. The tickets are ordered. H: He will need more money to complete his purchases so we had better give him some more. S: The watch that I will buy will be in my pocket. G: That is no problem. S: If they touch my clothes then erect a monument to me. G: What is in the pocket is okay. S: We will work some more, then we will die.

16. S: You told me a good thing yesterday -- "If you have to run then run without suitcases and other property". G: You know it is a long way to run! (All talk.) H: What was that? G: He said, "If I have to run, where the hell do I go -- to the US or British Embassy?" I told him in that case, run to the nearest one. (All laugh.) S: I will go have dinner with the delegation now. I haven't drunk a drop of wine or vodka -- nothing. I have in mind the occasion of our celebration. G: You have a good percentage of your shopping done. S: About one-half. G: Well, that's not bad. I'm surprised you had time to do that much. S: We did it fast. Mrs. WYNNE wants to spend a lot of time picking things out. WYNNE only has the bills/receipts. He has a whole stack of bills; he will submit them later, so that you know that I have done it properly. G: Well we are not arguing about that. S: If I needed money I would need Soviet money, or things that I can sell to friends for Soviet rubles. I don't have the right not to bring someone a sweater, for example, to the wife of General VARENTSOV. Perfume -- for perfume I can take money. I will let them pay me the price of the article in the Commission stores, about 50-60 rubles -- 500-600 rubles according to the old system -- that's what they cost in the stores. G: I see.

17. G: There is 100. S: So you gave me 150 and here is 100? G: 250. S: Should I receipt for this? G: You are our co-worker, not an agent. With agents, you have receipts, etc. S: No, we take receipts from agents. G: From agents, yes -- but you

are in a different category. S: As long as you have reminded me of money, I would like to state my opinion and then we won't return to this subject. Inasmuch as you have made such a decision, or it is not made but you have a plan, I can flee unexpectedly with the family and leave everything. Leave things worth many thousands. The hell with them! Let them choke on them. You consider my EOD (1 April 1961), but I have been working for you much longer. My thoughts and opinions have split away long ago, just to work with you. But many Soviets have ideas who would like to (work) for you. But ideas are nothing: it is only a bluff. Action is important. I started working.....by the way, today it is two years since I finished these courses, the 1st of May 1959. At that time I started preparing the materials, all this, all other matters. Almost two years have passed and I have had this in my pocket. I wanted to start working for you actively eight months ago. You know this very well.

(18) S: Since there is this system of document evaluation, and it is important for me, I want to live well during the period that fate will have me live in the Free World. G: Of course. We understand. S: I would like to state my opinion again. Inasmuch as I don't have diamonds -- my father did not leave me anything in the English or American banks -- I can defect to you in six to eight months, in a year. I want to (defect) in two-three years, in order to do more with my position in the General Staff and my being stationed and working in Moscow. But it might happen that I will come to you earlier. G: Of course. S: I would like to request the following: That all my materials be evaluated separately. How? In any way! G: Okay. S: Considering of course, that I have already been given sums by you already. G: Of course! Of course! S: It has to be done very honestly. What one has earned, is what he should have. A person's ability determines what he has in the Free World. The stupid one is the street cleaner; the smarter one has his little shop. This is the way it seems to me, objectively. A (person) should get what he earns. G: Yes.

(19) S: The work that I did in advance during this period, I considered important. I strived for it. I attained it. I did everything I could regarding these matters. Now I will work on my new assignments and you will get (reports) from there. I will work actively in all ways and at a deeper level of comprehension. That is why I request -- if you consider the material to be of no value or if it is only average, this is a different matter. But if some of them have a certain value .... I recently read in the papers that the Americans paid one million for a file, a dossier of some sort on Brazil or some southern country. We heard this. A

million! Now you will receive f'fteen recru'ted agents who are recru'ted and working. This also has some value to me, as a worker. G: Yes. S: If I must come to you in eight months, then I will have $8,000. in my account. G: No! No! This is not the way it works. S: This will not satisfy me! That is not enough. I'm telling you this. G: You do not understand. S: I am telling you honestly. G: Of course not. We are talking about a general princ'ple.

(20.) S: I thought this through deeply today when I prepared this. You are work'ng with me now, but in a year or two you may get a promotion. New people, whom I don't know, will contact me. They won't know me, or will only kn w about me from what you tell them. This is just an example -- suppose you get a promotion at work. H: I think you better tell him that while this goes on we shall stay. G: We will be working with you permanently. S: And if you get a high position? G: No. This won't happen. S: Then I will have to start proving everyth'ng again. G: No! No! S: We have become acqua'nted, I confessed everything to you as one should. G: We understand your pred'cament, and we both vouch that we w'll work w'th you permanently. S: Thank you.

(21.) S: Now the last thing -- despite the greed of KHRUSHCHEV, we are very limited in our payments to persons who help us. If I ever get something of value for you about rockets, please pay the persons who have helped me -- that is all. That 's all that I will say about the subject. I came to you because of political convic- ons. I started work'ng for you in Turkey. Check all the f'les, my anonymous telephone calls against IONCHENKO, against the General and against the regime. Was I not ready morally? Yes I was! G: All this will be considered. S: I should be considered to be one of your soldiers, from that t'me on. G: This will be considered; don't worry. S: Check. I am sure the Turks have all this recorded. They understood me accurately. I was very nice to them. This strengthens my case. It helps me convince you, and it helps your higher authorit'es to understand that from that period on I switched from uncertainty t' def'n't' actions. I was afraid, of course, and uncertain many t'mes. But I was on your side. G: This w'll all be considered. S: I uncovered IONCHENKO to the Turks. I called from the telephone booths. Some meetings were postponed. Later, at the command of the General, I supported the meetings with the Turkish agent. I saw the surveillance. All this built up and IONCHENKO was expelled 'n three months. Who gave the leads? I d'd!

(22.) S: Before my departure on 4 November I telephoned that the manual was stolen. Was there such a call? The Turks know. It was recorded. You know! Let them tell you that there was a call on 4 November. I was t'ld (in English) when I called, "Mister,

please come in and we will talk with you. (In English) I said, "Okay, okay!", but I had a ticket in my pocket already. I left via the East. If PEEKE had been there at the time (I would have contacted him); I was afraid to talk to the other one. The American Air Attache was new, a Colonel, and I was afraid to talk to his assistant, despite the fact that I had good relations with them both. I was afraid. I trusted PEEKE. If PEEKE had been there then, and in charge, I would have asked him to "give me the address for future contact".

(23) S: Later when I knew everything that was happening in the Kremlin, I went out toward the BALCHUK. For some reason I was drawn there. I had the inclination to approach the West. I knew foreigners who were staying there; that is tourists. I thought I would stop them and tell them what the situation was in the Kremlin. What was happening! What a struggle! G: You can be sure that everything that happened before will be taken into account.

(24) S: When I come over to you, I would like to live decently. Will I have the right to live my last years in such a manner? G: What is even more important you will have a financial base with which to provide yourself with a house, car, etc. More important, you will have a good, honest, and worthwhile work with us. S: I will give all my strength to this, all my faith. If you have this system of payment, then consider that I have worked actively for you for two years, for two years. Then allocate my earnings for two years at the monthly rate. Everyone must have his own. If I had savings in the bank then I would say that I don't need anything.

(25) S: This is secondary to me, believe me, but I also have to provide for my family and myself. All I am concerned with is whether I shall be able to do this? G: We understand and sympathize with your views. S: I want to earn this; I don't want a gift. Don't say that (Subject's true name) is a good person, let's give him ..." whatever it is. I don't want this. I want to earn what I get. H: Very well. S: I did not say to you -- Here is one rocket, two. This is a code. This is something else. I gave everything! I am willing to work with my heart, soul, head, health and strength. G,H,&J: We understand your views. S: These are my views on the matter. Please excuse me for putting it this way. H: It is alright. S: I am thinking of my future. You are very nice now while talking to me, but maybe you won't be here. That is what I am afraid of -- maybe you will be transferred. H: No, this won't happen. Never! G: This will not be. S: Then I will not detain you. I will go to dinner. Am I in your good regard now? G: Yes. S: I swear by my mother, child, conscience, my brain, my heart -- that you will have an even higher opinion of me -- about ten times higher. G: Then you will be here at 2100

hours. St Yes, and we shall work. But I am not saying goodbye.
(Subject left at 1545 hours on 1 May 1961.)

Meeting #12, London, England, 1 May 1961

1. (Subject arrived at 2112 hours, on 1 May 1961, at Room 360, Mount Royal Hotel, London.) S: Good evening! G: First of all take down [redacted] address. S: And his telephone number? H: [redacted] The telephone number is [redacted] S: I understand. (Copies) Well, shall we work some more to celebrate the 1st of May? (All laugh). In the Kremlin, on 1 May, they invite the cream of the crop. The same ones are invited all the time, the Ministers and wives, the Party, the Marshals, one or two workers from the plants (laughs).

2. G: You have not determined when your meeting with the RESIDENT will take place tomorrow? S: No, it is the day after tomorrow, on the 3rd. Tomorrow (at the Soviet Embassy 2 May day celebration) I will attend the movie. There will be a few drinks. It will end at 2200-2300 hours.

3. S: I saw WYNNE, after talking with you. He invited me to a nightclub tomorrow evening -- with your permission. (All laugh). He said, "Very expensive", but that is okay. G: That is necessary. S: A big nightclub! One should go once. G: Of course. J: And you are not going to take us with you?! (All laugh) S: If you like.

4. G: Do you think you can come over tomorrow during the day? S: Yes, of course, but I do not know exactly when. G: What is your program? S: Tomorrow we visit FERRANTI and another place. WYNNE told me. This is very interesting. That takes place in the morning at 1000 hours. He will come at 0915 hours. We will have had breakfast by that time. I think we will return circa 1700 hours. G: Well, since you have to go shortly to the Embassy, maybe you can come earlier. Only, ½ hour, if you can. S: And maybe we can do everything even at 1600 hours. We will try. Wait for me after 1600 hours, at 1630, 1645 hours. G: Of course. Don't worry if you are ½ hour late; that is okay. S: Okay, after 1600 hours. G: That is Tuesday from 1600 hours, and for ½ hour or an hour, because he must go. He needs to wash, shave, etc. in order to go there properly. S: I can't go dirty. G: Okay, no longer. So ½ to a maximum of one hour. S: That is the 2nd. G: Okay. Then the 3rd, Wednesday? S: The 3rd. On the 3rd and 4th, my people will be at the exhibit. The exhibit closes on the 4th. I won't hang around there; I have nothing to do there. I will take them to breakfast and to the exhibit. Then, I will direct them what to do. Later, after the exhibit, they will go to the Embassy, where they will work -- write, consolidate all the cataloging. So on the 3rd we work "seriously" --

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according to time. G: Yes. S: The 4th!

5. G: Wait! Can you come over on the 3rd in the evening at about 2100 hours? S: Of course, definitely. G: Let me write it down -- 2100 hours. There will be a surprise for you, the Big Man. S: On Wednesday? G: Wednesday. We need a definite answer regarding this because it would be awkward, to be honest... S: Of course, it can't be otherwise. G: That is why I wanted to clear it up. S: This is all most important for me. G: If it is inconvenient for you, or you are not sure -- it is better to do it right. It will be very awkward otherwise. S: There is no question about it. There is nothing to talk about. I will be here. G: Exactly.

6. G: On Thursday, can we also plan to work? S: Thursday also. G: Fine. On Thursday, from the organizational standpoint, we want to make a final check of all commo arrangements, find any unfinished things that might show up in the conversation. We want to review everything carefully, and have you take all the things that we are giving you -- the little transistor, the little camera, the film, etc. S: Papers. G: ,Yes, operational papers. S: Give me lots of film. G: Yes, you will get it. You will seal them up Thursday evening in your (room), so as to eliminate the risk that something might happen on Friday. So that you have it. On Friday, we will meet anyway. S: We will meet daily, but will set the next time every day. Is that what we decided? G: Yes.

7. G: On Friday, we will have a friendly relaxed meeting with a few drinks. We will talk over all the details and will clear up anything that might arise. We will review with emphasis on what are to us the main things of interest. It is not mandatory that everything be fulfilled, but if the opportunity arises... S: This will definitely be done. I'm a little inventor, I will invent! (laughs). Then I will send it to you. G: You will do everything you can, but within the limits of your opportunity. S: Okay. I will have personal letters to pass to you, about information, military matters, political matters, personal matters, advice, etc., and you will let me know orally, or in writing -- typed on a Russian typewriter. Please have it in Russian so I don't have to burden myself with translations and to avoid meanings being confused. G: That is clear. S: In the form of directional-instructions. G: Of course, that is clear.

8. S: On the 5th, we hug and say goodbye. G: Exactly. G: Too bad it is so! (All laugh). G: Fine, this is settled. S: I wish I could come to this side sooner. Maybe the trip to

Canada will work out. It would be very good, in about three months. H: In three months? S: I think so, maybe 2, 2½, 3. I asked you once when I should plan to have my vacation. I will see how it can be worked out with my trip to Canada. If Canada works out then I will postpone it until late Fall. I will go to the South, where it will still be warm. Well, in general, I will keep you informed about everything in writing.

9. G: Regarding the vacation, our advice is not too important. Your opportunities should determine this. S: I'm tying this up with the arrival of WYNNE. G: We don't have any definite (dates) when you should take your vacation. You should rest. It would be good for you. S: Now, let's say something happens to WYNNE. He becomes ill; he is hit by a car. Please think out by the 5th, who will contact me then; where we should meet, the two recognition words. What are the arrangements regarding this girl with the child? H: Yes, we will prepare all this. G: Okay. Instructions will be sent to you through the dead drop? G: Of course. S: The dead drop works well? G: Yes, fine.

10. S: Now to check the sites. The signal site will remain the same? G: Yes. S: Don't let it bother the person if the telephone is not in the booth, on the board. The board is nailed there. G: And they are converting the machines/telephones to the new coins. S: Correct, and then the hooligans cut them (the telephones) off. G: Clarify this. What do the hooligans do? S: When the hooligan cuts it off, he takes off the (telephone). The apparatus (telephone) is there, but not the receiver. Despite the fact that the receiver cord is covered with a metal sheath, it is cut anyway -- hooliganism! G: But later it is fitted with another? S: Yes, later, but the board (SHCHIT) remains there, despite the fact that the (telephone) is ripped off. The person should mark the line with a thin red pencil. In two minutes I will be at the dead drop! (laughs).

Atomics — Control of Stockpile — R/M.

11. G: Okay, fine. Now let's start from this. We have a few questions. The list is getting shorter and shorter. The first question is about atomics. The question: Do you know what authority -- through which departments -- actually has control over the locations where the stockpiles are? Who is in charge? I'm not asking where they are located, but who is in charge of this? S: The finished atomic weapons -- warheads? G: Yes. S: Fissionable atomic material, that is not in warheads, is under the control of the Main Atomic Commission, just like yours. They control all fissionable materials, and raw materials. The situation with raw material is bad. It is not accidental that such

interest was shown in the Congo. Almost all the high grade ores from Czechoslovakia have been removed. There were hopes that China would supply them but I don't know. The question is being settled with China now. Monazite sands had been found in China. The Czechoslovakia supplies were meager. The basic supplier has been Czechoslavakia, and also our own. There are Monazite sands within the territory of Russia, with a varying percentage of content, also other radioactive substances.

12. G: Where did you hear that the situation was bad? S: You want the source? G: How well do you know this? S: I heard this from several places. First of all, when I attended the courses. We asked the instructors questions; we were told about the strategic raw material but we were not told exactly how much is produced -- because it is none of our business. But from the standpoint of what we have and what the People's Democracies have, Czechoslovakia is in first place for production of Monazites. China has Monazites and we have Monazites as well as other fissionable materials. The Congo has a lot. KHRUSHCHEV's feelers were sent there at once in order to get everything possible. You know, an awful lot was thrown into the Congo. When KASAVUBU was still not in power and Patrice LUMUMBA had a very shaky position, LUMUMBA gave his consent and 28 planes with generals, officers and arms were sent via Egypt and Sudan to Congolese territory. A small airport in the Sudan, next to the Congolese boundary, was mentioned as the refueling station for our planes. It was impossible to fly by any other route because no one would permit us -- grant permission to land or refuel our planes. Twenty-eight planes -- IL-14's and several IL-18's, no others, no fighters, heavy planes, etc., mostly IL-14's...

13. S: Major Aleksey GUR'YEV, who was my interpreter in Turkey, flew there with his group. I showed him to you here (his picture) -- his wife and children, Kolya and Zhenya. GUR'YEV is working in the Information Directorate now. He knows Turkish very well, and French quite well. When the Minister of Defense receives the Turkish Military Attache or someone similar in Moscow, he is invited. The Minister and the Chief of the General Staff invite him, a major -- despite the fact that there was a big scandal with his wife. For things of this type, we kick people out of Intelligence. They try to get rid of the person as they consider that the family is not stable. That means he has no prospects. But because he is clever and knows languages he is kept on...and this is what he does. He flew down to the Congo and he told me everything about the Congo. He heard what attempts were made by the Soviet Government, and further what the orders were -- to establish themselves there and grab, first of all, all the fissionable raw materials that are located there. This was the primary goal

because the fissionable materials there are of a very high Uranium content. There is no shortage of raw materials for the production of atomic energy in the USSR, fissionable pure elements. But they are looking ahead and know that the reserves are not too large. That is the general situation as I have heard. Where did I hear this? From GUR'YEV and the Academy the instructors told me. I believe I spoke to Andrey Tomanovich PASOLOV (Phonetic) about this; he also added something about this. I did not speak to Sergey SERGEYEVICH about the raw materials; there was no need. I did not use my initiative to discuss this.

14. G: And who controls the finished products? S: All the elementary production is controlled by the given commission. I already explained this. G: That is clear. S: Now they say we have to produce so many (war) heads for certain rockets. I told you about the Kiloton -- and equivalents of TNT. These begin with S kiloton, and higher.

15. S: This matter then goes to the GAU, to ZHDANOV. G: The GAU! S: I repeat, the whole soul of the technical aspect, the stockpiling of finished products for separate components, is what I have in mind. Empty warheads, and the contents that are to be put into the warhead, all that is for the Army and for strategic purposes also. Because ZHDANOV works for MOSKALENKO, as he worked for the late NEDELIN, he has all this. All the bases are centralized and the security is centralized. ZHDANOV is proved with security battalions by our Army men, plus OMSDON Divisions (DIVIZII OSOBOG NAZHACHENIYA). In addition, there are KGB units. It is considered that all sites of national importance are always guarded, not by regular troops (RYADOVOY SLUZHBY) -- we have such guard battalions, guard companies, guard platoons, depending on the size of the site. They must be guarded by the KGB. They are attached to us.

16. S: I don't know if you happened to get the film of when the Soviet tested their first atomic bomb. They made a film. It showed how they wheeled the armed atomic bomb. On the sides, there were two officers here and two officers here, with pistols. Soldiers are there also, drawing the cart; a Willys-type vehicle towed it. We mentioned it someplace, a light vehicle copied from your Willys, a light GAZ-63. It has a wider axle than the Willys. G: Of the jeep type? S: Exactly -- of the jeep type, and sometimes they put on a truck body for carrying light loads. Such a vehicle tows a low cart with 4 dual rubber wheels. It tows it slowly to the airplane. This film was Secret, of course, and was not shown to everyone. This was the very first, when the atomic bomb was in its

first stages. They showed the woods and birds; they showed a huge cross that was laid out (on the ground), a circle and a cross in the circle, to mark its bomb target. The error was insignificant. The guidance was dual. The pilot pressed the lever to drop (the bomb) and a radio signal was given from the ground -- the corrections. The pressing of the lever by the pilot was not all. The bomb did not fall. Only when the calculations on the ground were exact, did the bomb fall from the airplane. The airplane was at a great height. The bomb fell close to the target. At various distances from the epicenter of the explosion starting from 2 km, they had motor vehicles, airplanes, tanks, also animals tied up -- horses, dogs, cows, sheep, etc. This was all echeloned in several rows, also a complete array of structural buildings built in the genuine manner. They studied the degree of destruction. Everything was studied scientifically in all respects, using all possible methods and equipment. This was done for the whole area up to the points where only radiation was present. In other words, the parameters of damage created by the explosion were studied, the atomic action, and the power of destruction. G: Who told you this? S: I saw the film with my own eyes. Victor spoke and explained everything. Everything was shown. There was no music or sound. They showed everything.

17. G: Was this at Frunze? S: No, at the General Staff. I was still working at the General Staff, when they dropped the first atomic bomb. That was before I left for Turkey. G: That is clear. S: There was this film. All the other atomic tests were filmed also. I think I saw two more films. I think a total of three films were made. Then everything was explained to me. Here there is death; here if humans are well protected they can survive. There are three categories of radiation illness. At this distance, if you are poorly protected, you will have radiation illness of the 1st category -- there, it will be the 2nd category. It is even possible at this distance. If one goes further underground and makes reinforced concrete fortifications for the full profile, the radiation will be insignificant. They showed all the devices and indicators that are used. I saw this training film.

18. G: But who controls, not the equipment, but the actual atomic weapon? S: ZHDANOV gets everything. It is ZHDANOV's responsibility to conceal everything according to strategic directions. I know definitely. VARENTSOV personally confirmed this. I will swear to this.

19. S: There are two separate underground atomic stockpiles on GDR territory. I know this "exactly", like 2x2 4 -- two stockpiles, two locations. But I don't know how many warheads there

are in each but, of course, it's not one or two. They are held in reserve. The command will be given from the Presidium, from the Commander in Chief. There is a curly-headed Commander-in-Chief, without a single hair on his head, or anything in his head. (laughs). From him to GDR and that's it. Similar stockpiling exists on Soviet territory.

20. G: Who is in charge of this stockpiling? S: I'm telling you -- ZHDANOV. G: The materials and the bombs? S: No, he is in charge of the warheads and the bombs. But they are not armed. G: So he controls the bombs also! S: Of course. That is part of the equipment. G: What exactly does he control? S: He controls the safekeeping, the technical supervision, the maintenance, the technical-engineering control. How is stockpiling conducted? Is there any radiation? Is there deterioration of material from the engineering standpoint? To use or to issue to someone in a brigade, because he wants to, is prohibited. Only the Minister can do this. The Minister is told by the Central Committee. The Minister will act through NEDELIN (means MOSKALENKO). What concerns the Ground Rocket Troops will be through VARENTSOV. ZHDANOV stores. ZHDANOV's dumps are controlled by the KGB. ZHDANOV had "neighbors" sitting all around him. The security of these Atomic installations is maintained by divisions of OMSDON. ARTEMYEV was in command of one of these Divisions.

21. S: This is the structure. No one can do anything independently. VARENTSOV can't demand to get one bomb for use in maneuvers. No, it has to originate in the Central Committee. G: What do these letters mean? Why is it OMSDON? S: This is DIVIZIYA OSOBOGO NAZNACHENIYA. OMS is just added by them. I never asked. I will find out about these three letters. It is not read DON-OMS, but OMSDON. I will give you the exact full name; I never paid any attention or I forgot it. They guard the Kremlin, Lenin's Mausoleum. G: Yes, yes. S: There was a military school in the Kremlin, in the name of KALININ. It has been removed -- an infantry school. There are no schools in the Kremlin now. A Honor Guard Regiment of Artillery (SALYUTNIY POLK) was stationed there. It was removed. During the war, it was there. Your obedient soldier was almost appointed Commander of the regiment, upon graduation from the FRUNZE Academy. It was stationed in the Kremlin. I was in the Artillery and a former regimental commander, and was a good student at the FRUNZE Academy. Then they began to cut things down and I was assigned to the Ground forces.

22. G: To what extent does the responsibility of MUSKALENKO and VARENTSOV go into the rocket program? For example, you said that development and all scientific research groups are coordinated at GAU. S: The NIIs? G: Yes, the NIIs. Does the responsibility of MOSKALENKO and VARENTSOV reach the plants? S: Yes, it reaches to this extent -- the Director of the Plant is responsible to MOSKALENKO, if he produces rockets for him, to account for the fulfillment of the plan. But neither MOSKALENKO, VARENTSOV, nor the Minister, can order the Director of the Plant to do anything without first contacting the civilian authority in the Central Committee that is concerned with this. Their job is to take delivery; the plant is the supplier. That is, to fulfill functional responsibilities. He doesn't have the right to come to the plant and say, "This is a mess here; the men are not working." Or, "You are not fulfilling the plan." You have to report to the Minister, and the Minister will report to KHRUSHCHEV or his Deputy, whoever oversees this plant. This is the way members of the Presidium are placed in controlling positions. When BERIA was alive, he was in charge of all the rubber industry, in addition to his KGB functions. He was also in charge of all plants that produced tanks, rubber and explosives. Other members were in charge of other heavy industry plants. The Minister and everyone was subordinate to him. While the Supreme Soviet of Ministers met, these members of the Presidium, this head, was the highest Politburo. Now the Politburo does not exist as such, but the system is the same. They (Presidium members) all have 4-5 Ministries in their hands. They can make the Ministers stand on the carpet, remove them, sit them down, kill them, do anything they want. The member is responsible to the Presidium for his 5-6 Ministries; that is the functional breakdown. G: That is clear.

23. S: BREZHNEV does even more now. He is responsible for many of the defense enterprises. In this way, any big question is first referred to BREZHNEV, not to KHRUSHCHEV, BREZHNEV reports on this to KHRUSHCHEV. That is the way the "heads" work. The "heads" are constantly in conference discussing some cable from the agents. They decide where and how. They are constantly in conference and by telephone they give orders through their assistants. Sometimes the Minister sits there for days on end; he has his own office. G: I understand.

24. S: I remember this case. I was invited to the Kremlin to the Party Meeting (AKTIV) when ZHUKOV was relieved. At the Party Meeting in the Bol'shoy Georgiyevskiy Hall of the Kremlin, they got 2,000 military persons together. It is necessary to

come to an understanding with us so that we would applaud (applauds). "It is right that ZHUKOV was relieved!" It has to be supported so that it can be used in the newspapers and speeches later. At the entrance to the central hall, in the corridor of the Bol'shoy Palace, they exhibited the large painting of ZHUKOV on horseback. You probably heard of this. G: On a white horse! S: He is sitting on a white horse in full uniform, and under the hooves of the horse are the fallen Fascist colors with the Swastikas. It is very well done. When the war was over, ZHUKOV had actually done a lot to defeat Fascist Germany; he did an awful lot. The artist was inspired by this. Paintings of SUVOROV and KUTUZOV were displayed -- why not one of a 20th century notable by GRABAR' and another artist! A very beautiful canvas, higher than this ceiling, a beautiful frame, everything. When they painted the picture, it was said that it was fitting and that ZHUKOV deserved it. He got his fourth Hero's Star. He was given everything. Why did KHRUSHCHEV pick on him? If you remember STALIN relieved ZHUKOV because he feared an army uprising -- not the whole army, but let's say 80% -- 75% for sure, well 80%. Some said 90% would have followed ZHUKOV. I will tell you now how this took place. I heard VARENTSOV say this and I also heard it at the Party meetings. He (KHRUSHCHEV) said, "By the painting, you will see what a personality cult he has. A shame!" Before this he said it was right that the painting was made, and the painting was hung in the Central Building of the Soviet Army. Everything was as though it was proper to have a painting, in color -- a national hero! And then the personality cult was brought up. If he was a modest person, he wouldn't allow the painting to be done. He said, "The painting cost about 20,000 (rubles)." So what? They could have written ballads, poems, plays about ZHUKOV just as well. This was all a put-up job reshuffled for this meeting -- first, to relieve the man and put him to shame, and to undermine his authority. So, the Minister, all the Heads of the Directorates, Chiefs, of Staffs, were at this meeting (ARTIV). The Minister gave his report. He just started to report, when someone came and whispered in his ear. He left and was away for an hour. Then he returned and sat for a while. There was a buffet -- mineral waters, fruit, everything! Then the top man -- the brain -- arrived, and the whole matter was discussed and the accusation made. He said, "Please excuse me, comrades, that I did not work with you all the time. I was called 'into the government' (V PRAVITEL'STVO)." The government, however, was right there, in the Kremlin, next door to where they confer.

25. S: So that is their functional breakdown. There is no one person who can sanction the use of atomic energy, the movement from a stockpile to somewhere. Everything is centralized. The bases are scattered all over the country and the GDR and there are prepared warheads. This has to be investigated. I think that in Germany it can be done easily. Maybe I'm a fool, but I think that it can be done. G: And the Scientific Research Institutes, as you explained, will be GAU. S: GAU is the brain of Scientific-Technical thinking. The Academy (meaning Dzerzhinskiy) is also a brain in its own way, in the GAU. Highest Scientific Cpuncils -- there is a scientific council at the Academy. It is composed of the doctors, candidates, professors in the military and all fields -- optics, electronics, equipment, guidance, supply, etc. G: This is under ZHDANOV also? S: No. I am speaking about the Academy now. The Academy is under ODINTSOV; but it is subordinate to MOSKALENKO because it prepares cadres for him. There are no barriers or walls between scientific thought; it all flows into one source, as I say. And the Scientific Research Institutes -- not scientific research institutes in general, but Scientific Research Institutes for Fuels, Scientific Research Institute for Electronics, NII, NII -- all work according to their specialty but for one large purpose. G: I understand. That is the way you explained it to me.

26. G: Everything is coordinated by the Committee which sits in at GAU. Who is in charge of it? S: The Chief of the GAU is automatically the head. G: So it is under ZHDANOV? S: Under ZHDANOV! G: That's clear. That's fine if it's ZHDANOV. S: But, when necessary, VARENTSOV gets mixed up in it. G: Yes. That's clear. S: He could say, "You were given a certain matter to work out and you are dragging it out." or, on paper, "You worked it out well but in practice it doesn't work, or it works out with mistakes." You see, they all participate in all these discussions, conferences, meetings when necessary. But to start off, it's the scientists. These Germans that are in the suburbs of Moscow. They work also; they are invited; they are consulted, developed. Maybe they do more and just finish up there, because they developed the V-2 rocket which is the prototype of all the rockets.

27. G: Now, going beyond the scientific people -- who builds not only the launching pads but the foundations, etc.? S: I understand -- the Chief of the Main Engineering Directorate. G: Only he? S: He has the Kuibyshev Academy, which prepares engineering cadres and fortification specialists, who are subordinate

to and available to construct everything needed for the rocket command. G: That's clear. S: They also prepare fortification specialists for other underground defense sites and also engineering cadres for mining, mine clearing, for making passages (roads), etc. All types of engineers needed in combat. All cadres are prepared there. The biggest department there is this one (for rocket base construction) -- the one with all the new requirements. G: Correct.

28. S: So the Chief of the Main Engineering Directorate is Colonel General of the Engineering Troops VOROV'YEV -- I don't remember the initials. Under his control he has the Academy, a NII, his own ranges (POLIGONY) outside Moscow. Like the Chief of the Chemical Directorate, he has his own ranges. I will tell you where the chemical one is; I was there twice. There they put a rabbit and other animals in a metal box for tests. G: In Moscow? S: Outside Moscow, very close. G: This will be VIEM? S: No. G: ...the All Union Institute of Experimental Medicine? S: No, this Experimental Medicine is under Colonel General GRIZHOV. I am talking about straight chemistry -- pure bacteriology and pure chemistry. I was at this range twice. It is about 30 km outside Moscow. There is a small populated area in the woods. When you drive up, it stinks of IPRIT gas. There are yellow spots on the grass. There is barbed wire along the road, guards, patrols -- even cattle cannot enter. They put a rabbit in a glass box and give it one dose (of gas). The rabbit shudders and dies. They give another type; the rabbit shudders and then dies. We were shown all these gases.

29. G: Do you know what gases they are? S: No. G: Nerve gases? S: We have all this. But the evaluation of gases that you asked about...the best American gas, which is ordorless and colorless, is very highly regarded as a tactical gas. G: You are thinking of Lewisite? S: No. J: Nerve gas? S: Nerve, yes. G: It is highly thought of? S: It is highly regarded but we don't know the secret of (this gas), but we know its tactical properties. Maybe not all, but some of them. They say that the Americans have a tremendous gas -- colorless and odorless, excellent for tactical use. That is the evaluation they give it. G: Yes. S: There is one gas -- I won't answer now as I have some materials about this. By the way, they are not secret. I will tell you what gases they are.

30. G: Is there an intention to use gases in case of war? S: The 7th Directorate of the General Staff, the Main Chemical Directorate, has the Academy of Chemical Protection in the name

of VOROSHILOV, Military-Chemical schools, Scientific Research Institutes. They prepare cadres, both chemical and bacteriological. G: They are joined together? S: Yes, one command and one management. The cadres are also one. The Institutes are separate. G: Do you know where the Center is? S: All the Centers are in Moscow, but the experimental Centers are... One is on a small island in a swampy area of the Volga, beyond Kalinin. G: You don't know the name? S: They said there is a small island... G: Oh, yes. When you were at Kalinin, do you remember seeing the huge stocks of chemicals. They were there during World War II. Are they still there? S: When I was in Kalinin, when the Academy of Rear Services was there... G: Across the Volga from the Academy.

31. Here is what I will tell you. There are Centers in general, all around Moscow, in Kalinin and especially Kaluga. G: Kaluga, yes. S: There is a big base there and the brother of Sergey Sergeyevich VARENTSOV is the Chief of the Base in Kaluga Colonel Nikolay Sergeyevich VARENTSOV. Two brothers. Sergey Sergeyevich lives in Dmitrov, and their old mother lives there, 60 km from Moscow. I go there often with him. G: Where is this? S: Dmitrov. He is from Dmitrov, His mother lives there in a house, 60 km from Moscow. It is in the direction of our atomic center where they take scientists openly, where the first atomic station (ATOMNIY BLOK) was created at Dubny. Dubny is beyond Dmitrov. I was at Dubny once. On Sundays, I often drive out to (Dmitrov) with VARENTSOV to see his mother; he gives her 500 rubles every month. We take produce out to her. There is a nice garden there. We get a good meal, tomatoes, etc. There is a museum there.

32. S: His brother is a colonel like me, but a colonel in the engineers. He fought on the First Ukrainian Front with me all the time. G: What base is he Chief of now? S: Chief of the Kaluzhskaya Base, subordinate to ZHDANOV, a huge base.

33. S: But now to finish what I started -- beyond Kalinin, there is a swampy area. G: Yes, yes. S: I was told this by my late father-in-law, GAPANOVICH. G: That is considered to be the Moscow water storage area? S: The water storage area is in the direction of Dmitrov. I am telling you about Kalinin, about the chemistry. You are correct, the water storage area is huge. There are all kinds of water overflows, sluices. A canal passes through there. Now to finish, there is a small island (OSTROVOK). The Volga flows around it. It is like my living on an island in the Moscow River; there it is the Volga river. The (island) is covered

with woods and there is a barbed wire fence. All the little houses, offices, and all the containers with the bacilli, and the various inducers of plague (CHUMA), etc... G: That is clear.

34. S: I want to finish about the brother, Colonel Nikolay Sergeyevich VARENTSOV, so that you will know everything. He is a nice, modest fellow. He is older than I am, about four years. He is about 46 years old. He married the mistress of VARENTSOV. VARENTSOV had a mistress at the front and one day, when he was sleeping with her, his wife arrived early in the morning and found them in each others' arms. It almost ended in a divorce. VARENTSOV's brother liked the girl and married her. She was pregnant at the time. She gave birth to a girl, who is actually the daughter of Sergey Sergeyevich. (laughs). S: He had two more. So there are three children now. G: It's a family affair! (laugh). S: In general, he is very nice, I was at his DACHA, the last one. He wrote me a few things. I even have a photo, which he signed. He likes me very much. G: But you don't need to send the photo! S: I will send it to you. (laughs). It won't take a lot of room in our mail. (laughs). I will ask you to study it well, make an enlargement and a portrait. (laughs).

35. So modest Nikolay arrives. He says he had an accident, a soldier got tangled up in mines and a high tension mine fell down and killed him. As a consequence, there was unpleasantness, ZHDANOV came down and chewed him out. ZHDANOV does not like VARENTSOV and VARENTSOV does not like him. When ZHDANOV had the heart trouble VARENTSOV said, "The least he could do is retire". I know ZHDANOV personally. I sat with him like I am with you now. I will be bossing everyone around on September 2nd at VARENTSOV's birthday party. What I need is a microphone so that I can hear everything. A very miserable looking little colonel came down with ZHDANOV; you know the expression POMESHCHAL NA NEM (to report on him). Well, he did not take anything down. Nikolay Sergeyevich had a small fire, just recently.

36. S: By the way, I have another good source. In Mozhaysk, we have a huge artillery base. There is a Captain Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich SKLYAROV who works there. You need the name and patronymic? G: Yes, please. (laugh). S: His wife, Valya, works in the Main Military Publishing House. In Turkey I had a stenographer-typist, PRONINA, from the embassy who helped me. The wife of GUR'YEV was the stenographer-typist, but when she was sick sometimes and also when she went to USSR, Tanya PRONINA helped.

She was an M.I.D. worker.

37. S: There was a Shura ANDRIANOVA there who is working for PODSEROV now. She is his mistress. Whenever PODSEROV flies someplace, to you especially, ANDRIANOVA always goes also and sits there for 2-3 months. But this is Tanya PRONINA, also an M.I.D. stenographer-typist, who helped us. When I returned from Turkey on 25 January it was the namesday of Tatyana and she invited me over with my wife. She lives close to Pushkinskaya Ploshchad.

38. There I met the SKLYAROVs, husband and wife. SKLYAROV is such a fool. We participated in the Hungarian affair and received the Order of the Red Combat Banner (ORDIN KRASNOGO ZNAMYA BOEVOGO). He was a tank crew member, but from the engineering end, in the armored forces. Before this, before Hungary, he was stationed in the city of Vozh. Vozh is in the Turkestan military district, on the border of Afghanistan. When the war, the events, ended in Hungary he was recalled. They drowned everything in blood and then removed the tanks. He was sent to Vozh again. He is such a nice modest fellow. He said he was stationed there before, but he went to Vozh anyway. This one (Tanya PRONINA) started pestering me -- "Please help my girl friend and the girl friend is not bad." I'm also sorry for him so I help. Good women should be helped! (laughs). S: I said a couple of words and he was transferred from Vozh to Mozhaysk.

39. S: There were no vacancies in Moscow; it is hard to find a job in Moscow. But I have so many friends and I have connections with VARENTSOV and others who work there. Often people ask me; I have had many requests from friends because we have a simple relationship. I help them but demand the same attention for myself. If someone is not nice to me, then I can tear his head off. There are my morals and my personality. I am respected, I am known for this, and people are very afraid of me.. They respect me.

40. I said two words to the personnel man and he was out of Vozh and in the place where he is now. He is bored with being there. He has been working there more than two years. He wants to be transferred to Moscow, his mother died and left a large room on Armyanskiy Pereulak which he wants to get from his stepfather.-- his father is not alive -- who wants to grab it and get married. But he is registered (PROPISAN) in Mozhaysk and Valya is registered in Moscow. Valya, his wife, is the daughter of a retired artillery

colonel who worked in the Artillery Academy and lost his job recently. He has a small apartment on Gorkiy Street opposite the telegraph office. This is an interesting thing -- why am, I mentioning this? This captain tells me everything.

41. S: When I was getting ready to go to England I met him. He said, "(Subject's true name) will you transfer me someplace?" I said, "There is nothing in Moscow now, my dear fellow. Sit and wait, there is nothing!" It is not easy to get him into the Academy. I offered him the slot of chauffeur in Turkey as driver in Istanbul -- as head driver and instructor. The personnel people upheld me. He passed the Central Committee and KGB (security) checks. He received a perfect score (5). Everything was okay regarding the relatives and all that. Then they looked and could not send him abroad. He does not have a mother or father and eight years ago, in 1953, there was a case of drunkeness. They are keeping him in mind but are holding up his processing for an (exit) visa to go to Istanbul as a chauffeur for our Strategic REZIDENTURA. I tell him, "You are a fool! You see I do everything for you, but am I responsible that you don't have a mother or father? So sit and wait. If I have an opportunity, I will transfer you."

42. S: (Note: Subject is quoting SKLYAROV) "(Subject's first name and patronymic)! I recently had an unpleasantness." "What?" "There was a fire." "Why?" "A shell exploded." It killed two civilians. They were cleaning with brushes and it created a spark. Apparently they were steel brushes -- a regular shell, not an atomic one. Two were killed and four wounded. A small fire occurred. The system is as follows: The cells (rooms) where work is done with ammunition) are isolated from each other by thick walls, so that a fire or shock will not spread. This occured in Mozhaysk where our Captain SKLYAROV works. G: This is very interesting source. S: Yes, I can describe many more. I will write them up for you later. I can simply ask how is everything? What is new? They know that I know more about work than they. They feel very lucky if they can tell me something also, and then they trust me -- without a doubt. Captain SKLYAROV, a nice fellow.

43. G: Does the General Headquarters Reserve (REZERV GLAVNOGO KOMANDOVANIYA) still exist? S: The RGKs are units that are created in wartime. But now they have the following subordination. They are centrally subordinate. Everything that we consider to be centrally subordinate is in the hands of the Minister and Chief of the General Staff. This is actually the basis of RGK. But they are not called RGK now.

44. S: What is the General Headquarters Reserve? There is no reserve; everything is from the General Headquarters. When there will be a deployment to fronts, for operational purposes, then the fist of RGK has to be held directly. But in the case of battle readiness these candidates will remain in the reserve which will be used to strengthen one or another strategic area, a front or army. So there are installations and units that have special units (SPETS CHASIT) within their organization. This exists and is in the hands of the General Command, but they are not listed as such. It is not said that you are serving in RGK. You serve in the Army but your assignment is such in case of battle readiness.

45. G: Yes, who are they subordinate to now? S: They are subordinate to...G: To the OKRUGs? S: No, by territories. That is a very good question. What is located in the territories of the OKRUG, from a garrison standpoint, is subordinate to the Commander of the OKRUG. He is responsible for the supply of food, uniforms, fuel, etc. to the garrison. But directives regarding battle training, the closing down or reduction in size of the units, came from the General Staff in Moscow. (The Commander of the Military District (OKRUG)) is responsible for discipline, parades, etc., and the garrison commander has to obey his orders.

46. S: But the commander (of the Military District) can't order a battalion transferred or relieved, nor can he criticize or supervise training. He does not have the right. He is (in charge of) general administrative supervision, and concretely it is the General Staff. These units exist all over the Soviet Union, they exist in all Military Districts but they are not Military District (units). They are centrally (subordinate). Military District commanders are given several brigades for their division. They have to train them and be responsible for everything. The commander is responsible for order in the RGK units but cannot command them. G: That's clear. Fine.

47. G: When did you first hear that all satellites would be given rockets? When was the decision made and by whom? S: I heard this ten times. The decision was made by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KPSS together with the political leaders, who often come secretly without anything appearing in the press -- SHIVKOV, KADOR or MADOR. They fly in, are met and seen off, and there is nothing in the press. When necessary they announce it - "The peace-loving Warsaw Pact met!"

KADAR

48. S: They, first of all, have telephone communications and KHRUSHCHEV can talk to them ten times a day. Representatives sit in the General Staff for coordination. If there is the slightest change in the situation, the agent net reports political (information), American or English troop movements, etc. All this is reported at once. It is plotted on maps, and changes are made. Intelligence information is fully coordinated. Intelligence operations are not run against these countries but they teach them how to run operations against the opposition. There are constant political consultations, etc. There was a meeting and it was decided to give rocket weapons. So it is this way. If there are rockets, then there are bases where any kind of warhead can be attached. It can't be separated; it was decided this way.

49. S: I heard this about ten times. G: At the courses? S: No! Today it is two years since I completed the course. I maintain contact with the courses. I maintain a friendship with FILIPOVICH, he lives in the same house as Valya. He is the chief of a course. He is in charge of a VAK which is subordinate to the general staff. The subordination exists because he receives orders to train 50 General Staff officers. He accepts them. But all this is coordinated through VARENTSOV -- MEDELIN formerly -- now MOSKALENKO.

50. S: VARENTSOV tells me this: ("Subject's first name)! I am overworked." "What's the matter?" "New matters!" Really, all the time, he spends 2-3 days in Moscow and then leaves by air in either one direction or the other. He drags BUZINOV with him.-- "BUZINOV, where are you going?" "There! Sergey Sergeyevich is taking me to Poland -- new matters. We have to help our brothers who can do us dirt -- to teach them and give them some things. It is an order from our government!" So, a few fragments from VARENTSOV, and this one tells me in detail: "(Subject's first name), I am leaving for Hungary for two weeks". Why? A new something or other. G: So in other words he was there already? S: Yes. This year.

51. S: And they forecast that by the end of 1961. Sorry, I heard this in 1961, in 1961 in the beginning. The preparation, of course, began in 1960 but not for all countries. I have this in my report someplace in 1960. Germany -- the GDR got them first -- in 1960. In 1961 -- by the end of 1961 -- following Germany's example, set them up in all the other Peoples' Democracies. G: That's clear. S: We are giving rockets to China also, but they are making their own now, according to our specifications.

52. S: Personnel are being trained all the time. There had been a faculty for foreign students at the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. Now it has been removed because there are many secret things, and there have been cases of arrests of the officer students in USSR. I know some Germans were arrested, some Hungarians, and I know one Pole was arrested. The faculty was moved to the Higher Voronezh School at Voronezh. This is in connection with artillery. The Combined Arms part at Frunze Academy has remained there. Officers from all types of units come (here), chemical, engineering, artillery, etc. -- all. G: Of course, a school for all branches of the military. S: Yes, they arrive and have better conditions than our officers. The government gives them an allowance, and here in the Soviet Union they get a subsidy. They live it up. They go to restaurants; they have girls and have money left over. This is just information. This is a very important matter, what else did I want to tell you? Everyone is promised (rockets).

53. S: VARENTSOV visited all the Peoples' Democracies including Korea. He showed me photographs. There is one of him in field uniform, walking along fortifications in Korea. He has these photographs; I saw them. I can steal one photograph from the album and send it to you, as proof. VARENTSOV was in China several times. Whenever Chinese come here they immediately give him two or three big boxes of tea. He loves tea! He brews fresh tea every time he drinks it and uses 50 grams of tea each time. He drinks only real tea. G: Where did you put him up at home? S: He invited me when he worked in Tbilisi and Lvov. He slept with me. I had a wonderful double bed. My wife, mother and daughter slept in the other room. You know, I have 45 sq. meters of area. That's enough for me under the present circumstances. He ate at my house, and KARIAFILI visited me at my home when he was there. Now when I want to celebrate some occasion I invite him with his wife and children.

54. S: My daughter stays with them all the time, either at the DACHA in Babushkino or at their separate apartment next to the PVO of the country, -- the one we will blow up. G: (laughs). S: Because his youngest daughter, Natasha, is the same age as Galya. G: Yes. S: I bought a blouse for Natasha today. When he comes from Czechoslavakia or someplace he brings something for Galya, shoes or something. G: That is the way it should be. S: That is what our relations are like.

55. S: Now to finish this, I may be repeating myself but I will confirm it. It won't do any harm. This is a firm order that the rockets be operational b y the end of this year, 1961,

in all countries. This does not mean that there will be large numbers, that's my feeling, and I can't say how many. I think that, of course, they won't be given everything. To start off they will definitely be given the R-11 definitely because we have very large numbers of them and it is proven. When one knows the R-11 rocket then it is easy to go over to the others, both larger and smaller. The free rockets will definitely by given. In general I want to correct myself. The free rockets will be given first, then the guided ones.

56. S: Personnel is being trained well and very intensively in the countries of the Peoples' Democracies. In other words, the officers whom we trained will teach there with the help of our instructors and teachers who go there for 2 - 3 years as consultants. This is being done very quickly.

57. S: There is a question that I asked and never got a reply to. VARENTSOV did not go to Albania, and I have not heard that any of his artillery officers went to Albania. Because Enver HOXHA turned away from us in the presence of KHRUSHCHEV, when the whole clique met, they said that after TITO the next traitor, an opportunist and (subject can't remember word) -- one who -- Lenin's... Oh God, what's the matter! G: You mean independent communism? S: Well one who preaches Lenin's doctrine in his own way -- Marxism, Leninism. Not a reformist, no. G: One who splits away? S: No, we are all around it but there is a word for it. G: A revisionist, no? S: No. Dolores IBARRURI said that he is the second declared rightist scoundrel in this respect, a deviationist (revisionist), after TITO. And he, HOXHA, behaved very independently there and he departed first. He left his first deputy... a short name, four letters... G: Why did he stay? S: Because Enver wanted to leave. KHRUSHCHEV made the following decision so as not to wreck relations with Enver completely, because this would do harm. G: Of course.

58. S: He was told everything they wanted to tell him. Enver turned it down and departed. They kept quiet, because the others support, and are in the Soviet Bloc. But Albania is only hanging by a hair. Itwants to proceed independently. Also it does not want to joint our bloc nor does it want to be dictated to by the Soviet Union. That's how Enver wants to break away. Despite the fact that Enver is on bad terms with TITO, he has bad personal relations; he has taken his own path. We Marxists, like KHRUSHCHEV think that persons who take their own paths are revisionists and are playing into the hand of the Capitalist Bloc.

59. G: Now I have several questions about the V-75. Can they be used on ships? S: I have not heard. Why do you have it used there? G: I don't know. Is it possible? S: Why? We have coastal armament and we have coast defense troops as part of the navy. They have them. G: Of course, that's a different matter. S: We don't have large units that have to be protected.

60. G: The headquarters will have or already have them to a certain extent? S: For what? G: Where there are large concentrations, etc. S: The V-75? G: Yes. S: The V-75s are in the hands of the commander of the PVO of the country and commanders of the rear areas. In case of war it is different. There are separate PVO units that have these rockets; they are separate units. They can be assigned to the Military District where there is no PVO zone and a PVO zone will not be created. The military zone needs anti-aircraft protection. It will be given, for example, a regiment, a division or two regiments. G: I understand.

61. G: How about in Germany -- do they have them to protect their troops? S: Germany was the first country to get rockets. G: For their own use? S: For their own use, for the Germans... G: So they have them. S: I don't know, can't be that. I have heard that the Germans of the GDR are anti-Soviet and cannot be easily penetrated. Is it really that hard to find out things? I thought that you knew about the rockets through Germany a long time ago, through your agent net. G: To some degree only.

62. S: You should pose this question -- there are four rocket brigades, two stockpiles (of nuclear warheads). Two of the rocket brigades are to receive atomic warheads when necessary. They are trained for this. G: I understand. S: That's exact. The 6th ADD Brigade is there under Colonel FEDOROV. G: Are they found around Moscow? S: They are deployed there, yes. Moscow is very well protected. It's the Moscow zone. G: Have they standard artillery and rockets all tied in with fighter intercepter aircraft? S: Yes, they are all tied in together.

63. G: Now this is interesting. When VARENTSOV said that there was a shortage of electronic equipment... S: And that the electronic equipment is bad. He said so directly. G: Did he ever complain that there is a lack of accurate geodetic maps? This is from the standpoint that extremely accurate maps are necessary. S: We mentioned this. He never said that there are no maps. There are maps -- at any scale. The geodetic tie-in at separate installations (UZLAKH) is not done on maps but on a given plane table (DANNOM PLANSHETE). There are special geodetic

units (CHASTI) which make ready the goedetic preparations in three days for R-2 rockets. G: Yes. S: For R-11 it also said how long it takes -- about the same. This is considered to be extremely bad!

64. S: But the matter is not in the maps, the matter is in the training of the cadres who could do it fast, and the matter is in the branching out of the triangulation net. Triangulation has to be tighter, more points that have been calculated down to the last second by X and Y should be created. This triangulation! G: Yes. S: In some directions there are many triangulation points, and in others there are none. Where there are triangulation points it is very easy to tie up the plane table (PLANSHET) and the location of the rocket, to aim it at the target. Here where there is no triangulation we don't have any order and they check, and recheck, (CHEKUYUTSYA). They establish an agreed upon triangulation net, check it and recheck (CHEKUYUTSYA) for days, day and night without sleeping. G: I understand.

65. S: There was such a case, listen to this, almost unknown -- concerning this. Last year, in 1960, there were big maneuvers in the Transcaucasian Military District, next to the Turkish border. The training was under the supervision of the Minister (of Defense). KHRUSHCHEV came there (to observe). In connection with the visit they had training. They fired rockets to the Turkestan impact area (PRIEMNAYA) like they fire from Kapustin Yar. CHUIKOV, who was appointed already, was in charge of everything and had to report to the Minister when everything was ready. The Minister was to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal KHRUSHCHEV (laughs). MALINOVSKIY says, "Comrades, marshals, generals, and officers! I present to you the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Comrade KHRUSHCHEV." (S applauds All laugh). S: He (KHRUSHCHEV) nods his head and steps forward.

66. It is awful, all the Russian people suffer from this. When I look at this I say they are lied to, suppressed; they have not seen anything good and do not see anything. They wait all the time. That's the Waiting Doctrine that has been developed now. It's great! Wait! (Laugh) Die and others will wait. Well -- VARENTSOV told me this in detail. Please remember this; it is a very characteristic moment. VARENTSOV became very miffed at CHUIKOV. He called him an impolite scoundrel who used abusive language, the SVOLOCH!

67. S: So the Minister and KHRUSHCHEV are about to arrive. Everything is ready; the troops are deployed. Everything is ready except these points (triangulation) don't exist. It can't be said

that everything is ready to fire at any time. There is an inspection commission to check this. It is not the object just to fire. The object is to train the troops. They said to him, "Are you going to impress?" CHUIKOV is nervous. As long as they are such monkeys, they can't manage to do it. Why drag it out for so long? They tie it in too long and when they (team of Ground Force Artillery) report the coordinates, CHUIKOV checks them through his people. Are they accurate? Who will take the responsibility for inaccurate coordinates? The same thing will happen in wartime? They would be court martialed and dismissed from the Party. (G laughs).

68. S: Everyone is sitting and waiting. The Generals -- they wait and demand. CHUIKOV calls KARIAFILI, VARENTSOV's Chief of Staff. "Well, Colonel general! Are the coordinates computed for firing, ready?" "No, Comrade Marshal. This and that is still to be done." "If I were in your position, I would have provided everything." VARENTSOV then entered. "But maybe you, Marshal, can tell us if the coordinates are ready or not?" VARENTSOV said, "You know, Marshal of the Soviet Union, coordinates are not produced (as fast) as you make pancakes!" (all laugh). S: I saw that he was nervous. I put something on the table, turned around and left without requesting permission to leave. One is a marshal of the USSR, the other a marshal of a branch of the armed forces. CHUIKOV is the important person. KHRUSHCHEV might call him his right-hand man. CHUIKOV is the closer to KHRUSHCHEV, can approach him easier, and circulates closer to him than VARENTSOV who is called up only when he is needed. And VARENTSOV said, "I replied to him: Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union! Coordinates are not produced as fast as you make pancakes". He fixed him with this and left. (all laugh)

69. S: A lot of effort is going into this now. What is the trouble? A bear and rabbit can be taught to play on a drum and strike matches, but that isn't the matter. The fact is that the matter with triangulation is bad, and therefore they must spend a lot of time. So, as far as I understand it, an adopted triangulation net is formed. It is accurate, but requires more time for complete readiness and complete calculations. More than one point has to be tied in. Many launching platforms have to be tied in. This is the whole trouble.

70. S: Let me again repeat my analysis of rockets -- free rockets. There are large lateral deviations at long ranges. They still can't reduce this to a minimum. In wartime they want to compensate for this throggh the use of atomic warheads, since a greater destructive area will result due to a more extensive

detonation. Geodetic preparation for these rockets is still the obstacle. They are preparing cadres, improving aiming devices that I gave you, calimators, various compasses (BUSSOLY) etc. They are trying to perfect this geodetic work. This historic event did take place -- "One does not do this like you make pancakes" and he left.

71. S: He is a very spiteful person. He probably will not be awarded (the Order of Lenin). He wants to get it very badly, not because he has 5 others already. He also has the Hero of the Soviet Union; he has many orders. But (He wants it for) the prestige. When I was at KARIAFILI's 60th birthday celebration -- a top artillery man but he has poor relations with everyone. Everyone criticizes him; they did not give him an Order. Instead he was presented with a watch engraved with his name, but this is not the same. What does he need the watch for? He has ten already. But to get an Order -- that is what would have been significant.

72. G: Now tell me how are the rockets transported? Is air transport used or is it all over roads? S: It is as follows. I told you how many axles per rocket load. That's worked out using these trailors (TELEZHKI), also the number of rockets per railroad car. Railroad loading has been worked out. There are separate subassemblies in crates which come to the assembly center. Then they are mounted. They have transported free rockets by air during training -- I know this -- rockets like the KORSHUN, in unassembled form. There is no established system (by air transport), but I do not think this is a problem. If necessary they can be transported by air. If it is possible to transport tanks by air it should be possible to transport rockets. Light tanks are transported easily.

73. G: You know this place, Mytishchi? Is the Central Artillery Design Bureau located there? S: No. I definitely know where the Central Artillery Design (RASCHETA) is located because I had arranged for a person to be employed there. It was in the hand of VARENTSOV; now it is in the hands of Moskalenko. It is on Khoroshovskoye Shosse opposite the Aganderzhevskogo Cemetery. I placed the son of your friend BERDENNIKOV, who was my direction chief (NACHALNIK NAPRAVLENIYA) there. I arranged things for so many people. Maybe that is why I am still in the position I am. It helps; everyone puts in a supporting brick. This BERDENNIKOV came to me...

74. G: Is VORONOV in charge of this? S: What VORONOV? G: Yours. S: Chief Marshal VORONOV; he is a consultant to the Minister. G: Concerning this? S: No, a general consultant. Chief Marshal

of Artillery VORONOV. But VORONOV was not made the commander of the strategic or ground rocket troops. He is a consultant to the Minister. G: VORONOV. S: VORONOV, Chief Marshal of Artillery. He was commander of artillery at Stalingrad. G: So he is consultant to... S: ---To MALINOVSKIY and/the Consultative Group. Your friend SHALIN is in this group also. All important retired Generals are in the Consultative Group. But SHALIN is aging now. He is ill, but he is a member of the group.

75. G: Was there a General FEDENKO in GRU? S: Of course, a general lieutenant. G: Is he still there? S: FEDENKO is an old intelligence man. He was one of the chiefs of Strategic Intelligence. He was deputy chief of the Directorate but he was never the chief. He was in Germany for a while. G: Is he in Moscow now? S: FEDENKO is in Moscow but not in our Directorate (Strategic). G: It's strange that he is not in yours. S: He is somewhere -- concerned with scientific matters. I will find out for you. He is not on the higher staff of the GRU.

76. S: There are two deputies, MANSUROV and ROGOV. G: Of course. Is there a General FEDOROV there? S: Yes, he works for us, Major General FEDOROV. G: With whom is he connected? In which directorate? S: I think he is doing something in the 10th Directorate. G: You mean the Directorate of countries of Peoples' Democracies? S: Yes.

77. S: General of the Army TULENEV is alive, the former Commander of the Military District of Moscow. He is also connected with the 10th Directorate. G: He is not in retirement yet? S: No. He still works. I see him at the barber shop which serves generals and us. He does not have to wait in line as we do. (All laugh)

78. I will send you the new organization of the Committee, the telephones, and I will send you a list of the General Staff. There all the names are listed alphabetically with two telephone numbers. There are two switchboards -- the three digit one (TROYCHATKA) and the four digit one. I will give you this list; it is printed. The ranks and positions are not included. Example: Reception room of MALINOVSKIY, KONEV, etc. It is very easy to get this.

79. G: Do the troops have means by which they will be able to determine when they are attacked by chemical, bacteriological... means? S: That is a good question. Here is the answer. All

intelligence has the task of finding out about the enemy's intentions to launch a chemical or bacteriological attack. The task is given to everyone starting from military intelligence, and we have the task from the operational strategic standpoint. The first priority is rockets; then chemistry and bacteriology. G: Do the troops have anyone attached to them for this purpose? S: The troops have cadres that are trained. I repeat -- at the academies, institutes and military schools they have the task of teaching the troops the types of attack, protection procedures, and how to conduct chemical intelligence. G: Yes, that is clear. S: That is part of the Chemical Corps? S: Yes, exactly.

80. G: What are these secret military addresses? Example: Leningrad-300. Moscow-400., etc. What do they mean? S: This number is not assigned to any one unit. It is a military RAYON. The address will first read 'Moscow-300' and then there is a postal box number (POCHTOVIY YASCHK) or a former Field Unit number (POLEVAYA POCHTA). Field Unit Number is a wartime term; now it is called postal box number or Military Unit number (V.Ch. - VOYSKOVAYA CHAST'). So the 300-400 is the RAYON, in which some six units may be included. They know that it should be sent to this sector, to a garrison. It is a very general, or prearranged mimerical indicator. There they have the P.P., V.Ch. and for secret civilian installations which are military material producers it is called Post Box (P. Ya. -- POCHTOVIY YASHCHIK). No military unit even has a P. Ya. A Post Box is an indicator of a defense enterprise, a secret scientific institute, a civilian aviation plant, etc. P. Ya.! V.Ch. is a military unit. POLEVAYA POCHTA was a term used on the front during the war. It is no longer used.

81. G: Do you know what the exact numbers are which are assigned to specific defense installations? S: To electronics, optics, physics, etc? G: Exactly. S: I have, available to me, very many post boxes. Specialists from secret enterprises come to us at the GNTK, and when we write up their personnel files we write post box so and so. We don't write the name of the enterprise. G: In the Committee? S: In the Committee. I will give it to you. G: We will thank you for that. S: These specialists who come to you, the TV and film specialists... There are many secret enterprises connected with electronics, exact mechanical things. I have the name from post box so and so, address so and so. I will send you some with names and addresses -- of the ones coming to you.

82. G: Are the Field Post Numbers in special blocks of numbers? Are they all five digit numbers with '25' being a certain

thing, etc.? S: All military unit numbers are five digit. They are not in blocks. For example, the Military Diplomatic Academy is #75033. That's the way they write it -- V.Ch. 75033. Everything goes to your relative, Mr. Georgiy, to KHLOPOV. They are not grouped in any way. Military units are grouped in a garrison and every unit has its block. S: For example, if the rocket troops' military unit is '38' and 75033 is KHLOPOV's. G: Interesting!

83. S: KHLOPOV -- if we take him as an example -- is within the city limits, but on the outskirts. There are not other battalions or divisions nearby that would be under KHLOPOV's command. They are all subordinate to the commandant of Moscow, who just got promoted to a lieutenant general -- a big, tall fool with a large forehead. He was a division commander at Rostov-on-the-Don. His first deputy is VERESHCHENKO who was the deputy chief of my course (class) at the Military Diplomatic Academy. General KHLEBOV was the Chief of the course. Colonel VERESHCHENKO was the deputy and had me running around for four years. Later something happened. He was kicked out of Strategic Intelligence completely and he was able to get the position of Deputy Commandant of the city of Moscow. He still has this position. I see him often. His wife died from cancer recently. He has two children.

84. G: Are there numbers like, let's say, 25000 to mean artillery, 17000 will be the engineers, etc? S: Yes. G: What is the relationship? S: I don't know. These group numbers are always given in this way. The numbers mean something. That's the way it was developed. Here is what I can do. I will take several units of the artillery -- the (VOYENNAYA CHAST) the field post number and we can find the key. There is always a key in the number. Here please -- in intelligence we always have a zero 75033, 22504. There is an institute (FILI) of your friend, VARTANYAN. There are many; I don't remember. The zero indicates that it is an institution belonging to the Second Chief Directorate, GRU. G: Ah -- so there is a specific system. S: Government cars always have a zero in their number. A zero in a four-digit number is always a government car. There are not too many government cars. They are changing to Chaika cars now. All KGB, Ministers, various chiefs -- their cars all have a zero. SEROV has a two zeros! But they are four-digit numbers.

85. G: Have you ever seen or heard radio sets named BERYUZA or KREMNYY? Do you know anything about them? S: No, There is a KREMNYY, but I have not heard about the first one you mentioned.

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G: The first one is BERYUZA. S: I have not heard. It is BERYUZA -- a stone. KREMNIY is a type of quartz. G: So both are stones. How about R-401? Do you know about it? It is also a set of some kind. S: I have not heard. Is it used in aviation? G: It is used in general for radio transmission. S: I have not heard.

86. G: In general, what sets are used for coded messages or as radio equipment? Are there any special names which are used as cover names? If one wanted to transmit something and rather than use a certain number, use a name like "on the string";"on the LUNA"... S: You see these prearranged indicators are always used, but there is no system for their use. They are always used as cover names -- MARS, LUNA, KORSHUN, etc. They are always used. Nothing can be called by its real name. Where there is an "8", it means rockets. A brush for the rocket will have an "8" if it is a separate piece. (laughs) S: The air heater, which is a metal box with a centrifuge, an electric ventilator -- the number starts with an "8". I named many of the numbers starting with an "8". You can't say launching platform! You can't say the air warmer for the rocket. They will take your Party card at once. (S laughs.)

87. G: Remember, when we spoke about the atomic weapons you mentioned that there are BOYEVYYE RADIOAKTIVNYYE VESHCHESTVA (combat radioactive substances). Are they used in shells or in some other missile? Are such missiles operational? S: We did not go into this because we were not taught this. However, they exist for use in battle. They are products of the decomposition of atomic substances. G: Yes, exactly. S: It is the effect after the explosion of a bomb. This is all considered. We consider that the destruction of an atomic bomb consists of heat waves, shock waves, flash waves, radiation, and then all the radiation by-products -- radioactive dust that is carried 25-50 km depending on the wind. If it is carried in the direction of our troops, they will be given the command to put on the protective clothing, etc. G: That isn't the question. That is normal.

88. G: Are there substances of this type that are delivered in a warhead. S: They exist! G: Then they act to contaminate a whole area. Is it considered to be a separate method? S: Yes. It is taken into consideration -- created and planned. It is not considered to be very effective, but it is a supplemental method to poison an area, water, etc. G: Is it considered to be very important? S: I did not mention this in my notes but I know about it. This is put into special warheads -- I mentioned two types of warheads yesterday but...forget one. There are stockpiles of missiles (shell or other) filled with the substance. It can also be spread from a special apparatus carried by planes, not only by warheads fired from the ground to contaminate an area. Yes, definitely there are BRV's. (Short break while tapes are changed.)

89. G: Regarding the signal by phone, do this on Monday rather than Sunday. S: Where will I go on Sunday? Oh! So that's what you have in mind; I thought you were doing this in general. G: No, it is better a day later.

S: No, no! I will arrive in Moscow on Saturday at 1905 hours. I will spend 30-40 minutes for formalities, passport, saying farewell to the delegation, etc. I have a document there stating that I am a member of the delegation. G: Wouldn't it be better if you did it after you visited your office and made sure that everything was in order? S: No, I will go home. Then, an hour later, I will leave and will call. G: If this is convenient for you. S: This is convenient forme, but I don't want to go against your decisions. G: But wouldn't it be better if you spent a couple of days in Moscow, went to the office and determined that all was in order? S: So that is the wayyou want it! G: What do you think? You know, from the official standpoint, it is also more reassuring to know that all is well. S: Maybe I should call Monday. G: That's what I thought. S: Saturday and Monday -- aren't you interested to know that I arrived home on Saturday and that many things have been properly concealed? (Laughs) G: Of course. But remember that we also want to know how everything is at your office and that no one there hasany suspicions. S: Okay. Let me call on Monday after work. G: That is not necessary because if the signal is received on Monday that all is well it is clear that everything was in order on Saturday. S: So I will not say anything on the phone. I will just ring. G: Twice. Two series. S: Yes, two series. That's all. If there are many series then something is wrong and you should look for an explanation. G: Just so we don't have a mix-up. If everything is okay on Monday, it means that everything was okay on Saturday. S: Yes, that's right. G: This way you will have the opportunity to visit the office. S: What date is this? Saturday is the 6th, so it will be the 8th. G: So on the 8th. S: Okay. G: At what time will it be convenient? In the evening? S: To call? G: At 2000-2100 hours? S: I can call at any time. G: But you have to leave home.

(90.) S: Yes, I can stay late at work. Coming (home) from work, to the right from the office, is a church where I go to pray. Opposite the church is a public bath (BANYA) where I stop to drink beer. G: In the public bath? S: In the public bath. There is a counter there. The public bath is opposite the church, and there is a public phone right next to the entrance. Further to the right is the kiosk with beer and there are the Mens' and Women's rooms. (All laugh) S: To the right is a dead-end street (TUPIK). There is never anyone there. There I have a spot from which I can check surveillance (KONTROL'NAYA TOCHKA). I like this street that leads from the public bath and church. It is better to orient onself from the church. Ul. Stankevicha leads directly to the Chaikovskiy Monument, the conservatory on Ul. Gertsaga. There are some very nice houses there -- musicians/artists lived there and have since been buried. There are plaques on these buildings, about four of them. There is a garden (POLUSADNIK) in front and the entrance is very dark.

It is very easy to go that way, stop in the entrance, kiss this girl, and give her the material. (All laugh) S: Maybe she won't be able to recognize me in the ark. (Alllaugh) S: I would do this so she would not worry. (All laugh) G: So she would not call for help!

91. S: We should think this other thing over. It was a very good idea to throw (the material) over the fence into the American House grounds. G: That is, at a specific time. S: Definitely. There is a pool, a garden. The dog can be taken out for walks there. It is easy. I once had the idea of jumping over the fence. G: It is high. S: It's high, but it's possible to climb over. G: About four meters. S: There is one place where it can be climbed. There is a little house there; one can get on it and jump over. G: Why climb there? S: It is territory where diplomatic immunity can be claimed. G: That is a dangerous idea. Why? S: I wanted to. I swear I wanted to climb there with my material. I had the material in my pocket. G: Yes. S: KHRUSHCHEV was going to the UN. He should have been exposed and the rocket information that was needed should not have been delayed in lying around for so long. Some sections of the material are two years old, from the beginning of the course. This was not written in one day, but during the whole course. We'll have to study hard. It's May 1st today. (All laugh) S: We need vodka. To the fame of Russia!

92. G: What do you know about the latest tanks? For example, is there something new after T-10, the heavy tank? S: It's good that you asked this question. A lot of attention is paid to tanks. They are built in large numbers. VARENTSOV is cussing; he doesn't believe in them completely because although theyhave their advantages they are clumsy. It is easy to knock them out. And this whole armada of tanks can become scrap. He is very unhappy that KHRUSHCHEV and the Government administrators have been convinced by the Minister, the Commander of the Armored Troops and the Highest Military Soviet -- not the Scientific one but the Military composed of all the commanders of the various types of troops. Tanks are built in large numbers; some tanks act as carriers of launching platforms. G: That is clear. S: No. Not only the launching platforms I mentioned, but free rockets as well. A lot of KATYUSHA rockets are mounted on tanks. A lot of work is being done on the tanks regarding their speed, the reduction in weight and the strengthening of the armor. This is the cause of a fight which is going on through our Committee -- getting information on the strength of new steels, etc.

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93. S: The main deficiency of Soviet tanks is considered to be the excessive weight of the armor. The maneuverability and speed could be improved by just reducing the weight. A lot of money is spent for tanks. There are no absolutely radical new tanks. There is a constant improvement of the Js and tanks you mentioned from the standpoint of reducing the weight of the armor and increasing the strength. Also improving the engine and fuel quality. Formerly heavy fuels were used -- heavy, unrefined. Now I hear they are developing new fuels. They are working on this but I can't give you anydetails. G: So there is nothing new? S: There is nothing new; we studied them. G: So the last one is the 54. S: And also the Js are also being improved. G: And the floating ones, the 76? S: Yes. You know that they showed an amphibious tank in the parade today. G: There was? A 76? S: Yes, an amphibious one. They were shown in the last parade also. I was at the Embassy today. G: Yes, and that is all there is? S: There are no absolute new light, medium, or heavy tanks. There are no new models or new types of construction. They are improving the existing ones and produce large quantities of them. So they are operational and are highly mobile. They form a big advantage from the standpoint of firepower and movement for the striking forces.

94. G: Are there large tracked vehicles for personnel, for [illegible] crossing water, etc.? S: They have everything. I will tell you. G: Have you heard of the self-propelled unit, the SU-71? K-41 is the normal, small one. S: Maybe. I don't know this number; it does not mean anything to me. Self-propelled units using the tank chassis exist. There are special command tanks, mobile observation points. They have light protective weapons, short range weapons for close range combat, no cannon or anything. It is equipped as an Observation Point; it has many sights (Episcopes), lots of equipment, and is useable in all directions, 360°.

95. G: Do they have TV as well? S: Infra-red techniques are widely used in tanks. G: So they can operate at night? S: They can see at night. G: Do they have gyroscopic equipment like a naval ship? S: I understand. For the stabilization of the armament in any mobile situation. It exists! G: This exists. S: Dzerzhinskiy Academy had a very large faculty working on this matter. The position of the gun is stabilized, no matter what position the tank is in. This is very well developed. The problem has been solved. G: Is it in all the tanks? S: The infrared equipment? G: Infra-red. S: No. It is special, especially in these tanks, the command points. These tanks are used as scouts. At night, they are sent far out and use the infra-red rays. G: And all the tanks have it? S: These tanks that are to be used as command points, special tanks. G: A-a-a-h! S: But they don't have much fire power.

In return, they are covered by the fire power of the other tanks. The commanders sit in these tanks. G: Do the combat tanks have infra-red that would enable them to operate at night also? S: You see the infra-red equipment is portable. If it is needed, it will be installed in a tank. But these special tanks already have it. G: But in general they don't have it. You answered that clearly. S: I think they don't have it and there is no reason to have it.

96. G: Have you heard anything about the new mobile installation 122 (30)? S: Yes. There's a new one, but I am not familiar with the number 122. G: This is a gun. S: A gun? I thought 122 was a number of a component. There is a 122 mm; it exists. G: A new one? S: One hundred twenty-two mm with rifling. G: Yes, a new improved type. S: I will tell you what is improved. I know because I visited that tank park (TANKODROM). It is outside Moscow at Kubinka. I'm trying to remember where that chemical thing is and I can't remember. G: What direction? S: It is 70 km away. G: Could it be near Solnechnogorsk? S: No. I know Solnechnogorsk. G: Could it be Seneshno? S: There is a Lake Senesh. G: Yes, that's right. There is an island there also. S: Yes, there is an island there. S: The former range (POLIGON) is there and the highest combined arms courses are given there. G: Exactly, combined arms with tanks, artillery, etc. S: They have everything. G: I don't know your tankodrom location. You tell me; I don't know any other place. S: I can't remember the chemical center. I will find out. I will remember. G: Do you want the map? It will help. S: Here is Kubinka. Ask me questions while I look. Now about the tanks, new ones -- and the gun.

97. S: Now to finish about the 122 mm gun. A new turret (BASHNYA) has an improved design. The turret is high in front and slopes down in back. The opening where the barrel comes out... it is good I remembered. The recoil mechanism has been redesigned. It is now a double mechanism -- one above and one below. They were able to reduce the length of the recoil mechanism because of this. The recoil is now taken up by the double mechanism. Improvements of this type are constantly going on. (Pause - S looking at map.)

98. S: The Military-Chemical Academy is on Vlitsa Radio, Dom 10. This is the name of VOROSHILOV in Moscow; it remains as it was. It is very large and it has a lot of equipment. They have tanks there with flame throwers. I saw them in operation there. G: Who is in charge of flame throwers, the engineers? S: No. The head of the chemical troops is in charge. The engineers, of course, provide the equipment; there are special plants for this. They work together very closely. Engineers are from Kuybyshev Academy in Moscow. It is located

close to the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. I will remember this; I have this written down. I have all this information on our equipment. Of course there are many new Secret ones there. It is in my workbook, where I have military notes written down.

99. G: Where is your workbook? In GRU? S: In my desk. G: They were in GRU? S: No. This is my workbook on military matters, strategic directions, etc. There are many Secret things there for me. If it should be found it would be bad for me. G: Of course. S: It is in my desk. It is locked and I have the key here with me, in London. G: Don't lose it. S: Just one key. I didn't even leave it at home. G: You would have to break open your desk. S: The lock is a special one that I had installed like the ones used in a piano. I took the other one out. The key is here; I can show it.

100. S (Looking at the map): You know it is somewhere to the northeast, 30 km, but here details are not shown. G: Not Pushkino? S: No. G: It is to the northeast also. S: No. Correct, here is Pushkino. It is a short word. One can go there like this ... G: By electric train? S: You can go by electric train, but it does not go that far. I went there by car. We have the Main Veterinary Institute, and there they have a Military-Veterinary Faculty, even now though we hardly have any horses left in the army. They only use them for transport in internal IKHOVS. If you go past this Veterinary Institute, to the left, is the Strategic Intelligence Institute where your Armenian friend VARTANYAN was the chief (PILI). And this road goes straight past a large mansion, and then goes into the woods; the range begins there. I will write this up. Let's not waste time. I can't remember now.

101. G: What schools or academies have been closed these past two years? S: First, the Rear Services Academy was closed at its base in Kalinin. G: So it was transferred? S: No. The faculties were scattered. One faculty was given to the Leningrad Academy, others to the Frunze Academy. A new academy was created (PVO in Kalinin) and has been in operation for two years and is beginning to produce cadres. To start off, higher academic courses for the PVO were established. Two classes graduated from the higher academic courses. Now the PVO Academy is subordinate to BIRYUZOV. The General Staff Academy in the name of VOROSHILOV was closed. They organized a faculty and placed it in the Frunze Academy. They consider that at combined arms center, the Frunze Academy, it is possible to teach an even higher level -- Generals and Division Commanders. This formerly was done at the VOROSHILOV Academy. This VOROSHILOV Academy does not exist any more.

102. S: In those buildings, your friend YERZIN sits now and this is the Institute of People's Friendship. (Laughs) That's what they created! G: Yes. S: It should be exposed so that persons would not be sent there for study, and the Institute would close. It's not an Institute; it's a University. If you decide to play it up well, refer to the following fact. When I was in Odessa, before I met the American interpreters, I heard with my own ears over the radio, in early August 1960, "Now we will have a word from Prorectors -- YERZIN and someone else." So in Odessa, I heard YERZIN's voice in my hotel room in the evening. He said we have accepted so many students of all nationalities, as well as Soviet youths; we plan to accept so many more. This was in 1960, when the University was beginning to function. This does not come from me as the source. The whole world heard YERZIN about (you can say), "We know who Comrade YERZIN is! Comrade KHRUSHCHEV, how are we to understand this? Why are you cheating these negroes whom you are supporting, etc., when you are training them as your spies there!" This can be played up very nicely; this should be used to embarrass him. These negroes sell themselves without any hesitation.

103. S: So YERZIN spoke over the radio. He has the same cover story as I; he is supposedly discharged. At one time he did serve (in the army), before he always claimed to be an MID worker. His file has an entry that he served in the army. He never served in the Army; he served in the KGB and he is in the KGB now! Before he was appointed Prorector, and after his removal from Turkey.

104. S: I left on 5 November. On 4 November, I called the Turks. Please check this. Do they have a record of this or not? If not, they are fools. (Laughs) I am sure they have it. Such things are not missed; I called directly to the First Directorate. G: We can't be too nosy in this respect; the Turks don't know about you. S: But maybe somehow unofficially. G: But why draw their attention to this? S: You are right there. But maybe in some way, maybe by chance. G: If by chance then. S: I made 4-5 such calls over the telephone. YERZIN left in a year. He had unpleasantness with BEDOV despite the fact that he personally recruited a Scandinavian diplomat and gave him 5,000 Turkish lire all at once. They took money from me, from the operational fund. Later they reimbursed it.

105. S: VAVILOV, YERZIN's Deputy, was a good friend of mine and FEDOROV and YOSHKOV were his operational workers. Also the one whose picture I identified yesterday but could not remember the name. We noted it down, that he was in Turkey, and also his number. G: This is not important. S: And so VAVILOV came to me and said he needed money urgently for a person they had bought.

I said, "Please sign the receipt". I placed it into our folio; one section is with the codes and the other is the operational portfolio. It is sealed and with a zipper on three sides. I lent them the money. So they didn't take any money from the Embassy; they took the money from me. The agent was someone from Scandinavia, no name or anything. When YERZIN returned, he had troubles with SEROV. I met YERZIN. He was always very nice to me.

106. S: He gave me all his keys and his communications channel, when I reported to SEROV about the deceit of the General and all the General's affairs. I was right in doing this; it raised my stature a lot. I acted from the standpoint of the Party, and honesty. It was absolutely right and proper, even though I entered into a conflict with the General. When I spoke to him he said, "Get out of here you babe in arms". He often sat in my office on the first floor with me and drank Vodka.

107. S: YERZIN had troubles with SEROV because of failures in Turkey, and SEROV was making trouble for him. He bought a car in Syria and exchanged the new foreign car in Odessa for a Volga. This was done so as not to attract too much attention by having a foreign car. Foreign and American cars attract a whole crowd (in USSR). The Militia chase the people away claiming that they bow down to Western accomplishments. (Laughs) Whenever there is a car at the Metropole (Hotel), Intourist, or an Ambassador, etc., there is always a crowd. This is beside the point. I met him (YERZIN) and he offered to give me a ride in the new car and said, "I'm in a bad mood. How are your affairs?" I said mine were not good either. He said, "I have this jerk (SEROV to deal with); he does not want to listen. You make a report to him and he is probably thinking about KHRUSHCHEV's daughter". He (SEROV) is married to a relative, not a daughter, but a niece or something. In any case, SEROV is related to KHRUSHCHEV in some way, the same as the Chief Editor of IZVESTIYA, ADZHUBEY. G: That's clear.

108. S: ADZHUBEY visited you and he is a complete fool. The world of journalists hates him because he compiled and edited a book of all of KHRUSHCHEV's speeches in the USA -- speeches that were written by the Central Committee. For this he received the LENIN prize and medal. It is called a TRUD (work). (Laugh) As soon as KHRUSHCHEV is criticized then the book can be thrown out. (All laugh) S: It was printed in large numbers. It is so thick! It contained all his speeches at banquets, etc., that he read from notes. All this ADZHUBEY compiled. You see, it pays to be a relative, I would like to be a relative.

109. S: What was I talking about? G: About the old and new academies. S: Yes. So YERZIN said he was fighting with SEROV. He said when you report to him he doesn't even listen. YERZIN worked for ZHUKOV in the Committee for Cultural Relations Abroad. From there, he was appointed Prorector, with the objective that he would develop a spy school. G: Is ZHUKOV the old Intelligence man who was not sent out anyplace because of drunkenness? S: No. This is a clean MID type. So suddenly he was elevated to the position of Prorector. This is a high (position). He lives on Frunzenskaya Nab, not far from VAKHTSOV, about three houses beyond Stroitel'naya Ul. I was at his home, on the 5th floor. He has two rooms. He is married and has two sons. So he was elevated to this high position as Prorector.

110. S: YERZIN has an operational staff there. Among them is a Colonel of the Armored Tank Forces, who was Chief Assistant in Afghanistan twice. He was kicked out from the Strategic Intelligence organization. Mark his photograph. He is now a civilian employee of the Institute with YERZIN, but he has active tasks. Other KGB personnel were obtained by YERZIN and now serve as instructors; some were accepted, and some are also in the administration of the university. So our Colonel got a position there. I asked about YERZIN and the Colonel said, "He thinks highly of you. He remembers "(Subject's true name) is a good operational worker; he has high principles". [redacted] is his name. Write down Colonel of the Armored Forces, Leonid. He was in Afghanistan twice and after his last assignment, from which he returned in 1960, he was discharged. Before that, he was the Assistant in Turkey. He was abroad 3 times. I have not seen his photo yet. YERZIN is using him also.

111. S: There they are taught MARXISM-LENINISM. They are prepared morally, and then when they return (home) they can be political, or any other kind of agent. They prepared Patrice LUMUMBA there. This has to be exposed and destroyed. It's absurd! It is false all around! Did you write this down? YERZIN was in Turkey and twice in Afghanistan. He was discharged because of age; he did not work well in the organization. He worked for TSAREV; he was his assistant.

112. S: Write -- TSAREV, Military Attache in Afghanistan, replaced now by Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel Vasiliy POKICHKO. He graduated from the Academy together with me. I probably have named all 98 persons by now. Don't forget that I'm the 98th! I have named 97 already. Is there a photo? Please pick out a good one. (I showed Subject his own picture taken on a Polaroid.) S: So you have POKICHKI? G: Yes. S: He finished with me in 1953. He is a Hero of the Soviet Union, Combined Armed Forces. TSAREV, whom he replaced -- you see we have a whole chain -- is now the head of the course in the Military Diplomatic Academy. He is working there already. He is Head of the 2nd Course.

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113. G: Do you see military maps? S: Yes. I have them in my possession and I sign for them. I enter the situation or they give me situation maps that are all printed showing the Front military operations. We enter our own notes. G: Can you get one of these? S: I can only photograph it. Every sheet is accounted for. We have good scales: 1/200,000, 1/100,000. G: 1/100,000 would be especially nice if you could photograph one. S: 1/200,000 and 1/100,000 are very good. They show Moscow and everything. G: And all the regions of Moscow that are needed. S: The maps are new and all that. G: We are interested in them not because they are maps of the Soviet Union, but because of accuracy .. the scale and particularly new geodetic calculations. S: They have very strict accounting of all sheets. They are counted 10 times, when they are issued and returned. A person lost a sheet once. It was really not lost but destroyed, like the notebook I told you about -- the one that was destroyed by an internal enemy. There was a Tribunal; there was an order from the Army. It is very difficult with these maps. How about photographing with the Minox? Will it come out well? G: No, that won't do too well because there are scales there and ... S: So it has to be on the 15½ x 21 cms. G: You can't help that because the Minox has a very small frame after all; it has to be enlarged.

114. S: Now, I want to ask you this. It is very important. I have 15 agents. The details are all written in longhand. The paper is rolled up like a tube. (All laughing) S: When I return, I will type it up in detail. I have a lot of information about them in my head. G: Of course. S: Then should I give this paper as it is or should I photograph it with the Minox? Should I fold it up like this? I think it's not necessary to photograph it. Yes? G: If you can give it to WYNNE.. S: It will be in WYNNE's package with all the documents. There will be a separate package with Top Secret documents, and the other with materials that are for Secret Use Only. G: He will go directly to the Embassy. S: That will be fine. So I won't photograph it. G: No, don't. S: It comes to the same thing. He should only use the camera when he can't write. G: The Minox should only be used when you can't write. S: Yes, I see. G: For anything else, longhand or typed -- whichever is easier -- is fine.

115. S: Okay. Now, this task that I have to finish worries me and interests me. This information is in the field of things that I am supposed to know about. Now, when I give all this data to you, it will be so easy that you can find them tomorrow. You won't touch them? G: No, we won't touch them. Absolutely! S: How about the one in Ceylon? G: We will wait until you are in complete safety and you tell us to act. S: If anything happens it will immediately be

reported . He is in direct contact with GRECHKO. You know Colonel GRECHKO? G: Yes. Let's put it this way - we won't do anything without your agreement. S: But my agreement is to make him useless. That is my debt. G: Yes, of course. S: But it will be reported - TOP SECRET and TOP PRIORITY -- and a commission will be created to investigate who had access to the agent. My signature is there, every place! G: We won't do anything until you tell us. S: If you can do it in some way to neutralize him; he has 3 children. G: No, we will wait. It doesn't pay. Let him stay. S: But he provides special information. G: So let him. You are valuable also. Why should we endanger your life. H: That is not necessary. S: And how about killing him; run him over with a car? G: We can overdo it with this matter. Why kill him? S: Why not! For the cause! G: There are humanitarian considerations. S: Humanitarian feelings should be put aside. KHRUSHCHEV does not take this into consideration. G: Of course not, I know. S: (Laughs) So my request is that if you do it, then do it in such a manner that it appears to be an accident. G: We won't do anything. We won't do anything like that because it is dangerous. S: Anyway, keep this in mind.

116. S: I met ALEKSANDROV recently, who returned from Ceylon. This Novatinex that I ordered yesterday for kidney stones -- ALEKSANDROV asked me to get it for PLAKHIN. PLAKHIN studied with me; he finished the Academy with me and was the Military Attache in Syria. Now, he is Head of a Direction in the 4th Directorate. I gave the order for the bottle of Novatinix through ALEKSANDROV. I asked him, "Well, how is everything"? He said, "Fine, this one (Ceylon agent) is giving us information all the time and it is being evaluated very highly". G: Let him stay there.

117. G: When your attaches go abroad, who teaches them the new things (tradecraft) that they have to know for work? For example, a person is abroad for two years - who keeps him informed on the new developments about which he needs to know? S: Through Letters of Instruction (DIREKTIVNYYE PIS'MA); they all get instructions. The Letters of Instruction are written on separate items, with directions that after reading, the letter should be destroyed and this (destruction) reported by a document. This is done. It is sent on undeveloped film. G: Yes.

118. G: How about the underground testing of nuclear weapons? The (Soviets) are shouting that a suspension has been in effect since November 1958. What do they want, a permanent suspension, or are they acting with deceit? S: Of course they are acting to deceive, in order to gain time, so that you will not carry on experiments and develop new, more advanced, technical theories and check them out. It's to their advantage. It's all deceit. Of course!

They cover up with strategic rockets, sputniks. G: So they themselves act but want to stop others. S: Yes, and in this way slow down the development of others - your personnel, experiments, conclusions, and developments of these weapons. (Pause) S: For some reason, I was thinking of this. You will get some reports about his (KHRUSHCHEV's) deceit. Check them. You will believe what I reported. In the meanwhile, he shouts, drinks and makes a lot of noise. If you could say, "How about this YERZIN? Who is YERZIN? Who is this? And this one? How did you discharge this one? How are you cutting down the amounts of funds for this, this and this?" You know everything! His mouth will drop open! "Where do the funds go for the baby nurseries? If you gave all this to the children, they would be covered with gold!"

119. S: You know how these billions are collected? The Army is huge and they cut allowances of the cadres by one-half and more. Formerly I received 300 rubles for discounts; all Colonels received this. They don't pay for languages now. Regarding the Secrecy allowance - now they don't pay a cent for Secrecy, even if you work with codes. Before pensions were normally 90% (of salary), and in some cases 100% for special services rendered. Now the ceiling is 2000 for a Colonel and 3000 for a General -- 200-300 new rubles. They save a lot of money. A person who had a very dirty role in this, and is hated by the military, is FURTSEVA. She is the one who proposed this and ZVEREV supported her in this. Then ZVEREV became sick and he was ousted. He (ZVEREV) was the Minister of Finance. The officers were ready to kill ZVEREV and FURTSEVA or impale them on a stake.

120. G: Have you heard of any new thoughts regarding new atomic or rocket tactics? For example, is there a new doctrine? S: Tactically, the conventional rockets are for standard calculations. In using atomic ones, the effect of the explosion is computed with respect to the densities (PLOTNOSTYY) of attack, the parameters of the combat area, the withdrawal of friendly troops, the protection of equipment, neutralization of an area. These are all combat considerations. G: Yes. S: This is all in the regulations. We will photograph it now. Fifty frames on a film. That's good! That will be 50 pages.

121. G: Are there any special new developments regarding tactics? S: Yes, there are. G: There are, also. This is very important -- if you can find it -- the new battle tactics, the changes due to employment of atomic weapons. S: I will get all this for you. In four days we will part. I am only telling you that you will be getting all these ideas, their developments and conclusions, photographed on film. It's impossible in any other form.

HZO: Of course, we understand. S: I promise that this will be one of the first tasks. This is readily available to me. All I have to do is go in; take it; photograph it; return it, saying, "Thank you. I had to look at a couple of pages there." I can spend a half-hour on this and in a half-hour, I can photograph the whole book. The film won't be developed. G: Fine.

122. G: You mentioned this before -- what were the main points in the Secret letter from the Central Committee concerning relations with China? S: The main points -- 7 main points of conflicting views with theChinese, of a general, theoretical nature. Seven separate points. The letter was this big and thick. The first was disagreement concerning the possibility of co-existence. The Chinese, of course, advanced this idea and these 7 points are interconnected dialectically. They are not separate; you can't say that one point can be changed but not another. If they would operate as they wished and would not connect their stand to theother questions they would be simply enemies. And the Chinese are clearly not fools! But this way the Chinese also have some very sound ideas, like TITO, who has his own good ideas. Concerning the question of peaceful co-existence, the Chinese claim that it is temporary. Peaceful co-existence can't last long. Regarding this, they say that KHRUSHCHEV and the Central Committee of the CP/USSR are not interpreting the matter of war. Our Communistleadership claims that war is not inevitable. The Chinese say that this does not mobilize the working masses, the Communists and peoples, not only in our countries but also in the countries that are to join us some day. On the contrary, this leaves them cold. That is the basic idea. If you want I can get this letter, in the form of photographs. Maybe not the whole thing, but separate points, because it is very long. It was read inabout 2 hours. There are so many theories there -- 1,000 people were there.

123. H: I do not think he should spend much time on that. G: I think this is dated already. It is much more important to get the military materials, the manuals, lectures, etc. S: Alright, you give me the priorities. You can't grab everything with one hand. G: Of course not. S: So the Chinese said that when KHRUSHCHEV wants to prove that war can be completely avoided, he is completely wrong. This cannot be done because the Capitalist system exists with its own interests, powerful army, means of attack, etc. Therefore, what KHRUSHCHEV says he does not believe himself. If this would only bear on the interests of KHRUSHCHEV and his small group, it would be one thing. But such a theoretical statement with a foundation only cools the masses and the peoples who should be influenced oppositely. They should be mobilized for a war with Capitalism. That is the point that they made. As you see, these ideas cover some of the seven categories when they are separated, but they are all presented together. This is in general terms. I can photograph these separate

points; they are printed in large type. G: Or you can write, copy them. S: It will take too long to write. G: No, just the main themes. S: I can take the letter from the Party Committee (PARTKOM), sign for it.. G: But don't give too much detail on this. He spoke for hours there. There is a great mass (of material). It's a whole volume. S: It's a whole volume.

124. S: Next the Chinese spoke up against the condemnation of the personality cult of STALIN. This is in the letter. First, they discussed it in general terms, and then in detail. They said that when speaking about deceased persons you should say nice things or keep quiet. That's the Chinese attitude. The Chinese admit that STALIN had faults, but they say that every political leader has them and despite all of his faults STALIN was working toward victory in the end. He mobilized the masses; he put them under his command through the use of force, through the KGB, with a piece of bread, through fear. He was a tyrant. KHRUSHCHEV criticized (STALIN) for his use of a globe to point our directions. He had a huge globe in his office in the Kremlin. He spun it around and pointed out directions to his commanders. He pointed out directions but STALIN also worked with maps that were prepared for him by the 1st Operational Directorate of the General Staff. KHRUSHCHEV brought this up. KHRUSHCHEV said, "He managed operations on a globe." You know, this was just childish! G: Of course.

125. S: The Chinese listened and studied all this, then they quarreled with KHRUSHCHEV. Listen, MAO TSE TUNG has not gone to the Soviet Union for several years now. KHRUSHCHEV went (to China) only once. The Chinese sent to the USSR were all at the level of 2nd or 3rd ranking men in the Government even though KHRUSHCHEV is considered to be the 1st man, not only in the USSR but also the other People's Democracies. He is considered to be the top man, the Commander-in-Chief. Now GRECHKO has been appointed, but still this is under KHRUSHCHEV's control.

126. S: Now about the personality cult and the harmful effects which they again equated to the idea that the rank and file Communists, who are not deeply indoctrinated with the (Communist) theory, lost their faith in the Communist Party when they heard this matter about STALIN. Another person who can think this out deeply and can separate one item from another without mixing them up will remain a Marxist, a Party member in his views. But the rank-and-file -- for example a negro who carried a photograph of STALIN as a symbol(of Communism) -- when they found out about this, they tore everything up and he in this way destroyed their faith in the Communist Party. This is the Chinese analysis. It is all said very correctly from a Party viewpoint. Listen, at one time KHRUSHCHEV wanted to take the casket (STALIN's)

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and bury it in or next to the Kremlin Wall. He was talked out of it. I told you this before, that when the Chinese spoke at the last session (KHRUSHCHEV) said, "Take him (STALIN), together with the box". These are historical -- historical in quotes -- words. Sergey Sergeyevich told me this -- KHRUSHCHEV said, "Take him, together with the box."

127. S: Further, the Chinese are very aggressive in their policies concerning this matter of a future war. In other words, their whole political theory boils down to the fact that masses have to be mobilized. Hatred of the enemy should be developed to prepare them for war. KHRUSHCHEV's peace-loving policy, in quotes, is calculated to cloud over the minds of the peoples of America, England and other countries. Of course, the governments don't believe KHRUSHCHEV and he knows this. This is the battle forthe World. The Chinese see two sides to this. One side is good, to win time to build up arms. But the other side is that the peoples are cooling off and the revolutionary type of hatred and spirit does not exist towards the Capitalistic countries. They analyze this very deeply for themselves. KHRUSHCHEV and the Central Committee answer in the letter.

128. S: This is what we are taught and what we are told. That at the present stage, it's not necessary to analyze so deeply. In other words, KHRUSHCHEV is exposing the fact that he is fighting for peace now in order to win time so as to lull Capitalism, its governments and peoples to sleep through all methods and then dictate his own terms. Here it is in very general terms. There are a lot of interesting conclusions made there, a lot of interesting ideas. There are 7 separate questions - directions -- and they are all tied together and support one another. G: That's clear.

129. S: That's the substance of the letter. There is also a lot of water there, but these parts that cover these 7 points of the present interpretation, war and the evaluation of war, are important. The Chinese say there has to be a war. KHRUSHCHEV says there might not be a war, or there might be a war at some distant future time. They (Chinese) say war can start at any moment but if KHRUSHCHEV admits this, what will happen to his Peace-Loving Policy. It will go right under the cat's tail! G&M: Yes. S: That's why he (KHRUSHCHEV) is backing out. He says, "Why are you exposing me? I am fogging up the brains and you are beginning to remove it". That's the way it is. This is the crux of the matter.

130. G: Have you seen any instances where good intelligence material was obtained from radio intercepts or deciphering of coded messages? S: Yes, I have seen it. There are such cases. G: Yes. S: We do not possess your codes. We don't know all the keys but there are departments like LENKEY's

at Tankovoy Proezd #4, which is SEROV's (GRU). G: Yes. S: He is the one who tries to decipher everything. There are mathematicians sitting there and whenever a group, a number, repeats itself then they start hunting for the key. I think they sometimes find the key. Yes, of course, they do. We don't get anything that is complete or thorough or exact through agents, but radio intercepts give a lot. G: From which countries do you find it easiest to get this information? What results do they have? S: Radio intercepts are made in all countries -- in England, Turkey, America, etc. -- wherever there are radio messages to intercept. You can't control it in any way because a special radio recording station is located in each Embassy. G: Of course not. S: The channels are monitored. Tactical material is intercepted, that is data that is transmitted for official use. This tactical material often is concealed by use of code words, etc. It's very easy to decipher this.

131. G: When ciphers were broken, which countries were they from? Do you know? S: Those Intelligence Points located in OKRUGS which are adjacent to other countries constantly intercept messages. They have special stations, machines, special radio gear. It is called the OSNAT system. (Subject means OSNAZ - OSOBOGO NAZNACHENIYA. Comment: There are two such Regiments in the DDR under the GSFG.) G: What does it mean? S: This is a special unit -- listening equipment, intercept equipment, by radio. They also tap wire communications whenever possible. This is all the OSNAT (OSNAZ) system. And our cipher/code clerks that return from a tour abroad go to work for OSNAT (OSNAZ). There they don't lose their qualification or specialty and when necessary they can be sent abroad again. G: Do you know if the Turkish code was broken? Which ones were broken? S: The only tactical material we had about Turkey came through interception of channels of communication. We actually knew all the divisions and shipment of supplies to specific places. We know everything; numbers are repeated. This is a frightful thing. This is the first accurate tactical source which is reliable and these reports go all the way up to the government. G: That's clear.

132. S: In every country, in every REZIDENTURA, there is a representative of the Technical Intelligence. If the equipment goes out or order then under the guise of a courier, a technician will be dispatched from Moscow at once. He will arrive, bringing parts. He will repair and turn up everything. They are Colonels, Communications engineers, and they really know their business. Imagine this! This is a frightful thing! But what can be done? Jamming possibly, or more logically, invoke strict communications security measures -- a directive to this effect under penalty of a trial. Bring up this matter! Eliminate this source for the Soviet Technical Intelligence service! They get a lot of tactical material without agents. Don't give them anything. You

should establish the following discipline. Regarding conversations, use codes, special transmission means and above all when it is not necessary, maintain commo silence. Send written reports instead. This is a frightful thing! It should be weakened.

133. G: What is the Central Bureau of Political Information? S: The Central Bureau of Political Information exists but it's a Directorate, not a Bureau -- Directorate of Political Information. It is subordinate to... G: The KGB? S: No. All these Directorates that have their own representatives abroad are subordinate to the Central Committee of the Party. They collect information, and then publish a special bulletin. Some bulletins have a red classification indicator; some are black. The red indicator is Top Secret. All information on you from intercepts, information obtained about your policies clandestinely, are all under red indicators. Of Special Importance! Black indicators also cover Secret matters but of lesser importance. They publish this bulletin of their own. The politicians study it -- the ideas, the views, etc. This is the center where all political events are evaluated. Not economics, only political. Military matters are separate. G: I understand.

134. G: Who is in charge of the Committee dealing with (persons) going abroad? Is it KGB or the Central Committee? S: KGB. G: Not the Central Committee? S: One moment, in the Central Committee there is Commission for Departures. The Commission for Departures is attached to the Central Committee, but it is staffed by the KGB. They have the positions of instructors, and the instructors are members of the OBKOM of the Party. Colonels and Generals sit there. The execution of orders from this Commission for Departures falls on the Administrative Department and from the Administrative to the Military Department. Did you know that the Administrative Department is the Military Department? G: Yes, yes. S: They are ashamed to say that there is a Military Department in the Central Committee so it is called the Administrative Department as though they were busy with paper, pens and ink -- administratively -- but it is actually military.

135. S: KRUTOV is in charge of the Department; MIRONOV was there before him. Now he is Deputy Chief of the Academy. Nikolay Mikhaylovich MIRONOV was formerly the Chief of the Directorate of the Moscow Military District. I worked for him as senior instructor. Now he is Deputy Chief of the Academy. He lives close to me. He is also a good source. I christened his son. G; G: So you soldered the KGB to the Central Committee of the CP/USSR! S: My God! It's kept secret that there is a Commission for Departures. I had to go before I could leave for Turkey and I was called there when I was to leave for Pakistan, when they were checking on me. I was ready to go to Pakistan, I told you.

DUBROVIN got the visa. DUBROVIN was later discharged. He was the Head Instructor of the Department of Military Diplomatic Service at the MDA. Now it has been incorporated into the Department of Special Training (SPETZ-PODGOTOVKA). The head was General LISITSIN. You know him. G: Yes. S: He was discharged.

136. S: So this Commission exists. You are called before it and [illegible] given forms to fill out. The forms have the classification Top Secret when filled in. The first page reads: "I a citizen of the Soviet Union.... that I won't betray my trust, etc., etc.," (All laugh) S: The second one (form) is for information. You complete them and they are taken to the Instructor. The Instructor reads them and calls you up. "Well, Comrade (Subject's true name), we have great hopes for you, hurrah!...." Everything to make the person feel he is in the highest organ of the Central Committee. An ordinary person briefs you. Of course, not VOROSHILOV! (All laugh.) S: Everyone is given instructions to read.

137. S: What do the instructions contain? They are very interesting Top Secret instructions. To uphold the honor, etc. This even is mentioned -- if you are traveling in a train abroad, you should sit in a compartment with others of the same sex, i.e., a man with men, a woman with women, so that a man would not sit with a woman in a Capitalist country. (All laugh) S: Demand this from the (R.R.) conductor. Under no circumstances should one travel in a compartment with both sexes. It continues this way: Don't drink too much; don't talk too much. Report any case of provocation to the Ambassador, Counsellor or VOKS representative, depending on who is available. Don't take any Secret materials with you! (All laugh) S: Don't make any notes. If notes are made, then carry them with you all the time; don't leave them any place.

138. S: Here is a good case. It can be written up in the press. I give you my permission. Let them think how you got it. Two months ago we sent a GDR Delegation to the German Federal Republic. An engineer from Leningrad was sent along. He was slightly sick mentally. He made notes in an agent notebook like mine. He was not an Intelligence man; he was an engineer. Possibly he was coopted; I never found out. We did not coopt him, possibly the KGB did. He put the notebook in the pocket of his overcoat and forgot it in the car when he got out. He got the overcoat back but the notebook was missing. He became so upset that when his comrades went shopping he hanged himself. He used the cord of an electric iron which he attached to the electric fixture hook on the ceiling. They had taken a portable iron to save money on pressing. He used the cord from this iron. The body was flown to Leningrad.

G: He became scared? S: Yes. He hanged himself. He had a good wife and two children. They said that he was mentally unbalanced; he took it too hard. He was a fool, of course. But he did hang himself. The others returned and found him dead. It was two months ago. We were all called together; it was a big affair.

139. S: They didnot want to let DOBRUR come with me. He is a Latvian from Riga. This is the 2nd time he has come here. He is not married; that's why they did not want to let him come. But since he had been in England before, they did let him go. I did not want any changes in the delegation. It could change my whole life. I said that he had a mother and that I would take personal responsibility. He was in England before and did not defect. Why were they afraid this time? Because a Latvian defected some place recently. S: Do you know that a Latvian defected? G: I didn't know. S: Well check! A Latvian defected recently! He was with a delegation and did not return.

140. G: Is there a committee or person who is handling our defectors MARTIN and MITCHELL? Are you familiar with this? S: Of course, I'm familiar. They are handled by the KGB. They are under their control, their protection, and they provide for them. But I personally feel that they want to return very much. (Laughs) G: Did you see anything -- their questioning, etc? S: No. G: How did they get there? What was the travel route? S: They were vetted (RAZRABOTANNY) beforehand. That's what I heard. G: You mean here in the USA? S: Yes. G: Then they were given the opportunity and... S: They were given the opportunity, but they were vetted (or developed)definitely. G: By whom? Do you know? S: I don't know. Not ours. Not the Strategic Intelligence. The neighbors (KGB),of course. S: Yes. Definitely. I know we had nothing to do with this. KASORIN told me, "(Subject's true name), we have nothing to do with this matter, unfortunately. It would have been a big plus." The neighbors (KGB) arranged it.

141. G: Whatorganization takes all KGB and your (GRU) reports and collates them for final use by KHRUSHCHEV or someone else? S: The system is simple and clear, very easily defined. All important telegrams go "via the top", i.e., KHRUSHCHEV, and then the Minister reads them. All telegrams from the KGB and from our Chief Intelligence Directorate, etc can go "via the top". The Heads of the Directorates sign off if they go to the top or if they should be held at some level to the worked on for incorporation into further reports. Some may merely go to the Information Directorate. They route them. The signing off for us is done by SEMOV on the important ones,

they then go to the Minister. It may happen that the REZIDENT, the KGB or our (GRU man) will write: To Comrade STALIN, to Comrade KHRUSHCHEV, Comrade MALINOVSKIY, Comrade SOKOLOVSKIY, the Chief of the General Staff. He writes to the top, going over the head of his supervisor. We write everything to SEROV, but we can address it directly to MALINOVSKIY. In that case, it will definitely go to SEROV first.

142. G: Who prepares everything so that it will be clear to the minister? S: The telegram is read in its original forms, also the signature -- (say from me). There were such telegrams; my telegrams were read, etc. -- such as information (telegrams). The original is read. Then all the material is pulled together in the Central Committee -- let's say regarding Anglo-Soviet relations, for example. Then it is given to the MID. If there are many questions or a note, an announcement is prepared. In other words, everything is pulled together at the top, in the Central Committee. The Central Committee gives it to the MID or to some other Ministry, depending on the type of information. There are some telegrams that never go to the top. They are stopped at SEROV's office or at the desks of the Heads of Directorates. They give them to the action party. G: You mean administrative telegrams or those which are sent if there are new summaries, or additional data, which is to be collated into a new report? S: I understand. The Military Attache prepares a yearly report on the combat readiness of, let's say, the English army. What new units exist, deployment, new technological developments, training if we saw it or if our neighbors (KGB) gave us this type of material. All these reports, summaries, are collated and given to the Minister in the form of a report. The Information Directorate prepares this. G: And the KGB? S: That's for the Minister of Defense. The KGB does the same thingthere. The KGB also has an Informatiim (Directorate). They also receive information and have to think it out and decide where it has to be sent. G: That's clear. S: What has to be incorporated into the general information? I repeat, the information comes in as cables and then as reports.

143. H: Now that the questions are finished, let us show him some photos. G: You answered very well. You answered an awful lot. I congratulate you! Because the questions were not simple. It was difficult to answer them. S: I am not prepared of course. If I had prepared myself I might have been able to give more theoretical information. G: What we are interested in finding out is what your general knowledge covers. One can't know everything that is happening in life. S: It is the duty of an officer of the General Staff to know a lot. (All laugh) Maybe some answers were not exact. G: But you did

very well. You said when you did not know something. This is natural. You're not an encyclopedia. S: I will tell you this. If I only knew the ARBAT or the Committee, if I only visited the ARBAT or the Committee, I would probably know only about Strategic Intelligence. This is my field; I was taught this. G: That's clear. S: But I have a wide circle of friends. If I want to find out something about a given field I always can -- either in general or in detail. G: That's why we are trying to find out your fields of knowledgeability.

144. (The packets of photos were now prepared for Subject to identify.) H: Q145. S: He is an officer of the Strategic Intelligence. He worked in the Information Directorate. That's all. You didn't bring PAVLOV's photo? G: He is not in this set.

145. S: This one is Strategic Intelligence. H: Q160. S: He is a low-ranking one, a radio operator (RADIST) or something. He has hopes for something higher.

146. S: This one is the same -- GRU. A high-ranking one. H: Q165. S: What's his name? I know him. He is stocky. I saw him running around. He is operational, not an Information Directorate officer. Write 2nd Directorate, that's under KONOVALOV.

147. S: No friends, maybe I will find someone. I have not seen ZOTOV yet. ZOTOV is not here. G: It's possible that he is not there. I thought that he would be there, but if you did not see it. H: What series is this? R? J: Italy. S: Here he is. We met him. He is an officer of the Strategic Intelligence. H: R-97. S: A young one. He entered the Academy while I was there; I don't remember the year.

148. H: R66. S: A radio operator - code clerk (RADIST-SHIFROVAL'SHIK). He might be under cover of courier-guard. We never state in the passport that a person is a code clerk; we say courier, guard, administrative worker, etc.

149. S: This one is a neighboring worker (RUS). H: R62.

150. S: This one is one of our Strategic Intelligence officers. H: R42.

151. S: This is one of ours, a naval one. I know him. H: R-40.

152. H: R18. S: A chauffeur of the Strategic Intelligence. He was at the school/base undergoing training.

153. S: Works for Colonel AVRAMENKO, his worker, an officer. H: Rib. G: Of the same type as the other? S: No. He is a case officer, an operational worker.

154. S: Have you noted what I told you -- that Lt. Col. FEDOROV should be removed. The Military Attache in Iran should be removed and his frightening assistant NIKOLSKIY, a very good natured fellow, a major. He is under cover -- a 2nd secretary, I think. I don't remember.

155. G: Have you heard of BUCHICHEV? A colonel? No, I don't remember. VAVILOV should be removed from Istanbul. He has many connections there. Len'ka is a nice fellow. He should be removed. VAVILOV, a neighbor (KGB) should be removed because he operates well in Istanbul. He has lots of connections, many friends, an operational worker, case officer. Check on this yourself. Don't forget to establish direct surveillance.

156. S: Officer of Strategic Intelligence. H: Hy. S: If this is Sweden, there has to be a Colonel here -- the one who gave me the examination after the 1st course. He is working with the 60 students now. He was a Military Attache. H: In Sweden? S: In Sweden. G: Maybe you will find him. S: He examined me.. He is in command of the 60 students now. They were very sorry when I left. My typist told me. She said, "They liked you so much". I made them use their brains well, yet I was human.

157. S: I forgot to mention about apartments. I wrangled 30 apartments for the students from KHLOPOV. His wife died when I was graduated. He is Red like a samovar. (All laugh) G: I'm like a samovar. S: No, I'm not talking about you. You are just a healthy person. You have lots of blood -- like bronze. (All laugh) S: He is driven in a car, a ZIM. He is very stocky; you are better looking! (G laughs) S: But it is not worthwhile taking a photograph for a portrait.

158. S: I was across the street from the main gate of the American Embassy. There is a house which is a clothing store and haberdashery. I bought a lot of soap and underwear there. I would look out the window (at U.S. Embassy) to see if the policeman saluted. When he saluted, I knew it was a diplomat. I knew, almost from the moment I saw him. Then I would walk parallel to him and think to myself -- when he gets into the car I think I will get in also. Then I would tell myself, "No. Don't be a fool. He might call a policeman." (All laugh) S: At one time, I followed a poor girl -- yellow socks and a yellow hat. (All laugh) If you would clear this up, I would be very happy. (All laugh) She had to report this, that there was surveillance on her. She was a good-looking American girl, tall, good-looking!

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159. H: Hl8. S: 100 percent guarantee - ours (GRU). You see, he must have an Intelligence connection, but I don't know him by sight. Of course, it's the Military Attache's office (VOENNIY APPARAT) so he is an officer. I don't remember what he looks like.

160. S: I have another goodfriend, YANCHENKO. He went to Africa. A Colonel. He has always worked as a reporter, but he is a Strategic Intelligence officer. A senior officerthe same as I am. He worked at the Academy when I was in command of a course. He is a nice, good-natured fellow. He was very nice to me. We drank and went to parties together several times. He was called out urgently, and he went out as a TASS correspondent. TASS is used as a cover. Everyone has cover. They place either KGB, or our officers, in the slots. We have people under cover of Torgpredstvo, G.V.S. (Civil Airlines), TASS, etc. YANCHENKO's wife came home for an operation: She called my wife and said, "We got a bad post. There is nothing to eat. It's frightening". He is with Sekoure Toure. H: That's Guinea.

161. G: Do you rememberthe name KOTSUBA? S: Of course. KOT-SU-BA. G: He came from Germany; he was in Intelligence. S: I remember. G: He was with you, then he left and was Deputy Commander of the city of Berlin, under the Commandants' office. S: He is a genuine officer of the Strategic Intelligence. I think he never left and is still working for us. I remember the name and his face slightly. G: He was fat; he liked to have a drink. S: That's him -- KOT-SU-BA. G: Exactly.

162. S: This one is a code clerk or a radio operator. H: #49. S: Probably not a code clerk, but a radio operator. This one has something to do with OSNAZ. He is at the Center studying radio techniques.

163. S: I am not identifying many people today. Nowhere have I seen an old Intelligence officer.

164. S: I know BOCHKAREV. G: Do you know him? S: He studied with me at the course, in the Fall of 1953. Now he is working for KUDRYAVOV. He goes to Germany, checks dead drops, etc. He helps establish dead drops, carries money, etc. Write this -- BOCHKAREV. He is the 97th (of Subject's MDA class of 1953). He wears glasses.

165. S: Check about Colonel PARKHOMENKO. He is some kind of relative of YERLENA's stepfather. The one who defected in Germany, or the one who was captured before he fled, SALDANOV. The one who married the daughter of a General. G: I did not hear of this. S: SALDANOV, they say, was caught before he could defect and they shot him. A friend of SEROV. The relatives don't know themselves what happened.

166. S: I recognized a lot of MID workers. I didn't point them out to you. I know many from MID. What's the matter? FEDOROV is not here and this BOCHKAREV...G: BOCHKAREV is Victor Viktorovich, isn't he? S: How do you know? I can't believe it but that is exactly right. The little one who wears glasses. No listen -- when did you leave Moscow? (All laugh.) S: When you come over, come and see me. (All laugh.) S: To sit with you. We will really accomplish something. Victor Viktorovich, that's right. G: I will check several names with you later. S: He studied with me; he finished in 1953; he is very nice to me. He saw me before I left. He is a Lt. Colonel. G: He was in Austria? He travels? S: He said he was in Germany several times. He said he went on a call of nature and checked a dead drop in the ruins, in Germany. You are right. He was also in Austria.

167. S: Do you know KHLOPOV? G: I even know his name and patronymic. (All laugh.) S: Poor KHLOPOV! If he only knew how many times we have thought of him, at this high level of ours. (All laugh.) S: Especially since he is the same height as you. His face is very similar. When he works he wears glasses; otherwise, he doesn't wear glasses. G: You see it's the same, without glasses. S: By the way, I want to confess now. When you were first briefing and talking to me, I thought that you were KHLOPOV in disguise.

168. G: Do you know ZVEREV by any chance? S: Write this down. He graduated from the Academy. G: He graduated from the Academy. He is a big fellow with a red face. G: Yes, yes. S: He had some kind of trouble at work. G: He is Victor also? S: Yes, Victor. Correct. He graduated in 1953. At present he is working at the Center. They want to train him for duty some place abroad. He works in KONDVALOV's 2nd Directorate. He studied with me.

169. G: Do you know this big fellow, RADIN? He is a huge fellow. S: I don't remember.

170. Note this one. He is a Strategic Intelligence officer. S: J-57. S: I don't know what his job is there. He might be stable boy; I don't know.

171. G: Do you know the one with a Georgian name? KHARLAMPIDI? S: No. Is that his correct name or a nickname? G: I don't know.

172. G: There was a YELSUKOV. S: No. You can write this down. Another person who studied and graduated from the Academy with me was FEDOSOV. He was 2nd Secretary in Tel Aviv, Israel. An aviator. At present, he works in the 1st Directorate of the General Staff.

173. S: Write down a few more of my classmates. TITOV graduated from the Academy with me in 1953. He is a Colonel now. He works in the 1st Directorate. He refused to go to Italy under cover. He said he wanted to be sent as an Army Attache, a real warrior. G: The 1st Directorate of the General Staff? S: Yes, the Operations Directorate. I remembered him. I have to recall all my 98 classmates.

174. S: This one is in the 4th Directorate of the Strategic Intelligence. H: J-39.

175. S: An officer of the Strategic Intelligence. J: Aleksey MYAKESHEV S: I don't know him well; I only know he is in the 4th Directorate. MYAKESHEV, yes? J: Yes. MYAKESHEV is J-39. S: I know him. I say "hello" to him, etc. He is in the 4th Directorate now, this MYAKESHEV. He graduated from the Academy later than I did.

176. G: Do you know a BELYAYEV? He was supposed to have studied with you. S: No. There was no BELYAYEV in my class. He might have been in another class.

177. S: Now write this. I just remembered; this one is very interesting. SALOMATIN, Fedor Fedorovich. He was in America. A neighbor (KGB), he graduated from the Frunze Academy with me and entered the Military Diplomatic Academy in 1950. I entered in 1949, and he entered in 1950, a year later. He studied in the same class with IONCHENKO, a neighbor (KGB). He was in America. He worked poorly. He worked in the Consular Department -- SALOMATIN, Fedor Fedorovich. His wife is Katya. They say she bought about 100 nylon fur coats for resale. (All laugh.) S: I remember him because he is being prepared to go abroad. The neighbors (KGB) discharged him. He worked in the PVO of the Moscow zone. He also worked there before he went to the Frunze Academy. He is working there again. When I was processing to come here, I went to ARBAT often and met him. He is being transferred from the neighbors (KGB) to our organization. Even this combination is passable. I did not have a chance to find out where he was going. He was in America about 2-2½ years. He is of the same graduating class as Sergey Sergeyevich.

178. S: Show me photographs of the ones who were in America before. I will show you which one is now the Counsellor in Delhi, India; he is operating with difficulty there. He is the one who told me that there are two REZIDENTURAs in New York and one in Washington. G: Yes. S: Give me his photograph; I will remember his name at once. We are doing this in the dark somehow. Can't we ask India to send lists? I could point out at once the one who went there as the Chief Assistant/Military Attache, the one who was to have been with me. In India. A Lt. Col. who graduated from the Academy with me. He is a big good-looking fellow -- Sergey Sergeyevich -- and has a beautiful wife.

179. G: But are they legal REZIDENTURAs or illegal? S: No. Let's clear this up; we don't understand fully. All REZIDENTURAs are illegal, in general, because they are conspiratorial -- illegal. G/M: Of course. S: There are REZIDENTURAs that are staffed with Case Officers that are under cover or are in an overt official (APPARAT) office of the Military Attache. They have agents and persons whom they are developing. They meet with them and give them money.

180. S: There are also illegal REZIDENTURAs, that our legal apparatus does not contact. They only provide money, radio equipment, tapping-intercept equipment -- all that is needed -- through dead drops. The REZIDENT of this network is also illegal and does not contact the legal network. He has his own communications channel to Moscow; or an OSNAZ station, using the radio given to him. For example, New York has direct communications into the office next to the one occupied by General SOKOLOV. I showed you who worked there. Now to make absolutely clear -- the illegal REZIDENTURA is composed of either American agents or persons that we sent in. But we have not let them make contact. G: These are the ones you are talking about when you say there are two in New York and one in Washington? S: No. In New York there are two. One is the network using the UN as cover -- where MELIKH was. They have their agents for contact. The other, completely unknown, REZIDENTURA is never contacted. They only get money from us through dead drops. Even the REZIDENTS might not know each other. G: I understand. S: The agents in the illegal REZIDENTURA not only spy themselves but they may have their own deep cover agents. They only have communications with Moscow. That's the kind of REZIDENTURA it is. I wrote the Otpechkovyanna; it means the one which is cut-off. G: That's clear. There is just one -- or more? S: Just one.

181. G: There is no such REZIDENTURA in Washington? S: There is none in Washington. There is a very weak agent network in Washington. They have limited opportunities. It is made up of old agents -- leftovers -- trash. They are handled by our Case Officers from the Strategic Intelligence in the Office of the Military Attache in Washington, and by 1st and 2nd Secretaries, Attaches of the Embassy, etc.. An Embassy Attache can be a KGB or a GRU officer. G: Yes. S: Now we have settled this. Otherwise, I wouldn't sleep quietly -- I will start writing letters about this. G: It is all clear. S: So there is one in Washington; there are two in New York. The Soviet Strategic Intelligence has three REZIDENTURAs in America.

182. S: One of them has no connections in any way. No one sees them and no one will see them. There are no meetings, no control, no telephone calls, or anything. Money is sent over and put in a dead drop. In some cases, it doesn't even go through the legal people. It is put in a dead drop by some traveller and the REZIDENT or an illegal agent will pick it up. I think, personally, that the network is made up of illegals sent in from other countries -- from South America, Germany, any place. It is organized. All the agents have been pulled together. They contact each other. They have means of radio communications, money and other materials and valuables, needed to work -- and they work. One may be a barber; another may be a waiter; the 3rd in military service. G: That's clear.

183. G: Do you know what the KGB has there? S: You see the KGB also has illegal REZIDENTURAs. I don't know what they have in America. They also have illegal REZIDENTURAs that are in contact with them and fulfill

[redacted]

their requirements. They also have these conspiratorial (cover) REZIDENTURAs, but they are directed by KGB (neighbor) officers who are in Washington -- again, the Counsellor, the 1st Secretary, some Torgpredstvo employee, etc.. Like MELIKH. What was MELIKH's title? Employee of the United Nations! G: That's clear.

184. S: Now the problem that bothers me, and all of us. The REZIDENTURA has direct radio communications with Moscow. They have a powerful station, a special frequency, a transmission time-table. To intercept the broadcast, determine the location, catch, and shoot them...There is such a REZIDENTURA. I think it is composed of non-Americans. This is my opinion. I can give my opinion; I must give it. The reasoning is because analogously there is nothing in Turkey. Please listen to this again, carefully. SUDIN is going there. Illegal agents will be sent in. They will be brought together into an organization. A REZIDENT will be appointed. He will be financed and he will work. They will set up the illegal REZIDENTURA in this way. There are no valuable agents who are Turkish, etc.. Why is SUDIN going there? Because the emphasis is on illegals. In places where it is hard to recruit agents, they will send in agents and will operate using the illegal means to carry on their Intelligence work. G: That's clear. S: Let SUDIN go there. You might uncover something. He is going to Turkey as a Counsellor; a slot was obtained from MID (Pause.)

185. S: It is a frightful thing, the flexibility of the Intelligence organization. Report this and make your own conclusions. This affair with POWERS happened on the 1st of May. On the 5th of May, there was an order to stop all Intelligence activity. Money that was already in dead drops was not picked up; The hell with it! -- If we lose all of the agents; if they get mixed up or stray away from us; or if they are without money or feel abandoned. It was suggested that we contact the ones that were needed, but no! This was for prestige. This was a great loss for our Intelligence, but the hell with it! It benefited us otherwise.

186. S: Then a new order was given. Again they started reorganizing and carrying on Intelligence. Now the emphasis is for illegal Intelligence; all efforts are expended to this end. Any amount of money for training, penetration, etc...third, for radio intelligence. They are preparing special radio monitoring personnel. In other words, there is an emphasis on anything that gives evidence of success, and success is achieved. Drop by drop it, of course, gives a lot of information. You know this yourselves. It is a weapon that they have developed and one which we should cut down. We can localize and cut down to almost zero the number of radio-communications channels. I'm sure that this can be done with certain techniques, discipline, etc.. We can achieve our goal. If you don't believe that we get a lot from this source, how can I prove it to you? Illegals! Please -- I can give you a lecture. I named personnel, SUDIN; what exists in Washington and New York.

[redacted]

187. S: This Sergey Sergeyevich has me confused. Where is his photo? H: We will find him. S: He is Counsellor in Delhi now. How many Counsellors can there be -- two, three? Give me the name and I will recognize it. It is a good Russian name.

188. J: A tall Colonel. H: J-26. S: An experienced Case Officer, he graduated from the Academy before me. He is a clean GRU man, not KGB. He is either an Artillery or Tank officer, not Infantry.

189. S: I don't see many from Pakistan. I know all the Case Officers in Pakistan; I have not found a single one of them. I can give you their aliases and pseudos, and you don't give their photos to me. Either you don't want to know or you know already -- good! (All laugh.) S: Officer of the Strategic Intelligence. H: J-14.

190. S: Here he is! H: J-12. S: Here is Colonel FEDOROV. He graduated with me from the Academy in 1953. His wife divorced her first husband; he is her second husband. She had cancer in her left breast and it was removed; she wears a "falsie". They have two children. He worked in GAU for Marshal YAKOVLEV. In 1949, he came to us at the Academy from GAU. He was in England. He was not too successful here (in England). He did not recruit anyone when he had operational requirements. Now he is Military Attache in -- what country is that? H: Holland. S: In Holland -- Military Attache. He is not the REZIDENT there; he is a consultant. Write this. He is a candidate for Technical Sciences; he got it at GAU. He is a foul, crafty fellow. He was nasty towards his comrades. He is not the REZIDENT; by law, he is definitely not the REZIDENT. No matter what. If he is Military (Attache), he is not the REZIDENT. He is consultant to the REZIDENT because he is smarter than the others. Remove him from there.

191. S: His Deputy Assistant. H: J-11. S: You see how they are together.

192. H: India! S: Good. By the way, the Military REZIDENTURA in India has the following task. I will give you the agents; there is a REZIDENTURA. The agent net is on conservation. There is a radio operator with everything cached. There are two brothers in the agent network. What contact do they have with the Case Officers? They get money; we feed and support them; we check their health etc. so that they are always available to put the radio in operation. Mr. NEHRU should be told this. All is held in reserve. Everything is cached in zinc boxes that are soldered and are air tight.

193. S: This is a low-ranking worker. H: P-83. S: Technical, GRU. Are the latest ones here also? Sergey went with them in about September. Sergey Sergeyevich who was in my class. I have not found him yet.

194. S: Chauffeur. H: P-64. S: This is my code clerk. He was in Turkey with me. H: P-49. S: NEVZOROV, he was in Turkey with me as a code clerk until the beginning of 1956. He was formerly in OSNAZ. We have a big

OSNAZ in Chita, a huge center in Chita, Baikal. At the center, while I was saying goodbye and asking ZASORIN what I should bring him, a cable arrived in which NEVZOROV asked that he be transferred from India. His older son has to attend school, or he does not like it there. I know him and his wife. He is a good, very calm fellow, who does his work well. G: What is his rank? S: Captain. He was Senior Lt., now he is a Captain. While I was there, a coded telegram arrived asking that he be transferred. The matter is being looked into now. He will be replaced. NEVZOROV, code clerk, experienced, an old hand.

195. S: Senior Assistant of the Military Attache. H: P-26. S: He graduated from the Academy with me. Lt. Col. in the Technical Troops. He was abroad before. He is a Senior Assistant to the General. He went to India, circa September. What is the first letter of his name? J: Aleksandr. S: No. The last name. He is my colleague -- the first letter! J: K. S: The second? I don't remember. J: K-O-R S: KORYAKOV! No, no. J: KORYAKOVSKIY, I think. S: KORYAKOVSKIY! That's right; he graduated with me in 1953. He was abroad before. This is his second tour abroad. He was as Senior Assistant to the Military Attache. He worked in the Information Directorate before his departure. He is a clean officer of the Strategic Intelligence. KORYAKOVSKIY.

196. S: A worker of the Strategic Intelligence. H: P-114.

197. S: It would be nice if General of the Army, SEROV, would come in now. By the way, SEROV suffered a lot when he was appointed to a position with a lower rank. He was a Minister of SSR and now he is a Chief in the General Staff. He isn't even the Chief; he is Chief of Intelligence.

198. S: Here is Sergey! It did not come out well. H: P-123. S: What is the first letter in his name? I want to recall it myself. It is very bad photography. I recognized him by his good-looking wife next to him. He was in America for a long time, about 3½ years. What's the first letter? J: V-E-Sh...S: VESHCHUNOV. J: That's right. S: Hold it here. She is a good-looking woman. He is her 2nd husband; she divorced the 1st one. I will find the one whom he replaced now; he is working with me in my OTDEL.

199. G: TSAREV? S: No. TSAREV was the Military Attache in Afghanistan...

200. S: I don't see Petr GANICHEV here, who is the Senior Officer in the 4th Directorate running India. He replaced me. It is a poor photograph. He was in America 3½-4 years as 1st Secretary.

201. S: Strategic Officer. H: P-142.

202. S: Strategic Intelligence. A Major. H: P-147.

203. S: Where is GANICHEV, the one who replaced me as Senior Officer? He was Senior Assistant to PAVLOV, the Military Attache. Do you have any more photographs from India? J: No. S: I can't find the Counsellor whom he replaced. This one was a First Secretary but he was given the Counsellor's position. He was also a Colonel. S: This is the Major General, the newly acquired Military Attache. KORYAKOVSKIY is his Chief Assistant. G: Isn't he an Intelligence officer? S: He's "from the troops". He's as much an Intelligence officer as a dog's 5th leg. (Laughs) It's incomplete. Petr GANICHEV, who was PAVLOV's Assistant, is missing. PAVLOV is not here, the Military Attache who was replaced by the General. You see how incomplete it is. Three Strategic Intelligence Officers are missing. H: We do not have every card. S: Please write this down -- PAVLOV, Military Attache, India, Strategic Officer working in the Information Directorate for a long time. He is a Colonel.

204. S: Then the 2nd one missing, Denis POLYAKOV. He is the one whose wife lived with the Commercial Counsellor; he graduated from the Academy with me.

205. S: The Colonel, who was Counsellor, is missing. I don't remember his name. He was replaced by VRSHCHUNOV. VRSHCHUNOV is missing. Four are missing. Write it down, because when I am not here you will say (Subject's True Name) does not remember. If you wish, I will look through it again. Four Strategic Officers are missing from this group. I have a good memory and I know them all well. Colonel Petr GANICHEV is also missing. He was transferred because he had a malignant tumor. He was operated on and now he is feeling better. He is working as Senior Officer of the 4th Directorate in charge of the India area. He replaced me. Another one is missing -- Assistant Military-Air Attache of PAVLOV, the one who was in a car accident outside of Delhi. He broke his spine and ribs and was taken to Moscow by air. I don't remember his name, but I remember what he looks like. Five officers missing. Do you recognize this one who was in Washington? J: Yes. S: That's not bad.

206. S: The Military-Naval Attache had one of these cameras. You say this camera is expensive? G: Yes, it is. S: I was told that it is quite expensive.

207. S: What shall we do? G: Go to bed. Tomorrow we will meet at 1600 hours as agreed. It will be a short meeting to clear up everything. Please don't forget to call [redacted] in the morning. S: I will call him and will go visit him, maybetomorrow. G: Yes. You have to get this.

S: Tomorrow I will go to the Embassy; then I will go to the nightclub. The day after tomorrow, I meet the REZIDENT officially. I will give him the materials about the mnemonic and electronics. G: At what time? S: I will be told tomorrow. H: Okay. S: Tomorrow I might be able to find out from SHAPOVALOV about the agent's message. G: When do you expect to call [redacted] S: The day after tomorrow. I will settle everything concerning [redacted] when I meet with the REZIDENT. Tell [redacted], if he calls. I will call him myself tomorrow. H: He must ring up tomorrow! G: Yes. He will do that. Have you set up a tentative time when you will meet him? S: The Counsellor (REZIDENT) will tell me whom he plans to appoint as the contact for [redacted] I will report everything to him. I will show him the materials you have given to me. G: But when you talk to [redacted] over the telephone, won't you arrange for a meeting? S: No. Tomorrow, when I talk to [redacted] over the telephone, I want to meet [redacted] and then arrange it personally. H: He must ring up to arrange this. G: Yes, I know. H: Otherwise, you see, [redacted] may not be available. We can't keep the chap here you see. S: I will call. G: He will do it. H: What time tomorrow? G: 1600 hours. A very short one, just before he goes back to the Embassy. H: 1600 hours. G: You said at 1600 hours, yes? S: At 1600 hours. G: Okay. We won't keep you long because you have to wash and get ready to go with them. S: Yes. Tomorrow I will dance. G: We can't keep him too long. He has to meet his group.

208. S: Now, I will spoil Mr. Herold's mood. I was told that it costs 450 to go to a nightclub. I was told it costs 10 to dance with the girls, and that the tables cost a lot. He (WYNNE) said 450, so that I would pay for him also. I saw him move a pile of sand from the street into his yard. He paid 18. He is building a house. G: Yes. S: I presented the suit to his wife today and she danced with joy, just like a goat. (All laugh.) S: I was very glad that she was pleased. She is a very pleasant woman; she is nice to me. She really helped me. Was I right in doing this? Yes, I was! G: Yes, of course. S: I'm a kind person. H: We are not criticising this. S: But it is a fact. G: But you are taking gifts, etc.. That's also important. H: Of course. Everything is in order with this. S: I was only thinking what your supervisors will say about the 450 that I spent in the nightclub. G: No, no! S: You gave me 1250. I will sit for another five minutes. How will I say goodbye to all of you on Friday. It will be hard and only the fact that we will be working together will help me morally. G: We will meet again soon. S: Well, I think it's time to go now. (Farewells are said. Subject left at 0030 hours on 2 May 1961.)

[redacted]

Meeting #13 (London, 3 May 1961)

(Subject arrived at 1310 hours on 3 May 1961 at Room 360 in the Mount Royal Hotel in London.)

1. S: (Looking at the various items of medicine obtained for him) I'll not put anything in the suitcase now. You have a lot of work ahead of you Mr. Harold. I just had a talk with the REZIDENT. At 4:30 I left the girl. God knows how I was able to accomplish everything. I saw the REZIDENT; I had a talk with SHAPOVALOV: I had decided everything; I had clarified everything. H: That is fine. S: But there is so much work to do. G: How much time do you have at your disposal? S: We'll work for an hour and a half or two hours. I sent the delegation to the Exhibit. They will be working there and [redacted] is with them. I arranged this to come here.

2. S: I has spent the whole night on my feet. But then how the night had been spent! I was at a most luxurious cabaret. Could you extend my leave for about ten more days? (Laughter) I was at her place two hours. I left WYNNE there. There was WYNNE's friend, Norman -- a nice chap. He takes trips to Canada -- a very good friend of WYNNE's. He knows me as a Soviet representative and that is all. First we went to one club, then to the cabaret. The show started at one o'clock in the morning, very nice, classical, the music in Turkish style, as if to order.

3. S: They picked up a 23-year old girl for me at the club -- a good girl. She has a pretty name -- [redacted]. Her telephone number is [redacted]. Now, everybody knows it. (Laughter) I spent two hours with her. I had to get some sleep. At eight o'clock I had my breakfast already. G: Were you at her place? S: Yes, I was at her home. She has a separate apartment. Everything was modest, but good. She was a nice girl, somewhat experienced, but that was okay. She is twenty-three years old. H: Once more, [redacted]? S: [redacted] (all laugh). G: Did she charge you much? S: WYNNE said 15 pounds, I paid her through WYNNE. I do not think he would overcharge me and pay her ten pounds. She was told that I was Alex from Belgrade, Yugoslavia (laughter). We had a table there, everything was fine, WYNNE said that she wanted 15 pounds. I gave the money to him. He gave it to her and asked her not to ..... she didn't ask me for a penny more. I spent two hours with her. It was getting light.

4. S: I was up at seven, ate at eight and at nine we went to the embassy. We received our money. Then to the REZIDENT's reception. I spoke alone with him for 30 minutes. I had a talk with

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[redacted]

SHAPOVALOV. I told the REZIDENT all about my trip. I showed him my daily itinerary; I showed what you had given me (i.e., the brochures). He had everything packaged up, called the code clerk in my presence and sent it out. See what it means not to have shown me all photographs!

(5) S: Today I met a very fearful KGB man, VORONIN, Yevgeniy. He has been here two years already. There was no photograph and, if I had not met him today, you would not have known anything. I'll report on VORONIN separately, allright, in order.

(6) G: One more question -- could there be any consequences because of the girl? S: I do not think so. It's true that: WYNNE gave me a preservative, but I ..... G: This is important. S: Of course it is. I considered it. I came home and washed and everything. She was clean. I think she takes care of herself. WYNNE guaranteed her but at the same time, he gave me a box (laughter). No, no. Everything is okay. I exclude this. I have little experience -- I am responsible. G: There is a proverb, if one is unlucky .... S: One could get it from one's own sister. G: That's it. You know the proverb. S: I do not think so, but if anything ..... to get cured, there is nothing to fear, but I do not think so.

(7) S: So, the REZIDENT saw me right away in the morning, below, in the basement in room number 8. The bookkeepers are next door. This room is adjacent to the REFERENTURA. The main entrance to the REFERENTURA is to the right of the entrance, to the basement. This is all in house #13. I told him about the trip and showed him your material. Right then he called a code clerk. He brought an envelope and was told to put the material in the envelope and to address it to Colonel ROGOV, V. M. from Colonel (Subject's surname and initials). That will go out with the next mail on 13 May. G: What were the initials. S: V. M. Well, I reported everything to him.

(8) G: What is the name of the REZIDENT? S: He did not tell me and I did not ask anyone. The photograph which I picked out was he -- I'll risk my neck on that. But no one told me his name, not even he. I asked him whether there would be a package or a letter, I would be bringing back. He said perhaps there would be a letter for VORONIN, the Chief of the NAPRAVELNIYE. I could send that home. Why should I ask him his name directly? I know that SHAPOVALOV talks about everything. I did not ask him any questions and yet SHAPOVALOV told me the characteristics of those with whom he works. In a day you will know with whom SHAPOVALOV is working. G: That's good.

[redacted]

9. S: Look up the name of the person in the picture. The same one -- he is the REZIDENT. I've reported to him in detail about [redacted], the plan of working with [redacted]. Ops officer GENERALOV will be assigned to [redacted], tomorrow or after tomorrow. I'll know about that at five o'clock tonight. They are bringing GENERALOV to the embassy at five o'clock for me. I am to give GENERALOV all the data on [redacted] and to arrange the meeting for him to meet [redacted].

10. S: I want you to tell [redacted] about my plan. [redacted] had invited me to visit him, but why drink whiskey? If I had the time I would visit him with pleasure. I'll telephone [redacted] after my talk with GENERALOV. I'll ask [redacted] to come to the lobby of this hotel. We'll meet here. I'll call GENERALOV and arrange that -- we'll be drinking coffee. I'll tell him that [redacted] will be here and that he is not in his own town. [redacted] will come up to us and I will introduce them.

11. S: [redacted] should be told that I shall not come and visit him. I should not do this. [redacted] had asked me to see him, in general, to tell him everything. That I cannot do now. You told him everything and now I can't spare two hours. I'll telephone [redacted] tomorrow. Maybe [redacted] could make it tomorrow when GENERALOV would be here to see me in my hotel room. Later, we would come down to the lobby or the bar and [redacted] would show up at that time. I'll tell him the time and ask him to bring a few things, one or two items, and to say to me that he will mail me the other items on cement and steel that I requested. I'll say to him, "Mr. [redacted], why do that? Here is my friend from the GNTK in the embassy. Hand it to him." Then I shall introduce them and the deal will have been made. That is the plan. G: Fine.

12. S: Warn [redacted] not to call anyone himself -- never, not even GENERALOV, until their relations develop further. The REZIDENT would invite him through GENERALOV -- there will be an official invitation -- Let him go. I told them about [redacted] that he was an esteemed person -- he is educated, cultured, loyal to us. He had visited the Soviet Union two times. I said that we could not recruit him, and there is no need to do that -- . He is already 69 years old, but we could get information from him. As the REZIDENT had said, he would expect to get general information from him and so on. So, [redacted] should not be active; he should not show any interest. I ask you to report my request. They themselves will come to [redacted].

13. S: When they approach [redacted] with certain requests it would be up to [redacted] to figure out what to give them. He should conduct himself plainly but firmly because he could be asked many

[redacted]

questions. He could reply that despite his experience he does not know, but he could reply to some questions by saying that he was sure he was right. You understand. Later their relations would develop step-by-step. What decision they would come to, you would tell him about that yourselves. You'll direct him. I request that you brief him, I cannot do it, I do not understand him well. G: Okay.

14. S: So, GENERALOV should be waiting for me at five o'clock in the embassy. I'll take a taxi to the embassy, quickly arrange everything, and return to the hotel so we can meet again. G: Okay.

15. S: Another thing. SHAPOVALOV had asked me to his office when I saw him today. I asked him what I should say for him at the Center. He asked me to request the Center to permit him to operate more actively. As it is, he can work with the Indians (Hindus) only. I had supposed that he was working with the Indians. He knows the language brilliantly. I said he knows only two words in English and even that in the nominative case only.

16. S: An Indian correspondent had given him some data. There are several Indian correspondents here; there are many Indians here. You solve that yourself. Set up surveillance and find out who, and what has to be done. The Indian is paid by them; he is their agent. The Indian passed on the information on that day when SHAPOVALOV was the duty officer. The information was of a political-military nature, about some troop movements, about some new American bases here, and about deliveries of new arms to England. He told me in general terms. I did not display any interest.

17. S: I said that I could send a telegram to the Center, but he said to tell them only if the REZIDENT said to do so. If the REZIDENT does not tell me, I am not to say anything because they would chop off his head for telling me about it. So, those telegrams, and what I am telling you in general terms ..... He is right, the REZIDENT did not say a word, not a word. That means I'll not say anything. I asked SHAPOVALOV to tell me about the telegram so that I could remind them -- the general contents of the telegram, no details. Well then, the Indian -----. He knows the Indian language very well; he had been in India and knows the language well.

18. S: So, how, it is simple to find this Indian, and some thought should be given to what to do next. You'll expose the Indian and SHAPOVALOV could say that some information had leaked to (Subject's surname), that is what I am afraid of. G: Don't worry, we won't touch him. S: The Indian is a correspondent, a very informed person, a paid person. He did not tell me that. I do not

know whether he had picked him here or had contact with him in India. The fact is that he is his (SHAPOVALOV's) source. Just as I have been supposing, I am clever sometimes, sometimes, rarely but right. So, I told him, he does not know English, or he would be given a written report. If it were given in English he could not translate from English to Russian immediately. But he told the Ambassador about the contents right away. Therefore it must have been in Indian.

19. S: The next matter is most interesting too. G: Wait, and your material, the brochures, were they sent by the REZIDENT? S: Yes, the REZIDENT in my presence, called the code clerk of his REZIDENTURA, who brought an envelope. It was placed in the envelope and will leave on the 13th of May. The code clerk took it with him. There they collect diplomatic mail. I do not have the material -- I made the selection. He looked at electronics. There was a brochure on Nemonics. There was the one I picked up yesterday from Ferranti and the one you gave me on canning. Now, this is all on SHAPOVALOV.

20. G: How about MERRIMAN? Will be a plus for you if the REZIDENT transmits his report? S: Of course! When I return I'll write such a report! (Laughter). What do I need that for? G: Will the REZIDENT send one to his people? S: I had reported to the REZIDENT and he had made a note about MERRIMAN that (Subject's surname) and GENERALOV would meet you to discuss this matter, to arrange with SHAPOVALOV, -- SHAPOVALOV introduces me to everybody. When could it be done? I said that I would bring him at five o'clock in an automobile; he had an operation.

21. S: At five o'clock I'll have a talk. That will be written down and a telegram will be sent to Moscow. Then an operational report is compiled .... saying that (Subject's surname) had suggested that an acquaintance of his whom he had met twice, once in the USSR and once here -- plus detailed data about the acquaintance -- that he be used for getting information from him unwittingly. In my report I shall state I had suggested him to the REZIDENT and he was transferred to case officer GENERALOV. And I receive a small "plus" (laughter). That is the way it looks. This will all be in line with my program, my assignment. (Laughter).

22. S: Are my eyes red? G: They are beginning to be. S: But I do not want to sleep. To continue ..... The REZIDENT chatted with me for thirty minutes and told me the following things. He said it was difficult to work. When I asked him why, he said that recently an Englishman had offered some material of a military nature and had asked for 2,000 pounds. He had to have it urgently for a house, his personal needs. The REZIDENT said that he had

asked the Center. The Center replied as usual that it was too much and wanted to know whether the material could be obtained for study, but who would be fool enough to surrender the material? Up to now he said he had had no reply, and the person did not give him the material. This is a fact. An Englishman with military information wanted 2,000 pounds.

23. S: The REZIDENT is taking his vacation in June. Prior to his leave he will travel around the country. I asked him about that yesterday and he confirmed it. He told me himself that he was waiting for his replacement on scientific and technical matters, the Colonel whose photograph you have not shown me, PAVLOV. Had you shown me all photographs I would have found the one about whom I shall talk now.

24. S: This is the content of the conversation. He is pleased with everything -- is pleased with the Delegation -- that there were no incidents. I told him that toasts were drunk (seated) for KHRUSHCHEV and (standing) for the Queen (laughs). So he is pleased, and thanked me for everything. I thanked him. I have known him by face for a long time.

25. S: In my presence he told the code clerk to prepare a a telegram that Colonel (Subject's surname) would leave by airplane on the 6th. He asked me whether I had been given a pseudonym prior to my leaving. I told him that I had an old one but there wasn't any need for it when I travelled here. So, he told the code clerk to use my true name. The code clerk took my (hesitates) -- your -- material (laughs) and left. He said that he would write a letter, he could find me through SHAPOVALOV and asked me what my plans were. I told him there was an exhibit and then preparations. He said that everything was okay. SHAPOVALOV had reserved the tickets for the 6th of May.

26. S: Now, I left the REZIDENT and went for the delegation to house number 18. G: What time was this? S: I was with the REZIDENT -- at 9:05 we were at the Embassy, all five of us. I placed everybody in house #18 where PAVLOV sits, and where the scientific group is. SHAPOVALOV met me immediately. SHAPOVALOV and I had a chat. I told you about it. He went to the REZIDENT about (Subject's surname), and was told that he would see me immediately. Not more than 30 minutes with the REZIDENT. He asked SHAPOVALOV to leave. We had a conversation just by ourselves. There was only the code clerk he left later too.

(27) S: He started to tell me how difficult it was to work; PAVLOV has been away for six months; GENERALOV has this -- SHAPOVALOV does not know the language. He repeated the same thing again, but in brief. He said he wanted to rest and would send his wife earlier, -- that is, his wife would leave before him. We said our goodbyes.

(28) S: The bookkeeper came in as I was leaving. The bookkeeping section is right there, in house #13. He said that he would pay each delegate separately. I said that that would be fine. One delegate is paid from one account, another from another account. There is such a confusion that the devil himself would break his head. So I left for house #18 and brought the delegates to the bookkeeper. The bookkeeper calculated everything and gave us the money. The delegates and I were walking, same side of the street then to the right, to the Exhibit. As I was leaving house #13, the delegates, about three of them, were behind me.

(29) S: I saw Zhenya VORONIN pressing the button to the REZIDENTURA. I gave him a sign. He understood and we didn't greet each other. He and I had lived in the same house. VORONIN lived in house #36. His father is a General Major VORONIN, a political worker. He is now retired; he is not working. They lived near the MVD headquarters in the house of a friend. The mother had died. The father remarried and gave to him (Zhenya VORONIN) and his family a room in my house, on the seventh floor. His wife, who is here now and whom I also met, badly wanted me to pet her a little.

30. S: He wears glasses. He is near-sighted and wears thick lenses. He has a bad case of DIATRIYA, external signs. He is of medium height and on the skinny side -- not exactly thin, solid but not fat. He wears glasses. VORONIN has been here for two years already, KGB. He had graduated from the Diplomatic Academy in 1954. His basic language was Yugoslavian. He was preparing to go to Yugoslavia but for some reason did not go to Yugoslavia. English was his secondary language; it has been activated and he has been in England for two years now. Immediately after graduating from the Academy he joined the KGB. He is an active worker, impudent, daring. He should be watched very closely, more so because you have picked up may KGB men.

(31) S: This is what else the REZIDENT told me. That you had some kind of a lawsuit here and some one had received a 25-year sentence for illegal contact, for passing material, for spying. I do not know when that happened, recently or a year ago. He said that in general it is difficult to work with the English. The salaries are high, the life is good. When an Englishman is offered

100 pounds he says that his janitor gets that much but, when it comes to 2,000 pounds -- what that one has asked, why this is what happened. They say, "Let's have the material and if it is worth 2,000 we'll pay it." He said that in general the English are frightened. Their standard of living is high and they are frightened. Why should they take risks for 100 or 200 pounds, to put their heads under the ax, to be imprisoned? If one wants to take a risk then do it for large sums of money and our government does not pay large sums. They must produce rockets! You know, they want to grab two places with one hand. You know the expression; it is indecent. (Laughter).

32. S: He complained that they give too little money. That is the general situation, I know it exactly. If one asks for a large sum they do not ask to cut it in half, they say one tenth, one-twentieth could be paid. They have a tight fist on their money -- very interesting. There, in America, there was a decision by the Central Committee to pay $50,000 to bail out MELIKH. It was KHRUSHCHEV's decision and it was upheld by the government. There, this is only a detail, during the conversation he mentioned that someone got 25 years. He did not disclose to me who it was. I am listening and asking questions with my eyes only. Why should I display any interest?

33. S: He talked with me for 30 minutes and he had revealed to me matters about which the REZIDENT is not supposed to talk even if I am a worker of the GRU. G: Yes, of course. S: He complained. And what was the total sum of our conversation? He wants me to speak favorably on his behalf at the Center. This is a poor guy. One of his men is away, another one is ill, and another one doesn't know the language. Another one is a fool, that one says he is a Military Attache and cannot be active. He knows that I have contacts, that I am an old member of the group, that I would repeat everything. Of course I am not going to say anything; there is nothing to talk about. These were the contents of my talks with the REZIDENT and SHAPOVALOV and the deduction which I made about acquaintances of SHAPOVALOV. One of them is military, or a civilian who is working at the Ministry, who had asked for 2,000 pounds for military information. Who, of course ..... I would get into that safe with pleasure -- and would give 50 years .....

34. S: So I am passing by, and VORONIN is pressing the buzzer. I haven't finished with VORONIN yet. We acted as if we did not know each other. The delegates and I walked 200 meters and met his wife who was pushing a carriage in which was her two-year-old daughter. I told her ..... we use the familiar form of "thou". We used to kiss; I could do anything I wanted. She did not appeal to me: I

told her that in Moscow. There, I could never have run into her, but in London I did (laughs). We stopped and I introduced all the members of the delegation. Then I asked them to wait for me, squeezed her shoulder a little and asked her how she felt. The little girl was staring at me. She told me that I had grown older. I told her that she had changed also. Later they traded the room they had in house #36, my house, with her relatives. Her father had died recently, in Moscow. She said that she was planning to fly and Zhenya would go on leave in the fall. He is KGB, he must be watched.

35. S: You already had picked out and exposed (RASKOLOLI) -- that is very good. He is very active and undoubtedly has contacts here, I am sure of that. He has one man for sure and one or two active acquaintances. So I can say his abilities and characteristics are such that he is not the kind of man who would be sitting and not doing anything. He wears glasses, shorter than I am. VORONIN -- how did we miss his photo and PAVLOV's too? So, at five o'clock, I am repeating once more, I'll go to get acquainted with GENERALOV, officially, and brief him about MERRIMAN. Tonight I'll inform you when GENERALOV will come to see me.

36. S: Everything is going according to plan. I visited the cabaret according to plan. (Laughter). Everything is done according to plan. I would say that you are helping. The girl is playful -- interesting. She knows English only. She was born in London, I would ask her how to say things in English and she would say how do you say it in Yugoslav, and I would say in broken Russian and she would repeat (laughs). Okay, that is all. Do we have a right for a minute of rest?

37. S: I have a question. Now suppose someone contacts me? What will he call me? What would be my name? Will he call me Alex, Paul, Peter, Joseph? G: First of all he will say, "How do you do? Greetings from Colonel PEEKE S: (interrupts) - Well, how will he talk to me? We address each other. I would like to have you give this some thought. G: If you meet people officially .... S: (interrupts) They'll know me officially as Mr. (Subject's surname). G: We have agreed, he will be official and you will be official.

38. S: Another question. I'll have reports, and I may feel that I should write with the aid of carbon paper, to conceal some important information. I'll send you a sheet of clean paper. How will you know that there is an S/W message there? I should make

some mark. Otherwise you could think that it is a wrapper and throw it away. But I'll have information there. Here, there is the usual, standard paper. I'll make a report out with the aid of carbon paper. How should I mark it so that you would develop it? G: All papers would be checked. S: Maybe I should make some kind of a mark? G:,... something not normal. H: We'll both know.

39. S: But why should you check clean wrappers when there is nothing there, and there will not be. I shall not carry it. But there will be a sheet, folded thus. There will be material..... G: If you had some material and among it there would be a blank sheet of paper then it would be clear that there is something on it. S: Well, the sheet will be folded into four parts. G: Fine. S: Like this ... then develop it. G: That's good, but don't place any marks, if there is a small line it may draw suspicion. S: Oh yes, correct. But I had to ask.

40. S: Now, something has happened to my radio all of a sudden. Well, they have transistors and you are giving me the batteries? If the batteries go down I can throw them away, but if something else breaks? G: You can get it fixed there. It is a normal radio. S: Now, if something happens to this (the Minox), should I send it to you for repairs? H: (in English) The camera? We shall send him the second one by WYNNE. G: You'll get a spare camera via WYNNE.

41. S: Now, another thing. I have another request, such items as a camera, your instructions, do not give it to WYNNE. G: Under no circumstances. S: Send them by diplomatic pouch. As soon as WYNNE arrives he'll get them. At the same time, I have made a note of this. Perhaps it would be worthwhile; please think this over, that is, to send these things here, my suitcase, by diplomatic pouch. When WYNNE comes he will bring it to his hotel. Would that be okay -- the suitcase? G: That is not that simple. S: Is the freight expensive? H: (In English) It is not the question of the price. You see, the plan he (Subject) put out the other day was much better. See, what I don't want to do is to have WYNNE going into the embassy, bringing a dirty grey suitcase. Taking it into the place, it can be noticed. Carry a small package like a briefcase. That is a different problem. As a businessman he can carry it, walk around the street. Carrying a dirty grey suitcase out of the embassy is not normal. G: (translates above into Russian.)

42. S: No. The cars drive inside beyond the gate. The militiaman remains outside. He has no right to go in there because it is inviolable territory. G: But the driver is KGB? S: Whose?

G: The chauffeur? S: No. Now our middleman, an Englishman, has received those things. He knows they are for me, or for WYNNE. He comes to the Embassy; the car drives up to the embassy entrance and WYNNE brings the suitcase to the hotel. This is a variant. G: (In English) He is talking about an official car. The embassy car brings the suitcase to WYNNE's hotel. S: Okay, let's not do it. H: (In English) It is not normal, you see. G: It is not normal. (Note: Several people talk at once. It was agreed that the material would be delivered to Subject in person.) S: Just in case, we must bear in mind, that things could be sent to me by mail.

43. S: I have a Soviet telephone, it is Soviet and bad but that is of no consequence. It works well. We have many Yugoslav, Czech and German telephones. These are not possible to buy since they are ordered by our ministries. My point is this -- It is very simple to take our phone out and make a microphone in our telephones. All my telephone conversations can be heard without lifting the receiver. I have a request, not now, but later. Send me a new telephone through WYNNE or other channels, preferably German or Czech. G: Could you buy one yourself? S: I cannot. G: You could install it? S: Of course. Then they could not tap the line and use the telephone as a microphone. Secondly, the workers come. I had the telephone a long time. They were near the telephone during my absence. I exclude completely that something has been connected, but for safety I want to connect a new one, throw the old one away, and say I bought it.

44. S: They are sold, but it is very difficult to get one, very difficult. As a rule they are distributed. This is my request -- telephone apparatus. I do not want an English one -- German. G: Will it work? S: Yes. Many houses have white telephones, black, small portable ones. Everything is the same. G: How about the magnetic parts? And one could dial? S: Yes. The numbers are the same, the Latin letters are painted over with our own letters. For some reason I want to replace my telephone. G: Have you had any suspicions? S: No. I could say I bought it from a friend, from a telephone man. Think about that. I have a separate apartment. Who would see it? It came from Czechoslavakia; it is difficult to get them. We will have conversations, but the devil knows, you understand, maybe ..... G: Yes, Yes. S: I know, we were taught how to adjust and make a microphone out of our telephones.

45. S: The next very important matter. -- I want you to give it some thought. As soon as another (Soviet) agent, spy is caught, analyze all spies who were caught during the past year, two, three -- Soviets in all countries. Using them as reasons, send a note.

I am leading up to the proposal that personnel of Soviet embassies, trade delegations, and Consulates should be cut. You will chase out many active operational intelligence officers and will create confusion between the services fighting for slots. This would disorganize them for approximately six months, eight, a year, until they sent in new ones. Believe me, I have a good idea. G: Fine. S: In this respect we will weaken them somewhat. I am not saying that we will eliminate completely, but we'll hinder them very much. This is all according to my list .... G: Fine.

(46) S: And we should catch another one, and then analyze, there were so many, who did what, that this situation cannot be tolerated, the blown-up apparatus leads to increased spy activities in a country by Soviet organizations, accredited, abnormally blown-up. It seems to me somehow that we must analyze all this. It seems to me that there are more Soviets than Englishmen and Americans in foreign lands. I looked at the Soviets here -- such a great colony -- a whole battalions. Decrease them, all categories, because spies are installed everywhere beginning with attache, 1st, 2nd secretaries and counsellors. Decrease them all! It seems to me that if you did have to decrease your apparatus in Moscow we still could do business with the existing apparatus. But to deactivate the Soviet organs in England, in America -- this is a very important question. It can be played up from the political point of view. Tell them you have too many -- make it less. We should give this deep thought. It is an important problem.

(47) G: Now I have several questions which we can finish now because the rest we will leave for tonight. We have much to do. We had prepared everything so that it is all systematic. S: I want to add one thing about WYNNE. I want you to tell WYNNE that when he goes to Moscow he should not expect free food, free automobile, free hotel room from either the Government or the Committee in which (Subject's surname) works. He will not be given a free room on the Exhibit grounds. This is not England. Just because he wined and dined and drove them in a car here thus saving them money for their personal expenses, tell him not to demand the same from (Subject's surname). He has been telling me from time to time that he hoped that I would arrange everything for him there. There will not be anything. No one will sign the order to issue funds for WYNNE. For that reason WYNNE should be taken care beyond that which the firms give him in terms of minimum allowance. Let him go alone, without his wife although I am not ashamed before him. I cannot do anything for him. I am not permitted to do this at my personal expense. Tell him not to be angry with me. Whatever I can do for him I'll do. H: Allright, we will do this.

48. G: Prior to our last review of the signal plan, here is a simplification of the time schedule. There would be only one transmission per month sent repeatedly every Saturday and Sunday at 2400 hours. S: This is wise. I agree. Let me review what I will take with me -- the instructions, the signal plan, film, and this -- the camera. The transistor is in the suitcase. I'll put the medicine and catalogues on top of it. G: The S/W -- there is nothing on it now. S: This will be here; it will be under my feet. G: Now all this -- three sizes -- do them by tomorrow morning. S: Yes. Now these one-time pads would be in my pocket. That's clear.

49. S: Now about this notebook where USA is written, the black cover, perhaps I shall not take the cover. I'll join the four sheets of carbon paper like this and the rest will be clean paper. I'll not take the cover. G: Okay. S: It is too large, and then there is "Made in USA". If it were a beautiful cover that would be another matter, but it is of the common type. It is good for camouflage. I'll camouflage the carbons with something else. G: Maybe we can get a British cover. H: Yes, we can. S: And I'll transfer the carbon into it.

50. S: Now, let us think, gentlemen -- WYNNE could not come for some unforeseen reason; someone gave me the signal; I go to the dead drop. We already worked that out. G: Yes, and instructions for you would be there. S: Yes there would be questions and instructions. It does not matter. Then I'll be making a contact with that girl and the baby carriage. G: All instructions will be there. S: Now I have a request. There were suggestions; we had talked much. Very many matters were decided. All your other advice write down for me. I'll read everything, and burn it well. G: We propose do do all that tomorrow.

51. G: We'll review photography, we'll look at the ciphers, I'll show you -- S: You gave me a cipher for 70 groups. After I decode it, how do I reply? Perhaps something would be urgent -- to whom do I reply? G: There will be instructions on that. S: Do you have the telephone number for me? G: You'll have it tomorrow. All operational matters will be taken care of tomorrow and will be prepared clearly and simply. Already you know when to listen to the radio, you have a choice as to what day.

52. S: I want to tell you something. SHAPOVALOV had requested me to see General LYAKHTEROV. He is the deputy of your relative KHLOPOV. He was formerly the Chief of the Fourth Directorate. SHAPOVALOV had compiled a dictionary on the Hindi language and turned it in to the Foreign Language Department of the Military Diplomatic Academy so that they would edit it and have it published. I

am telling you this so that you would know how well he knows Hindi. He has compiled a dictionary. He has business not with one agent here, probably more, but he has one for sure who can be easily caught.

53. G: There are several questions left. We cannot cover all of these but we still have a half hour left. We'll do as much as we can. There are rumors that you have duplicate headquarters for the Party and for the Government in the event of war. They are organized. These headquarters are hidden somewhere in the Urals or somewhere else. Have you heard about them? S: What kinds of headquarters, military? G: The kind which are needed to operate, such as Party headquarters, area headquarters -- in case of war. S: Those are emergency headquarters. All reserve sites for military purposes, ministries, etc., all government functions, have been set up. All this has been worked out.

54. G: The military, too, since this is easy to displace. S: Yes. There is a huge Command Post. They are in the subway in Moscow, somewhere between the Kremlin and the General Headquarters, deep below. There is an electric (train) that goes there. That exists. G: Are there any in the Urals area? S: Yes there are. Operational groups fly there from every ministry. Everything is in the rocks, underground. G: You do not know exactly, but in the Urals area? S: In the center of the Urals somewhere. There are shelters there.

55. S: By the way, I think I mentioned that in the Urals there are aviation hangars, underground factories. There are very many underground structures, but it is very, very expensive. I've been told that this takes up so much money that there are no roads. There is not enough money for the roads, but for civilian and military defense constructions there is plenty of money. G: Probably this duplication also exists in military districts, PVO, etc.? S: Yes, absolutely. The commander of the district takes care of that. He has an engineer directorate with engineer brigades to do this. This is the problem for commander of the district according to the mobilization plan. Only military, not civilian.

56. G: In the event of an unexpected war, how much reserve supplies do the land troops have? What is the supply level? S: I know that exactly -- 30 days. G: In place? S: In place. But, take a regiment -- it would not all be in the regiment's hands. It would be in rear supply points. The units have a five-day supply carried on hand, also canned foods, hard tack, etc. G: That would

be for the theater of operations? S: Yes. In general, the commander has a 30 day supply. If he does not receive anything, he will be able to feed large units. He has flour, grits, concentrates and canned goods ..... G: Who is responsible for this supply, say for a Group of Forces? S: That is done by ORGMOB. That is the soul of the army. G: Why do you say that? S: The ORGMOB, the Organization-Mobilization, abbreviated to ORGMOB. It can be a directorate.

57. S: Now, in general, you have just brought up a question, a strategic one. It is an important problem. We had talked about it.. The OBLASTs' VOYENKOMAT must be spotted and destroyed. They are vital. G: This brings up the question of what exactly is the mobilization plan. Who decides where recruits should go? S: Beginning with the Organization and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff and running through all the military districts and through the OBLASTS, city and RAYON as well as village councils where they have military conscription registration desks, the latter is the cell of the system. Down to and including the offices of the RAYON there are sealed envelopes. These are to be opened in the event of war by each RAYON VOYENKOMAT. The contents have been prepared by the General Staff. The instructions state exactly according to what plan what should be done. This plan has been completely worked out in time, phase, periods, such as H-hour, H plus one, etc. This plan has prepared lists of what personnel will go to what units, where vehicles, equipment and even horses will be assigned. The local commander at this point merely opens the envelope and follows the immediate instructions prior to receiving instructions from higher command. Even if a coded cable did not arrive from the OBLAST or military district headquarters yet, until receipt of such, the local commander knows exactly what to do. This includes dispositions of personnel, supplies, equipment, etc. He would know what to do for the first three days. Supplemental instructions covering the period up to D plus 90 will follow later.

58. G: Is the VOYENNY BILET still used as in the past? S: Yes. I have one and I will send you a photocopy of mine. G: Does it also include the pink mobilization insert? S: Yes, it does, but it is given only to lower ranking personnel, non-coms and officers through the rank of captain. Majors and above no longer have this insert. They gave me a VOYENNY BILET as a legend that I had been demobilized. You will see a copy of this -- in fact, I will devote an entire film to my documents. You will see my Party BILET, my UDOSTOVERENIYE LICHNOSTI and all my various passes to different organizations, my VOYENNY BILET and my civilian passport. This passport which is given to all officers who work in intelligence and

and receive civilian passports is called an operational passport. Pay close attention to the numerical designation on this passport. I will underscore it for you. If a militiaman checks my passport and notices these numbers, he will pass me by, realizing that this is an operational passport and that I have not been demobilized or anything of that sort. Otherwise, except for the code number, it looks like any civilian passport.

59. G: What kind of alerts do you have? For example, there are training alerts and then there are other categories. S: There is the air alert which exists as in the past, a chemical warfare alert, and there is a combat alert for troops to assemble troops. This is a general alert. For example, at the academy there were specific assembly points for each of the five departments and for the instruction personnel. ODINTSOV would always call one of these every two months as a practice alert. A general alert may be followed by a chemical alert. The general alert is the basic one. Then they criticize deficiencies in the speed of assembly.

60. S: In the General Staff we also have a system of OPOVESHCHANIYE which means who should notify whom in case of an alert. This is the key to insuring the desired assembly in case of an alert. In garrison positions alerts can be easily signalled by sound devices, but where people live in civilian quarters a personal contact method by phone and even in person must be established. Each officer must always have a small suitcase with minimum articles for personal use prepared for immediate pickup. Other academies may have only one alert in three months. That is done either on the individual direction of the chief or by an overall garrison commander.

61. G: To what extent is combat ready equipment brought out? S: Vehicles and artillery are brought out including ammunition, etc. One cannot tell whether or not consequent action will take place after the alert is sounded. G: Is there any practice alert which takes place in a skeletonized form without equipment, etc? S: Yes, but it is still a general alert with specific instructions added to it, namely to assemble without this and that equipment or arms. So it is simply a general alert with qualifications. But there is no such category as practice alert.

62. G: What type of annual maneuvers and troop deployments take place? S: I will send you the manuals covered in this and you can see all the details for yourself. G: How about the army reserves? Do you not have large numbers of both enlisted and officer reserves? S: There are extensive reserves and they continue to train them by means of assemblies. G: How often do they have to go? S: That depends on what their VUS (VOYENNO-UCHEBNAYA SPETSIALNOST') (MOS) is. If they are technicians, they are called out every year.

But if he is a veterinary, and we have few horses now, he may be called once in three or five years. Now that technical equipment plays such a great role and technical units are extensive, engineers and technicians are called up to be trained in new technology. There are ten-day training periods, one-month and three-month training periods. It all depends on what the training program has been set for.

Reserve training

63. G: What do you estimate the size of your reserves to be? S: I am afraid to guess, but if you insist on a rough estimate I would say that there is at least one reservist for everyone on active duty in most categories, and in certain specialties there would be two or three reservists per a comparable man on active duty. Of course, we always have new conscripts. G: Yes, but that is a different category.

Size of Reserves

64. G: When KHRUSHCHEV stated in 1959 that the army would be reduced by one million two hundred thousand troops to what extent was this demobilization actually carried out? S: This problem has not yet been decided even now. This is just idle conversation and complete deceit. Under this pretext they are discharging physically unfit, old people, and politically unreliable persons. And the rest they don't touch. He has made many skeletonized units out of divisions and regiments. But all key personnel, the unit designation, remain just the same. In case of emergency, in three days the unit can be filled out according to the organization-mobilization plan. If the OBLAST VOYENKOMATY would be destroyed, there would be complete panic in case of war. They don't even have real safes where their papers are kept, but strong boxes which would easily be destroyed in a good fire. If the contents were destroyed, even though reservists would know where to report initially, they would not know what to do from there on since all details are included in the mobilization plan.

Troop Cuts '59?

Ready for emergency

65. G: What would you say that the strength of the Soviet Army is now? KHRUSHCHEV mentioned that there are approximately three million six hundred thousand. S: We estimate it to be about five million. G: Is this from rumor or from statistical data? S: After all, when one works in the General Staff and breathes this air, it is not difficult to compute, despite reductions in strength, how many divisions there are, etc. We estimate that, including all armed forces, there are five million. G: Can you give a breakdown? S: We already estimated together what the main headquarters consists of and got up to a hundred and fifty thousand persons and I told you that the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense alone has twenty-eight thousand. This I know exactly. G: How about the breakdown by air forces, naval forces, etc? S: This is known to the Minister of Defense, his deputies, the Central Committee, the chief of the General

Strength of Soviet Army

Access general o.f., but not specific

Staff and the chief of the Mobilizational and Organizational Directorate. If you ask SEROV, he wouldn't know. However, he would know more about it than I do.

66. G: Do you have any idea of the budgetary allocation given to GRU? S: When I was in Turkey I remember a little of the computations. First of all they consider, of course, the officers' pay. Five years ago we had seven thousand generals. I don't know how many we have now. There they would compute for foreign duty what the monthly equivalent pay would have to be in foreign currency. I received 2,000 lira per month or 24,000 per year. Then all other intelligence personnel were computed similarly. Our operational funds were always in a rotating fund -- 15,000 lira. This was used for agent support. G: Suppose you had a rather expensive operation? S: For this, supplementary funds would be sent from Moscow. Monies are transferred through the embassy and the finance officer knows for whom the allocations are. Agent support funds, operational travel, and even operational entertainment, are all operational funds. Vehicle repair, housing, etc., are administrative funds. I can't give you a GRU total, although I could break down what individual incomes are.

67. G: How about the total military budget? How is that broken down? S: That is deliberately never broken down. KHRUSHCHEV may announce that there are one hundred billion rubles for military purposes, but no breakdown is given. This is always a reduced figure because there are other funds from which payments are made to factories which produce more material. You should always assume that the announced military budget is actually two to two and a half more times than what is publicly announced.

68. G: What does it mean for example when he stated that 30,000 rubles would be allocated for the development of the ICBM? S: I am not familiar with that figure and have not seen it used officially. Possibly KHRUSHCHEV said something out of turn once, but I am positive that the amount allocated for rocket development is much greater. Even VARENTSOV who is supposed to get a certain amount from the budget is always attempting to get supplementary funds from covert sources since he needs more money. He once told me this. He had been responsible for a considerable quantity of conventional artillery which did not have proper protective shelter and he was authorized to order large quantities of canvas covers. However in a year or two these covers rotted. So he discarded these at a loss of several million rubles and spent twice as much to construct permanent steel and concrete shelters. Despite the ultimate saving over canvas as well as the preservation of ordnance, he was criticized for this big expenditure.

Cost of V-75 — MIG-15 — Access — ECK

69. G: Do you have any idea of what it costs to fully equip a V-75 battalion? S: I have no idea but I do know that a MIG-15 costs exactly 500,000 rubles (in old money) because I was ordered to destroy one in Turkey and I had to sign papers. Of course the MIG-17 and MIG-19 are far more expensive. Just keep in mind that for very overt things such as individual pay, cost of running academies and other military installations, that is where the military budget can be seen, but neither VARENTSOV nor GAU pay for the production of cannons and rockets. That is all done by secret allocations to factories which are all part of the GOSPLAN.

VCh — military (underlined) — KGB — Internal telephone

70. G: Let me see what other questions we have here. You mentioned VCh before and said you would get us a directory. S: I will give you a list of all the military units that I run across. I already gave you the academy and I will give you the one at Kapustin Yar as well as others. G: I mean the VCh of the telephone system. S: That is a classified telephone line used by the government and for other official purposes. Everyone in the General Staff does not have a VCh. G: Can it not be intercepted? S: I believe it is difficult to intercept and it is a line which is connected with all OKRUGS and even with the countries of Peoples' Democracies. There is an internal Kremlin line called the KREMLEVKA through which we can be switched through a switchboard, but this can be intercepted. The General Staff has its own circuit and to get the city line you first dial '8'. On incoming calls to us we can also be reached by those who know the addit onal letters to add such K-2 or K-4. The VCh is basically a four number system but goes from switchboard to switchboard between towns and it is considered to be secure to use.

CMEA — Warsaw Pact — "Tsk" — Foreign Section

71. G: Here is an economic question. Does the committee called the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance have a relationship to the Warsaw Pact? S: Of course it does. It controls and coordinates everything. The Warsaw Pact is concerned with armaments, equipment, training, and military aid. G: Do you know who is in charge of this committee? S: All this goes through the Foreign Section of the Central Committee which has to do with the countries of Peoples' Democracies. If it's a military matter then it would go through the Tenth Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. The Chief of Staff has a deputy who is concerned only with these matters. G: Who is the commander of the Tenth Directorate? S: He is a general of the army and a former commander of the Transcaucasian Military district.

72. G: We're worried about your time now and we can leave these other things until tonight when we meet again. The prominent person who will meet you tonight will come here. He will come after

we have met and he will visit you for half an hour or so. S: I will be back here at 2100 hours then. Then I will meet the man, and when shall I see the queen (jokingly)? If I were in the USA, I would ask to meet KENNEDY. J: The queen happens to be in Italy at the moment. S: I know. I'm joking.

73. H: Ask him if he will have time to take a few practice films before this evening. S: Yes, I can do this, just for practice. G: Load it yourself to show that you know how and take it with you. H: Then we can develop it tomorrow and show him the results tomorrow evening. S: Now with respect to [redacted], you will tell him what I need. G: Yes, I have already translated the items into English and have it typed. You keep this list since it is your control list which was given to you by the MGB man in his own hand. S: Thank you. I will take this. I will leave all other materials except the camera. I will see WYNNE right away, then rest a little and go to the Consulate at 1700 hours. I will return here at 2100 hours. I may be five or ten minutes late, but no more. G: Pick up your money; you may take it with you. We'll see you later. S: Thank you. (Subject departed at 1440 hours on 3 May 1961.)

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7. S: Let me report to you. The deputy to the KGB RESIDENT in London is KARPEKOV. He is the First Secretary. If I could only stay here a little longer I could probably dig out a little more, and probably something about the agent net here. G: You know, now that you have been so well recommended at the embassy, the less you go there for unnecessary reasons, the better. S: They wrote up that the delegation here worked very well, that we did not annoy the embassy or make any demands on them, and that we did everything according to plan. I found out from conversations with GENERALOV that the deputy RESIDENT of the KGB is KARPEKOV.

(8) S: In my opinion, since you have already exposed KGB persons here, it would be a good idea to push this further, but don't bother the GRU. You will know all about them even more in the future, but don't touch them. Of course, you must take protective measures. This is so that no repercussions will fall back on us through any action. But press against the KGB. Make it so tough that the RESIDENT will be removed. This will upset their activities considerably and before new people can arrive here and become oriented, they will lose a great deal. G: I understand, and the GRU should remain in a favorable position. S: That's right, but of course keep them harmless.

(9) G: By the way, I have a request of you. GENERALOV told me that at the airport the British weigh our baggage and that we must pay personally for all excess weight over twenty kilograms. We don't have any money. G: How can this be if this is a Soviet plane? H: The AEROFLOT do not have their own representatives here and the luggage is weighed by BEA. If there is excess luggage weight, they will charge since they have to do this according to their rules. We will see what we can do.

(10) (Note: A few minutes later H returned with Sir Richard WHITE who was introduced to everyone in the room. Sir WHITE then addressed Subject as follows.) WHITE: Well, Colonel, the message I have to deliver to you is from Lord MOUNTBATTEN, the chief of the Defense Department of England. Will you translate this for me? First, he regrets very much that he cannot see you personally. He asked me to relay this message to you. I have been shown the oath of allegiance which you have made for the governments of Great Britain and the United States. I am filled with admiration for the great stand that you have made, and we are mindful of the risks that you are running. I have also had reported to me the information which you have passed on to us. I can only tell you that it would be of the highest value and importance to the Free World.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

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(11) S: My dear Sir (GOSPODIN) I am most grateful to the lord and to yourself for this attention that you are extending to me now. This attention on the part of the lord and yourself is to me an indication of your recognition of me. I place myself under your banners in full consciousness. I have hoped for this for a long time now. I did the best I could to prove my faithfulness, my devotion, and my readiness to fight under your banners until the end of my life. During the course of the past two weeks I have had the good fortune and the possibility to consider many important matters together with the gentlemen present in this room. These matters were of a military-strategic, and political nature. I wish to state to you boldly and honestly that I still have sufficient strength and health and sufficient training of both a theoretical and practical nature in order to give meaning to my new missions now and to execute them in the best manner possible for our Free World.

(12) S: I wish to assure the lord and yourself that very little time will pass before you will recognize me still further and even have an affection for me. Just recently I also had the opportunity to discuss all of the missions which are placed before me now and in the immediate future. I have also recorded all of the possibilities (accessibility) that I have. Here I was told in a very well thought-out manner, very correct and scientifically, about a group of categories of work both in an intelligence sense and in a political sense concerning the problems before us. I am sure that I will fulfill these missions qualitetively as a soldier should do. I swear to you as representatives of your governments that I will accomplish this. I would also like to add and to express the great desire which I have carried in my soul and which I carry now - I even thought about this in Moscow - and that is to swear my fealty to my Queen Elizabeth II and to the President of the United States, Mr. KENNEDY, whom I am serving as their soldier. Although unfortunately due to circumstances, this is not possible now, I hope that in the future I will be blessed by this fortune personally by the Queen.

(13) WHITE: Yes, well, I would like to reply to that. First, now that Col. (Subject's true name) is going back to Russia, I beg that he proceed with caution in view of the great risk. But I want him to know that should the time come when he must leave Russia and make his home in the Western world, then the obligations that we undoubtedly have towards him will be firmly and clearly fulfilled. S: This is all clear to me and I thank you. I would like to add two more words, if you will permit me. I request that you would convey my gratitude to the lord, my gratitude for his attention and I would like to thank you again for your attention. Please fulfill my request that the lord at some convenient moment state to her Majesty, the Queen, that her forces have been increased by one member - this colonel who is located in Moscow in the Soviet General Staff and who is fulfilling special assignments but actually is a colonel in her Majesty's service. Furthermore (please say that) I will serve exactly as instructed and that I'm in very competent hands. WHITE: Of that I feel sure. To meet you has been delightful. (Note: Wine is served for a toast.)

14. WHITE: You have had many many hours together to make this possible. Well now, we shall all drink to the colonel's health. S: Thank you for your attention and thank you for having brought me this very good fortune. WHITE: You understand my English a little, do you? S: I know English, but as one says, "fifty-fifty", or less. You know I was in Turkey and I was assistant attache. (To G:) How do you say "acting intelligence chief?" After this I had no opportunity to improve my English. I did not have practice. But I promise also in future I improve. (Note: All the preceding is said in English by Subject.) WHITE: Now that you're a colonel in the United States Army, I think that this will be necessary. H: You will also have to learn American. WHITE: I can see that you have plenty of stamina to work so intensively and still be on your feet. S: Yes, we have worked a great deal and I also had this delegation to take care of, with trips to make. We often worked until two o'clock in the morning. That's alright since we had important matters to consider, and these matters were more important than worrying about one's health.

15. S: I would like the lord and Sir WHITE and also my controlling case officers who are concerned about me and who will be receiving materials from me in the future - I wish all of you to know that I will serve to the very end in an honest, faithful manner and will be resolute to the end. That is my character and I am confident of my power to do so. WHITE: That is the impression that we have, and we are strongly convinced of this. S: Thank you. I will attempt to justify your faith. WHITE: I think that you have conveyed your desires very clearly to us and I think that we understand this clearly and entirely. S: It is very pleasant for me to hear these words and as a soldier I receive them willingly. WHITE: Now then, if you will excuse me, I think I will leave you to your work. The very best of luck to you in the accomplishment of your missions. My very best regards to you gentlemen. (Note: Sir WHITE was escorted out by H.)

16. S: Did I say everything properly? G: Yes, you did very well. S: Do you think he was satisfied with me? G: Yes, you did well. You didn't overdo it. (H returns.) G: Our friend is anxious to know what impressions Sir WHITE has of him. H: Oh, very good indeed. S: I tried to say everything honestly and briefly. G: That was good and I feel sure that Lord MOUNTBATTEN will tell her Majesty about you. S: This obligates me even more to work hard. By the way, Lord MOUNTBATTEN is the uncle of Prince PHILLIP and was not his mother Russian? H: He came from the Greek Royal House, but they were inter-married with the Russian Royal family and the Queen's grandmother was a cousin of the Czar.

Mil Vehs Reg Numbers

17. S: Well, shall we get down to work? G: Fine. I have some questions here which you may or may not know the answers to. First of all, do you happen to know of the military number system for Soviet military vehicles? S: First of all, all military vehicles with the exception of command vehicles are all painted a khaki color. All military vehicles have a letter designation which is keyed to cities, or garrisons if they are not in a city. This is to permit the Chief Directorate of Highway Control, namely the militia, to ascertain ata glance to what military unit the vehicle belongs. I do not know what the specifics are for each unit. On the right hand side of the cab, away from the driver, is a red star also signifying that this is a military vehicle.

18. S: The numbers within a garrison are issued in sequence and traffic control officers whose business it is to know can tell at once by the number which specific unit the vehicle belongs to. With respect to civilian vehicles used for intelligence purposes, I have already told you how the numbers run. G: What would the letter "U" designate? S: That is an alphabetical letter only for a numerical sequence. But others like "M" would be for Moscow, "T" for Tula, etc. KGB and MVD vehicles have a zero somewhere in the numerical sequence, either before of after. SEROV has two zeros, and then two more digits. However, our operational cars would be entirely normal. These are only for KGB, MVD and GRU official purposes. The PVO also have their own numerical sequences.

VIP a/c RR Car Limousines

19. G: Do VARENTSOV, MOSKALENKO, and ZHUKOV have their own private airplanes assigned to them ? S: Yes, they do. VARENTSOV also has his own railroad car. Two conductors service it and sometimes he takes the wife and family in order to save carfare. G: What kind of planes are they assigned? S: They get IL-14s, and KHRUSHCHEV has an IL-18 equipped with an office. G: Where are they stationed usually? S: Either at the airport off the Leningradskiy Shosse or the Vnukovo Airport. They are not at the Sharabetevo Airport, although near Sharabetevo, five kilometers away there is a civilian airport for internal travel. G: Who services these aircraft? S: It is under the command of the chief of aviation and specifically under his deputy for technical maintenance services. This is of course under the overall control of the Soviet Air Force. For the aircraft given to civilian chiefs of the Praesidium there is a General Mayor who is in charge. A full colonel is the personal pilot for KHRUSHCHEV. He has a million flying hours. (Jokingly) He has a great number of hours. We call them millionaires.

Space Cmte.

20. G: Did you ever hear of an organization called the Interdepartmental Committee for Interplanetary Communications? S: There is nothing by that name, and I haven't heard of it. G: Possibly this has something to do with your

Ministerstvo
Srednego
Mashinostoyeniya

Cosmonauts. S: This would concern NEDELIN and MOSKALENKO. There is some training school where space fliers are trained and subjected to all kinds of tests. At Monino there is an air force training base. It is a command school. It is in the direction of Naglinsk. The academy has been greatly reduced in size. The engineering aviation school in. Zhukovskogo is still on Leningradskiy Shosse. G: So all of these experimental flights such as the one by GAGARIN are really under military jurisdiction and have a military purpose. S: Of course they do, primarily for photography. It would be absurd to say that GAGARIN was not given automatic photography to control.

21. G: How about the Ministry of Middle Machine/Construction? S: That is exactly what it is called. G: Does it not have a connection with rocket construction? S: Yes, it does. This is its cover name for civilian purposes and international purposes. But actually they are building rockets. G: Who is in charge of this committee? S: This is under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. G: Where is it located? S: It is in one of the buildings on the Kitayskiy Pereulok going toward the Dzerzhinskiy Academy and their polyclinic is next door to my house.

22. G: Remember you mentioned a friend of yours whom you had helped quite often, a young officer who once had a minor fire at an artillery dump? S: Yes, that was Captain SKLYAROV - near Mozhaysk. G: Is this about 120 kilometers west of Moscow? S: I would say it's a little nearer. There is an enormous artillery base there. His name is Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich. G: Is it closer than Borodino? S: No, it's further from Moscow. G: Somewhere south of the highway, not far from Borodino there is a huge military installation. Do you know what it is? Or could it possibly be this artillery base? S: The artillery base is enormous and it is called a Class One base. There is even a railroad that services it. This Captain is stationed there now. He is a transportation officer; he is a tank officer. G: We believe it has been there since 1955. S: It is an old base which has been expanded. It is under GAU, under ZHDANOV.

23. G: By chance are you ever in a position to obtain first order survey data? S: That is a very specialized service. Although it is large and also has certain civilian components, the material is very closely held. In my studies of rocketry, abstract figures were used. All basic triangulation data is tightly held. They are partially under the Ministry of Geology and Protection of Resources of the USSR. This ministry is located on Bolshaya Gruzinskaya Street across from the Zoological Gardens. They also have a topographical working section. G: With respect to this work who is responsible

for data needed by MOSKALENKO? S: MOSKALENKO has his own unit for this, but this ministry cooperates with them. They provide MOSKALENKO withmuch basic data, even though he has his own unit. They also provide weather charts and information and are responsible for all such data throughout the interior of the USSR.

24. G: In February 1960 Marshal KONEV while speaking to the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers in Moscow said that though the ICBM has been developed, the first country to develop an anti-ballistic missile will enjoy a great strategic advantage. Have you ever heard any discussion of this theme in VOYENNAYA MYSL or any other military circles? S: In the first place whatever KONEV said could only be at the direction of KHRUSHCHEV. Even when MALINOVSKIY says anything it is at KHRUSHCHEV's direction. No marshal can express his own views. On occasion, when necessary, a military person can make a strictly technical statement. But if one word of politics is involved then his statement will have beenwritten out for him word for word.

25. G: Have you ever heard of DOROKHOV who is in charge of this program? S: Yes, I have heard the name, and I think that he is the one who received a decoration of Hero of Socialist Labor four times. I will check on this. It seems that he was one of many scientists who are little heard of who live very well but are under very strict surveillance.

26. G: Did you ever heard of a place called Saryy-Shagan near Lake Balkhash which is engaged in atomic work? S: I did not hear specifically of Saryy-Shagan but I have heard that at Lake Balkhash they are working on fissionable atomic materials. Huge quantities of water are needed for this. There is quite an installation there. G: From whom did you hear this? S: I heard this from many sources, even on occasion in lectures which referred to this place. It's hard for me to pinpoint a specific source, but even GAPANOVICH told me about this since he had served in the Far East. He said that there are areas in the Far East and Central Asia which are remarkably suited for such work and that they are very easily concealed there. These places are hard to destroy unless one knows their exact location.

27 G: What did KHRUSHCHEV infer when he said in early 1960 that new fantastic weapons had been developed which are more dangerous than the ICBM? S: He had in mind that he had given instructions to develop a new rocket fuel based on the fission of atomic energy for its propulsion. They are working on this now, but in addition to the atomic energy fuel they are also working to develop an extremely high calorific fuel. Of those that I have already given you, you will notice that Boron is one of the ingredients. But they are working intensively with huge monetary allocations to develop an atomic energy fuel.

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#14

(28) G: Have you ever heard that in your agent net or the KGB agent net there are highly valuable American, British or Canadian agents? S: I know definitely that in the hands of the Soviet Strategic Intelligence agent net they have American, English, French and German agents. I know this like I know two and two is four. It is another matter to estimate the value. For example, in Turkey even though some agent candidates had very little operational capabilities, still the order was for them to be recruited. No one expected a top-ranking general to be recruited. G: This is all GRU? S: Yes. G: How about the KGB? S: Of course they have (them). Not only am I sure, but I will put my head on this because the KGB borrowed money from me from my ops funds to pay their agents. The illegals also have their own network. They don't use the people native to that country necessarily but also use people brought in from third countries.

(29) S: Very soon I will give you a complete list of operating agents particularly in Ceylon. G: We are not going to touch them. S: Suppose I don't come over to you for two years? G: If taking action against them would in any way endanger your security during this period of two years, then I would say we would not take action until you come out. S: I understand. After I am out you can roll them all up. G: And you can help us. S: If you could isolate one agent and under the proper legend pick him up, even though his records will show some tieback to me, I could still get by with this. But if two or more were picked up then I would really have had it. G: In general, whenever we decide to act we would only do so after consultation with you, and you can give us the proper guidance.

30. S: Let me give you a quick resume. Do not touch anyone in India now. They are not active. They are on conservation. They should simply be noted and surveilled. They are all being paid. They receive periodic instruction and they have equipment such as radio sets. From time to time their radios are checked technically. In Pakistan the agent net is insignificant. But there is one agent who has been giving information about calculating machines. Ceylon, however, is an active area. It should be shut off. G: As I said before, we will take no action without prior consultation with you.

31. H: In this connection I would like to make a valid point so he will understand. Earlier he mentioned that someone was given twenty-five years for espionage. I want to emphasize with him that we have known about this case for a long time, but did not take action deliberately because we wanted to protect someone. It was only after it was no longer necessary toprotect someone that we took action against that spy. G: That's an excellent point. I will explain that to him. S: GENERALOV told me about this case. He also said that it was

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difficult to work in London and that there is no demonstrative type of surveillance, that there is very good covert surveillance. They particularly watch the man who is meeting with our people and then they try to double him back against us.

32. S: Let me finish regarding Ceylon. The agent produces American manuals on military data. He is a corporal. Promote the corporal, would be my suggestion, but transfer him to another job. Let him have a higher official position and more money as if this is an acknowledgement of his good work, but at the same time cut off his accessibility to important materials. This variation could work as a form of isolation. H: This would presuppose that we could deal directly with the government of Ceylon in order to effect this and this we would not do. S: However, valuable American information is leaking out. G: Nevertheless we cannot trust the Ceylon government in a matter of this kind. There are too many unreliable elements there. S: Yes, there are quite a few Leftists there. But at least you can stop sending valuable American publications and data to Ceylon. Let him sit there. To hell with him, but don't give him any new data.

33. G: Let me ask you something about codes and ciphers. Possibly you may not know the answers to these questions. First of all, who prepares and is in charge of the codes, that is, from the viewpoint of command responsibility and distribution? S: First of all, codes are prepared by cryptographic units which are Top Secret. Highly trained scientists, that is, mathematicians sit there. G: To whom is this subordinate? S: This is subordinate to the Academy of Sciences. First of all the Academy of Sciences has the most intensive intelligence research, but in addition to this they have a special service consisting of mathematicians who use electronic machines. This is done to avoid any possible repetition of cycles of numbers.

34. S: With respect to military usage, those codes are under the direct control of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. A specific deputy of the General Staff is personally responsible for this. He is concerned with this scientific section as well as with all codes and he is the immediate chief of the Eighth Directorate of the General Staff. He is a general leytenant. G: This is at the Ministry of Defense level? S: Yes, it is. This conglomeration has under it the mathematical section of the Academy of Sciences. They also have under them the training of code clerks and apparatus of all kinds, and under it they have their Eighth Directorate sub-sections which deal with codes like in our Second Chief Directorate. Colonel LEBEDEV is in charge of cosmo intelligence decoding. He is the one who is sitting in the building on Tankovskiy Proyezd. Of course the brain of this who computes the codes has absolutely no connection with designating who is going to use it. This is all assigned in the military section.

Codes

35. S: They even have short-cut codes for our own cryptos. For example, my name OLENIEV, and names like KARPOV, KARLOV, can all be coded in five numbers. Incidentally, I just remembered that RUBENKO's crypto is ENVER.

Acad Sciences

36. G: Who does this for the KGB? S: The KGB also has a cryptographic service and they also get the basic material from this brain trust of mathematicians in the Academy of Sciences. Of course, they can take this material and work it over to suit their own cryptographic purposes. G: Who provides the security measures, and protects these mathematicians? S: The same ones who protect the engineers and scientists who work on rockets, special KGB units such as the OMSDON. No one can enter their area at the Academy. In the past they were even paid for doing secret work but now all pay for secret work has been eliminated.

CH Sect

Ciphers

37. G: Do you know anything about the methods or principles of how they prepare ciphers? S: No, I don't. G: Of course they also have codes as well as ciphers. S: That's right. SEROV has his own code and directorate chiefs have their own codes. Incidentally, the KGB also has an Eighth Section. That number is the indicator for all code and cipher work.

38. G: Where is your GRU radio station located? Is it on the premises where the offices are? S: It's like this. We have our own GRU stations just outside of Moscow. These are the OSNAZY. Some are fixed; there are buildings of a permanent nature, etc. We also have mobile stations with the equipment mounted on trucks. A regular courier service goes to GRU headquarters from these stations.

39. S: The station that handles traffic from illegals on a continuing basis, however, is located right on the fifth floor of the GRU headquarters. This room is located just near where SOKILOV has his office. I even remember seeing the radio station when I was the duty officer. The duty officer usually checks safes in open areas to be sure they are locked and also checks sealed doors which are supposed to be locked.

40. G: Who is in charge of normal communications between your GRU headquarters and your REZIDENTURAs abroad? S: These communications are handled by the OSNAZY which are exclusively subordinated to GRU. These are all out of town. G: How about the KGB? S: They have their own OSNAZY, also out of town, but they may also have a special station atthe Dzerzhinskaya Ploshchad' as we do for illegals.

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#14

41. Q: Who handles the mechanics for transmitting a message? For example, suppose a priority message arrived at your OSNAZ for BERKHEEV. How would it get to him? S: The OSNAZ would notify the Eighth Section in clear text on a high frequency telephone line which goes directly to the Eighth Section. Of course this line cannot be intercepted, that is, monitored. Another method used is to transmit numerical groups from the receiving station directly to the Eighth Section by teletype machines. Then Eighth Section personnel decode the cable and deliver it. Low-level information type cables are decoded at the receiving OSNAZ station. Remember there is no set pattern and these are duplicate methods of transmission. Both methods are considered to be wartime security types of communications. The decoded cable at GRU, is handcarried say, to BERKOV.

42. Q: The KGB presumably operates in similar fashion? S: Of course it does. Q: Does the KGB also engage in radio communications intelligence activity? S: Yes, they do, just as we do. Q: Do you know where this headquarters is? S: No, I do not. But they operate on the same principle that we do and there is an interchange of information.

43. Q: Do you have any other extensive radio station network throughout the USSR since distances are considerable? S: Yes. Every RP has its radio station, but of course their equipment is nowhere near the capacity of the GRU OSNAZ stations near Moscow. Often they act as relay stations and when they get an incoming message say fromthe direction of Iran, the entire coded message is transmitted to Moscow. They do not decode it at the RP. Of course if the message is directed locally, say to the chief of a military district, it would remain there. This commander of intelligence operations in a military district is responsible for conducting intelligence against the country to which the district is adjacent. Q: Do they already have high speed radio transmitters? S: Yes, they have and they also use teletype.

44. Q: With respect to your technical developments for agent r- radios and tradecraft items such as concealment devices and SW, does the GRU do all this themselves or is there a central technical laboratory which may also service the KGB? S: No, the GRU has its own shop and the KGB also has its own, but they do have an interchange of data between them. The better developments may be passed on from onsto the other depending on who developed it. Of course operational details are not given as to who used what in what area. Q: Is this arrangement imposed by order or have they done this voluntarily? S: No, it has been done voluntarily. The coordination has been effected as the result of agreements by high-ranking officials.

[redacted]

45. G: Where is the KGB laboratory? S: I believe that they have their laboratory where they have their VAK, off the Leningradskiy Shosse. G: Do they have anything in Kuchino? S: Yes, they have, but exactly what they have there I don't know. They also have their higher school near the Belorusskiy Vokzal. G: Do you have any idea of the type of activity they have at Kuchino? S: This is a technical radio center. Of course they are under different cover.

46. G: Do you have any very advanced scientific technology which is electronic and which measures certain impulses all over the world? S: In electronics our greatest development has been in computers such as the STRELA. Now I believe they have already developed the STRELA 4. The earlier models were intermediate developmental models. We also have developed devices which operate as vibrating membranes and can reflect sound impulses even from glass. The KGB uses this for their interception work. The GRU does not. We have not used them ourselves but we have been told about them. We have also been told that such devices are possessed by both the Americans and the British.

47. G: Have you ever heard that in other countries, say in England, an electronic device in a box had been concealed somewhere? This device receives some sort of impulses and continuously transmits them back to you. S: Yes, there are such devices. They work automatically. I don't know the principles, but I have heard them referred to as beacons (MAYAKI).

(48) J: Has he ever heard of any technical devices that may have been used against foreign embassies in Moscow? S: Not only have I heard of them, but I have seen them. Many of the types have been copied from your equipment. They have thin membranes about a half centimeter thick which act as a microphone and which can be plastered into a wall. Wires lead out to some transmitter which is monitored. In general, these are copies of instruments which you have installed that have been discovered. G: But they have wires. How about those without wires? S: I have not seen any like that and I don't know about them, although they are probably working on such things. G: However, they definitely plant these devices in foreign embassies in Moscow? S: Yes, absolutely, in every embassy where a potential enemy is located - any which we can penetrate.

(49) S: This brings to mind a point which I want to emphasize. Of the numerous Soviet employees at the American, English and Canadian embassies, all of them report to the KGB. For example, my own aunt, Yelena Yakovlevna SHIVTSOVA had worked for a long time in the Afghan Embassy and she was an informant of

the KGB. She is the sister of my mother and has recently been pensioned. She never wanted to do this. She was working there as a stewardess and a nurse. She hated to do this but she was ordered to under threat and one of her assignments was to make imprints of the safe. Her son, Igor, was ill and they gave him medical attention thereby exerting more control over her. She was a gentle woman who hated this. She had worked at this embassy prior to the war for a long time, and later she was transferred to the Italian embassy. She was always terrified and confided in my mother. We were very concerned because any mishap she might have with the KGB would reflect on us. We were very pleased when she was pensioned two years ago.

50. S: In Turkey we never used local technicians or cleaning personnel, only Russian. But here in Moscow you have large numbers of servant personnel. Every one has a KGB mission to fulfill and must constantly report. Why can't you cut out these people and have your own cleaning women do the work? It is no disgrace to clean up floors for your own people to protect security. But no, you always have to bring in so many personnel and everyone is seeking a crumb of information for which they are paid. Unfortunately, Soviet people need every ruble they can get. There are absolutely no exceptions. Often your kindnesses to certain individuals serves a very bad purpose. How sure can I be about this when I tell you my own aunt was forced to work for the KGB in a foreign embassy?

51. G: With respect to what you have reported I would like a small clarification. Remember when you said that GURYEV flew to the Congo? Who was the source of the information which stated that the USSR had a possible deficiency in uranium and other fissionable materials? S: The one who told me about this was FEDOROV who is now a brigade commander in Germany. We were also told at the General Staff that the Congo is rich in uranium ore and that one of our first missions with respect to the Congo was to make arrangements for obtaining uranium ore. When GURYEV returned he told me about this for two hours while we were drinking wine. He said that KASAVUBU asked them to leave and not to interfere. Even Soviet doctors were pulled out of the Congo, and later the embassy was closed.

52. S: By the way, are your convinced about what I told you regarding Soviet employees in your embassies? G: Of course we are. S: All you need to do is compare the number of Soviet employees in your embassies and the number of your people in Soviet embassies. G: We will report all this and how our governments will act is their business. S: I have told you facts of life. Incidentally, my aunt's name had been RICHTER at first since her first husband was an Ossetian whose name was Boris RICHTER. The name is German. He divorced

my aunt, remarried, and is now living in Rostov. My cousin, Igor, was his son and he died after his illness in 1955. When she came to Moscow and was such a good housekeeper she was recommended for a job at the Afghan Embassy on Vorovskogo Street. She was good-looking at that time. She worked there for twelve years and she was the girlfriend of YUSNIS, an Afghan official from the Afghanistan court. Later she married SHIVTSOV, a prominent physician.

China Nuclear FW.

53. G: Remember you mentioned that possibly you could get uranium from China? What is the Chinese reaction to this? S: I know that at first we had given them all kinds of basic equipment for atomic research, various reactors, etc. Possibly they do supply us with some uranium ore, I don't know, but it may have been they want to keep all this for themselves. In addition, their ores are not so rich. It would not be economical to haul low-grade ore such a great distance. Our best supplies are in Czechoslovakia and in the DDR.

Central Artillery Design Bureau FW. Chief of Intelligence Service ? M.

54. G: Do you know where in Moscow the Central Artillery Design Bureau is located? S: Yes, I do. It is on Khoroshovskoye Shosse, opposite the Hippodrome and the Votkinskaya Hospital. There is a triangle there. This office was previously VARENNIKOV's. Now it is under MOSKALENKO. The Chief is General Mayor BEREZIN, but he, of course, is not an [illegible] intelligence officer. A Colonel ZARAMASHOV (phonetic) is chief of personnel there. BEREZIN is slated to be retired shortly. There are a number of new buildings there which are fenced in. Let me show you this on the Moscow map. G: Let me mark this as number 25 on the map and then we can record it.

FPN(4)

55. G: With respectto field post numbers, some of the numbers, we noticed, have four digits. S: I don't know what they are or what they signify.

K. 25 CIW Kamensk.

56. G: In November 1959 KHRUSHCHEV was bragging, as usual, and told journalists he visited a factory where 250 rockets came off the assembly line in one year. Do you know which factory this was? S: If these rockets were of the types LUNA or MARS, then it is possible, but this would not be true for guided missiles. Possibly only the hulls were produced, but this could never be completed guided missiles.

Medium Guided Dnepropetrovsk FW. Navy's names?

57. G: You mentioned that with BEREZIN's death there was mourning in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. S: This is because quite a number of prominent scientists and a lot of the personnel of the testing crews had come from Dnepropetrovsk. When the accident occurred and these people were killed that did not mean that the whole city went into mourning, but just that there were many individuals from Dnepropetrovsk who had perished in the explosion. G: This

would indicate that there must be some sort of installation for manufacturing rockets in Dnepropetrovsk.

58. Q: With respect to rail transportation of rockets, you said that this has all been worked out. How is it done? S: They use standard freight cars, but they have different sizes. It can be two, three, or four axle freight cars. They are not specially equipped, but are merely improvised to haul the various sizes of rockets in accordance with the loading data for truck transportation which I gave you.

59. Q: How many test firings of missiles are necessary in order to assess a missile's accuracy? S: When a rocket is prepared for testing and is actually fired, the data is taken down and is the basis for establishing its firing table. All deviations in the impact area are registered. Only after hundreds of rockets are fired and they fall within allowable deviations, are the firing tables exactly established. I cannot say how many test rockets are required, but dozens and dozens are fired before a rocket is accepted for production. This is also done under varying conditions, particularly at different temperatures. The main thing is that firing tables are established only on the basis of actual firing, not on theoretical data.

60. Q: Why was NEDELIN selected for the post of rocket commander rather than VARENTSOV? S: I have already told you that this was because VARENTSOV was unable to establish good personal relations with the Minister (of Defense), the chief of the General Staff, and with the chief of Ground Forces. VARENTSOV is a very good administrator, but he does not have ahigher education, that is, military. This was also a consideration. VARENTSOV is a little hotheaded. He wrote this letter to KHRUSHCHEV and it got into the hands of the Minister of Defense. Therefore he made a lot of enemies.

61. Q: What part did NEDELIN play in the missile program before the date of his appointment as chief of the rocket command? S: Let me review NEDELIN's former service. At one time NEDELIN was the chief of GAU where ZHDANOV now sits. Then they appointed him to replace VORONOV as the chief of artillery of (ground forces of) the Soviet Army which is now VARENTSOV's position. Then when YAKOVLEV was jailed I remember that VARENTSOV was summoned to visit NEDELIN. I was personally assigned a car to pick up VARENTSOV and drive him to NEDELIN. VARENTSOV stayed at my house that night, and I also met NEDELIN. NEDELIN told VARENTSOV secretly what had happened to YAKOVLEV. He also spoke of General Polk. VOLKOVYSKENKO who was YAKOVLEV's deputy. Both were jailed. YAKOVLEV's wife became insane. His son, a lieutenant, was

dismissed from the army. Later YAKOVLEV was rehabilitated and his son was readmitted to the army, but the wife did not get well. YAKOVLEV was assigned as the deputy to BIRYUZOV, the commander of the PVO of the country, and he will shortly retire. VOLKOVYSSKIY was also rehabilitated and he was appointed as the commander of the Higher Artillery School at Voronezh. NEDELIN then made VARENTSOV chief of GAU and named himself as the chief of the Soviet Army Ground Forces Artillery. As soon as the huge impetus for rockets developed, NEDELIN went as chief of the rocket command and VARENTSOV was made the chief of artillery of the Soviet Army Ground Forces. The GAU supports the rocket artillery as well as the conventional artillery. Each commander wants to subordinate GAU to himself. But that is impossible. Otherwise two GAUs would have to be formed.

62. S: The death of NEDELIN should be exploited by you in confronting KHRUSHCHEV particularly at a time of political expediency because he stresses how truthful he is. It would be very embarrassing for him. All you need to say is, "If you want us to believe you, why did you say NEDELIN died in an aircraft accident instead of in a rocket explosion? What difference does it make? We are sorry to see a highly respected marshal die, but why do you, in the name of the government and the Presidium, lie to the world as well as to your own people?" Similarly, you can expose the Peoples' Friendship University by citing that the prorector there is YERZIN whom you know to be a prominent KGB officer. Why is a known KGB RESIDENT who had been in India and in Turkey assigned as the Prorector of this university?

63. G: Have you ever heard of a Gen. Pol, V.F. TOLUPKO? S: I think the name is garbled. I know all army generals and all colonel generals, but not all lieutenant generals.

64. G: Do you know Maj. Gen. GAYDUKOV? S: GAYDUKOV? Yes, I do. G: How about VASILENKO? S: Of course I know him. G: What are they doing now? S: I don't know what GAYDUKOV is doing but VASILENKO is a friend of mine and is the chief of a faculty at the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy. He was formerly under VARENTSOV as an artillery commander in the First Ukrainian Front. He is the one who helped me get SKLYAREV transferred. He is there now and I have his phone number. It is 401. Write down the academy number. The index is K 68, and then his extension is 401. Incidentally, I just remembered that a relative of your friend Gen. MANSUROV, a major-general, is the chief of the Rear Services Department of the Dzerzhinskiy Artillery Academy and he is a Hero of the Soviet Union.

65. G: By the way, do you know an engineer colonel by the name of GORBACHEV who wrote an article on ballistic rockets in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA? S: I heard the name, but that is all.

66. G: Do you know a General NAZAROV? He gave a commentary describing rockets during the 1960 November parade. S: Of course I know Gen. Mayor NAZAROV. He lives in my house under me, in number 36. He has been retired and he lives in a DACHA where he has a cow. He has three rooms in his apartment, whereas I have only two.

67. G: I would like to show him the SS-7 photograph again to see if that is what he had previously in mind but I don't want to hint that that is the one we think it is. (Note: H produces a set of seven photographs of rockets taken at the Moscow parade.) G: You see, these were re-photographed from a TV presentation of the parade yesterday. S: On this first photograph they again showed old junk. These are old free rockets with the old-fashioned cradle. All of these are old types of free rockets. (Looking at photograph #2) This is a basic guided rocket, V-75. I notice how the angle of photography is affected by the deliberate placing of television equipment during the parade so that a sharp detailed picture was not possible. (Looking at photograph #3) These are all free rockets. (Referring to both photograph #4 and #5) This is the R-2. (Looking at Photograph #6) This resembles the R-11 somewhat, but I do not think it is the R-11. I would say that this is an intermediate experimental type which has never been adopted, even though it resembles the R-11 (Looking at photograph #7) This is the MARS, a free rocket. G to H: Would you like to show him your pictures or should we continue with ours? H: I'll bring ours tomorrow.

68. S: Let me see..I have already told you about the REZIDENT in Japan who is there under a false name. For the time being I wouldn't touch him. I have just spoken to him. G: Don't worry, we won't.

69. G: How is your new GNTK organization tied in with the GOSPLAN, that is, what cover is used to permit funds which pass through your committee to be used for the covert purposes intended? S: No particular cover is needed. Our new committee is under the Council of Ministers. Our chief is a deputy to KHRUSHCHEV. We are very closely tied in with the GOSPLAN. The recommendations of the committee are very influential in the planning of individual ministries. We serve as a coordinating body. The GOSPLAN is the heart of the whole overall pattern. G: In other words, you would recommend what is necessary for the country, say in metallurgical development? S: Yes, of course. G: And

economic planning

you recommend what is needed for military purposes as well as civilian purposes? S: Of course, since civilian factories must execute all military requirements.

Atomics for civil purposes

70. G: Did you hear from any source how the development of atomic energy from fissionable materials is progressing? S: I understand what you mean, and they are preparing such materials. G: There have been rumors that there are great deficiencies in the program and that it is falling far behind what has been planned. S: I believe those rumors are absolutely correct. I cannot give you specific instances but there are rumors that there have been many mishaps and test failures.

71. G: Can you give a rough estimate of the proportion of atomic energy research that is going for war purposes as contrasted to civilian purposes? S: Atomic energy research for scientific purposes is of an insignificant percentage. There are a few civilian efforts such as the icebreaker, Lenin, and certain reactors that have been produced, but almost everything is going for war purposes.

W/hs

72. G: I have one last question. This deals with the size of atomic weapons, for example, 5, 50, or 500 kiloton equivalents. S: For rockets, the size of the rocket remains the same but a different size warhead is fastened on. G: To what degree has this been developed? For example, what is the largest charge? S: I know that we have been firing rockets with a 25 kiloton equivalent atomic charge.

EO

73. G: How about atomic missiles carried by aircraft? Have you heard how large they can be? S: Yes, I have heard. Let me see -- on the lower scale there are five and ten kiloton charges up to twenty-five kiloton used by artillery, that is, rockets. An aircraft has an unlimited size bomb. It can carry whatever is manufactured. I have heard of a fifty kiloton aircraft bomb but this is the regular A-bomb, not the hydrogen bomb. The H-bomb has a greater equivalent, but I don't know what it is. What I have heard is that by artillery, including rockets, up to a 25 kiloton equivalent can be fired and that a 50 kiloton equivalent bomb is used by aircraft. H: Let us take a break now and we will change the tape.

FU

74. S: Show me again how to write down the numbers I will get by radio -- the groups of five numbers. G: It is simple, but in order not to get confused, we'll write it this way -- two dots -- then go like this. See? There is nothing to it. The same thing with the next groups -- like this --

five groups. Pencil in the group, then go ahead -- along the entire paper. It will be on for five minutes, so if you make five -- five -- five -- blocks of groups per line, it will be easier for you. S: I know, I know (with a deep sigh). When are we going to work tomorrow?

75. G to H: Well, we have the option of hearing more questions here; let me finish this sheet. I have covered all the asterisked ones in the first batch; the only ones I haven't covered are theones that are not asterisked in the first batch. There were quite a number of them, but they were the least important. H: Let's finish these up. G: Yes, we will. S: Yes, let's go.

Atomic w/h attachment

(76) G: Do you have any idea of what methods they use to fasten the atomic warhead on the rockets? S: This is called the process of STYKOVKI (locking-in) warheads to the rocket. This process has various methods for different rockets. One of the methods is to screw it in slightly, but not all the way around. G: Interrupted screw. S: Then, also, it can be attached by bolts -- (bolted) the bolts pass through the body of the casing (TELO RUBASHKI). Then when the entire process of STYKOVKI is finished, the entire joint is covered by a steel band. This is to prevent any turbulence (ZAVIKHRENIYE) -- to have a smooth surface. Then it is covered by special oil paints. First it is given a prime (ground) coat (GRUNTUYETSIA). This is all done very quickly. This is a very dependable solid method. There have been no cases where the warhead would fly off. This is STYKOVKA -- the warhead is brought up on a carrier, a hoisting mechanism raises it, and the joining is done (STYKUYUT).

Temperature limits w/l fuels

F.U.

L.W. Solid fuel

(77) G: Are there any limitations as to temperature due to locality (MESTNOST')? Suppose something has to be assembled in the far North, are there factors which limit this work? S: Absolutely. Temperature is a big factor. Plus 40 -- minus 40 -- this is a scientific category which has been calculated very exactly. There are climatic conditions when parts must be heated // G: Are there such climatic conditions where it is impossible to heat the parts -- say if it is minus 50°? (50° MINUS) S: Yes, there are conditions up in the far North where it is either very difficult or impossible to handle liquid-fuel rockets. There, they have to use solid fuel.× You can't heat the parts there -- can't heat them through -- and if you use gunpowder it will ignite.

⊗

Correction 20 who said use "tverdoye toplivo". S. generally says "porokhovoy".

78. G: When the inspections (checks) take place of these rockets with atomic warheads, do they have a definite methodical inspection -- say one, two, three inspections of this, inspection of that, etc.? Do they inspect them often? S: I have described all the technical inspections at all the positions. Why is this different? There is no "atomic rocket" as such. There are ordinary rockets with conventional and with atomic warheads. The rocket body undergoes all these inspections through all the testing apparatus. G: Then there are no extra inspections? S: There is a series of rockets that are already inspected -- they are available in case of need and have passed all the inspection. But after the warhead is attached, there definitely will be another inspection. That's because there are certain detonation circuits. G: How often are the atomic warheads inspected? S: There was this man who knows atomic warheads very well. I am sorry that he went to Germany; he should have been assigned to work either in the Academy or the PVO. Anyway, that's beside the point. These atomic warheads are under constant check all the time. The temperature is constantly controlled. They are constantly checking, with the help of indicators, for the amount of (radio-activity) radiation to be certain it does not exceed the safe level. As soon as anything exceeds the norm, it isreported.

79. G: How are they transported -- in any special way? S: They are transported seperately; I have already told you about that. All warhead parts are transported seperately in special carriers. They have their own regulations. G: Super - special! How about the relationship, numerically speaking, between the power of the warhead and its weight? That is, such a weight will be 5 kilotons, such a weight will be 10 kilotons, etc. S: There is such a table. I have given you the ranges, capacities. For each type of warhead there is a table -- at 150-200 kilometers with various types of warheads...

80. G: How about in relation to theweight? S: We have not been given this relationship. I think it has not beendone. You see, there are limits and this also limits the range. G: You see, what I am getting at -- maybe it's a geometrical relationship. For instance, 5 kilotons may weigh 1000 kilograms; ten kiloton may weigh 3000. S: Oh! This they did not give us. G: See what I mean! Not doubling it, but tripling it. S: No, theydid not give us this.

81. G: Generally, how many atomic explosion tests (OPYTOV) were there and what was the proportion of successes and failures? S: This is a good question. You did not detect all the tests. The smaller explosions are done in deep trenches. You may have picked them up as an indication

of a slight earthquake, but these werenot seismic manifestations. You must be made aware that there were many tests (OPYTY), but with very small equivalent charges. After these tests, we would watch what would appear in the press - TASS, for instance - and, with very few exceptions, there was no mention of them. The scientific-experimental work here is shooting forth like a geyser. All this is done in the central part of the Soviet Union, nearer to the Southern Republics. All this about stopping the nuclear tests is just empty talk -- just bluff. KHRUSHCHEV will chase them all out if they stop testing. And why is this still going on? Because there are still many problems which are not solved. But it is done very carefully, on a small scale.

82. G: Shall we show him some pictures -- J: Just a quick run-through to see if there are any who he can reconjure. G: Yes, there's a whole mess of them. S: Anyway, here is what I want you to know --many of the questions which you have asked me, I have put down as part of my assignment for the future. These questions have given me a good orientation as to what you want to know. G: That is exactly right. That is why we asked you, in the hope that you would remember and get the answers.

83. S: Is this the AFANASIEV who is sitting in the English sector? G: No, this one had something to do with Economic Intelligence. He's been fired. But it's the same name, AFANASIEV. S: Oh! Here is my friend -- Mr. CHIZHOV, a Colonel. (V-7) G: What does he do? S: He's the Deputy to the Chief of the 3rd Directorate, under General Major SOKOLOV. He gave me my orientation when I was coming here. He is the one who will hand in my NAVODKA (Report on Subject) so that in the Fall I will go for training to go overseas (PODGOTOVKU).

84. S: By the way, what do you advise? Should I seek being sent abroad or should I continue to work like this? Because actually it takes a while. First, there is the PADGOTOVKA; then the matter of the Visa - you can take quite along while before you issue me a Visa. If I come for two years, to England -- to America -- to Canada -- G: You'll be welcomed! S: There will be no benefit to our work. G: Of course there will be benefits. S: I can give you codes only. I'll bring you the codes and for an hour you will have 10 photographers working and they will photograph everything. G: Listen, you will have military courses. You will know everybody stationed with you -- all the people from Moscow -- you'll know who is arriving. You'll be going on leave and you can find out much in Moscow. And we can meet securely. S: So, you advise me to come? G: Of course. S: Then I will think along these lines. If they

decide on this, then they will give me some kind of "cover". I'll be discharged from the army notionally. I'll probably not come as military but will come as an advisor. But you think this will be good if I come? G: Of course! H: That would be very well. S: Of course I can get you the codes, -- the whole book and you can read all the cables.

85. G: Where do you think they will send you? S: Either England, America, or Canada but only there. G: You'll be able to tell us who does what at the place you are stationed. S: Well, of course, but maybe that is not enough. I think that I have some good possibilities in Moscow. G: But you will be in touch with Moscow all the time and will be able to tell us who is coming and going and also you will have your commanders' days. S: Well, then you have no objection if they send me abroad - if trusted by the Party and Government. I can do quite a bit during my training period -- and really, I would like to get away from "there". They can only send me to England, America, or Canada; I am finished as regard the Far East.

86. S: This is a very familiar person. (V-8) Let it stay here a bit. He is a Strategic Intelligence officer.

87. S: Now this one, even though he put on glasses, this is OSOKIN. (V-9) G: OSOKIN? The one who is in the Bureau of New Technology? S: He has bee laid off. He looks like OSOKIN very much but please make a check. I wouldn't want you to say that I (Subject's true name) have a bad memory and only know how to visit nightclubs and after all, photos are sometimes misleading. G: He says he <u>looks like</u> OSOKIN. J: This is V-9. (Photo checked out to be Peter OSOKIN.)

88. S: Here is an officer of Strategic Intelligence. You've got them lined up in a row today. (V-11)

89. S: Oh! This one graduated from the Academy in 1952. Now he is a Colonel, a Military Attache in Austria. (V-15) G: You are thinking of SHAMOV. This looks like SHAMOV very much, but it isn't. S: No, no, it doesn't just <u>look like</u> him. It is SHAMOV. G: I'll tell you where you made a mistake. SHAMOV finished the Academy earlier. S: Either 1951 or 1952. G: 1951 or 1950, but not in 1952. That's impossible. S: But it does look like him very much, doesn't it. I would have identified him as SHAMOV. Now I am remembering, and I think I'll challenge you on that. He <u>did</u> finish the Academy in 1952. I finished in 1953, and he in 1952. I don't even want to think about the name and patronymic. G: I think his name is Gevril Philipovich SHAMOV. S: I don't know that; I can't remember. G: (Talking quietly) He plays PROFESSNS a little,

drinks. S: Yes, yes, I know it is he. G: You're right about one thing. He did go recently to Austria s Military Attache. J: I don't know; there's no name on the thing. G: I'll tell you something, this man resembles SHAMOV so much that we can say that it is SHAMOV!

90. S: Do you know DUTOV? He's another friend of SHAMOV. S: The name is familiar, but I don't remember now.

91. S: Here is a man who works for KGB. He has only recently arrived here; I shook his hand today. (V-24) He is in England now. G: BRAGIN, Lev BRAGIN. S: Absolutely right -- not too bad with the English language, puts on airs somewhat, very active worker. GENERALOV was complaining to me about him today. BRAGIN has come to join this Technical (TEKHNICHESKUYU GRUPU) Group and he isn't doing anything.

92. S: Oh, hello! KAPALKIN. (V-33) He graduated from the Academy. This is the one who was the Chief of the Direction; he's the one who is working now at the Military-Diplomatic Academy at the BESKIN School for Illegals -- Viktor Vasilievich. He was the Chief of the Direction, was canned and now works at the Academy -- a ladies' man.

93. S: This is the Chief of a Directorate -- General Major MELKISHEV. (V-37) G: This one? S: He looks so young. Will you check it please? Is it MELKISHEV? G: He's Chief of a Directorate? S: The 4th Directorate. He was formerly the Deputy there.

94. S: (Looking at photos) Oh, Oh, here is Colonel LEVIN, the KGB REZIDENT in the GNTK State Committee of Science and Technology. (V-53) G: With you? S: Yes, here's his name and patronymic-- Yevgeniy Il'yich. He's Deputy to GVISHIANI. He was in Austria, or in Germany. I think in Germany. Is this list Germany? I'll ask you to show me this stack tomorrow when I have a fresh mind. There are so many familiar faces -- seems to be almost a block of Intelligence Officers. Here is another very familiar one. Please put it over there.

95. S: Now, this one is definitely an Officer of Strategic Intelligence! (V-55) G: You don't remember who he is? S: It's been a long time since I saw him at the Information Directorate. Perhaps he has gone somewhere.

96. S: Oh, here's GVISHIANI, Dzhermen Mikhailovich. He's married to KOSYGIN's daughter, my chief. (V-58) This stack I must look at again; this is a very important stack. When I come in fresh tomorrow, I will look at them first thing.

GVTK

97. S: Here's SCHWARTZ. (V-92) He knows English very well. He will be here visiting you on May 9th, with a Hoisting Equipment (POD'EMNOYE OBORUDOVANIYE) Delegation of 7 people. G: GNTK? S: Yes, GNTK (State Committee of Science and Technology). I'm a bit tired now. Let the photos wait a while. I'll go through them all tomorrow.

98. G: You know what -- you are tired now. Why don't you leave now and tomorrow we'll make a fresh start. S: So we have tomorrow, the 4th and then the 5th. On the 6th, I leave here. I won't be going to the Embassy. We are leaving at 11 o'clock. I'll come to say goodbye to you about 10 AM. G: We'll see how things work out. Perhaps we won't be here either. We'll decide this on Friday. Tomorrow we will start about 9 o'clock. S: Can we start earlier? G: Yes, then we won't work as late. S: Why? We have quite a bit. We must do some things more thoroughly, some less, but we should go through the entire plan. G: You won't have any mix-up with your delegation tomorrow night, will you? S: No, no, they're just like my little bunnies (KROLIKI). I got them some cigarettes (5 cartons) at the Embassy yesterday. They were so happy they almost kissed me. I got them for 11 shillings each! They are afraid of me. They know that if I write a bad report of any of them, they'll get it when they go back. I am not worried about security in front of them; they don't mean a thing to me. S: Now, tomorrow morning I am going to call [redacted]. Please instruct him, according to my request, how he should act. The day after tomorrow, I will take him to meet GENERALOV; I'll introduce him. He is not to show any active interest. GENERALOV will call him himself and will invite him. For tomorrow, I ask you to bring the pictures of all those in England. I will show you GENERALOV, and all those. There are many more familiar faces. I'll find them. At least I'll be able to say whether they are in England or not. G: Well, it's up to you. What time do you want? For us it's fine -- 7 or 8 o'clock or 9. S: I was thinking about 6. G: -- 6-- okay. Right after dinner. S: Let me think about this. Can I call you? G: Well, you know yourself we all must gather and a set time is better. If you have any possible difficulties, let's make it 8. S: I don't have difficulties -- what difficulties? G: Well, you'll have dinner and you might sit down to talk to someone. I don't know how things are organized with you. S: Let me think a bit. G: If you come at 8 o'clock, we have 4 hours for working, even 5 hours if necessary. S: Certainly. G: Eight o'clock is a good time. You will have time to dine and do things smoothly. S: Alright, we all meet then; you will set up all the APPARATURA. G: Of course, we will prepare and wrap everything for you to take with you. We will check everything. This whole operation will take 2 hours, then a few questions -- another one half to one hour. Then right away we will show you the photos -- the English ones and the others. Many of them are notimportant. You can shuffle through them in about one half hour. S: Of course, it depends what's in the set. Today's set has held me up because there were many "friends"

of mine there. G: Then on Friday, we can take it easy -- say our farewells -- have a few drinks -- joke -- and clean up odds and ends. S: Then on Friday Saturday morning I don't need to stop in to see you. G: You can, of course -- to say goodbye -- in case you've forgotten something. We'll shake hands. You will only be able to stay about 15 minutes. S: Well, of course, probably no more than 10 or 15 minutes. Okay, now suppose I go to sleep. I'm a bit tired. I had a session with GENERALOV. Alright, goodnight. All: Goodnight! S: I did not lose presence of mind in front of him, did I? I told him everything that was innermost, but tell me as friends for my own future reference -- did I do alright? H: On my word of honor -- I spoke to him afterwards -- on my word of honor! S: As regards the form -- the actual presentation of everything -- was it correct? G: Most correct. H: Very proper, well done. J: The important thing is that it came from the heart. S: Well, goodnight! We'll meet tomorrow at 8 o'clock. G: You didn't forget anything - the pen? S: No. (Subject left at 0005 hours on 4 May 1961.)

[redacted]

(21)

Meeting #15, London, England, 4 May 1961

(Subject arrived at 2010 hours on 4 May 1961 to Room 360, Hotel Mount Royal in London. Upon entering, Subject was shown blown up prints of the experimental shots he had taken previously. KINGSBURY, the photo instructor, was present.)

1. G: Did you take this under electric light? S: No, daylight. H: Ch! Daylight. S: May I? G: How was the lighting? S: It was cloudy and it was the second half of the day. (Repeats in English) second part of the day, about 4 o'clock. KINGSBURY: Approximately at 4 o'clock, yesterday afternoon. G: A surprising shot -- very clear. S: I work under similar conditions which I will photograph later. This is why I don't go into detail. G: You see how clear and exact everything in the written text is. S: Not bad. See how the frame goes evenly all around. G: Now see, here is already a little bit of an overlap. S: Oh yes, I see. I cut it a little bit on this frame. This is what should be watched, and here is the second part. (Subject photographed a pound note.) G: These are the results which can be had if done properly. S: I always believed it could be done. G: We wanted you to know that it was not for a lost cause to use this camera. It is a shame to risk everything and then maybe nothing will come out photographically -- but here is what you can get. You can read every printed word. KINGSBURY: The exposure was just about perfect. G: The amount of light was ideal -- perhaps you can remember the exposure? S: Yes, perhaps I can remember -- and also the distance between the window and the table. G: Now you know from your own experience that the closer you approach the equivalent electric light intensity, the clearer the picture. S: That's how I did it. G: Now, do you want to re-do some more? S: Not really. KINGSBURY: I think he has gotten the idea fairly well. These are very good shots.

2. S: I should have told you about Pakistan and about this business -- (Subject had received a note at the Hotel desk to call a number). G: Did you take care of this matter? S: At the Embassy no one told me anything -- I was not worried. I had to straighten this matter out with you. I made no phone calls to this number, not one. G: Well, who is he? S: I don't know. H: He is from TASS? G: The representative from TASS? H: That's the TASS representative, KONEV. G: He's the representative from the news service. H: No, he's with TASS. This telephone number is the TASS phone, their London number. S: Then why does he live here? G: He does not live here. He called you on the phone. S: Then the number he left was not the Hotel number? I asked you before; this is what was confusing me. G: At a certain time a man called you and wanted to get in touch with you. He left a number for you to call him. S: When we first arrived there was a TASS representative here -- when WYNNE gave the reception. So, maybe he wanted to ask something of the delegation. Tomorrow I will call. H: This is someone from TASS. G: That's all. He just wants you to call back. S: Tomorrow I'll call.

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3. G: What shall we start with? H: I think there are a few things here we ought to do with photography. G: Maybe we should start with photography, since the photographic expert is here right now. S: Oh yes, then if there are any questions -- One minute, -- May I? H: Yes. (Subject practicing loading the Minox with a new cassette). S: Someone was already snapping this. G: No, not yet. Now, once again -- now, now. S: It is not loaded is it? H: No, no. There's no film in this, is there? K: No. S: In this the position -- when the dots come together, can I load it? G: Of course. You load and unload only when the dots are like that, and only then. S: And if a dot is dislodged, I can't load it then? G: No. It means that the point has not been reached yet for you to load it. You should not load it when it's off center, right? K: You must not. It's possible... G: It's possible, but you may stretch the frames out of position. S: But I won't break it will I? Ask him..... K: No, but the pictures will overlap. G: What if he tried to unload it before the dots are lined up? K: No, that won't matter; it just means that he will have to open up the camera shutter so many times. G: But if he tried to force it open before the dots are lined up.... K: It won't hurt. G: It won't hurt. S: So then, the dots should be lined up (TOCHKA NA TOCHKU). K: In other words, if he wishes to remove the film before taking all the pictures it's quite possible, providing that he operates the camera three times. H: Three times? K: To put the exposed film inside the light-tight container. G: You can unload it when the dots are not lined up. The difference is -- say you are on picture #25, and you want to take out the film. You have to move the frames three times. S: Oh, I see, in order to tear it off. G: No, so that the unexposed film can be wound up in a dark place. Then you can open it. S: I see. I will work only, only on 1/100 of a second and on 30, because 30 centimers is the right distance. K: 0.3 (meters).

4. S: Now tell me under what circumstances there can be breakage? What can get broken and under what conditions? Let him explain that. G: (Translating above to K). K: It needs careful handling -- G: You must handle it gently. What is it that might be forced, or bent, or hurt? K: Well, the mechanism is delicate, and it is possible for it to break any time. G: Yes, but in what manner, in particular? That's what his point is -- what should be avoided? K: There's nothing he can avoid -- nothing. It will just be mechanical failure. G: If it breaks, it can just be because the mechanism is so delicate -- S: But I cannot repair it myself? H: No, we'll give him a reserve camera. S: Does it have to be oiled? K: No, no, no, no. G: Whether he has one or two -- it doesn't make much difference what he carries. H: We can give him one now, and then later another. This one has been overhauled today, so there should be no trouble with it. We will give him the reserve

one at the end of the month. S: Now when I begin to work -- here I am, working -- always is it necessary to lower this when I do this? K: If he doesn't click, it will show a blank, that's all. G: If you don't click, you just let the film frame go by. S: Is this correct? G: No, no. If you click then you open the shutter and let in the light. S: Okay -- Now suppose I have taken ten photos and I have to take out the film quickly. I do this -- one, two, three, four -- and -- K: Take out the film. G: Minimum of three beyond your ten frames. K: Don't use it again, of course. That film is finished. G: Don't use that roll any more. S: No, no, no. That's correct. I won't. I have to clear-up all the questions. Now, to reload -- here I have taken ten pictures, and I have taken them out; the indicator shows this number. In order to reload, do I have to make the clicks up to 50 and line up the dots? K: Right. S: Right now, I can't load it? K: No. S: Point-to-point, Red and Black -- and K: Begin. S: But I can't load it the way it is now, why? G: Because it won't be even. He wants to know what will happen if he loads it like this,. S: What if I'm in a hurry, and don't have time to click it? G: (to K) If you put it after the 14th frame? S: In such position? K: Well, you risk getting overlapping pictures. G: Overlapping? K: Yes. Instead of a space between each photograph, you may have an overlap. G: This is what you are risking. The film may not be in proper position, and you will constantly be getting half of one and half of the other. S: Why? G: Because it is not set up to center the film. S: I see. What if I have to make ten more pictures in a hurry, and I have to take them out -- I start with a zero? K: Yes. S: But you can't start with this position? G: You might, just be chance, hit it right -- by chance. K: Well, George, if he's going to take ten frames of one -- and then ten of another, he may just as well go on on the same film.. G: This is just a theoretical question -- not a practical one. He meant ten at once, and in a half-hour ten again, something like .. S: I'll watch the frames, that's all.

5. K: The frames exposed earlier -- I'd just like some comment on them -- how much light? H: Just a moment. You would like to know about the other film that was done in daylight? K: Yes. G: This is about those which we developed for you before. K: That had about the maximum exposure. In other words, the light was maximum. S: And you could not read anything? Ask them -- when it is a bright day, what am I supposed to do, move the table back? G: Exactly. S: Now it will be summertime; it will be bright -- how does he advise, as an example, if there is a bright sun? G: He wants to know -- if the sun is too bright -- how many meters from the window? K: I can only say that he must remember the light with which he had the most success in the past. G: It will be necessary for you to remember and try to recreate the light with which you had

the most success before. It is very difficult to determine the amount of sunlight. S: But if the light is very bright? G: Then, of course, you would be further away. S: Well, will you be able to read it anyway? G: It will not be very good -- some we'll be able to read, and some not. S: That will not be good. G: I think he's got this in parameters of very bright sunshine. S: That's exactly what I am talking about -- this weather. G: If he says on the darker side of light he'll be better off, maybe in the middle of the room. H: -- Or perhaps, with his back to the window. S: No, there will be shadow. G: Shadow is not so important. K: His own shadow is alright. S: If it's a very bright day? G: On a day when the sun is bright, if you stand with your back to the window there is shadow, yes, but there will be sufficient reflected light. S: Only? G: Yes, because the sun is so bright. It will come out anyway -- and it's better this way than to risk over-exposure. S: It's clear. Anyway, I'll try to pick a happy medium.

6. G: You already have some idea; you've been feeling around. You already know what to avoid, besides, asyou know, the bulb is more dependable. S: No, I'll have nochance to work with the bulb. Work ends at 5 o'clock. I can't take the stuff home with me. The only place I can work is in there behind locked door with the key in my pocket -- only in the daytime -- in daylight. G: You'll have to learn to gauge whether to come closer or stay further back. Anyway, it is easier to hide it quickly because there is no light bulb burning. It's even more secure for a fast "put-away" -- the instrument, under sunlight. He doesn't have to bother to set things up or to measure. S: If I use the bulb -- it is 100 and 60 watts. G: One-half to one meter is 100; one-fourth to one-half meter is 60. S: Alright, it is all clear. The photographs will be good. (K is leaving. Everyone goodbyes him and thanks him.) G: (to H) You have the little cassettes which he might need? H: Yes, I have lots of these things. If I can just remember where they are.

7. S: I have an important announcement, very important. Today, he (SHAPOVALOV) is going to meet his recruited agent as well as other people at the Pakistan Embassy. Of course, he will talk to several people, but he must be watched. He told me today that he has contact with, and wants to recruit, an English Communist.

Permission has been requested from the Center, but so far there is no answer. A British Communist. H: An Englishman-Communist. S: The prospect says he just wants to work. He says he doesn't need money -- his objectives are purely political, but they are "feeding" him a little. If I were going to be here another 10 days or so, I would uncover the entire AGENTURA. I already know about two people through SHAPOVALOV -- the Hindu and the Englishman Communist. Simply surveille them and they can be easily spotted. I heard that the Embassy was very gravely impressed, and has already notified Moscow, about that sentence of 42 years. This is a very severe sentence. I heard today that the wretch who received it is 38 years old. His sentence is 42 years, so he will be 80 years old when he gets his freedom. A very strong impression! The order has come down to the center to work seriously and be very security conscious. H: This is today's order? S: Yes, they informed them (Moscow) yesterday and today a telegram arrived from there with the "security" business. Their mood right now is very "bad". They say that this will discourage people from working with us. S: You have written down the auto number 462 -- his private car. He will be talking to his agent today - actively.

8. G: What else? S: Now, here are the bills for the things which I have bought so that you will know what I'm buying. H: Don't worry about that. S: And I want again to start with WYNNE. G: You don't need these? (bills) S: No, what for? I want to start with WYNNE. Saw WYNNE today. He (WYNNE) is getting certain receipts for us. He is getting us ready for departure and I can sense what his mood is. I am sly; I seem to look at things simply but I understand everything. WYNNE feels right now that I have a good deal of money, that I have been rewarded. He gives me glances and hints, which say that I should "fix him" also. I ask you to have a talk with him - a good talk, a friendly talk. Explain to him that he will be paid well and backed by you and that if he continues to work well with me he will always have enough of everything, even in the future. G&H: Right. You are absolutely right. S: You should tell him like this --"(Subject's true name) is a generous fellow, but you should not take money from him." This is so he won't think that I am greedy.

9. S: You know when he was in Moscow and I tried to talk him into taking the documents out he was afraid; he said it was none of his business. WYNNE was my last chance -- or I would have gone to either your Embassy or to the Americans. I would have been "burned" together with the documents. I don't know whether you would have flown me out or whether I would have lived there.

I had such impulses and intentions. WIMME did not want to do it at first, he was very much against it. He was afraid. Oh, how he was afraid! How I begged him and persuaded him. Of course, he understood that if I met with success, I would get him gold medals! After all, he is a merchant - you must realise this.

10. G: We will take care of him first rate. You said yourself that he was pleased when you saw him. S: Very pleased! But I ask you, please find time tomorrow to call him in and talk to him, before my departure -- so that he will understand. Otherwise, he will think, "Hah, that (Subject's True Name) he begged me so; he was so persuasive." Now he sees that I am sure of myself and that I am spending lots of money - the pounds are just flying here and there. He thinks, "Why doesn't he give me some? What an unscrupulous fellow. In Moscow he talked me into this and now he doesn't want to give me a share. He's greedy, no good". This feeling will lie like a stone inside him and that's the way he will feel when he comes to contact me in the future. Imagine! This should not be. G: It will not be. No. S: He has personal tendencies like that. He is a merchant - a tradesman. He feels, "I have done something and want something in return". If there is some gain from his action - pay him. He is a poor man. I want you to understand this delicate feeling I have of the situation. Perhaps I am not making myself clear. G: You are worrying for nothing. This will not happen. S: Today we had a conversation of this kind. G: He's inquisitive? This is none of his business. S: He is inquisitive and he feels that I have money. And he will say, "What kind of scoundrel are you? You begged me so over there and here you don't want to give me anything. It is no matter that I get mine from them -- from the government. Why don't you share what you got?" This is what I felt. I am sure of it. G: He is satisfied. He is very well reimbursed and feels quite happy. S: Perhaps he understood me to mean, in Moscow, that if he would do this thing, I would "thank" him perhaps, he has such an impression that I promised this to him because I was desperately trying everything. G: He is not offended. Don't worry at all. Don't fret a bit. S: I don't want him to have any bitterness when we say goodbye tomorrow at the airport. "Ahm, you grabbed what you could. You got yours. Now you don't need WIMME". G: No, it won't be like that. No. S: I did not tell you yesterday but I felt it. I am a very sensitive person and I felt it. G: There is no cause for it. S: I swear I am not wrong. I think that I told him in Moscow, "If I have it good, you'll have it good". And now he is wondering why I changed my line. This is a very important matter, especially since I'm going to meet him at the end of May. I ask you to reassure him tomorrow, tell

him that (Subject's true name) is a kind man. G: We will tell him that we have forbidden you to give him money. S: That's it. Tell him that you have forbidden me! H: This is right. S: Tell him, "You will get everything. Work a bit more". And when you tell him to work some more, he will get more steam up; he will make more effort; he will be careful. H: That's absolutely right.

11. S: Here is another detail -- you must know everything. When we were at that night bar, he invited a comrade and two girls, for himself. I had my own (girl). I said to him, "It is embarrassing for me to pay. You give her the money." So I gave him 15 pounds, and he gave it to the girl. Then they were there for some time longer - drinking, eating, fooling around. That was none of my business. He said to me, "I have blown 55 pounds." We had stopped in another restaurant before this. He was giving a broad hint. "All this was for you, I'm a poor man. Why should I spend 55 pounds on you?" This is the way he was hinting today. G: These are all mere details. Don't worry; we'll fix it all up with WYNNE. S: It's my duty to express my opinion. I will be working with this man. This will be a big link. I received this note today (telephone call) and I decided to talk to you right away. Tell him carefully, "(Subject's true name) has asked for some money to "thank you" but we have forbidden him. We want to give it to you ourselves." Tell him, "You'll get what's coming to you. Work well, and you will get rewarded." And I, here and now, promise you that I will work so hard that I will do enough for both WYNNE and for me. It is clear to you what I mean about WYNNE? G: Yes, of course . S: Thank you.

12. H: And just in this connection, I'd like you to tell him that he shouldn't mention to WYNNE this business of meeting with KENNLAND because that would upset him. S: OOOOH! NO! H: Under no circumstances. S: (almost indignantly) Mr. Harold, don't you think I ... H: Yes, yes, I know. S: I wouldn't say a word. G: But a word of caution had to be repeated. S: You are right -- and WYNNE doesn't ask anything.

13. S: So, MERRIMAN comes tomorrow morning at 9:30. GENERALOV doesn't feel at all well. By the way, GENERALOV was in America but he did not do anything. He worked very badly in respect to Intelligence. Are there British photos today? G: Yes, later. S: I was thinking we might work it this way - start with the photos because in about 40minutes I must call my people who are coming back from the Embassy. They are all extremely busy just now. Each one is writing something for the Embassy. I have to spend 30-40 minutes with them at supper because only I can sign the bill. Now, again I ask you, Mr. Harold, when you are talking to WYNNE, remind him to give each one of the delegates, including myself, receipts for 2 pounds, for each day, as we were

advanced. There are 16 days to account for -- that's 32 pounds per person. Eleven days we were here and 5 days in the other cities. Each of them has to account for 32 pounds. If we do not, there is hell to pay. WYNNE knows all this, but remind him again. G: Receipts? S: Receipts, copies of the bills. Only be sure that the bill doesnot show that the price of breakfast is included because according to Soviet regulations you must pay for your food out of the food allowance and you are not to use the housing allowance for both hotel and the food. G: Youare speaking of breakfasts, but that does not appear anywhere. That's included in the room price.

14. S: No, you see, hotel and meals cost each one 4-4½ pounds per day, but the companies pay the difference over 2 pounds per day which we are allotted. G: Oh, so you eat on special orders? S: What do you mean on special orders? G: Not according to the included breakfast menu, but a la carte? S: No, we eat breakfast, and then we eat lunch. G: Ahn, and lunch! S: Lunch - and we don't pay this money. The specialists are so happy! Well, let them be. G: Well, there will be nothing showing; it won't appear. S: Some hotels say "Including Breakfast". H: If they have special breakfast they will put it on the bill separately. S: Special breakfast. That's right. And this must now show up on the bills. All that should be shown is £ Per day and the name of the hotel. G: Can they get separate bills? Can they do that for them? H: I justdon't know how the hotels work. I'll have to find out. G: I think they can do it. If you ask them to split it up -- extra items here and the hotel room charges here. S: WYNNE knows all about this. If you tell him he will take care of it. The bill should say "Hotel Mount Royal -- 11 days. Received for 11 days --£22 ". G: Excuse me, but suppose you paid more than your allowance for breakfast. Can't you say you paid for that by cash? S: They'll say, "You paid cash? That's impossible. The company paid for your food! You only get 30% for everything". Then they'll start withholding again. Oh, they areclever with money there. For a kopeika they will kill a man. This is why I ask this. I explained all this to WYNNE; you just remind him. G: Separate accounts -- room on one, all extras on another. S: We don't need copies of the food bills. G: Yes, but for the hotel they have to separate their bills somehow. H: What happened in the other hotels, when they were at the Midlands? G: What did you do when you were traveling? S: We paid £ 2 per day for the hotel where we lived -- for five days, and 11 days here. G: How about the bills? S: WYNNE has the bills. He collected them. G: And they are correct? S: Correct. G: Ah, they were correctly made out. H: Oh, they are alright? G: Yes. S: Only the Mount Royal? G: Only the Mount Royal. Before departure for the country and after arrival -- or how? S: It should be as it happened. Three nights we spent here, then 8. So that the total would be 11 days, and then the 5 days in the other cities will make it 16. (G translating) H: The bills

for the 5 days were alright. Now you want separate bills for room only for every man, and separate bills for extras. G: You see, he can't pick up the bill alone for £ 160. It has to be £ 32 five times. S: This is a guide for me. It is important to make sure of every detail so that the bookkeeping department will have no bones to pick with me. That's why I ask you for this big assistance.

15. G: Listen, you have about a half hour now. We have a very important program. I suggest the following -- you can look at the pictures another time or later. Tomorrow, we can finish them up. I want to go over the main things. What are we going to cover in order? Operational instructions. What and how things will be done. Then I will explain briefly -- and even in detail -- the main missions which you will be given. S: Can I put them in my pocket? G: You can. How about writing them in Russian. S: Fine, I will. G: Thirdly, there will be some questions and the photographs also. I want to give you some instructions with the one-time pads. When you come back, I'll show you something else. This is something different. The size is different. We won't open them; they are sealed on purpose. S: Even one is not opened? G: No, they have to be like this. S: I understood all this from the instructions. The numerals are bigger, aren't they? G: Yes, much bigger - not quite this large, but almost as large. S: These are the first ones (code), and these the second (decode). G: You write with these (code). S: And I decode with these (HASHKIVAYU). With this I write -- encode. Well, we will write some more later, when I return.

16. G: Since we have about 20 minutes left, I will go over the operational instructions. Then we will review them when you come back. S: Shall I take any notes? H: Perhaps, George, when he returns at 9 o'clock or so, wouldn't it be better to go through this routine then? H: You can only start on that aspect now. G: I was proposing to read this and then review it when he comes back - to make sure he has it cold! S: Tomorrow we will be working very hard. G: On the contrary, I was trying to get as much done today as possible to leave more time for rest and for relaxed review tomorrow. S: Rest! What's (so important) about rest. Rest can be had on the airplane, when I get home, Saturday and Sunday. G: If he's going to stay longer, let's get on the road with this. S: This is a historic room. Someday there will be a memorial plaque here.

17. G: Let us begin with this (radio code and signal plan). Why? I'll tell you. The radio man will be coming to check things. He will come just as you leave. He will wait. When you return, he will have tuned everything up and all will be set. Before that, I want to... S: And then I'll take my instructions sheets. H: Well, let's show him how to do it. S: Perhaps I should talk a bit first, and you listen and check and see how I understand it. Can we do it that way? G: We can. Please go ahead. That's very important.

18. S: At the predesignated time, at the exact hour, I receive my signal -- 163, which will be transmitted for a period of 5 minutes. G: First of all, what is that exact hour? S: This will be at the appointed time. G: What time? You know what time. S: Yes, you told me. Midnight. (POLNOCH') H: Midnight. S: Midnight (laughs). G: Midnight of what day? S: On Saturday and Sunday at midnight. G: For how many Saturdays and Sundays? S: A whole month. At midnight, for a whole month, on Saturday and Sunday. G: From the 1st to the 31st inclusive. If the 31st is a Saturday, and the 1st is a Sunday, the month ends here (Saturday) and a new month starts (Sunday). S: Anyway, it's Saturday and Sunday -- no matter where the month ends. G: It will be repeated and repeated. So, if you listen just once a month, for even a few seconds, you will know if it isn't yours or if there's nothing there. Listen for the numbers that come after 163. The first one if it's higher than 5 -- then it's a dummy. S: Yes, then it's a dummy. If up to 5, and including 5 -- it is mine. Over 5, up to 9 -- not mine. Then after this 5 minute calling period, there will be a long dash, which will sound for 5 seconds. Now, in one place it says 5 seconds, and in another 2 seconds. So on this I had a question. The 5 seconds is what I remember memorized. A long dash which will last 5 seconds. Now,(S mumbling to himself going over the instructions) here, the next example is ... G: No, that's something else. This is the repeat -- when it repeats.. S: Oh, I see. Now that's clear. G: Because when it is repeating, you don't have to wait that long. The repeat is just for checking purposes. S: This long dash is a signal to me for attention because right after the long dash the message (NEPEDAA) will begin. This is clear. Now, I get the first 5 numbers. The first number is the important one for me; the second one is not important; the last three numbers indicate the amount of groups. There can be no more than 100 of these but the number (will correspond)? If the last two numbers are 78, then it will be 78 groups. Correct? G: Right! Absolutely correct. S: After the first five-numbers group, which is by way of an indicator, to show me that this will be "mine" and to tell me how many groups, so that I'll be ready to take them -- the message will begin. It will be repeated with certain intervals -- a number, small pause, number. I only ask that the intervals be a little longer. After this, I get a break (PERERYV), which

will be followed by a repetition of the message. After the repetition, during which I can check and correct everything, I will again get the group -- my call -- and 31, which indicates the end of the message. These two groups -- the first group of 5, and the second group, and, of course, the 31. This number is not part of the group. They are separate. If it indicated 78 I should get 78 groups not counting the first group of 5 and the last. G: Exactly. S: After this -- at the moment I am listening -- as Mr. Joseph advised me, I make dots like this, and dashes like this. Now when I have strained them all out, I begin to write down the numbers, the meanings, according to my control chart -- three dots, dash -- a 3 -- etc, a dot -- 5 -- etc. So now, after this I have written down the numerical meaning, and I have finished all the preparations and have received the numerical message, the groups. Now I begin to decode.

19. G: Alright, let us suppose you received this and at the end you see this. You have written it down ...163. The repetition doesn't matter. Heard's 31. Now, this is not part of a group; you have heard the 163 -- just as an example -- then a pause -- and you have written it down. These group separations meanthere are 33 of them. Now tell me what all this means.

20. S: This, the first group after this, indicates which pad I must use and which line to begin with. G: In what instance is this? S: If I have already worked with it before. G: Just the opposite -- only if it is the first time. It is only given once. If this is the first message -- you have taken it down for the first time -- and this group appears -- only if it is the first time you are receiving it. Of course, if it's a "live" message ... to tell you where to look -- here, there or elsewhere... S: They all have different numbers. G: And they are all 2's (decoding pads) -- you receive on the 2's. S: And on the 1's, I send. G: Yes, you send. Either SW or radio. We are not using any radio right now. S: This is for me for the SW? G: At the moment. It applies to the radio also. Is it clear? S: It's clear. G: So, this is the first message by radio -- live message. S: This first group is to tell me which pad to use. G: The first time! The second message -- telegram -- won't have this! And there'll not be another such number until you switch to another pad.

21. S: How will the second telegram be then? What will this first group, the one after this one, represent? G: This will be the first group. And what is this group? (line indicator) S: Aha! This group then will indicate to me which line I start with. G: Exactly. In the first message you get the number of the book. S: In the very first message; the "live" (BOYEVOY, RABOCHEY) message. G: This, will be the first line. Then it goes on and on and on and ends with the pad number. Here take a look at it. S: Aha! Yes, I understand it now. It must not be touched any more; it is only given for control purposes. G: So, you begin with this number -- the

first actually real message number. S: So in the first telegram, the real group will be the third one, and in the second message, the real group will be the second one. After,this one won't appear.

22. S: Now I ask you, please show me -- as though this page were not there. G: Surely. S: Here is the first page, the first line; and here is the first page which I'll open here. How do you open it? G: With a knife. (G&H showing Subject how to open a one-time pad.) S: I don't open the other ones? They are secret, so it's better that I don't see them. G: That is right - it is so you will not lose them. G: Then you figure it out. You use false subtraction. When you figure it all out, you start to write the numbers you worked out, after this first one. S: And then, according to the amount I get after I subtract -- I'll be (subtracting) all the time -- I'll start to decode the letters, figure out the meaning.

23. G: (Explains to Subject how to transcribe the numbers of the message into the literal text.) S: Tomorrow make me a real message. After all, you won't be standing in front of me to guide me. You will prepare it for me? That's fine. I will assume that I received them and then I'll work. I have a small suggestion. Send me two messages, one will be a "first" and one the "second". Then I will finally understand it all. G: Certainly. This is very important. Once you do this, it will always be easy. S: It will stick in my mind. G: Agreed. You're leaving now? S: I'll have supper and come back. We have another five minutes anyway. You'll give me two problems -- message #1 and message #2. Give me the numbers as though I had already "caught" them. G: A pencil is a good thing to have for this, a pencil and a large piece of paper. S: I will take my notes and these things I will leave here. G: We'll prepare something quickly. S: Two messages. And I'll do what I'm supposed to do -- subtract, etc. I'll go now. G: I won't touch your book because I'm using the coding book for my message that I'm sending you. You won't see anything there in your book but the printed numbers. S: Only be sure that there is some sense to the message I get so that when I compute it from the pad I'll have a logical result. G: Of course. S: I'll try to be as quick as I can. G: Do everything you have to. No one is going to run away. S: These things I'll leave here. I wonder if they have returned from the Embassy. It is probably inconvenient to call from this room. G: No, better from your room.

24. (Subject left for his appointed supper engagement at 2100 hours. Subject returned at 2210 hours.) S: I told my delegation that I am going to sleep and that my phone is disconnected. J: Here are your messages. G: This is your new pad. S: I have received my call number and 27 groups. (Subject examines two coded messages prepared by George and Paul.) (Subject

decodes the messages. Subject says he understands it all and doesn't want to waste time going over all the details but he made several minor errors which were called to his attention. He is given the second message and works on that with George. Again he is told about Number one and Number two pads -- which to use where. Encode on #1, decode on #2, also which frequencies are for Summer and which for Winter.) G: Higher ones are for Summer; the lower ones for Winter. S: Now again, let me time the frequencies on the transistor. (Subject experiments.) S: Anyway, I will always listen on the short wave, not on this one. G: On that one you can hear the news of the day. It is the standard broadcast band.

25. Paul: What I want you to do is to recognize what I have written down here. Just follow it with your eye. G: Can you recognize what that is? He is repeating so you can recognize it. S: I have one question. Let him show me how the multiple dots sound -- the dots that come after my call number, 163. G: (Translating to Paul) We will do it all again completely. S: He's giving me 163. G: Right. S: These are the multiple dots, then the long dash. G: How long is the dash? Paul: About that long -- 3-4-5 seconds. G: S(Working on practice tape) Paul: Write them down, if you can. I'll go slow - I'll give you time. Later you'll forget about this, it will be so simple! (Subject practicing reading signals) Paul: Now let's try the broadcast. (G explains to subject that the beeps won't sound in Moscow like they do here since these are slow speed.) S: That is too fast! G: My dear man, he's making it fast right now because he's just repeating 163. When he begins to send the message he will slow down. (Subject practicing some more.)

26. (During a short break in practicing reading signals, the topic shifts to teeth, undoubtedly.) S: These 5 color samples -- let me have them, a few of each, and my physician in charge will choose. It will be better to have them matched in daylight. (This is in reference to Subject's bridgework-to-be, for which he is being supplied the material from which his dentist will make 5 teeth to replace Subject's defective 5 false teeth.) G: How many altogether do you need? S: Five in all. G: Ah, I found it - it's either this one or that one. (matching colors) H: It's either shade #5 or #6. G: #5 is probably the closest. (Still arguing about the shades of teeth - Subject likes #3.) G: That's white like a baby's. S: If he can't have #3, it must be hard to get. (Finally he is convinced by G & H that he should take shades 4,5, and 6, five of each.)

27. (Now Subject returns to practicing reading radio signals.) G to Paul: Do you want to demonstrate this yet? That will finish the radio review. Paul: When you get this receiver, I will see that you get instructions

[redacted]

with it. G:(Translating to Subject): You'll get complete instructions -- written in Russian -- and a photograph illustrating the set. (Paul explains details of the RR-22. Subject is made to go through the tuning in process, and is shown the differences in the tone and the background noises -- and is told to get used to the one which is better for him.) Paul: Now shall we review the battery charger once more? (Subject reviews the procedure for recharging his battery.) G: Do you have a little secret book where you can put down some information? S: Yes. (Subject is now given a Moscow telephone number to call after his return to signify his secure arrival.) G: Write down -- from a phone booth, 9 o'clock in the evening, Moscow time, 8 May, Monday, and the alternate - on the 9th of May, at the same time. S: PM, not AM, at 2100 hours? H: That's right. G: Call the Number 948973. Three rings, one minute later another three rings. H: This means everything is alright. G: If anything is wrong, then call the same way but ring 5 times - to be certain - repeat five rings.

28. S: All is clear. Now let us go to the next item. G: According to schedule, WYNNE will be in Moscow by the end of May or the beginning of June. S: The beginning of June is not good because the exhibition closes the 4th of June. G: Probably it will be in late May or perhaps it will be on the 1st of June. Anyway, you will meet him at the airport; check to make sure that his baggage has cleared Customs with no trouble. Then you will take him to his hotel. The suitcase which is for you will be left in the car and you will go off with it, after you drop WYNNE off at his hotel. There is no need for him to take it into the hotel. S: No, why carry it around? G: Now let us repeat this again. You don't have to write anything down. S: I'll be meeting WYNNE and I will be carrying my briefcase, where everything of mine will be wrapped up and ready. H: Yes, yes, this point is also included in our plan. G: You willpass to WYNNE the material which you have gathered for us. This will include documents you picked up, undeveloped film, and those documents which you have already. S: Top Secret and Very Important -- if I get some -- and those papers I already have on the Academy, etc. G: If you consider it necessary for some reason to write us a letter in SW fold it up four times and attach it to the material. This is only if it is necessary. If you want to write a letter in plain text, the same thing goes. After WYNNE receives the material from you in the car, he will go into the hotel, wash up, settle down, and then he'll go down to the Embassy as soon as he can and will rid himself of the material. S: The man (in the Embassy) must be alerted as to the time of WYNNE's arrival. H: Yes, this will be done.

[redacted]

#15

29. S: I want to repeat this. I will give the material to WYNNE in the car and I won't leave the car. Where will WYNNE put the material? We have to think this through. WYNNE should have a briefcase or bag. G: WYNNE will carry one of those small traveling bags where one keeps the shaving equipment, the kind one takes along on a plane. He will come off the plane with it. It will be a perfectly innocent item. Then he will take it in the car and will put your material in it. S: He must hang on to it. G: He will take it by hand into the hotel -- then, quick as a shot, he will go on to the Embassy at his earliest opportunity. He will be expected there. He will deliver the documents, which in turn, will be sealed and sent here. If by any chance you have any large documents, which will not fit into WYNNE's small traveling bag, then while in the car there is no reason why he can't open one of his suitcases and shove the stuff in there. S: Yes, he will have his shirts and things in there and it won't be noticed. G: So, you will have a briefcase or a small suitcase. S: Briefcase. G: It depends on the size of what's inside.

30. S: I have something I would like to ask. I don't like the idea of WYNNE walking around the streets, etc. The man who is going to be expecting him, should be somewhere nearby, even if he has to be waiting there a long time. It may take us a while to get through Customs, to get the passport checked. Perhaps he should be waiting for him in the hotel. After all, I'm just going to drop him off near the hotel and leave. I'm not even going to see anyone, not even the clerk on duty. This man must see WYNNE as soon as he gets in. This is my way of looking at it. Perhaps you feel differently, but I feel that WYNNE should not be left holding my material for any length of time. G: He wants a man to meet him. S: The man should be waiting for him at the hotel. H: This will be dangerous. S: It will draw suspicions. G: WYNNE has legal and personal reasons to go to the British Embassy -- to report, to deliver a letter. S: Yes, this is realistic enough. G: So, he will go with his suitcase to the hotel. He has a room in the hotel. Then he will simply go to the Embassy. S: Well, I'll leave the security details for you to work out.

31. G: But here is another important matter. While he is with you in the car, you must arrange with him the time and place of your next meeting with him. S: For this, I'll go to his hotel the next day. H: But you must tell him <u>when</u>. G: Exactly when -- very exactly. It is important that the time is exact, because then WYNNE will know how to arrange his time at the Embassy with the man to whom he will give your material. He will then be able to arrange with this man when he (WYNNE) should pick up the shipment of items which are to be passed to you by WYNNE. If you say to WYNNE, "I'll see you tomorrow

at 6 o'clock in the evening" then when WYNNE meets and talks to the man at the Embassy, he will make arrangements so that he will have the shipment for WYNNE to pick up for you by 5 o'clock the next day. Then WYNNE will get it and bring it to the hotel and give it to you. This is necessary so that WYNNE will not be holding the stuff -- the various purchases -- for two or three days. After all, it may be dangerous. They may search his things. He is a foreigner and those things are done when he is out of his room. S: I understand - very clear. This way he will get the things for me and I'll take them right away. He will not keep them overnight. G: You have to let him know when you will meet him so that everything can be prepared and readied at the Embassy and held under seal for you. S: Completely clear. I will work this out. G: What sort of things might be there? For instance, some more cassettes, perhaps another receiver, some more instructions -- in addition to your purchases.

32. S: Incidentally, let us think about this special receiver. I don't think you should sent it to me just yet. I still have to find a hiding (TAYNIK) place for it. This must be worked out first. Don't send it just yet. G: Yes, it is better not to send too many things at one time. I'm only giving you an explanation why WYNNE should not hold the stuff too long. If he knows exactly when he will meet you, he can go to the Embassy a half-hour before, pick up the stuff, and then see you and give it to you. S: This is all very clear.

33. G: Now here is another thing I want to tell you. If, for any reason, WYNNE can't go to Moscow, then we will leave you a note in your dead drop, with instructions on how to deliver the material. This note with the instructions prepared will be placed just prior to the Sunday when you will receive a call exactly at 10 o'clock on your home telephone from a phone booth. S: On a Sunday? G: Yes. S: This then would take place after the expected time of WYNNE's arrival? G: Yes. H: This will be in June, at the end of June, not before. G: When the man telephones you, the telephone will ring three times. S: Exactly at 10 o'clock in the morning? G: At 10 o'clock. (Aside to H): Shall the call be repeated or not? H: Yes, it will be repeated exactly the same as his (Subject's) call. No, no, the call won't be repeated this time because after all his family will be there and it would look suspicious. S: But anyway, this will simply be a signal for me to go to the dead drop. G: Exactly. H: Exactly. S: I don't need the red signal then do I? And I go to the dead drop as soon as I get the signal? G: Yes. S: So I get into the car and go -- at 10:15 I'll be there. G: It is easy enough to make the call at 10:00 exactly. S: If I take a taxi, I will get to the Center in 7 minutes. G: This would be done after the drop is loaded. The note may be placed there 15 minutes before the phone call so that everything will be in order. S: It can stay there a half hour or a half day if the children are not playing there. I have reliance in this dead drop, but actually it should not stay there long, no longer than an hour.

34. G: Now, here is another means of communication to you, when you get this receiver. For the time being you will be practicing on the radio. When you get the good receiver then possibly one message should come each month as a maximum. Of course, a live message may only come once in 6 months. The signal will always be there, either live or dummy. S: That is clear. G: Now, we are still talking hypothetically -- say WYNNE is not there. If ever you go anywhere in Moscow -- to some official meetings, receptions, where there will be Western diplomats and someone approaches you, completely by himself, and says, "Greetings from Charles PEEKE"... H: And also the bit about the tieclasp. G: Yes, I'll show it to him in a moment. G: This will be the man who will be ready to take a message from you. H: He will either give you something. S: Or I will give him something. G: Now, as another recognition signal, here is a little gift for you. It is of no monetary value but the man will wear one like this. S: And I have one like it. G&H: You don't have to wear it. G: Is it blue or black? H: This one is black; these two are blue. S: Let's take the blue ones. H: No, because this man might be either British or American. (G explains that we don't want the same identical tieclasps to parade up and down all over an official reception.) S: I won't wear it.

35. G&H: No, no, you keep this blue one just to be able to recognize the others. S(Repeats the recognition signal): "Greetings from Charles PEEKE, and his wife." H: But the main thing is the name Charles PEEKE. S: Thus far everything is very clear and fine. G: Now, in case all methods of contact fail, you cannot receive by transistor yet and both May and June has passed -- only then should you think about throwing a package over the wall to the American House at exactly 10 o'clock in the evening -- 2200 hours -- on the first Saturday of any month, beginning with July. The alternate time will be on the next day, the Sunday following the first Saturday of the month. S: At the same time? G: Yes, the same time. 10 o'clock in the evening, Moscow time.

36. (G explains that the recipient of the package will be waiting around for some time and that in case someone is in the area who can observe Subject, several minutes before or after, 2200 hours may be a more convenient time to throw the package. The recipient will be waiting a good 10 minutes before and after the hour.) S: Where do I throw it? G: The exact place -- over the wall, of course -- is where the wall joins the building. You can't miss it. S: This is behind, not on the side? G: It is off Turchaninovo. Here is the Naberezhnaya... S: Wait, let me sketch it. I know the place; I've been there 155 times. Now, here's how I understand it. (Subject sketches surrounding area

the Moscow River, the hill, Turchaninovo, and finally the building itself, the windows in the semi-basement, the kitchen. George shows Subject which way the building is located in relation to the wall, and also points out that the wall extends in another direction -- a large, 4-meter wall. Some more explaining regarding the mechanics of throwing an object over the wall so that it will land inside the courtyard. George even draws pictures. The idea seems to be that even if the object hits the wall, it will still be inside the courtyard, as long as it clears the wall.) G: Don't throw the thing any other time, only at the designated time, and only if something unforeseen happens and you don't hear from the normal contacts.

37. S: Now with respectto official receptions towhich GRU people are invited -- it is not necessary to call me personally. No, he doesn't know me. Your Chief of Protocol has to call -- depending on whom he gets on the line -- actually it doesn't matter too much. Anyway, you have to extend the invitation from your office. You will be asked how many people are invited. If you say two or three, I won't get in on it. You must mention the member of our committee -- our technical and scientific liaison personnel, and invite about 8-10 people. Of course 10 people won't come, but this will get to the Chief of the Section and individuals will be selected. Then I'll be able to pick out who will go. That is the idea. You must invite an abstract number, and not one or two people. If you do the latter, they will only send the big chiefs. H: Right, we'll fix that up.

38. G: Now with respect to the throwing -- if it is not convenient this time, a month later will do. Just remember, the first Saturday of the month. S: It can only be the first Saturday in August. G: Yes, the earliest date is the first Saturday in August. If for some reason it is not a good day, make it next month. It's not such a big effort for our man to be on the alert on that one day of each month. He will be waiting. S: He will be waiting in any kind of weather? G: Of course. S: If it is raining, and I come by car.. G: So much the better. S: And he can be waiting and getting nice and wet? G: He can step out from within at the right time. S: Of course, he won't be there that long, but it is a good thing that you made the leeway of 2 minutes before and 2 minutes after the exact time because if I'm driving I will see thatthe watchman on duty won't be looking in my direction when I throw. S: Maybe we had better make it 5 -- 5 minutes before and 5 minutes after the hour of 10. G: Fine, let's make it 5 minutes. Maybe there will be some woman walking with a man or something like that. H: Only if all other means of communication have broken down. G: Don't worry about the weather. The worse it is, the better for us, because there won't be as many people around.

39. G: Now, the last point -- if by some chance you are in another country, not in China or in the Soviet Bloc, but somewhere where you can "breathe" a little... H: This is in case we had not learned of it beforehand. G: You can let us know where you are by the following method. The telegraph address is Lebcriehi, London. S: How will I let you know? G: He wants to know what text to use. S: No, I have that. Who will accept it? H: At the post office. S: No, they won't accept it. G: We are talking of the Western countries. (Subject, and everyone else, with great relief -> OHHHHH!) S: But I have to get a visa first! G: My dear man, I'm saying if by some chance you happen to be in West Germany, Austria, or Turkey -- not the Satellites. S: Oh, to contact you from that country... G: That's right. (S writing down the address.) G: And you sign it Alex. S: Written with an X. H: And you say, "I'mastaying in Vienna, at the Hotel Bristol, for 4 days". That's all. G: If it's a Western country nobody understands what it's all about anyway and the message goes unmolested. S: Do I need a stamp? G: You send this by T-E-L-E-G-R-A-P-H! S: Oh, by telegraph! And what do I say? (G goes through the instructions again about staying at the hotel ap and so in such and such a city, etc.) S: "Alex", that's a nice name.

40. G: All instructions to you about how to pass material to the lady with the child -- how and when to do it -- will come to you eitherthrough WIRE, or will be in the dead drop. S: Again, my dead drop? G: Yes, there will be instructions on where to pass documents, cassettes or anything else. S: Yes, I understand.

41. S: Here is another method (I offer). When to use it will depend on the necessity. If I must have a quick emergency meeting with someone, I can let you know through my dead drop and the place will be the one which I have found near the Tretyakovskiy Gallery -- that is a good place. G: You mean near REPIN'S statue? S: Yes. As to the time -- It will depend on the time of the year. At this time of the year, Summer, it is still too light at 8 o'clock. Ten or 10:30 would be better. The place is already known to us. We will speak only of the time and the day, and the recognition signals can be worked out. G: So, you suggest for the person to stroll by the Monument of REPIN. S: Across from the MOSKVA River. Not near the Monument of REPIN on the Naberezhnaey (Embankment) side, but on the other side, the way I have drawn it. You can give the recognitionsignals through the dead drop -- such as what he or she will be wearing. And also "from Charles PEIRCE".

42. H: You may tell him that with regard to the lady in the park, what I propose to arrange is to decide which is the best place for her. When we have done that, we will photograph her and the children in the park so that he will recognize the wife, the children, the pram, and the place in the park where she will be playing. S: Very good. H: Can you tell us what will be the best day for you? S: For this operation? Sunday, since it is my day off.

43. S: Now, in the most extreme case, if for some reason we can't use any of the other means of contact... The Committee is frequently visited by English representatives. Americans come in also, but more frequently the English. BERGER -- and some other names I remember come from the firm of LEICA or some optical firm -- anyway, here is another variant. These representatives often come to the Committee. I will try to come out to talk to a certain man. It won't matter if there are other people there. I'll try to arrange it so I can go out to talk. You (G) will arrange with one person and you (H) with one of yours -- and when I come out, we can exchange greetings and names. He will ask for my name. When I give him my true name, he should ask me, "Were you not in London at such and such a time? (The time that I am here now.) It seems to me that I saw you when I was there at our British exhibition". I was at the exhibit; I was in London; everyone knows this. This will be my signal. This is the man whom I will accompany to the door when he leaves. We have a waiting room on the sixth floor for all foreigners. It has an elevator to the first floor. On the way down in the elevator, let him give me what's necessary. I always accompany WITNESS when he leaves and other foreigners. There is nothing unusual in this. I meet them on the first floor also, but on the firstfloor he won't know me yet. I could, I suppose, tell him on the first floor as I greet him my true name and then he could give me (the packet) on the way up -- even before we have our talk. There is a chance he will get to know who I am downstairs, but upstairs it is certain that he will learn that I am (True Name). Then he must give me the pre-arranged password. (Subject repeats, with elaboration, the business about being seen in London between 20 April and 4 May at the exhibition). Even an American can say this. This is as a last resort. We can do this, if necessary, a year later.

44. S: If all else has broken off, you can give instructions to your (G) man or to your (H) man to go to the Committee. I will be looking for him. We keep a sort of registry. I have to see to it at 10:00 every morning to keep track of who is going to be present. It is necessary to see that there is Seltzer and sweet water and cigarettes ready for the British. If I am working already working as Deputy Section Chief, I can always use my initiative. As soon as he hears my name, he'll know, but we will continue talking for another 10-15 minutes. Then he should start on the "Didn't I see you in London?" bit. This, for me, will mean -- see this man out; see him out to his car. There I will take what he has for me, a letter or something small. There is a lift (elevator) from the first to the sixth floor. You press a button to get it up to the sixth floor when you see foreigners out. The No. 1 entrance is only for the chiefs and the foreigners. The rest use the entrance further down -- the center one. All this is as a last resort. This is a means by which

I may be reached. They all give their names, even the female interpreters, and the foreigners always write theirs down so that they will know later with whom they had a talk.

45. H: Can we just go back to the lady in the park. The idea is that he is not to talk to the lady. He will not receive anything from her. She will observe him. She'll be expecting him, you see. He will drop his material in the pram at a suitable moment and go on his way. As soon as she's noticed that, she will collect her children together -- the youngest one will have to be put in the pram -- and go quietly home. (Subject suggests that he should make some kind of comment either about the baby or about the carriage as he deposits his material, to make the pause more natural looking. Everyone agrees.)

46. S: There is just one thing that is not quite satisfactory to me. That is that the lady will have nothing for me. G: This might be dangerous. H: If we have things for him, we will give him instructions where they are. S: I suppose I can get those things from the dead drop. G: Why should she carry dangerous items which might compromise you? S: Where will you put bulky things? It's not good to put too much into my dead drop - a small box is all it will hold. H: Then, there will be instructions where the rest of the things are.

47. G: Now, you should make some notes -- but in a different manner. These are the things which are of most interest to us (KGI). You can burn the notes, but make sure they are welded to your memory. In the first place, when I am going over the details, don't feel hurt. Secondly, the details are only given so that you have an idea what it's all about. You are not going to write a whole volume. I will read it slowly, precisely, and you will get the crux of it. (Subject writes notes in ink.) G: First: Information which will help us determine who the Illegals are in the West -- primarily those in the U.S.A. and in the U.K. Second: Information, if you can obtain it, as to whether or not the British and the American codes have been broken by the Soviet Intelligence. Next point: Regarding the strategic rockets -- how many there are and when they may be ready for deployment; whether they are in the planning stages or are already deployed. This information is desired on rockets of all ranges -- approximately 1500 km and above. Find out, if you can, the general areas of the bases for rocket launching of all ranges; if you can get them, details on the target accuracy and the radius of error (VYPADANIYE) for the various rockets. What degree of accuracy do your people expect to reach with the aid of the geodetic data which they may have now? What is the theory of target location? Which targets are considered to be of strategic importance? How many missiles do they allot to these targets. S: Please repeat that from the beginning?

#15

48. G: (Elaborating) What is considered most important strategically -- our long-range aviation bases, whether they are in England or America? Is this of primary importance to them -- to cut off our atomic capabilities? Or what are their estimates? How much is allotted to this? Next question - where are the strategic rockets being made and in what quantity? This is all on the rockets. I'm just repeating that you should get all details and any information you canon rockets. I am underlining these points because they are not just general, but have been thought out. S: I agree that these are specific and concrete questions. G: Now, what point has development been reached in anti-rocket missiles (the defensive ones)? In other words, the missiles to be used against our rockets. S: I know, I know. G: Also, in what stage of development are the ZURS, the anti-aircraft guided missiles for low or high altitude aircraft? By high, I mean beyond the ceiling of the V-75. How many submarines do they have propelled by either chemical or atomic fuel having a tremendous radius of operation? Do they have atomic weapons' warheads? Are there any missiles with such warheads? What possible tasks (VOZMOZHNYE ZADANIYA) do they have? What is their specific assignment?

49. G: Now regarding atomic matters -- what are the atomic yields at various specific strategic missile ranges? How are the fissionable materials allocated to the various forces -- strategic, tactical and defensive? What is the status of production of fissionable materials? Do they have difficulties in their development, set-backs, and where is the center of the production? The easiest for you probably will be the GKHK. If you have a chance, find out about the yearly or the long-range plans, the amounts for financing specific scientific developments, and the priorities of your scientific interests in your committee. How is it distributed between the civilian and the war industries? If possible, find out something on allocations for nuclear physics, rocket technology, electronics, chemistry. How and into what categories or subdivisions it is broken down.

50. G: Now -- and this is the last -- if possible, photograph any documents which are important, those having any information or description of strategic missiles. Also, the latest atomic tactics and any regulations which may exist in respect to bacteriological and chemical warfare. S: You will have a new field service regulation (from me) in a very short time. G: That's what I said. Any new field regulations which have any atomic supplements -- SMITH's lecture, for instance, or any other such people in GSU, on agent, operational or illegals matters. If you can find a good detailed and exact map of Moscow -- 100,000 to 1 -- photograph it. S: I can get a map of Moscow. There are various scales -- some are secret -- 1 to 25,000; 1 to 100,000 and 1 to 200,000. G: If you can get any Secret or other type maps, please do.

51. G: Now, three more little items. Those 150 requirements that you told us about -- the scientific-technical intelligence to be collected on America and other countries of the West; those telephone books and lists which you mentioned. Also, it would be very important to establish definitely the organization of GRU - whatever is not clear to us yet. What number does the Operational Directorate have now? What other subdivisions are there? The Special Missions Section which has to do with diversion and sabotage - is that school for sabotage still operating? The one you told us about. S: It is operating. It has been reorganized, but it still exists. G: Under, whom does it operate? S: Now it is subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the General Staff. Before it was under SERBRENKO. G: So, it is subordinate to the chief of the General Staff, not the GRU? S: That's right. It's actually in GRU, but the control has been moved up. KHRUSHCHEV moved it. He doesn't trust SEROV. You see, that's all clear.

52. G: Anything which you know about the organization of the KGB would also be helpful, of course. These details are to give you a clearer idea of our priorities. We do not expect you to get everything but whatever you can get -- thank the Lord! S: This will all go in here for the time being. Later I'll sort it into different pockets. I'll leave the other things all here until tomorrow.

53. S: Wait, I did not put down the amount of rubles on that piece of paper yet - the receipt I wrote. H: Oh yes. Alright. Coming up, coming up... G: Here, write with this pen. S: The ink will be a different color. How much? G: Write 3,000. S: I know, I know. G: Look what small stacks they make! (New rubles) S: These are brand new. G: The entire Soviet Union has new ones.

54. S: Let me have a piece of white paper (for wrapping). I have given you many suggestions about not using certain people. I ask you again to remember this and think about it. G: Our most important thought is not to touch people which might jeopardize your safety. S: No. I was thinking about people like FEDOROV, VAVILOV, people like that -- "our" people. G: This is not our most important task. We are Intelligence Officers, not Counterintelligence Officers. We don't want to mess around with these people. Our Counterintelligence doesn't know about you. We don't want to let them know. S: Don't tell them about me. Why should you tell them? But tell them about these others. If these other people make trouble for us, why make a Chinese wall out of the whole thing? G: Your security is of the most importance to us. I am sure we worry more about it than you do.

55. H: Can we do these pictures now? G: Yes. Tomorrow I'll check you through again quickly. S: As far as the camera is concerned, we are all finished? G: Yes. S: Let's have the British photos. We'll finish these up today. I want to find that code clerk. I saw him again. H: Okay. Here, you take down the numbers -- you take them down too, Mike. It will be easier that way. S: These are the fresh ones, aren't they? G: Which ones are these? H: No, these are the ones he saw before. He asked to see them again. H: These are the '59-'60-'61 photos.

56. S: Here is the chief bookkeeper of the Embassy. (11639)

57. S: I don't want to skip over the code clerk. Here is one that looks very much like GERASIMOV, but it's a very bad photo. (9664)

58. S: Here is the GRU REZIDENT. (1650) He is the REZIDENT here - Lev Sergeyevich.

59. S: Here is one from KGB. He has just arrived. (11904)

60. S: Here is another from KGB, also recently arrived. This one came first and this one came later, the Committee of Technical Information. (4566) M: Which arrived first? H: The other one. The second one (4566) arrived first. S: I called him VORONOV or something before, or VOROB'EV. (Looking) I must have mixed this one up before.

61. S: This is IVANOV. (9946) Captain 3rd Rank, he graduated from the Academy with me in 1953. He is married to GONSKIN's daughter.

62. S: Here is the Embassy physician. (11641) A woman, the only one.

63. S: Here is the duty officer, who is also a courier guard (DEZHURNYY KURYYER OKHRANY). He guards #13 and #18 houses. (9584)

64. S: Here is another duty officer and courier guard. (8632)

65. S: Here, let's pull back that picture - the #9664 you asked me about it. The one that looked like GERASIMOV. Here is the real GERASIMOV. (935) He is the one who is coming out to see MERRIMAN tomorrow. Is the other photo the same one? They do look alike, don't they? They are different people, however.

66. S: Here is my friend SHAPOVALOV. (10943)

67. S: Here is another Courier Guard. (11572)

68. S: Here is VORONIN, Zhenia (Yevgeniy). That's the one I talked about before. (8213) His wife, Galia, has kissed me. Here is one from KHB. He graduated from the Academy in 1954. You should keep on burning the KHB-nik's. As I told you, this is our business. Or is it the business of CI?

69. S: He is an operational auto instructor. He taught me Operational Techniques at MDA (TSS). (12006) Now he is a chauffeur for the RESIDENT. I gave you his car number. He is the one who makes concealment devices in cars.

70. S: I still have not found PAVLOV. I feel that these are a fresh batch. A whole regiment! Here is Igor MILOVIDOV. He left here. (7094) He works with me on the GRTK. G: Tell me, is this MILOVIDOV non intelligence? S: He has been accepted by the KHB.

71. S: Tell me , what is the RESIDENT's name? I know it is Lev Sergeyevich, but you must know his last name! G: We just don't have it handy. It's here somewhere. I'll find out tomorrow. S: No one told me here and I didn't want to ask. H: Make a note to find out the name of (1650).

72. S: Are these new? G: These are 1960. We don't have completely new ones which is why there are repeats. S: Here is PAVLOV -- PAVLOV without glasses. That's why he was hard to recognize! (9459) G: Finally, PAVLOV! Thank the Lord! The Deputy RESIDENT. S: Anatoliy --

73. S: I still have not found that code clerk. G: Tomorrow everything should be KHL'TUREN with NEKHIDAN. S: Everything will be KHL'TUREN. Have you told him everthing? G: He couldn't understand you at all on the telephone. S: I told him 9:30, that I wanted him to meet a friend of mine. Didn't he understand? G: He understood who was calling and he understood the words 9:30 but that's about all. S: I did not tell him everything over the phone that I told you. I don't understand him at all.

74. S: So, we have found everyone except the code clerk. He's a bird! He decodes, transmits. He never goes out alone. (George explains that it is because the photos are grouped by years.)

75. S: Here is Lt. Col. VORONIN, the same name as the other one. (218) He is the Chief of the 3rd Direction (England) in GRU.

#15

76. S: Here is Col. KONSTANTINOV, Anatoliy Mikhailovich. He is the son-in-law of GORKIN who has two sisters. IVANOV is married to one and this one to the other. (2733) He works at the MD Academy, Chief Instructor, as I told you.

77. S: Here is one who works in GRU as a Senior Officer in the 3rd Directorate. (5597) He is under General SOKOLOV. He is a Colonel.

78. S: This one is a GRU officer and works in the 3rd Directorate. (2587)

79. S: Here is a GRU officer who now works with your BERKHEEV. (2204) (Illegal)

80. S: I'll have to look at '61 again. I have to find that code clerk. Unless he arrived very recently, I don't know when he arrived. Are these all the photo-albums? H: No, not all. S: Remember there was one we saw in Operational Techniques, in the 1st Section. We saw him before, remember? G: Yes, yes. S: At that time I showed you several KUZnik's, now I don't see them. H: No, those were in the other volumes. You see these are different volumes.

81. S: Here is one from GRU. An officer who works presently in my section under ROGOV. Not in GRUK, but in GRU. (2903)

82. S: Many KUZnik's are not here that I mentioned before. Are these all the albums? H: No, just for the last three years. Last time we had 1957, 1949, 1952, 1955, 1958. Now he's filled in the last three years.

83. S: I don't see VORONINA, Galochka. G: Does she work there or not? S: No, she does not work there. She just had a baby girl. She lives here.

84. S: Still can't find the "SHIPRIK", the code clerk. G: That's no problem. J: Let's pour another drink. H: Alright. It's not too bad, not for today. G: We don't have too much left for tomorrow, thank God! There are still some of our photos, and a couple of questions. That's all. S: So, this material I'm leaving here. G: Alright. S: This is all mine, all my notes. It's all here - till tomorrow. We have not found the code clerk, but that was alright for today? Here we are, Strategic Officers, making plans. Now I want to express something not quite clear to me. We have been working here.

Why can't we present to the government any ideas or conclusions which we have reached through our work? Is this not allowed? G: Yes, but we don't want to give away the fact that you are with us to those people who have no need to know. (Subject looks at some photos taken of him.) S: This is for Nikita Sergeyevich. I will show him how to practice deceit. (Everyone laughing and joking.)

85 S: What time do we meet tomorrow? 9:00? G: Yes. We will work like this -- 1 hour for questions; 1 hour for photos; 2 hours for fun -- or do you want 8 hours? S: How about the following morning? Should I skip over to say goodbye? G: For about 5-10 minutes, sure. S: Mr. Harold will come also? H: Of course. G: I'll be there also. I will not be leaving yet. When do youhave to be at the airport? At 11? S: No, we are leaving here at 11. I ask you to please call WYMMS tomorrow in the morning, to clear this up. I'm not making this up. I'm not overimaginative; I am a realist. You can see this all the time. G: We will tell him that it was forbidden. That's all. That's final! S: Yes, tell him that (Subject's true name) wanted to give him something on his own, but you would not permit it. Tell him that you will take care of everythingfor him and that he will get everything that's coming to him, if he works well. This will be stimulus for him. It will give him incentive. Also tell him about the receipts from the hotel. Give him a pat on the back for organizing things so well. He did, you know. They are feeding us for nothing. Of course, we are careful. We don't order any wine. I understand very well why this is done and they (the delegates) are very pleased. I was able to "buy" them this way - through your help. Even the highly-paid professor said, "(Subject's true name and patronymic) how well you organized everything." G: Have you bought everything you needed? S: Not yet. I still have$40 left. I have to buy a few more presents and some odds and ends. I'll have time to do this tomorrow. G: You got the one for VARENNIKOV? S: Yes. G: It was a good one? S: Yes, very very fine. G: It will be from Mr. and Mrs. (Subject's true name)? S: Yes, from Mr. and Mrs. G: And from us! Ha-Ha-Ha!! G: You'll have time to finish shopping tomorrow. It won't hurt to buy a few extra things for presents.

86 S: Right. Well, (clicking glasses) now we've finished. We'll say goodbye day after tomorrow. Tomorrow we'll start working again to finish. Well, all the best! S: You will think about the things I have mentioned. Everything is right. The money is received - both for operational and personal purposes. After all, the presents - are they not operational expenses? H: Yes, of course. S: Now, I leave my briefcase here until tomorrow. I don't think

I'll telephone her tonight. I'm tired. You know what street she lives on? I can't remember the name. Today I rode past her house. You know, she really fell for me. She was quite sincere, exceptionally so. Two hours was really very short. She was really a bit surprised that I left so soon. She is an experienced gal. I asked her, "Why don't you get married?" She comes from a good family and lives pretty well. She has this apartment -- I don't have such a nice one! The rooms are small but all the conveniences are there. Tomorrow will you be here during the day, in case I call? G: It's hard to tell. If it isn't convenient at 8 o'clock, we can make it 9. S: Right now, 8 o'clock is convenient for me. G&H: If you are not here at 8, we'll wait for you. S: Let's make it 9 o'clock. There's no use your getting here and waiting. G: Alright, 9 o'clock then. S:(And all) Goodnight! (Subject left at 0115 hours, on 5 May 1961.)

[redacted]

Meeting # 15A (London, England), 4 May 1961

1. (Subject knocked at door at 1420 hours on 4 May 1961, Mount Royal Hotel, Room 360. Only H and J were present. The unexpected visit was prompted by a note left in Subject's mail-box which he could not understand.) S: I ran here for a few minutes to mention two things. First of all I spoke to SHAPOVALOV at the Embassy this morning. At 7 o'clock, as he explained to me, there will be a reception at the Pakistani Embassy. SHAPOVALOV will be there. His car number is 462. H: 462? S: Yes, the sum of the numbers is 12 -- that makes it easier to remember. He will be alone, without his wife. From what could be made out of the conversation, his friend will be there.

2. S: Now at 2 o'clock, when I was picking up the key, there was a note addressed to me. (Opening letter) "Mount Royal Hotel, Mr. -----tiev rang and would like to contact you. Telephone 9831." That must be the number. Who is this? (H and J trying to figure out the name) KORDIV, KORDIEV, KORIEV? Maybe it's KONEV? KONEV -- that's right! S: That's Marshal KONEV!! J and H: No, that's impossible!

3. S: I was in the Embassy today and no one told me anything. Anyway, I did not call this number. I was at the Embassy today, all day, and no one told me anything. I ask you to please clear up this matter. I will be here this evening at 2000 hours. H: Well, all right. S: Who can that be? I did not call on this phone. (telephone ringing; J goes to answer it)

4. S: The letter was with the key and when I went to get it at 2 o'clock the letter was with it. They didn't say anything about this to me at the Embassy. H: I don't know who it is. S: Is it this hotel? Do they have four digit numbers? H: This is a telephone number. We can find this out.

5. S: Well, I'll be here at 8. Now I am going to WYNNE. My people are working at the Embassy. I was running around there. I had lunch there. I saw everyone there and SHAPOVALOV brought me here by car about 2 hours ago. I repeat his auto number is 462. He drives it himself ... in the Pakistan Embassy. So, I'll be here at 8 o'clock tonight. H: All right. S: I'll be here at 8 and at 9 we will have to make an interruption. The delegation will be coming and I will have to meet them and we will have to eat together. H: All right.

6. (Subject left at 1425 hours, having stayed 5 minutes.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Meeting #16, London, 5 May 1961

1. Subject arrived at 2105 hours on 5 May 1961 at Room 360 at Mount Royal Hotel, London.

2. G: Did you have trouble getting free from WYNNE and the delegation? S: We just parted -- he was here just now with his wife; we drank whiskey, said goodbye and he left -- what do we need him for? G: But this evening with the delegation? S: The delegation was here just now -- everything is finished. J: Okay, let's get to work.

3. G: Well now, tell us in detail what happened with MERRIMAN. S: I am not completely satisfied. G: Why? S: Everything went with a four -- not a five. When one gets mixed up with an old man -- Both you and I explained exactly when he should come, but he was seven minutes late. I went out to meet him -- you were going out and I spoke to you at the entrance. (Subject had met H and M on the hotel staircase as the latter were leaving.) You left and he arrived soon after that in a cab. I led him in and SHAPOVALOV and GENERALOV were waiting for him. The REZIDENT had decided to introduce both SHAPOVALOV and GENERALOV. I kept them in the hall, opposite the restaurant. The old man arrived seven minutes late and apologized. I had explained to him and so had you that twenty minutes was the limit, but it was impossible to break up the conversation for an hour. I got up, said I was in a hurry, ordered coffee and drank it and still he stayed. It wasn't only he -- it was GENERALOV too. GENERALOV got it from the REZIDENT for this. He put questions to him. GENERALOV's eyes lit up, but MERRIMAN found it difficult to understand that there would be time for conversation in the future, that it was not necessary just then -- although he had been warned. On the way I had told him, "Do your best. Arrange all conversation as quickly as possible and finish" (in English). I explained to him all this and he said yes, yes, yes -- but he did not understand me. You told him too. H: Yes.

4. S: Well, MERRIMAN began to talk about cement -- everything went well -- we should be thankful. I looked at GENERALOV -- his eyes lit up -- it seems that he has no acquaintances -- he is very passive -- if only his English were better. Then MERRIMAN stood at the entrance, showed off his silver things, smoked a cigarette, showed us how, he said, nothing would tarnish it -- corrosion or anything -- a whole hour! As soon as I knew I should have gone and got a taxi. GENERALOV made a second mistake and I reported this to the REZIDENT. He offered to take MERRIMAN in his operational car -- that is, he let him see the license number. They are idiots -- they don't know how to work. G: But

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[redacted]

this was not a minus for you? S: No. I will tell you everything -- why am I dissatisfied? The conversation dragged on, they were pushing MERRIMAN -- coffee and more coffee ..... "why don't you go away?" The hour passed and I knew that ANDREWS was due to arrive. This was why I was worried, but he didn't know this. I signaled to SHAPOVALOV I wanted to take him off to the toilet. G: Couldn't you just have spoken to him in Russian? MERRIMAN doesn't understand Russian. S: He would have flared up, "I wanted to study MERRIMAN further". I thought to myself, "there is time for this -- at some lunch, you fool -- you were in America, they taught you, surely you can finish this off."

5. S: Everything at first was excellent. Then someone sat down behind me. I felt that he was listening to our conversation. I wondered if you had given someone the job. G: Not on your life! S: Then I asked this man, "Excuse me, what time is it?" He showed me the time -- the man was just an inquisitive passer-by. But this was nonsense too -- We came out to the street, went to the operational car and got in and just then ANDREWS came by. He saw us and turned around. What could I do in this situation? He came up and greeted us, "How are you, Mr. GENERALOV? I believe that you have had an operation", and so on. GENERALOV said to me, "I didn't want to meet ANDREWS again at all. He has seen us with SHAPOVALOV and MERRIMAN". I said, Whose fault is that? Why did you drag out the conversation like that -- why do you work so clumsily? I will inform the REZIDENT" .. which I have done. They exchanged visiting cards -- everything was clear, he said. He handed over the material "Goodbye". Now they took him on further; "To hell with you", I thought. I sat with MERRIMAN and SHAPOVALOV with him in front. We went about three kilometers and then said goodbye and dropped MERRIMAN and they arranged to meet on Friday.

6. S: What is my request? That MERRIMAN should not telephone on Friday. Let them call and invite him. G: Definitely. That is clear. S: Tell MERRIMAN his sclerosis should get worse and he should stay away from work; this is my request. If they do not ring him, he should wait two or three weeks -- no less. MERRIMAN did not say everything -- what he did say he said well -- but he said it tediously. Everything should have been put off until the next time. And that other fool too ..... Well, we said goodbye to one another. And ANDREWS told WYNNE he had seen MERRIMAN with (Subject's true name) and with others from the Embassy. H: That I know already.

7. G: Have you seen the REZIDENT since then? S: Of course. We left MERRIMAN and went to the Embassy to report to the REZIDENT. At the beginning GENERALOV ran off to the REZIDENT while SHAPOVALOV

and I wrote up a report on me and on the project, excellently written .. about the work of the delegation with me as leader -- about all the new information to answer questions for our national technical problems. But this is not the point. GENERALOV who ran to the REZIDENT told him about this and said, "You know, this is an interesting old man. I decided to ask him some things". He was already preparing him. He said, "Some stranger near (Subject's true name) was sitting behind us, beside him." He also mentioned that ANDREWS had met us on the way but didn't pay much attention to this. "Well, so what? We will use him unwittingly. We will build up an acquaintance with him and receive information -- get to know people through him." My request is that the old man should do everything that you say, without taking the initiative. Initiative on his part now would be wrong. H: It is difficult to work with the old man. S: Yes, he should not ring up -- GENERALOV invited him to lunch and MERRIMAN returned the invitation. He should let them pay first -- the Embassy will invite him. MERRIMAN pleased them -- he conducted himself well, he was interesting, he told stories. GENERALOV mentioned one of his acquaintances, a Professor ..... MERRIMAN said, "I know him very well". Everything was friendly and in balance. MERRIMAN took them in.

8. S: I will write up my report solidly. If only there had been none of this long-windedness. The stranger appeared during the second half of the conversation. If only we had not met ANDREWS. This means that we did not fulfill our plan entirely and properly, if we examine every detail. Three things should not have happened. There should have been no second man -- for all the time at least. He could have come at the end. More than half the conversation could have taken place without him; there should have been no meeting with ANDREWS and there should have been no such long-windedness.

9. G: You reported all this yourself? S: Yes. After I finished the conversation with SHAPOVALOV, I said, "I must go see the REZIDENT; he may have something to say to me about his consequent decisions". The REZIDENT was asked and he said very well, let him come. I went into the basement in House #8 and reported to him. He said, "Everything is normal and good. We will use him unwittingly and we will not give him agent tasks." I said, "Well, I've told you everything". He said he would send a personal letter with me, wished us a happy journey and said that tomorrow I will see the Ambassador. We shook hands: there was a short conversation and that was all. G: You still don't know his surname? S: Whom could I ask? He didn't give his name. As soon as I get back, within five minutes, I will know his surname -- by another channel and it will be more realistic to do it this way. But his name and

patronymic is Lev Sergeyevich. Now I come to WYNNE ....

10. H: Now, before we get on with this can we just ask how he explained away how he had briefed MERRIMAN before these men (i.e., SHEPAVLOV and GENERALOV) arrived? G: (translates). S: Just as we agreed the day before yesterday. I telephoned and said that MERRIMAN had invited me home; he had prepared something and wanted to say goodbye to the delegation. The whole delegation was there at first: he took leave of them and left. G: Excellent. That is a beautiful legend (he explains in English). The delegation was there for two minutes -- thanked MERRIMAN -- and left. Everything was normal. H: I didn't quite get how he gave the brief to MERRIMAN about the cement. On the telephone only? G: (translates). S: When I left Moscow, specialists asked me to clarify certain questions on cement machinery. H: We know that. S: I met MERRIMAN at Oxford after we had visited "Edgar Allen". (George explains in English). S: Today I have remembered a conversation. When MERRIMAN was in Moscow he promised the specialists there that he would send them something and that he would keep in touch with them so everything would go as planned.

(11) S: Now about WYNNE -- he and I had a conversation today at 1830 hours; I was at his place. G: Have you spent the day buying your things? S: I was a long time at the Embassy checking accounts and then I went to the shops. G: Then you have done everything? S: Not everything. I will ask you to help me in some things. I've done everything for myself and I've got the presents -- everything has gone well. At 1830 I went to WYNNE's home. He said, "Well, let's have a last drink." Then he said, "I would like to invite you to supper." I said that it was not necessary and I had to meet the delegation. Then he said, "Well, then my wife and I will come and say goodbye to the delegation. We had a drink or two. I rang from WYNNE's, telling the delegation we were coming in ten minutes -- everyone arrived. Mrs. WYNNE came; we went to the bar and had a drink, sat for a couple of minutes and then they went off. I went to my room, collected some photographs and catalogues of where we had been: the others went to do their packing, and then I came to you. G: How about the receipts? S: I will tell you in a moment. I had a conversation with WYNNE. He told me that he had spoken with you and had received instructions. G: You said this? S: No, he told me this since he has spoken to you today. Regarding money, I said that in general I am not working for money -- that it is not necessary to give me money..... You see, when it is necessary to speak English, I understand WYNNE very well, unlike [redacted]. Well he said, "I'll do everything that they ask me to do and I only need money." So WYNNE's mood is not a bad one. On

[redacted]

receipts he has given all the instructions; he has already had receipts made for all the times we were in, and we will get the receipts for this hotel tomorrow. G: Excellent.

(12) S: I have a request. In the morning -- we are leaving at 11 -- you should tell someone that when all our things are (at the airport) nothing should be opened. There should be no formalities over excess weight. They should take no money and there should be no talk about this matter there. (H says that WYNNE will arrange for the payment of any excess baggage. G points out that the baggage must be weighed and that representatives of AEROFLOT work on this at London Airport.) S: That will be fine. I'll explain that to my people.

(13) G: Then about WYNNE. I beseechh you -- do not promise him all sorts of things. It is not necessary to make him promises which will be difficult to fulfill -- You see, this influences him. S: I did this already in Moscow -- I told you. G: I know, but now it is just not necessary to make him any promises. We will do what is necessary -- if you want something special done, let us know and it will be done. Connections with him are very bad operationally. S: I understand, but from my side I do not wish to ask you to do what I promised at the outset. Yesterday .. when I said how I felt about the gist of the conversation with him ./ G: Now you can set your mind at rest. You know yourself that you have taken steps. S: Well, so much for WYNNE.

(14) S: And we have finished about [redacted], haven't we? [redacted] should be absolutely quiet (inactive). What is bad about [redacted] is that he does not understand me and I do not understand him. When I said to him, "You promised -- about steel -- perhaps you will be coming to Moscow again to give lectures... You lectured us very interestingly in that field, and so on. Write us some sort of open article and we will have it published -- we often publish articles by foreign authors on technical questions." He said, "I will think about it. I know HYSOVSKIY (one of our main specialists) was interested in heat-resistant steels for rockets..." Why did he say rockets? H: Because he is a rocket man, you see. G: Because he is a simple mortal. He does not assess things as you and I do. He is not an intelligence officer. S: I understant that heat-resistant steel is the business of a specialist. Why did he say that? He made their ears go up..... "What a whale!", they thought.

Skal
Ks
K
for Rockets

(15) GENERALOV was shaken -- what a fool -- straight out of the conversation he invites us to leave in his operational car. And now -- it doesn't matter that we met ANDREWS does it, or that ANDREWS told WYNNE? G: No. S: Good. Just so that you know. I wasn't happy about it. If we had finished 20-25 minutes earlier,

[redacted]

#16

(20) S: Then something else. Are you getting ready a second Minox? H: We will give it to WYNNE who will give it to him (Subject) in Moscow. G: WYNNE can do this easily -- it is only a tiny thing; he can take it with him and hand it over -- no problem. S: Well, I wanted to ask. I do not want to keep two Minoxes at home. I will think about it. H: We could get the Minox in his DLB. S: I have worked this out. You have given me enough film for 1000 frames. To take the Regulations (250-270 pages) with two frames to a page -- will need 500 frames. Then I will already have used more than half. I am worried about film. Additional film should also be provided because I already have another book to copy. G: The pages of the Regulations are small enough for one frame each. H: This is the next question I was going to ask him. I propose that he should receive more cassettes from WYNNE. How many does he think he will be able to take? You see this is quite important because as it is difficult to get them in otherwise bulky packages like this -- as opposed to small messages. How many does he think he will be able to take from WYNNE so that he has got a supply for two or three months? (G explains.)

FSR over's title

(21) S: My number one project is the Field Service Regulations because it is very important and interesting and there is one booklet by Chief Marshal of Artillery, VORONOV -- a modern evaluation of rocket forces. This is theoretical (there is no description of rockets), views on their massed employment in military operations -- a good booklet. It is Top Secret. One can see it only be presenting a pass. If I can work on it, it will be very interesting. Then I will have the basic manual and there will be lectures on special training (intelligence).

(22) H: We are giving him twenty films through WYNNE. Now, has he any idea in his own mind -- what is his conception as to when he would want to pass over further material? Does he think that he will want to do it at the end of June or July -- that is, after WYNNE? Does he want to do it every month or every two or three months? How does he consider the situation? (G translates.)

(23) S: Let us not wait for many months. I have thought about this. This is a very good question. Here is my plan -- I will prepare as much as possible before the arrival of WYNNE -- some of this I have already -- you will have enough work for a month. I have thought about the following suggestion although I did not mention it before. KING knows me, he invited me when I was looking after WYNNE's delegation. I met him and his wife and got to know him well when I was at that fool's -- [redacted]. Let KING organize something and invite about ten people from the Committee ([redacted] arranged this BARDAK for 100 people -- with a negro -- when he got

himself a flat and we went to the flat [housewarming].) Some celebration should be arranged -- the birthday of the Queen's son and with this as a pretext he could organize. I want to give you my opinion as an intelligence officer. I liked [redacted] -- if he would take films and additional material when I offer it to him I would give it to him -- with your permission and on your orders. H: No. S: No? Then another man at [redacted]'s place? H: Another man -- our man.

(24) S: Or at [redacted]'s. But I do not want to work with [redacted]. H: We don't want you to either! S: He kept my packet for two days. After this they rang him up -- now a newspaper and now a question from the Committee through that interpreter-secretary of his -- I gave you his name -- a Russian who works in the 1st Directorate (KGB) (--half these people should be chased off. They are informers.) His name is SENATOROV. Without doubt, [redacted] already knows that I have been in England for 16 days. He is no fool and he knows that we will definitely have been active in the tactical and strategic fields. He understands this without your words or questions. He knows that I am in England. He knows of the wishes which I admitted to him. G: He did not understand your wishes since he did nothing -- He is a complete fool! S: He understood everything. He even asked me whether I wanted to live in the Soviet Union or to defect (ILI K NAM YEKHAT'). J: Oh really? M: That's a new one. S: I told the man everything about why I was making the requests -- and he understood everything, but you are right -- he is a complete fool.

(25) H: Can we just go back to [redacted] for a moment? Under no circumstances must he attempt to say anything or pass anything to KING. If [redacted] arranges an invitation for members of the Committee then he must only act when a man makes himself known to him. (G interprets.) S: And what will you say to this man? G: He will have the signal (Note: A tie-clasp had been given to Subject and an identical one would be worn by anyone who was to contact him.) S: What will you tell this man? I will walk around, look at everything -- all the rooms go into the kitchen, to the toilet. Your man should watch me. I will contrive a situation in which I am alone and I will give him a package of exposed film. G: He will be our own trusted man and no one else will know. S: Once he has them, that's all. Then it is your business. Has [redacted] already been warned that he should keep silent? --because he knows everything regarding [redacted] and [redacted]. H: I know. I have done this. S: Will [redacted] interfere? G: No. S: [redacted] will keep quiet. G: Absolutely. S: That's clear.

[redacted]

(26) H: He only wants to hand over, then, at the meeting? Does he rule out any question of the lady with the pram and all that? G: Oh no, no. H: I should like to get back to this time factor. (G interprets.) S: There will be new material from me each month -- sometimes a large quantity, sometimes less. But you cannot invite me to an English function every month. I must be asked to the Australian, English -- and if I become deputy to the head of the section -- to the American (Embassies). I can be invited by the Australians, the English, and the Canadians -- once by each in every three months, without repetition by anyone in that time.

(27) G: It is possible that you will be invited once in two months on an average. S: No. I don't want to keep material for two months. H: Once a month. That's all I wanted to know, because if we are going to use this ploy during the summer, using the lady in the park with the pram, I have to give her instructions how often she has to be there -- this is the whole point I want to get at. (G interprets.) S: This is my suggestion: on the first Sunday of each month -- at different places, the first place would be where I suggested -- opposite the statue of REPIN. Can she go out walking with the child in the evening? G: No, it would not be normal. H: And she will only push the children out in the pram in the immediate rayon where she lives. She can't push it all over town without taking a car. S: Doesn't she take the child out for air before it goes to sleep? (G interprets H's remarks.) S: The park is a different matter. G: She lives perhaps two or three blocks from the park; she can sit or walk in the park. It will always be in a park. But in which park? -- the one not far from her flat.

(28) S: I have a question. Suddenly I have an urgent message -- like the occasion when Marshal ROKOSSOVSKIY was sent to the Trans-Caucasus and VARENTSOV was there -- all the rockets were prepared and ready to fire at Turkey -- this happened. If something like this should happen -- how could I keep silent? Through what channel could I inform you? H: This is a thing on which I propose to give him instructions through WYNNE. At the moment we have made arrangements so that we can tell him that we have left a message in his TAINIK, but we have not yet given him any instructions on the return method. I am hoping to be able to lay on a drill involving a telephone call at a given time on a given day once a week, so that he can tell us to go and clear the dead drop, but only once a week. What I propose should be arranged, if he agrees, is that he should be able to deliver more bulky material such as Minox cassettes or anything else once a month but he should be able to inform us of something short which he can write down and put in his small dead drop once a week. But that I will only arrange after WYNNE has gotten back. (G interprets.) H: I am hoping to have all this arranged so that I can send in the instructions through WYNNE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(29) S: That is very good. But one must foresee this -- for what could happen? The Marshals and everyone go somewhere -- this is the very basis of our work. All else is good and important, but such a situation might arise. ROKOSSOVSKIY and VARENTSOV and another one -- I mentioned him, a General -- sat ready. They were ready to strike Adana. G: Well then, the radio and the Minox will be at the Embassy at #1 readiness and the films will be handed over to you by WYNNE with a message from us. S: Then this is all agreed, and I will be told, when you work it out, how to contact you in an emergency but only when I have something of real importance to report -- such as the removal of KHRUSHCHEV or the imminance of military action. H: Or only if he himself knows, for instance, that he is going to Canada then he should use it for that sort of purpose because the sooner we know, the better we can arrange things -- as well as critical intelligence. (G translates.)

30. H: I would still like to come back to these twenty films, because the biggest problem, which we have not yet really tackled is how to re-supply him. You see, we can pass him messages through the small DLB but there is a much more difficult problem of re-supply to him of Minox films and, therefore, I would really prefer (although we don't expect him, Heaven knows, to use more than twenty films a month) to give him a larger supply when we have a safe opportunity through WYNNE than to have to run risks in order to get supplies to him. I would much sooner give him a three-month supply if he can hide it rather than to do it through other hands. (G translates.)

31. S: Then we should hide them in shirts or in some good flat box -- a cigarette box or something like that. G: On the subject of the radio set, that is also what I have in mind -- if you could have it hidden. S: I cannot do that straight away. The dacha is not mine. There are people there, the clandestine situation is poor. Now something else I should like your advice on -- perhaps I can rent a dacha from someone who has to go abroad suddenly for a year -- perhaps I could even buy one on credit -- why should I buy one if I am going away? H: That is not necessary. G: If you get the chance of renting a Dacha, by all means go ahead. S: On a Dacha I could do some digging, plant some flowers and make caches and not even a dog could find them -- if they suspected me even. G: Are you thinking of one near town where you can go easily? S: Of course one can go to a Dacha in the winter, and there I would have my own room. G: And you would go to work from there daily? S: Perhaps sometimes, but not every day. But in summer one can live there the whole time and go to work every day -- we are allowed to do this in the summer. G: But only during vacation time? You would have to go into town by train when you are working? Wouldn't it be far out? S: It could be as much as

[redacted]

[redacted]

OKRUGI). Colonel-General SHTEMENKO was appointed to deputy commander of an OKRUG. G: Up to the present moment? S: Yes. I know this. G: And Chief Marshal of the Air Force, GOLOVANOV? Has he retired? S: He is not working now; he has retired. G: For a long time? S: Yes, I have not heard of him for a long time. G: And MALENKOV -- what is he doing? S: I'll tell you about him. Now almost all of them are in Moscow. G: MALENKOV too? S: Yes. I was told that he had been seen there recently. KAGANOVICH lives not far from VARENTSOV, on the Frunze embankment -- he often walks along the embankment with his wife and can be met there. MOLOTOV is very ill at the moment. G: He is in Austria? S: Now he is back. He was in Mongolia, in Ulan Bator. G: Then they sent him to Vienna. S: Yes. Now he is in Moscow. He is very ill and is under treatment. MALENKOV is in Moscow. SHEPILOV often walks along Gorkiy Street and was seen not long ago. He looks flourishing and is well dressed, they say. I saw him also. Where they work I do not know. G: How about KIRICHENKO? S: He is retired, in Kiev. G: And ZHUKOV? S: He lives in Moscow on Granovskaya Street beside the VOYENTORG and opposite the Kremlin hospital. Marshal SOKOLOVSKIY lives there too. His is a large house with huge apartments in it.

(40) S: ZHUKOV lives most of the time at a Dacha out along the Rublevskiy Shosse. By order of the Council of Ministers he was given a pension of 550 (new) rubles. G: That's all? S: It's a disgrace. According to the regulations, a Marshal has no right to retire. He is listed as continuing to work actively -- like BUDENNY, who does nothing, but who has an office in the grey building on Antipievskiy Alley -- a house with a large tower. He has his office there -- a Colonel is his Aide. Sometimes he comes to large lectures -- I have seen him. He enters, works on Command Training. He has a phone to the Kremlin but he does nothing. He receives his full salary as a Marshal -- since the last reform he receives 1200 new rubles a month. G: Is he higher than ZHUKOV? S: Yes. VARENTSOV receives 10,000 old rubles (or 1000 new rubles). He received more but they have cut him down. The Council of Ministers decided to retire ZHUKOV. I saw the order -- if I had had a Minox you could have had a photograph of it! It was signed by KHRUSHCHEV, and witnessed by the Ministers -- GORKIN was Secretary of that time. It read, "The Ministers of the USSR agree to the request of G. S. ZHUKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union, that he should be allowed to retire". A special resolution can remove a Marshal or create a Generalissimo -- and this was a special resolution. Then later there were similar resolutions on KONEV, on SOKOLOVSKIY and on TIMOSHENKO and like ZHUKOV, their pensions were set at 5500 rubles. But ZHUKOV had money, from savings. A minister receives 2500 rubles.

(41) The head of the General Staff receives 2000 rubles. The commander of a branch of service -- a Marshal of the Soviet Union

[redacted]

like BIRYUZOV of the PVO received up to 1800 rubles. VARENTSOV got 1200, now it is less -- everyone gets less now. KHRUSHCHEV said, "They have grown very fat. We cannot create intellectuals and capitalists like this .." and so on. But Marshal ZHUKOV -- He saved his money and as Minister he had a representation allowance. So he had his savings. A Marshal of Tanks -- a Commander -- received 1800 rubles. Such Commanders, Chief Marshals and Marshals of the USSR, or a Chief Marshal in charge of arms of service, ordinary marshals like VARENTSOV in aviation or tanks got 1200 a month. When my father-in-law died -- this is how I know this in such detail -- his wife received 75,000 (old) rubles. AtMajor General's widow got 50,000; A Colonel-General's widow -- 100,000; a Marshal's widow still more. Now if anyone important dies, the widow receives 10,000 -- not bad -- 100 new rubles! That is not a pension but a single payment to cover funeral expenses. My mother-in-law received 2500 (old) rubles a month for herself and for her son VALYA, the brother of my wife. Now he has come of age and gets nothing. The son of a dead general and she gets 80 rubles. She lives on her savings. She has 5000 (new) rubles left. This is how they save billions for rockets. Any complaints and the little bit will be taken away. But all are restless -- one says to a trusted friend -- KHRUSHCHEV should drop dead, the SVOLOCH, and that FURTSEVA should be drowned and we will kill that Minister ZVERYEV who has been recently made a deputy.

42. G: Do you know a General of Artillery, MUSATOV? S: I know many Artillery Generals but I do not remember him. G: Or Colonel SHUBNIKOV? S: SHVEINIKOV? -- He has just become Major General and is in command of Personnel. G: No. SHUBNIKOV. S: There is no SHUBNIKOV -- there is a SHUBIN. SHVEINIKOV, a Major General, is in the Artillery, is in command of the Cadre Directorate of the Ground Forces.

43. G: Do you know YASTREBOV and SERGEICHUK, who are concerned with the delivery of the arms outside the Bloc? S: The names are quite correct and exact -- there are such colonels. They work in GAU.

44. G: Do you know any of the people who have designed new tanks, artillery pieces, and so forth, and who have received prizes for their work? S: There was a great inventor -- DYAKONOV, a Colonel of the Engineers. He invented a good howitzer; he was from the conventional artillery. Now everyone has gone over into rockets. I know about ten of these people but I have forgotten their names. All their portraits, with underneath a description of what they invented, are in the Academy. There is a gallery of oil paintings of artillery inventors -- I could simply look at them and copy them for you. In the Dzerzhinskiy Academy there is a hall

[redacted]

73. S: GRU radio operator or driver. (K-126)

74. S: Why do you not want to receive from me tomorrow evening a signal to show that all is well? G: We want to know that everything is alright at work, as well as with you personally. S: If everything is not alright, I will turn up at the American or British Embassy! G: Don't run to an Embassy. S: Where to then? G: It is better to go to another country. S: How could I get to another country? This is something else we must think about. If I cannot go to an Embassy, can I stop a diplomatic car? I know the car numbering system. J: Let me explain. While the Soviet authorities do not have the right to enter an Embassy, they can stop any car, diplomatic or not. It is impossible to go from an Embassy to an airport. (G interprets.)

Dzerzhinsky Acad.y
Grizlov
Petrenko

(75) S: When I was studying at the Rocket Academy there was an important order and a number of discussions. One of our students, in the rocket faculty --there was already a rocket faculty, the 4th faculty of which the Deputy was GRIZLOV, who is now in DDR. PETRENKO was the Chief, a Colonel; now he is a General. The student went by the "UDARNIK' cinema; saw a foreign car stop and was asked in broken Russian and English, "Where is America House?" He said, "I know. I will show you ". And he got in the car, saying, "Go that way." The militia saw that the car had a diplomatic CD" on it and then saw a Soviet military uniform in the car. They topped the car as the first crossroads with a red signal; stopped he car and pulled him out. He was thrown out of the Academy nd was reprimanded along Party lines. This was done as an example o everyone else. All he wanted to do was to show them the way. he foreigners (in the car) were not detained. The foreigners ere going to America House, perhaps as tourists. G: Can anyone lp? S: Yes. This was one thing that happened. It would be alright if there was obvious danger, but to live there endlessly -- hat for? If I stop a diplomatic car, I should do so in a suitable place, like by the Ukraine where one goes under the bridge where the gate is. I know many places where one could stop a car without being seen by the militia; unless, of course, they were openly followed. Then I know that I could get to the American or British Embassy at great speed. I know,however, that they would not let me out of the country. They would nvoke an alarm that a General Staff Officer disappeared and all front ers would be closed!

(76) S: When I was at the Academy in 1952,an Air Force Colonel, who was an instructor in special training, went out of his mind. He went off drinking and neither his family nor anyone else could find him. He went to a friend at a remote place and caroused with women.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The Minister was informed and he ordered the frontiers closed. There was a special patrol, because they thought that he might try and get an aircraft and fly out. This was done as a precaution. Then he re-appeared. He was reprimanded, dismissed, and put on a pension. He was one of my instructors. Well, one would just have to sit in the Embassy and live.

77. G: Do you know the LOTKOVs -- father and son? The father is a Colonel and he was an instructor. S: I know him very well. He was an instructor, but not his son.

(78) S: Anyway, I do not think that this danger exists. G: But it is better to know beforehand what to do. S: Of course. J: The point is this -- we consider him ours. There is no question of that. The fact remains that the Soviets do not. The fact also remains that we do not have planes that fly in regularly. Even if we did, only the Embassy itself is considered extraterritorial. It is not that wedon't want to help! (G interprets) G: My advice would be that if you suspect anything, you should try -- together with your family -- to get to East Berlin under some pretext. S: They would not allow it. If a thousand tourists are going, they check ten thousand and reject nine thousand. H: The point is surely this, to take it very realistically. If they know what he is doing, they would not give him the opportunity to get to an airport. But if he feels that there might be some suspicion, which they cannot prove, then he stops immediately in order to allay their suspicions. If they know he is not going to get a chance to run away anyhow. If they are suspicious, he must stop work. (G interprets.)

(79) S: There can be no question of going to an Embassy under any circumstances. They would catch me immediately. But if, in the case of danger, I could stop a diplomatic car at some favorable spot...G: Then where would you go? To the Embassy -- and then what? There would be discussions and so forth and they would demand that you be handed back as a Soviet citizen. It is better to devise beforehand a plan for getting somewhere to safety by secret means -- to a frontier, the Finnish frontier,whichever is nearest. J: George, I think this has a bearing on a very important point. This is why we have been stressing from the very beginning that security is the most important factor. We would rather not see him or hear from him for one year than risk his neck in any way. (G interprets.) S: How can I endanger myself? I shall photograph so carefully that no one will know. I will

[redacted]

[redacted] Meeting 16 5 May 6, 1961 -

135. S: A KGB officer (T-46). This is an excellent photo group.

136. S: A GRU officer who now works in the Information Directorate (T-47).

137. S: A GRU Strategic Intelligence officer (T-48).

138. S: Now works in my group of 58 under ROGOV . A naval man. He finished at the Academy with me (T-49).

139. S: A Strategic Intelligence GRU officer (T-56).

140. S: A Strategic Intelligence GRU officer (T-58).

141. S: A GRU officer who now works inthe Information Directorate (T-62).

142. S: This is MELIKH (T-63).

143. S: This man now works in the Operational Directorate of the GRU (T-66).

144. S: This man is in the Information Directorate. (T-67)

145. S: ZAZULIYA. He was thrown out and now he is in Afghanistan as assistant to Vasya POKIDKA. He finished at the Academy with me. He is in the Air Force. He was in India. J: Yuriy? S: Yes (T-75).

146. S: A naval officer who finished at the Academy with me (T-77). We have gone through my whole class it seems to me by now.

147. J: These are all. S: Yes, this was a fine set of photographs. (This ended the operational phase of the last meeting.) S: If this ends everything for me tonight -- tomorrow I will run in to say goodbye for just a few minutes. I will be here at 1015 exactly.

148. Toasts in wine were drunk to Subject; group photographs were taken with a Polaroid camera with Subject and one of each participant individually.

149. S: I believethat in this first phase of our association wehave worked intensively and have achieved productive and valuable results.

[redacted]

#16

150. Subject discussed Georgian wines such as NAPEREULI, SVILULY, etc. and said that KHRUSHCHEV had ordered these names to be discarded andreplaced by numbers since all the Georgian names were those of princes.

151. S: There is a very nice girl here at the hotel but I had no time to get acquainted with her. Here is her picture (her name was Valerie Williams, one of the hotel receptionists). I asked her if she had a photograph of herself. She said, "No." So I gave her £5 and asked her to have her picture taken. G: Just for memories sake. She took the money and this morning she gave me this photograph and wrote this nice letter. She explained that it is forbidden for employees to go out with guests andshe sent her best wishes. You see how I spent the last of my pounds!

152. A toast of best wishes for success and for Subjects well being and security was drunk. J: Now bade Subject farewell since he was to leave early in the morning. Subject embraced J (which gesture was repeated next morning for the other three participants). Subject carefully packed the various items he was to take with him after they had been checked. Subject put all compromising material in a coat pocket.

153. J wished Subject"all the best" on behalf of his government and himself and stated that these meetings would be only the beginning of a long and fruitful association.

154. Subject stated that this association would continue until the end of his days and hoped that allwould meet again. He said that he was now completely at ease. He added the request that he should be protected and promised to fulfill all his missions.

155. Subject departed at 0045 hours on the 6th of May 1961.

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Note: Arrangements for receiving material from Su

a lady, children and pram in a park

WYNNE, or failing this

be passed in one of these

with such materials

Minor cassette 42

18
Jc 20 - 0100 hrs
18-19 July

(25)

YOGA Meetings Second Phase - July - August in London

Meeting No. 18

YOGA arrived alone, without delegation, in London in the morning of 18 July at about 09.45 hours. His arrival could not be spotted since he did not travel via the AEROFLOT TU-104 jet directly from MOSCOW which normally arrives at 10.30 hours. He arrived on an earlier plane. Upon arrival YOGA contacted TARRY and told him that the Soviet Embassy had booked him a room at the Kensington Close Club. Upon receiving this information from TARRY, MIKE booked a room at the same hotel and John Collins offered the use of his flat as a meeting place. TARRY informed subject that he should meet MIKE at a rendezvous point away from the hotel at which point MIKE picked subject up and drove him to the vicinity of the meeting place. Subject arrived with MIKE at 20.20 hours on July 18th. Upon entering, subject greeted the other three officers individually and stated that all was well and normal. He also mentioned that his wife cried because she could not accompany him to LONDON and that he had brought some MOSCOW vodka for us but MIKE told him not to go back to his room to get it at this time.

2. S: Next time I wish you would control the visa appoications better. The entire delegation submitted visas to the British office on 11 July and the visas came too late for us to take the plane for which we had tickets. Just before we were to go and while waiting to get our delayed visas, KHRUSHCHEV reviewed the declaration of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. which was made on 1 July. This declaration authorised forty to fifty selected industrialists and scientists to go to LONDON during the time that the Soviet Exhibition was in progress and actually forty-four including myself were selected to go, but all of these trips were cancelled when KHRUSHCHEV reviewed the Declaration. Have you not seen the Declaration? I photographed it. G: Not yet because it is now being developed. S: Oh, I see, I will tell you about it.

3. S: I have received a nice little room but I thought you would be staying at the Mount Royal and we would be there. G: It is better to be here, since you have no legend to go constantly to the Mount Royal Hotel. S: If I had received my visa on time I would have come here alone and would have met you on Saturday 15th July. G: Why did not your people submit the request for a visa a day sooner? S: You were not correctly informed. Your secretary in your Visa Office received a request for visas from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 11th July. This included a request for my visa and ten other persons. G: That is not correct. I know that he received it on the 13th. S: Even so did you not get my cable on the 11th? Then you could have checked on the visa. G: We received the request for a visa on Thursday afternoon the 13th. And it would have been unusual to grant a visa earlier since no-one gets a visa in less than forty-eight hours. x G: Nevertheless, it would have attracted undesirable attention.

4. S: Well anyway, KHRUSHCHEV revised his Declaration. I will tell you about it because it is on four frames of film.

5. G: How long are you planning to stay? S: I have been authorised to stay for three weeks. G: Whether the delegation came or not? S: Yes, either way. I received my visa on the 15th and my plane was due to fly on the 15th, but I could not fly out when I got the visa. The Embassy begins work at 1000 hours and I got my visa about 14.00 hours. G: That is right. The visa was granted only in the evening on Friday.

6. S: Here is my authorisation for coming here from the C.N.T.K. (Subject presented the document, requested that it be photographed and returned to him. He pointed out that this document was for the entire delegation of which he was to be the head. He pointed out that it was

/signed.....

x S: The group requested visas, not just I alone.

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signed by SAMARIN who was the Deputy Chief of the Committee and that the new Committee Chief was RUDNEV who had replaced KHRUNICHEV. ALEKSENKO also signed the document, another Deputy of RUDNEV).

7. G: And who has replaced that biggest chap? S: RUDNEV, Lieutenant General, Engineer of the Technical Service (Inzhener Tekhnicheskoj Slushby), An Electronic expert, who has been occupied all the time with defence technique [oboronnaya tekhnika]; about 54 years old, energetic, not all that bright, he replaced KHRUNICHEV. G: Do you think that will be better for you? S: No. KHRUNICHEV was more intelligent. KHRUNICHEV was better for work. But for me - well, yesterday he called me in and said....well, I'll tell you in detail in a moment. Well, he set me the task, which we are to do together, before our meeting, my dear friends, that's all. Well, I didn't think I would come.

8. S: I thought to-day that the film would be ready, because it is very important. It is very important. G: It will be, it will be. This evening. S: I've already managed to get into such a larder! [Kladovku]. You can judge it by the material. It is the latest, the very latest views for 1960 and 1961 on military doctrine, on matters regarding the utilisation of tanks, the fleet, the Air Force, the doctrine in general. G: They will bring it to us tonight. S: And this is where I photographed, first of all, KHRUSHCHEV's decree. So I'm checking the documents, I handed all of them over to you. So I want to relate the most recent events... and it could have turned out so that we would not have been together to-day! Now let us analyse what we are to do in the future.

9. S: On the 4th of July I was called to GVISHIANI, already I was the Deputy Head of the section, the appointment had already gone through, and he said: on the 1st of July a decree was passed by/Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. signed by KHRUSHCHEV, regarding the urgent, speedy assignment of 40 - 50 Soviet specialists to the Exhibition in London. The Committee appoints you the Head, the leader, in so far as you have already been in England, you have certain acquaintances, we are satisfied with your past trip' (to us: You did all this for me, despite MERRIMAN who did not make a meeting). S: GVISHIANI said "You are appointed the leader, urgently prepare 40 - 50 individuals including our own people". I said: "German Mikhailovich - what branches of industry shall we take? He said: "take chemistry, take light industry, metallurgists, machine constructors [mashino-stroitelej] and take the people who have already been in England, so that one should be able to get a visa for them quicker, and there is already an exit permit on record for them in the Central Committee which pokes its nose into everything; it will let them through faster, it will al be quite legal and correct". And I, together with my own people quickly prepared these groups.

10. S: We sent an application to the Central Committee - suddenly the Central Committee starts holding up. You see, we got the order on the 4th, and it was signed on the 1st. You will read it on the developed film to-day, with KHRUSHCHEV's signature, there it is written: "paragraph 1: ....second PATOLICHEV and his wife for twelve days.....paragraph 2 there: I don't remember it for the moment.....paragraph 3: that is what I told you about - it is entrusted to our Committee.....paragraph 4: PATOLICHEV is allocated 9,000 'foreign currency roubles'....paragraph 5: ....in case the Exhibition is visited by MacMillan and Queen Elisabeth the Second, presents should be given them according to the instructions and arrangements by the Soviet Ambassador. (signed) KHRUSHCHEV, Executive of Affairs."

11. S: So now we are preparing things. We are preparing straight away files, characteristics, photographs are being prepared in full, everything. Time to leave approaches - I've already - that is, a note was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding my first group - I was

/to leave.....

Meeting 18

again organise all this and do it, we need to have it done urgently, because it (the decree) was signed on the 1st, but we only got it on the 4th, and, by the way, on the KREML telephone. On the Government telephone, and this decree reached us later, when BREZHNEV signed it on July 5th, but as I told you we heard about it on the 4th."

20. I started worrying, I didn't sleep for three nights and even got thin! I thought, because you didn't give a visa - I would have left for here to prepare the programme for them, and to Hell with them! Let them change everything else while I would already be here with you!! So then on Monday they said the third paragraph had been revoked. Why had it been revoked? For two reasons: firstly a very strong impression was created by the Tartar who defected from the ballet while in France, a very strong impression. He was secretary of his Party organisation. So that you should know - Secretary of his Party organisation. He was chosen secretary by secret vote. Secondly, the people were prepared quickly, they were badly checked through the control organs, an exit permit was immediately demanded from the Section of the Central Committee and a visa was requested from you. And thirdly, what would the results be? Either the British would let them visit firms, or they wouldn't. And if they would not let them, then it would be a light entertaining stroll. And POLYANSKIJ managed to persuade KOZLOV to reconsider this point, and it was revoked. While I'd already got my visa! My passport had been brought to me, since the decision had been given me.

21. S: I want to - here is a cunning, intelligent manoeuvre - I came to SEROV, who saw me off this morning. I travelled with his wife and daughter. He saw me off this morning. In a suit like yours, only he had a star. But his wife and daughter are here in London, now. They came as tourists for twelve days, six in London and six in other towns. Tomorrow I shall be buying for them - I'll tell you more about it later. I shan't be buying it - we shall be buying it, for SEROV. (Laughs). So I came in and said: "Comrade Head of the Army, I was presented by the Committee with the leadership of the Committee, since they know that I am also a GRU worker and that I have interests in England, not only to carry out this work on the line of the Committee but also to fulfil our four tasks, regarding which I shall report to you shortly. There are four tasks which I have written down. My visa was granted by the English." My chiefs said: travel three or four times to the Capitalist countries. If you are recognised after having worked as a military attache and Chief Assistant in Turkey, we shall put you up for a prolonged mission. We shall see how the attitude of the Americans, British and French will be to you after you were a military type, but now are a civilian."

22. S: Further, this was taken note of in the section of the Central Committee of the Party, and they gave me permission. Out of the entire 44 people only I was given permission. They said: "Let him go!" Why? Because the Central Committee knows that I work both in the Committee and I work in the GRU. So it means that I have two purposes to go for. I said: "What right have we got not to exploit this opportunity, and not go?" I discussed this to begin with with General SMOLIKOV, and then with General MALIK. , you make this journey, along our line; does the Committee want to send you, or not?"

23. S: I went to this ALEKSENKO, this is ALEKSENKO - and to this SAMARIN - SAMARIN is the Second Deputy, he is Deputy Chairman (Zampredsedatel') - the second one, they have two Deputies now, ALEKSENKO and SAMARIN. I said: "With respect to the Committee line, considering that the journey of the Delegation has been cancelled, can I be of any use?" "Yes, of course, you can prepare. Within these groups there was a group of metallurgists, it will come to you there, we shall apply for visas; one of them is TIKHONOV." TIKHONOV is deputy of ZASYADKO, and ZASYADKO is the Chairman of the GosEkonomSoviet of the U.S.S.R. (Government Economic Council of the U.S.S.R.). While TIKHONOV is a metallurgist. He wants to come here for a month or a month and a half with a group, to visit a number of your big metallurgic firms. They should come for ten days - each

of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. When this group of TIKHONOV's was being planned, they wanted to show him the Edgar ALLEN firm and the firms, that is where MERRIMAN and McBRIDE are. And I was ordered to attach MILOVIDOV to the group of TIKHONOV's, when it arrives, and to warn SOLDATOV, i.e. the Ambassador here, the Soviet one, that TIKHONOV is arriving. TIKHONOV is a friend of SOLDATOV's.

33. G: MILOVIDOV is to go on waiting here all the time until they arrive? S: No, MILOVIDOV is leaving when the exhibition closes. G: He will come here afresh then, with TIKHONOV? S: No. Perhaps I will come with TIKHONOV. If TIKHONOV's group were to arrive now, MILOVIDOV would work with them. is general organiser, the Chief. I cannot travel with TIKHONOV, I can only direct (guide) everything and arrange everything, after that they can travel without me - why should I? TIKHONOV was invited by Mr. WEARING who is the Chairman of the Committee of Ferrous Metallurgy R.E.E.K. and he is the Managing Director too of the concern GUEST KEEN CO. There is a concern in England, GUEST KEEN Co., and the Managing Director of this concern is Mr. WEARING. This WEARING has invited TIKHONOV, when he was in Moscow at the Exhibition. Here I've got written down ARUTYUNOV Nikolay Bagaratovich - this is also a member of the Delegation of TIKHONOV. At present, so far, a group has been prepared consisting of seven people. This Nikolay Bagratovich is at present the Head of the Information Directorate within our Committee. ARUTYUNOV. He is also coming. So that so far a group has been prepared in accordance with this decree, and consisting of 7 people.

34. S: I was well instructed in photography. Perhaps there are some flaws. But I am cross with my camera. One of my Minoxes, when I photograph at 45, 46 and to the 50th frame, it goes very stiffly, it pulls. So that I ask you - in my notes here - you see the notation - invite a photographic instructor, I have several questions for him. G: We will do this.

35. S: Now, as regards this group of TIKHONOV's, it will arrive here to you - or rather, we shall ask for visas, and whether you grant them or not is your affair. I think that he should be granted to visit some firm. Perhaps I will come - one cannot tell. TIKHONOV's attitude to me is very pleasant. My stock was raised by GVISHIANI. I swear to you by my daughter - my beloved only one, and her mother - that when I left from here I presented GVISHIANI's wife with some marvellous scent, powder, lipstick, a packet of cards and several packets of cigarettes. I gave presents to everyone, I

calculated that I had given presents to the value of about £80 - £100. And when I travelled this time - even RUDNEV told me to bring him batteries of 12 volts. These are the Soviet leaders for you in their form! I shall speak to you later in more detail about this.

36. G: How about October and your possibilities for coming? S: As regards October, it's like this: I've just been very cunning. We already applied to the Central Committee with a proposal - I sent it, the third quarter - I passed on via the lady what specialists were being planned. Well - did I work correctly with this lady, or not? H: (in English) You stayed a little bit too long with her. S: Excuse me, I also am a clever man. It's impossible to sit, give and vanish. It is impossible. The lady is sitting, rain is approaching. A pram. She is holding all three children. She is again dressed in the same brown suede jacket, so that I should always recognise her. I appraised the whole set up, the rain is approaching, I on purpose waited for rain to begin, so that as many people as possible should leave. The place is bad. (It would be better) to go further towards the edge there, there would be fewer walkers. She was sitting beside the path opposite the circus and cinema. Everyone goes and sits there, when it is sunny there isn't space for a sardine there! People all round. But further in the square it's empty. The rain was approaching, I thought: let the first drops fall, then I'll approach her.

37. S: (Goes on to describe contact, says lady had no news for him and was not there the following Sunday, the 9th, although he would have had a message for her, as GVISHIANI had already informed him on July 4th that he, S., was ordered to London, and he could have passed this message on via the girl; he goes on to say that she had understood him despite his bad English, only MERRIMAN does not understand him! He will improve his English. He goes on to say that the British need not have feared the intervention of the Militia, as he, S., has his red book, and would have told the Militiamen "shove off, scum", would have let the girl go and then he himself discussed the matter with the Militiamen. The British are the leaders and mentors here, but over there he knows what to do. Goes on to describe departure of lady with pram and 3 children, and that he noted that all was well).

38. S: And how could I know that all was well? You could only inform me of this by wireless in a week's time. Now that you have passed in the message to me the fact that the carbon was wrong, I read the whole thing correctly, yes? G: Yes, yes, it was perfect. S: Without errors. And on Saturday, the day before yesterday, you sent me the same message. What for? On Saturday I again received 41 groups - what for? What do I need it for? G: Because .. S: I don't understand! G: Of course you understand. Just think. Every Saturday and Sunday during the course of a month this is being sent to/you the chance to listen whenever best for you. S: And do you think give that I would not have listened for it at once? G: (Explains again why repeat messages are sent). S: (Goes on to explain that he has made some three mistakes in decoding but found the errors. Does not find it too difficult. Nor does he find receiving too difficult. Before his departure he hid everything in a secret place (tainik), having first packed it all up. Complains again about receiving the same cyphered message of 41 groups twice. Reverts to his contact with the woman and calls her a heroine - she was most natural, didn't even start. Says it was quite correct and natural that he should have chatted to the children - otherwise why should he have approached at all?! etc. It is explained to him that it was all right once, but would not be a good thing often, if they have to use her again, the briefer the better. Subject says it would be better to meet further left in future, as there are less people there - not by the kiosks).

39. S: Now there is another question: why don't you - well, I go to receptions, to the Canadian Embassy regularly, as you know, the Americans don't invite me to the Embassy, although I have already met Americans - the patent chaps came for a visit, 6 of them; a furrier came for a visit, about whom I wrote to you. I also got acquainted with some other American. And no-one invites me! And I'm the deputy head of a section - there was the

big American day, I thought I would be at the reception, when there were several thousands present, but I wasn't invited! (J. explained to him that the American Embassy called his organisation and asked for a guest list, his name was not on it). S: Well, perhaps that's because I'm young and a new worker. (Agrees that this is the best way to issue invitations, remarks that he has also never been once at the British Embassy, as yet, but has been thrice at the Canadian Embassy). The Ambassador Smith, his wife, three children, FURTSEVA was there, KHRUNEV was there, and I was there too. So I go to the Canadian Embassy. As regards the American and British Embassies - I'm quite clear about it now. But perhaps that will also develop gradually.

40. As regards the lady, we've finished that. I request that she takes up her position in future further away from populous places. G: Now that you know her, the matter is quite different. H: Now that she is in England, you can meet her here in a short while. S: Now I have an idea - I would ask you to analyse this matter and solve it scientifically. Why should this lady not be invited to the Canadian Embassy, say, to a reception, so that I could become officially acquainted with her at the reception? Then I could meet her quite openly in the street, as I would come up to Ambassador Smith, if I saw him in the street, for a chat, never mind if there are 100 militiamen present! (It is agreed that such a meeting could be arranged).

41. G: (Explains which carbons should be used for S/W, of those now in S.'s notebook). S: I have written a strip in invisible ink there. I copied it out of there, but all the other formulae I have also here in ink on the slip of paper I sent you. (He had not written through the carbon, but the neighbouring sheet of paper). S: When you gave me the black notebook, there was a black partition sheet ..... and you told me, the three sheets lying behind it are the carbons, three in a row. G: No, no..... they were the second, fourth and sixth. S: I didn't understand that. .... When I asked for a large sheet like that, you gave it to me to begin with, and then you withdrew it. You told me: there is the cover, then there is a black sheet, an insertion, the first three sheets after that are all carbons .... I opened it, took out the first sheet, put it underneath, wrote very clearly - I sent a copy later - it was used later - everything turns out well for me, thank goodness I didn't destroy the carbon, I wrote through this sheet of paper, and I reckoned that the two sheets that remained were also carbons. You told me - all three sheets are carbons. G: .... the real carbons were the 2nd, 4th and 6th sheets. The 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and so on are not carbons. S: And why is this so? G: It is to protect the carbons. ..... So I informed you by radio: you did not write with that one, the first; take the following one, because I knew that your No.2 was a carbon. S: When I get home I'll re-arrange them so that I have the carbons one after the other, so I don't mix them up. (They go on repeating the same thing over again). I copied from there, but all other designations and formulae I have destroyed. So I have such a strip left - and why? Because on the opposite side - I didn't re-write it for you then, I kept it - and all the rest I've destroyed. (Referring to the slip of paper with notes which he gave us).

42. G: But what was it? S: There were: all the conventional designations which are used in this technique. Then the conclusions from SALKOVSKIY's formula for reactive raw material (reaktivnoe syr'e), there were several formulae. That's it. And I destroyed that, but I left the strip for myself, as I didn't remove the diagram describing the places during a rocket flight. That I kept, I took them, that is the last that I have remaining of all the tens of sheets - almost a hundred sheets - that I copied 'by my own hand', when I was on the courses.

43. S: Yes - how did my documents come out - all right? G: Yes, perfectly. S: The quality is not bad then? G: No. S: I got scared - why had I written - that thing I gave to the lady - four films - I think I stretched the photography to the very last frames. Did you get the materials

regarding BEKRENEV's lecture? BEKRENEV's lecture turned out well? G: Yes, very excellent. S: I photographed the second lecture, finished the film, wound it to the dots, started taking out the film, at that moment there was a knock on the door, I moved everything and it all moved onwards from the dot, and I trembled, my heart ached, because afterwards I did not click it fifty times, I had not time to put it back to zero again - I took a new film and put it in, while I hid this one, and continued photographing. And when I got to the 45th still and then to the 50th it was very stiff to turn, I really had to use force. I wanted to change to the other camera that you sent me, to the second one. Here I made notes there as to what I had to do, how it should be greased and such like, and I have questions for him, the photography instructor, let him come to see me. Because when working it's like this - telephone calls - one has to stop - you may have seen, I have even photographed some pages twice, because I wasn't sure whether I had turned the page or not. Is the manual all right, or not? G: Excellent. S: It was the year 59. The thing is, to get into that larder - G: Where did you get it from? S: From GRU. All GRU.

44. S: Now please write an article for me because I am very busy, and then I'm too tired to write anything for the Soviet Regime. When I received permission to look at the material it was for background for writing some article - that will be my cover story, then I shall open up such larders in the secret section! G: How can you account for the sources of data in such an article? S: Quite simply. We receive masses of open military journals from you, from the British, from the French. I finished two Academies. For the third time I am today on a mission to a foreign country, if I want to be clever, if I am a military strategic intelligence officer, if I absorb like a sponge everything that goes on here, I read, if I work - I am not working on that at present, I should be able to do this but now I have enough other work for the present for the Committee, for GRU, and our basic work - I didn't start in the right order - our basic work, GRU and the Committee. I get tired, I come home and fall into bed, I fall asleep, in the morning I do my gymnastics, eat and go out. And then afterwards I, in order to write something - I had small inventions, I proposed an Artillery angle measuring device, I shall tell you about it in detail later, you know, before, when I burned with the courage of an eagle, I wrote in the papers a little. Why should I not, if I sit down in front of all the material which we get through our Intelligence from you, such as the regulations through Ceylon.

45. S: By the way, how was that list, good, or not - of the agent network? H: All good, yes. S: Aha. We get the materials from there, we shall upset this agent operation as if they did not exist. We get (this) in our Information Directorate (headed by) KARPENKSKIY Lieutenant-General, who received a promotion - did you get the report about so many Generals being promoted? G: We received it.

46. S: Why should an intelligent officer not sit down, draw general conclusions and write about the opinions of the Anglo-Americans, for instance, in regard to artillery. Let us say tanks. But I myself am a General Staff officer, I can take any doctrinal subject, any question of doctrine, chew over it and give my own views in these secret articles in the journals such as VOYENNAYA MYSL and VOYENNYY VESTNIK. G: But won't they ask you "Where is your source?" S: But you must give me the sources - journals - you give me the bibliography - I asked about it. You indicate what I should use. G: You see, they will ask you "Where did you find it?" S: You give me a list of the bibliography regarding that which is printed openly, without the secret stamp, and I will look at all the libraries, all that is superfluous that you give me I will strike out, and will leave in that which is required. Or if you like I will send you a bibliography, and you write me on the theme - on the basis of this bibliography - your expert can write it so that it would appear logical that a 42 years old, (finished) two Academies, travelled abroad, has for eleven years had experience in intelligence, could have done it. G: That would be much better. S: I'll give you the bibliography. G: That would be much better.

S: We have tons of military journals from all countries. G: That is important, if you can say that such exist and you used it as source material. S: Well, we must come to an agreement during these 21 days. G: If an item of interest is found they may order you to produce the source.

47. S: Well, to begin with I shall review it, I shall write it all down in my working note-book, I shall think it over, don't worry - understands. I shall put in that to which I could have had access. And we do have access, through our intelligence, through secret literature which we steal by means of our agents, and through open literature which you very open-heartedly write! And we have tons of it - like this - right up to the ceiling - journals, just sit down and write! Think, gather everything! Gather it - on the subject of tanks, on artillery, on general views - infantry, and so and so, and so on - aviation - navy and - it would be logical, there is a lot of material. I would ask you to do this, and if I get into print with it once - and you'll get this article! - if it is printed in a journal, they'll say "What is this?" I am on this trip right now - they consider me to be intelligent for their use. Why do they still keep me in spite of my father? You don't know anything about my father, do you? G: No. But I will inform you if I find out.

48. S: They know that I can work, they taught me, a fool, for many, many years. They say I have initiative, am gifted, quick on the uptake - they expect a return from me. And if there is no return, then they will say: "That means he is slipping, he no longer has a future." I don't care what they say, in any case I shall be with you in two years' time. If at least I have something printed which is only several pages long, an article reflects good thinking, I shall then say: "I have had this printed, I want to produce something else now, I have more thoughts, ideas are coming to me! I must express them" I will tell them that. "I must read what our views are on such and such a subject" - and when I read I take photographs of it all! All those journals which were brought just now - tomorrow you will say to me: excellent chap!" After rockets this goes as No.2 in importance. I value rockets very highly, the information I gave you. I value it very much. These are the originals, that which we studied.

49. G: Will you have access any more to rockets? S: I shall have, I shall have. Yes, I was promised - I spoke with VARENTSOV - I said: "Sergey Sergeevich, I want to write something about anti-tank artillery, like for instance the type which the Americans have."

50. S: By the way, gentlemen, this thing of yours is working, isn't it, because it is very important to have this recorded. I shall just touch on it, later I will go into detail.

51. S: In connection with these events in Germany, Berlin, our Command must pay special attention to anti-tank defence. Special attention. Why? Because two tank armies - armies, that means consisting of regiments, brigades and two corps, that is an army, plus all auxiliaries. Two tank armies on the territory of the East German Republic (GDR). Check it through your other channels - two tank armies, ready for action on the territory of the East German Republic, not taking into account the tank armies, also armies, which are in the second echelon on our territory, in our forces, on the contiguous borders, and also in Czechoslovakia and in Poland.

52. S: And at present KHRUSHCHEV is carrying on a very cunning masked policy with his General Staff; he is putting much emphasis on tank forces. The tanks will have cannons and rockets on them, there will be machine guns on the tanks. So that our task will be to bring our anti-tank artillery to the highest state of perfection now, and to have anti-tank forces in each infantry section. I have in mind bazookas, and so on, and so on. These things must be available. They must be trained daily, like violinists being trained to play the violin, daily. So the troops can use direct fire daily over open sights. If our anti-tank forces will be at a high level, and his massed tank forces advance across the lines of communications, which will inevitably happen - we will talk about this in more detail later - and a very great many tanks will be built in the future. To the detriment of the artillery.

53. There is a battle going on at present between the Commanders of the Armies - why are you giving so much money to the tanks? While rockets and electronic science should be increased, and so forth. The emphasis is on tanks, emphasis on submarines, rockets. Aviation, that which he showed, that's a spectacle. These aeroplanes exist, they are not yet all in mass production, some are in serial production, but very few. I shall tell you later, of which there are more and of which there are less since that is known to me. For this reason, immediately - the Berlin question, after the signing of the agreement, they want to blockade the approaches with tanks - the whole problem - that we should - if we hit them hard in the teeth - I am saying this now, I'll say it in more detail later - he wishes the nature of these battles to be localised, but we must hit them so hard that they all be destroyed. For this reason the anti-tank forces must be raised to an as yet unheard-of level now. We must increase anti-tank forces, rockets, conventional artillery, bazookas, mines.

54. G: You think the demonstration was intentional? S: Yes, it was a parade, a spectacle. Some of our generals said: "We shouldn't go to look at this, we want peace, we keep on talking about peace, while there they are giving a demonstration of force." I heard this with my own ears. But these aeroplanes do exist. But the aeroplanes do not as yet compose air armies. Squadrons, so far. G: But do you think there is perhaps this tendency - to show these aeroplanes so that the West should also turn to more aircraft production in competition, and give less attention to rockets, so to speak to appropriate more money for aircraft rather than rockets.
S: He would like that, but he does not think that we are as naive as that. He knows that this will not work. G: But do you think that it is possible there was such a tendency? S: No, and in two or three years, those aeroplanes which he demonstrated now and the secrets which he showed, there will be many, many squadrons of them. They will be produced like sausages.

55. S: Tell me, this carbon which I brought, the one I worked on, can something be got out of it with the help of ultra-violet rays? G: No.

56. S: I got your radio message, every word of it. Was it exactly as you said? G: It was perfect, you got the full message. The only slight error was in the abbreviation for beginning. You read it as NASh instead of NACh which makes no difference at all. The message also probably straightened out in your mind that you used the wrong carbon for SW.
S: I could have written up the material in overt text just as well but I simply wanted to try out the SW system. By the way did you receive all my filmed materials? G: Yes we did and it all came out fine.

57. S: When I told VARENTSOV that I wanted to write military articles he told me to use his office, that is the office where GOSPE sat. You probably read what I wrote about his death when the helicopter crashed?
H: Yes, we got that. S: I am just checking to see that you received all my material. It is so good that Mr. KENNEDY and Mr. MacMILLAN have declared such a firm stand, this has created quite a panic there. Later I will go into details but right now we are just expressing general views.

58. G: Now let us consider a matter of the greatest importance for all of us and particularly beginning with the report which you yourself sent to us about the Berlin situation. Possibly you can expand on and clarify many details of your own report; for example who else was present when VARENTSOV made his statement you told us about? S: Gen. Major Andrey Romanovich POZOVNYY with his wife and I was there with my wife Vera and that is all. The occasion was when he invited his very close friends to his dacha for a drink as a consequence of his having received the rank of Chief Marshal. By the way did you get FEDOROV's photograph? H: Yes we did.
S: You see the existence of the four brigades was confirmed and I gave you the deployment area of the First Brigade. Storm groups should be organised to prevent these brigades from moving out of the towns where they are. This is something Mr. STRAUSS should work on.

59. H: I think we'd better start on the questions in the proper order. Q: to S: We have an agenda here and the questions have been placed in the proper order of sequence so let me ask you these in order. Here is the first one; what new developments do you know about in the Soviet position on the BERLIN question since the time you last reported? For example, what is the present Soviet position, what action have they taken and what is their plan?

60. S: I understand. The Soviet position as I have reported to you is as follows: first of all if it were possible to deploy a huge army on a wide front using only conventional weapons and no rockets with atomic or hydrogen warheads, there would probably be mass defections to our (the West) side. I mention this as a preamble to the situation. Q: Is this your view or do VARENTSOV and others share this view? S: This is a general view because our situation at home is rotten. They don't trust KHRUSHCHEV, they don't trust the Soviet Government and the people remain half hungry as before. The people are very displeased with KHRUSHCHEV's militant speeches and they say this audibly since it is easier to express oneself now that BERIA is gone. The current belief is that, thanks to KHRUSHCHEV's militant speeches, KENNEDY, MACMILLAN and De GAULLE have been forced to increase their armament programmes by two or three times. If STALIN were alive he would do everything quietly but this fool is blurting out his threats and intentions and is forcing our possible potential enemies to increase their military strength. They dislike him and say that he is hurting his own cause and that he talks too much about Soviet military accomplishments in his effort to frighten the Western leaders.

61. S: With this thought in the background in the present situation we (the West) do not wish to repeat a second Egyptian fiasco. We should react with firmness if he blocks the access roads to BERLIN, those blocking forces should be smashed and without striking with atomic weapons at industrial centres or rear areas. Should he attempt to do this then he should be repaid in kind and the whole world told that the West is protecting its vital interests which KHRUSHCHEV had trampled upon in violation of the Potsdam Agreement signed after World War II. If he expands the conflict to some degree then he should be answered with corresponding counter blows. Actually KHRUSHCHEV and the Soviet Army at this time are unprepared for this.

62. S: Now, what new developments took place since I last reported? KHRUSHCHEV is personally pressing the Central Committee of the Communist Party in two directions; the first is to establish and perfect a mass production programme of all types of armament, specifically rockets, aviation and other similar means. To implement this the workers of the Central Committee and the responsible Ministers are actually physically present at the respective production centres for which they are responsible. They are, for example, at such cities as GORKI which should be intensively bombed. Near GORKI is a town called SORMOVO. At this place there are extensive yards where submarines are produced. There are wharves, dry-docks and shipyards there. In addition, before I forget, there is a huge aircraft production centre which is building the Delta type bombers and fighters which you have seen, or maybe you call them swept back wings - this plant is located at DNEPROPETROVSK. Now this area has been declared a forbidden zone for foreigners, even the mines there which were previously visited are closed off because they desire to shut off access to the area.

63. S: What are they doing militarily? My old friend Marshal VARENTSOV is constantly travelling to the countries of Peoples' Democracies. Just prior to my departure to come here the extensive manoeuvres in Bulgaria were completed. Here is the way manoeuvres are now conducted. In every tank army and in every field army, that is mostly an infantry formation, one Division from the D.D.R. is included. The exercises are conducted just as large scale formations are trained but fully participating and fully equipped, one Division per Army from the D.D.R. also participates.

G: What type of Division is it? S: It is a standard D.D.R. Infantry Division which operates exactly as Soviet doctrine prescribes, and trains with the Soviet Army at all manoeuvres. G: Where does this take place? Is it with the Soviet Army only in the D.D.R. or elsewhere in addition? S: The German Division is included in the Soviet Army wherever the Soviet Army may run manoeuvres. This means it may take place in any country of the Warsaw Pact and also within the U.S.S.R. itself. This is a new measure which is designed to train the D.D.R. Army in tactics and strategy for joint operations.

64. G: How about Divisions of other Satellite countries? S: Shortly after I left you extensive manoeuvres took place in Czechoslovakia which involved Soviet, Czech and D.D.R. troops which were training for joint operations. Marshal VARENTSOV was there and all of the Marshals of the respective arms of service. Therefore satellite armed forces are being trained for joint operations. The last big manoeuvre just ended in Bulgaria. FEDOROV went to KAPUSTIN YAR with one rocket battalion in June for training. When I saw him he told me that when the Soviet forces in case of hostilities have to deploy and leave their garrison positions in the D.D.R., they will have to combat all Germans. The enlisted personnel of the D.D.R. Army are very hostile to us. The top brass is well disposed to the Soviet Army because they are well taken care of, just as their top political leaders. However, the enlisted man simply hate us and if we can't deploy in time they will beat us down with stones and rifles, and they will execute all kinds of sabotage. I wrote this up for you already. In other words if communications were cut, the isolated units would be trapped. I did not give you all these details for lack of space, so I want to tell you about it orally.

65. S: FEDOROV told me that the existing supply dumps for artillery were not adequate for storing rockets and that larger protective storage structures were constructed. These were both higher and longer than normal structures and could be easily spotted. There are so many German spies in the area that not only did they detect the rocket storage units but in a number of cases sabotage by puncturing the rocket shells took place. I wrote about this, upon filling the rockets with fuel, extensive leaks were discovered and these rockets were sabotaged to make them impossible to use. FEDOROV said that diversionist spies sent by West Germany were responsible for this. FEDOROV also said that since the Soviet Government will not allocate funds to rebuild artillery dumps, improvised shelters must be constructed and these are impossible to camouflage. G: Were there many cases of this kind? S: He told me that there were two or three cases of sabotage in his brigade. Similar cases were found in other brigades and he again repeated to me that there are four rocket brigades in the territory of the D.D.R. G: When did this take place? S: Only recently, in May.

66. S: Another thing I want you to check which I have reported is that in addition to KAPUSTIN YAR, Soviet rocket forces deploy near ODESSA, where this aeroplane crash I wrote about took place, have impact areas in Rumania and in Poland and they are test firing at those areas. The exact location from where rocket firing takes place is not known but it is from the ODESSA Military District. Another important bit of information told to me by Colonel BUZINOV, who is now the A.D.C. to Marshal VARENTSOV, is that joint operations in various types of military manoeuvres will take place throughout the entire year. Satellite armed forces will participate in these manoeuvres and the particular emphasis is to develop the combat readiness of the units belonging to the D.D.R.

67. S: Before going to the next question, I must say that VARENTSOV looked extremely worn and haggard when I saw him that Sunday, and in addition to the burden of responsibilities as Chief Marshal he shortly expects to be the Commander in Chief of all rockets in the U.S.S.R. They expect to replace MALINOVSKY as the Minister of Defense by GRECHKO. GRECHKO's Deputy will be MOSKALENKO, and VARENTSOV will be in charge of all rocket forces, that is, not only will he have the rockets and artillery of the ground forces of which he is now the Chief, but in addition he will be in command of the joint Headquarters of tactical rockets and strategic

rockets which are now under MOSKALENKO. I wrote this up for you; and there will be some twelve Directorates in this new combined Headquarters which will be all under VARENTSOV. He will also be in charge of PERKHUSHKOVO I told you about. This has been given to VARENTSOV even though the Minister dislikes him and many Marshals are envious of him. Quite frankly, though I have a great personal regard for him, he is not a deep thinker and has educational limitations. However, he is one of the best artillery men and they want him to be in charge of both tactical and strategic rockets.

68. S: to G: You will give me a plus for this, I just remembered that I found a classified article by your friend Lieut.Gen. KOCHETKOV. It deals with the creation of an operational directorate in G.R.U. I remember last meetings I was not very convincing in my explanation of this directorate. (S. misread title of article which actually spoke of the eliminations of inefficiency in operational intelligence and military intelligence, and not on the creation of an operational directorate). In addition there are a number of other very important articles here including those by VARENTSOV and ODINTSOV and other prominent military leaders. I am very happy that the photography came out clearly. H: This is a special issue of articles in VOENNAYA MYSL. Are these more secret than the ordinary issues? S: This is absolutely Top Secret and I will now find the sheet on which the classification is clearly indicated. (S. continues for some time to examine and to remark upon the articles which he had photographed).

69. S: Publications of a Top Secret nature previously issued by the various branches of service are no longer handled in that manner. They are now incorporated in a group of articles and published in a Top Secret special issue of VOENNAYA MYSL and in VOENNYI VESTNIK. I have photographed a number of these articles in toto and those were the ones which seemed to me most important. If you will examine the table of contents please tell me what others you wish photographed in their order of priority. (S. read all of the article titles and list of authors and emphasised that these articles reflected the current thinking and military doctrine of the Soviet Army. He also noted that enquiries or remarks concerning any of these articles must be submitted directly to the editor of the publication only through classified control channels).

70. S: I request that you have all this translated and turn the material over to your military commanders since the substance of these articles is of significant current importance. Even the word rocket is used here, not the camouflage word assembly of some kind or other and you will also note that there are now types of rockets with their designations described here. What I would like to do with all of the materials that I have passed to you is to re-examine them after you have processed them and have prepared a list of questions requiring clarification. At the same time I will be able to check the quality of my own photography.

71. G: What did you say that the position of General POZOVNYI was who was with you when VARENTSOV made his statement? S: He was the former Deputy to VARENTSOV for political matters. Now Deputy to BIRYUZOV.

72. (S. insisted on showing an article which included military estimates of the NATO Powers' military weapons to indicate what their intelligence was able to produce. While reading S. emphasised that he spotted three new rockets, the R-30, R-170 and the R-300, remarking that the R-300 designation was equated to the range of 300 kilometres. S. also referred to tables of Western powers, specifically U.S. rocket capabilities for a given sector of combat operations. The numbers of available rocket weapons of various calibres and the rate of fire was indicated. S. stated that these tables should be checked for accuracy and if Soviet information was correct then deliberate changes should be introduced in order to offset Soviet calculations of MOZh [Mathematical expectancy]. S. also mentioned that anti-missile missiles and their inclusion in a co-ordinated radar search net were described in one of the articles).

73. G: By the way how much time do you have available today? S: We still have time to work yet. G: We are concerned about your pattern of life here. Do you have to report to anyone? S: No. I am living all alone in a small neat room and I have not seen any other Sovietsthere. As you see from my documents I am my own chief and I can develop my business relations here with PAVLOV who is the acting Resident during the absence on leave of the Resident. I don't have to report to him. I have been assigned my own missions which I will attempt to fulfil and you may help me to fulfil some of them. All I need to do is to come back with a record of having accomplished my missions for both G.R.U. and the G.N.T.K. I have not yet told you about the G.R.U. missions but I will do so later and with your help I think I can accomplish all my missions.

74. S: The information I obtained on my last trip was favourably received, even though they did not use MERRIMAN I don't care. I saw GENERALOV recently while he was in MOSCOW. He told me that he had called MERRIMAN but could not reach him and when he did reach him MERRIMAN told him that he was busy. Possibly you gave MERRIMAN instructions that he should not go to a meeting. H: MERRIMAN says that he has never heard anything from them. G: Did GENERALOV actually speak to MERRIMAN? S: He was told by MERRIMAN that he was too busy, but why could he not have turned over the materials he promised me that he would get? These were just the overt materials that we had all agreed he would get for me and pass them through GENERALOV. H: Simply because MERRIMAN has not heard anything from GENERALOV at all. S: We shouldn't use such old men. He said in my presence in unmistakable English that even I could understand that he would get these materials for me. G: The point is MERRIMAN says that no-one has called him on the phone. S: GENERALOV told me he called. G: One thing is clear, either MERRIMAN is a liar or GENERALOV is a liar. S: Let's check into this because I received credit for having turned a man over for contact, but how they use him after that I couldn't care less.

75. G: Your present situation is now clearer but there will be days when you have to make an appearance somewhere, possibly to visit PAVLOV or go to the Embassy, and sometimes this could be in the evening. S: Yes, and on some days we will have to work during the daytime. On certain days I should be in my room in the evening and on other days I should meet with Soviets, but particularly since at this time there are many intelligence people in London, for example while I was on my way to see WINNE I ran into VORONIN. In MOSCOW he was the chief of a NAPRAVLENIYE in Strategic Intelligence under General SOKOLOV. Tomorrow I will meet him at nine o'clock and we will have a talk. G: Is he here on a mission? S: Yes, he has his own mission and there are a lot of intelligence officers that you have permitted to come here, particularly a large number of the neighbours. They are watching our people at the exhibition. G: Did he come as a member of a delegation from Lt.Col. ROGOV's to which you belong? S: No, he was sent here on a special assignment independently.

76. G: Let me continue now with questions on BERLIN so we can cover this subject. S: Very well.

Berlin ✓

77. G: This is an important question. What is the degree of confidence of VARENTSOV and other high ranking Soviet military officers regarding the readiness of Soviet forces to meet the consequences of KHRUSHCHEV's BERLIN policy? That is, if physical resistance develops? S: That is a very important question. If we consider today's situation the Soviet Army is not ready for any widespread war. VARENTSOV said there is no confidence that our forces are prepared. I even wrote you this and VARENTSOV said specifically that in going forward this way we are proceeding to a definite risk. We are preparing our troops and training them to be ready for any eventuality, but at this time there is no confidence that they are prepared. G: Did VARENTSOV say that? S: Yes, he said that. They are trying to establish this confidence, the Central Committee members, the various Party members and the Ministers are all at the production centres to develop the needed equipment preparedness and the Marshals and Generals are constantly with troops to develop their combat efficiency. As an example, during the manoeuvres in ODESSA Military District look at how many Generals perished there.

78. G: How do they regard the military feasibility of containing the military conflict within the D.D.R.? S: This is a purely adventuristic concept. They plan to block all roads of access through the D.D.R. to BERLIN with tank forces. Of course the first echelon of forces will be East German troops and back of them in a second echelon support role will be Soviet troops. As soon as this barrier is smashed then additional reinforcing troops will be brought up. The entire plan involves co-ordinated action on the part of East German and Soviet troops. The thinking is that if these reinforced troops can strongly repulse the Anglo-American, French and West German forces then these will abandon further conflict and negotiate with the East German Government in order to obtain transit to BERLIN. Further conflict will then be avoided and the Soviet thinking is that the Western powers will be afraid of further conflict. The Soviet estimates are that the West German Army is not prepared for conflict and specifically they are considered to be 80% of strength in equipment and manpower.

79. G: What sources are there to whom you attribute this thought? S: My sources are Sergei Sergeievich and, write down, KUPIN. KUPIN is now the Commander of artillery in a tank army in the D.D.R. M: Did you see him at VARENTSOV's? S: Yes, I did and he has just arrived in MOSCOW and he will be the artillery commander of the MOSCOW Military District, replacing General POLKOVNIK of Artillery LIKhACHEV who is being retired and, as I told you before, KUPIN's nephew GONCHAROV is married to YERLENA, VARENTSOV's daughter. G: So they are relatives. S: KUPIN has not received this position yet but the Central Committee has already approved it. His headquarters will be right near my house and he will visit me and I hope to be able to get much good information from him.

80. G: Do you think that the Soviet forces are ready for general nuclear war and what is the estimate of Soviet officers that such a war may develop out of the BERLIN situation? S: They do not want an atomic war but local atomic strikes are possible since they say they have what to spit with, but in so far as covering important military centres or concentration points they do not have the capability and for this reason KHRUSHCHEV is fighting for peace.

81. G: Therefore what would you say about the position of the preparedness of Soviet forces for nuclear war? S: They are not ready. KHRUSHCHEV's statements about this are all bluff, but he is preparing as fast as possible. Certain evidences are to be seen. Near where I live are offices of the RAYVOYENKOMAT who belong to the organization and mobilization Directorate and they are beginning to re-examine discharged officers. This is specifically restricted to engineer officers of all categories and other technical officers such as Signal Corps men, etc. In other words, the local military officers have received an order from the main organization and mobilization directorate of General Staff to re-examine all discharged technical officers and to place them on active duty.

82. G: Where did VARENTSOV himself acquire his information on the subject? Was it from official documents or from meetings within the Ministry? S: He got that from the Supreme Military Council where KHRUSHCHEV sits as Chairman and the active voices are usually KOZLOV and MIKOYAN. The other members of the Presidium are silent. These three are pressing and demanding that the German question be resolved by signing the D.D.R. Peace Treaty and that this matter can not be put off any longer because the U.S.S.R. would then be in a laughable position before the whole world.

83. S: The D.D.R. is nothing, they are only a vassal, they say that if we do not do this now the future generations will not forgive us because we have talked so much about signing this and did not do it. At this time they feel a certain amount of military strength, although this is far from having the capability of covering all military targets with atomic weapons. The reasoning is simply this, to strike one sharp blow, let a little blood flow and the Americans and British will be frightened and withdraw. This is what he is banking on, but if he received a severe counter blow then maybe he would sing another tune, at the same time you know what a bad morale factor the Soviet Army and population have. This you know from other sources not only from me.

84. H: If this happens what does he think will happen to KHRUSHCHEV? S: He would be in an untenable position and may have to withdraw. This POZOVNYY told me. G: Would KHRUSHCHEV be removed? S: No. They could have removed him a hundred times before this. First of all it would be a loss in prestige and secondly there is no-one adequate to replace him. MOLOTOV is of little consequence and there are no people like MOLOTOV and MALENKOV available. KHRUSHCHEV is a fresh man, a politician and a Party man. G: In other words he will just pull his horns in but will still remain the chief. S: Yes.

85. S: By the way I wish you would pass to your military leaders the importance of these articles because none of them contain any foolishness or flippant material. The authors are of such stature that any article of little consequence would reflect seriously against them. I particularly request that you call to the attention of your military leaders the great significance that is now being given to the expansion of Soviet tank forces. Such a great significance is now given to tank forces and a tank army does have tremendous striking power. You must increase your anti-tank weapons significantly as well as build up your own tank forces.

86. G: Who brought up the conversation on the BERLIN situation when you were with VARENTSOV? S: I will tell you exactly how it happened. Although I was burning with desire to ask about this it actually happened like this. First of all everyone had a few drinks and my wife quite innocently said "Sergei Sergeievich, looking at things from the viewpoint of a woman and a mother do you think we will sign the Peace Treaty with East Germany?" He said "Yes, this will be done" and later when we separated from the ladies together with POZOVNYY and myself he spoke of it freely himself and both POZOVNYY and I had interest in this matter so we furthered the conversation, but to be perfectly honest it was brought up earlier by my wife.

87. G: What is the opinion of VARENTSOV, that is does he agree with KHRUSHCHEV's view regarding what the Western powers will do? S: I can tell you exactly what he told POZOVNYY and myself. He even cursed and said "We are definitely embarking on a risky action". He mentioned that KHRUSHCHEV is prepared to reinforce the original clash with considerable reinforcements by tank forces. But he does not want the war to spread further. He realises that the NATO powers have strong nuclear capabilities, but he is relying on the assumption that they would not use nuclear weapons in the first phases of such a conflict. If KHRUSHCHEV had such capabilities his concept would be to launch an all-out initial smashing blow. But he does not have this and I have heard this view expressed many times by many officers on the General Staff. The people do not want to fight for anything in East Germany. In addition, we are subsidising with billions the black African peoples and are constantly being visited by their leaders and the attitude is why do two things at once?

88. G: What do the other high-ranking officials think of this? S: The high ranking officials including VARENTSOV, who is also a big man, realise that we have certain strengths but that in many respects we are not ready for a prolonged conflict, but they simply give orders to produce, to support and to execute orders and they have no choice but to do it; if they refuse they will be removed. Whether they agree or not they have to do it. To keep their positions and not get thrown out they would sell their souls to the devil. For example, you remember the time when VARENTSOV was not a Chief Marshal and was criticising KHRUSHCHEV here and there. Now at his party since he has become a Chief Marshal he raised his glass and offered a toast to the health of Nikita Sergeievich. I fell back, I raised my glass, but what the hell would I drink to him for? I thought of you and drank to your health. Now, of course, VARENTSOV is pleased with him and is willing to produce all the rocket forces available and he is particularly pleased at becoming a Commander in Chief of all rocket forces, tactical and strategic. Of course, all people are human and when one receives these great distinctions and power one will use this power and now VARENTSOV is favourably disposed towards KHRUSHCHEV.

89. S: But everyone knows how KHRUSHCHEV is lying when he says that we have caught up with America in milk production and in meat when for meat

they are slaughtering rabbits and horses.

90. H: And who was there when the actual ceremony took place? J: If he can reconstruct in detail how it all happened.....Who else was there with you - just POZOVNYI and his wife? S: I will tell you again. After he had received his promotion, a whole month and a half elapsed before we could congratulate him as he was absent from MOSCOW, let alone give him the customary toasts. And he himself felt that he must have a party with his close friends, and also invited Col. General ZHDANOV, The Chief of GAU - but he was away in LENINGRAD at the time and was not there with his wife. Therefore what happened was that one day Ekaterina Karpovna rang up my wife, I myself not being at home but in my office at the time, and left a message saying that he should keep Sunday free as we want you to come to lunch with us at the dacha that day?

91. S: The same message-order was given to POZOVNYI through Lyuba Alekseevna, his wife. His car....by the way he has been given a ZIM again as a Chief-Marshal, whereas before he has a....not a Volga...not a Chaika... no, wait a minute only that Marshal has a Chaika...no, a ZIM.... VARENTSOV hasn't got a Chaika. Only the Minister, The deputy-Minister and the Chief of General Staff have a Chaika...SOKOV hasn't got a Chaika either, he has a ZIM too...I have all the numbers of these cars...The message went on to say: "the car will call for you then you will drive over to SOKOL to pick up the POZOVNYIs". And this is what we did. POZOVNYI and his wife, myself and my wife, VARENTSOV and his wife, their daughters Yerlem and little Natasha and my daughter Galya.

92. S: After the meal was over, they left the table, the children are fifteen years old. Discussion began on various matters, we drank, he also made a complimentary toast to me; and so we drank...but it was all a question of feminine psychology, you understand, the women do not want war. So my wife asked "Sergei Sergeievich, but will the agreement be signed - now?" And he replied "Yes, it will be signed!" The subject was dropped then, however. After we had drunk some more, we got up from the table. We had drunk well, vodka, cognac, wine... and then we returned to the German problem, this time on my initiative, taking advantage of the lead which my wife had achieved on her own...I hadn't asked her to do so...this is of course only a detail, but again perhaps an important one...and he went on to speak as I have already reported to you. G: When was this? S: On Sunday June 25.

93. G: But did POZOVNYI have any opinions on this? S: Yes, he did. POZOVNYI actually saw me off the day before yesterday. I gave him a present of my spectacles which WINNE bought for me when I was over in Birmingham, as he had no spectacles. We said goodbye and as I was going on this trip I invited him to a meal at a restaurant. Well, after we had eaten we had a little chat. He also swears at KHRUSHCHEV, he swears at him a lot in fact, for his adventuristic policy. He actually meets many generals since he sits with BIRYUZOV, the Commander of thePVO of the land. He expressed many opinions, both his own and those of other people.

94. G: But for what reason do these other criticize KHRUSHCHEV? S: They are swearing at KHRUSHCHEV because he is making such a row when everything is yet far from ready and he may result in starting such a conflagration and we will get such a kick in the pants that blood will flow from our people...! This is why they are swearing at him! After all, the generals are taking a wider view of things, more especially as POZOVNYI himself is a political chief, a political worker in the Soviet Army.

95. G: Of course, he couldn't have told you such things in VARENTSOV's presence. S: of course not, but I must tell you however that POZOVNYI has often enough spoken to VARENTSOV in this vein, and often VARENTSOV agreed with him even. On various aspects and various problems. These are various details for which I can vouch [sign for] in my own blood! I can open a vein or an artery, which ever you please. Anyway gentlemen, there can be no doubts whatsoever on this, otherwise we will find it very difficult to work together or to agree.

96. G: But do you consider this may be a dangerous situation for KHRUSHCHEV, i.e. if things came to a negative situation do you think the top brass will begin to shout that he had dragged them into the mess? S: Yes, they could. G: And even remove him [KHRUSHCHEV]? S: Yes, they could remove him. Or alternatively, they could leave him - if they feel that the Anglo-American Bloc is <u>really</u> prepared to hit out not once but several times kick us in the teeth in localised areas and even warn us that they are prepared to go outside the localised areas and hit us on a wider scale even - then KHRUSHCHEV may postpone his fixed time limit. What will happen will be that ULBRICHT will say something, KHRUSHCHEV will support him, some dogma will be found and once again he will say "O.K. we'll talk about it later - anyway truth is on our side!" Something of this nature may take place.

97. S: But there is a final point I would like to make, even though it is clear to you, and it is my duty to point out as a high ranking officer of the General Staff that if this time we come down from our positions and do not show firmness, then KHRUSHCHEV's position will be very very much strengthened. All the peoples of the world will believe in him more and more and he will dictate his will in many other questions also. I myself am against that we (the West) should be the first to embark on wide scale conflict as this would be an error from the point of view of world opinion and also we would be doing this without proper preparedness. If it is decided to go ahead then one should go full steam ahead determined on a <u>total destruction</u> - as I have already told you in April/May. If not, then show <u>firmness</u> - to kick him in the teeth once or twice so as to stop him short! Or alternatively to prepare oneself on such a wide scale, that he will see that before he can even start anything he will have suffered complete ruination.

98. G: But do you consider that this represents VARENTSOV's own personal feelings or did he get this view from some sort of conference? S: This is not result of a conference but purely because VARENTSOV knows the truth of the matter. VARENTSOV knows how many rockets there are available. VARENTSOV knows what there is new. VARENTSOV knows what is possible and what is not. VARENTSOV knows the sum total of what we have available, what is available now and what the potential is for the future. VARENTSOV bases himself on a true knowledge of our actual truthful position as it in fact is and not what they are always saying it is. Although they may know just as well what VARENTSOV knows. As far as I know VARENTSOV and as I see the situation and which as a responsible person I must report to my Government, High Command and to you (since I am now talking to you as living responsible persons), VARENTSOV bases his evaluation of the situation on the knowledge of the actual true facts of our position.

99. G: But does he more or less support KHRUSHCHEV in this? or does he think that....? S: No, he does <u>not</u> support him and these are VARENTSOV's words: "We are going ahead at great risk" [idem m risk]: He (VARENTSOV) is taking into consideration the factual reality of the situation and it may well be possible that VARENTSOV's views coincide with the views held by ROTMISTROV, ZHADOV, MOROCHKIN and GRECHKO. He did not detail this so I cannot quote him, but the way I get the impression, judging him as an experienced person, I would say to you that if VARENTSOV knew that he had available 10,000 atomic missiles of various yields, he would have said "Oh, that is sufficient for us to cover the bases in Turkey, Iran, in the North etc." But VARENTSOV knows well that such is not the case, that he has not got these available, that they are just only still in the stage of manufacture, still in the stage of planning. VARENTSOV knows what he has available and he knows that a blow could be struck - but could this blow be taken to its logical conclusion? This is what VARENTSOV is not sure of, he has doubts because he has not got all this available.

100. G: Do you think your Intelligence organs have sufficient data on our war preparedness etc.? Are they really in a position to evaluate our strength? Or are they only relying on Western intentions? S: This is an excellent question. Here the point of view of the chiefs of Intelligence, as well as that of my colleagues in Intelligence and myself is that we have <u>exact</u> knowledge of the true military position (of the West), in certain respects. We have, for example, exact knowledge as regards the status of F.R.G.

military strength. Here, Intelligence has obtained exact information. Strategic Intelligence, through its special illegal agencies and other means, has obtained knowledge of the location of all vulnerable places in the system of defence and war-preparedness. Although these data are not complete, there are certain sources of information which strengthen KHRUSHCHEV and his Government in their views. His policies are therefore not entirely based on simple "nakhal'stvo" [= arrogance]! KHRUSHCHEV bases himself on real factors of which he does not know all the details and on this he bases all his insolence and firmness.

101. G: With respect to the intentions of the West, as far as BERLIN is concerned, can the Intelligence Organs give KHRUSHCHEV any positive data? S: Yes, but not fully. It can report to KHRUSHCHEV that it is known exactly that the F.R.G. military units are of 80% strength in manpower and equipment. This is the figure given by Intelligence - 80%, not 70% or 75% but 80%! Therefore, judge for yourselves! Does this look as though Soviet Intelligence has got exact data which it supplies to KHRUSHCHEV, or does Soviet Intelligence mislead him with the information they provide? This is for you to check and to decide. And another thing: Intelligence information is provided not only by Strategic Intelligence Organs, but also by the Intelligence Organs of all Socialist countries. I must tell you that on any day that I went into G.H.Q. in Gorki Street, every time without fail I would meet there some representative or other of a country from the Socialist camp: whether in uniform or in civilian clothes, but I could see perfectly well it was a foreigner... a Hungarian, Roumanian, or Bulgarian. Every single time, all the time, there they were, with their brief-cases and assigned cars. Because as a result of the WARSAW Agreement, a constant, serious, intensive and wide-spread preparation is taking place and a tight control has been introduced to unify patterns of training and joint operations. Not a day passed without my running into one of these characters, walking in or out of all the various Directorates. Therefore the factual situation is revealed in all its exactitude, but I would add that it is not complete nor is it in any great depth. For instance the Intelligence supplied by Czecho-slovakia and Bulgaria is much more exact that the information supplied by the Hungarians. Their information is supplied in more detail and, on checking, proved to be more correct. Because all intelligence under SEROV is co-ordinated and all data is put together and evaluated.

102. G: Have you noticed that there is an intensifying in the tasks set to Intelligence in connection with BERLIN? S: Yes, I must tell you that for instance the Soviet Mission in West BERLIN is composed entirely out of officers of Strategic Intelligence. For instance, Lt. Col. Petr GORELOV who was at the Academy with me, we both finished in 1953. He is not there now actually, he is on leave in MOSCOW. Recently we went together to the restaurant 'Aragvi' and he told me how the Americans had stopped him several times. You know they wear Soviet uniform, they are not in civilian clothes, this is the Soviet Military Mission in West BERLIN, so, he told me how the Americans stopped him and told him: "You are in the wrong zone" and GORELOV replies: "Gentlemen, open the map and look at it, I have perfect right to be here, in these particular streets". But the Americans insist "No, you are not in your zone" and they surrounded him, but he showed firmness and after looking at the map, it turned out that GORELOV was in his rights after all and had not infringed any regulations which would allow him to be accused of provocation. But such provocations do happen and they (the Soviet Mission) are working there now full steam ahead. They are all from the Strategic Intelligence.

103. G: Do they busy themselves with determining the mood of the people and all that? S: Yes, all that. What I would like to point out is that - in our actions, there must be an element of sober and conscious preparation, our actions must show assurance /confidence and, on top of that, we must also introduce into our actions a slight element of adventurism so that we could drum it into his skull and disorientate him(KHRUSHCHEV). For instance, you bring in a tank Regiment, but it should be announced to be a whole Division. Well, let Intelligence search like mad to find the other Regiments of the Division - where can they be. But let all the Soviet people know, let all the peoples-signatories of the WARSAW Pact realise that the Americans, English, French and Germans of the F.R.G. are ready to meet seriously and stand firm against this provocation regarding West BERLIN and the intention to subjugate West BERLIN - that is as clear as black on white.

Let it be clear that (the west) will stand firm and are prepared to strike a blow of destruction, but they do not want to be the first to strike, so that all the peoples should see who is the real aggressor and who is the defender of truth!

104. G: But did you not gather from your brother officers in the D.D.R. that they have been given new missions and they find conditions of work there more difficult now and that they have more tasks to fulfill etc. S: Yes, I did discuss this matter. Conditions of work were always difficult there, their task is: to find out exactly what the Americans, English and French are doing. That is their most active task, the one that is drummed into their skulls daily and on which definite results are demanded. Not only demanded but they are under constant pressure for results. All sorts of information is demanded: what new units have appeared and where, what are their numbers and designation, what type of units - whether artillery, engineering or Air Force.

105. G: How about the popular views and reactions? S: They are also being studied. I can also give you the views of FEDOROV and the views of KHOROSHILOV. You know, KHOROSHILOV, not VOROSHILOV, but KHOROSHILOV Jurij - he also studied at the KIEV Artillery School where I did, but he finished a year before me. I finished in 1939 and he in 1938. After that he was Instructor under ODINTSOV at the Academy and later he commanded a Brigade of conventional Artillery. Now he is chief of Staff under KUPIN who is the present Artillery Commander of a Tank Army, but KUPIN is leaving; KHOROSHILOV however, will remain C.O.S. of Artillery of the Tank Army. I saw him in MOSCOW recently, we had a meal at restaurant 'DINAMO', he invited me; he has his own MOSKVICH car, he came to collect me. And his views are as follows - this is what he told me; they are going to shoot us down, these Germans of ours, like partridges, if we do not take up a circular defence position so that we could pulverise everybody". And these are exactly the views held by FEDOROV. And I was very glad that these two colonels should have such confidence in me, and they know me well, since 1937 KHOROSHILOV knows me and FEDOROV also has known me for many years and respects me, and loves me as a friend, our families meet often. And FEDOROV told me that in September will begin the mass evacuation of (Soviet) families from the G.D.R. in expectation of whatever may happen next, and FEDOROV should know because he has his wife Shurochka there and two children a boy and a girl; the boy goes to school 15 kms. away from where FEDOROV's brigade is located [Comment WEIMAR/FELD, school is in NAUMBURG].

106. G: Do they consider that in a protracted conflict the D.D.R. forces will run away, over to the West? S: This is a second point. The first thing they spoke to me about was the attitude of the ordinary (East) Germans - the civilians, not the army - and this mood is bad. As regards the armies of the D.D.R., they expressed a very low opinion of its organisation and its commander - what the hell is his name - (they consider) he is a very mediocre person (Commanding General D.D.R. forces). As regards the D.D.R. officers, they said "We are not sure of them, they can turn either way". As regards the ordinary soldier, they didn't express any definite opinion and I didn't ask. But this man, the General commanding D.D.R. forces, I've forgotten his name, but he is such a fool. We see him on manoeuvres and he shows no deep thinking, no wise or large-scale vision, he is very superficial and mediocre. But the main thing is that they (the Soviets) are afraid of the ordinary German citizens, they just hate the Soviets. They will shoot them down like partridges as soon as we go out into the field of battle, we will (have to) take up all around defence and fight both the F.R.G.'s and the D.D.R. Germans who will have run over to desert.

107. G: And what if the Poles too rose up and attacked against the lines of communications? S: God grant that this will happen.

108. S: Now gentlemen I would like you to read this extremely important document. This is a photograph I took of the letter of the Central Committee of KPSS containing notes of the KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY talks in VIENNA. I didn't bother to photograph KENNEDY's questions since these are well known to us but I photographed the replies KHRUSHCHEV said he gave so that Mr. KENNEDY and our leaders could check and see what KHRUSHCHEV reports tothe Communist Party not only of the U.S.S.R. but all the Communist parties of the world,

because you will see at the beginning of this report a top secret order to pass the contents - in confidence - and verbally - to CASTRO, to the secretaries of the Communist parties of Italy etc. That is to say the respective Soviet Ambassador will summon TOGLIATTI for instance and will read the contents out to him. You will see, there is an exceptionally interesting introductory note there, giving instructions how to pass on the contents of this to the Communist party leaders in the U.S.S.R., the regional secretaries, because this letter is not to be seen by all members indiscriminately, and how to pass on the contents to the Communist (Secretaries) of the sister parties in the rest of the world; and separately for Comrade CASTRO...The Soviet Ambassadors in the respective countries, will summon these people and pass on to them verbally the contents..... It is a most interesting introductory note, please translate it and pass it on to our leaders.....it is most interesting for them to see how all this is done. And this contains not only all KHRUSHCHEV's so-called statements, but also his concluding remark to KENNEDY; "Mr. KENNEDY, inform MACMILLAN, DE GAULLE and ADENAUER that if they do not sign on our conditions, there will be war!" At least that is what he tells the Party he said to KENNEDY, but perhaps it wasn't quite so...and that is the interesting thing... A tremendous political analysis should be made and you and I are doing a great job here... I beg you to pass it on to your Governments at once.....(Subject then remarks how impressed he was with the firm answers given by KENNEDY to KHRUSHCHEV, and goes on to read out extracts from the document in question)....This will bring to light the real state of affairs and the attitude of the C.C. C.P.S.U. and KHRUSHCHEV towards this matter....that is to say: propaganda, agressiveness and firmness....it is most important that KENNEDY should know this....

109. G: When do the autumn manoeuvres take place in the U.S.S.R. - will they for instance give a definite military character to this autumn's manoeuvres, to give the impression of a type of mobilisation for instance.... In view of the BERLIN situation? S: No such demonstrative manoeuvres take place which are in fact a cover up for some sort of planned mobilisation as it is considered that everything is conducted in such absolute conspiratorial secrecy and all is so successfully concealed, that no extra precautions are necessary to conceal an actual mobilisation....they just mobilise! For instance, a review is now taking place of recent dismissals.... and it is just following its course....I know about it, you know about it and a few others..... Manoeuvres are not organised so as to conceal actual mobilisation. G: On the contary...in order to impress the West that you have such and such forces. S: I understand. There are no longer spring, summer, autumn manoeuvres, now we have only one type of manoeuvres - both inside the U.S.S.R. and in the Peoples Democracies, combined manoeuvres including one division from GDR, per army and these manoeuvres will continue, but they are no longer split into spring, autumn, winter, or garrison training - they are working in accordance with a combat training plan.

110. S: The call-up is proceeding according to age. KHRUSHCHEV has said people are to be "returned" [vozvrashat] (i.e. re-called) and the District Military Committee [Rajvoenkomat] have started re-calling the technical personnel, they are not taking the others yet, they have plenty. We take it for granted that everything that is done in U.S.S.R. is done under cover and in this case the manoeuvres are not a cover for mobilisation.

111. G: But when the alarm is sounded, when the BERLIN situation becomes acute, will this affect all the WARSAW pact signatories? S: Yes. Simultaneously. They want to do all this as soon as the 22nd (Party) Congress finished its work. The Congress will take place in October.

112. G: What is the opinion of prominent officers in the Soviet Union with regard to a possible revolt in say the GDR, Poland or Hungary? S: I can give you an exact answer to this question. Such things are not expected. No plans have been made for this. When hostilities begin, if the situation is favourable when the active elements go into action, then the mission is accomplished. If things become difficult the reinforcements

will join in the fight, and the alleged reason will be, say, for the unification of Germany, etc. This is the aspect in which this problem is seen here. G: I mean if the war expands. S: Then plans can be brought into being which had been prepared by your Intelligence and your Command. And the worst situation for the Soviet Army is that the GDR enlisted men will defect as soon as action starts. When you put a pistol to someone's head he'll keep quiet. They only really expect individual actions, and there won't be any large scale ones.

113. G: What do you think would happen if the leading echelons in the West Army would be West German troops? Do you think Germans would shoot at fellow Germans? S: Do not count on the GDR armies refusing to fire on the FRG ones. They will fire. Soviets don't count on all Germans who are under arms, the GDR officers and men fighting the West Germans, that is why a certain amount of purgeing is going on, but they are certain that the entire GDR Army will not lay down their arms when ordered to fire on the Western armies. G: Whose opinion is this in addition to yours. S: KHUROSHILOV's FEDOROV's, BIZAFOV's and KUPIN's. KUPIN is very pleased that he is being transferred from GDR to MOSCOW, Military District, and so is his wife.

114. S: VARENTSOV knows a lot, perhaps he doesn't tell it all, but when he voices his opinion he takes all he knows into consideration. His opinion is that the time is not right for action. I've told you why this is his opinion.

115. G: But if they really want an extended war to break out, what are the main steps they would take, other than in the Berlin situation? S: KHRUSHCHEV's Government of adventurers and his (FR) consider in such a case, mass destruction by the firing of rockets. This is in view of the fact that the internal situation will not stand up to extended military operations, morale will not stand up to them, desertions will start in order to save life, as a result of personal dissatisfaction, low standard of living. So the plan is to slam you with rockets for mass destruction and then the internal situation will right itself on its own. They are relying on mass destruction for which they are actively preparing. There is such a plan. Have I made myself clear?

116. G: If a report along the line of what you have just told us and sent to us appeared in the Western press, what would be the Soviet people's reaction? S: They would never get to know about it. All the Soviet Press is under the Control of the Central Committee. For example Mr. R'MK's declarations were only published in full in the magazine "Abroad" [Za rubeshom], which has a very limited circulation. I read it, as I have access to all publications. Only excerpts were published in the daily press. It was a very fine article well thought out and if our people read it they would see things as they really are. However, they only see Pravda, Isvestia and others of a real yellow Press.

117. G: What about Government officials? How would they react to what you have said and given us. S: If it reached all the various branches of the Administration it would, undoubtedly, create a very strong impression. But believe me, certain papers, marked with a red classification don't reach even party district heads. All they are fed on is "PRAVDA" and "IZVESTIA".

118. G: What would happen if we did smash through their tank forces blocking access to Berlin as you suggested? S: They would double strength in that area, and then we would have to double ours, slapping them in the teeth once again. G: And then they will retreat? S: Yes. So our problem is to burn their tanks out and place our there.

119. G: Why do they have to cover the road approaches to BERLIN with Soviet forces? If they sign a treaty they can use the German forces.

S: Because GDR is not strong enough. However, the Soviet Army will be the second support echelon and this fact will be known to the enemy. A German regiment may be backed up by a Soviet Division. G: So the very first units will be GDR units? S: Yes. Germans but reinforced by Soviets.

120. G: How will they control the air corridors? With German or with Soviet aircraft? S: With German and Soviet aircraft, mostly Soviet since the Germans have very few. However, joint action is planned.

121. G: Will they shoot down the Western aircraft which - S: Yes, they will shoot them down. They are making preparations for this, with fighters and A.A. weapons.

122. G: Does VARENTSOV think this too? S: Yes. After all I am not the Head of GHQ, I am continuing the analysis which Sergei Sergeevich has said in reply to your serious and very detailed questions. I have tried to tell you all from this source. You can check it by other sources.

125. G: Has he said anything about V-75 in connection with BERLIN? S: As I have already told you V-75 is a tested rocket which can be found everywhere, even in the Berlin area. It is produced in large quantities. That is a proven weapon in which they believe. I am sure this weapon is already in Germany.

124. G: So in spite of the fact that Sergei Sergeevich says that the Treaty is ready for signing your opinion is that KHRUSHCHEV may NOT sign it if enough pressure is brought to bear? S: Yes, KHRUSHCHEV knows that he had many deficiencies. We have been witnesses before now of KHRUSHCHEV retreating or naming new dates, or just shutting up. I want to repeat once again. Let us take the situation: The GDR have set out their blocking forces the second line is formed from Soviet tanks and artillery, we break through, they send reinforcements into the breach, but they will stick to the same limited area. The Soviet forces will not extend the fighting area. We must be prepared for them taking a gamble and expanding the conflict but according to the plan in force now, they will not expand the conflict. They will, however, increase forces continually in that area until they are overwhelmed. So we must have enough forces to suppress them.

125. G: Do you still consider, in spite of the fact well known to you and the Soviet Government that the main strength Western forces are mainly strategic and not tactical, that is locally, in the European Theatres, do you still think it is necessary or advisable to make a show of force specifically in Europe? S: Yes, show strength on German territory. This is VARENTSOV's opinion also: that it will all have a localised character only....only several flare-ups, several battles in the zone of communications...What he VARENTSOV means by zone of communications and what I mean by zone of Communications is, say - along the highways and railroads leading to Berlin.

126. G: And what do the Soviet Government consider will be the key steps for defence on the part of the West if the latter decide to hang on to BERLIN to the bitter end? S: They expect the following: a rapid completion of re-arming of the FRG and also increase the strength of their forces in Europe, both in numbers and armaments. And this is what they fear! The publication by Mr. KENNEDY of the 3 milliard increase in the defence budget created a very strong impression. Bravo, good for him! That kicked them in the teeth! They are convinced that these 3 milliards are going to be approved, although the Soviet High Command are convinced that there are also some other secret military funds at the disposal of the armed forces (of the U.S.) after all these exist in the Soviet Army and the USSR...they are therefore convinced that although they said 3 million, they will have at their disposal not 3 but 6 or even 9 milliards....They are afraid...and already they are

beginning to scratch their heads.

127. G: What was the impression as a result of the French moving a division back from Africa to Europe? S: A great noise was raised everywhere that this is an obvious preparation to interfere with the signature of the agreement and so on....Many more similar preparatory moves must take place so that the 'svolooh' - adventurer, that he will view it in the broad sense of things and not as a calculation for a purely small operation of local importance only but in its general widespread war aspect.... If he will receive several more kicks in the teeth like these announcements he will be faced with the following dilemma: either let things calm down and accept the fact that the West is so well prepared that it could move over to a general destruction... and he will certainly do so because he himself is not ready to answer (hit) back in full! Suppose he will send a bomber over these islands where are now (U.K.) and a rocket into America, and this will not be a direct hit, ["ne budet pritsel'no"] he knows perfectly well that all the strategic airforce (of the West) armed with rockets is hanging fire over the USSR...he knows that very well and he is keeping it in mind, but he says out loud: I've got the same! But he hasn't got the same - that's just it! G: And Sergei Sergeevich knows this too? S: And Sergei Sergeevich knows this and says: We are going on a gamble.

128: G: And they won't be ready in November either? S: No, after all how much is there left till November? Of course, it won't be ready. But the order has been given to reinforce everything already available, to train, to complete equipping with armaments, correct (faults) to maintain everything on a war-footing.

129. S: As I've already told you - and I consider this my sacred duty - to point out to you that the Soviet High Command and KHRUSHCHEV together with his Government are not only one single incident ["styohka"] in this German corridor (Area) but several incidents...that is to say he will build up the attack in the hope that he will break up the advancing forces of NATO in this area. He will for instance send out and deploy there say one tank army - we (the West) destroy it. He (KHRUSHCHEV) will at once send out another one - he has another echelon... I have already told you how many armies he has: how many armies there are in the GDR, Czechoslowakia, on our Soviet territory (Soviet Union) in Poland etc. tanks etc....which I beg you to pass on and treat with due importance and consideration...This is not a bluff, these are not match-boxes these are tanks moving rapidly on caterpillars and firing! If these are knocked out, he will replace them with others, saying "I will make them choke in this corridor!" Whereas we must do everything in our power to make <u>him</u> choke instead! He will then be faced with the dilemma: what to do next? Is it worth going further or not? And since he has not got the strength to fight out on a general wide-spread front, he will have to pipe down. Or alternatively if he finds out through Intelligence sources that there will be endless forces thrown in to replace the ones he knocks out, then he will stop at the very beginning and will not carry on the the signing of the agreement. These are the possibilities.

130. G: Do you think it possible that the Soviets may attempt to give us false and misleading information through Intelligence channels? S: Oh yes you mean dez. Yes, this is being done constantly. There is such a specific category of activity. Specifically they may spread rumours that the forces of the D.D.R. are larger than actually and that they are all in combat readiness and the ULLBRICHT has been making successful and popular visits, they can lie about the status of the East German soldiers morale.

131. G: Are they actually doing this now? S: Yes, and they will continue to do this. G: Do you know of any specific operations now in progress? For example, inform tion given to a double agent recruited by the Soviets or through any high level penetration they may have?

131. S: This is all done on a planned basis and is controlled by one headquarters. This is known to GRECHKO who is even related to KHRUSHCHEV and he consults with him on these political matters, but I don't know of any specific example.

132. G: Do you know of any high level penetrations in Western governments who co-operate with KHRUSHCHEV and on whom he may depend on in making BERLIN policy? S: Yes, there are, all the Secretaries of foreign Communist Parties in capitalistic countries. These should be strangled, but very little is done about them.

133. G: I mean non-Communist persons who are prominent? S: I heard about Cyrus Eaton and I reported to you about him. As this Central Committee letter shows the addressees are all Communist Party secretaries and others favourable to KHRUSHCHEV. I cannot understand why these Communists are not eliminated, they did this once before in Turkey. As a member of the free world now I realise that my governments are wise, but I must be a complete fool since it is totally incomprehensible to me why persons like CASERO and TOGGLIATI and the other Communists in the West are not eliminated since they are obviously creating a Fifth Column. As persons these individuals are nothing, but they do influence masses of people. At one time ATTATURK shot the Communists and in later years, NASSER and KASSEM also threw them out, why can't we do the same?

134. (Subject continues to criticise the humanitarian and liberal Western nations for not wiping out all Communists within their reach, basing his arguments on the very letter from the Central Committee which appeals for Communist support throughout the world. Subject stressed his intimate knowledge of the Communist Party operations which are completely deceitful and which he is trying in every way he can to convince the Governments of the West to take stern measures against. Subject particularly emphasised the danger that CASTRO may influence other Latin American peoples appearing as a Latin-type LENIN).

135. (Following a few minutes intermission subject said)"We have agreed that I give you all and we will join all our forces and possibilities for our work. You and I have been working together for less than a year, in fact we have been working together since only 20th April". G: Yes. S: a few months, a very few months. Let us look at the results. We, with your help, under your direction, with my possibilities, which I do not exaggerate, we brought to light a series of new questions of a political character - dealing with Central Committee of U.S.S.R., we touched upon many subjects related to the GNTK which deals with technical intelligence....is it now clear to us. I've told you how the delegations are made up, you read that representatives of KGB and GRU are included. We have brought to light military questions. We consider our tasks to have been carried out. Oh, but this is only the beginning. "Is 5 per cent".

136. S: If we analyse everything: concrete questions, material available, information, some of which possibly needs checking - that is the law, from a dialectic point of view, we also are learning a sort of dialectics but a type different from the Marx kind, we have given each other a lot.

137. S: We already have the moral right to say that for some of the questions we now have a new view, we have certain material which can't be thrown out, material extracted from our common scale of opinions, understanding conversations, wishes, and actions. That is to say that I consider that our work is aimed at a target, it is many-sided, it has not got a narrow, one-sided aspect.

138. S: All right we haven't got to the bottom of some things, but we'll get there. Everything can't be done at once. This is the first road we are standing on. I guarantee that the conditions of any sudden aggression which may be planned will be immediately communicated to

our H.Q. [Kommandovanie], complete with facts. What these facts are going to be I will let you know, when I discover them. That is one of the principal tasks. G: Of course. S: And so when we discover a series of new, basic facts there is one thing I am afraid of. I am afraid that we won't be able to carry through to the end and get the facts to our organisations, to our authorities, so that they could draw new, practical conclusions.

139. S: I would like to be wrong. Take for example that letter and introduction. One must understand that CASTRO is not only going to read it for information. There is lot we don't know, and we may never know, because my hand carrying the MINOX cannot reach that far, neither can our eyes reach that far. This must be developed however. If this much is given to CASTRO, and we know that millions are being given him, then he is involved also in other things. What conclusion can we draw from this? Eliminate him, at least stop him from developing more followers. That is were we are going to loose unnecessarily if we do not do this. How can we achieve this. I do not know how many more Central Committee letters I will have to open. I will open everything that passes through my hands. You are helping me in my search, by giving me material assistance. I am now able to take people to restaurants, I buy people drinks. I give presents. Everybody is pleased. People ask me to get them things. RUDIN himself has asked me to get him three sets of batteries, but has he given me money? We are going to buy them, you are going to spend £5 - £10. Then people have asked me to get cameras, rings/and so on. We do all this but we discover only this and that. I want deep conclusions to be drawn - don't expect to suddenly uncover something, just like spreading out a carpet.

/for cameras

140. G: What makes you think that we are not doing this? S: It isn't being done. G: You don't consider that it is possible tomorrow morning to act on your suggestion since there are considerations of a tactical nature, a question of timing. S: You can kill me but I cannot see what are your tactical considerations in the matter of CASTRO. Why do you keep CASTRO on? G: CASTRO will fall. Steps are being taken and at the proper time.

141. S: One day! With this "one day, sometime" we miss the bus. The right moment is a factor. Surely you didn't fly thousands of kilometres to see me, in order to say _ you are our friend". I know I am your friend. I am pleased to see you. You are pleased to see me. I can't give you all the secrets of GHQ, all the maps, all the plans - I can't get near them. There are documents which a Marshal reads and signs for, and if he wants to re-read them he has to sign for them again. So they know that Marshal so and so read this document five times. No one else can see these documents. And I don't see us recruiting a Marshal. Take VARENTSOV - once he has become a chief Marshal, he begins to like KHRUSHCHEV, you can't get anywhere near him. That's the way people act. He is well off financially, he has power, he wears badges of rank, he has a car, he has followers, he has a suite, he has a guard, a dacha, so "long live KHRUSHCHEV"! And who is KHRUSHCHEV? VARENTSOV used to say that KHRUSHCHEV is a fool and an adventurer, and now he drinks his health. I raised my glass: what can one do, but I didn't drink to him. I swear to you that he was thinking as we do but since he has started wearing the enormous USSR coat of arms - it's all over. A man is a man. You can't explain everybody's actions.

142. S: You may laugh at me and call me a braggard, but I take a lot upon myself because I feel I can do a lot. I have so far given you very little, but no matter how much I can give you I can't give you everything. And you won't have in every Directorate. One must face the truth. You must have a broader view. For this far-sighted men exist. These wise, far-sighted people should be more decisive. That is the wish of a strategic officer, member of GHQ staff of one of the branches of GHQ of USSR. G: I assure you this is being done. S: No,

not at the moment. G: You can't always have the results put in front of you. S: We should either work according to such a method that they (our HQ) believe us. Or else we just get together and drink wine. S: We have such sources at our disposal, and, they can't be carried through to their logical conclusion. That is what I am afraid of. God forbid, God forbid. Now take Mr. HAROLD. I love him very much. I think of him every day, as I do of you. I swear, I think of you (of him) many times during the day. hen I go to bed at night I wonder what he is doing, whether he is thinking of me. I listen to the radio - 163..... And to-day Mr. HAROLD looked at this material and said "A collection of articles, noteworthy abstract articles" but they are not, they are the views of GHQ of the USSR.

143. G: We only developed them to-day. We have just received them. S: We will sort this out among ourselves, but the high-ups, that Lord who sent me a message, which I prise greatly, he may say "this is not what we want". This is what I am afraid of. G: Do not worry about this. You are valued and the material as well. S: This is our first meeting: we are just getting organised with the elucidation of a number of questions, new material, and I just wanted to tell you what was bothering me. G: You don't have to worry at all. S: All these things won't stop me. Our contract is to fight. (G: explains subject's worries in English). G: You have the impatience of youth. S: I am not a young man, look at my grey hairs. You remember I told you if we don't risk all our diamonds, gold and valuables we will be destroyed; if we risk them our wealth will be tripled. We are taking too long to get started. S: I swear to you - believe me, as a strategic officer, these first steps of firm declarations, of a firm position, taken by Mr. MacMillan, Mr. Kennedy, that excellent fellow de Gaulle and Adenauer, who is also a good chap, have already brought into play a new element. Perhaps the best thing to do is to declare you have more than you have. Why should this bald devil get awaywith everything, everybody listens to him, he lies - and perhaps that is the right way to act. And all we do is say, "better don't do anything".

144. G: On this subject, could you tell me, how can we misinform this bald devil. Perhaps his Intelligence people do not have all the facts. S: His Intelligence Service is <u>not</u> all powerful. G: How can we get false information through to him? S: Do a little and magnify it five times. I repeat prepare tanks, anti-tank defence, increase your forces. Do it on the scale of a division and say you've got an Army Corps. And disseminate this information along all channels; press conference, and all the rest. (Say to him): "You dirty scum so you now declare that you will sign without us, after being our ally during the war, after we have fed you, we have supplied you with weapons, with transport. All your artillery, all calibres, would have been sunk in mud had we not supplied the transport. And now you willfully want to swallow up Berlin". I assure you that this is just the first step, he will swallow Berlin. Tell him "for this behaviour we are going to slap your face". This will make him stop and think. G: Can we do anything about this along Intelligence lines? S: Of course. And you must work from all sides.

145. G: What is the 5th Directorate, GRU, doing about this? S: Setting up their agency networks [agentura]. Have you read that letter of mine? All this is still going on, all agency networks have been activated and are in direct contact. This is being done everywhere, including the countries of the Far East. G: With regard to the BERLIN question, have "their"(GRU 5th Directorate) agents not become activated. S: Yes, all branches. The tasks have already been allocated.

146. S: now, before I forget. SUD'IN has gone on leave. He has been made a General. And by the way he was an Air Force colonel, but has now become an infantry General. He was preparing to go to Turkey, then he used the following subterfuge. He said his wife was ill - he didn't want to go to Turkey. So they said to him "you scoundrel, we

made you a General as you were going to do an important job. You were going to set up an illegal residentura using agents from other countries, not the Turks, there might be Swedes there, Bulgarians, etc." This embarrassed him and he went off on leave. Before he left - I handed the papers (SUDIN's) in to General POZOVNOY yesterday, he asked me to get him a nylon shirt, neck measurement 43 cm. - I gave him the paper that had to be typed - that paper I told you about giving SUDIN a telephone, the paper had already been signed, all POZOVNIY had to do is to get it re-typed on a special form for VARENTSOV to sign, and once it has been signed POZOVNIY will keep it until my return to USSR. SUD'IN asked me before he left "Get me a telephone, even if I am going away". His application has either already been vised for Turkey, or soon will be. I think he should be allowed in Undisurrounded so that we can be kept informed. If we do this we will be wise people.

147. G: Listen, through what channels and what actually should one say in order for it to sound like the truth to KHRUSHCHEV? This disinformation about forces, etc. S: The best way would be through Press, Radio, and through those people who we have doubled and who work for KHRUSHCHEV - he believes them. G: And the important thing is to get across that there are more forces etc. S: Yes, that wehave secret information, numbers assigned, atomic missile launchers [atomnye pushki]. STRAUSS has the right approach to this problem. We have got to envisage the situation in such a way that should the necessity arise we would give atom war-heads to ADENAUER. You can say "We didn't want to give it him, but if you (KHRUSHCHEV) are going to take one-sided action you force us to do it".

148. G: Now you are going to pay a number of visits to your Embassy here. Are there people in the Residentura or the Embassy, among the MFA personnel, who you think could have reliable information on the BERLIN question? Perhaps they have received special instructions, or perhaps they could tell that in the event of worsened relations it had been decided to send fewer delegations, either to England or to other NATO countries, or perhaps they have cut down on the number of families allowed to accompany Embassy officials. Do you think there could be such indications? S: Yes, there can be such indications. They should be watched, and analysed.

149. G: Would it be normal for you to ask "What do you think about the BERLIN question? How will it react on you here in England?" S: Yes, of course I could discuss this matter. PAVLOV has said that he would like me to visit his home. I'll tell you about it. Actually, PAVLOV when he was leaving for England asked for a transfer out of here and they want to make me a Counsellor for Technical Science here and Deputy Resident to LEV. Then recall him in a year and make me the Resident for England. This is the GRU plan, but the Central Committee will say "And who is father?" "The father is a White officer who fought against the Soviet Government and his son could finish that Government off". Exactly what the son is in actual fact doing. (Laughs). GRU has complete faith in me, I swear. That time I returned I went to SMOLINOV, Head of Cadres Directorate, I gave him two fountain pens, the most expensive purse I bought here at Harrods, cards and a bottle of scent. He said this is embarrassing" and I replied "Why embarrassing, they gave me these gifts, believe me the firms I visited said "(true name) our present to you", what am I to do with all this lot?" "Well, in that case, thank you very much".

150. S: The money that the U.S. and British Government give me I do not spend on myself only. G: Did you give VARENTSOV a present? S: He'll get one. This is the easiest of things. (S: goes on to describe a table lighter, shaped like a rocket, which he saw in a shop this morning. He also wants a battery electric razor, which he intends giving VARENTSOV as a birthday present on 15th September, when VARENTSOV will be 60).

151. H: Won't you be on leave at that time?

S: I intend postponing my leave, as Ekaterina Karpova has said to me the last time they were at the villa the artists have already been booked and you'll be the major domo". (Subject then goes on to suggest that they find a bottle of wine produced in the year VARENTSOV was born and make him a gift of it. This ploy had enormous success when used by the Counsellor in CANADA, GORUNOV who sent a similar gift to Gennadij Vasil'evich ALEKSEJKO (or ALEKSEJKO), RUDIN's Deputy). RUDNEV's

152. Subject then goes on to say that "The Chief Marshal" gets, in new currency, 2,500 (roubles) a month. Last trip when POZOVNYI heard that was once again flying to the big islands" he left a message for him "not to forget old soldiers", so subject brought him back a number of gifts for himself and his wife. "They kissed me. In spite of the fact that he is a rich man, he has savings amounting to hundreds of thousands in old currency, he adores presents". Everyone going abroad brings presents.

153. S: Now, I think I've told you everything about the GNTK Committee. There is nothing more on the Committee. G: Yes, but here is something important about BERLIN, could you find out whether special tasks have been given either to the Resident or to someone else in your Embassy here? Have instructions been given on what action is to be taken should the situation there deteriorate. What intelligence tasks to be undertaken in England with regard to the Berlin question have they been given? G: That is clear. I am sure there is something, I am sure VORONIN did not come just by chance, he has some kind of mission; he is the Head [Nachalnik Napravleniya] of a Direction.

154. G: We would also like to know the personal opinions of Embassy staff, if they dare voice a personal opinion, particularly if they disagree with KHRUSHCHEV. S: I think I can find out about the instructions received, but not the opinions and thoughts of the colony. It would look suspicious for "A MOSCOW man sent on a pedagogic mission" to try and find out people's opinions.

155. G: If you make notes do it very innocuously. (S: explains his very safe way of making notes, then goes again on to describe his meeting with the woman and her children and the clever way in which he acted. He also suggests that as he is Head of Department he could quite safely be invited to the British Embassy. He has already been invited by the Americans, at the time when the Patent Delegation visited the USSR). G: After you met her at an Embassy reception officially there would be a logical legend for greeting her in town later.

156. (S: suggests that there be no meeting the following day as he has a lot of work to do and must meet his people. This would also give the other people time to study the material available. ---Follows argument about how a suit should be bought for subject. He requests a dark grey suit for next day. N. agrees to get one for him at Simpsons. Also whether or not a dental plate could be made for him, since his Moscow dentist is very ill.

157. Subject was shown the map of London to orient him. Subject shows list of people he knows in England. Export Manager of HAWKER SIDDELEY - BELLINGER. MILOVIDOV has given him his card. He has a book for subject. ESSEX whom subject met at the Fair in LONDON. Subject then checks over list of documents he had brought with him and was to hand over.

158. The next meeting was set for the afternoon of 20 July , TYRNE would relay exact time. Subject then refers to SOEKARNO's visit to MOSCOW and says that the Soviets had given him a lot of arms and money as they really want to hit the Dutch hard. The situation there is very serious and an attack may start this year. Subject will give further details later.

159. Subject left at 0100 hours 19 July 1961.

Meeting No. 19

O Subject arrived at 1500 hours on 20 July 1961. He began by recalling that this day is the anniversary of the day three months ago when they first met and started working for the Cause. A toast was drunk to the work done and to still more to be done. Subject then reviews his activities the previous day, as follows:

(2.) S.: Yesterday morning I went to the Embassy as well as this /as morning, so/to clarify various points you asked me about. Various new things emerge which are of great interest and importance to us (Subject had made extensive notes which he used as an agenda).
S.: Then I spent about thirty minutes at our Exhibition (Earls Court) with WYNNE and subsequently had lunch with him. After lunch I had a little rest because I knew that in the evening I had to go to the Embassy and later meet SEROV's wife. I had meant to lie down for an hour only, but when I woke up at 8 o'clock I had been asleep for four hours! Just as I arrived at the Embassy, PAVLOV also returned from the reception and went on to tell me about the people he met there, specialists etc. Actually he (PAVLOV) told me some very interesting things denoting a most interesting (new) twist in Soviet strategic activities.

(3.) (Subject then recounts how he telephoned SEROV's wife and daughter at their Bayswater hotel and went over to collect them and, although they were already in their dressing gowns preparing to go to bed, convinced them (the wife and daughter) to come out with him, took them to his hotel restaurant and stood them an excellent meal for which he will send the bill later! Subject remarks that the SEROVs' attitude to him is most friendly, although he had only met them on the plane flying over. It emerges however that prior to his departure, on the day before in fact, subject had been summoned by Gen. SEROV who, after informing him that his wife and daughter were travelling as tourists to the U.K., asked subject to take care of them, ensure that someone should accompany them shopping, see that they had a car at their disposal etc. Subject and the SEROVs actually came over not on a scheduled flight but by the special plane sent over to collect the KIROV Ballet Company. And although Army-Gen. SEROV had sent a telegram asking them to be met, on arrival there was no one at the Airport, no car, nothing. Subject got the GVF representative to ring the Embassy and waited a whole hour with the SEROVs before finally getting on the bus to the terminal where he was himself being met by WINNE who then took him to his house. It was the Embassy who finally arranged the SEROVs' hotel, sightseeing etc.

(4.) Although subject didn't see the SEROVs any more that day (18th), when he saw them the next day - they were absolutely delighted to see him. As a matter of fact the daughter, who is 22 years old, absolutely fell for him! Subject goes on to recount how in the car (taxi) she squeezed up to him and how both mother and daughter expressed enthusiasm at his kindness and charm. This as a result of his gift of £20 which he

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/gave

gave the SEROVs for the following reasons: On arrival subject was given £115 by the Embassy for expenses during his 'komandirovka' (official trip) whereas the SEROVs had some dollars which after exchange amounted to only £18. General SEROV however had apparently particularly wanted a garden settee-swing for his dacha, but the cheapest cost £20-£50. Consequently Mrs. General decided to get a descriptive pamphlet and the General would order it to be copied in the workshops. Besides she much preferred to spend the money on blouses and cashmere sweaters etc. Subject then offered to buy the swing himself for the General, since he had wanted to buy him a present anyway, but Mrs. SEROV suggested buying the General something else. On hearing this, subject decided to give Mrs. General the money and let her chose herself. He consequently offered to do so in the taxi which took them on a night sight-seeing tour of the West End. Mrs. SEROV accepted with alacrity and insisted that on return to MOSCOW he should without fail visit them at their dacha where all the strawberries, honey etc. were at his disposal, and that the debt of money would be repaid. Whereas the daughter, Svetlana, was so delighted that she expressed desire to dance rock and roll with him! The SEROVs' eldest son apparently is married to KHRUSHCHEV's daughter Yekaterina, who is a ballet dancer. SEROV is consequently a VIP not only by virtue of his position but because of his relation to KHRUSHCHEV himself.

5. Subject then explains that Army-Gen. SEROV was BERIA's deputy in the old days, that he was kept on by KHRUSHCHEV (after BERIA's liquidation) and was later appointed President of the KGB. When the Presidency of KGB was handed over to SHELEPIN, SEROV came over to subject's 'firm', i.e. on SHTEMENKO's dismissal he was appointed Chief of the 2nd Military Intelligence Directorate. Notwithstanding, subject describes him as "just simple kindly old Ivan Aleksandrovich" who came to see his family off at the Airport and humbly begged subject to help them while in London. "and this is how I am helping!" concludes subject, roaring with laughter. (It also emerges that SEROV keeps bees at his dacha to cure his rheumatism)

6. Subject will meet the SEROVs again the following day (21st) because they are due to leave London on the 24th to visit other cities in the U.K. and on the 30th are due to return home by ship to LENINGRAD. Subject stresses that he is now "first on the list of visitors" both at the SEROV house and dacha, not only as a subordinate of the General but also by virtue of having been so attentive to the General's family. And all it cost him was £20! Subject intends to cultivate this to the full by visiting the SEROVs as often as possible and by patting the daughter occasionally since she seemed to like it!

7. Apparently SEROV's daughter, who although not very beautiful is very intelligent, is at the moment studying at the Mikoyan Aviation Institute where she hopes to get a degree of Engineer in Aviation electrical equipment ("elektro-oborudovanya samoletov").

8. Subject says he is a firm believer in enlarging his circle of acquaintances amongst houses "of interest", so as to widen his scope of possibilities, adding that he has another similar "useful"acquaintance.)

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Meeting No.21

1. On 24th July, 1961, subject arrived at 1305 hours. Subject has purchased a silver cigarette case costing £22 which he will give to [redacted], which he unpacked and displayed. It is to be inscribed "to dear Sergej Sergeevich" and not with [redacted]'s full rank etc., since their families are on very friendly terms and signed from (subject's true family name). After discussion it was decided that engraving is to be done in MOSCOW for security reasons. Subject agreed.

2. Subject requires further supply of batteries which he was asked to bring back by [redacted], both PHOTOS and [redacted]. S: The two sets are not enough. B: All right we will get them.

3. S: After visiting the Earls Court Exhibition for a short while that morning, I then went on to the Embassy where I saw PAVLOV who told me that he had heard from [redacted] that I was first on the [redacted] and was being 'recruited' for the [redacted]

4. B: [redacted] asked me for news of the machines I had promised to obtain. I told PAVLOV that I had already spoken both to [redacted] and [redacted] about both machines and that [redacted] was going to buy one in his own name and then hand it over to the Soviets who would pay the bill. The bill will then be taken by me to MOSCOW as an official invoice to justify the cost. The [redacted] engine will be delivered this week on Saturday. As regards the other ARITA engine, however, I plan to send [redacted] a telegram tomorrow (25th) stating that since the firm absolutely refuses to sell the Soviets less than 1000 machines en bloc, the British specialist who has been in frequent contact with [redacted], had agreed to buy the ARITA in his own name and subsequently hand it over to me. And I now request [redacted]'s agreement to this transaction and request that the cost of the machine in £ should be transferred accordingly to LONDON in my name. Such a telegram would increase the Soviets' trust in both [redacted] and [redacted] who are apparently listed in MOSCOW as my potential contacts for close study, and further use. It would be most advisable for me to send such a telegram tomorrow, to justify my stay in the U.K. during the past week. What I need is the price so I can report it even though delivery may be later. B: I will find out tomorrow. S: Then I can send the telegram a day later.

5. Subject requests additional photographic apparatus (tripot in particular) to save him adjusting the focus every time as he had to do for the 300 pages he has just brought over, i.e. spending 10-15 seconds on each shot. Subject guarantees that he never takes photographs unless he has 100% certainty that he will not be seen or interrupted. Consequently, the shorter time he spends in a locked room the better so as not to arouse suspicion as to why he locks his door. Subject listed all his photographic problems. S: The photography instructor has been scheduled to come here on Wednesday and we will cover all your problems.

6. Subject explains how he took photographs of secret intelligence (GRU) telephone directories of personnel working in the departments headed by, [redacted], who is the chief of 2nd Napravleniye of the 4th Directorate, and [redacted], who is the head of the 3rd Napravleniye (in the same Directorate): S: I succeeded in photographing them while [redacted] was away sick and I sat at his desk in which I found these directories.

7. S: The internal extensions in each department of the 4 number system can be obtained when ringing from an outside telephone

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by prefacing them with the prefix K-2 instead of going through the main (GRU) exchange no. K-5 03000 for instance. K-2 is the automatic prefix which connects one to the internal exchange. This is an open or rather semi-closed system. The General Staff Archives' tel. no. is K-7 which indicates that it is located in the BAUMANI district (of MOSCOW), these archives being located next to the STALIN Military Academy for Senior officers. (It is decided to revert to this later). (Note: Complete explanation of phone systems given in 22nd meeting).

8. In looking through these directories to find his own name, subject comes across an entry giving his home telephone number and saying he can be found through SHIKOV, Anatoli Ivanovich. Subject goes on to explain that SHIKOV was one of the senior officers in the 4th Directorate, having served previously to that in Egypt as Resident in Port Said. Other changes are scheduled to take place in the 4th Directorate soon as follows: On SUDIN's departure, SHIKOV will be promoted Head of the Napravleniye to replace Colonel DOLIN - the former Resident in IRAN and the present Head of the Napravleniye, who is in turn being promoted to replace SUDIN as Deputy Head of the Directorate on SUDIN's departure, although the post actually carries a General's rank, whereas DOLIN is only a Colonel. S; We will return to this in detail later.

9. S; As regards the Academy of Sciences directory, this includes the names of the many specialists mobilised for secret work on various defence projects, rockets, explosives, engines etc. Those peoples' names could not suddenly be excluded from the Directory - which is restricted secret anyway, as it would have aroused the suspicion of the other scientists in the Academy, most of whom are not party members but members of the old nobility or intellectual families. If these Academicians' names would have been suddenly excluded the others would have guessed at once that their colleagues were now working for the Ministry of Defence or the VPK.

10. S; Now last time we spoke of the S.P.S, P.S, P.5 rockets, details which I have already listed. I have no further information on the first two but would like to stress that each is a completely different weapon by virtue of their different ranges, earmarking and utilisation. The details which we already been listed in connection with those earmarked for submarine and land forces. I obtained this from PAPUSHKIN who had just returned from a course at the Senior Artillery officers Military Academy in LENINGRAD, where he had been studying these weapons at a VAK.

11. S; As regards the P.5, I actually saw this huge rocket with my own eyes and even touched it but it was instantly covered up by a large canvas and those attending the course were not allowed to study it - nor were they allowed to study the P.7 or the P.9 rockets which are all prototypes being tested in the research and development of various sizes and capacities for the production of a greater jet propulsion force ["reaktivnoj sily"].

12. S; As regards these developments, PAPUSHKIN as a wise and experienced Artillery officer commented that it is not possible to increase by mechanical means the jet propulsion force even further as the metal could not support this increase when the fuel expenditure (consumption) per second remains unchanged, since it would result in the metal burning out and this, in turn, if the fuel injector [forsunka] burns out, would result in an immediate fuel leak which would inevitably lead to either of two things. Either an outbreak of fire, or the rocket will cease travelling after the first 150-200 metres. It would be impossible to achieve since the essential scientific mutual balance will have been disturbed.

13. S; I'd like to mention something about the Directory listing numbers on 7th 4, commonly known as "traichatka", and explain that this Exchange serves the Minister himself, as well as all the Directorates, departments and Institutes coming under his jurisdiction - i.e. in General Staff of the Ministry of Defence. PAPUSHKIN's own Directorate however does not form part of (come under) the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence, but is part of the structure of the Ground Forces which is an

.../entirely

with the Ministry of Defence and its General Staff via the K PMLIN line "Kremlevka", which is allocated to all military "rukovodyashchiy sostav" (R.S.), for important conversations.

20. S: The reason why the Directory, in listing SERVOV for instance, does not give his initials - as is the rule for the majority listed in the Directory - is that SERVOV being quite a common name, it was thought this would avoid people guessing that the present head of GRU is identical with BERIYA's old deputy.

21. Subject also requests that he be allowed to buy the latest model of the American ZENITH wireless receiver, which having eight wave-lengths bands, Subject could also use as an alternative set to receive messages. He intends installing it in his "dacha" as he considers it would be simpler if he could also listen to music on it. He has no radio at home at all except the transistor we gave him. Besides he wants to improve his English by listening to the BBC. After much discussion regarding the security factors the request was held in abeyance for further consideration.

22. G: Let us work now on our agenda questions. First of all we want to clarify some points on the Berlin question. You said that assuming the roads were blocked - the Allies press on notwithstanding and send through transport planes to Berlin - these planes will be shot at. Who told you this? S: Firstly, this was told to me by VARENTSOV. Secondly, it was confirmed by Volodya FEDOROV when he was passing through with his battalion. Thirdly, by Yuriy KHOROSHILOV, who is the Chief of Staff of Artillery in the Tank Army, [redacted] under FU IF and who was previously a brigade commander of Artillery, but conventional Artillery, unlike FEDOROV (who is Rocket Artillery).

23. S: KHOROSHILOV was in MOSCOW on leave but was recalled back a fortnight earlier than the date originally fixed for his return. Notwithstanding, he found time to ring me and arrange to meet. We went to the Dinamo Restaurant where, amongst other things, he told me (as I have already reported to you) that "the Germans will make a real hash out of us!" So I asked him "But what will happen?" and he replied "this is what we are being told, and this is what we feel ourselves (will happen) and what I, as a Chief of Staff can tell you (will happen)..." and then he (KHOROSHILOV) went on to confirm much of what I had already heard... (as follows:).

24. S: As soon as the agreement (with GDR) is signed, a state of alert ('trevoga') will be declared immediately, putting all the GDR forces on the alert for the take over of control in all check-points - the defence and control of which in future will be their entire responsibility. Meanwhile, the Soviet troops will be kept in readiness ('na izgotove') : the plan being that they should not come out at once to occupy these roads, since this would then mean provocation to be followed by bloodshed... What will happen is that the West will be told: "Americans, British and French, please, you are still free to go to BERLIN, but you must now deal with the GDR (for passes)....or if you wish to fly along the Corridor at the agreed height and on the agreed course, please do so, but you must approach the GDRs who now control all flights and grant the necessary permission accordingly for a certain time-table and number of flights...similarly for railways.....

25. S: If however the Americans, British and French refuse to deal with the GDRs and try to force their way through, then the Germans will start firing. And since the GDR forces are evidently not strong enough, then the Soviet tanks will come out and attack the forces with which the (the West) tried to ram their way through to BERLIN.

26. G: There is a small non-sequitur here: although one can block

.../off

off a road or railway, one cannot do so in the air. Consequently, this means that the GDR air force will have to shoot down the transport planes of the Western Allies - that is fire the first shot. S: If the West do not apply for permission or give notice of intention to fly to BERLIN since they do not wish to deal with the GDR and just send off a plane (without prior notification) then the Germans will fire at this plane (from the ground) or order their own planes into the air (to attack it)... although their (GDR) planes are in fact Soviet planes... G: Yes, but the first shot will be fired by them? S: Yes, (the first shot will be) theirs!

27. G: But what happens on the roads? Who will fire first? Will it not be the other way round? S: Wait a minute! Let us say that the scheduled plane didn't fly through since the Germans started firing at it. So then you go along the road - not in tanks or armoured cars - just in ordinary cars or lorries carrying people and food-supplies. You are stopped, but since you do not wish to have any dealings (discussions) with the GDRs, you press on - so they start firing first at you, i.e. "if they (the West) do not recognise our rights - then fire... arrest...destroy them!" Even though the West had not yet sent in their tanks...The West won't be the first to fire, they won't start firing till the others fire first, I fully understand that. But things will happen as I have just told you - this is absolutely certain and cast-iron. I heard this from MARSHCHOV himself - "if they (the West) refuse to talk with the GDR and try to press on to BERLIN regardless, then they will be kicked in the teeth!" I vouch for this with my life that I am telling the truth! And if the Western Command then decides to send in their tanks so as to clear the way through, then they will also send in their (GDR) own tanks!

28. G: Who was the source of the statement that if KHRUSHCHEV realises that there will be tremendous solid opposition from the West, then he will stop and not sign the treaty? Is this an opinion held by you or held by others or is it a fact based on policy that someone may have heard at say, a meeting of the Supreme Soviet or some other such meeting? S: This is an opinion held by us all and it was expressed to me firstly by General POKROVSKI as well as by many other officers, FEDOTOV among them. What MARSHCHOV said was as follows: "we are going ahead in a very risky gamble [idem ne bolshoi risk]...we are going to show absolute firmness because, so they say, history will not forgive the leaders of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, if once again they postpone matters and once again do not sign the agreement (with GDR)..." So I said " What do you mean we are going in on a risk - how so, Sergey Sergeevich?" and MARSHCHOV replied: "Because if they (the West) refuse to talk to the Germans, and the German (sentry) will bar the way and say "give me your propusk" and then the Americans will get excited and so the fighting will begin..." I mean local fighting...(deep sigh)...And many say "what nonsense - what for", and all of them confirmed this to me, FEDOTOV also... In MOSCOW this is a well known fact, the people in General Staff DO know all this and visualise how it is all going to happen... after all we are constantly breathing that atmosphere...! And when I name to you my various sources, I only give the names of people who are known to you and who are actually concerned (take an active part) in all this. Because if I hear something from some IVANOV or PETROV there is no point in telling you about it and even I myself forget about it by next day since these people mean nothing to you or me.

29. G: As soon as the agreement (with GDR) is signed, a battle alert will be instantly declared in the GDR...and for what purpose? For the purpose of countering any, as they (the Soviets) say, 'childish' gesture on the part of the Western Military commanders, the Western representatives in Germany as well as on the part of the FRG Germans themselves. And since their (GDR) forces are not sufficiently strong, consequently they are going to be supported by the Soviet forces in Germany who are being put on battle alert, in position of battle-readiness No.1....And this battle alert will be

.../echeloned

echeloned back to the forces on the territory of the Soviet
as those stationed on territories of satellite countries.

50. S: (because they are envisaging the following) ...and what if the Americans should suddenly send in several thousand tanks so as to unite the two Germanies - then battle will commence...what sort of battle? A local battle!...and to what depth of front will it extend? To the extent of the territory on which these troops will be located i.e. there will be no attack (by the Soviet forces) on the rear, on other countries where our (Eastern)troops are concentrated... There will be no such attack...because they (the Soviets) want everything to be decided in this particular sector: the area wherein the highways are and the railroads and in the air...i.e. in the sector where it is expected that the West will show, as they (the Soviets) say, 'disrespect' towards the GDR...where (the West will say to the GDR Sentry) go to hell, I won't show you my propusk...! and so a skirmish will begin in this Sector...

51. S: And if the West send out their tanks, then the Soviets will also send out their tanks in support...and so they will begin firing at each other...For that is how the whole thing is envisaged and planned and there is nothing clumsy in this, everything is absolutely clear cut... So once again I would like to repeat to you what my own ears have heard and how I understood the position....(this is the plan envisaged): They will only show force and bar the way (to the West) only in the event that the West will refuse to talk to them (the GDR)... and not that, say for instance that as soon as the Germans will take up frontier control positions and the West sees them, the West will start firing at them at once.... Neither (is it envisaged) that as soon as the Soviets will see the Western forces, they will start firing at them...but they will say "and on what grounds are you travelling on this territory? According to the agreement you should have permission for this from the Government of the GDR. If you have permission from the Government of the GDR to make a flight at such and such a time, then please go ahead!...".

52. S: And this is where KHRUSHCHEV, ULBRICHT and GROTEWOHL are being so clever. For they will say: "We are not limiting the entry of Americans, British and French (into BERLIN)..." But God forbid that this should lull the West into a feeling that there is no danger...because this is only the first step, i.e. once the time-table of movements (and permission for such movements) is in the GDR hands, then they can dictate the rules of the game, and continue to press through with their own will.

53. S: It is perfectly clear to us and we understand perfectly well that the Soviet Government has no right to sign an agreement with the Germans, but they are trying to support this action with armed strength... And (it is planned that)should the Americans, British, French and the FGR Germans refuse to talk and negotiate with the GDR concerning regulations for future use of communications with BERLIN, then they will be told: "No, stop, we must defend our rights according to the agreement... the Soviet authorities have gone and we are therefore a sovereign power in this territory..." But the Soviet forces will not leave, they will just retreat some distance nearby...and then, as the German (GDR) forces are weak - they haven't got anything such as a matter of fact I could tell you about it since I personally know more or less what they've got into this Sector, into this Zone, i.e. over the German territory as a whole. That is how the Soviets want it for the moment, they do not want to widen the area of hostilities, they do not want to turn it into another world war... This is the Soviet plan and this is where the gamble and the risk comes in. This is the risk VARENTSOV was talking about.

54. S: I could have easily proved all this to you if I could have recorded all such remarks as and when made to me had I been supplied with a pocket recorder. But this should be one of excellent quality, as apparently the GDR model is dreadful and makes ghastly rattling noises. and is consequently not being used by Soviet Intelligence.

55. S: This is what the Soviets are preparing for. And that is why

.../all

- the Soviet tanks and artillery will be thrown in - in great strength -

all manoeuvres and training is being done on a joint basis with all the WARSAW Pact countries, that is why there is urgent demand for equipment, for tanks....and especially the tanks are being given particular emphasis. The Western Commands should never suffer from the naive illusion that the Soviet Military and Government Organs have stopped developing tank forces. We have already spoken in April-May that what is taking place in the USSR is a re-allocation and partial reduction in Air Force and Navy, i.e. disbandment of unnecessary elements in Air and Naval forces...and this is done,why - not because the Soviet Government and High Command do not have a high regard for the Navy or Air Forces as such....Not at all, they are doing this because they consider that this disbandment can be compensated by the organising of a smaller but more specialised force with the introduction of new weapons, i.e. rockets of various calibers, diametres, and ranges...

36. Q: I will try to find out further details on this question...the exact vital moment... but [illegible] has already told us that he is taking his family out of Germany in September and all [illegible]'s officers are going to do the same.

37. S: It would be a very good thing if... actually I would like to meet sometime the [illegible] Minister [illegible] - although of course I realise I am much too small a minion for a man in his position.... to advise him to run special schools organised for teaching diversionary tactics so as to create absolute panic within the garrisons occupied by Soviet forces i.e. by starting fires, blowing up roads, communications, etc.... It would be like a mouse-trap then, and the Soviet forces will then start running round in circles and by the time they will start firing it will then be too late..! And if they are too late, with God's help the advantage will be ours... Because this is what they (the Soviets) are frightened of. And why are they so frightened? Because they know full well what the atmosphere is, how the Germans look upon them, how the Germans hate them... and they know full well that as soon as any skirmishing begins, the Germans will start throwing stones at them, beating them with sticks or guns - if they have them...

38. S: And just imagine what will happen then. [illegible] has all material in his brigade - [illegible] has two complete firing units: one already fitted with rockets ready to fire and the others are kept in the Brigade rear area. The Brigade actually has four firing units in all allocated for its initial mission although in fact there should be twelve in all spread out in depth, so that it is known that to a depth of several hundred kilometres all these rockets are going to [illegible]'s brigade only... so that if his depots are set on fire, several hundreds of his people popped up, just imagine the chaos! Everybody running in all directions at once. There will be no longer a unified brigade, no organised firing... And once they are out in the field they will start firing at once in all directions and at the GDR Germans, and at the FRG Germans, and at the Allied forces - all at once on a circular front - so they say! Once they are in combat deployment that is bad for our side....So it essential not to allow them to deploy in combat formation. Because, after all, they are sitting like in a mouse-trap....they are not sitting out in an open field now... because that would indeed be bad for the west if they were sitting in reserve positions so that it would then be very simple and quick to change to combat deployment....but they are doing nothing of the kind! They are sitting in a house - in wonderful accommodation with telephones, baths, bars and jass bands even... This is what they are afraid of - this is listed as the prime danger. And why should we not make use of this? For if we (the West) do not, history also will never forgive us for missing this opportunity!If we(the West) say: all right, let [illegible] do it according to the rule, wait for them to take up combat positions and then start firing!

39. S: Simultaneously organise diversionary groups so as to destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible...and then it would take the

.../Brigade

Brigade several days to re-organize itself, and that only after they have received new supplies of firing-units from the second Gear area, because everything in the front line would have been burned out....everything - all equipment and material....I do not consider that would be too difficult (for the West) to achieve! Because if some bold and decisive action is taken here, an awful lot of destruction can be achieved!

40. G: Another item for clarification. You remember you mentioned the existence of anti-missile missiles. Have you heard whether in this connection there exists some programme under [redacted]'s direction i.e. Institutes, factories, training courses concentrating on anti-rocket defense with rockets... S: I have taken a great interest in this myself and I know that what I was told is correct and that I have understood the situation correctly as follows: No device actually exists that is in fact a realistic, completed, workable device against a rocket attack. A serious and considerable amount of work however is being done on these lines...but this work which is carried out in the Scientific-Research Institutes, the NII8, not those under the jurisdiction of [redacted] or [redacted], but those under the Ministry of Defense itself. These Institutes are controlled by Special Technical Engineering Directorates in the Ministry of Defense or in GAU....An awful lot of brain-exhausting work has been done on this problem, but still no stable device that could be put into use as an anti-rocket has been worked out as yet. Some of course have been tested. I can absolutely vouch for that. And since the Rocket is Device No.1, this would be Device No.2 - an anti-rocket, but no such device has been perfected yet, although tremendous work and research is being done on this. Considerable sums of money have been allocated, quantities of scientific experts mobilized for this purpose in order to calculate the exact trajectory so as to meet the oncoming rocket with an explosion that would destroy it.

41. G: But could they adapt for instance, the V-75 or other ZUR's rockets for this purpose and if so are any attempts already being made on those lines? S: Yes, of course, they could adjust it, but so far this has not been worked out or approved...of course, they could since they already have rockets for such a height, a rocket that can be perfectly controlled by radio.... but not explode it on the trajectory of the oncoming rocket. But the whole complexity of the matter lies in the exact calculation of the exact moment of our firing of our rocket and to compute electronically all details determining height at which the other missile is travelling in order to be able to hit it. Even if they know the exact amount the enemy missile is fired they haven't got the means for working out the trajectory. One can't really adopt the method of firing against all possible trajectories for one given missile. It's too expensive. That is a question which is being studied very seriously.

42. G: Do they know anything about such tests at KAPUSTIN YAR or in KAZAKHSTAN? S: No, no-one has told me anything about this. You see, KAPUSTIN YAR and similar ranges in the ORVKA Military District - I am sure there must be other ranges, we just haven't discovered yet, they are so secret - any way all these places are used for testing equipment which is practically ready for issue to troops, or else equipment already in use which is being perfected. It is also used as a testing ground by Institutes. KAPUSTIN YAR is not connected in this matter you are asking about.

43. G: Can you tell us whether there is a programme for anti-ballistic missiles? Do they expect to have them within a year, two years? S: I can tell you that it will not be sooner than from one to three years. But they are working hard on it. Large sums are being spent. The Soviet doctrine in general assumes that for each new weapon a counter-weapon is to be found, once they build a tank they immediately create an anti-tank weapon; having created rockets they are now working on anti-rocket weapons. They also know that the enemy is working on the same lines. And the Soviets assume that in view of the enemy's high-level of electronic-computing techniques they are ahead. But the Intelligence people can't find out the exact degree.

44. G: Has Sergey Sergeyevich said anything to you about this?

.../:

S: All he has said was that we (the Soviets) are working on it. He has not said anything definite. Sergey Sergeyevich is worrying himself sick on account of the lack of trained personnel and the low level of computing techniques. I'll ask him about this and you can listen to his reply.

45. G: Assuming that the ADS system exists, would it be in the hands of PVO A.A. defence or would it have an independent command? S: PVO would have it primarily. Their troops are trained for this. There is no point in giving it to VASYUKOV. It has to be near the frontiers. Definitely it would be under the PVO.

46. G: What other rocket, besides the V-75 was shown at the May Day Parade? Two were shown. G: Was the second one also a ZUR39? G: Yes, a ZUR3. S: No, I haven't heard anything. Anyway I was here at the time. When they told me about the Parade they did not say anything about a new rocket. Perhaps it is another type of rocket, not a ZUR3. All right, I'll check. G: As you attended lectures at the Academy on the V-75, does this mean that this rocket will be issued to troops for their own defence? S: Yes. When you'll get the sketches you will see that it is used for defence of troops. This is also mentioned in the 1959 manual I gave you, but the exact type of rocket is not mentioned. The following troops are covered: large 2nd echelon troop concentrations, Army front HQ, Troops preparing for attack. Other troops, if means are available. The same system which was applied during World War II.

47. G: In the case of improved types of the same rockets, would the PVO be the first to get them? S: Yes, of course. They have always the first priority. Marshal of Artillery, KAZAKOV, Commander of PVO ground forces, his people are equipped for the defence of troops he has rifled A.A. weapons, he has some aircraft, and he will get the V-75 as and when it is produced. He probably has some already, I feel sure he has.

48. G: You said you were told at the lectures that you can have the rockets operate at 3,000 metres and up to 20 kilometres. Does this mean you can't operate at lower levels? S: You use other calibres for lower levels. The rockets developed velocity must be employed at high altitudes. At lower levels fighters or A.A. are used. I've already told you all about it.

49. S: The other thing I've given you is the rocket launched from an aircraft. There are 4 rockets carried by the plane.

50. G: There is one thing that is not clear. When they say that the range of the rocket is 40 km, the guidance is 10 to 20 km, which means that it can fly another 20 km. after the 7 seconds, how is it guided then since it has been cut off from ground control? S: Let me refer to the materials (S. is shown his notes). Which range are you referring to, horizontal or vertical? The second-stage assemblies of the rocket give you 40 km., the guiding ends after 20 km, as it is considered that after this height it will continue along the fixed trajectory, and it can be exploded by a special explosive device say at 25 km so that it flies 5 km without any guidance. It will fly for those extra 5 kms if 25 is set; or 10 kms if 30 is set along the direction in which it had been guided.

51. S: In this way by using the possibility of the flight of rocket V-75 for 40 km, the troops using it for firing say at a height of 25 km. accelerate it to the limit of control for 20km. calculating that the control up to 20 km. will give absolutely accurate flight in the same direction for the remainder of 5 km. with the help of rudders, the correcting assemblies etc. will come into action, it can operate at 29 and 30 km. That is why it is considered that the important thing with regard to this rocket is to keep it under control for those 20 km.

52. G: It is very important to know what happens when it explodes. S: I've written you in accurate detail about this. The only thing I have forgotten to tell you is the depth of the grooving (of the fragments). Those

.../grooves

grooves can be smaller and deeper, they don't all have the same depths. It is rather like jeweller's work. Where the grooves are smaller it will explode sooner, with a smaller number of fragments. The angle I have mentioned is achieved with the help of this cutting or grooving, as well as the number of splinters required. I gave you full details, the only thing I didn't speak about was the relationship between the depth of the grooving and the fragmentation. I repeat the type of grooving on the jacket, the number of fragments, and the method of "refining" [refinirovanie] the whole which breaks up into fragments, I've written you a detailed report about this, about 3600 fragments or as the notes stated. (Subject explains similarity to a hand-grenade). The grooving is done in such a way as to obtain a cone of fragments in the predetermined direction. The depth of the grooving is also one of the controlling elements.

53. Q: Here is another detail, as you are so interested. During this "refining" of the sections which gives you the fragments, they try to make all the fragments angular and to cut out wastage. The effort is to make the maximum number of fragments effective. They have been successful in this. They should disperse by predesignation in a cone toward the approaching target. Dispersal angle is 2°- 5° for fragments. The bursting angle of the whole is 10°. (This is all written in notes). The action of the fragments is guided, at a distance of 50 metres they can pierce steel armour. The distance is calculated on the guided action cone. It is always directed straight ahead. (Subject gives a demonstration during the conversation).

54. Q: Has the V-75 got an atomic warhead? A: No, and they don't consider it necessary for it to have one. They consider it a much too expensive entertainment just for one aircraft.

55. Q: Have you heard anything about K-25? A: It exists, but I do not know any technical details. It is older than V-75, but it has never been developed. It is one of the first. It appeared to be successful and they may go back to it. But you know they have so many variations.

56. Q: Will they develop missiles for low-flying aircraft? A: If you mean rockets, the answer is No. They believe that the enemy will not risk expensive new aircraft on a plate to the opposition (Soviets) by flying low and exposing it to ground fire.

57. Q: Are they considering developing more powerful rockets? May be engage the U.S. B-70 planes? A: No. They consider that at the present stage they've got sufficient, they have the V-75, they have aircraft with a ceiling of 30 km, these aircraft can carry rockets which will add another 4-5 km. Of course it would be nice to develop and have them, but you can't do everything at once.

58. Q: Do they intend to instal the V-75 or similar side on naval vessels? A: Yes. This is depending. These same rockets are being used. The same principle. I'll find out about the submarine for you. It has just not been one of the subjects I have dealt with at lectures, or anywhere else. I do not know where it is mounted.

59. Q: Did they give the V-75 to the Satellites because they have been given the V-75 is because [illegible] has decided it is time they had their own trained personnel and knew how to use this weapon. It does not mean that the Soviets have anything better. Anyway let me tell you that they only give very little to the Satellites. All that is happening is that this rocket is issued to the first troops occupying these countries. But they do train the Satellites in the use of them. Anyway they don't give them all the rockets. The more powerful and long range ones they keep for themselves, saying that they will be fired from Soviet territory by Soviet Troops.

.../60

60. Q: Have you heard anything about there being tiny hand operated rockets which could be used as A.A. by a soldier? S: The A.A. have certainly not got anything like this. I am certain of this. Perhaps they exist as new anti-tank weapons and haven't been issued to the troops yet. That I'll have to check on. There are a number of prototype weapons which have not been issued to the troops. I mean machine guns, automatic rifles.

61. Q: It has been noticed that around LENINGRAD they are building very many A.A. guided missile ( ) defences. But they appear to be a new type of defence not like the V-75 installation. Could you tell us anything about this? S: I think that your information that there are other types of rockets there is incorrect. The building is all done for the V-75 but also includes shelters, underground storage areas and platforms. LENINGRAD is not the only city affected. Such A.A. defences will be also built near , and other industrial centres, political centres, etc. It is all done for the V-75. Of course, it is possible that it will later be used for other rockets. I also doubt that anyone could have seen either the V-75 or any other rockets. Who ever gave you the information made a mistake, probably due to the fact that he is not a rocket expert.

62. Q: Could you get us some rocket designs? S: Yes, of course. The instruction manuals had blue-prints attached. I had wanted to copy them as I told you in the Spring, but I didn't have the time to do it. I also thought that if I gave you all the figures you would be able to do a sketch. I'll keep this in mind for the future. All you need to do is to blow up the shape of the rocket to actual size. Q: Of course all projections of the rocket such as stabilisers are of interest. S: I will do this. There are sketches folded in all rocket material. Stabilisers are all fairly standard for rockets.

63. S: When you gave us those figures for fuel pressure so many tons at a temperature of 5°, and for 27 tons a temperature of 40°, did you mean this to be minus 40° ? S: I will check (looks at his notes). Yes, of course, it should be minus. How can such a huge thrust difference occur at only a 10° change.

64. Q: Do you know what R.M.P. 75 means? This refers to the radar equipment. S: I think it is part of the launching assembly [puskovaya ustanovka] but here it is written rocket "aiming station" [stantsiya navedeniya] (radar station). In this case R.M.P. 75, is the aiming station for rocket V-75. This is connected with the R/T control. Let me tell you, it was jolly lucky for us that I was not sent to the LENINGRAD Staff courses. They would only have given us distances, combat possibilities, and tactical considerations in general. They would have taught us nothing at all about the rocket itself. These are all engineering details. All this is being studied at the Frunze Academy - Faculty No.3, radio-electronics.

65. Q: Did they compare the V-75 to the Western A.A. guided missiles? S: No. They only had general review lectures, right at the beginning, on the American, French, English and German rockets. I told you that for the German ones they talked about the "V". They gave us very little information on Western rockets. And I can judge by the assignments given to the Residentura that we have little information.

66. Q: Now, we have finished the chapter on V-75. We will now go on to unconventional weapons. Have you heard anything about this new wonderful weapon you have, about which KHRUSHCHEV has spoken, besides the atom powered engine? S: No. That is the only thing he could have meant. They are pressing to develop this atomic powered engine and the accident occurred because they were in such a hurry. He could have meant new types of aircraft. Let me tell you how I understand his statements as a General

Q.34

.../Staff

Staff officer. He has in mind atomic and hydrogen bombs, new type of aircraft, rockets which have already been approved, this he considers sufficient to brag about. But it is all very thinly spread. Put massed and directed against one target it could of course be effective. But he has no capability of hitting many targets. That he is yelling for peace to gain time.

67. Q: Has he got bacteriological weapons? A: Yes, he has. Q: Can we have any details about this? What types? Methods of employment? Storage depots? S: There is a manual dealing with chemical warfare, it may be dated 1959, but I will get it for you. I believe this is the latest. Q: Have you heard whether it is the Soviet intention to use these weapons? S: I've already told you and am repeating, there is a special Directorate dealing with this matter; there are chemical troops, there are secret firing ranges, where chemical and bacteriological warfare are being tested. They intend to use these jointly with other types of weapons in order to increase the effects of the attack. Q: Do they intend to use it in response to the enemy's using it, or do they intend to be the first to do so? S: They have two options planned: in the case of a surprise attack everything will be thrown in, otherwise should the enemy during the course of a war use chemical and bacteriological means they will reply. If on the other hand they adopt the doctrine of being the first ones to disrupt everything, to prevent receiving a decisive hit from the enemy in response, they will throw in chemical and bacteriological weapons. A lot is being prepared. You can't disregard this in your planning.

68. Q: During the last world war the Germans and the other combatants did not use poison gas. S: The Soviet troops were equipped with chemical shells. I had them myself. They were not supplied to the firing positions, but I knew that my regiment had rear area supplies. In the same way that all artillery had been ordered to destroy the enemy tanks, in the same way the chemical troops would have had orders to go all out. I held one of these chemical shells in my hands, but there were none at the front, they were at the army group held against emergency. Now, you have asked by what means the bacteriological and chemical weapons are going to be used. Of course, the most important part is to be played by the air force. Special tanks, which will be fitted to aircraft, are in existence. The dissemination will be by spraying certain determined areas. They also have chemical shells which can be fitted to rockets to the war-head. VARENTSOV has these. There are special containers for fitting to the war-head, filled with chemical or bacteriological solutions. All the "rocket carriers" [maiteli raket] will be chemical-bacteriological carriers. All this has already been studied; there is a Directorate at GHQ, headed by a Colonel-General dealing with these matters (VOLKOVEN).

69. Q: Have you heard that the Sputnik can be used not only for military purposes but also can be used as an atomic weapon? S: I have not heard this. But I have heard that it is very difficult to adapt the sputniks for correcting the aiming of atomic weapons, due to the cosmic speed at which the sputnik travels. I know that they are working on this. GAGARIN has made his flight on which he took photographs of certain sectors [otsechki], although they said there were no cameras installed. There was a complex of various types and sizes of cameras, which he switched on automatically. KHRUSHCHEV and the press lied when they said at the time we launched the man that nothing was photographed and no information collected. Q: Who told you this? S: A number of people told me that on this Sputnik, and in fact on every Sputnik, they try to instal all sorts of optical instruments, photographic instruments, for taking photographs. GAGARIN was given all equipment. By the way, I must tell you that General Staff were livid when they learnt that the Americans had launched a Sputnik travelling over Soviet territory. They said that this was a Spy-Sputnik.

.../They

areas in the mountains, where tests are being prepared, but they have no concrete information that bombs have actually been tested in these places.

77. G: Have they got intermediary atomic shells between 5 and 30 kilotons. S: Yes. They have them. I have fired them.(simulated problem). They have special tables, for 10, for 15 kilotons. I didn't have my Minox otherwise I would have photographed the tables. These weapons are for use with rockets, for "R-2" and "R-11". For atomic guns they used 5 kiloton shells. There were no 10 kiloton shells mentioned, only 5. (subject makes a drawing showing where the troops are located and what the troop safety line is).

78. G: Are great numbers of these atomic guns in operational use? S: Yes. G: Have they got them in GDR? S: I think so. I don't know for certain, but there are a great number of them being produced. G: Are all your troops using them? S: Yes, I think so. G: Did [illegible] tell you whether there are such guns there? S: I didn't ask him, you hadn't told me you want to know (joking). G: Under whose command do they come? S: Under [illegible]. They are the GDR reserve (RAK) for ground forces. For GDR they are in [illegible]'s hands, but [illegible] is subordinate entirely to [illegible]. [illegible] knows these guns and has told me he believes in them, they are good guns. [illegible] has been given the 5-ton atomic gun. I don't think there are any others. They have not been tested with atomic shells; they have been tested with High Explosive shells, pretending they were atomic ones. Nor have they used them for warfare.

79. G: How do they know that the gun won't blow up when they do use atomic shells unless it is tested? S: Well, they have made all the calculations. (subject repeats vehemently a number of times that no atomic shells have been fired. He had asked instructors and [illegible] (he thinks), who has worked in GDR). S: The task was to test the gun and its reliability using High Explosive shells. They have had other trotyl equivalent tests, but not by using guns and mortars. They have dropped these bombs from aircraft, very accurately, as the trajectory was observed from the ground, after release. I've told you about this. I will check on this; you have confused me, although I am very sure that the guns were not tested with atomic shells. But the dummy shells were calculated to the last milimetre to represent the atomic ones. We were shown films dealing with Soviet atom tests. All sorts of structures, animals, vehicles etc. were placed at various distances to test destructive effects. Pressures developed during an atomic explosion were recorded by a steel assembly made in the form of a steel shaft, a steel pad and a membrane which records by grooves on the metal. These grooves register the pressure, say a hundred thousand kilos.

80. G: What is the ratio of High Explosive to nuclear warheads for "R-1", "R-2" and "R-11"? S: I can't give you the exact ratio, but this is the principle they work on. Everything has first got to be prepared for the conventional, High Explosive warheads. If a crisis arises and they decide to busy Capitalism, then the lot will be transferred to atomic warheads. If the war is a chivalrous one, not an atomic or hydrogen one, then the rockets will carry High Explosive warheads, trotyl cordol, etc. I don't know the exact figures, but I think that the ratio is for say 100 rockets, you will have 10 atomic warheads for 90 High Explosive warheads. This is what I gathered from lectures, although no specific figures were given. The atomic warheads are manufactured and stored separately. Of course, what can happen is that they decide to fire atomic rockets in a certain theatre of war, and then they will supply only atomic warheads, for the 100 rockets. However, this is only conjecture; this must be questioned.

81. G: Who is in charge of the distribution of nuclear warheads? At what level? S: [illegible] controls their production, and stores them. The

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brought this matter to your attention now is that it is possible I will be leaving the Committee in a few months time. That is why it is important for me to have firm foreign acquaintanceships established with whom I could continue working, with the knowledge of my superiors, and not in the line of my work for the Committee, receptions to which I would go as a personal friend.

95. S: What can happen to me? They might prepare to send me to England - please God! Or [redacted] might give the order "return him to the 'Apparatus', to [redacted]". He can either make me the Deputy Head of a Rezydenturye or even the Head of a Rezydenturye. That would also be a good thing, please God. I would then remain in [redacted], and could go on seeing old acquaintances from time to time. It would still not rouse comment; after all, I must be polite, greet people if I meet them, keep up 'diplomatic behaviour'. Should someone go away, you could introduce someone else to me. It was not by chance that I, for this reason, proposed [redacted] to you. I say this as an example. My proposals may be the right ones or the wrong ones.

96. J: Would you be in uniform if you returned to [redacted], and could you then meet foreign military attaches? S: No. I will be in civilian dress. Even in [redacted], and even in the 'apparatus', I will serve in [redacted], but will walk about (in the same dress) as I am doing now. Should there be a war then I will be back in uniform. Q: In reverse, could you put on uniform in [redacted] to meet, say a Military Attache? S: I would have to consult my superiors about this. They might reply: "This would be difficult. Why should we try to throw dust in their eyes. They have already acknowledged you, and let you into England twice already as a man who has had his discharge [illegible] and here you are again appearing in uniform in front of them". Q: Yes, that is true.

97. S: I can maintain friendly relations with people who might be useful if I once had a solid introduction. I do not need to engage in agent activities; I can study him for a year. J: How would you meet such individuals? In a restaurant? S: I will tell you the chain. I will tell you how we are instructed in this, and what is required of us. Well, I have become acquainted with a man at a reception; I've met him once or twice. I have already reported that I am acquainted with him. He appears to be a sympathetic individual to whom it is worth paying attention. This is already the art of the intelligence officer, whether it is worth cultivating him for three months, six or a year. After a few meetings he (the Intelligence Officer) suddenly receives an invitation from the contact to a celebration, say the birthday of contact's wife. They are interested in the man, so he goes. Or I can ask for official funds to entertain the man in a restaurant, in order to get to know him better, i.e. I can keep closer contact on my own initiative with a man on whom I am known to be working.

98. J: On seeing a group of Americans or British in a restaurant, say diplomats, you could escape acquaintance with them? S: It would not be well looked upon if I had never met them before. We are not permitted to associate with people if we are not acquainted with them, i.e. no pick ups with foreigners.

99. S: If after proper introduction, I were to say that I think it would be worth while to spend some time on a foreigner, who might be of interest and use, I would be told to go ahead, as this is my active initiative. I need firm acquaintanceships of this sort on which I can be actively working in view of my possible change of occupation this autumn, after my holidays. Officers working in [redacted] do invite Diplomts to restaurants, as for instance, the 1st Secretary of the Afghan Embassy was invited, and others. [redacted], for instance,

.../who

180. G: Let us stop on the 2'n to-day, we will continue to-morrow. S: So it was a good idea to have photographed this? G: Yes, of course.

185. G: Is there a LAZAREV there in Cadres? S: Indeed he is Colonel LAZAREV.

184. S: IVANOV is to go to the 1st Otdel, he has been promoted Colonel, while LAZAREV is probably there too.

185. G: Do you remember AZAV? S: No, I can't.

186. G: Do you have a NOVIKOV there, he has gold teeth, he is a Colonel. S: Yes, I know him and incidentally how about my dentist? G: To-day an appointment is being booked for you.

187. Subject makes his request for tape recorder, including a pocket model, etc. Subject says he is free when he wants to be free in relation to his missions. If he can fix the 'ANITA' matter up quickly, he'll 'spit' on them! He arrives at the Embassy every morning at 9, 'he' sees him, at ten to ten he has finished breakfast and goes out for ten minutes. At the Embassy he has discussions, answers any questions they may have for him, drops in to see them from time to time, etc., sits there for a time, but after that he has his own business to attend to, both the Committee's business and GRU's business, after all, he has to take care of his missions.

188. Subject lists his local programme, purchases he wishes to make, etc. Subject says he will be free anytime during the afternoon the next day to see the Doctor. Subject left at 1915 hours on 24th July, 1961.

Meeting No.23

1. Subject arrived at 1510 hours on 20th July, 1961

2. Subject opens package and shows EXACTA camera.
S: They have 4 types of camera: one EXACTA, one cine-camera, a new German one, and two ordinary Soviet ones. I got this from PAVLOV, yesterday, for my trip to STAMFORD. This camera is now loaded with a British made film (ILFORD). I brought this for you to take the number etc. in case operational use is made with this camera in the future - and secondly I'd like to have the photographic instructor to tell me how best to use it. I have an exposure and time chart here which they gave me, and I would like it checked.
C: That is fine, we will do all this before you go on your trip.

3. S: I have one very interesting thing to tell you. I was even thinking of calling you yesterday. SHAPOVALOV came up to me yesterday after I had had my conversation with PAVLOV, and said "Oleg Vladimirovich I would like your advice, you are my former boss, I've some trouble concerning my work". Before that I had read a telegram from SEMOV enquiring about his family, a reply has been sent mentioning the £20 loan and the shopping expedition. PAVLOV has already sent off the telegram about ANITA, here is the text: "During the British Industries Fair in MOSCOW, such and such a firm exhibited two prototypes of a portable computer ANITA. At the present time the firm has signed a great number of contracts with certain capitalist countries for the supply of this machine (mentioning October). During the fair our specialists in MOSCOW considered the advisability of acquiring the ANITA computer. The English firm had then replied that they can only sell it on the basis of one thousand at a time. The English specialist who maintains scientific - technical relations with the Committee has promised (Subject's name) to obtain an ANITA machine against cash down and subsequently pass it on to us. The price of the machine is £400. Please reply urgently whether it is advisable to give this sum, via (Subject's name) to the British specialist or there may be the possibility of repayment after delivery of the machine. Let us have your instructions."

4. C: Did you mention the dates of the exhibition? S: No, I gave PAVLOV all the other details orally. He asked me to thank [illegible] and to arrange a meeting with [illegible] at the Embassy at 10 o'clock on Monday. VOROHIN came in and told PAVLOV and me that he is leaving LONDON by air on either Saturday or Sunday.

5. S: Then I went with SHAPOVALOV to his office. I have been in five rooms already which are involved with intelligence work, I will draw it up for you later. SHAPOVALOV's trouble consists in the fact that the "Centre" had ordered him to drop his Indian contact as he was suspected of being an "agent-provocateur". The Indian in question is a journalist, a young man, representative of an insignificant Indian paper. I reported this to you in the Spring. His name begins with K, and on the 23rd July he is supposed to have gone on a trip to PRC, as a member of a delegation of journalists

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21. Subject then refers to Van VLIET and how displeased he was by his transfer from MOSCOW. G.Explains that van VLIET was removed because of woman trouble. S. The people in the (Soviet) Ministry of Foreign Trade, who have spoken to me about him, were of a very low opinion as to his abilities. They thought him a fool. Subject then repeats that SMITH, the Ambassador, treats him (Subject) in a very friendly manner.

22. S: Now, about MERRIMAN, I am to ring him? H: Yes. S: All right. And think about McBRIDE. On the 31st I will take WINNE to meet PAVLOV. Prior to my departure I need receipts, hotel bills, which WINNE should obtain for me.

23. Subject mentions the Zenith radio, and George tells him to be silent and look. The radio is shown him. George explains in detail that this radio is being given him to show him we are sympathetic to his wishes as good friends. The gift is from the heart against our better judgement and should show him that money is no problem but security is. Therefore, the tape recorder (personal use) is out since he would be suspect having it and risk a disaster by trying to record VARENTSOV if the latter should visit subject.

24. Furthermore Subject should abide by our advice and decisions re future requests of a security risk nature and minimise his acquisitive desires. Subject was visibly touched and thanked us profusely.

25. S: However I'll have WINNE take it in, rather than taking it now. (The set was removed from its packing box and Subject was shown its components, operation etc. Its unpacked size permits it to be carried in a normal suitcase easily. Subject reassured us that he can easily legend his having obtained the set in the Comission store. He explained how it is registered, how easily it can go through customs, etc. Since WINNE had requested to postpone his trip to the USSR till 26th August due to his son's sudden apendectomy, the schedule was reviewed and to permit Subject's leave Janet and husband's leave and WINNE's arrival to fit in, the 23rd August was decided upon.)

26. G: Regarding the military article you wanted our help to write; it seems that since you are an artillery officer and have been given access to the PTURS data by VARENTSOV, and other artillery studies; you should look over the material inthe GRU spetsfond to see what manuals or data there is on the same subject - anti-tank weapons, are from Anglo-American Military material - and give us the bibliography. S: I'll consider this and I will get a list of subjects and magazines dealing with Anglo-American forces which KORENETSKI's people hold in the GRU Information Directorate. I will even expand the subject matter, maybe an infantry topic would be O.K. I will also try and send photocopies of my other papers and articles which I can get - through WINNE.

27. G: Just send us a bibliography. S: I will send you a complete list of what we have on your forces. Then if you can send me the material back I'll work it over properly.

28. G: Now to reassure you that your information is definitely reaching our leaders - here is a report on President KENNEDY's speech. I won't read it to you but I can point out to you that in a number of statements, exactly those thoughts which you suggested were mentioned. (Subject was delighted).

/29. ....

29. S: I reported to you last Spring about the situation at the time of KhRUShChEV's coming to power. When he kicked out the opposition - MALENKOV - etc. There was even three days when he was not in power. KhRUShChEV is adopting the same technique with the Army he had previously with the Party officials. During his "reign" he has personally promoted approximately 1500 officers to Generals out of a total of 4 - 5000, and also promoted a number of old Generals to higher ranks, up to the rank of Marshal, and even Chief Marshal. He relies on their support. But both in the Presidium and in the Central Committee there are still a number of people who supported MALENKOV, MOLOTOV, BULGANIN, etc. PERVUKhIN is one of them. There are also unconfirmed rumours that KhRUShChEV fights occasionally with MIKOYaN. MIKOYaN is in opposition with regard to some of KhRUShChEV's opinions, arrangements etc. KhRUShChEV is not popular with the masses. They do not care for his jokes, comments, etc. They blame him for the miserable life they have to live. We know he is a political adventurer.

30. S: Among the leaders (rukovodstvo) there exists a secret opposition, which remains secret because the majority are still KhRUShChEV's proteges and the others don't want to lose their jobs. But there could be a distribution of forces and a split as a result of the BERLIN question. All of them who are aware of the weak points, with regard to the economic and military situations, who will say "It is too early to go to war." We've got to wait. What's the point of heating up the situation because of a BERLIN which has existed for the last 16 years." Should this occur, it is possible the KhRUShChEV will carry the day and win once again, on the other hand the reverse might happen. We have to take this into consideration. They could either remove KhRUShChEV, saying he was ill or else he might resign - as MALENKOV did, or they could say "You go on being the boss, but let's r treat on the BERLIN question, let's think something up." Let's say outright that we are defenders of the peace, the Anglo-Americans have taken the extreme view of our declaration and are preparing for war, we don't want war, there's no hurry, we'll settle the BERLIN question oneday". There are lots of diplomatic words that can be found in order to meet the situation and to fool the people and lie again.

31. The 22nd Congress will decide what action is to be taken. It doesn't appear on the Agenda, but as I have told you before whenever there is one of these big gatherings they have secret sessions, the plenum, the praesidium, and I am positive that this matter will be discussed, it might even be discussed before the official opening of the Congress. So we must keep in mind these three possibilities. (Subject continues on this theme for some time, repeating roughly what he has already said.) - Namely:

1) KhRUShChEV may crush all opposition and proceed to sign East German peace treaty, inviting local hostilities and risking general war.

2) KhRUShChEV may be forced to compromise and delay signing peac treaty in view of Western opposition and propagandize this more as his desire for peace - still postponing possible action re East Germany and Berlin to a further date.

3) KhRUShChEV may be deposed.

/ 32. .....

you, my good friends, is that you understand me correctly and have no doubts. You should not laugh at my request to kiss the Queen's hand. All you need to say is that I have not yet reached such a stature to deserve this and in that case all I have to do is to work, work, work.

27. S: Our work has been progressing properly and seriously. Your guidance has been top grade and in fact I know that with your consultations not only you but one hundred people are working on our materials. At the same time, however, I beg you to understand me and not to be offended by such requests. Although my morale is excellent, after all, I am a soldier, not a young girl. I do feel slightly hurt and at a loss to understand why, if the work I have done is indeed valued, why I am refused this gesture which would mean so much to me in the sense of my morale. Materially I am more than spoiled and I am indeed deeply grateful for all that has been done for me in this respect. All I can say for this is many times thanks. I do feel, however, that others before me who also did so much to help the West were perhaps shown more appreciation and more encouragement by prominent people personally, purely from the morale point of view. I do appreciate that Lord MOUNTBATTEN's representative met me but I think if there were more trust in me---. Perhaps you have not studied me enough to feel sure, but I think that a request for such recognition is correct.

28. S: I think if I were a big man and a soldier--such as I am--would come to serve, I would consider such a recognition proper and desirable, and I would find time to meet, inspire and thank such a soldier. If there is not enough yet to thank me for, then let's not talk any more about it. Maybe it will take another six months or a year but understand me correctly. Perhaps I am a romantic; after all romanticism is an integral part of the work I am doing. Although I am slightly hurt I would have never brought the matter up at all, had it not been raised officially by you. I have given myself heart and soul. All my thoughts and feeling I have dedicated to this work. In spite of all the difficulties facing me I have surmounted many obstacles to achieve what I planned. Why couldn't some enthusiasm, some encouragement be shown to me in exchange by your leaders of the West? Of course if I have not yet earned this, then all is clear and I will continue to work to earn it. Such encouragement is essential to me more especially if say, in a month's time I am caught and finished! What if say, they would raise a fireman's ladder outside my window and catch me in the act of photographing documents when I myself think I am not observed? Maybe I will be forced to come out in a month's time. All this I mention as negatives and reject them.

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improvement of our collaboration. I am convinced that the tempo of my work will increase considerably in the near future and that is the reason why I have asked that meetings should now take place weekly, so as to enable me to hand over the considerable material I will prepare for the Western Governments, covering all problems of interest. Finally, my tasks are now clearer to me and since I have the opportunity to increase my activities, I will fulfill these tasks to the full. I raise my glass to drink a toast of gratitude.

25. S: To tell the truth, there is another reason why I wanted to speak personally to someone from the Western High Commands; that is not because I have any secrets from you (my case officers), but because I have a request to make. I am happy that I am at least able to state my wish via the microphone now. It is almost two years since I started gathering material for you, but I consider that I have now been in active cooperation with you for three months. Three months is also a significant time period. I am most grateful and satisfied with my collaboration with you in this room, and wish to thank my American and British leaders for all the help and encouragement given me, and ask the said leaders to thank their case officers for their hard work during these three months. Three months may seem little, but is much when considered as a period of active work in Intelligence. This work will become even more active, and for this reason I ask for weekly contacts starting from October.

26. S: I would like to ask my leaders to thank you for the great work which you have carried out. If necessary, let them take from my own personal means, from the sums which are already at my disposal -- I ask my leaders to give each of you £ 1,000. JANET, the photographer and wireless operator, £ 250 each; while all the technical secretaries, the workers, translators, etc., should receive £ 100 each!! This is from me, my modest present, and I ask my Governments once more, and their command, to fulfill this request. I am grateful that you have rewarded WYNNE and the American instructors I contacted and in appreciation of the fine work, support, advice, and inspiration you have given me, in addition to the farewell kiss and brotherly handshake I will give you in parting, I make this request for the material expression of my gratitude. (He is thanked and told that everyone would be happy to work with him if they didn't receive a farthing! He is told that he has always been considered "one of us". He is thanked for everything he has done, is doing and will do, and is promised full support in his work. Speeches of thanks and toasts continue. He sends greetings and thanks to everyone he knows and those co-workers of his that he hopes to meet in the future. It is emphasized to Subject that however important the material is that he hopes to get

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for us, to photograph, etc., he must always remember that his continued personal safety takes priority; he must not run any unnecessary risks in order to get material for us.) S: For me it is not only your respect, for me it is your order. (In English.)

27. (A social interlude follows, with more toasts and light jokes.) S: Let us all sit down, as per custom, before parting. It is nice to meet with you and hard to part. I think of you daily as you of me. We have worked out quite a satisfactory long "tail" for all contingencies in the matter of communications, which is very important as there may be changes in my work. However, whatever the changes are, I will remain in Moscow. They may take me into the General Staff, away from the Committee, in which case we will change over to pure agent-type contacts. Only. Well, we can operate on the basis of the old acquaintanceship with JANET. This is very intelligent, firm and correct. However, we must hurry to organize my actual possibility for this acquaintanceship, the official introduction. (Subject is assured that this is borne in mind.) S: Then I can spit on everything that comes. I can meet the husband anywhere, accidentally, on the street, greet him, ask about JANET, etc.

28. S: Let me review. I thought everything over; asked about everything; and reported everything. The plan is clear. H: This was an excellent opportunity to clear up all points which were unclear previously. S: Some of the questions put to me related to material which I had either already forgotten about, or about which I did not know very much. G: No one can be expected to know everything. S: The more so when bearing in mind the security control -- the pass for the 1st Directorate is one; you need another one for the 2nd Directorate. Or rather, the model of the pass is the same, but the marks on it are different; the designations are different. There are designations and signatures. Why do I call them designations or markings? There is an expression for this. The guard immediately looks at this marking; he lets a lot of people through quickly; he looks at the marking; he doesn't look even at the photograph and your face; he knows the marking. After all, they arrive in a crowd and leave in one too, before and after work. Well, in the middle of the working day, when it is dull, you can go in and out a hundred times.

29. S: This time we were unable to go over an operational car. If a car could be shown to me next time, I will show all the spots which are used on it because, "despite all ingenuity, there is a pattern". A car is a car ...with all the same components, so there is a pattern. The hiding places have been intelligently chosen, are commodious, and are utilized intelligently. It is important that I should show all this to you, as it

Because VARENTSOV has a Head of Intelligence Section (NACHEL'NIK RAZVEDOTDELA), Colonel ZAIKA. This very same Colonel ZAIKA was the head of the Intelligence Section on the 1st Ukrainian Front, and he (VARENTSOV) is keeping him (ZAIKA) with him at present. Insofar as I have Intelligence training, I can immediately concentrate and prepare myself for work on Combat Arm Intelligence, in this case on rockets. G: One must bear the following in mind -- after all, everything happens in this life -- perhaps after six months have passed VARENTSOV may suddenly die of a heart attack. S: It happens. It may happen. G: He is, after all, in his 60th year. S: Quite right. G: Then these ties may prove non-permanent. One must take this into account. S: I must tell you that for the sake of VARENTSOV's memory KARIAFILI will always stretch out a helping hand to me. They can't all die of a heart attack at once -- his deputies. After all, they won't turn their backs on me all at once, but if they do -- there are my distant relatives, the (Subject's last name, plural). If you say, " go to the Far East and work in from there we'll collect you by submarine and take you to Japan when necessary; go with your family to such and such a harbor for a fishing trip and then row out a few miles in a rowing boat." That is also an alternative! In Khabarovsk, there is exactly the same as in Moscow regarding the Army -- and the Khabarovsk, the Far Eastern OKRUG (region). There is no Khabarovsk OKRUG; it's the Far Eastern one. The staff is in Khabarovsk. It's also important. And there is the same material in Riga and in Khabarovsk and anywhere else. It's the same one as in Moscow and in its surroundings.

33. S: And I can tell you that this year there is going to be a very big sounding out as to what they intend to do with me. There is division here, two opinions. Some wish to make me a General and bring me on, because I have become ripe for this, have sufficient education, experience and age. While others keep a brake on me, like SHUMSKIY and those below him -- and those at the Central Committee, because of my father. It is still a riddle to me how this matter of my father became known. I ask you to help me in this -- to clear things up. Why was it not known before, that my father was a White Guard Officer? Why? If it had been known earlier, they would have told me about it earlier. They would not have let me go to Turkey on a long mission. At the same time, only thanks to the fact that I served extremely well in the Soviet Army; was on political work; was in three campaigns; was decorated on the Front; twice commanded a Regiment; fulfilled my tasks with a fine efficiency report.... Wherever I was, in all fields, in all fields in my official duties .... then I learned a lot. They, of course, take that into account; they have to take it into account. But what do you think? You are intelligent people. Why did the matter of my father become known? Why wasn't it known before. G: They dug and dug, and got to the bottom. S:

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Phase III - PARIS

Meeting No.31

20th September, 1961

1. Subject signalled properly in MOSCOW as directed on 19th September at 21.50 hours indicating that he would arrive on the second day. Actually he came on the following day, the 20th September, on the AEROFLOT flight, a TU-104 via COPENHAGEN. TARRY met him at Le Bourget but did not approach subject. Subject contacted TARRY outside the terminal and was driven by him to his hotel, the Cayre. During this ride subject passed TARRY a package of eleven cassettes of undeveloped Minox film, the contents of which were mentioned at the meeting later. TARRY notified Roger who picked up the cassettes from TARRY and sent them off via courier to LONDON for processing. Roger instructed TARRY to drop off subject at 1930 hours on the opposite side of the Solferino footbridge from the RV point at which Mike and George planned to pick up subject by car. Subject crossed the bridge to the RV point at exactly 19.30 and he spotted George. He followed George along the river bank to the parked car and was driven to the safe apartment arriving there at 19.50 hours.

2. After preliminary hearty greetings, during which subject presented Joseph, Mike and George with caviar and a Georgian "Horn of Plenty" the party waited for the arrival of Harold, who came about 20.20 hours from Orly Airport where he had just arrived from LONDON. He was also presented with the same gifts.

3. Prior to Harold's arrival subject stated that his trip was delayed until he had received his visa from the French on 19th September. His T.D.Y. was authorised for twenty-five days. He left his Travel Order with us to be photographed. Subject enquired if his previously passed material via TARRY in MOSCOW turned out well photographically and he was reassured that it had.

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4. S.: In the KREMLEVKA telephone directory it states that only secret material may be discussed but not Top Secret. Of course, this doesn't mean a thing and they speak of Top Secret matters because who can classify mentally where the borderline is.

5. At this point subject was introduced to Roger and subject presented Roger with a jar of caviar. He also brought a package of select cigarettes and caviar for Janet in the event that she would be in PARIS. During the toasting with wine, while waiting for Harold, subject stated that his wife was expecting in seven months and was duly congratulated.

6. S.: This is exactly the fifth month anniversary of our having met on the 20th April. I want to wait for Harold so I will not repeat myself, but I have much significant material to tell you about, some of which comes directly from the mouths of MALINOVSKY and a prominent worker of the Central Committee, CHURAYEV. I regret that I did not have a small tape recorder, as I could have given you the tape just like the film cassettes. It would have saved me much work but I tried to remember exactly what was said and have written it down. The situation over all looks very bad. This old man is striving to accomplish some fantastic coup during his lifetime. KHRUSHCHEV is stirring up all of the trouble that there is. He is the instigator of everything. He is the formulator and the executor of all this dirty business and adventurism. If he died or was killed it would relieve and change the situation considerably to our advantage. It seems that he knows he has not many years to live and he wants to do something like a maniac, which stems from his senility.

7. While we are waiting, let me report on what I have photographed. I have photographed the card index lists which include the military manuals and regulations of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Federal Germany and a little on Italy. There were about 100 items listed. At that time I sent you only a few extracted titles as a guide for the article I wanted you to prepare for me, but recently I had the opportunity of photographing the

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whole card file and this included about a hundred items. I did this at GRU. I laid out the lists and took up to three shots of each one according to what would fit in the exposure frame. Now you can select any theme for me.

8. G.: Will all of those manuals be available to you as a reference in the future?

S.: Absolutely. Any one of them at any time. All I do is to ask for an item by our catalogue index number.

G.: On which country were there the most materials?

S.: The majority were on U.S.A., then on England and the Federal Republic. There was less on France and only a little on Italy. I only photographed the materials which were dated 1958, 1959 and 1960 because the older ones such as 1952 or 1955 are already obsolete. I would say that the sources producing this are located in neutral countries such as the sergeant in Ceylon about whom I spoke before.

9. M.: What else did you photograph?

S.: I photographed all remaining articles completely in the first two issues of the sbornik for both the years 1960 and 1961. In addition to this I photographed some new articles (there were three issues of the sbornik in 1960 and thus far in 1961, there may be another issue, the fourth, in 1961 which has not yet been published). In addition I photographed artillery articles which covered geodetic computations and artillery reconnaissance. There were four articles and I covered those published in 1958, 1959 and 1960 on the above subjects, but there were many, many more which I have not yet photographed. I did not yet have a chance to get my hands on strategic intelligence lectures at GRU. I used a total of eleven cassettes for all this photography and I have left exactly forty cassettes.

G.: You photographed the sbornik articles at GRU, but where did you photograph the artillery articles?

S.: At VARENTsOV's Headquarters. At that place I was worried because a ray of light was coming through the window when I photographed.

...../ I could not

I could not go closer to the window for fear that someone would spot me and in moving back it was too dark. There could be a sunspot on the page and I would like to know if they come out clear. I also photographed the telephone directory of the Soviet Government.

G.: Do not many people also appear in the KREMLEVKA?

S.: Yes, but the KREMLEVKA has many other lower officials in it.

S.: If necessary I could re-photograph them but I hate to repeat.

G.: We will see how they come out but it seems that they may be legible because you had a sunspot on several sheets of your last photography but it could be read.

10. S.: I have two cassettes which cover the proposed plan of the Committee for sending delegations all over the world during the first quarter of 1962. This should be of great interest because it states exactly from which organisation how many individuals are designated for each delegation; e.g. from the Ministry of Defence, from the Committee on Electronics etc. It designates all of their postal numbers and categories of specialists. That is all of my photography, but in addition I stole our Committee telephone directory and passed it to you. There were nine hundred copies published.

G.: Have any officers such as yourself been designated as members of the delegations you mention?

S.: No. No-one is mentioned by name. All that is stated is that one or more people from our Committee will be sent in such and such a delegation and similarly a number of persons from all other scientific or industrial organisations. That is the formulated and approved plan but the individual will be selected later.

11. G.: What are your own future prospects now?

S.: It all depends on the attitude of the Central Committee. Just prior to this trip they requested a new ~~personnel file~~ clearing report (kharakteristika) on me. There has even been a proposal approved by two generals in GRU that I be sent for a tour to WASHINGTON as a Counsellor. However, all this depends on the Central Committee.

G.: What slot would this be?

...../S.: GRU of course.

S.: GRU of course. Two generals called me to talk about it but how it would go on from there will depend how they regard the story of my father. I have only come on this trip because no negative statements were submitted by the "neighbours" against me personally. In addition I had some good results from my last trip and received a commendation. They say that I can produce some results and that I make a good effort and in addition I bring them presents, about which I will tell you later.

M.: What did your wife say when you were coming here?

S.: She was crying and screaming because she speaks French and she would be in Seventh Heaven here.

G.: Who wrote up your kharakteristika?

S.: I read it, GRU wrote it up and submitted it to the Central Committee. They merely called up GVISHIANI and he said on the telephone that he agreed that I should be sent.

12. S.: Even though the situation looks very bad I am very glad that our governments have displayed such firmness and decisiveness. The Soviets did not expect such a firm stand. This has placed them in a position of concern and MIKOYAN does not get along at all with KHRUSHCHEV. They are still not sure of themselves and they know they do not have everything that they need. They can launch a nuclear attack and destroy several cities and 10 million people but that will not solve all of their problems. I won't go into that now and jump around from one topic to another, I will wait till Harold comes.

13. S.: We can work tonight until we become tired and tomorrow at 0900 hours I must be at the Embassy where I must have a talk with the Rezident, a Gen. Maior. Today I spoke to the Deputy Rezident Colonel KUDRYAVTSEV, who is also the Counsellor for Science and Technology. We will review my missions and plans here and after that I will be free. I will be here for twenty-five days and here are my orders. You can photograph them. Incidentally among the films which I passed today there is an elaboration of my missions for this trip. They are all written out on two pages and I photographed them. This was signed by Gen. Lieut. KOZLOV, using the pseudonym DOZOV. I will need a lot of help from you to accomplish my

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missions since I must come back with something substantial.

G.: What is difficult to see is on what basis your headquarters expected you to make contacts here and accomplish your missions when you don't have the French language.

S.: They consider that 90% of the French businessmen know the English language at least to some degree. I have been at the French exposition in MOSCOW and at the reception at their Embassy, but I have few acquaintances.

14. S.: With respect to this little book written by BUZINOV which I sent you, if you could work up a similar article for me and with a preface such as he made I could simply take a girl in the translation office of Voyenizdat and check her translation into Russian and submit the work which would be to my credit. However, it would be a simple matter now for me to submit an article using any of the manuals, of which I have photographed the titles as a reference. My contacts and relations with people, such as with SEROV about whom I will report later, are getting on so well now that possibly by the end of next year they may recommend me for promotion to General. Whether they would give it to me or not is another matter, but the recommendation would be good to have on my record.

15. At this moment Harold entered and was warmly greeted by subject.

16. S.: Fine, let us start to work now, we have a lot to do. I will try to tell you everything accurately, but of course you will have questions on everything I report and it might take the next two meetings to clarify them. Let me review - I have passed eleven cassettes. I have photographed completely all the articles in all the sborniks which I have begun before, for 1960 and 1961. There are also new articles in additional issues for 1960 and 1961. I also photographed four articles from the Artillery Journals; they came from 1958, 1959 and 1960. I included 1958 because I found there an article on geodetic preparation for rocket forces. There are many other artillery articles which I will photograph in the future and I also have issue No.3 to photograph of the sbornik of the Voyennaya Mysl' for both 1960 and 1961 and there may be a fourth issue in 1961.

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17. S.: Now I will relate to you the report which I have prepared and which you should immediately report to your superiors. VARENTsOV's birthday party was celebrated not on the 15th but on Saturday 16th in order to permit more time. On the 15th September at 0900 hours I met VARENTsOV at the Leningrad Railroad station where he had just arrived from LENINGRAD. After having left you I had given him his razor but on the 15th at the railroad station I brought him a package containing the cognac, about which I will tell you in a moment, and which has great significance, as well as the rocket-shaped lighter and the cigarette box with inscriptions thereon. He kissed me as he greeted me at the station. He was also met there by General Lieut. VOZNESENSKIY and General Lieut. NIKOLAYEV. VARENTsOV had been in LENINGRAD because a Party conference was held there and he was elected as the delegate to the 22nd Party Congress, and very probably VARENTsOV at this 22nd Party Congress will be elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He will be elected as a candidate or a member of the CC, in other words he will receive a promotion along the Party line. Having given him the packages I went to the Committee, whose car I had at my disposal, while he went to his Directorate where he was greeted and where a ceremony took place in which he was awarded the Order of Lenin. He told me to be sure to come on the 16th at 16.00 hours together with my entire family, including my daughter and mother, to his dacha. He said that he had invited many people but many would not be there because they were out of town concerned with military matters. Who and with what military matters I will relate in a moment.

18. S.: He said that the Minister MALINOVSKY would be there and CHURAYEV Viktor Mikhailovich, who is a member of the Central Committee and the Head of the Party organisation of the RFSFR - one of KHRUSHCHEV's right hand men. Gen. Polk. FOMIN will be there, Gen. Polk. SAMSONOV, Gen. Pol. G.S. KARIOFILLI, RYABCHIKOV, a Professor of Chemistry and Lieut. Gen. SEMENOV, who was VARENTsOV's Deputy on the First Ukrainian Front. Incidentally one of VARENTsOV's two present deputies, the one who replaced COFFE is also Gen. Lieut. SEMENOV, that is a namesake of the other. In a moment I will tell

..../you the details

you the details of the party. Since I left you in England I have had the opportunity of speaking with VARENTsOV, ZASORIN, BUZINOV and many others. This is what I must relate to you at once.

19. S.: In the beginning of October this year there will begin extensive general (vse-obshchiye) manoeuvres. There were never such manoeuvres in the history of the Soviet Army. This is because all headquarters of all military districts will participate and also all headquarters of groups of forces. Even all rear services in the military districts will participate in these manoeuvres. In other words every Army formation will execute its assigned mission in these manoeuvres just as they would be called upon to do in case there was a war. In addition all headquarters of all countries of People's Democracies will also take part in these manoeuvres. These strategic manoeuvres will begin in early October and will take place throughout the entire USSR and throughout all of the countries of People's Democracies all based on combatting a hypothetical enemy in the direction of Germany.

20. S.: I will now try to explain to you in detail why these manoeuvres will take place and what their objective is. Later I will tell you who, why and when gave me this information. These manoeuvres are called strategic because they involve very great territorial depth and all military districts and all groups of forces will participate as well as all the headquarters of the countries of the People's Democracies. These manoeuvres will continue for a period of up to a month. The objective of these manoeuvres is to examine everything as a whole and to determine what units have specific capabilities. They will examine who can best fulfil offensive missions shock action, defensive operations and to examine the state of training and combat readiness of all units, as well as their joint action. Through these manoeuvres deficiencies in training can be corrected and experience in joint operations gained. But this is only one purpose, the second purpose is to have these huge forces in a state of combat readiness exactly at the time that the Peace Treaty with East Germany will be signed, so that if any difficulties occur immediately after the signing of this Treaty, which will be signed right after the Congress * they would be in a position to strike a heavy blow. In other words what KHRUSHCHEV wants to do is to backstop with actual large-scale military preparations

..../camouflaged

* which will be signed right after the Congress.

camouflaged as manoeuvres his signing of the Peace Treaty with East Germany.

21. S.: KHRUSHCHEV considers that if NATO swallows the second pill and he considers that the first pill, which was the closing of the borders of East and West Berlin, has already been swallowed, - that is the action of 13th August - incidentally, I knew about this closing four days before the fact and I wanted to pass this information on to you but had no means for doing this, since the phone call arrangement was only good for Monday and this took place on a different day. I did not want to risk putting the information into the dead drop and calling by chance. We will have to work out a system that will permit me to pass critical information to you quickly in future.

22. S.: KHRUSHCHEV, his Central Committee and his government plan to do this - on the 17th October to open the 22nd Party Congress. This conference we should call Conference "Aggressive". That is because a very aggressive attitude will be prevalent, all sorts of propaganda speeches are being prepared asking decisive action against imperialism and colonialism. And by firing up the Congress with such speeches KHRUSHCHEV hopes to untie his hands for aggressive action by placing the responsibility for the decisions which support KHRUSHCHEV and his government's position on the Congress. Even if a war takes place after the Congress, KHRUSHCHEV can refer to this situation as a decision of the Congress. For Bolsheviks the Congress represents their programme for the immediate future. All secretaries of Central Committees will be present at this congress as well as secretaries of the Parties of other People's Democracies and Communist Parties from capitalist countries as well, many of the latter will come secretly. It will be of interest to see how the Communist leaders throughout the world react to the concept of military action at this time as proposed by the leading Communist Party, namely that of the Soviet Union. I suggest for your consideration and that of our leaders how advantageous it would be to introduce some sort of split in views at this congress. It is important that there be no unanimity of views between all of the Communist leaders of the various countries.

23. S.: Already there have been orders issued that during the month of

..../October no //

October no foreigners should be admitted to the Soviet Union. All MOSCOW hotels are now being retained for the use of Central Committee members and Party delegates. They are even fumigating the rooms to be sure that foreigners previously living there have not left bacteriological contamination. Even in our Committee we have turned down all requests for foreign visitors during the month of October by saying there is no room, and that they will be busy with the Party Congress. This will continue until the 15th November since many Party delegates will stay after the Congress to attend the celebration and parade of 7th November. In addition they are now preparing to set up very strict counter intelligence procedures in MOSCOW and the Moscow oblast during this time. Therefore, I request you to have all of our agent operations in MOSCOW suspend activity during this period. It will be very difficult to work in MOSCOW during this time and the KGB from other cities have also been called in.

24. S.: Let me review. Immediately after the Party Conference KHRUSHCHEV wants to sign the Peace Treaty; at the time of the signing he wants to have all possible military units in a state of combat readiness. If necessary he will strike. If it is only a local attack by us then it will be parried, but of course if a larger conflict develops that is why combat readiness is needed. KHRUSHCHEV, our General Staff and the GRU know prefectly well that secret preparations in modern times are not possible due to intelligence techniques. But under the guise of manoeuvres, concerning which he will insist that they are only manoeuvres, their extent and duration can easily be extended. If the allies swallow the second pill and say "very well since you have signed a treaty with East Germany we will deal with East Germany", then the strain will be relieved and the manoeuvres will terminate and the result of these will still serve as a valuable training exercise for joint operations. If not the powder is still dry and military action can be employed. This is the dual purpose for which these manoeuvres are planned for the early days of October.

25. S.: Right now MOSCOW is boiling with all kinds of representatives from the headquarters of the countries of People's Democracies, both in

...../military and

military and civilian dress. I have seen them everywhere and anyone can spot them. Secondly, all prominent military commanders are in the field with troops, for example, at VARENTsOV's birthday party his deputy PYRSKIY was not present.

26. S.: There are two deputies, PYRSKIY and SEMENOV, who replaced GOFFE. PYRSKIY is now at NOVAYA ZEMLYA where they are experimenting with atomic detonations. There is a large base there on which are rockets with atomic warheads, the details of which I will give you shortly. The other deputy SELENOV is now attending the atomic bomb tests in Central Asia. Here is how I found this out. At VARENTsOV's party, Viktor Mikhailovich CHURAYEV asked VARENTsOV - where is PYRSKIY? and MALINOVSKY said that PYRSKIY is doing a fine job in running the tests and the training programme at NOVAYA ZEMLYA.

27. S.: I can now report to you about the atomic tests being conducted now since KHRUSHCHEV felt that it was impossible for him not to run these tests. These tests have two phases; in the past years the first phase consisted of testing the individual TNT equivalent weapons. They were raised on towers, from masts and dropped from aircraft. But now KHRUSHCHEV and his military commanders are testing nuclear detonations delivered by rockets. This is phase II. These tests are conducted by means of firing a rocket with a conventional charge against the selected target and then assemblying an atomic warhead and firing it against the same target. Both MALINOVSKY and VARENTsOV answered CHURAYEV that Gen. Polk. PYRSKIY is now at NOVAYA ZEMLYA running the tests and will continue to remain there because there will be additional tests.

28. S.: There is a huge rocket launching base at NOVAYA ZEMLYA which is equipped to fire the R-12 and the R-14 rockets. There are no R-11s there; this was all told to me by BUZINOV. Now with respect to these rockets the R-12 is already adopted and is being serially produced. Its range is two and a half thousand kilometres. The R-14 is now being prepared for serial production but it has not yet been produced in quantity. The range of the R-14 is four and a half thousand kilometres. Both ranges I have given are those for these rockets carrying an atomic warhead. Of course the ranges are greater with conventional warheads.

...../G.: Approximately

G.: Approximately how much greater would the range for rockets with conventional warheads be?

S.: They should be about twice the range of atomic warhead rockets.

29. S.: Before we proceed further let us look at the conclusions we can draw about KHRUSHCHEV's plan to have troops in combat readiness for either one or the other eventuality after he signs a peace treaty with East Germany. I will try to draw three conclusions concerning these preparations. First of all he is preparing nine armies as I reported in and adjacent to the immediate East German theatre and now he has ordered a tenth army to that area about which I will tell you shortly. This overall area includes East Germany itself and the areas immediately adjacent to it. In East Germany itself there are only two armies but the others are nearby in a supporting role. This first purpose is to frighten us. However, if the Communist world expresses complete approval at the Congress for his policy and he also feels that world opinion is with him he may strike us. He wants to take advantage of any indecision on the part of the Free World and may actually attack the leaders which are the United States and England. He does not have all available means for carrying through such a strike to a final conclusion. The military people know this but they act meekly before KHRUSHCHEV. And if he orders the beginning of hostilities they will comply. (At this point subject was asked to halt because the tape was to be changed).

30. G.: Before you continue we would like you to state who your sources were for all of the information you have given us, by individual item.

S.: I suggest that you take notes on the items I report and ask me to clarify them later. Now regarding PYRSKIY that came out of the conversation brought up by CHURAYEV who asked where is PYRSKIY and he was answered by MALINOVSKY and VARENTsOV. BUZINOV told me about the R-12 and the R-14. All rocket materials of VARENTsOV's concern passed through his hands, he told me that certain officers were at various bases where there are rocket launching sites. I will list these for you in a moment. These officers have all been sent to the bases as representatives of VARENTsOV and similarly there are representatives of MOSKALENKO there where the bases have a strategic designation. In addition in conversation with VARENTsOV he

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mentioned a number of times that the R-12 and R-14 rockets exist. With respect to the Party Congress and preparations therefore all had something to say about this, so I am not singling out any one source.

31. G.: Was KHRUSHCHEV criticised by anyone at this birthday party?

S.: No, they drank a toast to him. They are all people placed in their positions by KHRUSHCHEV.

32. (Subject now showed his list of the 89 members of various delegations who were tentatively selected to go to PARIS during the Exhibition and who were the people processed by subject into delegations which he would meet in PARIS). S: You see the ones crossed out in red have already been approved for travel here but out of this group of 89 probably no more than 20 will actually come. In four or five days I will meet one group and arrange for their hotel and itinerary together with the Assistant Rezident who is responsible for science and technology.

J.: When will the Exhibition close?

S.: 5th October.

J.: Will you be tied up with your delegation as you were with the group in England?

S.: No. Not at all, I will just meet with them and arrange things for them, but you will have to help me with my missions. I do not know anybody here and a lot of my assignments will fall on your shoulders.

33. S.: Let me give you the exact circumstances under which these conversations took place. We all got together at 16.00 hours on 16th September at BABUSHKINO. When I came there with my family RYABCHIKOV, the Professor of Chemistry was already there. (VARENTsOV had been on vacation with him previously at BADEN). Then Gen. Lieut. SEMENOV came, then Gen. Polk. FOMIN, then the Minister MALINOVSKY came with his wife. The presents we brought were the best and most sensible of the lot. MALINOVSKY brought a magnum of champagne and also a big cake shaped like the Horn of Plenty. CHURAYEV brought a large wooden eagle on a stand. VARENTsOV said that my boy (me) had really tried to do everything from his heart. I wanted to

..../tell him

tell him that there were five boys doing this. MALINOVSKY and CHURAYEV arrived in Chaikas, there were all kinds of Zims there and guards. We took a walk in the garden and then came to the table. The only one in uniform was the Minister and when I was presented to him he asked if I didn't have a relative in the Far East, to which I replied that I had a shirt-tail relative of sorts. VARENTsOV said to MALINOVSKY that I was one of SEROV's boys. MALINOVSKY's wife is a pretty woman and her name is Raisa Yakovlevna whereas he is Rodion Yakovlevich and my mother's name is Taisa Yakovlevna. When we sat down VARENTsOV told me to do the honours so I opened our cognac. It turned out to be out of this world (60 years old). The Minister wanted to drink only that cognac. I made it go around for everyone three times; however, I gave full glasses only to the Minister, VARENTsOV, CHURAYEV and myself. They began to feel tipsy after the first round because the Minister made a toast to VARENTsOV and everyone drank bottoms up. The cognac was so good and everyone was so delighted with it that they talked about it for half an hour, out of the six hours that the party lasted.

34. S: After that there were toasts by VARENTsOV and SEMENOV and finally it came to me. I remembered that no-one mentioned the fact that VARENTsOV had just been presented with the Order of Lenin. So I said that I proposed to drink a toast of congratulations to Sergei Sergeievich for his having been the recipient of the highest governmental award, the Order of Lenin. As they began to applaud I thought I would pull a fast one on the Minister, so I continued by saying that this award represents the high esteem for Sergei Sergeievich by the Party, the Government and personally by the Minister of Defence. After that he beamed and I could talk to him as a Comrade. He continued to drink cognac in sips all along and then requested that the bottle of champagne be opened and all drank champagne. The others were drinking other cognac and vodka and frankly the other cognac was junk. CHURAYEV, about whom I will give you details later drank a lot and was getting tipsy. After this the men went to the next room to smoke and I kept my ears open as you would expect an intelligence officer to do.

35. S.: Even my mother innocently contributed to the conversation by asking the Minister if there will be a war. The Minister replied that it

...../is hard to

is hard to say and that he does not even want to talk about it because he has to think about it all the time, namely, will there be one or not. However, I can say that the situation is difficult (polozheniye tyazheloye). Our enemies are not giving in to us although it is true that they have swallowed one pill. We handled this one well (sealing of East-West Berlin border) but how will it be in the future. - All I can say is that we are keeping everything in readiness. This was really a general question for all to hear the answer to.

36. S.: Later CHURAYEV who was drinking a lot and seemed to be a good fellow, called me aside and asked me to get him all kinds of things here, which you will have to help me with, and he said many things about which I will report later. I have twenty-six items here and thus far I have only covered two (Note: on his agenda). Others also asked questions, but I did not, I had to keep modest and ran around pouring drinks. We continued later to drink tea and eat fruit and KALINOVSKY was the first to leave because he had to fly on the next day at 10.00 hours to LVOV. On Monday there was to be a Party meeting there and he was to be elected as the delegate to the 22nd Congress from there and in addition he had to review matters of military training in relation to the coming manoeuvres.

37. S.: All high ranking commanders are concerned with preparations for these manoeuvres. VARENTsOV is constantly travelling as well as all other big commanders, and they are very seriously training and preparing for these manoeuvres. Beginning with the headquarters in MOSCOW, all other headquarters throughout the land are also busily engaged in this. We must pay particular attention to these manoeuvres and study all developments by all means at our disposal. These manoeuvres will involve political considerations affecting the entire world and they serve as the military backing for the policy KHRUSHCHEV is trying to push through. I have already reported to you what their objective is and have not only told you where I found out but confirmation of this on a small scale is evident everywhere in the GRU where every little officer has his own small mission to perform in support of this.

...../Representatives

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Representatives from both VASILEVSKY and MOSKALENKO are constantly sitting at the rocket bases since these bases have now been supplied with atomic warheads.

G.: When exactly will these manoeuvres begin in October?

S.: Between the 3rd and the 5th and will continue until the end of the month. On the 17th the Party Congress begins and after that will be the signing of a Peace Treaty. By this time the manoeuvres will have gone into some advanced phase and the world situation at that moment will be the factor to determine whether the troops will continue to stand at combat readiness or if they will terminate the manoeuvres. I will continue to report to you to what extent this will take place. Everything is not established in a perfect way, but to some degree they will be combat ready. At least they will not have to drag out soldiers by the ears from the garrisons, since they will already be in certain deployments depending on what phase of manoeuvres they have reached. This is the significance of manoeuvres and this is what we must expect from them.

38. S.: As a staff officer of our command allI can suggest is that we now begin a propaganda campaign pointing to the aggressive nature of KHRUSHCHEV and the coming Party Congress to show that we are not deluded. Many effective counter measures can be taken and from what I read about firmness expressed by the West I know that this is causing KHRUSHCHEV anxiety. Your leaders should take full cognizance of what I have reported regarding these manoeuvres, they should check from other sources what I have said and take appropriate counter measures, the nature of which is of course their business.

39. S.: Now both from documents and from conversations I have discovered where there are rocket launching sites about which I will tell you. They have atomic warheads available there. I mentioned already NOVAYA ZEMLYA where FYRKOV is stationed. The next one is NORILSK, there is a base in that area; then in FRANZ JOSEF Land, but I do not know the exact location. In the area of the town of VORKUTA, these are the northern bases. In the South this is what I have found out in fulfilling your mission assigned to me to discover what I could about rocket launching sites. The area of KRASNOVODSK and also in the area of KIROVABAD. These face Iran and Pakistan.

/Also in the

Also in the South, literally two days ago we were getting permission for a Japanese geophysicist - his name is SATA (probably SATO) - to show him the island of ARTEMA which is near BAKU. He was concerned with the technique of producing oil under water. Our committee submitted a request to the General Staff and we received a paper with an official Top Secret answer to the effect that no foreigner may be admitted to the island of ARTEMA. There is a rocket base there. Either it is a PVO place or a rocket launching installation.

40. S.: There are also atomic tests being conducted in Central Asia. That is where SEMENOV, the second deputy to VARENTsOV is sitting. I do not know who the officers are from MOSKALENKO, who are at the Strategic rocket bases. BUZINOV and KARIOFILLI told me that many of their officers are constantly going to the bases and they serve as the eyes and ears of the artillery command because there are atomic warheads at these bases. There are also conventional warheads there and the positions are kept under constant combat readiness, and there are representatives there from both MOSKALENKO and VARENTsOV.

41. S.: Now here is another important item for you. You probably are aware of and know that on the 8th of September, possibly by your time zone the 9th, an atomic detonation took place. This was the first detonation of a 16,000 kiloton (sic; but see Meeting No.32) yield. In the past they had detonated ten, fifteen and larger kiloton yield, but this was the first one of this magnitude. This detonation of 16,000 kilotons was performed by means of the R-12 rocket. This rocket was launched from KAPUSTIN YaR, and its impact area was in Central Asia. The detonation took place at the highest point in the rocket's trajectory. It was a high air burst and VARENTsOV was present at this test. VARENTsOV personally told me about this, he had been at KAPUSTIN YaR. When I was eating in a restaurant with BUZINOV he also confirmed this. Prior to launching a rocket with an atomic warhead, at first a rocket of the same type with a conventional warhead is launched to determine the range and deviation errors. For the rocket that carried a 16,000 kiloton warhead the conventional warhead rocket had a v/b of 160 metres.

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Let me emphasise that these tests using rockets with atomic warheads were mandatory for KHRUSHCHEV to make because the headquarters demanded this to study how these rockets would perform with atomic warheads. This was never done before and therefore KHRUSHCHEV used all political manoeuvrings and false arguments to get away from the non-testing agreement, because he has a great need to make these tests himself. This is the only way to understand the matter because all he did was to twist political facts around.

42. G.: Will you explain how the conventional warhead rocket worked?

S.: The conventional warhead rocket had a v/b error of only 160 metres. But it was of course detonated on the ground on its impact area target. And on the basis of this trajectory the atomic warhead rocket was fired. You see when we discussed rocket accuracy last Spring such precision had not yet been approached but now that they have developed accuracy they can use atomic warheads, realising that the bursts can be made at a desired point.

43. G.: When you gave the range of the R-12 at 2,500 kilometres and you said that the burst took place at the height of its trajectory, this would make it a very high airburst.

S.: Yes. It was a high airburst in the interests of surface protection and even so the burst took place over wastelands. We will return with conclusions to these matters and please preserve my notes while I go on to the next point.

44. G.: Before you do that, one small clarification. Exactly from whom did you find out about each specific launching site?

S.: I repeat, about NOVAYA ZEMLYA, MALINOVSKY and VARENTsOV answered CHURAYEV's question. I found out about NORILSK, Franz Joseph Land and VORKUTA from KARIOFILLI, VARENTsOV and BUZINOV. About KRASNOVODSK and KIROVABAD I found out from both BUZINOV and POZOVNYY. Regarding ARTEMA there was this document. In addition when POZOVNYY was working with the PVO in BAKU he also visited ARTEMA and there were bases there then.

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45. S.: Right now BUZINOV is in the D.D.R. with FEDEROV. FEDEROV has had a lot of trouble there. His son who is not mentally normal was beaten by FEDEROV and this thirteen-year old boy ran away in the direction of LEIPZIG. He was brought back and headquarters called in FEDEROV and told him that his son was persona non grata in the D.D.R. Right after this incident one of his officers lost a secret document and again FEDEROV was on the carpet. However, he is still at his post although his wife, daughter and son were sent home at once. She was even at VARENTsOV's birthday party, but in a separate room for the younger people, where my daughter sat and VARENTsOV's daughter also sat.

46. G.: Have they begun a general evacuation of Soviet dependents from the D.D.R. yet?

S.: No, not yet, but there have been indications that this would be done in September. I heard rumours about this but did not pay much attention.

47. G.: By the way was the height of the atomic burst given to you?

S.: That is very simple to determine, because according to physics the epicentre would be one tenth of the trajectory range. This is a law of ballistics.

48. S.: My next point is very important, I obtained this information from ZASORIN. He was on duty during the night of 7/8th September in GRU in SEROV's office. I met him when I brought some medicine he requested, and he told me that during the night of 7/8th September a cable from PARIS came to GRU stating that the President of France, De GAULLE sent a message to WASHINGTON, LONDON and BONN giving the decision of the French Government to allocate 230 military planes to participate in the defence of Western interests in BERLIN.

49. S.: The Rezident here in France, General Maior Ivan Nikolayevich CHEREDEYEV.....

G.: What official position does he hold?

S.: He has a cover job, but I don't know which one. I will see him tomorrow. CHEREDEYEV had a comment in the cable stating that the information

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was obtained from French Communists. The information I have just given you was not announced anywhere, neither in TASS or anywhere else. It arrived in a Top Secret classification. There is clearly a leak somewhere in the French Government through which this information was obtained. The cable arrived at night and because of its nature was immediately delivered to MALINOVSKY, the same night. He read it at home and ordered that the contents be given at once to all members of the Presidium and to all the commanders of combat arms, in addition to a number of commanders of military districts which are adjacent to the theatre concerned. The next day SEROV was advised of this. Note that the chief Duty Officer must be at least a chief of a napravleniye, in order to make spot decisions on the significance of a cable. ZASORIN is very friendly to me and gives me much information verbally. I strive to maintain this good relationship. My conclusion to this matter is that investigations should be made to determine who could have access to high level correspondence from General De GAULLE. This man should be found.

50. S.: I have already written to you earlier giving the name in full of the Frenchman who suggested to the Soviets that they should not permit Americans or Englishmen to visit certain sections of an aluminium factory in which there was an advanced technological process. This was the factory in STALINGRAD. This information came from official papers of the KGB in which it was stated that this Frenchman made that suggestion. I couldn't copy this document, but I had it in my hands for two minutes and copied the name of this Frenchman letter for letter. Maybe he is a KGB agent, maybe he is co-opted by them or is some other type of svoloch. This statement of CHEREDEYEV's that the information came from French Communists again confirms my statement that Communists in all Western countries are being actively used for espionage.

51. G.: Did the cable classify what type of planes or from where they would be re-deployed?

S.: No, all it specified was that they were 230 military combat planes. Incidentally I caught ZASORIN in a very favourable situation. I asked him if he was not given a decoration for the information he obtained in

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his Middle East Directorate about Iran and Turkey. He said "not a damn thing", "none of us got any credit, not even GRU, because this information came straight from KASSEM". He felt well disposed when I said this since after all this kind of information comes through his napravleniye; so he mellowed and told me about the cable.

52. S.: On the 17th August, there was a decree by the Party and the Government creating a command of Civil Defence. The chief of the Civil Defence of the Soviet Union has been designated to be Marshal CHUIKOV. He has been relieved from his duties as Chief of the Ground Forces. This decree was spelled out in seventeen pages and I held it in my hands about [illegible] twenty minutes. I read it and will summarise its contents. I did not have a chance to photograph it but when I do I will photograph it in full. The created command of civil defence (komandovaniye grashdanskoy oborony) has been made subordinate to the Minister of Defence. This command of civil defence is for a special period (osobyy period). This is exactly the term used and it is in quotes. This period will be announced by the Party, the Government and the higher military command. Action should be taken for defence of industrial installations and its rehabilitation as a result of enemy actions. Protection of the population of course is also included. When this special period action is announced, all necessary action to be taken by every Ministry is detailed. Every individual Ministry must plan to take measures for the protection of its own installations evacuation and protection of its personnel and its own rehabilitation. When we speak of the civil defence command CHUIKOV is not the commander but the chief (nachalnik).

53. S.: At this moment the position of Chief of Ground Forces is vacant. As Sergei Sergeievich told me this position may be filled by KRYLOV, the present commander of the Moscow Military District, but recently it appears that KRYLOV has refused this position. At this moment ZHADOV is the acting Chief of Ground Forces and recently I have heard a rumour that CHUIKOV will return to assume the position of Chief of Ground Forces, even though the

position of Chief of Civil Defence is important they cannot find a suitable replacement for CHUIKOV as Commander of Ground Forces, and that position is still vacant.

54. S.: At present reserve officers are being called back to active duty to serve in Civil Defence headquarters. This is a very interesting new organisation.

G.: How is this organisation set up in terms of local subordination?

S.: Like this, there is a central command and then the subordinate headquarters are organised in military districts. Their functions are closely co-ordinated with the Oblast Party committees, the Oblast Executive committees and all the way down to rayons. At any rate one of these days you will get a photocopy of the whole seventeen page document. One exists in the Committee and there is one in GRU.

55. M.: To whom did you say it was subordinate?

S.: To the Ministry of Defence, but also to the Council of Ministers since it is partly a military and partly a civilian organisation. Reserve officers are being taken to fill out the headquarters cadres.

G.: You say it is a military district breakdown, but not by oblast?

S.: It is by military districts because as you will see later when I report on this, there are many problems which are the concern of the commander of the military district, particularly in terms of military support and supply.

56. S.: Next on the 12th or the 14th September PANTELEYMONOV was recalled to MOSCOW to GRU to report on Iran. He is the GRU rezident in Iran. He was told that his T.D.Y. would be for a period of one week and that he would have no leave. This is in connection with what I have already reported to you concerning Iran. They want his report there now as the rezident of GRU. I did not see him but I know that he came on the specific instructions of SEROV and that he will work with ZASORIN who told me about this.

57. M.: Who told you about the original information concerning Iran?

S.: ZASORIN told me and also BUZINOV who had been down South. He

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told me that extensive military preparations are being made in the military districts adjacent to Iran. Another point I would like to mention now is that KHRUSHCHEV is going to tie in Iran to the German problem. He plans to send troops into Iran when complications develop in Germany. This is planned to be done in October. KHRUSHCHEV plans to localise this matter in Iran on the basis of extensive American military bases there. ZASORIN also told me that other rezidents in the Middle East are being called in for consultation in MOSCOW but which specific ones I do not know.

58. S.: By the way another thing I have heard about KHRUSHCHEV's present policy is that he wants to have a short period of quiet particularly prior to the convening of the Party Congress. VARENTsOV told me that KHRUSHCHEV seems to be sitting on the brakes right now and is not agitating now which VARENTsOV considers to be very correct. This is being done so that during the Congress everything can be carried out in a militant manner with all kinds of military demands and reinforced by the forthcoming manoeuvres, to give the best possible climate to the signing of the Peace Treaty. And in case of trouble to be in a position to deliver a blow. This could be a local conflict or a large one, KHRUSHCHEV is ready to strike us first. However, if the West is ready to swallow the second pill, namely recognise the D.D.R. then the tension will be eased. KHRUSHCHEV has now high hopes of a split in NATO.

59. S.: The Soviet Command estimate that the Americans have three rocket bases in the territory of Iran.

G.: Who told you this?

S.: Two persons told me this, the first one to tell me this was BUZINOV since this information is plotted on military maps to which he has access. Later when I was feeling out ZASORIN on this topic he confirmed it and said "Yes, that's about right". BUZINOV knows this more accurately since he is concerned with operational matters and they have their map showing enemy military dispositions and installations. In addition VARENTsOV has his own intelligence unit, which is concerned with studying the relative strengths of opposing forces in each theatre of military action. BUZINOV added that

..../the rockets

the rockets deployed on the three American bases in Iran can only reach as far as the South Urals. This is evidently from the calculations of the Soviet Technical rocket analysts.

60. S.: In reference to the photograph of my graduation class from the rocket academy which photograph I request that you show me later so that I may identify the individual students and instructors, there is a class-mate of mine, Lieut. Col. BONDARENKO who was recently in MOSCOW and when I went to the Artillery Headquarters to photograph, and of course I walked around there and ate etc., to act normally, although my photography was covered by a visit to the secret library for reference material for the article I am presumably writing. I met BONDARENKO there.

G.: Which Headquarters was this - the DZERZHINSKIY Academy?

S.: No, it was VARENTsOV's Headquarters, but it is located on the Academy premises.

61. S.: BONDARENKO told me that he had just been appointed as the Deputy Commander of a rocket brigade in KREMENCHUG for engineering matters. This brigade contains mixed battalions of our old friends the R-11 and one or two, I do not know exactly the number, of R-12 battalions. So you see here is an example that the R-12 is an adopted weapon issued to troops and specifically such a battalion exists in KREMENCHUG.

62. S.: I now want to report to you various other items which could be of interest or significance. In the cities of LENINGRAD and MOSCOW there are shortages of vodka. They are not producing vodka now and are using up old stocks. Alcohol is being stored in reserve for rockets. They are drinking cognac and wines and if vodka from old stocks is to be thrown out it results in all kinds of fights. Alcohol is being stored as a strategic reserve.

63. S.: VARENTsOV replied to a question which was very cleverly brought up by CHURAYEV regarding little news about MIKOYAN. CHURAYEV asked if MIKOYAN were ill since so little is heard about him. VARENTsOV replied to

..../CHURAYEV's query

CHURAYEV's query that despite the apparently good results achieved by MIKOYAN during his trip to Japan that MIKOYAN was arguing with KHRUSHCHEV and not agreeing with his policy. In addition at much lower levels rumours are heard that MIKOYAN does not agree with KHRUSHCHEV's militant position regarding BERLIN and his general foreign policy.

64. S.: CHURAYEV gets drunk quickly, which was not appreciated by either the Minister or VARENTsOV because they were astounded that such a prominent man would permit himself to make the statements he did at the dinner table. CHURAYEV personally told the following: "Only yesterday" (this would be 15th September) "the Central Committee" (and remember he is the Chief of the RFSFR) "received a report that in the town of BESLANI a large centre not far from ORDZONIKHIDZE, hooligans attacked Militia men and killed several of them. A similar case occurred recently in the town of ALEKSANDROV in the MOSCOW Oblast and their situation was even more severe since not only were Militia men attacked but also representatives of the local MVD. This is similar to what happened in MUROVO" (and you have read in the papers that there were mass executions by shooting there) "and a similar situation occurred in IVANOVO where the second uprising occurred, taking the form of an extensive hunger strike. In IVANOVO up to 400 men attacked the Militia when they attempted to disperse the crowd who came to make a mass appeal for better food conditions but collected peaceably without sticks and stones to make their plea. They complained that workers in MOSCOW and LENINGRAD had sufficient food ration whereas they and their families were starving. When the Militia attempted to disperse them from the areas of the OBKOM and the Ispolkom then they attacked the Militia. The Militia fired warning shots at the ground and air, not at the crowd, but neither they nor the Chairman of the Obkom could quiet the crowd so troops were called in who succeeded in dispersing the crowd and mass arrests were made."

65. S.: In general there is much unrest within the country. All kinds of banditry is breaking out including assaults, knifings, all kinds of theft and murder. These numerous attacks on the Militia are not only done by hooligans but by elements of the civilian population, as in IVANOVO, who wish to express

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their anger at the unsatisfactory situation. Even the Ministry of Defence has published orders for punishment of cases of mass rape in the Minsk area. One of the guilty was even the Party Secretary. Even in the MOSCOW area in towns such as RAZZNSKOYE there have been numerous hold-ups at knife point. This has even taken place in electric train lines when few people travel.

66. S.: The Army morale is bad since there is little faith in KHRUSHCHEV's militant policies. Reservists called up and those retained who have been scheduled for discharge feel that they are only kept temporarily to suit KHRUSHCHEV's policy and should the situation result in less tension they would be thrown out. But in the meantime they must risk their lives for this policy. This situation is known to KHRUSHCHEV and to his commanders. This is why KHRUSHCHEV is maintaining such a stern policy when he says that any local conflict may develop into an atomic conflict. He does not want to deploy his entire conventional army because he fears mass desertions. Many officers and men will go over to the West, after all look at how many Soviet soldiers and officers deserted from the D.D.R. to West Germany.

67. S.: There are many instances like those I mentioned about dissatisfaction and one example is one that SEROV personally told me about. I have been at SEROV's house twice and will report in full on this shortly. On the 9th September there was a Party conference in the FRUNZE District of the city of MOSCOW. A Chief of a Department of the FRUNZE Academy, Colonel LAZAREV made a speech at this Conference as a delegate to this District Party Conference. He made a speech against the cult of KHRUSHCHEV. He said that KHRUSHCHEV had correctly criticised the cult of STALIN and now he is himself developing more and more the cult of KHRUSHCHEV. The Colonel was interrupted and immediately the Chairman of the Raykom proposed a censure of the Colonel's speech. The speech was called apolitical and incorrect and it was proposed that his mandate as a delegate be taken away. This was done by vote at once and he was thrown out of the Party Conference for daring to criticise KHRUSHCHEV. It must be assumed that he will also be thrown out of the Party and also from his position in the FRUNZE Academy.

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68. A brief pause followed and subject said:- We have much work to do. I am only giving you the highlights of my report now, then we will get into detail and after you have studied and reached definite conclusions you can re-question me for clarification.

69. G.: While we are waiting for your next items, although we have no time to go into the questions we have prepared for you now, just tell me one thing - who in general was the source of the information you gave us on BERLIN in the material that you passed through WYNNE in MOSCOW?

S.: It came from Gen. Lieut. KORENEVSKIY. He had visited his close friend a member of the Central Committee whose name I do not know. ZASORIN is very friendly with KORENEVSKIY, who, as you know, is the Chief of the Information Directorate, and he told me that KORENEVSKIY told him about this order that KHRUSHCHEV received from the Presidium and the Central Committee and what KHRUSHCHEV wants to propose when our chiefs convene exclusively to consider the BERLIN question.

70. S.: Let me go on to my next point. You requested and gave me the mission that I find out by all possible means what is being done in the USSR about the development of an anti-missile missile. I can tell you exactly and this information was told me by Sergei Sergeievich, BUZINOV and POZOVNYY. POZOVNYY has very wide and important contacts and he is a prominent political worker himself. In MOSCOW KHRUSHCHEV has established a large and special NII and there is a special experimental rocket battalion which is developing by means of all kinds of electronic guidance assemblies rocket control which is capable of intercepting a hostile missile in flight and destroying it. Right now there is just a special NII and the experimental battalion. The Army has nothing. Everything else KHRUSHCHEV may say is foolishness, bluff and propaganda. However, experimental work is being done.

71. S.: Another mission you gave me I have fortunately accomplished is the following, there is a prominent rocket designer in MOSCOW whose name is CHELOMEY. This man is listed in the Kremlevka Telephone Directory.

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CHELOMEY is 43 or 44 years old, his first names are Vladimir Nikolayevich; he is a prominent specialist on KHRUSHCHEV's rockets, very intelligent and talented and has two laboratories under his direction in MOSCOW. In one of CHELOMEY's laboratories KHRUSHCHEV's son is employed. KHRUSHCHEV has a son who is a civil engineer. CHELOMEY is the one who worked out the employment of the rocket "Krylatka" which was used on submarines for employment with ground forces. He is also perfecting the "Krylatka" which is being used on submarines. BUZINOV confirmed for me that the velocity of this rocket is 500 metres per second.

72. S.: The next point is: There are 400,000 men in all services who are due for normal discharge from the Army and the decision has been made to postpone this discharge until sometime in the Spring and to retain these men on active duty. This data I read in the General Staff. You see this is just another element in KHRUSHCHEV's plan to have a militant decision made at the Party Congress and to sign the German Peace Treaty and be supported by these troops on ostensible manoeuvres which are combat ready and here he is retaining men who are scheduled for discharge as a further element of support of his plan.

73. S.: Next item. A Third Soviet Army is being moved into the territory of the D.D.R. There are only two Soviet armies there now not counting D.D.R. troops. The Army being brought in is the Eighth Mechanised Army. This Army was mentioned to me by MALINOVSKY who left VARENTsOV's party early because he was flying to LVOV the next day. He said "We shall see how our number Eight will stage its transfer of bases to Germany". It is being moved there from the Sub-Carpathian Military District. This Army is composed of three tank divisions and two motor-rifle divisions.

74. S.: In addition, although I do not know where the exact locations will be, six regiments of the PVO type V-75 rocket regiments are being moved into the D.D.R. Keep in mind that these are independent regiments of the PVO.

75. S.: It is interesting how this can be confirmed, here is an example. The day before yesterday I was in VNUKOVO with a girl friend that I see from

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time to time, Irina. I went there to take her to a restaurant because everybody knows me in town and VNUKOVO is an internal airport. There the deputy head of the restaurant is an old friend of mine an ex-officer who had previously worked at the Aragvi, I told you about him, BONASIENKO, Volodya. He told me that when he was on duty on Sunday the Minister and his wife arrived, there was delay in getting the plane ready and that the Minister finally flew off to LVOV. Can you imagine this? Here I get a confirmation from a civilian, that which I heard on the 16th at VARENTsOV's party.

76. G.: What will these PVO regiments of V-75s protect in the D.D.R.?

S.: I don't know exactly but I presume they would protect our troop units and undoubtedly there are other units there already which will be supplemented by these six.

77. S.: Remember there are a total of ten various armies in that theatre even though now the Third Army is in the territory of the D.D.R. itself, this will serve to increase the Soviet troop density in the D.D.R., but the other armies are in the second echelon and their function is to serve as reinforcements and a source of replacements when needed for the first echelon. Of course in case of a general offensive these armies could also be committed and in fact if necessary not ten but twenty armies could be used.

78. S.: VARENTsOV told me another thing of interest and he even cursed when he said it: "We are doing things in a one-sided way. We are placing emphasis on rockets and it is proper that we should do this but we are beginning to forget about conventional artillery. This conventional artillery is of course organic in all rifle divisions. We now have a shortage of conventional artillery." He said that there were deficiencies in certain types of artillery thanks to the inclusion of rockets. He did not tell me what types of weapons they were deficient in. The armies that are deployed in the German direction are not up to strength in equipment or in armament. The deficiencies are being reduced every day.

79. S.: I believe I have already written to you that in PARIS on the 18th October there will be a Conference of the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission. The Central Committee has confirmed sending Vice-Admiral CHEKUROV

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and the intelligence officer from GRU, Captain 1st rank RYSHKOV.

G.: Yes, we have received this information.

80. S.: Well I have already talked about this speech of KHRUSHCHEV's saying that there could not be a local war on its own. It is just this which is the dreadful thing about the whole situation and it is felt both in the country and within the Army - hence his insidious policy which we should note and understand - this desire to strike first and to destroy atomically everything that he can, as far as his atomic strength will allow him - to scare us and those in his country who disagree with him - if I (KHRUSHCHEV) destroy with the atom - you understand that all who are discontented - and many in the country are - will immediately be silent.

81. S.: These are the questions which I wanted to report on from this list - the most important. But a number of them must be expanded upon to a certain extent and I will allow myself to continue with this during the course of our work. I ask you to keep this list.

82. S.: While we drink our wine I will tell you some new political anecdotes which the Russian people have made up - this is done with a purpose, not by chance.... Two Soviets meet. One asks - "How do you live? Well, do you go to the cinema?" "Yes, I live well, I go to the cinema"..... "Do you go to the theatre?" "Yes, I go to the theatre, I live well."..... "Do you read the newspapers?" "Yes, I read the newspapers - if not how would I know that I live well?"

83. S.: Another one. One Soviet asks another "Will there be a war?" "No" "Why"? "Because KHRUSHCHEV's battle for peace will not leave one stone on another."

84. S.: A Jew is asked by a KGB man "Why have you concealed the fact that you have relatives abroad?" "I have never concealed the fact that I have relatives abroad - I wrote the truth, I have no relatives abroad." "You evcloch - you are concealing the fact that your brother lives in Israel." "Then it is my brother who really lives at home - I am the one who is living abroad."

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85. S.: KHRUSHCHEV gave a questionnaire to everyone "What will you do when we reach (dokhodit') America?" Someone wrote "When we reach America you can go on, but I will stop right there....." This is the life of the people - humour through tears - rough humour.

86. S.: (Checking his list) Now I must show you on the photograph the teachers and students. You remember that you asked me who studied in the VDA with me - one was Colonel BALAKIREV, Nikolaj. He finished at the Academy with me, was in Italy for a long time, is a senior officer under the head of the Second Directorate Lt. General KONOVALOV. Another one, Major KISHILOV, Nikolai too, also works for KONOVALOV. I mentioned (LT) Colonel FUKOVSKIJ who has gone to Iran. Colonel BOKAREV, deputy to SHOLIKOV for internal cadres of the GRU. There is also a Colonel BYCHKO, Aleksandr Nikolaevich who was in Canada, then worked as a senior officer in the Operational Directorate with SOKOLOV, the Third Directorate. Now he has also been transferred to General SOKOLOV, the second one, who is in the Otdel of foreign relations. Then I mentioned the name of Colonel CHERKUNOV - an airman, working in the CC working on our GRU cadres - he has written a new personal report on me (kharakteristika). Colonel KOLIBANOV works in the CC in this same administrative department which is concerned with GRU cadres. I mentioned them already - this is just a confirmation that they are still in the same place.

87. S.: Now I will tell you in short and then in detail, about the SEROVs. They received me very nicely at their home. They live on Granovskogo Street, opposite the Kremlin hospital next to the Voentorg.

G.: How was contact made - did you ring them up?

S.: No, they searched me out - his wife rang for me at home - had Oleg Vladimirovich come back, and so on. They expected me back from you, from LONDON, about three days earlier. Granovskogo Street, No.3, second entrance, flat 71. I came alone as a guest, taking their things with me in a small grip - there is such a watch on the place, downstairs, but they rang up to say I was to be allowed in.

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88. S.: Marshal of the Soviet Union ZHUKOV lives in the building, below the SEROVs, who has not so far gone to work for KHRUSHCHEV. SOKOLOVSKIJ is working as a chief adviser in the Glavkom, ZHUKOV has not yet agreed to do so.

89. S.: Marshal of the Soviet Union GOLIKOV lives on the first floor, opposite ZHUKOV, Head of the Main Political Directorate - all in this house where I was. Opposite SEROV on the same staircase (2nd floor) lives the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., PUDENKO. Above SEROV lives SUSLOV, member of the Presidium of the CC and above SUSLOV is the flat of FURTSEVA - all in No.3 Granovskogo Street to which your obedient servant goes as a guest! All these people are in the second entrance - there was no conversation about the people who live in the first.

90. S.: Well, I arrived, gave him his shirt and all the little things. They were all very pleased. They laid the table. I was alone as a guest. He arrived, asked me how my duty trip had gone and then went to the reception for the Korean National Day. I stayed with the family. When I said that I was going to France they gave me a list of requests - I have got them all written out. Then I went home - the caviar I have brought you is from the SEROVs - they gave me caviar and kolbasa - I have not brought the kolbasa because they have it in France. We got on very well. SEROV was the first who signed the first paper authorising me to come here on a duty trip for the GRU. After Mrs. SEROV and his daughter Svetlana had telephoned several times to my home without reaching me, one day SEROV rang CHEZHOV, SOKOLOV's deputy in the 3rd Directorate - SOKOLOV was on leave "Where can I find (subject's name)?" "I will go and find him immediately". He called me out of the Committee, asked what it was about and he told me to call SEROV urgently at his home number Granovskogo Street - he has a telephone at home and one at his dacha. This CHEZHOV as the deputy to SOKOLOV who is sitting in SOKOLOV's office gave me the key and said that I could telephone from there. - what trust! The safe was closed it is true, but not sealed. I closed the door, sat down and telephoned. He said "You seem to have disappeared - we want to see you." I said "Comrade General of the Army when should I come?" He said "Come tomorrow at 6 o'clock." I went to his house, he went off to

...../the Korean

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the Korean reception and I stayed on with the family. Their attitude was excellent.

91. S.: Soon after this, I was summoned by IYEVLEV, the Head of the Direction under SOKOLOV - a Captain 1st rank - we have come across him. IYEVLEV is concerned directly with America as VORONIN does with ? England. He asked me: "What would you think if we sent you to America as a Counsellor?" I said that it was an attractive idea - "I am still capable, healthy and willing. The country is very interesting and important for intelligence work. I would willingly agree. This is my open answer to your open question. I agree." Then, two or three days after I had seen SEROV I was summoned by CHEZHOV. He said "We are thinking of sending you there. We will check in every detail. You would go as a Counsellor - a straightforward Counsellor to the Ambassador - but your work would be for the GRU. That is where the conversation stopped - what will come of it God only knows. They may of course take me. SEROV may, of course, give the order "Take him out of this Committee and put him to work in GRU" and then we will see where they will send me - either to England or to America - for there were conversations about England too. Thus during my work with you here we must think in detail about my communications with you - only along the line of agent communications - excluding the Committee and my visits to Embassies etc. - only through agent channels - DLBs, meetings with Janet and so forth. We must be prepared for this - this is a real problem. The second question which affects us - when I leave here I should have instructions from you on how to pass on to you immediately this or that important material for our High Command - as for instance I knew for four days beforehand that the BERLIN frontier would be closed on August 13th, and that KONEV was flying out. I ask you to think about this. This is all so that my ideas and requests are in your heads already.

92. S.: My missions in France are on two sheets which I have photographed and which you have not yet seen. I ask you to select a route which I can travel through France after the closing of the Exhibition. Somehow we shall have to work for France, for General de GAULLE - I shall have to work through you if they will not help. I ask you from your deep knowledge and experience,

...../to think //

to think out something interesting so that I can achieve something on this duty trip - so that once again I go home with results. You read my report and know that I received thanks for my work reporting on that base - for all my photographs. They show the new anti-aircraft system in England - people from the Embassy have not been along this route recently and have not seen this base.

M.: The photographs were good, were they?

S.: Yes.

93. S.: Incidentally, about Karl Marx's grave. I submitted a letter, which went to the Central Committee who told the Embassy to allocate money for the payment of the caretaker of the cemetry to clear the grave up and instructed people working in the Embassy to go and check on this and to go there more often. They can see that I am alert from the military and political point of view, as an intelligence officer.

94. S.: I should also report that I did not have time to spend much time at the French Exhibition (in MOSCOW). I know of someone - I will give you the name and show you some documents. I went with WINNE, and once by myself and I was at a reception at the French Embassy, given by the Ambassador. I have no acquaintances - I could not acquire them - I did not look for them and there was not enough time. But no one knows whether I have any such acquaintances in MOSCOW. Give me some acquaintances of Frenchmen who speak Russian and some French and who were in MOSCOW. Or pick out someone from firms which might go..... We must think about this..... any of the French who were in MOSCOW.

H.: This is not so easy.

S.: He should be one of our people. If you read you will see that the GRU has given me the task of putting two or three Frenchmen in touch with our Rezidentura. Two or three are not necessary - this is Utopia - give me one. Give me a man who can fool them and do whatever is necessary for us. People who can work with Russian representatives - we can achieve something interesting through this link. I have been given the job of choosing DLB

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sites and meeting points in all the towns where I am. We shall know them then - two or three in a town. Is that bad? And then, if you give me something big I will get a decoration.

95. H.: I think that we ought to explain to him at this moment that France is not quite the same as England and that we do not want to bring the French in in any way - we want to keep this entirely secret from them and therefore we can not get the co-operation of the French in the same way as we could do in England and, although we will do the best to help him in every way we can, it is going to be very much more difficult for us whilst we are here. You had better explain this to him.

G.: You must remember that you are in France, not in England and, as you remember, you yourself told us about a Frenchman who has been in the USSR and who visited the aluminium factory. No one knows where there are leaks.

S.: But surely there are steadfast people in French intelligence who can be told and who are working wholeheartedly for the French and for us?

G.: We do not want to share our knowledge about you.

S.: I understand that you are clever and experienced case-officers (rukovoditel') but surely France is our country?

H.: Yes. But if we were to tell the French what we are doing here this would complicate matters. They would want to be here too. We would not be able to get security and therefore although we are quite prepared to do anything within our own powers we are not prepared to do anything which would involve bringing in the French. (G. explains).

S.: Evidently they have few acquaintances here because the senior officers in KONOVALOV's operational section (uchastok) say "For goodness sake get us two or three people somehow" - you can read this in my brief. You know, in England they only gave me a mission for making one contact - at the same time we can infiltrate our people here. We can do something profitable here. Well, I ask you to think about it - what you do should earn me thanks - this is your business as case officers.

H.: You must understand that we will do everything in our power, but our powers are not so great here in France.....

...../96.

96. S.: Do you think that we could arrange that I find something - this is primitive, is it? Or that I steal something again like the Nomonic 115 - you remember - I got a good evaluation for that from KORSNEVSKIY and for the electronic manual. Well then we must think out something good so that I get a decoration and am promoted to General. Then you will get a map with all the bases on it.

H.: It is not so simple for us.

S.: I understand ..... but if I go back with empty hands after 25 days they will say that he has only been groping about and has done nothing.

H. You won't go back with empty hands.

S.: Well, let us think something out - they did not give me money for nothing. We should talk about WYNNE - I have a question I would like to discuss with you. We must think something out.

97. H.: Yes. I would like to talk about WYNNE with him at this stage. I don't know what he has talked about, but we have got to bear in mind that if WYNNE is going to be important for the future of this operation it is frightfully important that he does something for the firms which he represents. He has already spent a long time hanging around. He has not carried out his tasks - he is due to go to Yugoslavia and although he is here now, he cannot stay. Otherwise he is going to lose his job and his potentialities for the future (G. explains).

S.: He mentioned the same to me, he should certainly go to Yugoslavia - he is not necessary here. It was very good that we met. He said at the Committee that he was going to visit our Exhibition.....

98. S.: Well, to go on, so I wrote, I shall not be going to England. There are none of those sort of delegations. At the beginning of 1962 WYNNE should visit the Soviet Union with a delegation. +I may be able to accompany TIKHONOV - on the metallurgical delegation to England. But WYNNE should come - this is important.

G.: He can bring us some mail.

S.: Yes. Well what about [illegible]? He tells me that his firms are not satisfied with him - he is losing touch with them. Of course, as I feel

...../you know, he

you know, he would be ready to work exclusively for us and with me - and to receive money for this - a monthly salary - this is clear. In general WYNNE has many suggestions - he wants to bring his wife here but what use would that be. We visited a restaurant just now - an hour ago - he had changed and had forgotten all his money. I expected this and I had £2.10s and I gave him £1 to pay - I had already changed all my dollars into francs. Well we know WYNNE's psychology. He is a good fellow and we are fond of him - he is a little self-seeker, of course, but he is an honourable man and has done a lot for us. He must be supported in the future - how, is your concern not mine. He should stay here for a couple of days - to show me PARIS - there was no point in going out with him tonight - I am tired and this is more important. Then he can go and come back later during my stay.

99. Subject hands over envelope and letter given to him in MOSCOW with arrangements for PARIS meeting. He was given telephone number of safe flat and told that one of case officers will always be available on this number. He is told how to use a telephone - given 'jetons' told always to speak in English and never to telephone from his hotel or from the Soviet Embassy.

S.: I will check the number with you later (see below).

100. S.: On 24th -30th September in Oxford there will be a symposium on the structure and making of paper, on the theoretical and technical aspects of paper production. The symposium will be attended and addressed by leading paper experts from many countries.

The Head of the 1st Directorate, SEMICHASTNY, is very interested in this symposium and the head of the Otdel of SHELEPIN. SEMICHASTNY is very interested in paper from the point of view of "passportisatsia". There will be no delegation from us. I have asked WYNNE to get me overt material on this.

H.: Yes, I should think we could get that. We will try that.

J.: Here are telephone tokens - (further discussion of use of telephones).

101. S.: During the French Exhibition LOPATENKO, the head of the Department

...../in the Committee

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in the Committee, got to know a Frenchwoman Marie Paule LACHAUX.... she works in the Federation of Mechanics. She wrote this with her own hand ..... WYNNE and I met her in MOSCOW - she speaks English and French, of course. We must take a look at her - perhaps we can arrange some links through her - the company she works for is interesting.....

H.: I'll have to look it up.

102. S.: Now further, the electric razor with batteries which was given as a present created a furore. All Ministers and prominent leaders wanted one, for example SEROV and SHISHLANI. It would be nice if we could find a French firm which manufactures these razors and build in the legend that this firm has made a gift of a number of razors to the Committee with an accompanying letter.

M.: How many razors do you need?

S.: Six. Next since on the 7th November they will celebrate the 44th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution it would be nice if some wine or cognac could be picked up with the vintage 1917. This would make a hit and especially since CHURAYEV requested this specifically. He even asked for a bottle of cognac like VARENTSOV's and his year of birth is 1904. I plan to bring CHURAYEV the odds and ends he asked for such as a good pocket-book, socks, etc. And I will get bottles of wine, vintage 1917, for SEROV, MALINOVSKY and CHURAYEV. I'll ask VARENTSOV to take the bottle to MALINOVSKY and when he is told that it is from the Colonel he had met who is walking around as a full Colonel for twelve years now and it is time that he should be proposed for General, I am sure that SEROV will not object. MALINOVSKY will probably say "Go ahead and write the resolution." I am not losing by the fact that I bring them presents, it is a prima facie evidence that they trust me by the fact that they accept my gifts. My legend is very simple, I got along well abroad, they feed me and give me small presents and I buy other odds and ends out of the money that I save. They even write letters and notes to me with their requests of what they want. Next. I would like to have some records by VERTINSKIY and LESHCHENKO. I gave one to SEROV and he is listening to it all the time. It is a rarity for Soviet people to have these records. Next

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I need personally a small gold lady's watch either Omega or Longines but the numbers should be on the dial. Then I need a whole lot of little bottles of perfume, the Serova and CHURAYEV asked for this as well as others. Such as Chanel No.5, Mitsuoko and Arpege, etc. But only little bottles; further CHURAYEV requested as well as FOMIN and KARAFILLI, sets of bill-folds, pocket-books and watch straps to match. And I need about twenty cheap ball point pens. And I need three small briefcases for CHURAYEV, VARENTsOV and BUZINOV. In addition many requested a medicine called Sustanon which is taken by injection. I think it is manufactured in Holland, maybe your doctors could help obtain it. In addition the insecticide you gave me before was very favourably received and they request more. I also need a lot of batteries of 30 volts and 15 - I think the brand name is Vertrix. I will leave the list with you and please get me more of these Ex-lax tablets as well as others which are similar.

103. The safe house telephone number was checked with subject to be sure he had it written correctly. He was told how to use French automatic telephones and was given tokens. Subject then reviewed his financial position.

104. S.: I was given 507 dollars in cash, 251 dollars have been computed for my food and for my lodging I can only pay a maximum of 36 francs daily. The room I now have costs 53 francs. I don't care what the cost is as long as my receipt will read 36 francs per day for lodging. (After discussing the possibilities of moving to another hotel it was decided that the easiest way would be for subject to request another room in the same hotel the price of which would be under 36 francs a day. Subject was told that this should be no problem since very adequate rooms could be had well within his limit. Subject was told that arrangements such as were made in LONDON were not possible in PARIS because it would risk security and falsification of a hotel bill could also be a problem and in addition the proximity of his hotel to the Soviet Embassy would make it likely that the Soviet Embassy would know what the normal prices of that hotel are).

...../C.: In addition

S.: In addition they gave me 370 francs or 75 dollars for my travel money, which would last five days throughout France. Please arrange an itinerary for me which would be consistent with my cost allowance for such travel.

G.: This sum is more than enough to cross the length and breadth of France if one were to travel by bus. (Subject showed an additional travel pass prepared by his Administrative Section. This will also be photographed, but in the safe house since he must have this document on his person. Subject showed all his other papers including a rail ticket back to the USSR).

S.: They wanted me to take a train back so that I could look around and report what I could see in West Germany on my way home. However, I have to have visas for Belgium and West Germany and I will speak about this at our Consulate tomorrow. If they will do this, fine - if not I will certainly pay the difference in roubles and fly back.

105. S.: This list of the possible 69 members of delegations who had been proposed to come here and of whom only a few will come should also be photographed. The names struck through in red have already been approved for coming here. The photography should be done here, however, since I should have the list on my person in case anyone asks me about it. When I was at the Embassy today I was received by KULYAVTSEV, Ivan Pavlovich. He is a Colonel. He is a fat husky fellow and is one of the two deputies to the Resident. Tomorrow I will be received either by the Rezident or by his Deputy. It seems that the Resident is travelling throughout the country now, but I am not sure. All this is what I wanted to report to you today and I request that you look over everything and on your further questions later I will be able to recollect supplementary details.

106. J.: He said that in a few days a delegation will arrive here that he must meet. To what extent will he be tied up with this delegation?

S.: All I have to do is to meet them and set them up in a hotel and then together with this KULYAVTSEV, to work up these points of interest for

...../each of the

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each of the delegation members to visit.

G.: Will you have to go to these points with them?

S.: Yes, that is possible, but it is really up to me.

J.: But he will not be tied up as he was with the first delegation to LONDON?

S.: No, not at all, and I must also mention that it is possible that no-one at all will come. There may be a decision to save money and not to send them or only to send very few.

107. S.: By the way, here is the SEROV family's request. (Reads long list and leaves with us to purchase for him. Subject then showed a small note-book full of purchase requests for his own family).

J.: I can see now why you need 25 days in PARIS.

G.: They must have taken three or four days of planning just to write this out.

S.: They took more than that. (Subject was explained that due to the inevitable interest on the part of the French who must surely know that he had at one time been an intelligence officer posted in Turkey, it would not be wise to meet too frequently and even if short intervals between meetings at the very beginning were used these should be stretched further as time goes on).

G.: First of all in view of this French expected curiosity it would be best for us to meet in the evenings and not during the daytime when it is too easy to be spotted. Although we would like to meet reasonably frequently to resolve all of our current business which is so important, in the early stages of your stay we will meet at longer intervals later.

S.: That is right; I agree.

G.: How about our next meeting? You have laid out your schedule for the day and what do you propose?

S.: How about six o'clock?

G.: That is too early, it is too light yet.

J.: He is tired, why should he not have a free day tomorrow and go out and we can meet on the day after.

...../ G.: Then

G.: Then we will meet the day after tomorrow at 19.30 because it will be dark then and you can go out with WINNE tomorrow.

S.: Very well, but will you arrange to have someone drop me off at the other end of the bridge because I don't know how to find it very well yet.

H.: We will do this.

108. S.: Will the materials that I brought be available tomorrow?

H.: No, not tomorrow, but possibly the day after.

S.: I wish you to have a chance to look at it, since there is much about it we should discuss.

G. That is exactly what we want to do and that is why we want to meet the day after tomorrow.

S.: That's fine, then you will study everything tomorrow and the day after I will meet you at 19.30 at the other side of the bridge.

G.: Do you want to look at the map of PARIS to see exactly where you live in relation to the bridge?

S.: Not tonight, I am very tired and you can show me next time.

H.: We will drop you off in the vicinity of your hotel.

M.: George and I will go with him and George will drive to that area since he knows the route.

109. A farewell toast was drunk as Subject made his farewells and left with M. and G. at about 23.15 hours. He was delivered without incident at a slow rate of speed in the vicinity of his hotel at approximately 23.35 hours.

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Meeting No. 32 on 22nd September. 1961.

1. Subject was met at the RV point which is at the end of the Solferino footbridge at 19.30 hours by Roger and Harold. The party arrived at the safe apartment at 19.45 hours. The pick-up was covered by Michael and it went off with no incidents.

2. G.: Please let me have all documents which should be photographed now, so that you can have the originals back before the end of this meeting. We have arranged to have them photographed.

(Subject gave his list of delegate candidates out of which a number would be arriving in PARIS. This was a list of four sheets including 89 names. The other documents was his GRU Administrative Travel Order.)

S.: Later I will show you which people on the list are KGB.

3. (Subject took out his notes and said) - Although we are fairly careful with our friends the French, I found out quite a bit of information which should be of considerable interest to them and of course to us. I will now review what I have done in this respect since I have arrived home. Yesterday at 09.00 hours on the second day of my arrival in PARIS I went to the Soviet Embassy. I was received very well by the Resident Gen. Major Ivan CHEREMEYEV who had just returned from MOSCOW where he was on temporary duty. He knows me for a long time since we worked together in the Mandate Commission which was processing students for the M.D.A. class with which I was involved. He was a Colonel then. I was astounded at his affable and direct attitude towards me. He said that several cables had come in about my arrival and I explained that I was delayed by the visa application. He said that he wanted to talk to me at length later but that he was about to have an operational meeting with his case officers on intelligence matters and he wanted me to participate at this meeting. He said that he would welcome my opinion on various matters at this

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meeting and I replied that I would be glad to be as helpful as I was able to be. He added that since I have come for twenty-five days and will be under his jurisdiction, in addition to resolving my own missions he would like me to help them.

4. S.: Their Rezidentura is on the second floor of the Embassy building. Only the Military Intelligence people of GRU are on the second floor - Strategic Intelligence - and all of the rooms have been checked out. Secret matters may be discussed there except that names, dates etc. are not to be mentioned. I immediately saw two officers there with whom I had studied at the M.D.A. and who graduated with me in 1953. The Military Attache who was introduced to me was surprisingly Gen. Maior SOKOLOV who was the former Chief of the Foreign Relations Section in MOSCOW. Formerly Gen. Maior Michal MASLOV was the Military Attache here and he is now the Chief of the Foreign Relations Section in MOSCOW, while SOKOLOV has replaced him since a month and a half. The Naval Attache is also here, who is a Captain 1st Rank and who was the Assistant Naval Attache in Turkey while I was there. He is Vladimir PROKHOROV. There are many operational case officers under cover and I must spot every one of them who is here in PARIS. I will also spot all KGB officers, of whom I have already noticed several.

5. S.: We sat at this meeting from about 09.30 until 15.00 hours. The first deputy to the Resident, Igor Aleksandrovich ANANYEV was also there. He is under cover. The other deputy is actually second deputy KUDRYAVTSEV, the Counsellor, who is concerned with science and technology and whom I met two days ago. I was introduced as a GRU Headquarters officer on TDY in PARIS who would participate in the meeting. The topic of the meeting was to review the missions of GRU to the Rezidentura in France on the acquisition of military materiel samples and data (dobyvaniyu voennykh obraztsov vo Frantsii). These military samples consist of weapons and documents on their technology. Then every

/mission....

mission was discussed point by point. Every case officer will discuss his mission and this case officer was requested to detail the exact status of his progress in accomplishing his mission. Even Gen. Major SOKOLOV was called upon to report, but he was not required to stand up to make his report. Even as Military Attache he has a mission here which is to obtain data on weapons or the weapons themselves through the Attaches of the countries of People's Democracies here in Paris. The Poles here have succeeded in making some penetration and have had some military samples available to them. I will report on all of these items in a moment since it is my duty to report this to you in the first instance. How you advise and warn our French friends is up to you; this is a secondary matter. In addition possibly I may succeed in fulfilling a tiny portion of these missions since some of them correspond to my own missions such as obtaining data of material, etc. which

6. S.I. As you can see the position of Gen. Major SOKOLOV as the Military Attache here is consistent with the re-organization I reported to you several months ago, namely that all Military Attaches should be strictly cut off from directing operational work, which is done by the under-cover Resident. The missions set forth to all Residenturas is to obtain by every possible means such as by monetary payments through agent networks, through contacts and acquaintances and even to steal if necessary, in short by all and every means using personal contacts, the countries of People's Democracies and Communists. The Communists here are very active and they are rendering tremendous assistance to the strategic intelligence case officers. This again invokes my constant remark to you, namely that maybe I am a complete fool but I cannot understand at all how Communist Parties are not completely eliminated, Communists brought under severe control in democratic countries, especially since they do such constant and considerable harm. I told you last time that it was a Communist source that reported about the plans for redeployment of 230 military aircraft.

7. S.I. CHEREDEYEV was very severe with his case officers but ...

/very...

very intelligent man; for example, when one case officer reported that he had assigned his agent the mission of obtaining two weapons out of his total mission of fourteen for fear of compromising himself to his agent, CHEREDEYEV called the case officer a fool, saying that he had already compromised himself by requesting the two weapons (or assemblies thereof) and had he given the agent the entire fourteen items, possibly by now some of these items could have been procured instead of waiting for the procurement of the two requested and holding back the other twelve until the first two were obtained. The officers are afraid of him, particularly since he has been promoted to General. Previously he had been the Chief of a Napravlenie and later the deputy to KONOVALOV, the Directorate Chief in GRU.

(8.) S.: The Communists are sitting all around and have penetrated everywhere. I am sure that they are bringing great harm to our mutual work and are hurting De GAULLE's domestic and foreign policy.

(9.) S.: The missions to obtain military weapons and material in France by the Rezidentura is duplicated in the Rezidenturas of all capitalist countries. The emphasis here is not so much on French military armament but on U.S. and British armament. In the list of items desired there is a tremendous number of items of U.S. manufacture. They know the nomenclature of all latest items of equipment and weapons. They could only know this due to some look out of U.S.A. About 90% of the items listed were of U.S. manufacture but these overlapped military equipment mutally used by Americans, French and West Germans, in short all NATO equipment.

(10.) S.: CHEREDEYEV said that the Rezidentura in the U.S. A. has given them the leads regarding the weapons which were the basis for the missions in France. One item was the small calibre U.S. mortar which has a very well developed system for targetting (tsentrirovanya i navodki). It can be well orientated along three planes. The mission is to obtain the mortar itself or, if that is not possible, its photograph and full

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technical data. Another mission was to obtain the U.S. "NATO" rifle and the cartridges for this rifle. They also wanted the latest models of the very well-developed U.S. and British gas masks. They are particularly interested in the filtering substances which have a very effective adsorbtion quality. Specifically they are concerned with what I believe is technically called the breathing cassette in which the filtering segments are placed. A great priority is placed on obtaining the secrets for anti-corrosive treatment of submarines and the submerged portions of Naval vessels. This is a repeat mission since they have been after this for a long time. This is a chemical type mission and our vessels require much more frequent dry-dock repair than the NATO vessels. Then there are twenty to twenty-five detailed missions involving various items in electronic technology applicable in rocketry. They are interested in all types of electronic units and assemblies of U.S., English or French manufacture, that are used in radio, radar, measuring instruments and guidance systems. Sketches and diagrams are particularly desired. Another item is a small U.S. rocket launched from aircraft which is capable of creating atmospheric disturbances against radar action. Apparently these rockets emanate some electro-magnetic waves which cause this disturbances. This serves to jam enemy radar beams. The way they explained it was that after firing this instrument descends slowly on a parachute and jams radio and radar.

11. S.: A universal mission for all Rezidenturas, but particularly here in France is to visit all chemical factories possible to determine the composition of the new solid fuel for rockets which has been developed by the French. They say that the French already have hundreds of solid fuel cartridges which are suitable for firing rockets. The French are considered to be world leaders in this field. Another requirement is to obtain all possible data on heat resistant steels. In this connection I found out that the nimonic series have been developed in U.S.A. and not in England. However, it seems that they are working together with the

/British....

British in the development of heat resistant steels. In addition all data on the components of liquid fuels were also missions. The above comprised the basic items listed as missions and each case officer had a considerable number of missions to fulfil. But from the reporting that I heard by the individual case officers only a few missions have been accomplished and no case officer had fully accomplished all his missions. Another item I forgot to mention was the acquisition of electronic Naval depth gauging instruments. These were of U.S. and British manufacture. Missions regarding documentation consisted of technical data on steel production, rocket fuel production and all documentary data covering the items listed above. These missions for the obtaining of documents were also distributed by CHEREDEYEV to his case officers.

12. G.: How many case officers were present?

S.: There were ten officers present yesterday but these were not the whole contingent. Many were not permitted to attend. Let me see, CHEREDEYEV was there, his Deputy ANANYEV, the Military Attache SOKOLOV, the Naval Attache PROKHOROV - he has been here maybe four or five months - then Mikhail Kuz'mich SOLOVYEV - he is a GRU officer who was previously in GENEVA and he was transferred here with his wife and two children; he is in the technical group where there are also two KGB officers. There were five other officers present whom I will identify for you from photographs when you show them to me. I also visited the individual offices of the other GRU men who were not at this meeting and I knew several of them and greeted them, for example, GRIGORIYEV, Valentin, Captain 2nd Rank, who had studied at the MDA as my classmate. He works for PROKHOROV. CHEREDEYEV asked one of the five officers I did not name to send a cable to GRU stating that I had arrived safely. As a summary of this meeting all officers stated that they had assigned all of their missions for execution to their agents. They have a large number of agents and, as I mentioned before, they are greatly helped by the Communists here."

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13. S.: After the meeting I spoke to the Rezident and his deputies and detailed my mission. I said that I will try to find some new acquaintances by visiting the Soviet Exhibition and using the few acquaintances I have met in MOSCOW at the French Exhibition, should a contact prove to be of interest to the Rezident I would turn him over. I mentioned that I had the mission of obtaining some technical data and to find dead drops. The Rezident said that they had many dead drops in PARIS and that I was not to waste my time here but when my itinerary for travel through France would be established, then the Rezident would tell me in what towns dead drops would be desirable. He even offered me an operational car and chauffeur for my trip through France.

14. S.: At the meeting I was asked to speak and I told them of what items were purchased at the French Exposition in MOSCOW. The purchasing commission was the same one that had been to LONDON and at the French Exposition they purchased items totalling 2,600,000 new roubles. We purchased much of the electronic equipment which was shown there and for GRU considerable optical equipment was purchased. There were two officers from the GRU in this commission. One was Gen. Maior of Engineers who works in the Information Directorate, VYSOTSKIY, and there was another Colonel from the Information Directorate in the Commission. For GRU they purchased automatic pilots which can operate in the far north, electronic equipment and optical equipment. The one who checked and authorised this large purchase was GVISHIANI's father-in-law, a Deputy of KHRUSHCHEV's and a member of the Presidium, KOSYGIN. I also mentioned which of the items they had listed, GRU considered to be of prime importance, since I was briefed on this prior to my departure and I also mentioned the symposium to be held at OXFORD on paper production. I also supported CHEREDEYEV's statement that duplicate samples are necessary, even if it has been reported that a certain item had already been obtained in another country.

15. S.: CHEREDEYEV was very please with me and was most courteous. He gave me French cigarettes and said that operational funds, which I

/had not....

had not been given in MOSCOW, were available at any time should I need to entertain anyone. He escorted me to the door, asked me to come back any time and I went to dinner with ANANYEV and SOLOVYEV, to the TORGPREDSTVO where they have a dining room, near the Bois de Boulogne. After that I rested and went out with WYNNE and had a very nice time.

16. H.: Do they know that WYNNE is here?

S.: No. Let us talk about this now. I have a proposal which I think will simplify things for us considerably. Let me finish first describing circumstances leading up to this proposal. Today I went to the Embassy again, then I went to the Exposition with SOLOVYEV by metro, because he wanted to show me how the metro runs. There SOLOVYEV introduced me to the deputy director of the Exhibition. The Director is a clean man from the MVD but the Deputy is our man from GRU. His name is Leonid Vassilyevich FEDOKOV, a Colonel of GRU, under ROGOV like myself, who works under cover of MVD. I spoke to him for a short while and he said that an important delegation would be coming at 3 or 4 that afternoon and would I please return at that time. I had lunch with WYNNE and I went back to the Exhibition. There I spoke to him about my missions and I mentioned that an Englishman who has close ties with the GNTK and who had been at the French Exhibition in MOSCOW will possibly come to the Soviet Exhibition in PARIS for two or three days. I added that this man has many contacts with firms and is planning to organise a mobile exhibition in U.S.S.R. in 1962. I told you that WYNNE had mentioned this when he was at the Committee in MOSCOW, and there is a record of this discussion there. WYNNE also officially stated in the Committee that he would come to PARIS for two or three days. This is also on record. Therefore it would be very good if WYNNE would go to the Exhibition for two or three days. He should not go off to BELGRADE on Tuesday. In about ten days the Exhibition will close and after that we do not need WYNNE here at all. It is going to close on the 3rd of

/October. ....

October. WYNNE can even come to the Embassy to ask for me or I can simply meet him at the Exhibition. In that case I will tell the Embassy that the representative of many British firms who has close contact with our Committee has arrived here and in addition I can say that WYNNE has promised to bring me some worthwhile documentary material. This would be most plausible and in my view very correct. Of course if you say no, then WYNNE can go to BELGRADE, but please consider this. It is a fact that people come to this Exhibition from many countries, and WYNNE did say at the Committee that he would come here. If I met WYNNE at the Exhibition I could take him to a private office with NEGREV, pour him out operational wine and he can say that he has brought me a package of some material. This material I will deliver to the Embassy. I am just giving you a rough plan and you can arrange the details as you see fit. But this would simplify our work and be very good for me.

17. S.: I already met one businessman through NEGREV; I have his name written down in my notebook which is in my coat pocket. The man I met through NEGREV is Marcel WACHBRESS from the Society of Franco-Russian Friendship. He speaks English, though poorly. He even criticised the Exhibition, he asked me why there were certain technical items there which could be of interest to specialists only and nothing from the country itself. There is nothing from Soviet life here. NEGREV told me today that the KGB are everywhere, no matter in what direction one spits. They are in the stands, amongst the interpreters and the guides. That's all I have on the Exhibition and with respect to WYNNE I again repeat that if he was to work with me for two days it would be very good for us and it would also strengthen WYNNE's position with the Committee since I would report that I met WYNNE here and that he brought me something.

18. S.: Tomorrow morning I am going directly to the Exhibition with Ivan Pavlovich KUDRYAVTSEV, the Deputy for Science and Technology,

/because....

because one of our Ministers is arrivingthere, I believe from the Ministry of the River Fleet. In general up to the time of the closing of the Exhibition I will be going there and to the Embassy every day and after that I will take a short trip through France. Maybe I could pick something up either directly along the line of my mission or something similar to the missions I mentioned earlier. Some filter material for the gas mask even if it isn't the real thing, or a shell cartridge. I need your support in these things because it will help me attain greater stature and as a result I will be sent out more often on TDYs.

19. S.: The problem of my room has not yet been solved. What has happened is that they moved me out of my room to another one in the same hotel with the price just the same. (It was decided that WYNNE would get subject a room at the Palais d'Orsay and move subject into it if a room is available. The price there is 34 francs per day.) This is all that I have to report.

20. G.: We have lots of questions. Let's begin with the clarification of the information you gave us the day before yesterday.

S.: Yes, and please let me have my own reference notes.

G.: Here is the most important question. At the very beginning of your report you used the expression "if necessary KHRUSHCHEV will strike" at the time of the signing of the Peace Treaty. By whom was this specific statement made and what were the circumstances?

S.: This expression was not told to me by only one person. This concept was expressed to me by VARENTSOV and also by POZOVNYY and BUZINOV and in addition I have heard in the General Staff from those who are in a position to know and with whom I have friendly relations the same thing. This is all tied up with the general theme I reported that if you retreat from BERLIN then things will be quiet again for a year or a year and a half until KHRUSHCHEV starts yelling again that we have achieved a victory and that KENNEDY had been afraid.

G.: What was the context of the circumstances when this was said?

S.: Specifically BUZINOV asked me if I had 500 roubles with which

/to get....

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to get some supplies of butter and sugar because he felt that things would be very bad in October. I asked him if he were not being panicky. He said "No. I am an old soldier but I have a feeling from what I see, and you must through your channels, how difficult things can be in October. I have been running from one place to another and sending officers to all kinds of bases where preparations to the point of combat readiness are being made. And I know that if the West begins to fire after the Peace Treaty we must be ready to strike them a hard blow and we do not have sufficient reserves of rockets.

21. G.: What specifically does KHRUSHCHEV lack to follow through an attack on the West?

S.: He does not have sufficient number of atomic warheads. They published in our press that we have 30,000 atomic weapons of various yields and many fools believe this; they have various size yields, but few - they are still making them. Similarly, although the R-11 and R-12 rockets have been found to be satisfactory and are being mass produced, the R-14 is still not in serial production.

22. G.: What else does he lack?

S.: Trained personnel cadres. Several years more are required. Is it not significant to have 2,500 students at one time at one Academy, the DZERZHINSKIY Academy in peacetime? And these can be seen going to their studies every day.

G.: Any other fundamental items - how about submarines?

S.: There are insufficient submarines. However, they do have an announced plan for attacking the United States and England using ICBMs, submarines and aviation. This was announced at the reception by KHRUSHCHEV himself, and he also mentioned that they had a nuclear weapon of one (sic) megaton.

G.: And who told you specifically about each of the other deficiencies?

S.: VARENTSOV told me many times about all these deficiencies I

/have....

have mentioned above. On this I swear.

23. G.: What you have just answered would answer item 21 of your notes, since you just said that KHRUSHCHEV spoke of this at the reception you referred to.

S.: That is correct. I also forgot to mention that there is a lack of perfected electronic guidance systems. There has been a little quantity of rockets developed and with this small amount KHRUSHCHEV is attempting to scare us. However this maniac before the end of his life may desire to make this tremendous attack and that is what all the Russian people are afraid of and that is why I made the suggestion that it would be worth while to assassinate him. We would relax for a year or two before a new leader emerges and there would be a big fight for control of power. The most outstanding candidate now, the smartest, is MIKOYAN, who is still an old Leninist. MOLOTOV is ill and will not compete, KOZLOV and BREZHNEV are complete fools and these two don't like MIKOYAN since they are stooges of KHRUSHCHEV. They would not move up CHURAYEV either, he is a second rate man and he is ill; he is 57 years of age and he almost died recently - I must tell you about this.

24. S.: Last May 1st when I was in LONDON, CHURAYEV was at the May Day Parade and caught a severe cold and on the 2nd May there was a serious mine cave-in at KRIVOI-ROG and many miners were killed and KHRUSHCHEV ordered CHURAYEV to go there personally to investigate the disaster, since he was a Chief in the RFSFR. Sick or not CHURAYEV had to go and he was taken back from there with extreme pneumonia. He almost died and he was practically dead clinically until a medical colonel succeeded in giving him sufficient transfusions to bring him back to life. CHURAYEV related all this at the birthday party.

25. G.: On these general exercises in October what components of the satellite forces will participate?

S.: Evidently I didn't make this sufficiently clear in my report.

/In these....

In these general manoeuvres there is not a single unit which will not have its wartime military mission to accomplish. All will participate since a mock war will be declared. Irrespective of where one sits in what headquarters, all elements of troop deployment per phases such as D+5, D+10 etc. will be undergone, even to the point of establishing bakeries, laundries and field hospitals.

G.: And will these exercises be done as fully as you say by the satellite forces?

S.: Yes, just as completely. Of course, firing will be restricted or simulated and atomic bursts will be simulated also, but VARENTSOV and BUZINOV told me that there will also be rocket firing exercises. These may be done in the KAPUSTIN-YaR area or in some isolated place. This exercise is to train the rocket crews in target aiming. Although there will not be a general mobilization, this mass deployment of the entire standing army as it passes through its manoeuvre phases will put it into combat readiness to the extent of the forces now under arms. The Air Force and all services will participate and offensive as well as defensive phases will be scheduled. I forgot to mention another thing - all forms of signal communication will be intensively used to train those units properly.

26. G.: Please explain how many prominent commanders such as MALINOVSKY and VARENTSOV, who will be delegates to the Party Congress can attend both the Congress and be at the manoeuvres.

S.: This is very simple. I myself participated at the Party meeting in the Kremlin when ZHUKOV was ousted. KHRUSHCHEV and the new Minister made a speech and in half an hour they left the Assembly which continued to make other speeches and cheered KHRUSHCHEV's policy all day long. Therefore at this Party Congress they will listen to KHRUSHCHEV's opening speech which will be the programme for the Congress, and go. The rest of the delegates will make speeches for seven to ten days. The big people will not attend discussions by delegates from kolkhozes.

/They will....

They will only be present at the main presentation of the programme - and go. I also heard from POZOVNYY that during the Party Congress the entire PVO system for the defence of MOSCOW will be put on a strict combat alert.

27. G.: How about China?

S.: China will have a separate role in this. They will guard the possible hostile direction of American attack from Japan. China will also be represented at the Congress but it is still not known whether MAO TSE TUNG will come personally or not. They very much want to have him come to MOSCOW as a popularity gesture for the Congress. When I find out I'll report all this to you because I propose to make a personal visit on CHURAYEV.

28. S.: I would like to ask a question at this time if I may.

G.: Go ahead.

S.: I have been thinking for a long time that it would be a great advantage for us to invoke a small local conflict with the Soviets in some remote area, something like the Finnish War or the conflict in the Far East in the past. KHRUSHCHEV does not want this. It should be demonstrated that KHRUSHCHEV is the sole proponent of nuclear warfare and the only warmonger amongst all nations. He says that a local conflict would develop into a nuclear war. This is not true and a conflict using conventional weapons in Korea or Vietnam could be made. If a local conflict was created on the borders of Iran or Pakistan or Turkey and there was enough provocation for this, by the Americans and British, and a Soviet Army group of almost fifteen divisions were to be deployed in this direction, say 500,000 men, and both sides were employing conventional weapons, you would be surprised to see how many mass desertions by officers and men would take place from the Soviet Army to your side. Then this svoloch would see himself how weak his position is and he would have to cease all hostilities to patch up his Army. The Army today is seething, KHRUSHCHEV has abused it severely by his extensive discharges in the past, which is something that STALIN did not do. KHRUSHCHEV is called "the abuser of the Army". Our leaders should

/recognise....

recognise how much dissatisfaction there is amongst the officers of the Soviet Army. Of course it is not for us, particularly for me, to suggest political action, wiser people will do this and it is not even our concern. However, I mention these things because I feel you should report the extent of the dissatisfaction in the Soviet Army. KHRUSHCHEV is today the new HITLER, an atomic HITLER and with the help of his stooges who support him he wants to start a world conflict so that prior to his death as he has said, "I will bury Capitalism."

29. G.: Will you explain very carefully this very important statement you made. You stated that on the 8th September there was a nuclear detonation using a rocket as a delivery means with a warhead of 16,000 kilotons. Do you realise that this is 16,000,000 tons or 16 megatons?

S.: Yes, 16,000 kilotons -- wait, I beg your pardon, 16,000 kilograms.

G.: That makes sense because that would be 16 kilotons.

S.: Yes, of course, that's what I had in mind.

G.: Then, will you tell me why was it specifically 16 kilotons, since usually your terms refer to 5, 10, 15 etc.

S.: Yes, that is true, they usually go by fives but evidently they have invented this particular yield and that is what they tested, but why, I do not have any idea.

30. G.: Have you ever heard even from rumours what is the largest Soviet nuclear weapon in TNT equivalent?

S.: I have heard of astronomical figures and it was announced that there is a 1 megaton bomb, which a hydrogen bomb could produce; however, I do not believe that they have tested this yet and they are still working on it. VARENTSOV never mentioned this, nor did any other person with whom I have talked.

31. G.: Are the R-12 and the R-14 rockets now VARENTSOV's rockets?

S.: Yes, they are VARENTSOV's rockets.

H.: Let us go a little further into this one. In VARENTSOV's

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article written at the beginning of 1961 he complained that he was not being given an operational tactical rocket with a range greater than a thousand kilometres, but these rockets have ranges which are much greater. Does he know when this change took place. (G. translates)

S.: At that time there were no R-14 rockets, they were only being made and now they do exist, but now he has been given them.

H.: But the article was written in the second issue of 1961 and these rockets must have been well advanced so VARENTSOV must have known that they were to be produced. Does he know if there has been any change in the subordination of missile control during this period between May and September? (G. Translates)

S.: This is entirely possible. And it is possible that they have given a portion of MOSKALENKO's rockets to VARENTSOV.

J.: How does he know that the R-12 and the R-14 are VARENTSOV's?

H.: Even though VARENTSOV went to their testing ground he might have gone there as an observer.

S.: When VARENTSOV went to KAPUSTIN YaR for the rocket tests he went there to accept them into his command from industry. He would not have gone there if they were not his rockets. He went there under the directive of the General Staff and of the Ministry of Defence.

G.: Did VARENTSOV tell you this?

S.: Yes, he said "I am going to KAPUSTIN YaR" and at the same time BUZINOV told me that there are such rockets.

32. H.: But the R-14 is still in the strategic range since it can go 4,500 kilometres with an atomic warhead and much further with a conventional warhead. Therefore it can't be called a tactical weapon.

S.: But none of us know that the R-14 will not be allotted to MOSKALENKO to fulfil his missions and also to VARENTSOV to fulfil his. In addition it is a very closely knit over-all command, both are under governmental control and particularly in a budgetary sense and if in the earlier stages VARENTSOV's rockets needed a greater range, MOSKALENKO

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would have turned over some of his rockets for VARENTSOV's units to launch. The two commands are very closely co-ordinated, and it will continue to be this way and in case of war there would be a lot of rockets which would be turned over from one command to the other. This was foreseen and the commands are well controlled centrally.

G.: Is it not true that a long range rocket such as the R-14 could be used by VARENTSOV at shorter ranges.

S.: Of course it can. Any rocket can be fired at shorter ranges than its maximum but it is efficient to use a rocket at its maximum range. It would not be efficient to use such a large rocket with a 2,500 kilometre range to fire at a target a thousand kilometres away, when an R-11 could do this. However if there are no R-11s then a larger rocket would be used.

33. H.: But he did not say that VARENTSOV at any time had specifically stated that he is taking over command of the R-12 and R-14 rocket units.

S.: No there was no occasion for VARENTSOV to say this to me in those terms directly. He only mentioned that he lacked this and that and that MOSKALENKO has this and that, but the R-14 may be allocated to both VARENTSOV and MOSKALENKO by the High Command. I reported to you in LONDON that there is a tendency to unify both commands.

H.: Has he heard any more about this unification for single command since he last told us about it in LONDON? (G. translates)

S.: Yes, I had a conversation about this with BUZINOV only recently. BUZINOV does not wish to leave VARENTSOV's command and he is now working as the Deputy to the Chief of an OTDEL. He said that if VARENTSOV becomes the over-all unified commander his Adjutant would have a Major-General's slot and BUZINOV is hoping for this since he has been a Colonel for a long time. He hopes that this unification will take place quickly so that he can be with VARENTSOV and become a General/Adjutant. At this time the General Staff considers that this extensive reorganisation is difficult to do when the present political situation is so critical.

/If there....

If there were a relief of this tension they would push through this organisation in three or four months. BUZINOV knows the situation because he is very close to it and they are not doing this now because of the present situation. However, the concept has not been rejected, nor has it been considered incorrect and it will undoubtedly go through. In case of war now both commands will be very closely co-ordinated.

34. S.: As you know VARENTSOV is now a delegate to the Congress and will be nominated for a candidate for the Central Committee. We can't tell what will happen but he is in good standing. The Minister came to his birthday party, and he didn't go there because he loves VARENTSOV but it was probably suggested by the Central Committee, of which MALINOVSKY is a member. CHURAYEV, however, came of his own free will. In the past VARENTSOV had called MALINOVSKY a fool and from my own observation I did not think he was very bright and when we have time I will tell you more about him later - that is, how he behaved at this party. Now VARENTSOV is being kept in a prominent role. They made him a Chief Marshal, gave him the Order of Lenin and the Minister came to his party; this is rare for the Minister to do particularly as he had to go to LVOV the next day. Incidentally to this birthday party ZAKHAROV, the Chief of Staff, PIRSKIY, CHUIKOV, the new Chief of Civil Defence and ZHDANOV were also invited, but none of them were in MOSCOW on that day.

G.: Wasn't KARI[illegible]LI there?

S.: Yes, he was, didn't I mention him?

35. G.: Who told you that the atomic warheads were all ready at the launching site?

S.: That was BUZINOV. And VARENTSOV said this also, he told it to POZOVNYY and to me.

H.: That's all right for NOVAYA ZEMLYA where they are doing the testing, but how do you know that the atomic warheads were delivered to these other places such as NORILSK and Frants-Josef Land.

/S.: ....

S.: I know that there were atomic warheads there because BUZINOV mentioned many officers who were being sent for one and two months duty to the bases I mentioned because there were atomic warheads there.

H.: The thing to determine is whether these warheads were always at these bases or were they recently moved there.

S.: I understand. The atomic warheads were recently moved there from all of their specific storage areas wherever they may have been, because they were to be placed in a position of combat readiness to support KHRUSHCHEV's belligerent policy.

A short pause was made to change tapes.

Side 2

36. G.: Did Sergei Sergeievich by any chance mention the range dispersion (the Vd) of the R-12 rocket?

S.: No, he did not and I couldn't very well ask him, but it seems to me that the Vb of 160 metres is a more significant figure for us since it is the lateral dispersion.

37. G.: Is the constant travel of VARENTSOV's and MOSKALENKO's representatives to the missile bases a recent development or have they always been sent there?

S.: They have been always going there, even before. If that were not the case MEDEKLIN would not have been killed. They are now going to the testing of nuclear detonations delivered by rockets and they are going more intensively and frequently now because KHRUSHCHEV has insisted that the launching of rockets with atomic warheads should be accurately worked out as soon as possible. KHRUSHCHEV even insists that they personally make inspections. Therefore both PYRSKIY and SEMENOV have been sent out and when necessary VARENTSOV goes also, since there are many sites at which tests are being made and many types of rockets to be tested. Trips are being made continuously by the officers concerned. This intensive testing is a clear-cut example of the preparedness of which I have mentioned.

38. G.: And this is also true for NORILSK and VORKUTA?

S.: Yes, and to give an example VARENTSOV said at his party

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that he had just returned from SVERDLOVSK where he visited factories. I will send you a recent picture I have of VARENTSOV. You will see yourselves how tired he looks. But though he limps and moves around with difficulty, he is constantly flying around like a young boy because KHRUSHCHEV will have it no other way - just look at the example of CHURAYEV who almost died. They are all afraid of KHRUSHCHEV and must obey his orders or they will lose all they have. CHURAYEV bragged that he had a dacha given to him with 12,000 roses growing there, that is how these parasites live on the workers' blood. A capitalist doesn't live that way.

(39.) H.: I would like to get this absolutely right - who told him and when that atomic warheads were taken out of storage and delivered to the missile bases? (G. translates)

S.: When the situation over BERLIN became more tense, KHRUSHCHEV with the support of the Central Committee ordered that these atomic warheads be placed on a ready status and be delivered to the launching site in order to support his political policy with force and KHRUSHCHEV realises that we may strike him first.

G.: But who told you this?

S.: First of all BUZINOV, then, when I was in Headquarters of Artillery, I heard from the various officers that they were being sent out to determine accurately in practice how long it takes to move up atomic weapons to their proposed launching positions, how long it takes to assemble and mount them into firing positions, what the reactions of the troops are to the concept of employing such weapons; in short, all previous paper calculations were now being checked out in practice. At the same time they are bringing themselves into a position that if atomic weapons are necessary to use they will be in position to be used.

H.: Did he hear about the movement of these warheads before the phase of atomic testing or after this period?

S.: They were moved up before this period and then the decision was made to test them by using rockets.

/H.: ....

40. H.: But they are not being tested at all missile sites. They have tested them at NOVYA ZEMLYA but not at every missile site. How does it work out when they move these atomic warheads to the various other sites when they have not already tested them? The two things seem illogical. It is logical to take warheads to the places where you are going to test them, but the testing is to get ready for war and there may be minor adjustments on parts that they haven't tested before. How can they in fact then move them to these other areas to be ready to be fired when they have not tested them? This appears to be a contradiction.

S.: There is no contradiction. Unfortunately we do not know the co-ordinates of the sites where they are being tested and the co-ordinates of the sites from which they will be launched. And I am sure that the testing is done at sites which have no relation to the launching sites that would be used in case of war. All we know are the general areas but it is a fact that these sites are not the same, for example, even on NOVAYA ZEMLYA there are concealed storage areas and launching sites all prepared for use in case of war but the actual testing that PYRSKIY is running may be several hundred kilometres away on NOVAYA ZEMLYA. Therefore there is no contradiction.

41. H.: Can I ask the question another way? Did he know in advance that the tests were going to start.

S.: Yes, I knew in advance that KUPLEV was flying off and that the BERLIN border was to be closed four days before it happened. And I knew about two weeks ago that it was indispensable for us to test nuclear warheads with rockets as the delivery means. I knew this from BUZINOV and VARENTSOV said "Rockets must be tested because we are not sure how they will work with atomic warheads." This, I knew after WYNNE left MOSCOW.

H.: How many days did it start after WYNNE left? It could only have been one or two days.

/S.: ....

S.: No, it was about the same time, let me look at the calendar. The BERLIN border was closed on 13 August, I knew about it about the 9th or 10th of August and I wanted to pass this information via the dead-drop on Monday. But already I heard the radio announcement that KONEV had flown off so the news was no longer secret. The fact that it was necessary to test nuclear weapons with rocket carriers I found out only after WYNNE left. I found it out the following week and it was clear then that KHRUSHCHEV was using the disagreement over the BERLIN status as an excuse to untie his hands with respect to nuclear tests. Obviously if I had known of this earlier I would have given this to WYNNE as a first priority instead of the cassettes. Later I considered putting the information in the dead-drop and calling and then I would have observed to see if it were picked up within one hour and if not I would have retrieved my message from the dead-drop. However, you warned me not to do this unless it were a case of great urgency and I was not sure how urgent this was.

G.: Before you leave we will establish for you clearly what is urgent and what is not.

42. G.: Now on NOVAYA ZEMLYA is there a polygon there or operational launch sites, or both?

S.: It is a fully equipped launching site for wartime as well as a testing area, and I have heard in our headquarters that our people were disturbed because the Americans and British have spotted our interest there since your submarine was in that area.

G.: And FYRSKIY is in charge of running the tests?

S.: Yes, he is. He is the first Deputy to VARENTSOV.

H.: How does he know that he is actually running the tests? This is something that I think needs a lot of definition. First of all at one stage he did say that apart from FYRSKIY running the tests, LOSKALENKO would be represented there. Then surely there are the atomic people who would be interested in the atomic part of it, then who is in over-all charge?

/S.: ....

S.: On NOVAYA ZEMLYA PYRSKIY is responsible for everything. And the fact that a representative from MOSKALENKO is there and representatives from the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and even from committees that we don't know the names of now, they are simply there as observers, and I heard the Defence Minister express himself about PYRSKIY. I wish I had a recorder so that you could listen yourselves.

H.: If PYRSKIY is in charge of it, does this in fact mean that only testing of rockets as carriers for atomic warheads in the tactical range and not within the strategic range is being done and if testing is being done in the strategic range, where is this being done?

S.: This question is not correct. What is being tested is the action of nuclear weapons using rockets as a delivery means. What is important to determine are the deficiencies and errors in the rockets' operations etc. etc. All are present, those who will launch rockets at great ranges and those who will use rockets at smaller ranges. Even those who plan to fire at shorter ranges may tomorrow be assigned a mission to fire at greater ranges. The main thing is to make the tests. It is not important who is in charge, even though PYRSKIY is VARENTSOV's representative, there are other representatives there from MOSKALENKO. There is after all a centralised control by the Party and a centralisation of the All Union military and political organisation. And therefore they decided to assign PYRSKIY, first of all he is an engineer, a Colonel General, a representative of a Chief Marshal. He is an engineer by background and a specialist in atomic matters, and he is concerned with plants which produce fisionable material. After all these plants may produce atomic warheads one day for VARENTSOV and another day for MOSKALENKO, the plants are the same. So they appointed PYRSKIY and there is nothing unusual about that. MOSKALENKO was not offended by this at all. And if MOSKALENKO personally had not been there his deputy could possibly be of lower rank than VARENTSOV's representative.

/43. ....

43. G.: But does VARENTSOV have an over-all control, since PYRSKIY is his deputy in deciding what and how should be tested?

S.: No, PYRSKIY received a composite order from all concerned and he will submit his report to the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee and the Minister of Defence. He is there as a Government representative and anyone else could have been appointed if he were considered to be qualified.

H.: He stated that PYRSKIY was the expert on atomic matters. Can he give us any information on PYRSKIY's background?

S.: I don't mean that he is an atomic expert as such. He is an all-round intelligent and is a well educated man. He understands nuclear energy and equipment as well. He is an engineer by education whereas KOSKALENKO and VARENTSOV are not. PYRSKIY had been the Commander of Artillery in a military mission in ROSTOV the North Caucasian Military District. He was also the Commander of Artillery of an Army then he was made the Deputy to VARENTSOV. In this way VARENTSOV was strongly supported by PYRSKIY because he is an engineer. PYRSKIY does have many personal deficiencies, however, and VARENTSOV does not get along with him well. They do not have close personal relations. He does his work very well but as an individual he is always intriguing, he wants to be a Marshal of Artillery and he is jealous of VARENTSOV because he considers VARENTSOV to be a fool in technical matters. He is merely a strong administrator. VARENTSOV can operate massed artillery units effectively but from the viewpoint of technology, PYRSKIY is far above that.

44. G.: Is this base on NOVAYA ZEMLYA the most recent one?

S.: It's construction has been going on a long time. Some time ago I mentioned the North Regions to you but at that time I did not know exactly where.

G.: How about the other bases such as NORILSK, VORKUTA and Franz-Josef Land?

S.: They were also being prepared for a long time. I know that NORILSK and VORKUTA were closed to foreigners. I know this because a

/Canadian...

Canadian delegation came to MOSCOW on an exchange basis with delegations visiting the far north, in order to determine construction techniques in very cold climates. They wanted to go to VORKUTA but were refused permission. There is even an article by OBINTSOV in which the extensive work by numerous engineer forces in the far north are described. All kinds of underground shelters and fortifications have been constructed in the far north, particularly in the area of VORKUTA. All this underground work is done because of its extreme cold temperature and I am sure that there are many other bases in the far north. I will find out the locations of all the sites that I can but in the meantime you should expect that there are many more there. The principle to keep in mind is that they are building as many dispersed bases as possible avoiding large concentrations. These areas are being extensively prepared as launching sites for nuclear strikes. On the other hand from the defensive viewpoint thanks to dispersion and the isolated nature of the country, little damage to installations and personnel would result from enemy attacks.

45. G.: Now, with respect to armies, when you said that there are only two Soviet armies within the D.D.R., who told you this?

S.: FEDOROV told me this at the time that he came to MOSCOW en route for training his battalion at KAPUSTIN YaR. BUZINOV went there also and he is visiting FEDOROV now and when he returns he will tell me all about it.

G.: Before you stated that there were two tank armies there.

S.: No. That is a misunderstanding; I did not say that there were two tank armies there in their entirety. It is the same concept as when I said there are ten armies deployed in the general direction of the D.D.R. These are echeloned throughout the entire territories adjacent to and reaching far back from the D.D.R. They are part of the over-all Front commanded by Marshal KONEV. Some forces even lie in the U.S.S.R. territory. The tank armies and other armies are also echeloned back. Their main elements may be in the D.D.R. There are lots of tanks concentrated in the D.D.R. and when I said that there were two

/armies....

armies within the territory and now a third one is being moved in, this means that their combat elements may be there but their rear services may be far back in Poland or in the Baltic area. To determine this exactly we would need a map laying out the entire order of battle. But in order to estimate the strength of the forces opposing us in this theatre, which are under KONEV, we must consider that he had nine armies in his command and now he has ten with the addition of the Eighth Mechanized Army.

46. G.: In other words only portions of the armies are actually in the D.D.R.?

S.: Of course, and FEDOROV told me that the local population was not pleased to see large Soviet troop units in their territory. For estimating purposes we should consider that there have been two Soviet armies in the D.D.R. and now the third has been brought in. It is entirely possible that D.D.R. divisions may be attached to these armies.

47. G.: Now with respect to this battalion which is the experimental anti-missile battalion, where is this battalion actually located?

S.: The Institute itself is in MOSCOW and I believe it is in the area of Dolgovskiy-Streshnevo but I will find out the exact location later. The battalion, however, is located at a testing site, but which one I do not know. It is not in the MOSCOW area, maybe it is in KAPUSTIN YaR.

48. G.: Here is a question regarding your item No. 14. Who told you about this?

S.: The fact that KHRUSHCHEV said that there can be no exclusively local war is general conversation in the entire General Staff. I cannot single anyone out, everyone speaks of this.

49. G.: And who told you about the delay in the demobilisation of 400,000 men?

S.: This is known exactly to BUZINOV. He said this twice to me.

G.: Why is he in a position to know this?

S.: Because VARENTSOV also has an organisational-mobilisation otdel and they know the total personnel strength with respect to

/artillery....

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artillery troops and then someone must have told BUZINOV what portion of the artillery troops are involved with respect to the whole of the demobilisation delay of troops.

Another pause took place for the tape to be changed.

50. S.: Nowadays the KGB has again raised its head. One must again be careful of what is said. This is another of KHRUSHCHEV's strong control policies; after all, just look at the stature of the heads that rolled. And he is both the author and the initiator of all the trouble that the whole world is now so anxious about.

51. G.: Regarding the items about closing the BERLIN border, who told you about this and what were the circumstances?

S.: At VARENTSOV's house I was invited together with POZOVNYY and we sat around a table just as we are sitting here together with our wives. And POZOVNYY said "Don't talk about this, but we have prepared to shut the borders in BERLIN at six o'clock in the morning on the 13th August." Later BUZINOV told me the same thing. I was almost tempted to call up and tell you about this in open text or to put it in the dead-drop.

52. G.: You mentioned that in KREMENCHUG there is this brigade with battalions of R-11s and R-12s.

S.: Yes, and if you show me my graduating class photograph I will spot the deputy commander, Lieut. Col. BONDARENKO.

G.: Of what use, are the R-11 battalions in KREMENCHUG?

S.: That is only a rear area, they train there but if the brigade is needed it may even be transferred to Germany; this is only a home station, a garrison, and there is a training school there. It is simply a brigade and I do not know its number and it is a second echelon unit which is in the process of training, it may be even transferred to the Far East, to face Japan.

G.: That is very clear.

53. G.: Now, please tell us the proper title and the official position of the other persons who were at VARENTSOV's party. Let us take Gen. Polk. FOMIN, Gen. Polk. SAMSONOV and Professor RYABCHIKOV.

/S.: ....

S.: I understand, let us first take Gen. Polk. SAMSONOV. He is the former chief of staff of Artillery under VARENTSOV, just as KARIOFILLI is now. The Chief of Staff of GUKART (Glavnoye Upravleniye Komanduyeshchego Artillerii) of the Ground Forces. Don't mix this organisation up with GAU now called GRAU, GUKART is the official designation of VARENTSOV's command. Today SAMSONOV is the Chief of a Faculty (Kathedra) of the VOROSHILOV Academy which has just recently been amalgamated with the Frunze Academy. He is the author of many artillery studies; he has written many articles and he participates in reviewing artillery manuals. He is an outstanding artillery theoretician. VARENTSOV made a special toast to him. He is a small bald man.

54. S.: Now Gen. Polk. FOMIN of Artillery. He is rather ill these days. He is also an excellent artillery theoretician. His present duty - he is in this Council reviewing inventions, the Chief NII of GRAU, which supervises the work of other NIIs. At one time he too, like SAMSONOV now, was Chief of a Faculty in the VOROSHILOV Academy, now in the FRUNZE Academy. At one time he was also a prominent artillery commander during the war. He is a very close friend of Rodion Yakovlevich MALINOVSKY because at one time they both served together in CHITA. Their families are also well acquainted and their two wives were also constantly yapping at the table at which they sat together.

55. S.: Now, Gen. Polk. KARIOFILLI. He is very ill and he wishes to retire. I just remembered, the deputy to KARIOFILLI is Gen. Lieut. VOSKRESSENSKIY, who also met VARENTSOV at the LENINGRAD Railroad Station, greeted him and immediately flew off together with BUZINOV to the D.D.R. on an inspection trip. He is a small thin man. If he didn't have to go he would probably have been invited to the party because VARENTSOV has high hopes and reliance on VOSKRESSENSKIY and hopes that one day he will be his Chief of Staff.

56. S.: Now as to Professor RYABCHIKOV. He is about sixty years of age and a very prominent chemist, a professor and a doctor of chemical sciences and he works on bacteriological weapons. When he made his toast he said "I know Sergei Sergeievich not as well as the others

./present, ...

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present, since I met him only at KARLSBAD and I have listened to everything said about him by those who have known him for decades and though I have only known him for several months I subscribe fully to what has been said about his being a great man, but in addition he is a most amiable person and thanks to his kindness and friendship I am a guest amongst you here." Although the professor was not drinking too much he did let it slip that for some time now he had been working on the preparation of certain artillery charges for the Generals present. MALINOVSKY frowned a bit when this was said since the man obviously referred to bacteriological charges for artillery and rockets. He said specifically "Sergei Sergeievich, I also load the items that you launch and fire." I already told you about this SEMENOV who was a former Deputy to VARENTSOV and who is now retired.

57. G.: Explain more about the GUKART.

S.: First of all under this Directorate all artillery schools and academies for ground forces are under VARENTSOV through this directorate. Previously Gen. Lieut. KUPIYEV was the Chief of the Upravleniye, but he has been retired. Now the Chief is Colonel LEBEDEV, who is the Chief of Military Training in GUKART. There is an intelligence section under Colonel ZAIKO. They have an organisation planning section which works as an organisational mobilisation section and also as a material supply section. There is a technical section, and there is an artillery material section. There is also an editorial section which formerly published the Artillery Journal which is no longer being published, but they have other publications to be concerned with.

G.: And undoubtedly they have a personnel section.

S.: Yes, of course, and they have an administrative office.

G.: How about an ammunition supply section?

S.: No, they would not have this, that would be under GRAU.

58. S.: What other questions do you have?

G.: Just a moment and I will get out the questions we have for

/you....

you to clarify based on your report to us on the 22nd August, which you passed through WYNNE. Harold will you hand me the questionnaire on this subject, as well as his original notes so that he can refer to them. You certainly remember your first report of 22nd August on the BERLIN situation. Now, although events are moving fast and the situation has changed, please clarify the following..

S.: On basic matters nothing has changed; the tension still remains and I added when I arrived the day before yesterday that the problem of Iran will be linked to that of BERLIN.

59. Q.: To what degree do satellite leaders know and accept KHRUSHCHEV's plan? and also include what the Chinese attitude is.

S.: Let us consider the Chinese separately and the other satellites on the other hand. I was not able to produce the exact letter of MAO TSE TUNG of the differences in views with KHRUSHCHEV, the letter has already been officially destroyed. With respect to all satellites except China they most completely agree with KHRUSHCHEV. They agree with every peep of KHRUSHCHEV's; just look at Hungary. FERENC and others said something different on their own foot and everything went straight into the hands of KADAR. Anyone who says the slightest thing different from what KHRUSHCHEV decides or states is immediately removed. Even GOMULKA who at one time attempted to run an independent course of sorts has now calmed down. All of these leaders execute KHRUSHCHEV's wishes, they even make the same type of aggressive speeches to impress KHRUSHCHEV. The Chinese apparently independent of the Soviet Union still want to stand in the forefront of the Communist movement. MAO TSE TUNG and his entire clique, stated that after the death of STALIN the influence of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has become weaker. But the time is still too soon for the Chinese to seize the position of the vanguard of the Communist movement, even though the population is three times that of the combined other Communist countries. From the viewpoint of numbers, and maturity in the Party sense as well as strength and correct thinking they

/consider....

consider themselves higher, more intelligent and more correct in their course than that of KHRUSHCHEV. Of course the Chinese will not do anything negative since there is a flood of gold, machinery and all other support going to China from us all the time, and they will not disturb the international position of Communism. Certainly not as openly as TITO has done. Therefore KHRUSHCHEV maintains a liberal attitude towards China and MAO TSE TUNG maintains a liberal attitude toward the U.S.S.R. They don't want to sharpen their differences. There are many fundamental differences between them that they have spoken about and these remain differences of opinion as before. Right now very little is said about China; judging from the reports in the papers one could assume that China does not exist. However, whenever there is a Congress or any other international problem is discussed, there is at least always a so-called "observer" there from China. He always supports and approves of what has been said and obviously China is closer to us than any non-Communist country. I mean by this the so-called vascillating countries. Therefore, despite everything else China must be considered to be a first rate friend and a reliable helper of the U.S.S.R. in any situation or difficulty. If a difficult situation develops, China will not insist on its own demands but will support the common cause of Communism. To what degree and on what scale is another matter; this is a problem which deserves thinking about . But the contradictions are not as critical as it may seem, each country is going along its own course and each one thinks that it is a right course. But China must always be considered as the supporter of the Soviet Union particularly in terms of military support and in that sense it should be considered as any other satellite of the U.S.S,R. China is not Jugoslavia. Jugoslavia is really under our control although it is vascillating considerably. However, there is a great deal in common in the policy of TITO and MAO TSE TUNG.

60. G.: From whom did you find out about KHRUSHCHEV's statements which

* ? S.: were quoted as what he would say at a high level conference. This

/information....

information was told by KORENEVSKIY to ZASORIN. KORENEVSKIY has very strong contacts in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. And it was stated to him that if the Western leaders go to a conference with KHRUSHCHEV about the German problem, KHRUSHCHEV will take his own position on the German problem. And let us look at this from a viewpoint of actuality. What else that is new, can KHRUSHCHEV state concerning the German problem? All he can say is "Very well I agree not to sign a peace treaty for another year" and this he does not want to do. But so far as the justification of his position and his views on the German problem, there is nothing more that he can add - he has said everything about it. Therefore, he will take the position that if a Conference on the German problem comes about but the conversations will also involve other matters, then he will discuss everything together. But if our leaders meet with him to discuss only the German problem to avoid a possible war over it and if Messrs. KENNEDY, MACMILLAN and De GAULLE state that they are willing to accept a certain flexibility concerning the German problem, on certain matters and will accept some points and not others, this would be a precedent for further consideration. And therefore they would ask KHRUSHCHEV to make certain suggestions and delay the signing of his peace treaty until everything was resolved, that is where KHRUSHCHEV would get up and leave the conference and say "I have nothing more to discuss." And this would be a complete repetition of PARIS where Mr. EISENHOWER met with KHRUSHCHEV. This came from the Central Committee to KORENEVSKIY, who is a very big man and is the Chief of the Information Directorate of GRU.

61. G.: Please explain this contradiction, KHRUSHCHEV's present belligerent attitude is completely opposite from the position that he fought so hard to attain at the 21st Party Conference. Can you explain and with referencing, what brought this about? I refer to KHRUSHCHEV's own contradictory words.

S.: I understand you perfectly. Everything is dialectically interwoven. Even DARWIN was a dialectician. When KHRUSHCHEV was

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speaking about something entirely different to what he is saying now, in fact he was setting specific time dates when he would sign the German Peace Treaty and then denounced them, it is like swinging a club and then seeing that the reaction is not in his favour, so he stops swinging. At that time there were no military forces capable of supporting the policy he now advocates. Now he is sitting on a military horse and although he is not fully equipped to the maximum he is beginning to talk in a different way. Why has he kept quiet for so many years and now he is speaking loudly. He estimates that there are weaknesses in our western countries and he also considers that we are not fully prepared. He also knows some of our potential strengths in detail through his Communist agents particularly and will continue to know this unless we strangle these Communists and he feels that he has strength and can act this way and he feels that KENNEDY, MACMILLAN and De GAULLE must take him into account. Now that we are showing him firmness he is ill at ease, but he still hopes that we will swallow the second pill. What you refer to as a contradiction is actually a dialectic deviation and as military strength increases he wishes to use this means to gain a political victory in the German problem. And now if we falter he will win both a moral victory and additional time for himself. However, if KHRUSHCHEV is struck at with force he may recoil and think about it for a year or a year and a half. Of course he will arm during this period, as will we, and then this will be really a war of nerves. I repeat again that any concession to KHRUSHCHEV based on pure reason and humanitarian considerations will be regarded by KHRUSHCHEV as a weakness on our part. And incidentally all this stems from the problem that you involved yourselves in, in1956 in Egypt. In fact now that you still tolerate CASTRO in Cuba, he considers it an accomplishment on his part. You see the contradiction is this, whereas we use complete reason and humanitarian thinking in our approach to him, he translates this as an indication of weakness.

62. G.: Were these high level command changes made in connection

/with....

with the German situation, or were these changes which were planned earlier?

S.: This is again an example of KHRUSHCHEV's tactics, namely of wielding a stick. He had sent KONEV out, actually he had sacked KONEV just like he had SOKOLOVSKY, but when he needs them he calls them out again appealing to their Communist Party affiliation and to do what they should for the Party and Country. SOKOLOVSKY has already agreed to work for KHRUSHCHEV, but ZHUKOV as yet has not, but there are rumours that he will and the KONEV situation is a repetition of the same story as when ROKOSSOVSKY went down south to the Caucasian district. This is nothing but propaganda and I am sure that ZHUKOV will also agree to serve, we must await this.

63. G.: Does KHRUSHCHEV actually rely on the satellite armies in case of war?

S.: He is completely confident in the political nuclei of the political leaders in the satellite countries. He is sure of this and KADAR is as much a stooge of his as a Secretary of an Obkom.

G.: How about the troops?

S.: He is sure of a certain percentage of the troops but he does not trust them as a whole. That is why he relies so heavily on nuclear weapons. In short, if they want to live and eat to survive they had better support KHRUSHCHEV. This is why he states that any local conflict will develop into an atomic war. It is absurd and indicates absolute aggressiveness. And he is trying to frighten people by this, both ours and his own.

64. G.: Can you explain clearly exactly what is meant by a mechanised army?

S.: I have probably not clarified this sufficiently before. The word "mechanised" means everything on wheels, that means there are no foot soldiers and no horses, they have eaten all the horses. In addition all of these mechanical transports have been given more fire power such as tanks and self-propelled artillery. All other artillery is either

/transported...

transported in a mounted form or is towed. As much as possible of the wheeled and tracked equipment is armoured, even personnel carriers have steel plate protection. All infantry rides on one form of equipment or another. A mechanised army may have varying composition; it may have four, five or six divisions, but all of them would be mechanised divisions, insofar as the infantry component is concerned. There can be variable numbers of tank divisions and mechanised divisions in the mechanised army. There is no set pattern.

65. G.: What is your concept of what is often referred to in your manuals as a Field Army and how does this differ from a Combined Arms Army (obshchevoiskovaya)?

S.: They are the same. Take for example the Sub-Carpathian Military District. Four armies were stationed there. Now, with the redeployment of the Eighth Mechanised Army there will be three. Two of these are Field Armies and one is an Air Army. When they speak of a Field Army they want to stress that it is primarily an infantry army, but different from a Mechanised Army. However, it is exactly the same as a Combined Arms Army - a Field Army can have varying numbers of rifle divisions depending on the mission assigned to the army and all kinds of other arms may be attached as needed.

G.: Would the divisions be motor-rifle divisions?

S.: No, the rifle divisions here would be foot soldiers.

G.: Therefore, the concept of a Combined Arms Army would mean that the rifle divisions you just spoke of have had engineer, tank and artillery units attached thereto and therefore the word "Combined Arms" is used.

S.: That is absolutely right.

66. G.: In case complications develop in connection with the German situation will Soviet Troops be sent into Roumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia?

S.: Without question and they will assume the prime combat role in these countries. KHRUSHCHEV would never permit independent

/satellite....

satellite army action for political reasons. He will have Soviet troops in front of them and behind them.

67. G.: If the allies succeed in forcing access to BERLIN, could then KHRUSHCHEV start a general war?

S.: KHRUSHCHEV does not want a world war and would attempt to defeat the allies locally, but if he feels that he has sufficient strength to knock out the USA and England, who are the leaders of NATO, it is possible that he may strike first. Even though in the past our General Staff and our foreign policies had condemned the concept of surprise attack such as Hitler used, but now they have gone around to the viewpoint that there is a great advantage to the side that makes a sudden massive attack first and they are preparing themselves to be in position to do so. Since he cannot muster enough strength to strike at all potential enemy countries simultaneously he is singling out the U.S. and Britain as his attack targets estimating that the other allies would disintegrate due to differences amongst themselves and be happy to be alive. The conclusion we can draw from this is that if he does not retreat from his wild proposals and impossible conditions we should strike him first, otherwise he may strike us.

63. G.: What are the present views of particular high-ranking officers regarding Soviet policy on Germany? and the role of Soviet forces? Do they agree or encourage KHRUSHCHEV?

S.: A Minister such as MALINOVSKIY agrees with KHRUSHCHEV completely, although to himself he may say that it may be too early to embark on such a risk. No-one can openly oppose KHRUSHCHEV, they would be simply removed. Each one is afraid of losing the benefits he has thanks to his high position. Do you think CHURAYEV wants to lose his estates with his twelve thousand roses? They would rather see everything go up in flames and go up themselves with it than say anything in opposition now and be removed.

69. G.: Who gave you the information that you reported regarding

/TITOV's....

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TITOV's flight?

S.: These are the rumours going round all over the country, but no prominent person has told me anything about TITOV. The rumours going around are that TITOV only went around once, just like GAGARIN. The scientists, however, who have made these elaborate preparations also run tests secretly and to some degree they have had success. KHRUSHCHEV likes to bring forth military men as a screen. There are two versions of these rumours; one version is that TITOV made the same type of a vertical flight as the American did; the other version is that TITOV only circled the world once. I tried to bring this up but VARENTSOV says nothing, even though he must know the facts. BUZINOV does not know anything either because these things were done with great secrecy and the launchings were made from MOSKALENKO's bases. Possibly MOSKALENKO has nothing to do with cosmic flights, but unquestionably his bases were used for this. The Soviet people think that this was propaganda and although they understand that such feats are possible they do not believe it has been yet achieved. Of course, a flight once around can be exploited for delivering an attack against us.

70. G.: If, as you suggested, one rumour stated that a scientist went around a number of times in another vehicle, instead of TITOV, that in itself would be an accomplishment, so why would KHRUSHCHEV not announce it?

S.: The devil knows why. Maybe it is because he is so set on presenting military men. There is much that is unclear about this and although these are nothing but rumours, I felt it my duty to report this to you.

G.: In other words these are no more than low level rumours.

S.: That's right, but if everything had been so well perfected as KHRUSHCHEV alleges, then why did he not invite westerners, even KENNEDY, but at least news correspondents to witness the launching and results of these flights?

71. H.: I'd like to come back to one of the questions, since there is a slight difference here between what he said before and what he says now and I would like to know exactly how he got it. When he wrote us before he said that KHRUSHCHEV was going to do something about Turkey and Iran /in September....

in September or October. He now says it is going to be in conjunction with BERLIN. I'd like to get this story absolutely straight and clear. Who first told him about Iran and Turkey which was after he left us in LONDON? What was said at that time and when was the position changed?

S.: I understand. The politics of the Central Committee and the Party is centralised and they can embark on any alternate routes and perform any metamorphosis in an opposite direction. First of all it is important to know that such a policy existed against Iran and continues to do this. This is what I reported to you. At that time they were planning to solve this problem in an isolated fashion and they only mentioned to me the month of September at that time. Then, I was told that it could also happen in October and I told you that after the Party Congress they would sign a Peace Treaty with Germany. Now I am clarifying this and am saying that this problem will be resolved simultaneously with the German problem. After the end of the war when our troops entered Iran they were not badly received by the local population and our troops even helped the peasants harvest their crops. Our intelligence reports that the entry of Soviet Troops now would not be badly received by the local population. KHRUSHCHEV contemplated giving an ultimatum similar to the one he gave a short time ago to Turkey and to Pakistan that if any more U.2 flights were sent from their airfields those airfields would be attacked. The ultimatum to Iran would state that if American bases were not removed from Iran, Soviet troops would move in. Obviously no-one would remove anything and if he moved in his troops then war would begin. That was one line of action, but they began to think more deeply about this. Possibly a conflict resulting from this would not work out well since there are also U.S. bases in Turkey and Pakistan; therefore it would be better to delay this for a month until October and in the meantime build up preparations. In the meantime the course of the extensive manoeuvres would be checked and troops deployed advantageously and since the Party Congress is meeting on 17th October, this problem can be handled simultaneously

/with....

with the German problem. A third possibility is that only the German question will be considered and our troops can be concentrated in the direction of Iran but would not go in. The important thing is to be prepared for any eventuality and to adopt that course of action which would be the most expedient politically, but of course all courses of action must be developed for possible use. Therefore this does not mean if they plan such a move for September that they would necessarily have to follow through. Preparations are going on intensively in the Caucasus in terms of troop training and preparations for possible military action. The island of ARTEMA has been closed. I had to report to you that preparations for this action in September were being made but one cannot tell when KHRUSHCHEV may decide that another course of action is more advantageous.

72. H.: I understand all that and it is perfectly clear, but I would like to know who told you exactly about the plans for Iran in the first instance.

S.: It was ZASORIN who is the Chief of the Napravleniye against Iran and now he has been visited by the Resident from Iran PANTELEIMONOV. As soon as I return I will speak with him again and find out what has taken place. He is the one who told me September or October and then added that it probably would be in October together with the German problem.

73. H.: At the time that you wrote this you also said that they were considering to send CHUIKOV down there, but since then that has been changed. How was CHUIKOV connected with the Iran problem?

S.: At the time that KHRUSHCHEV sent KONEV off he wanted to place Marshals in every border military district. Therefore he was considering CHUIKOV together with a whole group of Marshals for an assignment, since then he has decided to make him the Chief of Civil Defence instead but it does not mean that CHUIKOV may not be again the Commander of Ground Forces which is being rumoured. All these moves are tentative considerations, but I assure you that if hostilities break out there will be a Marshal in every border military district.

/H.: ....

H.: What I am trying to get at is whether the timing of the change in the assignment of CHUIKOV had anything to do with the change in the plans for action against Iran.

S.: That is entirely possible, it could have been, but I do not know for sure. You must realise that the Central Committee is deciding in case of war which Marshals to send to what border military district, because in case of war these districts will become fronts. There will be a front in the theatre of military action and a Marshal commands a front. Today even though Marshals are not actually present there that does not mean that preparation is not going on and possibly they have been already designated but have not gone there. When hostilities begin they will appear because the troops morale and prestige of a front is enhanced by the presence of a prominent Marshal who is a proven military leader.

74. G.: When did KHRUSHCHEV make this statement about chopping down the tree and then the branches will fall off themselves?

S.: He said this in the Kremlin during a reception. I don't know which one, he has them all the time but it was about the time that I wrote about it. You have no doubt heard from a Western ambassador about the incident when KHRUSHCHEV was drunk at a Reception and was speaking about a megaton bomb and although his people were trying to correct him he was mixing up TNT equivalents with actual weight. I think it must have been the French Ambassador.

75. G.: Since KHRUSHCHEV must be well aware of Western military superiority over Soviet armament, how can he be so arrogant?

S.: You see he feels that the West is not fully prepared and there are many contradictions between the members of NATO. He feels that if the West werebetter organised then it would be stronger but since there are contradictions in NATO it is possible that some of the nations would pull out of it and therefore it is weak.

G.: Does he not recognise the West's superiority in armament?

S.: He recognises that there is armament strength, but he feels that the contradictions in NATO are strong enough to justify his position and he anticipates winning because of this.

/76. ....

76. H.: I think it is time that we should be packing up to go - it is getting late. (Subject stood up and examined the artillery journals which he had photographed in order to spot the section on geodetic preparations for firing).

S.: By the way there will not be any more artillery journals published in 1961 the last issues are in 1960, from now on artillery articles will be placed in special sbornik, but I have put away for me in the Artillery Headquarters in a safe another journal which I have left there in order to photograph it when I return. The new artillery articles will be placed in the sbornik of the Voyennaya Mysl but it is possible that an entire issue can be devoted to artillery articles.

77. (Subject reviewed his mission assignments and again requested our help in introducing him to a French businessman. With respect to October meetings with Janet in MOSCOW the entire month was cancelled because Subject planned to go on leave immediately on his return and in addition not only would the time element be too short in October for his accumulating any material or photography immediately after leaving us but since he himself had stressed that the KGB activity during October and up to 15 November would be exceptionally heavy it would be wise to avoid contacts with Janet during this period.)

S.: However, we must arrange meetings for November. (Subject was told that it would be possible for him to meet again with Janet here in PARIS and at that time the meeting plans for the future would be worked out.)

S.: As long as I am in the Committee meeting arrangements with Janet at Receptions are fine but we must keep in mind that if I am transferred back to GRU then we must establish a system for future communications which would be exclusively on a clandestine basis. In addition to that we must work out a method for me to pass on urgent information to you, that is for that kind of data that you must have within twenty-four hours.

G.: We will work all this out prior to your departure.

/78. ....

78. The next meeting was set for Monday the 25th September at 19.30 hours but Subject would be given instructions to meet at a different RV point through WYNNE. Subject was told that prior to WYNNE's departure it would be well to take advantage of WYNNE and his car to make a short trip around PARIS. Subject agreed. Subject was shown a transcript of his first meeting and he was impressed by the amount of work it takes to record the meetings with him. He was told that we have to do this in order to report to our Governments what he has said as accurately as we can. In connection with the official meeting with WYNNE that Subject contemplated, he requested that WYNNE would bring him some material, something like technical brochures, he was shown some very fine French business firms brochures and he was quite pleased with some of these which he would select later as having notionally acquired through WYNNE or a French businessman. Subject's documents which were taken out by Roger to be photographed were now returned to him. Subject left at 24.00 hours and was delivered by car to the vicinity of his hotel, but a few blocks away by M.G. and J. There was no incident involved.

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MEETING NO. 33 - 25th [illegible], 1941.

1. Subject was picked up by M. and G. at the new HY point without incident and arrived at the safe apartment at 1955 hours. Subject expressed his displeasure about the current headlines which predicted some sort of appointment but he was reassured when told that these were newspaper speculations since HITLER had not yet made his speech.

2. S: I have a few notes here and first of all let me mention a question which you brought up last time. With respect to the possible appointment of CHUIKOV as Commander of the forces facing Iran, I want to remind you that the appointment of KONEV was made only three days before he went off. This was not announced in the press at first, but I believe that he left on the 10th August, prior to the closing of the border. Therefore we must keep in mind that preparations for an activity may be going on and may be planned long before a particular individual is designated as the Commander. In addition there may be a number of candidates and decisions may be altered favouring one or the other at any time. Our job is to keep in close contact so that I can report to you all possible variations and we must be prepared to accept any one of the possible variations.

3. Here is something you can check up on since it is within your province. We can check on [illegible] although I believe him completely, we can check to see if the number of employees allowed by the French is actually the number which he reported to me as being in that cable which came while he was Duty Officer. Both [illegible] can be easily checked to confirm the creditability of an unwitting source like [illegible] in whom I personally have great confidence. And again I repeat that if I ever reported to you that some man was to be given an appointment and later another man received it, this does not mean that the first report was incorrect. This is life, there are changes.

4. M: The whole point on this question is that the information that he gives us is of such great importance that before we make our reports we would not be doing our work properly if we did not examine the problem together with him from all sides. We must make sure that we have got the facts right and that there is no possibility of error. What he produces in documentary

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form is 100% but when we are dealing with a human being or a series of human beings there is always a possibility of increasing the margin of error and of misunderstandings. And this we want to eliminate to the maximum of our ability because of the importance of what he is saying. (G. translates).

S.: I understand this and it is very important that we are reviewing all these points which are not clear and in addition you are orienting me and teaching me to examine more critically my obtaining the information with respect to my own understanding. I can see where many fine points are important and even in this numerical value given by ZASORIN your checking could indicate in case there was an error that though ZASORIN may be honest with me, possibly he is careless, with respect to accuracy. H.: In this case there are a number of other possibilities as well. It may be that everything that ZASORIN told you he did properly, but there is a possibility that the information which ZASORIN received was in itself not correct.

5. This is a very important conversation because we have a number of questions which we wish to put to . . this evening and he will see as they develop that they will cover precisely this type of ground. S.: That's fine. Let me finish this point. I reported to you that the Resident PANTELEIMONOV was called to headquarters from Iran and it is possible that the Chief of the General Staff may even receive him since he could be concerned with strategic intelligence matters. But at present I don't know whether he will receive him or not, but I will find out before I go back. However, in the press there are already articles criticizing the fact that this took place only a short while after I reported about Iran to you. Therefore we know that some plans and preparations are being made but how the plan of action may vary and be activated in one month or another one cannot tell. The point is we should be aware that such preparations are going on. I have already told you about discussions that the Iranian people would receive Soviet troops well because in the past Soviet troops have assisted the Iranian peasants.

6. 5. May I now bring up the subject of WIKE, that is the last item that I have and then I will be ready for your questions. The last two days I was at the Exhibition and then I looked around in the town a bit from the viewpoint of clandestine operations, thus far I have not noticed any surveillance against me whatsoever. Certainly not Soviet. So far as the French are concerned, maybe they are watching me, but I have not noticed it at all. Last night I was at the Exhibition and I [illegible] hours

[illegible]

1300 hours. Shortly after I left, at 1500 hours, a stairway broke injuring seven people, of whom one was hospitalised. Today I noticed that this section was shut off and closed. Yesterday was a day of Franco-Soviet friendship and they wanted to have a lot of pomp and ceremony, but the French Government would not permit this. The ceremony was very brief and consisted of just a few short speeches. The Soviet Ambassador was there, the Director of the Exhibition and the Chairman of the Franco-Soviet Friendship Society. The place was fairly crowded, however, because it was a Sunday and the weather was very fine.

7. The day after tomorrow will complete my first week in my visit here and by now having oriented myself I must work on my missions and you must help me execute them. In this connection I would like you to instruct YYYYY as to how he should act in the future. I will present my plan and my views and you please change it and improve it as you see fit. It seems to me that as of tomorrow the time is ripe for YYYYY to have arrived in PARIS overtly. On Wednesday, the day after tomorrow, he should visit the Exhibition at about 1100 hours. The Exhibition opens at 1000 hours. He should go to the Exhibition Administration and ask the Director or Deputy Director if they know whether any member of the Committee for Co-ordination of Science and Technology of the U.S.S.R. is present. He should say that a month ago he was in MOSCOW at the Committee and he was told at receptions at the Committee that either Mr. XXXXXXXX or Mr. (two more) would be going to the Exhibition in France. He should add that he is well acquainted with people in the Committee and he is a scientific-technical journalist since he handles delegations which go to the U.S.S.R. and receives delegations which go to England. "I'd like to meet with someone because I am now planning my Exhibition in MOSCOW in 1962. Is there anyone here ?" They will tell him that I am here and when he asks how to reach me they will only locate me at the Exhibition or call the Embassy. Therefore Wednesday I will visit YYYYY officially. Then I will report to the Resident that our good friend and contact of the Committee has arrived for a few days. Mr. BELOV and I will mention his favourable background and the fact that he has brought me something. The Resident will probably offer me operational funds to entertain YYYYY. YYYYY should bring

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me a few items that he had promised to get from England. And later he can hand me some of the materials that you have already shown me, saying that he picked these up for me in France. I'll look them over later and divide them into two sections, so that some of them will be in English and some in French. I can easily say that he travels extensively and has contacts everywhere even here in France, since the firms he represents do business here also. It is now the right time for WYNNE to be more active and there are branch offices of at least two of his English firms here in France. This is most plausible and logical and it will be of great advantage to me particularly in the eyes of the Rezidentura here when they see that I am doing something. Another request I have is that when WYNNE meets me officially he should change his car. I shouldn't be seen in that car again because he went everywhere in it. Therefore he should get another car when he meets me officially. That is my suggestion and request.

8. Another thing, I did not get my receipt yet from the hotel where I stayed four days, I don't care if it is for the full sum, I can balance it off, but now he has got me a room for 22 francs. He went to the other extreme. So he is saving me money which I have to return to the Soviet Government, and will probably call me a fool for not spending what I was allotted. He should ask that I have a better room there so that the difference wouldn't be so great. Then I have to have a list of some of the people from here who have visited the French Exhibition in MOSCOW. I could pretend that I met some person here.

9. (a.) From this there are quite a number of problems. First of all he must face up to the fact that perchance he may have already have been seen with WYNNE. And if we pretend that WYNNE has just come and we go through all these motions at the Exhibition, we might do, by mischance, more harm than good. (G. translates). S.: He doesn't have to say when he arrived, but he'll pretend that he has just met me, but it would not be right for me to report that I had met him earlier. Who do you think could have seen WYNNE, someone in the Soviet Embassy? G.: Exactly. H.: For example, I came here under another identity and have gone nowhere, but yet the other day an American who knows me asked Joseph if I were not here. S.: Well, I don't know for sure,

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but I don't think anyone has seen WYNNE, maybe he avoided the Soviet Embassy. I will meet him at the Exhibition. Very few embassy people go there.

H.: It's all right to meet at the Exhibition, but WYNNE shouldn't ask for him. They should meet there by chance and then he can introduce him to the Director and say "this is my good friend". In that case we are not telling a lie, we are not saying anything at all and we are not saying that they have met before. S.: Fine, let's do it that way, it sounds very good. By the way, if somebody did see me with WYNNE, how does he know that that is WYNNE ?

H.: And it is perfectly logical to say that WYNNE is only passing through PARIS to see the Exhibition and he is on his way to handle his business commitments in BELGRADE. And, if for any reason they want to check up they will see that he has in fact gone to BELGRADE and the whole thing ties up. Secondly, if we play it this way it would be unusual for WYNNE who doesn't know where his friend is to go trotting through PARIS carrying brochures. He will tackle getting the brochures to him in another way but not at this meeting.

G.: All he needs to say is "I didn't expect to see you here for sure, but I brought something for you and I have left it in my quarters", or my office, or wherever they would normally be and WYNNE could then give you the things at the following meeting.

10. S.: That is clear, now I have another question, while passing through PARIS to go to BELGRADE, could WYNNE not be engaged in making business contacts here in PARIS ? H.: No, because this is out of WYNNE's territory. His representation with his firms is exclusively for their trade with Eastern Europe; they have other representatives here for their trade in Western Europe, and this has nothing whatsoever to do with him. (G. translates).

H.: But we are working on the problem of introducing somebody to him through WYNNE who is a representative here and who works, we hope, in the same general sphere, and who, thanks to this trade representation here, could logically meet WYNNE and who could be introduced by WYNNE to our friend. S.: That is very good. Was that man at the French Exhibition in MOSCOW ? G.: The whole point is that WYNNE would have normal business reasons to know this man and when you report on a man's background, having been introduced to him, to the Resident it is likely that this man will be of interest to the Resident, which is the purpose of the whole exercise. S.: Would it be inconvenient at the

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time than [illegible] does to [illegible] to have his [illegible]
This is to remove prominent identifying features as much as possible in
case someone saw him before - it's a red moustache. G.: Now that would
make things more complicated later.

H.: Now we are trying to establish this and pass over the contacts as quickly as possible because WYNNE absolutely must go to [illegible] or else he will lose the representation of his firms and he will not be able to go to MOSCOW. S.: Yes, yes, that's right, he will be thrown out, and he is very much afraid of this. H.: Therefore we cannot keep him here until the end of the Fair and our present plan is to keep him here only so long that we can effect the contact. S.: And also materials. H.: Of course, but once he has the contact, the materials will follow after the [illegible] said that I would have something from WYNNE. H.: Of course, it comes to the same thing. WYNNE will give it to you and he can say that partially the brochures come from the new contact. S.: Does the man speak English? H.: Of course he is an American. S.: That's fine, I don't care if he is an Irishman as long as he can speak English. H.: The other brochures WYNNE can say he merely picked up while travelling and some of them came from France. G.: Let us get on with the timing for this. H.: Yes, while we are working on this plan we have not yet made the contact we are hoping for, but we hope to do it quickly. G.: Even tomorrow, for as short as a half hour meeting, we can pick you up in the car and go to the woods to give you full instructions as to where, and when and what to say if we are fortunate enough to have all things in our hands by that time to give to you. We plan to do this tomorrow. H.: The most important thing, so that this thing will move quickly, is for WYNNE to go to the Exhibition tomorrow, but he must be available all afternoon for us to reach him if we need him to introduce him to this other fellow. G.: Since the man will be unwitting, we must lay on a careful plan and to save time WYNNE must meet you officially at the Exhibition as early as possible tomorrow and then have the afternoon off in case we need him. We hope during this time to have WYNNE meet the man and they will find a mutual [illegible] and engage in a business connection to establish an acquaintanceship. Later you will contact WYNNE and he will tell you when and where to pick you up so that we can brief you on the next step.

12. S.: Fine. Tomorrow morning I will go to the Embassy and see if there are any cables for me, as I always do, just to check if any delegations are coming, and then I will go to the Exhibition where I will be at 1000 hours. You will of course instruct WYNNE that he should go there too. Of course, he will not bring me anything then, but will give me brochures the day after. You can speak to him in the morning before he goes and tell him what to do. G.: When WYNNE gets there don't keep him long, say one and a half to two hours, and then let him go because we may need him for our contact arrangements and WYNNE will not be able to tell you when we want to pick you up at that time. Therefore after releasing WYNNE you call him at 1800 hours and he will give you instructions then. S.: I can simply go to his hotel at 1800 hours and he can tell me everything. G.: That's fine, you do that. S.: Everything is clear and very good. As a safety check when WYNNE drops into my old hotel for five minutes to pick up my shirt, he can ask there if anyone enquired about me. The Embassy already knows that I am staying at this new hotel.

13. Another thing we will have to be working on is my itinerary beginning with October 5 or 6 after the Exhibition closes. G.: We have that in mind also. Now, let us know what did CHEREDEYEV suggest to you regarding places you should visit ? S.: He suggested that I visit electronic and chemical plants anywhere in France. G.: Did he not name any factories or towns ? S.: No. Because how can he do this when he doesn't know if I have a possibility of visiting there or have any contact there ? H.: What is the purpose of this trip ? Is it to visit factories or is it to photograph military installations as you did in England ? S.: The purpose is to visit the factory, but as soon as my itinerary is established then on advice from CHEREDEYEV as well as my MOSCOW briefing I would look at military targets located along my itinerary route. If I worked up a group of contacts based on let us say those I met in MOSCOW and those I developed here, I would check out this list of plants to visit with CHEREDEYEV and he would indicate the priority interest and from that my itinerary would be established. H.: Therefore we have got to find somebody who can arrange visits to factories. And that is not so easy. S.: How about this man that you want to get me

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into contact with ? Can he not arrange for us to take a trip somewhere ?
G.: We don't know at this point yet, but we may find out in a day or two.
S.: Very well we won't go any further into this now, I think I have reported everything to you on my part. There is nothing new to report from the Embassy, especially since they close at 1200 hours on Saturday and are closed all day Sunday. At the Exhibition I have not made any new acquaintances with the exception of having again spoken to the Secretary of the Franco-Soviet Friendship Society. If I can make a contact through him I will report it to you at once. So right now, up to the closing of the Exhibition we will develop piece by piece all contacts that we can and then we will see what I can do for the remaining ten days after the closing of the Exhibition. G.: Have you exactly established a date that you must leave ? S.: I am authorised twenty-five days and I will either fly out or go by train on Sunday the 15th October. If I go out by train or not will depend on whether our Consular Section have arranged transit visas for me to go through Belgium and West Germany. G.: Have you submitted requests for these visas already ? S.: Yes, our Consular Section know about this and they said that they would do it for me.

14. (The plan for the next day was again mentioned). S.: I suggest that the best time would be for WIRTH to come to the Exhibition at 1430 hours and walk in the vicinity of the automobile display. I will meet him there. H.: Let's have a short pause and then we can go on with our questions. S.: Do you have photographs of the Soviets for the Embassy here ? H.: Yes, we will show them to you later.

15. S.: By the way did I do right by photographing the personnel file of KLOSSE, the scientist who defected in Canada ? Was this of any interest to you ? G.: Yes, but there were the consequences of this affair to either you or the Committee and were any particular security measures involved ? S.: To me there was nothing at all. As a matter of fact the Committee didn't suffer either but they felt very uncomfortable. All the Committee did was to obtain his passport for him, since as we are designated as a co-ordinating committee, all passportisation passes through us; we have an otdel for this. For example if the Academy of Sciences processes their individuals for a delegation, they do all the inside work and all we do is to then submit to the Consul request for a passport at the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is usually done

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through our cadet indoctrination course. There was a tremendous upheaval in the Academy of Sciences, a number of people were discharged - it was later discovered that at one time KLOCHKO was under action for dismissal from the Party allegedly for having a personal argument with someone in which he was accused of enmity. However, this action was dropped as unsubstantiated. The way I became involved in this was that Gen. Lieut. KOGOV called me, since GEROV was in Poland at the time, and asked me to get whatever files the Committee had on this man. KHRUSHCHEV and the Central Committee even ordered he have the man assassinated. The Academy of Sciences submitted all their files on him to the KGB, which took whatever action was necessary but I was sent to our Personnel Section of the Committee and told them that GRU headquarters was interested to know what we had on this man since we processed his passport application forms and they simply handed it to me. They made a Xerox copy of the file and I had it all day so I had a chance to photograph it.

15. There was a tremendous upheaval since he was the author of some seventy works, a member of the Communist Party since 1939, he was the holder of a Stalin prize and was 59 years of age and he has knowledge of some three hundred thermo atomic/nuclear chemistry in his head. When the balance of the delegation returned they were questioned by KHRUSHCHEV and Aprelov and they told us all the details of how he smuggled out of his hotel and Mr. Luber at the Conference when he announced that he would not go back, what was said. The Counsellor of the Embassy was there and one of the members of the delegation who was a KGB man was there. Therefore although it was most painful, for our Committee the real upheaval and blame was on the Academy of Sciences. TIME came the day after I photographed this, so I handed it to him. He told me that he had read it in the press already and that another Soviet engineer had defected. His name was also Ukrainian, SENKOV and he defected in Austria. His father asked him to go home but the son refused and went on to West Germany. Can you imagine the upheaval at the Academy of Sciences with two in a row defecting ? KLOCHKO was working seventeen or nineteen years at the Academy of Sciences and was the Director of a laboratory; it will go hard for his son but he had already left his wife with whom he had lived for seventeen years. One of the workers in the Council Committee involved when the exit permits was dismissed and there were received reprimands along the Party line for inadequate check

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and for letting a man of this age who does not have [illegible]
(insufficient hostages), with no family, go abroad.

17. Q.: What would have happened to you had you handled this [illegible]
S.: If I had been the chief of the Canadian Section and had actually done the processing myself for this man, which in this case was done by the Academy of Sciences, I would have been thrown out of the Committee and received a reprimand along the Party line at the very least. All our comrades did to affix a stamp so to speak - they only asked for the passport. If one of the men in my delegation which I first came to England headed it, in view of the fact that I had personally processed them, I would have [illegible] people are happy that many on this list of possible delegation members are not going to come. I am sure that no more than fifteen or twenty will come. Up thus far there was no advice by cable, maybe tomorrow there will be. The exit commission is being very careful and strict now. To some extent it has even affected my trip now, since they demanded a new personnel report on me. It was a military [illegible] report [illegible] to see if anything new of a derogatory nature had been added since they last examined my earlier personnel file in March.

18. Q.: Didn't you say that the KGB was going to go after this man KROCHKO? S.: Yes, when they first found out about this, the Central Committee ordered the KGB to dig up all material on him and there was an order to find him and assassinate him. I found this out in all because we were also helping in getting documents about him. The first day after he defected he stayed in the basement of a Canadian police station. Q.: Is the order to assassinate him now in effect? S.: Yes. And this man must be protected. There are other situations like this - a man was assassinated in Austria another in Turkey. This case is a serious loss to the Academy of Sciences and to the Soviet Government, because this man knew many secrets. At the Conference he said to the Soviets, "Do not agitate me, [illegible] they bring him his suitcase or he wouldn't talk, and this was done. The Counsellor told him Mr. KROCHKO, as the situation no matter [illegible] your mistake, but in two hours it will be a crime, and [illegible]

and he answered "I am sick and tired of this propaganda and agitation and if you continue I will stop talking to you and leave". Then he explained that he had stayed in the basement of the police station the day before and gave as his reason for defecting that all his life he has tried to do something good and useful and he was always persecuted and bullied and he had decided to defect a long time ago. He said "I have done this now and I will dedicate the balance of my life to developing those ideas which I still have in my head and even if I don't succeed in finishing everything, other specialists will carry on". That's all there was to it and he told them to go to hell. The Conference lasted one and a half hours. H.: This is absolutely word for word what we know about this talk as reported from CIA officially. S.: I repeat that you should protect this man and call to your attention that when the code clerk defected some years ago in Canada (illegible), when they found looking for him in his room they were going to kill him. I believe they tried to kill him even later. S.: Yes, and they may be still trying to do it and this man also needs protection. That's all I have to report on this, if you're ready, let me answer your questions.

19. Q.: Sergei Sergeievich as you have told us travels constantly. He has made several trips away from MOSCOW in the last month or so. It would be of value to reconstruct his traveling in so far as you can. On 15th September he returned from LENINGRAD. Where else did he go to during the preceding month? S.: Here is how it is. Sergei Sergeievich is constantly making air flights. Q.: What kind of aircraft? S.: All my aircraft and the Ministry of Defence has a squadron of military aircraft available. All one needs to do is to call the Duty Officer, but in case all of these planes are engaged he can simply fly on a TU and the ticket is purchased at the expense of the Ministry of Defence. Q.: What type of military planes are these? S.: They are all Ilyushins. However he came back from his party conference at LENINGRAD by train. Then my daughter stays with them at the dacha and either I or my wife call her she has often mentioned that suddenly that day Sergei Sergeievich has flown off somewhere. He begins the day very often without knowing that he will be flying off somewhere during that day.

20. Q.: And where was he ? S.: He was often in Germany, he was at KAPUSTIN YaR during the tests; he was also in SVERDLOVSK, but that was much earlier and he was down south in the Trans-Caucasian Military District and this was a separate trip from the one to KAPUSTIN YaR. He goes to Germany quite often, I even reported that to you last April, so when they called him to go to LENINGRAD for the Party Conference, where he was elected unanimously, of ocurse he also had his own official work to do there as well, just like MALINOVSKIY who flew off to LVOV on the 17th September, also had military inspections and conferences to attend.

21. Q.: Tell me when Marshals such as MALINOVSKIY and Sergei Sergeievich are elected delegates at a Party Conference to the Party Congress or Supreme Soviet, are they elected only by the military population of an area such as a republic or an Okrug, or by a certain number of persons both civilian and military ? S.: No, it's like this. The dictators of the Central Committee compute it this way. Suppose there are two million one hundred thousand Communists in the Soviet Army. They would then decide that let us say, two hundred delegates to the Party Congress representing this group should be sent there. Of these twelve Marshals should be sent, say fifty Generals, so many officers, so many non-commissioned officers and so many privates. They are playing the game of democracy and this is supposed to cover the representation of everyone and these candidates for election as delegates are distributed by the various rayon Communist Parties and some Marshals have their own Party cells and there may be a Communist Party unit of some size in a Group of Forces. In short wherever it is possible by size to hold a Party Conference from such a conference only one delegate to the Party Congress be sent. These are elected by secret ballot, but the Central Committee proposes the candidate even though he doesn't live there. VERETSOV, for example, was proposed at LENINGRAD, not only because there are already many candidates to be voted on in the MOSCOW area but VERETSOV is known in LENINGRAD and has his home there. The members of this Party conference are both civilian and military who met there because they were sent by the lower Party units of that district, both military and civilian.

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22. G.: Possibly, MALINOVSKY lived in LVOV at one time. S.: Possibly, but that is not essential. The Minister of Defence is known throughout the land and he could be elected a candidate from any district. This is all a play at democratic procedure only. Of course, usually, when they suggest who should be elected it is better for the local Party Conference to know the individual, but sometimes at the Conference a letter is read which states that the Central Committee suggests that a certain candidate be considered for election. They may simply say "Three delegates should be sent from you. the Director of a prominent factory, some milkmaid and we offer also VARENTSOV for your consideration." Everyone applauds and votes that way. The whole process is sheer stupidity and even at the Party Congress the big people may come for one day to attend the opening and the introductory speeches and then go off and not attend another session.

23. G.: Then you mention that Sergei Sergeievich visited SVERDLOVSK, do you know what kind of plants he visited ? S.: He told me that he inspected factories which were producing military equipment. We know that there are rocket factories there and these were what he was inspecting. He did not specify what assemblies or types he was looking at but merely said "rocket production". He also visited factories in CHKIL. G.: And are there many factories in that city or in that oblast. S.: Yes, there are. J.: When did he go there ? S.: Let me see - he was there prior to the time that he was at KHRUSTEN YAR and it was prior to his German trip. I believe it was in July 1961. He also goes to LENINGRAD often since his leadesy is there and his grandchildren live there too. He goes to LENINGRAD by boat, plane and train, but for greater distances he only flies and I remember that he returned from SVERDLOVSK by air on a Sunday because we visited him that day. G.: How long was he in SVERDLOVSK ? S.: He was there for about a week.

24. G.: Did you know when he went to KHRUSTEN YAR ? S.: I know that when BUZHKOV told me he was already there. H.: What were the exact dates ? S.: I can't remember, but I will now start writing down dates since I see that it has a significance for you. G.: Yes, it is very important. That should not be a difficult thing to do. How long was he in KHRUSTEN YAR ? S.: He was there three or four days, not longer. Then the new tests using nuclear warheads with rocket delivery were being run. I will take note of this in the future because I can find out when he is going from his writings of

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conversations between the families. G.: Did he go there by ...

S.: Yes, he did.

25. G.: On what occasion did he tell you of the atomic ... K-12? S.: After his return from there he told me that the K-12 ... tested with an atomic warhead and RUZHOV told me that it ... adopted, that it is in serial production, he gave me its ... the atomic warhead and the other data I passed to you. He also mentioned that it was being tested at KAPUSTIN YAR. H.: We would just like to pinpoint the time a little more. We have VARENTSOV coming back from ... the 15th September and earlier than that he was possibly three or four days in KAPUSTIN YAR. Can he work back from September 15th and say that VARENTSOV was in LENINGRAD a day or two before that, can he recollect the time. S.: I understand. He was in LENINGRAD at the Party Conference for a short time, he flew there by plane and prior to that he was in KAPUSTIN YAR. Incidentally a plane flies from MOSCOW to LENINGRAD in one hour five minutes, but the trains are almost all night trains from either end, so one could sleep on the train and arrive at one's destination in the morning. For example he arrived in MOSCOW at about 0900 hours. I am sure he was in KAPUSTIN YAR only three days, not more, but I did not jot down the dates. H.: Did your friend see him on the dates after his return from KAPUSTIN YAR and before he went to LENINGRAD ? S.: I believe I have seen him twice, once before he went to KAPUSTIN YAR and once again before he went to LENINGRAD for a short time when I went to his headquarters with the ... RUZHOV told me the details after VARENTSOV returned from KAPUSTIN YAR. RUZHOV is often called by phone to bring some papers or documents to VARENTSOV after VARENTSOV is at his destination and on several occasions he sent RUZHOV two or three days beforehand to prepare certain things for him. H.: I would like to cover one more point before we go on to the next question. He told us that this test that VARENTSOV went to see took place on the 8th September. Did VARENTSOV tell him that it was on the 8th, or how else did he know it was on the 8th ? S.: I told you the day had the possibility of a seven hour difference to American time and in addition VARENTSOV was in KAPUSTIN YAR several times, but we are discussing only the last time. H.: But did he in fact tell you that date as the 8th ? S.: Specifically, that date

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by BUZUNOV. G.: Is it possible that BUZUNOV could have made an error of one or two days? S.: On two, no, but on one day he could have made a mistake. He told me something like yesterday and if that day had been the 9th instead of assumed yesterday to be the 8th - possibly I misheard and he could have said the day before yesterday, then it would be off by one day.

26. G.: Let me explain something to you. As you may well imagine, we have all kinds of technical devices that can determine with accuracy the fact that a nuclear detonation has taken place. S.: I understand this perfectly. G.: And on that specific day, the 8th September, there was no nuclear detonation at either KAPUSTIN YAR or at NOVAYA ZEMLYA, but there were incident detonations near that day, both after it and prior to it. S.: Yes, there could have been a misunderstanding on the date, I could have misheard "yesterday" for "the day before yesterday" and when I came here on the 26th I was thinking about this and was also confused by the difference between your time and ours. G.: The difference is only seven hours to MOSCOW and it could be a few more hours spread between MOSCOW time and KAPUSTIN YAR time. S.: In addition the time given could have been the launching time and not the detonation time, perhaps the exact time they did not want to state.

27. G.: Did by any chance VASILTSOV refer to the rocket by its NATO designation or did he simply call it the R-12? S.: No designations whatsoever were given - they were simply [illegible] R-12 and R-14.

28. G.: You will record the dates accurately from now on? S.: I certainly will and at that time what seemed the most important to me was the fact that there was a nuclear detonation and the value of the yield was given as well as information on the range of the rocket. [illegible] thing for us on dates is that when we receive a nuclear detonation [illegible] date and subsequent to that he informs us of a specific yield of the warhead, then we can compute additional data from that. (G. translates and explains further that by associating the recorded and computed electronic oscillographs on a specific nuclear detonation and knowing what yield that detonation was would permit other recordings to be computed and in fact this would establish a scale of values). S.: I understand this perfectly and first of all I realise that your equipment cannot make an error, but I can mix up

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the day that I was so impressed by the fact that the first time since I have been working together I was able to learn of an actual detonated nuclear yield that the date exactitude did not strike me as such a significant factor, but now what we must do is to analyse the whole time period involved. G.: Let me give you another example. Hypothetically, suppose there had been a detonation on the 6th September and on the 10th September, we would have recorded readings on both detonations which could be of different yields. Therefore when you report that one had taken place on the 8th it is of the greatest significance to us to learn if the error applies to the detonation on the 6th or to the one on the 10th. S.: I understand this too and in the future I will certainly be careful. With respect to the detonation at NOVAYA ZEMLYA I did not give you any date for that but just the time period during which this took place. G.: And we know that you were correct because we have a reading that a nuclear detonation did take place in that area during that time period.

29. S.: Please always check me, I am trying to report as honestly and factually as I can to you and I wish you would check to see if the 250 planes ZASORIN told me about were in fact that number. G.: Since you have brought up this topic I have a group of questions here that we may as well cover now and then return to the original sequence. The first one said that the information about the three U.S. missile bases in Iran is entirely false. After all, we ought to know what we have there. S.: That is good that you can check this and maybe the GRU made a mistake here and have given wrong information to our General Staff, maybe they reported only three bases in Iran directed against the southern Urals and in fact there are thirty-three there; that would be in our favour. BUZINOV has three bases indicated on his situation map and possibly they are contemplated bases and he has them indicated incorrectly. G.: It is clear in this case that the GRU has made a very bad mistake. Could it be possible that intelligence has misled KHRUSHCHEV into over confidence. S.: No, I reject this possibility. KHRUSHCHEV has at his beck and call all reports for every country with complete order of battle data, if they consider that there are three nuclear missile bases there and you say that this is an error, so much the better for us; let them believe this misinformation.

30. C.: And in a similar vein, when you reported about the Ninth Armies and how you [illegible] in the German direction, that is about fifty divisions, however, within the D.D.R. (illegible) irrespective of how the Armies are deployed, there are about twenty Soviet divisions in the territory of the D.D.R. That is a large number and however we distribute them numerically between armies it would certainly be a larger number than two armies, and I do not count the third army being brought in, the Eighth Mechanised Army. S.: In my report I listed two armies in the D.D.R. and now I am listing the third one, the Eighth Mechanised Army, which is being moved to the D.D.R. You should consider that at least five divisions would be in an Army and possibly you are considering some of the divisions in an Air Army. And possibly you are considering some D.D.R. troops which are also in division formations. C.: No I mean only Soviet divisions and Ground Forces not Air. S.: I reported to you that in an Army there would be a minimum of five divisions, so maybe these contain seven or eight divisions each. Therefore multiplying seven by three you would get twenty divisions or more. In addition, remember this, that there are many divisions which are independent and not included into armies. These would be General Headquarters Reserve divisions. There could be two or three of these. I think it would be absurd that my informant could have made such a mistake. I told you altogether that there are nine armies, and now a tenth has been added, but that is in the German direction.

31. H.: Who said that there were exactly nine armies in the front with KONEV commands originally. S.: There are three sources who said this, they are: General POZDNYYY, who named this specific figure, and this was confirmed by BUZUNOV who often goes to the D.D.R. I have also talked about this to ZAGORIN who is a nepravleniye chief and he has this information through the GRU channels. I can't understand where an error could be made there. Maybe you consider armies which had been previously stationed in the D.D.R. and now only certain advance headquarters exist, or possibly the new regiments armed with the V-75 rocket can be grouped into a larger unit with centralised control which would be a division and this would increase your estimate of divisions there.

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32. G. According to our order of battle map, and I do not make A mistake in this because you don't hide an Army headquarters, I show that there are five field armies in the territory of the D.D.R. plus in addition an Air Army. S. This is impossible, this is a mistake. Let us look at this further, it is very well known that very large numbers of Soviet troops have been brought into the territory of the D.D.R. and it is very difficult to deploy them. There are insufficient garrison areas and military towns to house so many troops and they cannot be all kept under open skies. It is a tremendous engineering effort to build so many structures to house personnel, cover vital equipment, provide the necessary camouflage, etc. etc. for protection against weather and cold for such a huge force and never was such a density of Soviet troops in Germany mentioned to me. You told me that we have a sufficient number of troops in the D.D.R. to handle NATO and now they have reinforced it still further. We know that they have now ten armies in the German direction and maybe your calculation for the large number of armies in the D.D.R. extend the real boundaries to a point beyond the D.D.R. to include five armies. But that would not be the D.D.R. even if an Army in the first echelon was just beyond the border of the D.D.R. but in a position to give close support, that would still not make them within the D..... and you may include these in your total. In addition they don't have enough airfields for such a huge number of aircraft that would have to be there in an Air Army. I reject the possibility of such a fantastic concentration within the D.D.R. and believe that there is an error in this calculation, you must include units beyond the border.

33. (A brief pause was made to change reels). S. I'd like to add another comment or two on this last question. First of all, of course it is possible to make an error and I will study this matter more closely when I get back, but I doubt very much that they would make a mistake in terms of armies. They could make a mistake of a division or so, by counting such that they should be knowledgeable of this and I do not understand how they could make a mistake in the number of armies. Looking at it from the viewpoint of military science in the event of outbreak of hostilities, such a concentration would be brought into the area. But now everything is being supported in great depth

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all on the Polish-Soviet border and a total of [illegible] have been assigned to this napravlenie which are involved in the German problem. Possibly inaccurate intelligence in terms of understanding military matters have included the additional armies even though they are outside the D.D.R. boundary but still close. I will, of course, look deeper into this situation. In addition with respect to the air armies of which the total is two, they must be necessarily deployed at great depth since they would want to avoid being placed at vulnerable aerodromes immediately adjacent to the West German border. They would be in the supporting echelons and they also include bomber aviation as well as fighting craft.

34. Q.: Do you remember when you were describing the anti-ballistic missile programme, what did each one of your informants say about this, for example, why do you suggest that the Institute is in the Gorkovsk area? A.: There is a large military training base in the area. I know that there are studies in electronic technology there. I was stationed there for a long time and went to the academy for four years in that area. BUZINOV stated that there is this Institute in that area, so it is not just opinion. There are large yellow buildings, and a large wall around them, that do military technicians work there, not only civilians. All the employees there are under strict security regulations not to speak of that they do. There is only one such institute and it has a testing battalion, but of course this battalion is not in GORKOVSKIY but in one of the testing sites. KOZLOVSKIY also told me this and he lives in that area. Q.: Was additional information [illegible] did one source give about this compared to the other? A.: He (KOZLOVSKIY) has been riding around that area and fishing in the river for years and he meets all kinds of high-ranking generals and they speak about these things.

35. Q.: Since we were just speaking about BUZINOV, you identified him before yesterday that he is the deputy chief of an otdel and in addition he is an aide de camp to Marshal VASILYEV. A.: I'll explain this reference, he is an A.D.C. to the Marshal for missions of special importance when [illegible] was reducing the size of the army structure to economy measures

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the position of aide de camp for missions of special importance was eliminated from the Tables of Organisations. All VARENTSOV had left of his personal staff was his Adjutant and two civilian chauffeurs. He had no one to fulfil this important function requiring responsibility. And previously he had FEDOROV who was replaced by BUZINOV. So VARENTSOV had to do one of two things, either discharge BUZINOV or assign him to another duty slot but still have him do his important work as A.D.C. In the future, should VARENTSOV become the Commander of the Combined Rocket Forces then the Tables of Organisation provide him with an Adjutant-General, which position BUZINOV hopes to receive should this take place. Q.: What is the otdel of which he is a deputy?

S.: This otdel is a part of GUKART, it is called the Technical Otdel which controls the adoption of new material. It is a part of the Armament and not part of the Headquarters Staff which has its operations section, intelligence section, etc. It is an Otdel of the Commander of Artillery's Directorate. BUZINOV only visits the Otdel for two hours a day and some days he is not even there, he is primarily occupied with executing VARENTSOV's affairs. He gets 2,300 roubles for his duty status and if he were merely a senior officer he would only get 2000. The Commander of the otdel may be unhappy because BUZINOV is only there on paper, but he doesn't dare say anything because VARENTSOV will fire him. The point is that BUZINOV has the pass in all the Otdels of GUKART and he has a propusk called a Vezdekhod, which permits him access everywhere.

36. Q.: Who told you that Marshal CHUYKOV was going to be the Chief of Civil Defence? S.: He already is in this position. Sergei Sergeievich told me this and as I reported to you before, they don't like each other, so Sergei Sergeievich said to me "They made this jerk CHUYKOV Chief of Civil Defence, but who knows, he may come back as Chief of Ground Forces yet". They very wisely considered General KRYLOV, the Commander of MOSCOW Military District for this post, but he himself refused it. Maybe he is afraid to accept this responsibility and he is in a good spot now as Commander of the Military District of the capital, and he will always move ahead into a hi position. ZHUKOV was also proposed as a candidate for this post and even GOLIKOV, the Chief of the Political Directorate was considered for the position as Chief of Ground Forces. These are all possibilities but I do

there so you even if we can't predict who is going to have this position.
GOLIKOV was made General of the Soviet Union and he is definitely hopeless,
he is just a stooge of KHRUSHCHEV who supported him during the ousting of
ZHUKOV.

37. G.: In connection with civil defence, you remember there was an organisation called DOSAAF Dobrol'nyye Obshchestvo Sodeystviya Armii, Aviatsii i Flotu (Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy). S.: Yes there was. G.: Does it still exist? S.: All of these semi-civilian organisations for civilian defence of local installations and areas in the rear, some were under the navy, some were under the air force, some under Ground forces, you remember them, the DOSAAF, the DOSARM and other (DOSO) of these have been absorbed into the Civil Defence Command, now it is a more concrete basis. There is a headquarters and staff and it is well organised under the Ministry of Defence. I will send you the full seventeen pages of this material which I will photograph. This spells out all chains of command and responsibilities and who will do what in case the decree period is announced, and this of course could be announced by KHRUSHCHEV and the Committee at any necessary time. And this is all financed out of the budget of the Ministry of Defence and all of the chiefs of military districts are tied into this plan for action when necessary and co-ordinated with it. All of these headquarters in military districts as well as the Commanders of military districts will report to the Minister of Defence and to KHRUSHCHEV on the status of civil defence. Before do you remember the Osoviakhim was handled through the Rayon system only in a slipshod manner since they had neither much equipment or funds, but now the officers assigned to civil defence local headquarters are on the same status and pay scale as other regular army officers.

39. G.: Do you mean then that all of these old organisations have been scrapped and that this new civil defence command has replaced them? S.: But all of these others have been absorbed by the new ones and it is now much better organised and directed. G.: Therefore the DOSAAF will not be called that any more. S.: That's right and all of these functions will be taken over by this centralised and organised civil defence organisation. The creation of

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this command is a ruling step of the Soviet Government and you will see by reading the seventeen pages who is authorised to declare an 0blyy period and under what conditions. G.: Good Heavens! If there are seventeen pages about evacuation of ministries and plants which may have been given in the polozheniye which established the Command? S.: No. This only gives responsibilities for doing these things but the specifics of what military goes where and when and all other details are contained in a secret document for each responsible organisation and is a part of the overall mobilisation plan. The government placed sufficient significance on the creation of this command by placing a Marshal at its head, and the Marshal, I forgot to mention earlier, retains his status as Deputy to the Minister of Defence. At the same time they had contemplated sending CHUIKOV down, as Commander of the forces there. And the never a Marshal is sent to such a large Military District it is because in case of war this will become a front. At the same time it would fit in with [illegible]'s propaganda policy. You recall at one time ROKOSSOVSKY was sent down there to command troops facing Iran and Turkey and another variation of this was then KONEV was selected to command the troops in the German direction. And CHUIKOV they had considered sending down there.

39. G.: Please explain what is the difference between a Party polozheniye and a postanovleniye ? What kind of documents are they ?

S.: A polozheniye is a document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party for an action which will be in effect for a long period of time. It is like a category about something in particular. A postanovleniye is for a specific action such as an action that would send me somewhere or to form a Committee. G.: Mr Blair Ruseell, it is an order, all right, but the Central Committee finds it indicate to use the word order, they use the word postanovleniye" (device). In fact it is an order in very large capital letters. By the way, did you criticise me for sending you the Central Committee letter on KHRUSHCHEV's report on Agriculture? Did it [illegible] worth-while ? G.: H.: and A.: Yes, that was fine, we were happy with it.

40. G.: Did you hear from anyone on the General Staff or anywhere else who may know, on exactly how many Soviet divisions are stationed in

Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary or Bulgaria ? S.: No, I never [illegible] happened to mention this and I could not very well ask him a direct question since it would display unusual interest on my part. I even found out about the nine armies by listening, I didn't ask a direct question to learn this. The best source for this would be to have an acquaintance with an officer in the First Directorate who would know all about the organisation and dispositions of Soviet forces. Such a man would know about special organisation in armies with respect to the number of divisions in it, then there could be no confusion in estimating the number of armies in Germany by taking a total of twenty divisions and deducing therefrom that there are four or five field armies.

41. G.: Do you know if KONEV would also have the Soviet forces in these countries under his command ? S.: KONEV will have under his command all those armies designated for the German napravleniye no matter where they are deployed. Presently within the D.D.R. the army is under [illegible], but he is subordinate to KONEV and is his Deputy, thereby placing the Soviet troops in the D.D.R. also under KONEV who would command a Front in case of war.

G.: Therefore Soviet troops in countries like Bulgaria would not be under KONEV. S.: That is right, it is too far to the south and these troops would be part of a South Eastern Napravleniye.

42. G.: You reported that there were still two field armies and one air army in the Sub-Carpathian Military District. How do you know this ? S.: Many people told me this beginning with POCOVNYY who had told me [illegible] this very often and it is hard for me to keep it in memory. No one mentioned this, but a common expression used was "within the structure of the four armies in the Sub-Carpathian Military District". (this was prior to the redeployment of the Eighth Mechanised Army).

43. G.: Will you specify exactly the types of divisions which exist in the Soviet Army, for example the Motostrelkovaya, Mekhanizirovannaya, Tankovaya. What other types of division exist now ? S.: There are others, for example, the Airborne Division; then there is an organisation called an Engineer Army into which structure go engineer divisions. And of course

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there are 160 Divisions. That is about all there are now. How many
about cavalry divisions ? S.: No. These do not exist any longer. Only
a few cavalry regiments have been retained. They are used [illegible] parades
and for some guard duty.

44. G.: Have you run across any indications of Soviet activities in
other areas of the world besides Iran, such as Albania, Indonesia or to stir
up further trouble in South East Asia ? S.: In the Central Committee this
is constantly being studied. We have special committees dealing with
these countries and nspravleniye. They are particularly concerned with
countries which are divided such as Korea, Indo-China and even now Laos.
Within all these countries there are many representatives from the General
Staff and the Ministry of Defence. G.: Do you know of any specific actions
being contemplated ? S.: No. I do not. They are, however, keeping close
contact in all these countries, for example, IONCHENKO is sitting with HO CHI
MINH as an advisor on intelligence matters. And there are many others in the
General Staff there also.

45. G.: Have you heard any specific reaction of senior officers to the
following U.S. actions regarding BERLIN: increase in military strength by
calling up two new divisions in the U.S., reinforcing U.S. troops in Europe by
40,000 men and reinforcement of the BERLIN garrison ? S.: All these actions
you speak of we have heard of and they are fully known in the Soviet Union. This
served to disturb and create a nervous tension to a considerable degree. In
the tendency was to move up more of our own forces in that direction. G.: Did
anyone express the feeling that these actions might bring the situation close
to a conflict ? That is that there could be a war ? S.: The general
impression I had up to the very day of my departure was that the Soviet
officers felt that the U.S., England and France were determined to take a firm
position and would not step back from it, with respect to the Berlin problem.

46. G.: In this connection it would be very important to have your views
about this or any other possible change of U.S. policy on Germany from
discussions amongst Soviet officials in the Soviet Embassy here. S.: That
is perfectly clear and I will certainly study this matter. G.: And in
addition we want to know about all orders of special significance

may be required in connection with this matter, furthermore, I'm sure the Resident will tell you to what degree he has had success in fulfilling his missions to collect data on NATO plans, policies and thoughts relating to the Berlin situation. S.: Very well. I will clarify this point.

4.7. I'd like to mention another thought that occurred to me just prior to my arrival orders for a greater concentration of forces were issued. As soon as MOSKVITSOK demanded the six PVO regiments of V-75 rockets moved in and I am under the impression that KONEV has constant direct contact with MOSCOW and KHRUSHCHEV has full confidence in him and has given him adequate responsibility. It was probably at KONEV's request that a third mechanized army was allocated as well as those six regiments. Maybe it was a response to the cable advising of the redeployment of the 270 French planes. This cable was given to MALINOVSKIY at night and in the morning when I went to see him he already had an addendum with MALINOVSKIY's order to take action to be taken absolutely only after a Paris item is positively identified. ZASORIN was the duty officer who received the cable.

4.8. [redacted] the Military Council [redacted] Supreme Military Council meets on a scheduled basis, it is a frequent occurrence for them to meet at an unscheduled time. KONEV may be asked to come on a one day notice and to furnish a report on some particular matter, or merely to attend in person if matters other than rockets are to be discussed. It is an operational body in the hands of the Government which can meet whenever it is needed. In addition it is not obligatory to assemble a quorum which may include all the commanders of Combat Armies. Only the necessary commanders are assembled who are in a position to make a decision. It is a very flexible body. G.: How often do they meet ? S.: These days they meet very frequently. There are many occasions when MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff, several commanders of the Combat Armies concerned, ANDRIAN and KOZLOV meet together, and there is your

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military Council. G.: I could [illegible] say, rather [illegible] last month [illegible] would be [illegible] be called out for a few hours or for a whole day. G.: [illegible] is that it would be of interest to know when VARENTSOV attended such military Council meetings in connection with his information [illegible] VARENTSOV as the source, so that we could possibly identify this information as coming from these meetings. S.: All I can say about this is that VARENTSOV is a very well informed man and when he [illegible] a statement regarding the current situation it may not be the result of decisions of yesterday's [illegible] Council meeting which he attended, but since he knows what has taken place before that it may be a summarized thought on his part. Therefore it is hard to separate out which information came from a decision of the Supreme Military Council, what came from VARENTSOV's discussions with his colleagues from other [illegible] and what came from a personal discussion between VARENTSOV and the Minister of Defence or the Chief of Staff.

49. G.: What is the precise name of this military council? Is it called the Verkhovnyy Voyennyy Sovet or is it called the Vyeshiy Voyennyy Sovet of the Ministry of Defence? S.: It is called the Vyeshiy Voyennyy Sovet. There is also a Verkhovnyy, that would refer to the Presidium. G.: I see. And who are the members of this Council? S.: Yes, of course.

50. G.: I have finished the agenda questions, but if you either have any items in mind which you would like reflected, please say so. Fine George, we have covered everything. G.: You see, questions of this type help to clarify and pinpoint your report. S.: Yes, and [illegible] for you elements of doubt. I suggest you send a cable to your [illegible] information [illegible] ask him to check his data.

51. G.: I can tell you that your data on U.S. [illegible] is wrong and possibly you will find out more about it if you return [illegible] I can tell you that the president from time to time [illegible] course, he only reports on matters of [illegible] and although he is responsible for reporting of the military [illegible] including all U.S. forces there, they probably would not [illegible] with accuracy [illegible] of the [illegible]

either. C:I But you say ZUBILOV has this data inscribed on his military Order of Battle maps. S:I Yes, and he gets his information through KGB channels. C:I If so he probably gets it from KORNIYEVSKIY and/or the Information Directorate, who certainly would be knowledgeable of all available facts. S:I Yes, you are correct, KORNIYEVSKIY would be very well informed on this, but that is how they estimate.

52. C:I Would you like to look at photographs now of the Soviets in France ? We have a tremendous amount of work to do to arrange our meeting tomorrow between YNNE and a man that we have spotted and then to meet with you and advise you as we have already planned so we will end this meeting with you examining the photographs. (Herold produced the sets of photographs for Soviets in France).

53. C:I I want to repeat to you for your clear understanding that if we do not succeed in making all arrangements tomorrow we will not pick you up tomorrow, but will tell YNNE by 1800 hours whether you will be picked up and at what time and where, either tomorrow or at a later date. I want you to know this so that you will not be disappointed and of course we will do our best to have all contacts worked out tomorrow. Therefore be prepared for either eventuality. S:I I understand completely. (Subject looks at the brochures which he will allegedly receive from YNNE and although subject requested more brochures from England it was explained to him that YNNE also collected brochures in French and other languages for subject in France. Approximately three or four brochures were in English and a fifth one was in Spanish and subject selected the ones which he desired from YNNE, all of which were explained to him as to the topics involved and these were placed in a separate file to be given to YNNE for passing to subject later.)

54. C:I What rumours have you heard expressed regarding [redacted] death ? S:I This occurred just shortly before my departure and nothing official has to be seen yet concerning this so I did not have a chance to get any information on this and here in PARIS I haven't heard a word about it.

55. By the way when will YNNE give me these brochures ? C:I The day after tomorrow, since tomorrow you will officially meet YNNE and introduce him to the Directors of the Exhibition. Of course, you can have it in the

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evening from Paris, tomorrow night, provided this is after you have introduced him to the Directors as if you had just met him for the first time. That's fine, I'll drop by his hotel and pick them up later. Are you sure that you cannot find anyone to introduce me to who had been at the French Exposition in Moscow? And about this woman, would she not do? [illegible] ask a hypothetical question, suppose there were a Frenchman who had been at the exhibition and who dealt in one of your fields of interest and you had his name and you dealed him up on your own. Remember, this Frenchman would have no relation to us whatsoever. S.: If you give me such names I could certainly call them up as a member of the Committee who is visiting Paris. I would figure out how to approach him, that is, what to say, just so long as I had the lead. J.: Then suppose that this Frenchman that you had contacted would go to the French police and say "There is a Soviet who is interested in [illegible]. How would this affect you?" (C. translates and clarifies for subject). S.: I will have to think about this. C.: Remember, if we don't control this man or in fact know anything about him there is no way to know what any particular individual would do. S.: I will have to think about this. This is a very serious matter and a delicate problem. Now I am ready to look at the photographs, there is work to be done. H.: I'll get the photographs and I think the points we asked him about were covered very well. C.: I'd say two points were slightly over covered.

56. Subject began to examine the photographs and made identifications as follows: (In the list which follows the names in parenthesis are those given on the cards. Subject identified by name only those officers whose names are not in parenthesis).

No. 77 This is the Ambassador, Sergei Aleksandrovich [illegible]ADOV.

57. No. 69 This man is like a Kurier Okhrany (security courier). He sits where the pass section is near the entrance. Although I did not see him in the Residentura, such people are always KGB (Pavel Mikhaylovich [illegible]).

58. No. 62 A GRU officer - he is an engineer and a specialist and he attended the operational meeting at the Residentura (Nikolai Nikolaievich SOLDATKIN).

59. No. 53 He is a KGB officer (Vladimir Nikolayevich SAVCHENKO).

60. No. 52 He is a KGB officer (Aleksandr Ivanovich KOROTKEVICH).

61. No. 49 Here is the chief book-keeper of the embassy. He is the one who changed my dollars into francs (Mikhail Andreyevich FATKOV).

62. No. 40 He is a KGB officer. I see him there every day. (Levon - or Leon - Petrovich MAYILYAN).

63. No. 38 A KGB officer (Nikolai LYSENKO).

64. No. 36 Here is a GRU officer. He is the one who sent a first cable about my arrival and he was also present at the operational meeting. He is a large impressive man. His name is LEBEDEV (Lt. Col. (Air Force) Aleksei Ivanovich LEBEDEV).

65. No. 31 Here is the Counsellor for Science and Technology. He is Ivan Pavlovich ZUBRILIN, a Colonel and GRU officer and the Second Deputy to the Resident. He was also at the operational meeting.

66. No. 29 Here is another GRU officer who also participated at the operational meeting. I will tell you all those who were there. (Yuvenali Ivanovich KHOLEV).

67. No. 22 Here is a GRU officer (Viktor Nikolayevich ISAEV). He was not at the meeting.

68. No. 21 A GRU officer (Vadim Georgiyevich KIRSEV).

69. No. 19 Here is a GRU officer who was not at the op. meeting with me. He sat in an office in the corridor and he graduated from the M.D.A. with me. His name is Captain 2nd Rank Valentin Gerasimovich Grigoriyev. He is an assistant to the Naval Attache, PROKHOROV. He is married to this teacher who is older than he is.

70. No. 14 A GRU officer, but this photograph is very poor. He also was not at the meeting (Igor Vasil'yevich PIREV).

71. No. 12 Here is a KGB officer. He is the one who meets all the fleet (Nikita Artemovich ZAPLUZHNYY).

72. No. 7 Here is the Resident, Gen. Major Ivan Nikolaevich [illegible]

73. No. 142 Here is a GRU officer who is an engineer on electronics and he was at the meeting. I remember his last name, it is ZEMLYANSKIY (Vladimir Ivanovich).

74. No. 137 Here is a GRU officer who has been in France before. He is a Naval officer (Vladimir Mikhailovich SVARLOV).

75. No. 129 A GRU officer. (Sergei Sergeievich PAVLOV).

76. No. 117 This is a GRU officer (Yevgeniy Andreievich LISITSIN).

77. No. 116 Here is also a GRU officer (Vassily Ivanovich LEVITSKIY).

78. No. 114 A GRU officer (Yevgeniy Mikhailovich KUZKIN).

79. No. 102 Now here is a GRU officer (Vladimir Alekseyevich FEDOTOV).

80. No. 98 Here is a GRU officer who was present at the operational meeting (Aleksey Vasil'yevich [illegible]).

81. No. 68 ANAN'YEV Igor Aleksandrovich. I found him. He is a Colonel and the First Deputy to the Resident. H.: It says ANANIL on the card. S.: No. That is wrong, his name is ANAN'YEV, with a soft sign. He was also at the O.S. meeting.

82. S.: I do not see General SKOKOV. G.: That is because he probably only came recently and we did not have a chance to insert his picture yet.

S.: There are a lot of old pictures of GRU officers here and they have left France already.

83. No. 155 Here is a KGB Armenian (actually Georgian) (GULYA Nikolayevich KELADZE).

84. S.: Where is that stout assistant to the Military Attache; he graduated from the Academy with me, I don't see his picture. (There was no picture of this officer but on Wednesday September 27th subject verbally reported that this GRU officer was the Assistant Air Attache and that his name was Colonel LAZARCHUK).

85. No. 174 Here is a KGB officer. He has become much stouter since this picture was taken and I had dinner with him (NIL Ivanovich LENDEV).

86. Not 5 of Joe's list — Here is PROSKUROV (Vladimir) the Naval Attache, he was also at the Ops. meeting.

87. Not 6 of Joe's list — Here is a GRU officer, he was not at the meeting. (Aleksandr PORTAKHALOV). He had formerly been in Pakistan.

(This completed the examination of the pictures. The Diplomatic List was also examined, but since its date of issue was March 1961 Gen. Major SOKOLOV was not included, but instead it gave Gen. Major MASLOV as the Military Attache).

63. S.: Is there anything else we must cover tonight ? G.: No. We have finished with our questions and our pictures. S.: I have the building lay-outs of the Embassy and I'd like to spend five or ten minutes looking at it. We can spot the offices of GRU. (Subject said that on the second floor in one of the wings only GRU officers and the Referentura were located). (He showed on the plans where the entrances were, the staircase to the second floor, the Residentura room of CHERDENTSEV where the Ops. meetings were held and the few offices he had visited, including that of Gen. Major SOKOLOV. He pointed out that there was only one telephone in the common lobby of the Referentura and this was an internal Embassy phone. For outside calls, the GRU officer would be called out to where city phones were placed. In addition to the GRU offices, on the fourth floor where the Embassy Counsellors are located, those GRU officers who had official Embassy cover positions, such as KHOKHLOV also had their overt offices. (The second floor being one flight up).

89. G.: We don't want to start any other new work because you won't have time to finish it and it is better to do it afresh. S.: Did you get any results yet from the materials which I submitted and about which you may have some questions ? G.: We have not had time to work it over yet. That will take a considerable time. By the way I have a message for you from our chiefs. It says that the evaluation of the material you have obtained in the Artillery Journals is rated very highly and you are to be commended for your initiative and judgement in selecting the articles that you did. S.: There is another item on artillery which is in Russian here

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and is waiting for me. All of these articles including that one
DUBINOV signed out for personally. After all I don't have the right to go
into their files since I am not a member of that command.

90. G.: How are you getting along with your own purchases. We are
moving along gradually on the list that you gave us. S.: I have not done
much shopping yet, I just got a lot of little items when I went shopping
with [illegible].

91. J.: Tell me, do you have a dacha now ? S.: No, I didn't buy one,
neither did I rent one. G.: Was it because you had no time ? S.: Er,
yes, partially, but then you rather discouraged me from doing this also, but
I do have money. However, I didn't rent one. Before I leave me will
reconsider this matter again and you can advise me if I should have one or
not. I need a place to go to should I have to leave Moscow suddenly. The
only area I can think of now from which one can get out of the country is the
Baltic area, since things are shut tight in Germany now. At least that's
how I see it and that is better than dragging the family all the way to the
Far East to make a border crossing there. G.: How about the southern areas
like those facing Turkey and Iran. S.: The borders are very tightly
controlled there. G.: How about water exfiltration from the area of BATUM
on the Black Sea ? S.: That is a very good idea and I know that area
particularly from the Turkish side since I was involved in handling this
plane that crashed there; the Turkish village is only seven kilometres away
from BATUM. I have a good friend in that town that I visit whenever I am
there and I am as at home with him as with relatives. His brother was in
VATUTIN'S command and was killed during the war. We often sat at the
seashore where he has his own dacha and swam in the Black Sea and we could
see the border illuminated by both Turkish and Soviet projectors. Our border
guards parade along the shore-line often accompanied by dogs. The only way to
get out from there would be by a small boat straight out to sea and then be
picked up. The only other place that seems favourable to me is the Baltic
area where the people hate the Soviet regime and are waiting to be liberated.

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One could get out from there by boat. However your suggestion about BATUM is very good; it can be done from there. G.: Do Naval craft patrol the shore-line heavily ? S.: There are patrol boats there, but not many. Let me ask this question again. If I compromise myself, would I be accepted if I ran to a Western Embassy ? H.: They can't do anything for him because they can't get him out of the country. (Subject understood the difficulty and left shortly thereafter at about 2300 hours. Subject was delivered near the area of his hotel by R. and J. and arrived there without incident).

MEETING NO. 35 - 27th SEPTEMBER, 1961.

1. In following the plan as laid out in the previous meeting, No. 34, of the 26th September, for the day of September 27th, it had been arranged with subject to meet on September 28th by being picked up at RV point No. 1 at 2000 hours. In addition to debriefing subject on the events of September 27th and advising him regarding his future course of action, it was also planned to have an operational meeting together with subject and Janet to finalize MOSCOW contact arrangements for the balance of 1961. However, due to the unexpected requirement for Janet to be in LONDON by 1500 hours on 28th September, in order to execute this part of the operational plan it was decided to instruct subject through WYNNE to be picked up at 2100 hours at RV point No. 1 on the 27th September. This meeting also would have the advantage of checking more closely with subject the events of the very full day. Accordingly subject was so instructed and was picked up at RV Point No. 1 at 2100 hours by M. and G. with Roger checking for surveillance from another vehicle. Subject arrived at the safe apartment at 2125 hours.

2. G.: Our friend mentioned in the car that there are unpleasantnesses with WYNNE and he wants to give us a full report about it. (Roger was called in to listen to subject's version of the difficulties and G. translated for Roger points that were unclear.) S.: As soon as Roger is ready we will consider the WYNNE problem. WYNNE is waiting at his hotel now. (Subject stated that WYNNE's disposition is extremely bad and that he would attempt to portray his version of the facts and we could make our own conclusions and analysis. Subject said that WYNNE did not want to work with him or with us any longer because first of all WYNNE felt insecure with respect to his future and was always given a waiting answer so that he did not know where he stood. He added that he felt he was doing important work together with us but he insisted on having his future secured and unless it is so secured he would rather not continue to work with us and was planning to return to

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LONDON the next day. WYNNE added that he wanted to acquaint him with certain facts even though he was forbidden by us to do so. Subject reminded WYNNE that he would report this to us because he must and WYNNE agreed. WYNNE was unhappy because his wife had been twice contacted by telephone in LONDON by someone who enquired when WYNNE would go to BELGRADE. This disturbed her and she in turn called her husband in PARIS and he was further disturbed because she was contacted and even that night while WYNNE and subject were having dinner, after subject had met HOCK, WYNNE called his wife again in LONDON. When subject asked WYNNE why he was so concerned about BELGRADE, WYNNE confessed to subject that nothing had been prepared properly for the BELGRADE trip with respect to the necessary appointments and business details for negotiations there on behalf of the English firms represented by WYNNE. WYNNE told him that he was prevented from making adequate preparations and arrangements due to the time required of him to spend on subject's behalf, but in subject's opinion this was entirely due to WYNNE's own fault in doing nothing in the free time he had when subject's interests did not require handling. Subject then stated that another basic reason for WYNNE's disgruntled feeling was that WYNNE was dissatisfied with the financial arrangements and when the figures and conditions were mentioned by subject, allegedly as reported to him by WYNNE, they were in complete error as Harold explained in detail. Either WYNNE did not tell subject the truth or subject garbled the facts or WYNNE himself was under a misapprehension or possibly WYNNE was cleverly laying the groundwork for additional future demands. WYNNE further stressed to subject that he was unclear as to his future because he had to spend so much time on the operation that he was gradually losing the confidence of the firms he represents which will drop off from him and that is why now he is unprepared to go to BELGRADE and plans to return to LONDON. In addition WYNNE complained that he would not receive a decoration about which he was told that the concept emanated from subject's imagination and subject confessed that he did infer this to WYNNE long ago in MOSCOW and WYNNE was further disgruntled allegedly because he could discuss nothing with subject even though they were closely bound together in work. Subject stated further

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that with such an attitude he did not need WYNNE to work with and added that since WYNNE had done everything for us that was required of him and was well paid for it and also performed his work in a commendable way as a patriot he should be released if he feels that way. But subject continued with the same breath, and in fact in the same sentence, adding that furthermore he does not need WYNNE until January or February of 1962 when WYNNE will come with a delegation to MOSCOW. Subject felt that the basis for WYNNE's attitude was entirely monetary. As a parting shot subject said that he did not need WYNNE in PARIS, however it would be well if WYNNE would return to PARIS just prior to subject's departure, so that he could notionally deliver brochures to subject and see him off to his plane as a farewell gesture.

3. Although these apparent disgruntlements had to be considered in a serious light because of the overall importance of the operation, they did in fact, as we suspected, turn out to be a tempest in a teapot. That very evening WYNNE denied to Roger that he wished to stop work and furthermore he did in fact of his own volition go to BELGRADE on the following day. All misunderstandings of course can and will be resolved and the situation developed to the point that it did purely as the result of strained nerves. There is no question that subject both wittingly and unwittingly can be most trying in his often capricious demands and handling him on the part of all concerned requires great patience even if understanding is not always possible.

4. While Roger was still present subject was requested to report on his contact with [redacted] so that Roger would be in possession of those facts prior to talking to WYNNE later that evening. As a further sequel to the above disgruntlement on the part of WYNNE, it should be stated here that that same evening at about 2300 hours WYNNE called to determine whether subject wanted to go out with him on the town that night which was impossible and consequently refused by subject. On the other hand just prior to WYNNE's departure for BELGRADE by plane on the following day, subject called WYNNE and expressed his thanks and gratitude to WYNNE for his many services and kindnesses to subject and added a phrase to the effect that he had spoken to his friends on behalf of WYNNE and that they had agreed to take care of WYNNE's problems and demands.

5. With respect to the contact with [redacted] subject said that as per plan he was in his hotel at 1500 hours and WYNNE called him at 1500 hours to advise him that immediately after the close of business at about 1830 or 1900 hours, WYNNE would contact subject again for a possible meeting with a man. He did this at 1745 by phone and instructed subject to come immediately to his hotel. Subject was there in one half hour and picked up WYNNE at his hotel and proceeded in the same taxi to the George V Hotel where they went to the bar. Mr. [redacted] met them in the lobby at which point subject was introduced to [redacted] and when they went to the bar WYNNE went to order the drinks while subject and [redacted] had the opportunity of discussing everything necessary alone. Subject was extremely pleased with [redacted], both with respect to his personality and the way he understood everything subject had to say and subject on his part understood everything [redacted] had to say. Subject told [redacted] about the four main points of technical interest that he had and that subject had been at the Exposition and had been asked about these items by Soviet experts and subject further asked for assistance to visit certain types of plants. [redacted] carefully jotted down all this data and explained that he was going on a short trip on Thursday, the following day, and would return on the 4th or 5th of October. Upon his return he promised to call subject at his hotel, the number of which he gave him, at 0800 hours and arrange a meeting with subject at which everything could be discussed further. He also asked him for brochures as well as to arrange visits to plants. Subject was impressed with [redacted]'s co-operation and added that when these recontact arrangements were made, WYNNE was not present. G. asked subject if subject considered WYNNE's performance in making the introduction and setting up the contact was satisfactory, and subject immediately replied that WYNNE had done a first rate job and that in general WYNNE deserved nothing but praise for his operational support work in general. He further added that he forgot to mention that one reason for WYNNE's being upset was that his wife told him that all was not going on smoothly with the reconstruction job of WYNNE's home in LONDON. Obviously this is another actual factor for WYNNE to be in a more nervous state of mind than usual. At this point Roger departed to consult with WYNNE on his side of the story.

6. G. enquired if subject had in fact consulted with CHEREDEYEV about the clearance for making a telephone approach to TARASSOFF, and subject replied that he could not see the Rezident that morning although he was at the Embassy at 0900 hours, because the Rezident was completely tied up with Embassy matters involving his cover position as Counsellor, because they expected a visit from the Premier of France to the Exposition on the following day and a visit by General de GAULLE on the day after that. This, of course, involved tremendous preparations on the part of the Embassy and extreme confusion. Therefore he could not see the Rezident but spoke to his deputy ANANYEV about the brochures given to subject by WYNNE. ANANYEV, being an engineer, examined these brochures and gave a favourable evaluation. He kept them at the Rezidentura for further analysis to decide what to send to GRU and what to send to the Committee. Subject merely mentioned that he was busy making contacts and would devise a plan after he had everything organised and lined up and would present it later with his proposal as to how to proceed. He said everything was fine at the Embassy and that he had then gone to the Exhibition where the collapsed staircase was being repaired for the following day. Subject stated that he did not call TARASSOFF that day because he had promised us to first speak about it with the Rezident. Prior to discussing TARASSOFF further, subject confessed that there were two reasons why he came with such meagre, if any, preparations from his end in MOSCOW concerning contacts with French businessmen who had visited MOSCOW. The first reason he gave was that he had completely over-estimated our capabilities for having such contacts at our finger tips in PARIS. He understood clearly why this was not the case now and admitted his serious error in making this assumption. The second reason, which was interwoven with the first, was that he in fact was not sure that he would be sent to PARIS at all at the time when the French Exposition was running in MOSCOW, so he made little effort to establish the groundwork for this possible trip, not having much faith in his chances of coming here. Only after the French Exposition was his trip to PARIS formulated and it was too late to do what he should have done earlier. Subject also

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emphasised that he was reluctant to seek French contacts in MOSCOW in view of the intensive effort made by the KGB to do just that and he did not want to run into their interests. Subject further emphasised that all Frenchman having Russian names or known to be of Russian extraction are prime targets of KGB interest. In this connection subject was not referring to TARASSOFF, about whom he was unwitting at the time, but to another Frenchman with a Russian name about whom he had learned in the notes on the Frenchwoman interpreter which were given to him by LOPATENKO and which he had shown to us. He was afraid of contacting this man or any other Frenchman to whom he had only a tenuous introduction, because of fear of running into the wrong person and he assumed that we had the capability in PARIS of selecting a reliable person. In this respect subject candidly stated that he wanted to be honest with us otherwise we would have grounds to assume that he was doing nothing to further his own cause and was as lazy as ZENNE. Subject continued by saying that he now felt confident something very tangible would emerge from his contact with [redacted] and now there was a firm basis with which to work to accomplish his mission. With respect to TARASSOFF, he said that that man was most attractive with respect to his position but requested additional checks made on our part prior to his contacting TARASSOFF because of a feeling subject had that possibly the KGB had contacted, ~~if not recruited,~~ TARASSOFF in MOSCOW and he could run into serious trouble because as soon as the name would be traced with the KGB, they would see that subject, as the son of a White Army officer, had been drawn as by a magnet to another White Russian and that would be the end for him. Therefore, no matter how strong the temptation had been and still was to contact this man, subject was very glad that he had the opportunity on this day to consult with us about the desirability of his making this contact and he desired our confirmation and approval that he should do so. All agreed that in view of this most serious consideration and in addition to the obvious fact that the KGB in MOSCOW would have an extensive dossier on TARASSOFF at the very least [redacted]

[redacted] After further deliberation and telling subject that we would consider this, he returned the notes given to him the day before by G. on TARASSOFF and we further decided later that this operational lead would be discarded. Subject also stated that although CHEREDEYEV may approve the contact, with no consultation with the local KGB since GRU and KGB are in a sense competitors for Western contacts, and though CHEREDEYEV knows nothing of subject's White Army father background and neither do the local KGB, still if and when the time comes for further operational activity with TARASSOFF the inevitable KGB name trace at the MOSCOW level would undoubtedly bring out the very dangerous allegation referred to above. Subject of course did not mention anything about this to ANANYEV since ANANYEV is not in position of authority to make any decision and secondly it would be strictly none of ANANYEV's business. In addition subject must make a report on this in MOSCOW, as an operational accomplishment of his, irrespective of how the matter is handled in PARIS and there in MOSCOW that inevitable KGB trace request could cause considerable danger to subject. Subject even suggested that as a third possibility he contact the man without reporting to either the PARIS Rezidentura or to MOSCOW and obtain material from the contact alleging it to come from another source. This was completely discarded and although subject was told we would consider this individual further we had decided amongst ourselves to drop TARASSOFF completely and look for someone else if necessary.

7. Subject then displayed the issue of 'Pravda' for 26th September and pointed out that the Soviet Government had officially announced the forthcoming military large-scale manoeuvres. Subject particularly stressed that the announcement stated that the manoeuvres were planned for the months of October and November. This fact to supplement subject's own report as learned from VARENTSOV and others, that the manoeuvres would last a month with a short possible extension, in subject's view is a bold admission on KHRUSHCHEV's part that he will continue to build up and develop his armed forces in these manoeuvres to cover the entire period after the Party Congress, the signing

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of the Peace Treaty and the November holidays to be in position to influence his political moves with the maximum combat-ready forces. Of course these other consequences, namely the purpose for having this force available, was not mentioned in the paper, said subject.

8. At this point Janet entered and was warmly greeted by subject. This event was described to subject as the surprise of the evening and it was held at this time because Janet had to return to London on the following day. After lengthy discussions concerning subject's schedule for his leave of 35 days of which he would take 16 days at a sanatorium at KISLOVODSK and the remainder he would spend working for us in MOSCOW, and after Janet had described fully her normal pattern of movements on Mondays and Fridays to the Arbat area, the following schedule was established to cover the balance of the month of October, the month of November and the month of December. Subsequent contact arrangements would be established in early December based on subject's information on his own plans and subject to our concurrence. The October schedule would begin on Friday the 20th October, which would be a personal meet at the Commission store on the Arbat at 1300 hours. For every Friday beginning with the 20th October and running through until the end of November, this site and time would be considered as the basic meeting. Every Monday following the Fridays above and thus beginning with Monday the 23rd October, would be considered to be the alternate meeting for the preceeding Friday. The place would be the left hand store on the second floor of the Praga Restaurant and the time would also be at 1300 hours. Only in the event that no meeting takes place on a Friday would Janet appear on the following Monday. Hoever, if a meeting took place on Monday she would still appear on the following basic Friday meeting site. The schedule for December would be reversed in some respects as follows. The basic meeting would still be on Fridays and it would take place on the 1st December, but the site would now be in the park at 1600 hours. The alternate meeting would still be on Mondays following every Friday at 1300 hours at the store above the Praga. The one exception would be that Monday, Christmas Day, is omitted as an alternate meeting time. The above is the exact and simple schedule to cover the balance of 1961.

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9. Subject mentioned that his own schedule would be as follows: He would leave PARIS on the 15th October; he would need about five days to complete all of his official reports and submit them to both the GRU and the Committee. Then he would request his leave to begin between the 20th and 25th October and the normal thirty-day leave allowance would be increased to thirty-five days to include allowable travel time. Whether he took his sixteen days rest cure at the KISLOVODSK sanatorium during the first half of the 35 day period or the second half of the period would depend on his success in obtaining his putevka (booking) for the first half. At any rate subject stated that he would definitely meet Janet on the first schedules meeting of Friday October 20th and give her a note with written explanation as to his leave time schedule and his date of return to relieve her of the burden of going to the meeting places unnecessarily during that time. Furthermore it was pointed out that with the exception of the sealed cassette packages containing undeveloped film Janet should examine any loose material to see if it does not contain a message for her. Similarly Janet was warned by G. that in some distant phase of the operation it may be possible, even though not contemplated for this current phase of scheduled meets, that subject may include what appears to be a blank piece of folded paper. This paper should never be discarded since it may contain secret writing. The over-all plan was clearly understood by all concerned.

10. At first there was a discussion about using a number of telephone rings by subject to signify that he was going on leave on the following day, but since he will already know by the 20th October and will so inform Janet in a note, the concept of using telephone rings was carried over to another plan which involved the most urgent type of message passing on the part of subject under conditions of crisis which would be included together with a signalling plan and a dead-drop and this concept was discussed at length with a tentative plan established at the end of the meeting after Janet's departure, since it did not concern her actions in any way.

11. /

11. With respect to Janet one additional important consideration was resolved. This was to smoothly effect an actual official meeting between Janet and subject at a reception either at an Embassy or at a private residence to which logically and officially both could be invited guests. Subject reviewed all of the official receptions at Embassies and private homes that he had been invited to on an official basis by dates and places as well as persons since he was a member of the Committee. It so happened that both were invited to the home of Hilary KING, subject once and Janet numerous times. It also appeared that from their respective recollection of the persons present that they both had been there already without being introduced to each other at the party at Hilary KING's first residence on the Prospekt MIRA near the RIGA railroad station on one of the days between the 8th and 10th December 1960. At any rate for chance queries both subject and Janet could conveniently use that place and date as a legend for having met each other as an excellent cover for an unexpected meeting and greeting in MOSCOW should any question ever arise on the part of KGB or whomsoever. In the meantime an actual meeting would be arranged between the two at a reception to be given by Dr. SENIOR, the Scientific Attache at the British Embassy. Subject interjected here that when people have once met officially, subsequent contacts are perfectly normal and approved. As an example he said that GVISHIANI has a good friend, an Italian, whose name is MARINOTTI. This man has been living in MOSCOW for six months now in a very fine room which he uses as an office, in the Hotel National, which GVISHIANI has arranged for him. The man seems to be of considerable value to GVISHIANI and they are close friends and go out together to eat and drink, etc. and in addition the Italian always brings GVISHIANI fine gifts. The Italian often goes to LONDON, NEW YORK and WASHINGTON. Subject was involved in reconciling the mandatory request by IONOV the Chief of all hotels in MOSCOW to remove the Italian from his room during the time that the various delegates to the Party Congress would be in MOSCOW. This was an order from the Supreme Soviet. GVISHIANI did not want the Italian removed, but it was so arranged that the Italian's office with all of his paraphanalia was locked up in the Italian's room while the Italian himself planned to go on leave to Italy during the period of the Party Congress. This satisfied everyone. Subject used this interesting

relationship as an example of approved contact with foreigners by Soviets. Getting back to his own contacts subject stated that he had first met KING at a reception at the Hotel National dining room when the WYNNE delegation first arrived in MOSCOW and later KING invited him to his home for a reception on the Prospekt Mira. The date was about the 8th-10th December and the whole delegation of thirteen persons from England were there, and from the Committee, in addition subject LEVIN, LOPATENKO, POLYAKOV and SHVARTS were there and many other , including numerous people from the British Embassy. Subject was told that the above would be used as a legend and an actual reception where both would meet would be planned for the time after he returns from his leave because there would not be sufficient time to do it earlier. Subject stated that he had also met Dr. SENIOR the Scientific Attache at KING's reception in December 1960, but he had never met him at the Committee offices although he knows that SENIOR comes to the Committee at least once every month, since it was preferable, on the basis of personal security, to meet at a reception at Dr. SENIOR's house, instead of at KING's. Subject was asked whether it would be normal for him to be invited by Dr. SENIOR, to which subject replied that it certainly would be logical and in fact BERDENIKOV, who knows Dr. SENIOR well personally, had called him on subject's behalf when subject was attempting to get his visa quickly to go to LONDON. Subject stressed that at this time it would be very desirable for him to be invited to the British, French and Canadian Embassies and to any receptions held elsewhere by the English, Canadians or French, to which foreigners are normally invited. He also is concerned with the American Embassy, although up to now in a passive role. He had already received an American delegation at the Committee who came regarding matters of patents and licensing. Subject said that the chief was FRIEDMAN and all the other members were also Jews. Subject met another American who was in MOSCOW as a tourist and whose visa he had extended for him twice for ten days each at the American's request. Subject flew to PARIS in the same plane as this American, but only bumped into him at LE BOURGET. The American's name was McKELLAR, or something similar.

12. Subject remarked that anyone who has official dealings with the Committee can invite him with other members of the Committee to Embassy receptions, to private homes of those Embassy officials and even to restaurants which often have been used for receptions in case more room was required.

13. At this point Janet left since the schedule for the balance of 1961 was established. Subject was again reminded to submit his meeting proposals for January and beyond in early December. In addition he was reminded to be sure to carefully document his future information reports with every sub-source, date and circumstance.

14. The MOSCOW signal sites were then taken up. Subject was shown photographs of every site and they were oriented on the map of MOSCOW. After lengthy discussion as to how and when these could be used, subject selected in order of preference No. 3, then No. 1 and last No. 2. The purpose of the signal was to call the observer to the dead drop at once since this communication system was to be used only in the case of extreme emergency.

15. After much discussion regarding the way to secure the dead-drop procedure in terms of minimum time that material would remain therein it was tentatively decided that a signal placed on the adopted site during the night would mean that the DLB would be loaded at 0900 on the following morning. The observer would unload it as quickly as possible. That same evening subject would receive a telephone call, at a time to be set, in the form of a signal of so many rings. This would confirm that the DLB had been cleared. Any other signalling method indicating clearance of DLB such as placing a scratch on the radiator or signalling again elsewhere would require subject to reappear at the DLB site or the signal site a second time, which is undesirable. Thus at this meeting the concept was established and the precise mechanics will be adopted prior to subject's departure.

16. He left at 0045 hours on 28th September and was dropped off a few blocks from his hotel by Roger and J. without incident.

Meeting No. 36 - 30th September, 1961.

1. Subject was picked up at RV Point No. 1 by prearranged schedule from the last meeting at 20.00 hours on 30th September by Roger and G. It was raining slightly and the pick-up was effected with very great speed with absolutely no-one in visible distance. It appears that RV 1 is an ideal pick-up point. This is also Subject's opinion since his accessibility to it from his end is also effective in his ability to observe foot surveillance, and car surveillance is impossible since he crosses the footbridge across the Seine. It has been contemplated to establish an additional RV point which is on the other side of the Palais de Chaillot. As soon as Subject was picked up he also expressed the opinion that RV Point No. 2 should be abandoned because on his last approach thereto WYNNE had dropped him off too close to the Soviet Embassy compound and Subject felt that by chance someone in the future could spot him walking toward RV 2. This was our intention anyway, so while driving to the safe apartment, Roger deliberately drove slowly by the new RV Point No. 3 which, like RV 1 has the advantageous feature of not permitting car surveillance since the last few hundred yards are up a lengthy staircase which the contacting case officer can observe throughout its entire length prior to meeting Subject and escorting him to the car which will be parked at a higher elevation only a short distance away. At the end of the meeting Subject was dropped off in the area of his hotel but he was accompanied by M. J. and "John" and again RV Point No. 3 was pointed out to him for additional orientation.

2. Subject arrived at the safe apartment at 20.20 hours. As he arrived he mentioned what a small town PARIS was, since he had spotted J., and G. who were with "John" and L. drinking coffee on the Champs Elysees. Subject had walked by without batting an eyelash. This was a fortuitous circumstance since it served as an example in reverse to Subject to indicate how easily he too can be spotted by his KGB surveillants. G. explained to the other case officers about Subject's apprehension of RV No. 2 which

/we had....

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we had just dropped and mentioned his orientation on RV No. 3 and suggested that on the return trip RV No. 3 be pointed out again from the passing car from the other side to be sure Subject would know it thoroughly even at night. This was later done as stated above.

H.: Yes, this is a good thing and we have scrubbed RV 2 anyway. Subject was shown a sketch of the area where he had just been and he identified the exact location thereon.

(3.) Subject then reported as follows:

S.: For the past two days I have spoken on each day to the Rezident. His attitude to me is very cordial and pleasant. He gave me operational funds yesterday and offered me more so that I could entertain my contacts. He even invited me to his home and I will visit him one of these days. I was also invited by LAZARCHUK. I also spoke to GRIGORIYEV and PROKHORCV, who said that they would have liked to have invited me but they cannot and I can meet them in the office and have a bottle of wine with them there. This is because the French surveille them and this would be awkward. It is because they have overt U.N. positions. GRIGORIYEV did not become Captain 2nd rank yet, although it has been submitted. He is still a Captain 3rd rank.

(4.) G.: But you can visit the Resident and others officially.

S.: Yes. Because he has the cover of a Counsellor and I can also visit ANANYEV and KUDRYAVTSEV.

G.: When will you visit CHEREDNYEV?

S.: He didn't tell me when yet, it could be for dinner during the day or in the evening. SOLOV'EV also invited me, he is the GRU officer who works in the group on science and technology under KUDRYAVTSEV. And KUDRYAVTSEV also invited me to visit him on Sunday. Also tomorrow I have to meet a delegation of 14 people who have just arrived. I will report to you on them in a moment. They just arrived today and I have not met them yet.

(5.) S.: Let me say now what items of importance came out of my conversation. The GRU officers are working very actively in PARIS.

/The Rezident....

The Rezident, ANANYEV and PROKHOROV all told me that one can run clandestine operations successfully here. The counter-intelligence activities are ineffectual (nekval[illegible]tsirovannyye) and in effect it does not exist. The French counter-intelligence is very weak and surveille us in a primitive manner. If we ever go out of town by car their surveillance car is right on our tail and will not fall behind more than 600 metres. It is a demonstrative surveillance. In town here although they watch us in the Embassy and in our homes and follow us it is no problem to break surveillance and we can work here as we please. There are millions of handy places through which surveillance can be shaken off. This is the evaluation of the Parisian atmosphere that they have given me. Meetings, passage of information, etc. is no problem at all. Dead-drops are used very rarely since it is so easy to make direct contact. PROKHOROV said that by comparison with Turkey it is quite simple to operate here. There are only two complications here when one approaches a Frenchman directly he usually reports at once to French counter-intelligence that a Russian is interested in him. He reports all conversations and all questions or requests made by the Russian. Of course, when we get a solid spotting report on a particular individual then procedure goes along smoothly. This is where our Communist comrades give us tremendous help. They both spot targets for us and in many cases make direct introductions. Secondly it is difficult for us to get at a target of considerable interest unless we have a Communist's assistance in spotting or actually introducing the target of interest. Therefore almost all contacts are held here in PARIS, the agents are called to PARIS since it is so easy to work here.

6. G.: What is the status of their mission accomplishment?

S.: They do not fulfil them in full but there is plenty of work to do.

/G.: ....

G.: What is the MOSCOW evaluation of their work?

S.: They are not being criticised for not fulfilling every single mission and the work of the strategic intelligence Rezidentura in France is considered to be an active and useful one. They even have illegals here.

7. S.: In connection with this, I want you to write this down. Today PROKHOROV asked me if I ever had run into YERMOLENKO. He was a Captain and an engineer by education who graduated from the M.D.A. together with GRIGORIYEV and myself in 1953. GRIGORIYEV told me with absolute certainty that YERMOLENKO was an illegal and that he is now sitting in some country to which he has been sent. He is slightly shorter than I and rather thin. He was a particularly good friend of GRIGORIYEV's, that is why GRIGORIYEV knows about him.

G.: How would GRIGORIYEV know that YERMOLENKO is an illegal?

S.: We knew this when we were studying at the M.D.A. and several months before our graduation he was taken out of town to a special safe house to be trained.

G.: He has never met him here in France has he?

S.: No. He does not know where he is.

G.: What languages does he specialise in?

S.: His prime language was English and French was his secondary language. But of course God only knows how he may have been re-orientated later.

8. S.: Another interesting item which dovetails with the report I made earlier that the Rezidents are no longer the Military Attache, and that GRU officers seek other cover than the Attache's office is emphasised by the fact that Gen. Major SOKOLOV does not have an Assistant. Actually he is helped in his work as a Military Attache by other Attaches such as by GRIGORIYEV and to some extent by PROKHOROV. This is because there are no other Attache people, the others are all under cover like LAZARCHUK. Just look what a comparison this is with the huge Military

/Attache....

Attache group which existed under Gen. MASLOV.

9. S.: I also want to emphasise that on the same second floor where the GRU Rezidentura is located, beyond the next partition is the KGB Rezidentura. Both are blocked off from other, non-Intelligence offices. And one can use the far stairs or the stairs at the right to go to the second floor so that one can reach the GRU Rezidentura at either end of its suite of rooms. The KGB also have a buzzer system to admit them to their area. The entire area has been checked, rebuilt and made suitable for use as Rezidenturas. So much for that.

10. S.: CHEREDEYEV must know that I have good standing with SEROV and he is being very accommodating.

G.: How could he know this?

S.: I think as the result of his visits to MOSCOW he knows that my father-in-law was a General, that my distant relative is a General and that I know other Generals. He receives me much better than Lev did in LONDON.

G.: When official word arrived here announcing your TDY trip, how would the KGB here in PARIS react to this fact, which they would unquestionably know , with respect to their watching you. Would they not automatically be charged with doing this, particularly since you have come alone and not as a member of a delegation.

S.: The KGB could certainly do this on their own decision and they would know about my arriving here automatically. In addition, since I have come myself and have a travel document that is fairly high level, it would indicate that I enjoy the trust of the organisation that sent me and of the Central Committee. However, not only on their own part locally, but as the result of a direct order they may watch and write a report on me reflecting on my behaviour here. But thus far I have not seen any surveillance on me and I am checking for it all the time. They do know where I live and they have my telephone number.

G.: Of course, if you had a large delegation here withwhom you were involved, there could be a co-opted KGB informant in the delegation who would report on you.

S.: Irrespective of that and such an informant's report, the local

/KGB....

KGB here would make their own report. Today, there are such a large number of Soviets in PARIS due to the Exhibition that they have a problem watching everyone, but they did ask all about me at the Embassy. They do know from simple observation what organisation I belong to since they see with whom I speak and whom I visit at the Embassy. At any rate my work and relations at the Embassy and at the Exhibition are getting along well.

11. S.: However, I request your help in seeing if I can make a contact in the electronics field since both CHEREDEYEV, and ANAN'YEV have asked me that if possible would I please introduce them to such a specialist before I leave. They hope to get even a bit of assistance from all others who come here like I do to help them fulfil their mission. They will advise me about my itinerary after the Exhibition closes and of course their prime interest is that I should visit some plants which are concerned with electronics and chemistry. So please help me to at least accomplish a little bit here. I have given them another little package of brochures and will give them more later. The greatest interest of all for them is the firm BAGNEUX. You gave me two little items from this firm, one was old and they knew about it but the other one was of great interest. What interests them most of all about this firm is that it works exclusively on military orders. No Soviets are permitted to visit this firm. In the past the few who did visit were guided to one side and were given no brochures. They don't even have a catalogue of this firm. They requested me to pick up a catalogue so they could see what the firm is manufacturing. Since it is such a restrictive firm there is certainly no point for me to go there since for me to succeed in this would look very unusual, as a mere traveller in France. However, a few brochures from there would be most valuable if I could get them through [redacted] or through WYNNE. Another firm of interest to them whose catalogues you have given me, is the firm ACTA.

/12. ....

12. S.: Now, with respect to HOOK, I will represent him as an acquaintance of WYNNE's and I need basic background information on HOOK. I did not write it down. I do not think it wise to have HOOK meet anyone in the Embassy personally, after all he is an American businessman and representative here and not a pure Frenchman. I can get some materials through him, some contacts and I will write it up that way, and that is all. With respect to White Russian emigrants I have kept away from all of them who are visiting MOSCOW from here, even though I had many opportunities to meet them. And I will also stay away from them here in PARIS - it is better that way.

G.: Wait and see to whom HOOK introduces you and when you go on your trip you may meet people.

S.: All I need is some basic data on HOOK so that I can report on him in terms of who he is in contact with and where he works but if I do not offer him as a possible contact, they will leave him alone.

13. Subject now looked through his many pieces of paper and notes and said "Please write this down. The Chief of the INTOURIST representation here in PARIS is Anatoliy [illegible]yevich DUDIN, who is a KGB man. His office number is RICHelieu 4740 and his home telephone is TRIanon 14.45. I bumped into him today because he is concerned with all the delegations which arrive here. He is a KGB officer, but I do not know his rank. I can also give you the telephone number of SOLOV'YEV who lives in the same house with several other intelligence officers. It is PASsy 42.31."

14. H.: How long is your delegation going to be here?

S.: They came for twelve days beginning with today, but I'm not going to spend a great deal of time with them, but of course I will meet them and go around with them a bit. The delegation is being taken care of on their trips by Trans-Tour. They are staying at the Trianon Palace Hotel, the phone is D[illegible]ton 88.10. The delegation consists of ten automotive engineers and four of them are experts on (energetika) power engineering. I have not met them yet, I will do so tomorrow and

/their....

their itinerary is already set by Trans-Tour, but I do not have to go with them; I will take them to the Exhibition and introduce them to whoever they will be concerned with. I will find out everything tomorrow and then report to you. I will also check out which ones of these are on my list and possibly there may have been some new ones.

15. S.: By the way at my hotel they moved me from Room 15 to Room 114 on the 6th floor. It is 25 francs, but they promised to move me to a better room later. Don't forget I need some more brochures from England and particularly regarding this Symposium on the paper manufacturing processes at OXFORD.

H.: It has been ordered, we are waiting for it. (Actually the Symposium closed on 30th September).

S.: There is another big firm here, it is called the Syndicate for Electric Motors and Electronics; it is headed by a Monsieur FROUAS who has been in MOSCOW. While discussing personalities in MOSCOW with GRIGORIYEV and PROKHOROV I mentioned how much trouble PLYAKHIN had with his kidneys and they recommended that he get in touch with a Doctor VARSHAVSKIY in MOSCOW who is very famous.

G.: Let me copy down the telephone and address of the Chairman of the Franco-Soviet Friendship Society. (It was Marcel WACHPRESS, Association France-U. de S.S.R., 8 Rue de la Vrilliere, PARIS Ie. Phone. GUTemberg 32.20).

16. S.: By the way I am going to fly home and not go by train. In the first place, why should I waste two days in a train going home and secondly they told me at the Embassy that since my passport is not diplomatic but a service passport (sluzhebnyy) it would be foolish for me to cross Belgium and West Germany with it and the visas would probably take some time, whereas diplomatic passports would be given visas quickly. Thirdly, there is no Soviet plane leaving on Sunday 15th October from here, so I will fly on a foreign plane, and it will be much smoother to travel that way with my suitcases, with no other Soviets to bother me.

/17. ....

17. S.: At the Embassy they had a little bit of conversation in connection with the BERLIN question and here is what I found out. All Rezidenturas received an order (ukazaniye) which arrived during the period of time after I left LONDON and prior to my arrival here. The order stated that during these days of October and November, a special security care (bditel'nost') should be taken in going into town. Officers should go in pairs and not alone and better still in vehicles. Unnecessary agent contacts should be avoided during this period and provocations should be avoided at all costs. This, the Rezident said, in discussion operations with his case officers. This procedure is only for this time period and it is not a categorical order by KHRUSHCHEV to suspend all agent contacts such as the one he issued at the time of the U.2. incident. Thus all unnecessary contacts should not be made and those that are indispensable must be carried out with great precaution. The impression there is that the Peace Treaty will certainly be signed, but anything that will evolve therefrom is pure guesswork.

G.: Did the KGB receive a similar order to the one you mentioned?

S.: I have not been told so but I am positive that they did because they must since those policies are all co-ordinated at the highest level. They would not be permitted to operate and fall into provocations while we carefully wait. This is what I wanted to report of which I did in the past two days.

18. S.: I have just remembered that both PROKHOROV and GRIGORIYEV just today expressed great displeasure with the policy at home of scrapping the Naval Surface Fleet. They consider that the development of a submarine fleet was too one-sided. They appreciated the value of submarines, as experienced mariners would, but they said that all naval officers were disappointed at the scrapping of the Surface Fleet. They would have preferred for the existing fleet to have been put into

/a reserve....

a reserve status, but not scrapped. GRIGORIYEV quoted from a French paper which he had in his hand that according to an article by Admiral GOLOVKO, our Soviet Admiral, the Soviet submarines are better than those of the U.S., have a greater speed and are better equipped. Despite this GRIGORIYEV remarked that strong as the submarine fleet is, it is still one-sided, and now a new surface navy cannot be built rapidly because it requires much time and money which is not available and even many of the shipyards and docks have been reconverted for submarine construction. Even with respect to submarines they considered that they were in insufficient numbers yet.

G.: Did they mention anything about atomic-powered submarines?

S.: No. There was no conversation about these at all. This is all I have.

19. G.: We have a little surprise for you: a first rate technician of ours has arrived and he wants to show you equipment that can be available for you in the near future, even though you will not receive it now and you will see what could be employed to complete our communication arrangements for two-way contact.

S.: That is very fine. I am very happy.

(At this moment J. went to advise "John" to enter and during the few minutes prior to "John's" entering, wine was served and G. engaged Subject in innocuous conversation deliberately. When "John" did enter and was introduced and a few more words of conversation followed, "John" asked G. to explain to Subject that while the introductions were being made over a period of 29 seconds a [redacted] group message was being transmitted. Subject stated that he heard no sound whatever and then being duly impressed "John" removed the transmitter from his clothing, showing Subject exactly how it had been fastened and a detailed briefing began).

20. Subject was then shown how the short ran[redacted]. transmitter operates. Every unit was explained to him including the keyer which

/magnetically....

magnetically impresses numbers on the tape, the spring wound tape sending mechanism which is connected to the transmitter and the battery power pack unit. After going through this and having Subject examine every unit he was told that in the future the three units, namely the power pack battery, the transmitter and the antenna matcher could be incorporated into one package. Subject's comments were then solicited. He said that the single package would be highly desirable for him, and very correctly and with a display of understanding he suggested that the on-off switch of the transmitter be placed in such a manner in the connector from the transmitter to the tape-sender that by releasing the tape for transmission with the release button, this could only be done when the transmitter is in the On position. This would avoid the possibility of activating the tape release for sending and not have the transmitter in action. Another slight modification he requested was to eliminate the letters on the keyer-dial since he would only use numbers anyway.

21. The balance of this demonstration was devoted to discussing from what points in MOSCOW on a radius of roughly [redacted] metres from the U.S. Embassy, he would transmit. He was shown why he should face the receiving station while sending to avoid his own body's insulation effect and the reason why [redacted] metres was chosen was explained to him, namely that in view of possible obstructions of a structural nature between his sending position and the receiving station, the effective maximum range of [redacted] metres on a line of sight basis was reduced to be sure his message would be received clearly and yet this would be the adopted minimum safe distance away from the receiving point from which he should send. It was explained that if he found a position which would afford a line of sight transmission, namely by simply being able to see directly the top of the U.S. Embassy, he could transmit at a convenient distance between [redacted] metres away and [redacted] metres away. He understood that his tape could be re-sent at any time if either he felt unsure that his message was properly sent or sent from the right

/position....

position or if after an established receipt signalling system would be in effect, no such receipt signal would be given. The button to emanate a signal for the receiving station's automatic recording mechanism was shown to Subject and he was told that he must press this button for a minimum of ten seconds prior to transmitting. Various areas in MOSCOW were examined on the map with differences of opinion as to the exact distance from the receiving station, but the principle was clearly established and Subject would check the approximate distance of the ground.

22. Subject's reaction was both favourable and enthusiastic. He stated that this would complete the communication link which had still been missing and that he would hire a dacha and find an adequate safe and weather-proof cache for the equipment. The dacha would only be at a distance of one hour's travel so that no delay in transmitting vital information would be beyond a few hours needed for preparing and coding the message, picking up the equipment and sending the message. Subject requested a supplemental demonstration on the scheduled meeting No. 37 to be held on Monday 2 October. "John" consented to be present since Subject was well-impressed with "John"'s demonstration. A final summary of the operation plans for Subject to be given his equipment at a future date with full written instructions for its use will be described after details are worked out at the next meeting. At this point it appears that when the equipment has been assembled on a hand-tailored basis for Subject and completely tested it could be delivered to the British Embassy in MOSCOW by bag and subsequently passed to Subject in a secure manner by WYNNE or other secure means.

23. After the demonstration Subject was asked about the voltages of the electrical circuits he could be involved with in the MOSCOW area. This would of course involve only the re-charging from a wall-plug of the battery-power pack. Subject stated that all areas beyond the city limits of MOSCOW, which would include the location of his proposed rented dacha, are now on 220 volts. MOSCOW, however, particularly in

/his area....

his area, still operates on a voltage of 127 volts. Gradually the entire MOSCOW area is being converted to a 220 volts circuit, but since this process is a lengthy one Subject requested that the power-pack be adopted to use either voltage. Since this can be done provided the settings are made for the proper voltage, "John" told Subject that this feature would also be included.

24. After the demonstration Subject said: We have not talked over the first batch of materials which I sent to you via WYNNE. There may be additional questions there, but I must see my originals.

G.: We have asked some questions already, but we have the rest of them all prepared and we will get to them later.

(Subject's graduating class photograph of the DZERZHINSKIY Academy, VAK Rocket courses of 1 May, 1959 was brought out and with it was a tissue paper template on which the facial outlines of all persons in the photographs were traced in the exact position that they appeared in the photograph. All these outlines were numbered to facilitate identifying all individuals in the photograph as described by Subject. The Photograph and template were placed on a well-illuminated table and Subject proceeded to describe the officers as follows:)

S.: Probably at this moment from memory I will identify possibly ten or twelve persons, but I will give you the categories of all of them. Later at home, since I have another photograph like this I will try to write out all the names from the notes that I have at home. Are you ready?

G.: Yes.

25. S.: No. 74 - This is Gen. Lieut. TRETYAKOV, the First Deputy Chief of the Academy and he is the Deputy for Scientific Research. Due to this position, he is the First Deputy. He is the author of many works and has particularly been noted for his work with conventional artillery. He lives on Gorky Street across from the telegraph office. He was promoted to Lieut. Gen. two years ago. He is an expert on artillery ammunition.

/G.: ....

G.: Does he write manuals?

S.: He may contribute certain sections of manuals, but he certainly is on the editorial staff.

26. S.: No. 75 - This is Colonel Nikola Arsenyevich FILIPPOVICH. He is the Chief of all VAK courses. He lives in the same house as General TRETYAKOV on Gorky Street. I have been at his house and he is very nice to me. He even said that one day I may take a short supplementary course to learn about new rocket developments. In the VAK programme there are short courses of a month's duration, three month courses as well as year courses.

27. S.: No. 76 - This was Subject's picture.

H.: Why were you setting there?

S.: That is because I was the Sergeant Major of the class (Nachalnik Potoka). The next two are also students and that is all of those who were students in the first row. They are sitting there with me because all three of us were the senior colonels in the class. (Subject now asked for one of his original notes which were handwritten and in which he had several of the names of the individuals in the photograph. This was found and given to him for reference).

28. S.: No. 77 - A Colonel of the Engineer troops, CHERNENKO. I told you about him in LONDON and said that he was Chief of a Scientific Research Institute which is related to both VARENTSOV and MOSKALENKO and is located near SOKOLNIKI. He lives in an apartment near the Frunze Naberezhnaya together with VARENTSOV's former Adjutant. This former Adjutant who is a Lieut. Colonel now, works in the Organisation-Mobilisation Otdel of GUKART under VARENTSOV. While CHERNENKO was taking these courses a reduction in personnel strength was taking place and he had formerly been the Chief of an Otdel in GAU prior to going to the VAK courses, but due to these reductions and also due to his bad relations with ZHDANOV, the latter did not want to take him back to his former position after he had graduated. He asked me very earnestly to speak to VARENTSOV so that he could get a ?

/him....

him and VARENTSOV did this and made him the Director of this Scientific Research Institute.

29. S.: No. 78 - This is a Colonel whose name I do not recall at the moment and, as I mentioned before I have a list of all these names at home and another photograph and I will work this up for you. In the meantime of those I do not know at least I will tell you who was a student and who was an instructor. This Colonel was also formerly a worker in GAU and now he is working in a training centre in the Ukraine, the name of which I have given you previously.

30. S.: No. 73 - Here is the Senior Instructor in both the Academy and for VAK courses. He is the one who gave me the photographs of the rockets which I gave to you. He first gave them to me as supplementary information to paste into my notebook. He is the author of lectures on all TRA installations. He is an Engineer Colonel. These afe all installations for free rocket launching. For example, GAU provides all descriptions of a technical nature for TRA, and launching installations. He works up all this material for lectures and to clearly describe all items of equipment and supervises the setting up of the actual equipment in the laboratories for instruction. I'll get you his name later also, but his speciality is exclusively on TRA and launching equipment.

31. S.: No. 72 - An Engineer Lt. Colonel. He is an instructor on electronics. I will also give you his name later.

32. S.: No. 71 - This is Engineer Captain SHNYR'. He gives lectures on all electrical equipment and circuits for guided missiles. He is concerned with teaching about all the control assemblies (pul'ty) and panels in the missile as well as all of the electrical testing and checking equipment and panels used at the technical position. He is concerned with the electrical circuits and equipment for all guided missiles. He is a very intelligent officer and we were very pleased with his lectures. He appears as a Senior Lieutenant in this picture,

/but he....

but he is now a Captain.

33. S.: No. 70 - A Lieutenant Colonel. He is the Chief of the Assignment Section of classes under FILIPPOVICH.

G.: What do you mean by "Assignment Section" (Uchebnaya Chast')?

S.: He is in charge of the scheduling of classes and administration work in general.

34. S.: No. 69 - This is Engineer Colonel NESTEROV. He is a senior instructor and he is exclusively in charge of all surface rocket handling, transporting and mounting equipment. He is the one who prepared all the lectures for the various cranes, carriers, towers etc. He is a very well-prepared and intelligent officer who has had considerable training.

35. S.: No. 66 - Now will come a whole row of students - this one is Engineer Colonel YEMELYANOV. He was a worker in GAU, but I do not remember where he was assigned after graduation.

36. S.: No. 59 - This is Colonel VYTNOV. He is the Deputy Chief of the Artillery School in KUIBYSHEV.

G.: What is his present position?

S.: He was returned to the same position graduating. However, they wanted to transfer him to the SARATOV Artillery School and possibly he has gone there already. This is because the present Chief at SARATOV is ill and they wanted to send Colonel VYTNOV there as the new chief. At least that was the proposal.

37. S.: The next rows numbers 2, 3, 4 and 5 are all students, unless I see an exception about which I will tell you in a minute.

38. S.: No. 9 - Here is Lieut. Colonel of Engineers BONDARENKO. He is the one I told you about who has just been assigned as the Deputy Commander of a Brigade for technical matters which is located in KREMENCHUG. This is the Brigade of mixed R-11 and R-12 battalions.

39. S.: Now, with the exception of BONDARENKO, No. 9 and No. 11, both of whom are students, the remainder in the last row are all laboratory assistants. They are mostly Senior Lieutenants and Captains.

/In addition....

In addition to these please mark down that in the other rows Nos. 22, 25 and 26 are also laboratory assistants. After lectures are given by the instructors and senior instructors, the laboratory assistants give us our practical work and practical demonstrations.

40. S.: No. 61 - This man was elected as the Party Secretary of our class.

G.: How does this work out, is he merely elected for the duration of the courses?

S.: Yes. There must be a Party meeting every month according to the regulations and Party activities must go on, so he is elected the Secretary of our Party group, but after graduation that is all over and he would rejoin the Party organisation of whatever unit he was assigned to.

41. S.: This is all that I can tell you about my class at this moment, but I will send you supplementary identifications later.

H.: That is very fine and I think that that is about all we should do tonight.

S.: It is only 23.00 hours; we can work a little more. Don't you have any questions prepared?

G.: We have a whole mass of them, but we want to handle them at another time.

S.: Well, we can do part of them now if you like.

G.: I can give you just the first short group of questions because it could serve a dual purpose. In addition to your answering the questions, if you know the answers, the questions will also serve to guide you about what we are interested in and what you can find out for us possibly from the Soviet Embassy here in PARIS.

S.: That's fine, let me have them.

42. G.: First of all. What were the reactions to KENNEDY's speech on the part of officers of GRU or any other Embassy officials who may have expressed themselves to you?

S.: The only reaction I have heard came from Ivan Pavlovich

/KUDRYAVTSEV....

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KUDRYAVTSEV the Colonel who is the Deputy to the Rezident for Science and Technology. He said that it was very lousy the way the Pravda article reported. It was completely abridged and nothing is clear in it whatsoever. He did not have a chance to read the full text which is always put out by the TASS bulletin but not published in Soviet newspapers. We have a journal called 'Za Rubezhom' in which everything is printed in full. This journal has an extremely narrow circulation and is circulated only to top Party leaders and is hard to obtain. The Ambassador of course gets his full text speech report through TASS channels. In addition I told you before that there is a White TASS and a Red TASS. Neither one nor the other are fully printed in the Soviet press. The Red one is always complete and is for the Central Committee, the White one is somewhat abridged. It is considered more as a review (obzor). Only Party leaders will see the full text, the people will not be able to read it. So KUDRYAVTSEV did not get the speech from the French papers yet and he only knows French, not English. So his reaction was that the speech was completely condensed with many parts omitted so that the people could not read it.

43. G.: Did MOSCOW not ask them to evaluate the speech?

S.: No. MOSCOW did not and would not ask this. In the monthly report that the Ambassador sends in there is a political section in which he will write up reactions, but in this report he will speak of the reactions of the French and other foreigners here.

G.: Did you hear about what their evaluation was of the French reaction to the speech?

S.: I don't know, they didn't speak about it. Of course this is one of the missions of every Ambassador in whatever country he may be accredited to. He must give all opinions and all evaluations of a political nature of the people in the country where he is stationed, but only two days have gone by since the speech and I have heard nothing yet. This will unquestionably be done, and the Ambassador may write up the report himself or sections thereof and he will work

/in concert....

in concert with his political counsellors. These will be neither GRU or KGB but strictly political Counsellors.

44 G.: Do you know what they may have reported to MOSCOW regarding the French attitude towards the BERLIN problem?

S.: I have not heard anything on this either, but beginning with tomorrow morning I will keep my ears open for any conversations along the line that you have just mentioned.

G.: This is all I have for questions for today and they were asked because this is something you might get additional information on here in PARIS.

S.: Yes, I will try. And it is certainly indicative how the Soviets do things, whereas the Western press quotes KHRUSHCHEV completely, here an important policy speech by KENNEDY is deliberately withheld from the people because much material therein runs counter to the policies advocated by the Central Committee and KHRUSHCHEV.

G.: That is very obvious since the concept of the so-called Iron Curtain is not to keep the foreigners from coming in but to keep the people inside from coming out.

S.: Yes, and the people would certainly like to know what had been in the speech.

G.: These are all the questions for tonight.

(45.) G.: By the way did you call that French interpreter?

S.: Yes. I called her the day before yesterday. I told her that I was one of her friends from MOSCOW and was the one who gave her a dictionary. She remembered me and when I asked her if I could see her and take her out she asked me to call her again Monday or Tuesday because she was very busy at this time.

Subject was warned to be careful because there was no way to tell whether she was involved with either the KGB or the French Service, but insofar as Subject had met her officially in MOSCOW and was speaking to her on his own, there could be no great harm even though it is doubtful as to how reliable any contacts through her could be considered by Subject.

/The next....

The next scheduled meeting having been already established, Subject was taken from the safe apartment at 23.15 hours by car to the area near his hotel. He was accompanied by M. J. and "John" who drove him by the new RV point as stated above and he was delivered to the drop-off point without incident.

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1. Subject was picked up at the new RV point, the Chaillot Palace, by M. and was surveilled from another car by Roger. Subject arrived at the safe apartment at 2010 hours. G.: Did you call the French girl ? S.: Yes, but she is busy today and tomorrow evening and tomorrow evening I will be busy because the Exhibition is closing. I have to be present during the closing ceremonies and there will be a sort of banquet in the evening, where I must also be.

2. S.: The delegation has arrived and they have thirteen people, four of them are metallurgists and the other nine are from various enterprises. They are staying at the Trianon Palace Hotel. Amongst them there are two co-opted KGB workers, one of them is the Chief of the Delegation and his name is Aleksander Pavlovich PICHUGINA (No. 14 on Delegation List, designated as Engineer of the Moscow Institute of Transportation Engineers). Today the KGB of the French Rezidentura called him in and briefed him on the local pattern of behaviour for the delegation, namely that no-one should go out alone, that they should not go out excessively and that a regular schedule should be established. PICHUGINA reported to the deputy KGB Rezidentura Chief here, whose name is ROMANOV, I have not yet found out the name of the KGB Rezident. PICHUGINA reported on the status of the delegation's mission, their general disposition, etc., and in addition said that one of the delegation members, an Armenian whose name is Aleksander Sergeievich SAFARYAN (No. 17, listed as Engineer-Technologist of an Armenian SSR Sovnarkhoz), an elderly man who is short and wears glasses, has brought with him at the request of a friend of his, also an Armenian, from YEREVAN, a bottle of cognac and caviar to be given to a friend of the sender, a French Armenian. He had given him the address of the French Armenian. When this was reported to ROMANOV, the latter said that this could only be done a few hours before the delegation was to depart from PARIS. At that time SAFARYAN could go in the company of the delegation chief or the deputy to the delegation chief, to that address and deliver the package. At this time it was forbidden to get into contact with the French Armenian who could, in some way, develop the Russian or talk him

into /

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into staying behind or pass him some valuable gift to bring back to his friend. The visit could only be made at the last moment and very suddenly.

3. S.: The others who came in this group were:-

Georgiy Vladimirovich BURDENKOV (listed No. 2 as an engineer of VNII (the Higher MOSCOW Research Institute) and he is an electro-energy engineer of the City of MOSCOW).

He is the other co-opted KGB man.

Then comes, Faina Borisovna GINOYAN (listed as No. 3 and is an engineer of the Ways and Means of Communication of the Armenian SSR Sovnarkhoz).

She is an elderly Armenian women.

The next one is: Marlena Ashotovna OVAKIMYAN (listed No. 13 as a chemical engineer of the Armenian SSR Sovnarkhoz).

She is a sympathetic young woman of about 28, whose father is a prominent Director in the Armenian Republic. You can look him up under the prominent people I gave you a list of. Look under the Armenian SSR and his first name is Ashot, and he is a prominent Party man.

The next one is: Susanna Semenovna PIRUMYAN (listed as No. 15, an engineer-economist of the Armenian SSR Sovnarkhoz).

Then there is Boris Vladimirovich TEPLOV (listed as No. 19 and is an engineer of the factory "October Revolution" in ODESSA).

The next one is Korney Denisovich TOVSTYUK (listed as No. 20 and is a scientific worker of the Chernovitsi Government University of the City of CHERNOVITSI, Ukrainian S.S.R).

And the last one is an interpreter Yelena Filippovna TOLMACHEVA (listed as No. 21 and is an interpreter of the MOSCOW City Sovnarkhoz).

4. G.: How about the other four ? S.: The nine I gave you are all on the proposed list but the other four are in addition to those on the list; they are metallurgists and although I met them briefly I do not know their names yet and I will meet with them again tomorrow. Today a cable arrived stating that twenty others are coming, some may be also on this list and some may be in addition to those on this list. In addition to the four metallurgists who have arrived, with them also came LAPTEVA who is our

interpreter /

interpreter from our Committee in MOSCOW. And they are staying at the Hotel Excelsior Opera. The other nine live at the Trianon Palace Hotel and in addition we also have reserved bookings where necessary at the Palace Hotel. These are the three hotels they use for our delegations. The last one is where the Automobile Specialists will go to. I have continuous contact with these delegations, I saw them today and I will see them again tomorrow. This one has its itinerary already established with TRANSTOUR. My job is to find out the exact itinerary and upon examining the towns that they will visit to arrange places for the delegation members to visit in accordance with the individual specialities and backgrounds of the delegation members. In this respect we already have quite a bit established.

5. S.: Here I have brought a copy of the proposal written by KUDRYAVTSEV in his own hand. He is the Counsellor as you know for Science and Technology and this is an extract from his diary and four copies have been made; one goes to our Committee, one goes to INTOURIST, one goes to the European Section of the Foreign Office and the fourth copy goes to the files of the Embassy. This is the record of his discussions; he gave me this copy because it applies to the delegation which has just arrived, concerning which arrangements have already been made. When others come he will have other arrangements already for them. If he did not have this for this delegation then I would have to arrange visits for them for two or three hours at one factory or another.

6. S.: Here he writes as follows: (subject now reads the entire text of the handwritten two-page report. In view of the fact that subject could not leave this with us since he needed it for use on the following day photography with a polaroid camera was made and after two trials a reduced size copy of each page was made with legible text)

- On upper left hand side was written "From the Diary of KUDRYAVTSEV I.P.".

- On the upper right hand side was written "Account of a Conversation with the President of the firm, Compagnie Generale d'Electricite, 30th August, 1961". The text was "Today I had a discussion with the President Compagnie Generale d'Electricite, Paul DUPONT, who came to the Embassy on the recommendation of DELGOFFE for the purpose of clarifying some questions

regarding /

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regarding the organisation of the work of a group of tourists who are electrical specialists who are arriving in France during the period of the Soviet Exhibition. My conferee told me that their company is an amalgamation of ten firms and produce a wide variety of electrical equipment and are willing to receive these tourists in order to show them the following enterprises - The Atelier de Delle in LYONS (Apparatus using medium and high voltages) - the LYONS Cable Factory (Le Cable de Lyons) - The Savoie Transformer Company (Atelier de la Savoienne), not far from LYONS. According to the words of DUPONT, these factories are the most modern and will unquestionably be of great interest to our specialists.

I thanked DUPONT for this information and I promised to inform our organisations which are interested in this about him". (It was signed Counsellor for Science and Technology, I. Kudryavtsev". Below a distribution list was written:- "one copy to GKKNIT; second copy to V/O "INTOURIST"; third copy to the first EO (First European Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); fourth copy to file").

7. While the photographic set-up was being arranged, subject said: By the way Harold, will you please find the graduating class photograph we looked at the other day. I have remembered the names of several more officers. I remembered that the Party Secretary was Lieut. Colonel of Engineers PAVLOV (No. 61). And I also remember two others. No. 42 is Lieutenant Colonel RYAZANTSOV. He is a line officer. He came to the class from the Ural military district and went to the same place after graduating, and this other one that I remembered - he is half-Russian, half-Jewish. His name escapes me, it is something like ZUKMAN. That is No. 43. He is an Engineer Major who is working near ROSTOV about 150 km. away at the factory which produces fuels and explosives I told you about before. He is the one involved in making these so-called powder pencils or candles for TRA weapons.

8. After the photography, subject said: With respect to this delegation which has just come and the other one which will come I will consult with them in terms of what cities they are going to visit, KUDRYAVTSEV will give them his prepared itinerary plan and if he doesn't have enough, I may even ask HOOK to indicate where interesting places are. I will not travel around with the delegation. G.: Of course anything that HOOK arranges is primarily for

your benefit. S.: That is right and let me mention one other thing that is important. Today I had a conversation with ANANYEV. He said that now that the Exhibition is closing all you need to do is to tell us what arrangements you have made for visiting places and we will assign Mikhail Kuz'mich SOLOVYEV to you. He knows French well and he can help you photograph etc. SOLOVYEV is an operational case officer about whom I told you before (he works in KUDRYAVTSEV's Scientific-Technical Group). Of course this conversation will take place after I have discussed this with HOOK, with whom I will meet on the 5th October. When HOOK calls me that morning I will ask him to meet with me as soon as possible. I will bring him a present of Russian cognac and caviare and we will discuss the possibilities of visiting France and obtaining brochures. G.: Is SOLOVYEV the operational driver also ? S.: Yes he is. He speaks French well and he has been formerly stationed in Switzerland, and he will be my assistant.

9. G.: How do you expect to work this ? If you go out alone with SOLOVYEV, do you expect to take photographs of military targets en route ? S.: Primarily I will go to the places which HOOK sets up for me to visit. In addition HOOK will give me some brochure materials and these will be supplemented with what WYNNE brings. This is all I have to report regarding the delegations and my work therewith.

10. G.: For how long did you say this delegation will be here ? S.: They will be here for twelve days. Of this time they will spend four to five days in PARIS and the balance of time they will spend making trips throughout France. I will know the details tomorrow. G.: Possibly you will go on a trip as set up by HOOK even before the delegation goes. S.: It makes no difference; once they go on the trip I have nothing more to do with it. G.: When do you think you will go on your trip after speaking to HOOK, do you think it will be on Friday or Saturday ? S.: No. I think it will be during next week, since I will only meet with HOOK on Thursday and that evening we have a meeting together to examine the plan. Possibly on Friday HOOK will show me something in the immediate neighbourhood of PARIS. I asked him to do this. On Monday or Tuesday of next week I will probably go out of the city somewhere.

11. /

11. Now I need some biographic data on HOOK. (J. produced a typewritten paper on which the basic background data and place of employment of HOOK were itemised). Since this material was written on U.S. Embassy paper, subject was requested to re-write all of the data in his own hand in Russian on a sterile piece of paper and George wrote out for him the correct English and Russian equivalents of the data which subject put in Russian text for himself. After writing all the information down in his own hand in his own notes, subject asked Harold what information was obtained for him on the Paper Symposium at Oxford. Harold gave him a paper industry journal with a page and a half summary of the symposium in which it was stated that the Symposium ended on 28th September. He was told that the reports would be formally published in two or three months. Despite subject's displeasure in not having the results of the Symposium in hand as desired by BEKRENEV, the Chief of the Illegals Directorate, for his false documentation programme, subject saw the point that he could not have these results before they were published. He will be given the paper industry journal later as ostensibly coming through WYNNE since he could not present it to the Soviet Embassy now because WYNNE is currently in BELGRADE.

12. S.: Will there be any more brochures from WYNNE for me which I need ? G.: Yes, there will be. S.: And I need something on the paper industry too. G.: This is not WYNNE's field but we will try to get you what we can. S.: When will WYNNE come here ? H.: We do not know exactly, but he will be here before you leave.

13. S.: What else do we have on our programme. Do you have questions for me? G.: Of course we have. First of all we will begin with this concept. Prior to the time that you have your transmitter, which we will discuss later, here is a concept for establishing a signalling system in the event that you have the most urgent information to pass to us. This is for a time urgency that is so vital that you cannot wait for the next meeting with Janet and must pass this information through your dead-drop.

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The concept is that you place a signal on this light-pole we spoke of before. (A very lengthy discussion took place on the manner of placing a smudge or numerical signal or some other sort of signal on the lamp post. In addition every possible variation in signalling by phone and by signal was discussed. In the middle of this discussion it was pointed out to subject that the sole purpose for such contact was for the most urgent type of communication to us. This was further spelled out in precise language, namely that if Soviet military action were imminent or that Soviet military action as the result of an action on the part of the West as a result of a Soviet ultimatum would be imminent, was the nature of his communicating to us by this means.

14. It was finally decided in principle, with the details to be worked out later that such communication would be transmitted to us as follows. At a time to be definitely set, but tentatively established at about 0830 hours on any day, subject would telephone on a number to be given him and would ring continuously until the telephone was answered. If a male voice said "Hullo" or anything else, subject would hang up and again make the same call and again hang up if a male voice answered the phone. During the late hours of the previous evening, as a double check subject would have placed a dark smudge a few inches below the number 35 on light-pole No. 35 at the signal site. The recipient of the message, which obviously should be the party for whom it was intended, since it would be a male voice, would immediately check the pole to be sure that the telephone call could not have been in error, despite the double call. In this case, and only in this case, would subject load the drop with his urgent message at approximately 0845 hours, knowing that the dead-drop would be cleared within a half hour more or less. He would make his call from a public phone booth, timing himself to be sure that it would be available at about 0830 hours. Then, knowing that he had already placed the signal the evening before, he could leisurely load his drop and proceed to his office, which is directly en route in a matter of minutes. Should a female voice answer the phone he

would /

would still have the option of hoping to hear a male voice on his second call, if he did not hear a male voice on his second call, he would assume that his message was not received by the party for whom intended and he would not load his drop and he would be forced to make contact on the next day. Under no conditions would subject be obliged to say one word on the telephone, concerning which subject has a most sensitive apprehension, particularly since he is sure that the KGB has a tape recording of all such phone calls and they could either match his voice or break it phonetically if he were under suspicion as the last straw in his defence against any possible accusation. The details of the above principles which were adopted will be finally agreed prior to subject's departure). H.: I think we have come to an understanding of this emergency procedure and we will take it up again later before he goes back when we have the details all worked out.

15. H.: Let us do questions on the Kremlevka first, then we will go into the radio demonstration and if we have any time left we can cover some more questions to the extent that time permits. G.: First of all how did you obtain this kremlevka directory ? S.: This directory belongs to GVISHIANI. I had been working in his office and I had the chance to photograph it. The cover was red; isn't GVISHIANI's name written on it somewhere ? H.: No. The name doesn't appear. S.: Here is exactly how I did it. I was working in GVISHIANI's office late on Saturday for him and there I photographed the Government Office telephone directory, but this Kremlevka I took home with me overnight and photographed it at home. G.: What are the peculiarities of this telephone system ? S.: It is classified as a Government telephone system. There are two such systems. One is called the V.Ch. which ties in MOSCOW offices to its central and the lines go throughout the land to all the oblasts where there are cities and to all oblast committees of the Party wherever a responsible Party official may be stationed. It is a high frequency system. One must request from the central switchboard to be connected - one cannot dial a number

on this system. The caller's number is asked for and given when a long-distance call is made. The Kremlevka is exclusively a MOSCOW circuit which inter-connects all the main Government offices. There is none like that in LENINGRAD. You probably have read in the instructions that the system is under KGB supervision. It is stated that Top Secret conversations are prohibited, but all and everything is discussed on this line despite the admonition. G.: Is it also a high-frequency line ? S.: Yes, it is but it is not on the same frequencies as the line going throughout the land which is called the V.Ch. G.: One can dial a number on this one - is that right ? S.: Yes, and four digits are used. G.: Is it ever called the Vertushka ? S.: Yes, it is. It is called either the Vertushka or Kremlevka; it is the same thing. Vertushka is the slang expression while Kremlevka is the official designation. G.: Is it correct to also call it a V.Ch. type system ? S.: Yes it is but again I repeat that its V.Ch. frequencies are in a different range from that of the line called the V.Ch. I forgot to mention that the long distance V.Ch. line runs to all countries of People's Democracies.

16. G.: Is it possible to be connected into the Kremlevka system from the municipal line or vice-versa ? S.: No, absolutely not. The only thing that can be done is to tap in to the cable if one knew where to do this and the conversations could be overheard if technicians can analyse the frequencies. In this directory all members of the Ministry of Defence are not included and in case of similar last names the office of the individual is stated to avoid confusion. G.: On what basis is it determined whose name appears in a directory and whose does not or who gets a Kremlevka telephone and who does not ? S.: All those who have important positions in any committee would have this telephone. Some people would have two telephones for example, the Minister of Defence would have his office in the Ministry of Defence listed and he also has an office in the Kremlin. G.: Is there not a determination on the basis of which one does or does not receive this telephone ? S.: Yes, there is. This is set by the (upravlyayeshchim delami) Executive Officer of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. He also determines who should be included in the special and restricted

dining room roster and in the roster permitting those to go to closed stores. This also includes special hospital privileges. It is the same old system of who gets a more elegant dacha and who gets a shabbier one. This Executive Officer has a big office which services the Council of Ministers. I just remembered that at one time CHERDAYEV was the Executive Officer. G.: Do not the various committees of the Central Committee propose or direct who should be given this telephone also ? S.: Of course they do; the Executive Officer merely handles the mechanics for which he is given instructions.

17. G.: On what lines are all the headquarters of the Military Districts connected with the MOSCOW Headquarters ? S.: All of these military headquarters are connected on the V.Ch. line to the Ministry of Defence which is the same line which connects all Party Headquarters and Governmental Headquarters. Of course this cable is such that it is a multiple conversation carrier and the various conversations are transmitted on various frequencies. G.: Suppose a military alarm message is to be sent out to all the Headquarters ? S.: It would go out on the V.Ch. line to all military centres, political centres, etc. as-required. Soviet technology claims that neither this V.Ch. line nor the Kremlevka can be monitored. G.: Do they ever encode conversations when particularly sensitive information must be passed and by means of the V.Ch. system ? S.: Yes. This is sometimes done since the Eighth otdel has a sub-section at every military headquarters, which can code and de-code. This is called a Shifr-telegrama. Of course these messages can be sent either by wire or radio. When used on the V.Ch. line it is called a telefonogram. The message is transmitted by numbers.

18. H.: Why does MOSKALENKO have two telephones ? S.: That is because he is considered to be very important as the Commander of Strategic Rocket Forces and one of these could be the number of his headquarters in PERKHUSHKOVO and the other one in MOSCOW. G.: Presumably KHRUSHCHEV has all telephones ? S.: Yes, but his home number is not given in the Kremlevka, neither is that of MIKOYAN. However I know that they both

have /

have a home number tied in because in an earlier edition of this directory, KHRUSHCHEV's home number was listed.

19. G.: Since when has this Kremlevka system been in operation ? S.: I would say since about 1930. I'd like to say this about the system, we once had a lecture on it. It is possible to find the key to the electrical frequency circuits used. The important thing is to locate the cable and to work out the formula (regim) to break the conversation. Another thing I forgot to mention is that all outstanding designers such as rocket and aircraft designers are also listed in this directory, such as CHELOMEY. H.: If we were to compare the names in the Kremlevka here with the names in the directory of the Academy of Sciences, thereby could we not determine who are the important men working in various fields ? S.: Of course this can be done; this can all be established. I told you that in LONDON, and you will see that only the important scientists will have a Kremlevka telephone. This is an important analysis and this work should be done because it will provide solid information.

20. ("John" asked that if the decision to attack were made, how would this order be transmitted to the various military commanders in the Soviet Union and other places such as the D.D.R.). S.: The communication means that would be used would be all those which have communications security. All V.Ch. lines would be used. And coded telegrams would be sent to all those commanders of every echelon who have sealed orders. They would be told to open their sealed orders and act accordingly. Therefore this message would be transmitted by the V.Ch. by coded telegram and coded radio messages. It would be interesting to listen to the conversations on the Kremlevka. I am sure that our technology could break the electrical code if they could only get at the cable as they did in BERLIN.

21. G.: These are all the questions for the time being. Now you stand up and give your demonstration with the radio equipment and explain everything yourself about what you understand about its operation. "John" will just stand by while you demonstrate.

(For /

(For a period of about forty minutes subject slowly went through the description of how he would use each item of equipment. He connected and separated all electrical and physical contacts which are necessary to join together for various phases in the process of transmitting a short-range coded radio message. Subject began with the keyer which placed the coded text in groups of five numbers on the tape. His procedure for using the one-time pad was also reviewed to remind him how to do this without reference to his printed instructions and for the purpose of refreshing his memory as to the number of additional groups needed with his encoded message text. Subject made the expected few errors and learned more thoroughly when corrected. Although he understands the procedure well, not only is actual practice necessary and desirable but when he does receive the instruments, they will of course be completely described as will their use and functions in his printed instructions. At this point the important thing is that subject likes this device and feels that it will serve a very vital purpose in affording secure two-way communication should all other means be denied by circumstances in the future).

After the demonstration, although it was already 2300 hours, subject said that he would like to clear up some of the questions we had prepared for him so it was decided to cover two sets of questions dealing with VARENTSOV's and ODINTSOV's articles.

22. G.: Throughout VARENTSOV's article certain general military terms were used which refer to sizes of units. I have them all listed and will read them to you slowly. For each of these, after you have defined them, we would like to know which specific size unit each term could apply to; I will read those off also. For example here are the general terms: Zveno; gruppirovka; ob"edineniye; soyedineniye; chast'; and podrazdeleniye. These are standard Soviet military terms. S: That is

absolutely /

absolutely right. G.: Now the point is, exactly to which of the following does each term apply and to what does it not apply ? Division; brigade; front; military district; an army ?

23. S.: I understand, let us take them in order. What was the first one ? G.: Zveno. S.: The zveno as a rule as a specific term is used in aviation. It is a small unit of aviation (3 planes). The concept of a zveno can be that of a link in a chain. It could be also used in a context like this: in testing rockets at the technical site when a certain category of assemblies are checked the Commander may say "There are many errors in this zveno". G.: Does it apply to infantry ? S.: No, but you can say something like this, that the signal zveno of an infantry unit is not adequate. In short these are general terms for a very small portion of equipment or personnel and the only specific meaning is that used in aviation.

24. G.: Next is gruppirovka. S.: This is a very wide concept. It could be a grouping of types of combat arms such as infantry with tanks and possibly with aviation. These could be referred to in connection with the grouping of forces on a specific sector of the front lines or in a specific direction. It is a large group usually and could consist not only of divisions, but even could include armies. In fact it is rare to say there is a gruppirovka of divisions. That would already be an ob"edineniye. The gruppirovka is generally larger and its meaning is directed to the fact that a number of combat arms are involved.

25. G.: How about ob"edineniye ? S.: That is a specific groupment of a single type of combat arm, for example a higher commander may put together a specific number of artillery units into one group.

26. G.: How do you define a soyedineniye ? S.: In the Soviet Army when one takes specific organic units such as a battalion or a regiment or a division and when any combination of these are put together for a particular tactical purpose this is called a soyedineniye. The soyedineniye, like the gruppirovka, also involves putting together various types of combat arms, but it is for a small composite unit as compared with

the larger one in the gruppirovka.

27. G.: How about chast' ? S.: This is a specific organic unit of any category. It could be a regiment or a battalion. It could also be an aviation squadron. G.: In other words it is any unit, generally small, which has its own fixed table of organisation. S.: Yes. That is right.

28. G.: How a podrazdeleniye ? S.: That is any tables of organisation sub-unit of which the unit itself is composed. For example, the company is a sub-unit of the battalion. A platoon is a sub-unit of a company. It applies to any type of troops.

29. G.: The next question also in VARENTSOV's article context is this: he named rockets as the R-170, R-30, R-300 and R-550, which are of course different from academy usage. Have you heard of these before and are they real or cover designations ? S.: These are all cover names but for entirely new types of rockets. I gave you the index designations for all the rockets we studied at the Academy except the Krylatka which I was not able to get yet, but these are all new rockets he refers to. G.: When are such designations as these used ? S.: These cover designations can be used in Top Secret articles such as the type he wrote. In lower classifications this would not be permitted, they would simply state SA - whatever it might be. H.: In the artillery journal, which is still Top Secret, they did use the SA designation. S.: After all a Top Secret document can certainly refer to materials of a lower classification, but not the other way round. Even at the Academy we were categorically forbidden at examinations or during lectures to refer to the word "rocket". The word "izdeliye" ("manufactured product") was used.

30. G.: The article also speaks of the reductions in time for preparing a missile for launching. It said the missile preparation was reduced from 2 hours to 35 minutes. The data preparation was reduced from 95 to 8 or 10 minutes and the geodetic tie-in time required was reduced from 24 hours to between 1½ and 2 hours. S.: First of all it still takes

a considerable time, sometimes days, not only hours to check the rocket at its technical testing site prior to being moved to the launching site. This still remains as it was and all of these procedures at the technical site which include the first, second, third testing categories etc. still take considerable time. But what the article refers to is that when the missile is brought up to the launching site, there they have worked out procedures which save considerable time. The preparation means that the final checking of the rocket must be made with the rocket already mounted on the launching pad. The data is obtained much faster now from the geodetic calculations in tying in the location of the target in respect to the rocket. And the inclusion of the necessary data into the various collimators and aiming devices to direct the rocket to its target, must also be done. This is too part of the missile preparation. The data preparation means working out the geodetic data into the numerical values by which the rocket mechanisms will be set to direct itat its target. This total time at the launching pad itself beginning from the moment the rocket is brought up until the launch button is pressed, has been considerably reduced from hours to minutes. The actual geodetic computation which produces the required data in the past had taken several days, as I mentioned from VARENTSOV's remarks to CHUIKOV, but now they have reduced this time, not only by having greater experience, but by having computed second and third order triangulation co-ordinates from the first order triangulation co-ordinates. Of course when you mention 1½ to 2 hours, this still depends upon what type of rocket you are talking about. There are still large rockets which require several days of computation to tie them in to new sites. G.: Can you explain by what means they were able to accomplish this ? S.: That is very simple. It is the result of continuous training and they were able to work out computations faster and faster. In addition to training better maps have been produced of the areas where the launching sites are to be used, so that more accurate and faster tie-in data of the rocket site with respect to the ground, could be made. In addition to this there have been improvements in optical instruments.

31. G.: When Sergei Sergeievich wrote this article he referred to recent exercises and war games. Do you know which exercises or manoeuvres he referred to ? S.: In the first place at all major manoeuvres there are representatives from every committee and from the headquarters of every combat arm. Whenever rockets are used in conjunction with these exercises everyone concerned with rockets from whatever viewpoint writes up summaries and conclusions of their own. I am sure that VARENTSOV used a number of exercises and the reports thereon to form his own overall conclusions. Manoeuvres varying in size are going on frequently in one place or another and all rocket employment is very carefully written up and analysed, so although the manoeuvres were no doubt recent that he referred to, I believe that he must have used the composite data from a number of manoeuvres.

32. G.: Can you define the following terms as applied to missiles and combat actions of a front - strategic, operational and tactical ? S.: In the first place when you consider a front operation, the strategic objectives and operational objectives would be examined together and at one time. However, the commands which control these weapons will be different. MOSKALENKO for example would control the firing of strategic rockets, but KONEV the Commander of the Front, though he does not command these rockets, he would know that at a strategic range MOSKALENKO plans to launch say six rockets. The operational rockets would be under the control of the Front Commander. The tactical rockets would also be under the Front commander, except that he would sub-allocate them to lower echelons. G.: The confusing concept is to differentiate between the ranges at which the strategic and operational rockets are used. S.: To me it is perfectly clear. I do not understand how it can be confusing. Take all three types of rockets assigned for use in one direction. Let us use for an example West Germany. KONEV, the Front Commander would know that MOSKALENKO will lay down fires by rockets up to say La Manche. He will know how many rockets and the time of launching, but of course KONEV will not command these rocket forces. Let us assume VARENTSOV will be assigned as the tactical

rocket chief of this front and KONEV will tell him to fire up to a depth of say 2,500 kms. against targets in the operational rear of the enemy. Shorter range tactical rockets would fire say up to a range of 400 kms. And these fires would all be co-ordinated under KONEV's command and VARENTSOV's headquarters. H.: But what are the ranges for these tactical and operational rockets ? G.: You see, at what point does one category of rockets terminate its range capabilities for the other category to take over from there. There seems to be an overlap in the ranges. S.: I see. Well, let us say then that the tactical ranges for the T.R.A. (free rockets) and heavy artillery operates at ranges from 100 to 200 kms. The operational rockets would operate from say 200 kms. to 1,000 kms. and even beyond that. And anything beyond that would be strategic weapons. For strategic rockets we must include types such as the R-14 with a range of 4,500 kms, I.C.B.Ms and also include missiles launched into space. KHRUSHCHEV is planning to use space rockets. Of course the overall control would always be centralised right up on the Central Committee level. They will determine what yields of atomic warheads will be delivered by what rockets, even down to the tactical rockets.

33. G.: Now, referring to ODINTSOV's article. S.: You mean the article on the rear areas ? G.: Yes. He referred to a missile troop exercise called "DON". Do you know where this was held and when ? S.: This was an internal exercise in one of the internal military districts and I do not know exactly which one but it was held in my opinion a long time ago. I think more than a year ago. I'm glad you mentioned his name, because I have just remembered that under his editorial guidance they are now publishing four separate sections of manuals on rockets to be used as texts for study at the Academy. Everything is included in these manuals that is taught at the five faculties. The manuals were written by the collective efforts of specialists and instructors. There is already one manual published which is Top Secret with a very limited distribution for study of rockets at the Academy.

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All sub-divisions are there beginning with the schematic composition of the rocket; all checks and tests required, all equipment needed for this, etc. In short all the material which we had studied from separate lectures and study have now been incorporated in this manual. I certainly will be hunting for these four sections.

34. G.: ODINTSOV in this article states that each rocket installation should have the following number of missiles for a two-day combat operation. For tactical and operational/tactical installations - 3 missiles at each installation; for troops anti-air installations (voyskovaya zenitnaya) - 6 missiles at each installation and for Army troops (T.R.A.)(voyskovaya armeyskaya) - 8 missiles at each installation. What are the last two categories of missiles and how does the last differ from the first ?
S.: All of these values are units of fire (boyevoy komplekt). At one time I gave you values of this type and the same value exactly for the anti-air installation. And now in this article the inference is that this was all checked, tested and adopted. The last category, namely the Voyskovaya armeyskaya includes without exception all T.R.A. installations and in addition would have short trange guided missiles. For example such as the R-11. The difference between this category and the first one is again a matter of range, all the short-range missiles will be in the latter category, but there will be a lot more of the guided missiles in the Operativno - Takticheskikh because a greater range is required. Thus far all T.R.A. in the Soviet Army is restricted to shorter ranges, but if in the future new fuel developments are made, particularly using solid fuels, then the T.R.A. equipment may be also used for operational ranges.

35. G.: In the rear area support of missile units of a front, what is a "Parkovyy Division" (Motor Pool Battalion). Is it only the vehicles for moving missiles or does it have other functions ? S.: This is exclusively the transport equipment for moving rockets - nothing else. You must have figured out the designation of the officer I told you about who works in the large artillery base near MOZHAYSK. I sent you his

characteristics /

characteristics, his name is Yevgeniy. The sub-unit which he commands, which is abbreviated as the PKP, or rather PKTs, that is the transportation service of this Tsikla (cycle, meaning within the artillery base compound). This includes transportation by rail since rail lines run into the base as well as motor transport. I was thinking about this because I have failed up to now to give you a manual of military abbreviations. And I was thinking of this designation I just mentioned because you may have had trouble breaking it down, since I did not spell it out for you. I will be sure to get you this manual of abbreviations because it will be much easier for you to figure things out.

36. G.: We'll stop with this question now, because we want to work up more reference questions and we want to save the ones we have already for later meetings. Now we will plan for Thursday, because that will be an important day. What do you propose to do ? In the morning you are expecting a telephone call from HOOK. S.: He should call me shortly after 0800 hours and I will try to arrange with him to meet as soon as possible, because after I meet with him I may have to report something or other to the Embassy. I do not expect to take any out-of-town trips this week. If he arranges a short visit for Friday somewhere in PARIS or the suburban area, then I will go visit that place on Friday together with SOLOVYEV. If not, then I'll go visit whatever he has set up for me next week.

37. G.: If you go out of town with SOLOVYEV by car and particularly in the outskirts of PARIS, be very careful about taking photographs because since Soviet vehicles are well known, you will draw a surveillance car in very close pursuit. S.: I don't think I'll take any photographs. That is not so important. If I could pick up some brochures or other types of documents, that would be much more important. I can get a camera at the Embassy at once, but I haven't asked for it. If HOOK could get me some places to visit and some brochures regarding electronics, that would be ideal. Then if I could find some person I could introduce SOLOVYEV to I would consider my missions to be fulfilled. How about this man with the Russian name ? G.: We decided to drop him completely, it was too risky. S.: I

think /

think you are right and I even had an experience at the Exhibition of a possible provocation. A Russian speaking Frenchman said that he had escaped from Siberia in 1925 and was born in RIGA and wondered if he would be given a tourist visa now and not be jailed again if he took a trip to the USSR. I referred him to the Consulate and when the man invited me to a restaurant to discuss this further, I said I had no time. This could have been a provocation.

38. G.: Of what help could we be to you concerning your itinerary when there would be no point to spot military installations to you en route since you cannot photograph them. S.: I'll have to cancel this request to you. Since you cannot arrange this as you did in England and you have to expose yourselves to the French Counter Intelligence in order to make such an arrangement here, it is better to drop it. If SOLOVYEV and I happen to see a military air base we can write up a report thereon on the basis of visual observation. I need some material from England yet, especially on the type of military industrial items I reported to you about so that I can give some materials to CHEREDEYEV to send home via GRU channels. Both he and I would get credit for this at GRU. Materials of lesser value we will send to the Committee. When I get to MOSCOW and deliver the presents to SEROV and if I did accomplish something here I would ask SEROV himself, or ROGOV to call GVISHIANI and thank him for sponsoring my trip since it benefited GRU. At the same time I will bring presents to GVISHIANI and others in the Committee and they will all be inclined to send me off on another foreign trip in three or four months. However, I definitely will not go abroad again during the rest of 1961. I will even attempt now to work to GVISHIANI and SEROV to see if I can get a visa to the United States. If the Americans give me a visa, then our KGB will not have an argument against me that I am known to the West as an intelligence officer and spotted. I am worried a bit now because as time goes on and it is already the 2nd October, I do not have any valuable materials at hand yet, but particularly in connection with this long list of target items that I reported to you on. G.: All this may develop favourably after you meet

HOOK /

HOOK. That is when we will review the whole situation and see what can be done. S.: When I gave them the document on the Nimonic-115, that created a most favourable reaction, they were delighted with it.

39. J.: Suppose HOOK would assign a man to go with you on trips, how would this affect your situation with respect to planning to go with SOLOVYEV. Would you all go together ? S.: In the first place HOOK should not go with me anywhere, just make the arrangements. If he assigns a man, that is fine but the man should not go with us, he should go in his own car and I will go separately with SOLOVYEV in our Soviet car and meet the man wherever he says. I could go alone with the man in his car for a short ride in PARIS or the outskirts of PARIS without SOLOVYEV, that would be allright, but on a longer trip I would go alone with SOLOVYEV and meet the man at the factory site, and on second thoughts, may be SOLOVYEV and I will take a camera along. At any rate, please try to provide something of value for me because I came back from LONDON twice with something good and this time in PARIS I have nothing to bring back.

40. G.: Tell me specifically what would be the best assistance you could get from [redacted] ? S.: I already told him, I said that I would like to have some brochures on something like Nimonics and other heat resistant steels. Other than that he should arrange for me to go to certain factories and simply give me the address and appointment times and the name of the person I am to meet. I will pick up any brochures I can from such contacts, but HOOK should also try to collect a group of brochures for me. I can legend the acquisition of these very easily. G.: Of course, whenever SOLOVYEV goes with you, your legend will be restricted to exactly that which SOLOVYEV also knows. S.: That's absolutely right, but I can meet [redacted] alone or make a short trip alone and that is none of the Embassy's business. Although they treat me very well and have complete trust in me. SOLOVYEV speaks no English at all, only French. J.: I would like you to do one thing when you speak to [redacted] and even more particularly to any

Frenchman /

Frenchman you may meet, take it easy and don't press too hard. S.: That's right, and I will not introduce HOOK to anyone, not even to SOLOVYEV, he will remain my own acquaintance exclusively. J.: Would you go to [redacted]'s home if he invited you ? S.: Alone ? With the greatest of pleasure. (Subject was shown a number of books, including a catalogue by ARMCO and a very fine French business firm directory for all major industries in France. Subject was impressed by the latter book, but kept stressing that the nature of brochures that he desires would be in the category of restricted or documentary type brochures similar to that we previously gave him on Nimonic-115.

41. Subject then described further how everyone in theSoviet Union at every level of officialdom was an absolute grafter and has his hand out to receive bribes and gifts. Subject enquired as to the status of our having acquired some of the numerous gifts which he planned to bring back and was shown the rare wines of 1917 vintage and other items. He then was trying to reconcile the size of the many items already acquired, such as his candelabra and his framed picture of the sea, which would not fit in any normal suitcase. G. suggested taking the frame apart, but subject was reluctant to do it, and though the most practical way of bringing it in would be simply to wrap it in paper and carry it aboard the plane (Western plane) and get it to MOSCOW that way, for some reason subject was reluctant to do this. In order that subject could contact us by phone if he were to be free on Wednesday evening for a pre-arranged entertainment by a lady it was arranged that subject call the safe house just prior to 1200 hours on Tuesday and say in English that he is feeling well or not well in case he is going to be tied up. At 1145 hours on 3 October, subject called and stated that he was feeling fine. The place for the rendez-vous would be shown to subject while en route to being taken home from the meeting. The meeting for Thursday was set for the same new RV point which worked very well and again the time would be at 2000

hours /

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hours. Subject left at 2330 hours and was driven by Roger together with J. and "John". En route the RV point for his Wednesday night appointment at 2100 hours, in the event that he should be free, was shown to him. He was delivered to the general neighbourhood of his hotel without incident).

MEETING NO. 38 - 5th OCTOBER, 1961.

(1.) Subject was met at RV Point No. 3, the Chaillot Palace, by G. and led at a distance to the parked car driven by M. Roger again provided surveillance cover. Subject arrived 15 minutes late and explained that he was tied up with his delegation and could not get free to make the meeting exactly as scheduled. Upon review of the circumstances at the pick-up point by G. and Roger on the next morning both parties who were present at the RV point felt that several persons in the area were observing everyone who passed at a discreet distance, but they certainly appeared to be members of the French police in civilian clothes. Since an intensive curfew regulation against Algerian Moslems is currently in effect and officially begins at 2030 hours, this could be the logical reason for French detectives to be actively patrolling. At any rate to play safe it was decided to abandon RV No. 3 and to return to RV No. 1, the footbridge, which has always appeared most suitable and had not been used for several meetings, only for the normal security consideration to break a pattern.

(2.) Upon arrival subject immediately began to describe everything that took place with respect to his contacts with [redacted] This was a most important day in lining up whatever arrangements were possible for subject to exploit in order to fulfil his missions for both the Committee and GRU on a legitimate basis. Luckily it had been possible to obtain a report from [redacted] on his meeting with subject via Al prior to subject's arrival at the meeting. The upshot of the report was, to quote Joe, that subject "hit like a cyclone" with his demands and has even arranged a trip for his entire delegation despite the fact that he was admonished against exerting pressure on HOOK.

(3.) S.: Excuse me for being late, I was held up by the delegation. Let me tell you everything in proper order. This morning, just a few minutes after 0800 hours, [redacted] called me at my hotel, and made an appointment with me at his office at 1100 hours. I went there and spoke to him for a whole hour. He received me very graciously and I also brought him some small gifts of Caucasian wine, caviar and cigarettes. I told him what I needed with

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respect to places that my delegation desires to visit in the PARIS area and in other towns. I also told him about what brochures I needed and about the places I want to visit out of town next week. He wrote everything down while we discussed this for a whole hour and we worked out a programme. According to this programme, tomorrow at about 0830 we will be taken to the Bourget area to visit a large electrical factory which manufactures electrical equipment. [redacted] has very kindly arranged for a representative of his to come to my hotel at 0800 hours. This man will be a guide and will go with me to the hotel where our delegation are staying as tourists. I have arranged for an interpreter to be there and have instructed the delegation chief to have everyone up, fed and ready to leave at 0830 hours. G.: How many people will this include ? S.: There will be nine of them and myself will make ten. I will go with them on this visit. G.: What happened to the other four ? S.: They are the metallurgists and they are already travelling through the country on their pre-arranged itinerary. G.: What happened to your Committee interpreter, LAPTEVA ? S.: She is also with them. [redacted] also got three brochures on Nimonics and may even get me a sample. This will take care of the delegation for the present and on Saturday evening they will leave town to visit places in France and [redacted] has arranged another place for them to visit during this trip. TRANSTOUR will take them and he will arrange for them to visit places on Monday and Tuesday. G.: Will you go with them on this trip also ? S.: No. I will just go tomorrow, and from there on they will go by themselves.

4. S.: Now, for me and for the representative of the Embassy, SOLOVYEV, HOOK has arranged either for the 11th or the 12th October, a visit by SOLOVYEV and me to the Electric Mechanic Factory at LE HAVRE. The Director is Mr. ROGSELL (phonetic). I will go there with SOLOVYEV and possibly [redacted] will have a guide go with us. This will take place on either the 11th or 12th October. In addition I will visit the firm "Jeumont" (phonetic) in the town of "JUMONT" (phonetic). This is about 250 kms. from PARIS. He said that each place could be visited during the course of one day. This trip to "JUMONT" should take place Monday or Tuesday, and the one to LE HAVRE on Wednesday or Thursday. The dates may be re-arranged according to how [redacted] is able to set them up; he will tell me when the dates are set. The Director of this plant in "JUMONT" is M. MOLLET. My only request to [redacted] was that

all of these visits terminate by Thursday. This would make it possible for me to work with you on Friday and Saturday. Therefore for these two visits on my part I will be accompanied by SOLOVYEV and will ride in a Soviet car. [redacted] is also seeing if it is possible for me to visit in PARIS here, the Chemical firm of "PESHINET" (phonetic) (Pechiney Cie. de Produits Chem. et Electro-Metallurg. 23 rue Balzac, PARIS 8e).

5. S.: By the way the representative of the GVF (Civil Aviation) in PARIS is a GRU officer whose name is Vladimir Ivanovich ZEMLYANSKIY (identified in U.S. Embassy photo series No. 222). He is a Lt. Col. of Aviation. He is the stout one I referred to and he was also present at the operational meeting. At that time I could not remember his name, but today since I have already got my Air France ticket, I was able to meet him. We also saw his photograph in the earlier pictures (British set).

6. S.: Let me get back to my arrangements with [redacted]. Therefore I will have three trips, one with the delegation and two with SOLOVYEV. He also showed me brochures, three of which were on Nimonics with new descriptions and I asked him to save these for me until he has collected them all, before I picked them up, and he agreed. [redacted] will also drop in to see me at 0800 tomorrow at my hotel, just in order to tell me when I should get in touch with him later in the day after I return from my trip with the delegation in order to find out from him how the other arrangements have been scheduled. He was very nice to me and has invited me for lunch, which may be on one of these days. After I met him today and made my requests, he already had arranged everything for tomorrow and advised me thereof by a phone call at 1700 hours. I told the delegation and they were most pleased that I was able to arrange this, since they could get nothing like this out of DUDIN of INTOURIST (KGB). G.: Why are you involved in arranging the trips for the delegation ? S.: Because this delegation has been sent here under our Committee auspices and as a representative of our Committee here and on visits of a technical nature it is up to me to make the arrangements even

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though you correctly said that they already have a general tourist-type itinerary planned for them. This is an additional visit which is superimposed on their itinerary which has been completely laid out otherwise. I try to fill in their free time that they have between tourist-type visits with arrangements to visit places of technical interest to the Committee. I am responsible for any of those on this list of 89 who may be sent here, thus far only these nine have come. No others will come. G.: What about the cable that stated twenty others will come ? S.: That was changed; they will not come. Probably that is for reasons of economy, but in addition the Exhibition has already closed. The other delegation members who are now here had a chance to visit the Exhibition several times. (Subject described HOOK's office and apparently was very much impressed by it).

7. S.: I thank you all very much for all your efforts, for arranging all this with [redacted] and this will solve my mission problems for the Committee since they will return to MOSCOW four days before I will and will report on this favourably. G.: And this will cover all of your Committee mission requirements ? S.: Yes, fully. G.: And the valuable documents will help you fulfil your GRU missions and the less valuable ones you will send to the Committee. S.: Yes, that is what I will do. I just want to mention again that it would be clearly valuable for me to have something from the Bagneux firm; I asked [redacted] about this too and he will try. That's all I have to report in respect to [redacted].

8. S.: Here is my Air France ticket; I am taking the 0800 flight on Sunday October 15 from Orly to PRAGUE and there I take a Soviet plane at 1155 hours and will be in MOSCOW at 1400 hours. That same night I can advise you by telephone with three rings as before of my safe arrival. My only request about the flight is that I must leave the hotel at 0600 hours to be at the Airport in plenty of time to get my baggage through, therefore please have WINNE get up at 0500 hours and arrange for both him and myself to be awakened then so we can meet this schedule. (Subject was assured that the

hotel /

hotel could wake them up on time and we would make sure that WYNNE would be available on time). S.: When is WYNNE coming ? It would be well if he could get here on Monday or Tuesday. H.: He is just arriving in LONDON today and he will probably not get here before Tuesday. S.: Maybe WYNNE could go on one of the trips with me. G.: Absolutely not. Keep WYNNE as a source for one set of documents, and [redacted] competely separate as your other source. WYNNE must not get mixed up with [redacted] in any way; he has already served his purpose as the contact man for you to meet [redacted] and this legend has in fact taken place and now WYNNE must be kept competely apart. S.: Very well, if you say it should not be done we won't do it.

9. S.: I had lunch at the Embassy yesterday with GRIGORIYEV and with PROKHOROV and I found out that GRIGORIYEV has an acquaintance who is a chemist and who has given him some samples of some steel corrosion preventative. It is applied something like a paint. The man works in the Pechiney firm, but I do not say that he is an agent, he may be only a good personal friend, he did not give me his name. Everything is well at the Embassy and nobody says anything whatsoever about the BERLIN situation. It is entirely quiet, but they are careful about going around in town and are doing so more rarely. G.: You were at the Embassy for the past three days now, was there anything new that you overheard of interest at all ? S.: I go to the Embassy every day and sometimes I drop in several times. Yesterday I was at the Exhibition watching how they were dismantling it.

10. G.: What about this banquet that you mentioned would take place on the 3rd after the closing ? S.: That was a farce; they are so stingy. I arrived there late, about 2130 hours, there were hardly any people there and in general few attended the Exhibition with the exception of Sundays. In all about 850,000 visitors attended the Exhibition, but in MOSCOW over two million visited the French Exhibition. I had to laugh, prior to the closing of the Exhibition our specialists sold some fifty expensive cameras

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to the French, but they were brought back and refused as being inadequate. Instead of an elaborate banquet and the giving of awards both monetary and in gifts to the people who worked so hard, all they received was an expression of thanks and they were shown an Italian film. There were hardly any people from the Embassy there. As a matter of fact some 500 French workers came to begin the dismantling and made all kinds of noise while the film was going on, so I left the place in disgust.

11. H.: Did you call this French lady, Marie-Paulle (Marie-Paulle Lachaux) ? S.: Yes, I did and I made an appointment with her to take her out tomorrow night. I invited her to the Lido and I would like Michael to make reservations for me in the name of Mr. ALEXANDER in the front row next to the stage. G.: Just go to the box office and ask for the tickets for Mr. ALEXANDER and you will see that all has been reserved for you; you do not need to tell the lady what name you are using.

12. G.: Now, about Sunday, it appears that that will be the day we should meet in order to review the results of the trip [redacted] has arranged and the plans he is setting up for you for the following week. That will be the earliest day we can meet since the next two evenings you will be mixed up with - excuse the expression - "other diversions". S.: Fine. At what time shall we meet on Sunday ? G.: At 2000 hours. That is a very good time and we will do this at the footbridge. S.: That's fine. That is an excellent place. The other place, where I came today is very good too. When I was walking up the stairs, there was nobody around (he thought). Next week we should meet more often since we have many things to discuss and to refine and if there are repetitions, what of it ? G.: We will see how things work out with respect to your travel schedule and we can plan more exactly next Sunday.

13. G.: You say you haven't heard one word about the BERLIN situation at the Embassy ? S.: It seems that they are tired of speculating on it and I get the impression that everyone is waiting. They are all listening to the radio and reading French newspapers carefully. They mentioned in the French paper 'Figaro' that in a soccer match in the Caucasus an uncontrolled fight began between a Georgian and an Armenian team and it became so uncontrolled

that they had to stop the game. G.: Aren't there missions to report on what the French attitude is towards the BERLIN crisis ? S.: I'll be able to tell you more about this later because I have a scheduled lunch with both the Rezident and ANANYEV and if they have a few drinks at this time maybe I can find something out. I'm glad that you asked me these things because it will help me direct the conversation. G.: Also it would be of interest to know if there are any directives with respect to any action on the Algerian-French difficulties, possibly such directives could involve what the French Communists should do. J.: If by chance you should go to the Rezident's house should he invite you there, try to notice who else lives in that house, on what floors and on what side of the house. S.: Very well I will certainly remember this, but of course I do not know whether I will be invited there or to the Torgpredstvo Dining Room.

(14.) G.: Now we have here for this evening's programme additional questions on our agenda and an album of photographs to look over; what shall we begin with ? H.: We may as well start with the questions, but I would like first to ask him to clarify two items which he has asked us to purchase for him. We'd like to know what those fifteen and thirty volt batteries he ordered were for so that we can determine the size because they come in various sizes. S.: They should be the very smallest sizes made but of the voltage I asked for. What they are for is this. LEVIN has a tiny tape-recorder and the batteries to fit into it are cylindrical and small. It is an agent-type recorder set, it is a wire recorder. Three little batteries fit into it; the other types are the square shaped batteries of exactly the same type you have given us before. Indidentally others always ask for small batteries for Japanese type transistor sets. The Japanese have brought in very many of their type sets. Little transistors are a typical kind of Japanese gift which they give to their contacts in trade dealings. There are also Soviet transistors but they are low grade. G.: The other question is about the battery operated razors. We're having trouble with this for the

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very good reason that many companies are discontinuing manufacturing them since the batteries become weak very rapidly. At first they work fine, but very quickly the battery power drops. However, we have a way of solving this problem by obtaining spring wound mechanical razors. All one needs to do is to keep it wound tight and it will work well indefinitely. This spares the necessity of always trying to replace worn out batteries. S.: I saw these once and I think that these would be very good, and as a matter of fact though I have heard about them I was afraid to ask you because I thought that I might be asking for too much. G.: That is just fine and if anyone argues with you you can simply say "look fool, this does not need batteries it is more modern than the others and it can always be wound up". S.: Of course that's fine and I will explain this except that I can't say "Look, you fool" to the Minister of Defence, since he is going to be one of those to receive it, as well as RUDNEV and SEROV. H.: That's fine, George, let's go on to the questions.

15. G.: In reference to rockets, when you consider the large ones such as the R-2, which has a long range, of what use do the Soviets consider it worthwhile to use conventional warheads on these rockets since a great expense is involved in the construction of these missiles and a small error off the target would make their effect worthless. S.: I understand your question perfectly. When you mention the R-2, first of all let me state that they have produced a large quantity of these rockets. It would be wasteful to scrap these so that they are now held in reserve. In addition many conventional type warheads have been already manufactured for these rockets. In addition they still consider that within the allowable lateral and range deviations for these rockets, the TNT equivalent conventional warhead would still effect a considerable area of destruction. In addition to this, when you consider that a war may break out in which nuclear weapons are not used, at least at the outset, these available rockets would be very necessary. As I remember from my studies, the parameters of error within which these rockets operate

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can still be effective. Of course, all types of rockets are equipped to carry atomic warheads and these are the ones whose ranges are used to determine how far an atom warhead can be delivered. Since the conventional warheads consist of TNT which is poured in like a solid mass of honey and are heavier, their corresponding ranges for each type of rocket are greater than if they carried an atomic charge. It is not feasible for technical reasons to balance the load of the atomic warhead with additional heavy material such as lead, therefore the ranges are smaller.

16. G.: Tell me how long has FEDEROV been in command of his missile brigade at WEISSENFELS in the D.D.R? S.: FEDEROV was assigned there last year in 1960, I would say in the late summer and he has been there more than a year now. G.: Was this brigade there before he was assigned to it ? S.: Yes, it was. G.: How long did it exist before he came there ? S.: Before he came there was a previous commander and he had trouble with the former deputy because the latter had aspired to be the Brigade Commander whereas FEDEROV simply came in from MOSCOW and was given the job. G.: How long do you say the Brigade has been there before FEDEROV took over its command ? S.: I would say this that all the four Brigades which are there have been there for now two years. Of course one may have been deployed there earlier and then the others followed so that the first one would have been there two years and the last one say a year and a half.

17. G.: What is the table of organisation rank for a commander of such a brigade ? S.: They can be Colonels or Major-Generals. If a Colonel does particularly well he can be promoted to a Major-General since that is the Table of Organisations slot. Now there are two Colonels there and two Generals; FEDEROV is a Colonel and I have given you the name of one Major-General who is a missile brigade commander, his name is Gen. Maior VINOGRADOV. Since you mention FEDEROV, I want to stress to you that FEDEROV could be of tremendous value to me if he were transferred back to MOSCOW. His wife is

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constantly bombarding my wife, VARENTSOV and myself to get her husband transferred to MOSCOW. She cannot go to the D.D.R. since she was sent out together with their abnormal son who got himself into trouble in the D.D.R. and was declared persona non grata. All of FEDEROV's personal difficulties there were in the line of personal transgressions but were not sufficient to have him removed for official incompetence. VARENTSOV would always give him a job because he was his former Adjutant and he is very fond of him even more so than BUZINOV. (Subject stresses that although he himself is one of VARENTSOV's favourites due to long years of friendship, he still also likes FEDEROV very much and FEDEROV would be a first-rate source of information for subject since not only did they get along very well but FEDEROV is in subject's debt for past favours to a great degree. Subject goes on to explain how he had a large party at his house just before he came and to which General POZOVNYY came as well as BUZINOV and other Colonels from GRU. Much classified information can come from such conversations and again subject stressed that he could get anything out of FEDEROV and BUZINOV, particularly when either of those two are drinking with subject).

(18.) G.: Have any long range aviation units been converted to or replaced by missile units ? S.: For a long time now in the Soviet Union the number of long range aviation units has always been small. There never was a programme to make large numbers of long-range aircraft, but the units which did exist were always retained. There were improvements made in the types, and newer types replaced the old, but the numbers were always relatively small. This long-range aviation of course is capable of delivering atomic bombs but it will require adequate air cover, our fighters will not be able to give it very long range protection because their own ranges will be limited. The crew of these bombers is sizeable, it runs from twelve to fifteen men, but it has considerable fire protection of its own with many multiple turrets and also carries rockets. These rockets are air-to-air types. I heard about all this from POZOVNYY, from whom I can easily get information since he is very friendly to me and tells me everything. After all he was in the PVO and was a deputy to BIRYUZOV. He attended all military conferences regarding PVO.

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19. S.: He has all kinds of personal contacts even now with Generals, such as Gen. Lieut. PETUKHOV, who is an aviation General who also lives near POZOVNYY in the SOKOL'NIKI area. PETUKHOV is still serving in PVO and these two meet often. Another good friend of his is Gen. Lieut. MITEL'KOV. He is the Commander of an Air Army near MOSCOW which is subordinate to PVO. The Divisions which compose this Army are all an integral part of the PVO of the Land. (Subject related a long-winded story about the background of MITEL'KOV). He is a widower and his wife who was deaf died in 1958. Upon returning from Turkey I celebrated New Year's Eve at POZOVNYY's on the year ending 1956 going on 1957. Four years later again on New Year's Eve I was at POZOVNYY's. This time POZOVNYY did not invite MITEL'KOV, but at three o'clock in the morning quite drunk, in came MITEL'KOV with a good looking woman. This lady, whom he introduced as his fiancee, is the Director of the Generals' store in MOSCOW which belongs to the Military Council of the Ministry of Defence. Her name is Anya MARTYNOVA; she was my old girl-friend. I knew her years ago and, oh well, she was my girl friend, but I didn't marry her. I pretended not to know her although we are good old friends and she was loaded with diamonds, since anyone who is a Director of a Generals' store always steals, grafts and gets things others do not, and she was no exception. After she was divorced from MARTYNOV, and she has a grown son now attending the Baumann Institute, she married Hero of the Soviet Union SOBOLEV, who was killed while making a test flight in the latest fighter craft when its canopy flew off. This happened in LENINGRAD but he was buried in MOSCOW in Novodevichiy cemetry. Now that she is a widow, General MITEL'KOV wants to marry her. Excuse me for deviating from my thought.

20. G.: In other words you mean that the missile units did not replace long range aviation units. S.: No. No. Under no circumstances. Although the fleet and other civilian enterprises were cut down in a budgetary sense in favour of rockets and their increased production, the Air Force was not touched and though small it remained as it was, that is the long range aviation.

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21. G.: Did VARENTSOV ever have arguments with the long range aviation people or the Soviet Air Force ? S.: Yes he did but this was all on a basis of fighting for a greater budgetary appropriation, but this is also true of the arguments he had with ROTMISTROV and the tank people; and in fact he still does have arguments but it is all over money. MOSKALENKO also has arguments with them for the same reason. In fact Sergei Sergeievich told me that he often argued with them in the presence of KHRUSHCHEV and the Central Committee on budgetary matters and KOZLOV, BREZHNEV and also MIKOYAN were present.

22. G.: Do you know what is the exact nomenclature or title and who is the chief of the Directorate of GRAU which actually accepts the missiles from the plants and serves as customer for the Defence industry ? S.: GRAU has some twelve or fourteen directorates therein. GRAU has a Central Research group which is involved with NII work. All of the Directorates are numbered but I can't tell you what the numbers are. They also have a specific designation. One may be concerned exclusively with optical instruments, another exclusively with artillery bases. Still another may be concerned with rocket material as such and under this they would have otdels. The exact title of the Directorate that you refer to I do not know but there certainly is one just as you asked about. There is also a Directorate exclusively for warheads. Frankly I know the internal organisation of GRAU very poorly; I need an informant who is employed in that headquarters to get this information. I am sure that BUZINOV and FEDEROV know, but I never chanced upon a conversation about GRAU with them.

23. G.: In the Artilleriyskiy Sbornik there are 8 K 11 and 8 A 61 missiles mentioned. Does this mean that the 8 K 11 missile and the 8 A 11 missile is with an atomic warhead ? (After considerable discussion and re-questioning the following summation was reached. The 8 A 11 and the 8 K 11 designations mean that they are atomic warheads. Designations such as the 8 A 61 are designations for rockets with conventional warheads. However it is possible that a rocket designated R-11 with the suffix changed to R-11 - A would mean an atomic warhead. Subject added that the

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designation A or K made no difference with respect to their both being atomic warheads. Their difference is their atomic yields so long as the 11 is behind them in the designation).

24. G.: Do you know the names of any other Central Committee Department heads besides TYASKO for Light Industry, whom you mentioned before ? S.: The last document that I photographed for you which involved the listing of Government leaders beginning with KHRUSHCHEV, that was the very last information on this subject. G.: You don't remember any from memory ? S.: No. You should refer to this directory.

25. G.: Who in the Central Committee in the so-called Military Section is the one that controls GRU ? S.: There is no such section which controls exclusively GRU. There is a military section (otdel) of the Central Committee of CPSU and to be more specific and not to call it military, because the Central Committee is squeamish about using that term, it is officially called the Administrative Section. It is the same thing. There is a group of officers therein who are concerned with the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence and with the Ministry of Defence as a whole. I named an officer there earlier who is concerned with GRAU, a Colonel whose name I gave you. There are two officers now who are concerned with GRU, and I gave you their names. G.: Do they control GRU at all levels ? S.: Yes, they have the kremlevka and they can simply call SEROV at any time. I just remembered the name of one, Aviation Colonel CHIRKUNOV. This is the first section or the Military Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the second section is the main political section of the CC of the CPSU. Thus the Central Committee with these two powerful tentacles, controls the entire armed forces in the U.S.S.R.

26. G.: Now, they sent out to all groups of forces and military districts high ranking Generals who are members of the Military Council. I remember one such representative was a Lt. Gen. in the GSFG in Germany. He is the representative of the Central Committee in Germany and he sits right next to the Commander in Chief of the GSFG. S.: He is a member of

the Military Council and reports to the Central Committee. G.: But certainly he cannot be with his rank subordinate to the Colonels you mentioned above ? S.: There is no subordination here whatsoever. A member of the Central Committee is all-powerful. SEROV speaks to Colonel CHIRKUNOV of the Central Committee by name and patronymic. After all CHIRKUNOV does not express his own personal views, he may be expressing the views or decisions of some Secretariat of the Central Committee. G.: But these members of the Military Council then must all sit somewhere in the Central Committee and there must be a pretty large number of them. S.: There certainly are but it makes no difference where they sit and rank is meaningless, they often go around in civilian dress. After all my father-in-law, General ~~GAPANOVICH was also a~~ member of the Military Council. There is a first member of the Military Council and he is appointed by the Central Committee. He sends out the people you just referred to to all of the military districts and to the groups of forces. These people are the soul of the political control over the Army and they report on everything that goes on in the Command they are assigned to with respect to how the command is exercised, personal habits of the Commanding Officer and his staff, etc. etc. They also report on the state of training of the troops and on their morale and on their discipline. Many of these people have no military background, but recently there are more and more who do have.

(A short pause was made to change reels).

27. G.: When did the first five-year class graduate from the missile course at the Dzerzhinskiy Academy ? S.: First of all the course is actually $5\frac{1}{2}$ years by the time the stazhirovka is included and they hand one his diploma. It is referred to of course as a Five Year Course. I would say that the first class graduated in 1959.

28. G.: You mentioned a Military Academy of Sciences and a Civilian Academy. Are these formal titles or just a way of referring to those with military functions ? S.: These are two different academies of course with different missions and with different Chiefs and Deputies. G.: But are those titles correct ? S.: Yes, they are. In recent years there has been a change, now there are a number of separate NIIs such as the one in GRAU,

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which in the past have been all joined under the Academy of Military Science. These NIIs now are subordinated to the respective combat arm which they serve. Although the Academy exists it is not the all-inclusive body it had been. Its functions have been considerably changed. G.: Surely some of the "military" academies also have some civilian work ? Or does the "military" academy include only military NIIs, laboratories and so forth ? S.: Their relationship is close-first of all the instructors have been taken from civilian academies . After all, all of the basic principles stem from chemistry, physics, electronics, etc. even though applied for military purposes they are actually from civilian sources. G.: Would the Military Academies also have civilian work ? S.: No. It would be the other way round, the civilian institutes would work for the military. The civilian institutions are more numerous, more developed and better equipped than the military, for example in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR there are five GRU officers who are assigned there just like I am to the Committee. The Academy of Sciences also has what we call a Top Secret Sector which co-ordinates Top Secret matters which are concerned with every phase of interest to the military. The point I want to stress is that there is a very close co-ordination between the Academy of Sciences and military-scientific institutes.

29. J.: Is this sector listed in that Academy of Sciences directory by that name or by a cover name ? S.: No. That is Top Secret. For example in the section of the directory under mathematical sciences you know that there are some people who work for the Eighth Otdel with respect to development of codes. I told you about this in detail last spring, but the individual mathematician would not be listed under any such category. Often specialists are called out of the Academy and requested to run some project or other for the military, they may be even called before the Supreme Military Council. When this happens they are given the people and facilities to assist them and they simply do not exist in the Academy of

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Sciences during the period when their services are required by the military. G.: Therefore your military institutes would have many civilian specialists as well as military specialists ? S.: Yes, they certainly do. G.: Therefore this Academy of Sciences directory would contain civilian and military scientists. S.: Of course it does and Harold very correctly said that the Kremlevka telephone directory should be compared with the Academy of Sciences directory to determine who the top scientists and designers are in vital Soviet scientific and military programmes. At least that will cover everything of importance in MOSCOW, but remember that there is a branch of the Academy of Science even in Siberia, and these people also work for the Army. There was a section in the Academy of Sciences directory which listed these people and gave the address of the Academy in NOVOSIBIRSK.

30. G.: Remember you mentioned that there are missile polygons in the Ukraine, specifically in NIKOLAYEV and SHKLO YAUR, which can fire into Poland and Rumania. Is it possible that these are just testing sites for troop training and not actual missile sites from where combat missiles would be launched ? S.: This is a good question. If you took NOVAYA ZEMLYA as an example, where PYRSKIY has been conducting the tests and these should be completed pretty soon since he must be back in MOSCOW in October, it is quite possible that the sites from which rocket testing was conducted will not be the sites from which rockets would be launched in case of war. But there at NOVAYA ZEMLYA there are other excellent sites for storing nuclear warheads and where missile sites in case of war are established. Similarly those two locations in the Ukraine are sites from which rockets are aimed towards the West in training exercises, but they may not be at all the actual combat sites against the West in case of war. Right now they are suitable for covering the targets, namely Poland and Rumania, in the event that it would be necessary to deliver via there. Whenever a huge site like these is developed it obviously requires all kinds of construction work including housing for

personnel /

personnel, adequate storage installations and all kinds of other auxiliary construction. This would never be abandoned, not only because it can be used for continuous training but because since it is completely tied in geodetically it can be used as a site for actual rocket firing against the enemy if the need arose. Of course, when hostile intelligence has the place pinpointed, they may displace equipment and personnel away from the immediate vicinity, but still close enough to use it. Therefore we must consider that all these sites like KAPUSTIN YaR, these two in the Ukraine and the ones in the north can all be used to launch actual combat missiles when necessary. Of course many missile sites which can be called firing positions are also being constructed and rocket troops would come there to use these prepared sites for firing in case of war. Much work must be done on these sites since launching pads require all kinds of preparation.

31. G.: Are there foreign observers at the current series of nuclear tests, such as Chinese, Bulgarians or for that matter any satellites ?
S.: No. No foreigners are permitted at our nuclear tests. I speak only about atomic tests because they do have representatives from the satellite countries at rocket launching tests. Only Soviet military people and scientists are at the atomic tests. The high officials of satellite countries are told that the tests are going on but there is some degree of distrust so that the representatives are not permitted to be there. At one time there were officers from satellite countries at the Dzerzhinskiy Academy, at least attending some of the faculties but now this has all been stopped. As I remember the VAK there, there was a foreign faculty, but since that time for the last two and a half years the Academy has become far more of a security type institution.

32. G.: Have you ever heard what the opinion of any senior officers is on the Chinese nuclear weapons programme and what is the opinion from any source as to when the Chinese will have such weapons ? S.: I have had interest in this matter and up to today all the Chinese have are various installations for making fissionable materials and for testing them. The

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Chinese scientists are striving to develop the production of fissionable materials and to produce them in more concentrated form but up to now they do not have a nuclear bomb. I asked Sergei Sergeievich about this, particularly after he had returned from Korea and China. He told me that they do not have any bombs yet and if they need atomic weapons then we would give it to them. The way I see it from a strategic viewpoint, if there is a threat on that flank, I think that we would simply send our own units into China to support them with nuclear weapons. However, up to now we have not given them any. G.: How soon do you think the Chinese will have their own nuclear weapons ? S.: I think that in two or three years they will have their own nuclear weapons. They are working very intensively on this; the Chinese do not have large quantities of raw material, they do not have any monazite sands, Czechoslovakia has more and we get this material from them. Although the Chinese do not have any completed atomic weapons, they do have many samples and quite a number of laboratories in which they are working on this problem constantly. The Central Committee is concerned that the Chinese will accomplish this in very short time. China has turned off on its own independant path with respect to many questions already. At the 12th anniversary in China, no prominent Soviets went down. The only one who went was PROKHOROV who is the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR together with a group of five insignificant officials. At the big party the Chinese gave in MOSCOW, KHRUSHCHEV did not attend.

(33.) G.: Since you mention KHRUSHCHEV, have you heard anything about his health lately ? S.: As a whole I would say his state of health is not very good. He tires easily and his heart is not too good. This was mentioned by CHURAYEV during VARENTSOV's party. He is being closely watched by his doctors and controlled medically. He goes for vacations to rest quite a few times a year. They check his health every day and watch his diet and with this kind of care it is quite possible he will survive another ten years.

(34.) G.: Getting back to FEDEROV for a moment, when he speaks to you about

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the rockets in his brigade, does he refer to them by "R" numbers or by "A" designations or in any other cover terms ? S.: When he speaks alone to me he simply refers to rockets by the "R" numbers. BUZINOV does also because we are all close personal friends. G.: How will he refer to them in VARENTSOV's office ? S.: To VARENTSOV personally he would still speak of the "R"s, but in strange offices he would speak of index numbers or call a rocket an "izdeliye" As I told you, at the Academy reference to "R" numbers is forbidden. Incidentally although BUZINOV drinks a lot when he visits with me he watches his step regarding classified conversation when a person he does not know well is present. I noticed this when I was invited to Colonel Peter GANICHEV who was a deputy to the Rezident in India and for whom I got an apartment in MOSCOW. BUZINOV went with me and ZASORIN was also there. We drank a lot that night and I had trouble getting BUZINOV home, there were no taxis and I gave 20 roubles in old money to the driver of a garbage truck to take BUZINOV home. On the next day, a Sunday, at 11 o'clock was when your man called me on the telephone. I did not understand a damn thing and he called at the wrong time and I did realise the call was from you, but I understood nothing that the man rattled off. He said something about waiting and then "bye-bye". I was not in the best of shape myself but I was not drunk because I never drink too much, but I could not understand a thing.

35. G.: In a combat operation what does the term "osnovnyye napravlenie" mean - what are these "napravlenii" in the European theatre, or do they vary according to the situation ? S.: In a theatre of military operations there may be one "osnovnoye" direction or there may be several. This was particularly true during World War II when our armies were still within the territories of the USSR. On the basis of these several basic directions fronts were organised, such as the First, Second, Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts, etc. These are often described as compass directions such as South East, North West or Central. Many factors are tied in to determine these directions, such as the major network of highways and rail lines, the main concentrations of

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enemy forces. Now the main direction is considered to be the BERLIN direction. It is really an operational-strategic concept, for example beginning from the main base of the ten armies facing West Germany, the main direction is called the BERLIN direction. In case of hostilities additional directions may be designated along the flanks of the main direction. These auxiliary directions may be temporary or fixed depending on the course of battle. G.: Would you consider the BERLIN direction as the main axis of attack which actually extends westward beyond BERLIN. S.: Yes. It would be both an operational as well as a strategic direction and BERLIN will in effect be an intermediate point, not the ultimate objective and the direction will extend all the way to the Channel.

36. G.: Do you know of any practical results of the Voyennaya Myal articles, that is actions that have been taken following their having been recommended in the sbornik ? S.: Of course, when these articles get to the Army commanders or even lower these are fundamental concepts on the basis of which troops are trained. H.: But you get a lot of disagreements;for example ROTMISTROV says this and ZHADOV says that and then there are criticisms. S.: These discussions must be considered as a step forward. First let us take the Field Service regulations of 1959. Here the general principles are laid down for various forms of combat under various conditions. In addition under conditions where weapons of mass destruction are deployed, new circumstances must be considered. However, there is no article in the sbornik which contradicts the Field Service Regulations. The articles represent the development of narrow or rigid concepts as expressed in the Field Service Regulations into much broader concepts since the course of battle may find circumstances of a special nature not possible to cover fully in the Field Service Regulations. Therefore these articles serve the Commanders as supplementary material to assist them in their training programmes. The Commander who gets these articles will take the appropriate reference to his own specific training programme and on the basis of this information will write up his own lectures and instructions for troop training. His

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subordinates may not even know that he has used the material in the articles in the instructions which come from him and assume that it reflects his own thinking, especially since they may not have access to these articles. The articles are an expansion of the principles in the Field Service Regulations which take into account specific conditions. Therefore the articles must be considered as one of the fundamental and up to date supplementary guides for all the armed forces in the USSR. New articles continuously bring up to date the inclusion of new types of weapons and their military application. It is not possible to publish a new set of Field Service Regulations every year. Even when discussions from various viewpoints are brought together and summarised the best points made in each viewpoint are summarised and a common course of action is recommended which is a step forward.

37. G.: Take PLATONOV's article in the sbornik; he mentions the Krylataya Raketa (cruise-type) under Naval control along the coasts, for coastal defence. Do you know of such missile units - what missiles do they have and could it be that Naval officers at Dzerzhinskiy are training for these units ? S.: I have certainly heard of these. The Krylatka was taken from submarines and developed and improved for use with Ground Forces. The Krylatka is also used in coastal defence and these units are under the jurisdiction of the Navy. G.: Is this the improved P-5, now called the SP-5 ? S.: That is correct and the Naval officers do go to the Dzerzhinskiy Academy to study these missiles.

38. G.: Have either Sergei Sergeievich or BUZINOV ever mentioned that they are working closely with Naval, Air Force or PVO officers on missile research, testing or troop problems ? S.: Yes, they said so and they do work together because all of these have the same basic equipment. The only difference is that the missions designated for the rockets will suit the service concerned. At the Supreme Military Council at which KHRUSHCHEV presides all representatives of the various combat arms are present.

39. /

39. G.: When Sergei Sergeievich spoke of failures in the strategic missile programme, exactly what did he mean by failures ? S.: He meant that there was insufficient trained personnel and that the electronic equipment was not fully developed. G.: You did mention this before, I thought there might have been still another kind of failure he may have referred to.

40. G.: Sputniks are launched and strategic missiles are tested at a place one thousand kilometres east of KAPUSTIN YaR. Have you ever heard Sergei Sergeievich or BUZINOV mention the existence of this polygon, which fires into the Pacific ? S.: I spoke to you about this, but I could not give you its co-ordinated position since I could not find this out. There is such a polygon and it is referred to as the one in Central Asia. There is even an impact area there to which they fire from KAPUSTIN YaR. G: And do they fire into the Pacific from this base too ? S.: Yes, they do.

41. G.: In the NEDELIN accident, what were the exact words used by the engineer to tell you that the first stage of the missile was propelled by nuclear energy ? S.: The way this was written up was that this rocket has been filled with a new type of fuel, using fissionable material in its propulsion mechanism. G.: Could it be said that this was nuclear assisted, boosted as it were ? S.: He said that it was a two-stage rocket and that the first stage when activated did not work properly and following the specific time interval which had elapsed without the rocket having left the launching pad and at which point no further movement should have taken place, all safety valves should have automatically closed. At that time NEDELIN and his party all came out of their safety shelters and suddenly the second stage ignited and exploded. G.: Is it possible that the second stage could have been atomic energy powered, or possibly both of the stages ? S.: No. Only one stage was so powered and it was the first stage. Both stages have fuel but the first stage was the one with nuclear power, but the second stage ignited.

42. /

(42) G.: When you say that the R-11, R-2 and R-1 are two-stage, what do you mean ? S.: I mean that Soviet science has taken the line that rockets should have two stages including the Krylatka and the V-75. In early tests there were three-stage rockets, but it has been decided that two-stage rockets are sufficient to accomplish the desired mission and they are easier to guide than three-stage rockets.

(43.) G.: Why aren't there any sbornik articles on strategic missiles ? S.: Articles on strategic missiles are placed in a special exclusive Top Secret Bulletin by MOSKALENKO and his officers. Of course they also get the sbornik themselves, but they do not write articles to place in the sbornik. I have not yet seen the third issue of the sbornik, but thus far I have seen no articles on strategic missiles. G.: What would the reason for this be ? S.: It is just an additional Top Secret security precaution and some of the recipients of the sbornik would not be concerned with strategic missiles. It would be none of their business.

(44.) G.: Have there been missile exercises in the Caucasus this year ? S.: You mean in which rockets were used? G.: Yes. S.: There were such exercises this year and VARENTSOV was there.

(45.) G.: Do you know how long a missile can be held after it is fuelled before it must be launched ? S.: I understand and every rocket has its own particular maximum time limit. They have developed a type of interior coating for the fuel chambers which permits the fuel to be retained in the rocket for a longer period of time, but to a certain extent no matter how you try to bottle up the liquid fuel it manages to leak and vapourise to some extent. This will vary for every type of rocket.

(46.) G.: Are the 3R2, 3R3, and 3R7 being developed further ? S.: Yes, they are constantly trying to perfect them. G.: Are their mounts amphibious ? S.: Of course they are. I told you that they were mounted on the chassis of the amphibious tank PT76. However, it is not recommended that they make a river crossing while the rocket is mounted on the chassis. The rocket should

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be taken across by other means while the tank chassis crosses itself. However there have been manoeuvres in which these carriers crossed a water barrier carrying one rocket.

47. G.: Can the atomic cannon also have conventional shells as well as nuclear ? S.: Yes it can and why shouldn't it, since the barrel is rifled ? It can fire either type of shell. G.: And are such cannons in the GSFG already ? S.: Yes, they are.

48. G.: Here is the last question. What would be the true unit designation of FEDEROV's brigade ? Could it be called by a prefix number, say 370, and then TRA brigade ? S.: That sounds very much like it. It could be called that. As a matter of fact since it is a secret designation he did mention it to me once and I couldn't quite remember it, but I do have his military unit FPO number, which I gave you.

49. G.: These are all the questions which we are going to take up today. We have more and we are going to work in still more for the next meetings. S.: I am ready to keep working. G.: Don't worry, we have the photographs for you to identify yet.

(J. showed subject a photo album of Soviet personalities in PARIS from the U.S. Embassy and subject had the following remarks to make about the persons he spotted as follows:-)

50. No. 5 This woman is from the Embassy and she worked at the Exhibition. I do not know what she does but she said that she has been here for four years already and that she wants to go home. (No. 5 was listed as Avianatta ANISENKO). She was working at the "INTOURIST" stand and knows French well. She and her husband, whom I did not see, will go home in a year. (He is listed as Mikhail ANISENKO).

51. No. 19 Here is a GRU officer. We have run across his photo before. He was also at the operational meeting but I do not remember his name. (No. 19 listed as Aleksey CHEREMUCHKIN).

52. /

52. No. 21 Please look up his name. I have seen him. G.: It is Vladimir DACHKEVICH. S.: It should be DASHKEVICH. He is a KGB officer. I have seen him in the KGB offices.

53. No. 32 Here is GRIGORIYEV and his wife. I told you that she had been an instructor at the MDA and was older than he. (Listed as Valentin and Maria GRIGORIYEV).

54. No. 35 This officer is not here in PARIS now. He has just become a Colonel and he is in the Air Force. He is a GRU officer who had been the GVF representative here (Civil Aviation) and now he works under ROGOV as I do and is with the GVF in MOSCOW. (No. 35 not listed, probably because no longer in PARIS).

55. No. 37 A GRU officer. G.: What does he do ? S.: He is a code clerk or something like that, possibly with the rank of Captain. He had been here in PARIS before. (No. 37 not listed, probably for the same reason as above).

56. No. 57 (crossed out) For some reason this number is crossed out, but he is here, this is Colonel KUDRYAVTSEV, Ivan Pavlovich. (No. 57 listed as Anatoli KULAZHENKOV, whereas for No. 56 is listed Vladimir Petrovich KUDRYAVTSEV, who is the other KUDRYAVTSEV also in PARIS. Therefore the No. 57 crossed out must obviously be a different number, which is not listed).

57. No. 56 This is a KGB officer (the corrected number would refer to the listing).

58. No. 63 A GRU officer. (Listed as Nil LENSKIY). We saw him before.

59. No. 62 This is a GRU officer who was at the operational meeting and we saw his face before. G.: That is LEBEDEV. S.: That's right. (Listed as Aleksei LEBEDEV).

60. No. 66 This is a low ranking man, a GRU code clerk (No. 66 not listed).

61. No. 93 Here is the Chief Book-keeper of the Embassy. I told you about him before. (Listed as Mikhail PETROV).

62. /

62. No. 90 A GRU officer. I don't know why the number is struck out. (No. 90 not listed).

63. No. 89 Here is a GRU officer who is now in PARIS. (Listed as Boris PANOV).

64. No. 129 A GRU officer. G.: This is SVERLOV. S.: That's right (listed as Vladimir SVERLOV).

65. No. 130 What is his name. G.: SVISTELNIKOV. S.: Yes. He is a KGB man but in the past he worked for GRU, then he went to the neighbours. There are many officers like that. (Listed as Paval SVISTELNIKOV). He graduated from our Academy.

66. No. 142 Here is the Ambassador. G.: That is right. (Listed as Sergei VINOGRADOV).

67. No. 157 Here is a number crossed out. He is our GRU officer. He is not in PARIS now. G.: It looks mis-spelled here, it is spelled ZAIKE. S.: It should be either ZAIKA or ZAIKIN. (Listed as Vladimir ZAIKE).

68. No. 160 A GRU officer. (Not listed).

69. No. 171 Here is a KGB officer. He is now here. G.: He must be an Armenian. S.: That is the one. (Listed as Nikita ENFANDZHIANTS).

70. No. 181 Here is the Rezident, isn't that right. G.: Yes. (Listed as Ivan CHEREDEYEV).

71. No. 182 Here is a KGB officer; I don't know his name. (Listed as Grigoriy CHOPOREV).

72. No. 184 Here is a GRU officer. His name is VOLKOV; he is not here now. (Listed as Gennadiy VOLKOV).

73. No. 222 Here is ZEMLYANSKIY, about whom I told you earlier. A GRU officer (Listed as Yevgeniy ZEMLYANSKIY). (Given above as Lt. Col. Vladimir Ivanovich ZEMLYANSKIY, Aviation Officer, now GVF representative, a GRU officer).

74. /

74. A packet of loose photographs was shown to subject and amongst these he identified one GRU officer, whose name is YEVLAMPIYEV.

75. This finished the photography and subject was asked if he had spotted where the code rooms were in the Embassy. S.: All the coding is done in that second floor wing that I told you about. G.: Where do the code clerks sit ? S.: They have their cabins in there but I haven't seen the rooms themselves. I see them running around there. G.: Can you identify them by face ? S.: Yes, I know them by face. J.: Does the KGB have their own code room and the GRU their own ? S.: Yes, of course they have their own, each one. G.: How about the M.I.D. code room ? S.: They have their own also, but I don't know where it is, possibly it is in an extension of this second floor, because everything there is so thoroughly equipped for security.

76. S.: You should prepare my mission assignments before I leave and review the old ones. G.: We have done most of this already and you may be sure that you will have a thorough review of this before you leave. S.: I think that I will be able to get hold of this four section manual to photograph during the time of my vacation, because, as I told you I will spend half of it in KISLOVODSK and the other half in MOSCOW. H.: How can you get hold of it. S.: That I can do from BUZINOV. He will get them for himself and sign for them. I won't even go to the Academy. I will tell him that I need them to write articles. FILIPPOVICH could even let me read them if I went to him at the Academy. I cannot go to their secret section and ask for it as I can in GRU. In GRU I would sign for it, but I cannot do so at the Academy since I am not registered there. Just like the case of the artillery journals. I asked BUZINOV to get them for me because I needed to study up on the material for some work that I am doing.

77. S.: These manuals are fairly large but I do have forty cassettes left and that should be good for about 2000 frames. This should last me for about three months. H.: Janet's husband has a re-supply. S.: When WYNNE comes of course he brings me bulky things, but cannot Janet hand me a packet

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of cigarettes ? H.: Yes. She can do this. S.: This solves the matter. My cassettes are in good shape and both of my Minox operate well. I use them both alternately. I almost always have a Minox in my pocket which is buttoned, but I don't always take spare cassettes, but the camera is loaded. There are certain targets of opportunity that I can take this way, for example the background data on KLOCHKO. I actually work on something or other every day, when I don't photograph I write up some terse notes at home.

78. G.: How do you stand with having completed the personal purchases you planned to make ? I ask this because it is going to be rough to throw this all on WINNE at the last minute if you still have a large number of items to get. S.: Don't worry, I will do all this myself. I have already got quite a number of things and I have visited all the places where I can get what I still lack. I know where they are. WINNE might take me to Versailles if it is not too far. I haven't been there yet. Neither have I seen de GAULLE's palace. H.: That is pretty far away, but Versailles is near. S.: I have seen most of the museums and I don't know how things will work out with this French girl I will see tomorrow. Maybe she will get some contacts for me and maybe I can go sightseeing in PARIS with her on Sunday.

79. (The matter of passing brochures by subject to his Embassy was discussed and he was advised that it would be better to wait until he had completed his trip with the delegation and possibly then receive some material from HOOK before he took anything to the Embassy). G.: In the meantime all you need to do is to report to the Embassy that you have established a good contact and certain things have been promised to you and when you get them you will bring them in.

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80. Regarding an acquaintance who subject could introduce to SOLOVYEV, subject was advised that the only way this could be done in a straight-forward fashion would be to meet the French people at the factory which subject and SOLOVYEV together would visit on the itinerary set up by HOOK. But anyone else would be insecure. Subject agreed to this. Subject again enquired if his information on the 230 re-deployed French planes was correct, but he was told that we had not yet found out, but was advised that if the information proved to be incorrect, it would not necessarily reflect on ZASORIN's reliability as subject's source, but the information could have been incorrect as reported by the French Communist source.

81. Subject now brought up his plea for both a translation of a Western military article which he could legend as having prepared himself and in addition a summary of a book which he would offer for consideration if sufficiently of interest to the Soviet agency concerned for complete translation and publication and for which subject would write a short preface in his own way, guided by the summary prepared by us. He was shown a recent issue of a very technical book on rockets and he saw how difficult it would be to understand, let alone translate such a book. After much discussion and repetition, subject stated that if within a year's time we could arrange to have both these requests fulfilled, it would solve his problem. He was told that we would do the best we could to accomplish this.

82. Subject left the safe apartment at 2400 hours and was delivered to the opposite side of the footbridge at RV 1 without incident by Roger and J. He walked a longer route home; this was more secure against chance observation by other Soviets.

MEETING NO. 40 - 10th OCTOBER, 1961.

1. Subject was picked up at RV No. 1 by M. and J. at 2000 hours while Roger provided surveillance cover. Subject arrived at the safe apartment at 2013 hours. S.: Yesterday and today I was at the Embassy twice on each day, both in the morning and the afternoon. They are extremely busy at the Embassy because all of the Embassy officers on the Ambassador's staff are writing their portion of the report to MOSCOW for the month since the Ambassador is going to MOSCOW in about two days and must take a full up-to-date report of the Embassy with him. He will report to MID and to whoever else he may be required to. During his absence he will be replaced by NIMSHCHINO who will arrive from MOSCOW in a day or two. The Ambassador will stay in the U.S.S.R. for a considerable time because he will also participate at the Party Congress and also possibly will attend the conferences afterwards. These conferences will be with the Heads of the Communist Parties from various countries. The Ambassadors to foreign countries do not always have personal contact with local Communists, but they certainly confer with the Heads of or representatives of the Heads of Communist Parties at conferences such as will be taking place now. This is in line with the guidance of "brotherly" Communist Parties.

2. S.: Yesterday I spoke to the Rezident and today I spoke both with the Rezident and with his Deputy. Yesterday the Rezident told me he was very busy due to the work he had to do in connection with the Ambassador's imminent departure and he asked me for a brief run-down of my own plans. I told him that I was trying to have two visits to factories of interest arranged and he said that that was fine and for me to do it in any way I saw fit but to include SOLOVYEV who has a solid cover in the Torgpredstvo just like KUDRYAVTSEV and has no acquaintances here yet since he has only been here three months. When he asked me how I planned to do this I said that we would meet people at the factories and I would introduce SOLOVYEV to the factory representatives and request that the factory representatives obtain brochures or other materials for me as the representative of the Committee of K.N.T. of the U.S.S.R. and send this to me via SOLOVYEV in the future. He said that that was fine and

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that I should do it that way and that he had arranged for SOLOVYEV to accompany me to JUMONT and then he asked when this would be. I said in one, two or even three days and in addition we would visit a plant in PARIS. He urged that the plants selected be in the category of those which produce products on the target list of requirements and I said that I would try. He said "I can see that you are really trying and I also want to say that some of the brochures that you have brought are of considerable interest". I had already given them all that I have received to date and today we examined them, about which I will tell you in a moment. He then asked if he could help me in any way and I said that I would come in on Friday to submit my local accounting to him and to pass all the additional materials that I receive from my acquaintances and contacts and write up my report. I told him I would not come in to the Embassy on Saturday since they have a short working day anyway and there were a few purchases that I have to make for people back home. He said that would be perfectly all right and possibly I would need even more time to make my purchases.

(3.) Last night [redacted] called me at about 2015 hours and asked me to come to the office today at 1730 hours. I called you last night about 2200 hours and told you about this. I thought that he would have everything set up for me today and would tell me about it at 1730. This morning earlier when I was at the Embassy, SOLOVYEV and the Rezident asked me when the trip would take place and I told them that it is still being arranged and that it is complicated but may be I would find out later in the day and when I did I would advise him. KUDRYAVTSEV insisted that on the 12th of October at 1300 hours I should be free because he wanted to take me out to dinner at a restaurant. I may find things out from him and this will not take long. Similarly the Rezident and ANANYEV also want to invite me for lunch or dinner and this will probably take place on Friday.

(4.) They also asked me to be at the Embassy at 1500 hours so that we could all together examine all my brochures and divide up those portions

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which would go to GRU by Diplomatic Pouch and what would go to the Committee by "heavy mail". At that time we all sat together, that is the Rezident, KUDRYAVTSEV, ANANYEV and myself and all we did was to examine my materials. About one third was separated out for GRU. It was a big pile, about two kilograms in weight. [redacted]s material which was the sample and its description, three brochures on heat resisting steel and your material on electronics were included. Broohures from Bagneaux and Pechiney were all included in this. The balance for the Committee was wrapped up and KUDRYAVTSEV took it to his office to forward to the Committee. I told them there would be more and they said they would again examine it with me and again divide it up between GRU and the Committee as they did with this batch. They examined it for over an hour, very carefully and were quite satisfied, but requested me if possible to get a little more on Bagneaux and Pechiney since this material was of great interest.

5. One hour after I left I was with HOOK. I spoke for an hour with HOOK and he said very apologetically that he was unable to arrange any trips. He says that I could not go to JUMONT, since they would not receive me for a week and the plant that makes chemical equipment has its Director absent for some time and could not receive me. (Babcock and Wilcox). Neither could I go to the electronics plant in PARIS. The people in JUMONT said that prior to any trip there I should have had a letter written to the Foreign Affairs Ministry of France. I told HOOK that if he had told me that earlier I could have had a letter from our Embassy officially requesting this permission, but now it is too late since it would be 48 hours before they would read the letter and they would set up a visit for next week, whereas I must leave on Sunday. Evidently HOOK did not know that this was necessary and he had just found out. He has done a great deal and he feels very badly that he has been unable to make the arrangements he tried so hard to set up. His materials thus far are of no great value but he does promise to get me more. I cannot complain since HOOK has tried so hard, so I am glad that we are meeting now to decide what to do next. What is important for me now is to make only one visit somewhere, not two or three, and as far as other arrangements are concerned I can give them plausible reasons as to why they did not work out particularly with the postponement of the visit to JUMONT. My dear friends, all I need is one visit / 9

visit and some more brochures. G.: We already have the brochures, don't worry about that, and they are good ones, you will see them later. You can say they came from both HOOK and WYNNE. S.: My friends, I want to ask you if in some way through the Embassy of the United States or the Embassy of Great Britain a request could be made to a French firm to receive me as an official representative (of a Committee of the U.S.S.R.). I am not thinking clearly now since I just left HOOK, but see if you cannot get one visit arranged for me. Tomorrow is a lost day also because HOOK asked me to call him only at 1600 hours (Next meeting's transcript may show a different turn to this expected plan). I know he will try to do something all day tomorrow, and maybe by chance something will work out but that would leave only Thursday or Friday in which to make a visit. Tomorrow I must go to the Embassy again and give them some reason for the delay. This is the situation with respect to my trips and the work for the Committee. G.: Don't worry about the materials, you will have them.

6. S.: [redacted] also discussed with me the possibility of his taking a trip to the U.S.S.R. in December, January or February. I gave him advice about how to request his visa and what lectures to prepare, etc. He wrote everything down about the procedures that I recommended. J.: The only thing we can hope for at this late stage is that by some small miracle [redacted] can arrange one visit for you. On this I am sure that he is serious but let us face the fact that he is not dealing with the American public or the British public. For our Embassies to intercede would be the height of foolishness, since it would indicate to the French our interest in you, which would be dangerous. (G. translates). S.: I could have tried to make contacts through official channels, but the results would have been worthless in terms of what I would be shown, so I thought that through special connections which I see you do not have at your disposal, I could get to see such places where I would not be invited to go officially. J.: Another point is that you should not be too successful here. If you are they may decide to send you back to PARIS and this is the last place that we want to meet again. We want to meet in a place like LONDON or America, under conditions that we can control and not in a place where we have no control. G.: Remember there are French regulations here

as laid down by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to visits to French factories by Soviets. S.: [redacted] was trying hard but he is not experienced in these things. I could have gotten a letter a week ago as official as you would want it, but now it is out of the question because time is so short I now would not even mention this to the Embassy since the Ambassador is too busy to be seen, if shown such a letter for his signature would say that it is useless to send it now since I am leaving on Sunday and why was this not done earlier. At any rate if I could only have one visit and a maximum amount of material I could introduce SOLOVYEV quickly to wherever we visited and it would take care of the whole thing. G.: All [redacted] can do is to do his best, and that he will do. S.: One thing I do not understand is that if the Director of the Chemical Equipment Plant is away why could not his Deputy receive me ?

G.: Every firm has their own internal regulations.

7. S.: I believe that we should meet twice more before I leave. G.: Yes. On Thursday and on Saturday. S.: And let us try as hard as possible for [redacted] to make me an appointment to visit a firm, for say only an hour or an hour and a half on Thursday morning, and send a car to my hotel at 0900 hours. I asked him about this and I also told him that I would have a car for him in MOSCOW all the time. All his guide has to do is to take SOLOVYEV and myself to the firm and he can go, we can get back ourselves. This is all I have to report on this situation, I cannot add anything.

8. S.: Now let me check my notes to see if there is anything on other matters. I think I have reported everything. Tell me, was ZASORIN's information on the number of aircraft correct ? I must know this in order to have an idea on how to handle ZASORIN in the future. (Subject was reassured that ZASORIN's information was satisfactory and that he should continue to respect him as a reliable source because the number of planes committed in various categories was even greater than that reported and since no specific plane categories were given by ZASORIN it was impossible to determine what units it referred to).

9. S.: By the way ANANIEV told me yesterday that the KGB in PARIS are working full blast, with Communists in every walk of life. The GRU officers only approach those Communists who have had some military background or are

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relatives of such and only after they have had permission to do so. The KGB should be watched by our French friends.

10. S.: By the way we have been working now constantly for six months, out of which we have been meeting at close intervals like now for over two months. All: We are well aware of this. S.: All I wanted to say is that you have helped me to understand, you have guided me and I am very grateful for this attention to me on your part and on the part of your leaders. G.: We have planned to do just as you requested. On Thursday we will lay out the complete missions for you to accomplish in priority order, and you will copy them down. In addition we will review all aspects of the operational plan. On the last meeting on Saturday you will repeat to us the missions assigned to you to be sure that you understand everything and then we will simply relax and have a good time.

11. S.: I must also remind you again that I need a book from you of some sort with a brief summary description in Russian of its contents. This book must be of a type that the Soviets would be interested in having fully translated and published. In addition at a later date, I need a complete translation of a very serious and worthwhile military article based on documents which I can legend as coming from the material at GRU of which I have given you a list. (After a lengthy discussion explaining to subject how all this would take time, he was shown a book with the title 'Man and Space' which was borrowed from the Library of the U.S. Embassy and published in 1961. Subject was so delighted with this book, although it is quite elementary in a technical sense, that he insisted after still greater lengthy discussion that he wanted to take this book back with him and that by Saturday a summary in Russian be prepared for him. This summary he would re-work at home with appropriate political overtones and presentation and re-type it prior to submitting it to the officials who would decide if the book would be of value as a complete translation and publication. Toward this end the help of VARENTSOV would be available and subject felt strongly that this would support his legend for constantly requesting Soviet documents as ostensible background material for the article he is writing. If the officials decide that the book is worthy

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of translation and publication, subject would so advise us through Janet and would expect us to provide him at a later date with a full translation of the book which he would use to check the translation by the Soviet publications translation bureau. It was agreed that M. would read the book and summarise chapter by chapter in English and that G. would translate this summary into Russian and have it available for subject at the latest at Saturday's meeting. Subject also asked for a book review on this volume translated into Russian if the book were accepted for translation and publication. He insisted that his acquisition of the book itself would be by simple direct purchase in PARIS from a book store and that despite the fact that a number of copies may already be in the U.S.S.R. from their U.S. book acquisition personnel, the idea of his calling attention to the book as of value and writing up a summary thereon is the significant point. Though this appears like blatant eye-wash to us, it may be possible that subject knows what he is talking about and this can do him considerable good and no harm at all.)

12. G.: How soon do you expect the full translation after you advise through Janet that the book will be published ? Remember this may take two months to translate for the full text. S.: That is too long, don't you have experts where one reads it out in English and the other writes it straight off in Russian ? G.: No. And besides you don't translate a book like you cook blini, to quote you. S.: Before you get the word that it should be translated you could pick up the book reviews on it and have that ready. (The length of this summary would run to about half a page per chapter, with variations as to the significance of the contents and the total would be approximately six pages. Subject was now shown a new set of brochures mostly English, but with some French, and he proceeded to sort them out as to which would be of interest to both the GRU and to the Committee and which were not necessary at all. He also received several general directories. After the piles were selected, those which subject desired were later wrapped up and he took them with him to deliver to the Embassy next morning).

13. G.: Now we will get into our questions. First of all let us clear up one we had at the last meeting. You said that a large strategic missile

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base is defended by V-75s in addition to aircraft. S.: And in addition this can be supplemented by conventional anti-aircraft batteries. G.: Who told you that this was so ? S.: I asked this question ten times, I often asked VARENTSOV how our missile sites and industrial centres are protected. I was always told that this is done by the combined PVO weapons available. This includes the proven and accepted anti-air missiles, the V-75, as well as aviation and all types of conventional anti-aircraft artillery. G.: What is the precise role of these V-75 missiles ? S.: Their role is to protect against hostile aircraft which approach the missile base, but the V-75s are not adjacent to the site where the missile base is, but some distance away. They may even be several hundred kilometres away. G.: Well, that is something else, that is the whole point of the question. Before we had the impression that you meant these V-75s were adjacent to the site. S.: No, not at all. First they are picked up by radar long in advance and its course was determined picked up by radar, just as POWERS' aircraft was/and the missiles V-75 go into action as soon as the hostile aircraft is within their range, but the aircraft's target could be 100 kms. away.

14. G.: Do you by any chance know or have heard of a GRU officer by the name of Izmail Aleksandrovich NETSVETAILO ? S.: There was a General TSVETAYEV who died, but I have not heard of this name, he sounds like an Asiatic. G.: That's right and he was supposed to have been here at the French Exhibition. S.: He may have come here under the auspices of the KGB or from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the KGB does not give us lists of who they send, that is to the Committee, and neither does the Ministry of Foreign Trade. I never ran into this fellow.

15. G.: The next question deals with your experience in Turkey. You said that the GRU Legal Rezidenturas in NEW YORK and WASHINGTON co-operate and also that the GRU has Legal Rezidenturas in ANKARA and ISTANBUL. Do these two Turkish Rezidenturas also co-operate and if so to what extent ? S.: Yes, they do and I have told you about this naturally. For example, I remember I received a cable once from ISTANBUL saying that a potential agent under

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assessment was going to ANKARA from ISTANBUL. We were requested to check on the hotel he was staying at, and they gave us two possibilities, and the duration of his visit. GIRIN and I went out to look for this Turk. We went out and made this check for the ISTANBUL Rezidentura and sent them the results. And I remember that we sent them a coded message, using numbers, with the results. Between Rezidenturas they use one-time pads for coding and these can be transmitted either by phone or courier. If by phone it is called a telephonagram. There is very good co-operation and mutual support between Rezidenturas in the same country, just as between WASHINGTON and NEW YORK.

16. G.: Is there a senior Resident, to whom the other Resident is subordinate ? S.: No. Both are completely independent. Each has its own operational funds, its own agent net and its own direct communication channel to MOSCOW. Neither one knows what the other sends or receives from MOSCOW. We for example have three channels for communicating with our people in the U.S.A., one is communication with the Illegal Rezidentura and the other two are to each of the two legal Rezidenturas.

17. G.: Try to recall the people in Turkey. Do you remember Ivan Stepanovich KARGALTSEV ? S.: I remember him and I knew him. G.: How about Sergei Polikarpovich TRISHIN ? S.: I remember him also, I believe they were both Naval officers. G.: Do you know what they were engaged in ? S.: In the first place KARGALTSEV was in ISTANBUL and so was TRISHIN. And I was in ANKARA, but I got to know them and KARGALTSEV came to visit me in ANKARA and he was a Captain 3rd Rank. They were there at the same time as I was in Turkey. I had KARGALTSEV together with other ISTANBUL officers to dinner at my home. He is a short, thin man. It was standard practice to invite visiting officers from ISTANBUL to our homes or to restaurants when they came to ANKARA and they would always entertain us in the same way when we went to their town. G.: Do you know if they were possibly engaged in support operations for illegals ? S.: I believe that this is an absolutely reasonable assumption and they were more busily engaged in support operations for illegals in ISTANBUL than we were in ANKARA. In the first place ISTANBUL is a large city of some 1,200,000 and

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there would be more illegals in that area than in ANKARA which is a large village, but even so I remember that I personally gave support to illegals via a dead-drop. They were travelling (marsh-rutnik) illegals.

18. G.: Do you know who they were or what you gave them. S.: No. Not at all, but I received a signal that the D.L.B. was cleared. I do know what I put in, since it was money. It was 5,000 lire at one time and less on the second time. G.: Did you have specific missions concerning illegals' support, e.g. the acquisition of documentation, a mail drop or legend material ? S.: Illegals are given missions of this kind and so is the Legal Rezidentura. They send their information to MOSCOW for them to use as they see fit. G.: What support activities of this nature did you do ? S.: I remember that at least one letter every month and a half would come from MOSCOW for us to post locally. All of us did this, IONCHENKO, GIRIN and myself. G.: How about documentation for providing a background legend ? S.: We did this also. There has always been an Illegal Rezidentura in Turkey, but I don't know anything about it but now that an experienced man like General SUDIN has been sent there he may break up the Rezidentura into several units or develop them further. I don't know what. There were missions to get all kinds of items of local clothing to the last detail. I also did this twice during my sixteen months there. These items were sent back by diplomatic mail. I went out with GUR'YEV to buy this. The clothing we bought was of the type commonly worn in Turkey. They were all simple items of clothing. G.: How about documentation itself ? S.: Yes, I remember an incident there where Turkish workers were hired by the Embassy to do repair work and their passports were picked up and I remember that the Consul who was a KGB man, Vladlen FEDOROV, called me at that time. Incidentally both FEDOROV and Aleksey VOSKOBOY are now studying at the KGB Institute beyond Pokrovsko-Streshnevo about which I told you before. The latter called me from there just before I left for PARIS and I will see him when I get back.

19. S.: Now FEDOROV when he would get such passports in Turkey would either work on them himself or give them to us and we would write everything from those passports on a special documentation index book (something like a

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very elaborate document identikit). There would be numbers keyed to every shade or colour and every possible dimension is keyed to numbers. We would make references, for example, to page 32, line 3 and the Centre would know exactly what we mean since they have an identical book. I never told you about this before, this is something new. By numerical references every letter in every line of the passport can be spotted for size etc. and every other detail. If three lines lower on the passport different lettering in size and colour is used, there would be a corresponding numerical index again by page and line and that would identify it exactly. This is called "etalony". All shades of colour and all types of lines in paper including wavy lines, can be pinpointed. Using this book which is Top Secret and only for clandestine operations, it is possible to duplicate any document in the world. This is a very cumbersome and detailed process to write up and the description of a passport may take ten pages. G.: How do they handle descriptions of paper texture ? S.: For this they do many things. They try to buy similar paper, then they try to get blank samples and finally we have quite a collection of stolen actual passports, from all countries. When a duplication or a forgery is to be made of say a Turkish passport, an actual passport is looked at, together with the report on the "etalony". The documentation expert can then see what changes may have taken place and he can spot any dot or special mark and the measurements are done to the millimetre. When FEDOROV gave us such a passport we would have to work on it for a day or two. After that the passports would be returned to the workers who had been engaged by the Embassy for several days. This is done in all countries and is called technical intelligence.

20. S.: Special requirements are occasionally sent out and in every country all new items in the photography and the audio-radio field are always picked up and samples continually sent to MOSCOW. All types of radio spare parts are purchased as the Centre orders us to and quite often a clandestine agent piece of equipment would be composed of totally non-U.S.S.R. parts. The prevalent types are West German, American, English and French models.

This is particularly true for equipment given to Illegals. G.: To whom is this equipment and documentation sent at the Centre by the Rezidentura ? Does it go to BEKRENEV ? S.: First of all all of the material goes to KISELOV (alias KRYLOV) (in 1955, now to the new Chief KARPOV), the Directorate Chief and there according to the requirement submitted by the other upravleniye, they distribute the incoming material, mostly to the First Otdel of SHELIGANOV (Technical Intelligence Section) or to BEKRENEV (Illegals Section, primarily documentation material for illegals' use). By the way KARPOV is the Chief of the Directorate now and still uses the same pseudo as KISLENKO did. G.: Does not the Illegal Rezidentura do most of the gathering of such documentary material ? S.: That is absolutely right because the others often find it impossible to get such material. G.: In addition it would seem that the Illegals would be better acquainted with what they or other Illegals would primarily need than officers in the Legal Rezidentura. S.: That is also correct, and let me again mention that that is why they sent SUDIN down there, since he will probably attempt to develop the illegal operations there and place illegals at U.S. bases at ADANA and other places, whereas in the past Turkey has been a very hard nut for us to crack.

21. G.: Now let us consider this GRU woman Illegal you mentioned before who is in ANKARA. Do you remember what you said about her ? S.: Not quite, I can't quite place her. G.: You even described that she was in a shop near the Red Cross building on the main boulevard in ANKARA on the left hand side going down to the Soviet Embassy. S.: Oh yes, but she was not alone in this, there was also a man involved. This was on Attaturk Boulevard going by the Red Cross building, just as you said and they run a jewelry shop, mostly silverware. When I arrived they told me not to contact them, but just to watch. There was an old man involved and this younger woman in her thirties. G.: What nationality were they or did they purport to be ? S.: I was told that they were Jugoslavs who had migrated to Turkey some years ago. G.: Was this a man and wife ? S.: No. But they were both members of the same family and there were other children in that family who were born in Turkey. He was an old man and she could have been his daughter, but I never had specific information on this. Our instructions were merely to see how they were getting

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along in terms of their being arrested or not, alive or ill and were they in a stable financial position. This mission was particularly assigned to my predecessor, KONDRASHEV and when he turned over the Military Attache affairs to me, as well as GRU matters, he told me just to keep an eye on them but not to contact them until the Centre gave instructions. If I had a map of ANKARA I could spot the store for you easily.

(At this moment a brief pause was made to change tapes).

22. G.: Can you describe this woman ? S.: I've already estimated her age. She is about average height and I can't remember her as being particularly attractive but I can't remember any better than that. The man is over sixty. G.: If they are being paid through what channels do they receive money ? S.: Of course they are being paid and they get it via dead drop, possibly once every three months. I don't remember the details. insert #1 G.: Have they been working for a long time now ? S.: Yes for a very long time. I'd say for decades before the last war. G.: Were they always in this location ? S.: That I do not know but they were there at the time that I was there, that should be very easy to check up on from the records of the store's proprietorship. The store should be most easy to find. insert #2 It is the only silver shop in that immediate vicinity.

23. G.: We will now return to the old set of questions. When you described the "MARS" as two-stage, what did you mean ? and is it obsolete now and being discarded ? S.: No. It has been further improved and instead of the "MARS" they now have the "LUNA" which replaces it. But the "MARS" is not obsolete since they have made a great number of them and there may be possibly ten thousand of them, which are too many simply to use up in practice. It has a very simple construction. The "LUNA" is larger and has the same sort of functional characteristics and a better range. G.: Did you say they are both two-stage rockets ? S.: Let me explain the meaning. The rocket flies as one single unit, but they have an upper and lower set of jets for propulsion which work together in a fixed relationship as the propellant. The rocket does not separate into two stages during flight. That is the true meaning of a two-stage rocket. These rockets have two levels at which the thrust is developed, but it flies as one unit.

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24. G.: It is well known that the automobile factory in GORKIY builds vehicles or carriers for heavy rockets. Have you heard from either Sergei Sergeievich or BUZINOV that rockets are also made there ? S.: I have heard that rocket assemblies are manufactured there. I have heard about this from two sources, POZOVNYY was one and I mentioned the other man to you, he was at the Academy with me.

25. G.: Is "LUNA" in serial production ? And is it issued to troops ? S.: Yes it is in serial production and has already been given to troops.

26. G.: Is the "KORSHUN" obsolete or is it still in use ? S.: It is in use and they have made a large number of them. It cannot even be written off like the "MARS" since there are a great number of these rockets in storage. It is still a basic T.R.A. weapon and it is a liquid fuel rocket of the T.R.A. I cannot tell you why it was not shown in the Parade.

27. G.: Have you heard anything further on the status of delivery of missiles to the satellites, particularly during your last stay in MOSCOW ? S.: I reported to you before that certain categories of rockets are being given to them, particularly T.R.A. rockets. The satellite troops are being trained in using these weapons and Soviet instructors are assisting in the training. There are many test firings. The only new development is that all this is being further perfected. G.: When are they expected to be operational in satellite armies, for example the armies of the D.D.R., the Czech and the Polish ? S.: It is estimated that they are operational now. They have already had test firings and this can only be done if the preliminary training has been completed. After troops have gone through rocket firing training it must be clear that these rocket units are operational. Even in the case of guided missiles the entire difficulty is in making the computations. The actual firing technique is relatively simple. The satellite troops might still require more experience in making their computations to strike a target exactly, but there is no problem in their ability to fire rockets.

28. G.: When GOFFE was the Commander of Artillery in the Sub-Carpathian Military District, did he have free rockets or missiles under his control then ? S.: He certainly did and that was one reason why he was taken from

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there as a man who had practical experience in operating such rockets, in addition to his being a capable man and General.

29. G.: Remember you mentioned that at the Engineer Academy Imeni KUIBYBSHEV may be concerned with construction problems and training of troops for siting smaller missiles. Does it have anything to do with the larger missile base construction such as MOSKALENKO controls ? S.: This Academy is in MOSCOW on ulitsa Obukha. They have several faculties there. They train fortification specialists and pioneer engineer troops who are concerned with all types of field fortifications and I told you that they also train engineers in the construction of every type of auxiliary and basic equipment on the ground for missile sites including bunkers etc. G.: Would this include all types of rockets, even ICBMs ? S.: Absolutely, for all rockets. This Academy is a general academy and it trains engineers for every category of engineer work. G.: Even for GUASS which is the Chief Directorate of Airfields and Special Construction of the Ministry of Defence ? S.: Absolutely. All that must be specified is what special training must be given for the type of engineer required. This academy is the only engineer academy in the U.S.S.R. All other engineer training installations are schools or higher schools. These train junior officers. The Academy has a special faculty which trains engineers for engineering construction for rockets.

30. G.: Does GRAU control any plants at all or does it just have representatives at plants to keep an eye on production ? S.: They have voyenpredy (military representatives) and these representatives are charged with the checking of each item of military equipment completed. They would condemn any defects and particularly for rockets they must check every item on a technical check sheet (formular) before they sign it and accept it for delivery to an Army depot. Everything must fall between allowable tolerances. There is not just one representative at a plant. There are brigades of them and they are all subordinate to GRAU. There is a special GRAU Directorate that is organised to handle the representatives. G.: Is the terminology of the organisation consisting of officers who staff this correct as the Otdel Tekhnicheskogo Kontrolya ? S.: The terminology is correct, but it is a Directorate, not an otdel. This is an enormous organisation and consists

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of thousands of officers which are sent all over the country and it is so large that it even has its own Personnel Section which in turn is subordinate to the Personnel Directorate of GRAU. There are many other personnel sections in GRAU, each one servicing the different GRAU Directorates. Many of my classmates from my VAK course were sent to GRAU where they went out as military representatives on rockets.

31. G.: Where is the T-10 tank produced ? S.: In the Urals, near SVERDLOVSK, but exactly where I do not know. G.: How about the T-55 tank ? S.: This is built in GORKIY and also in the Urals. Incidentally this Lieut. Colonel I just thought of, his name is GOLUB. He graduated from the Artillery Academy in 1959 and he works in GRAU on rockets and he had been a former Adjutant of VARENTSOV's. His name is Vladimir and his wife's name is Nina. He is running around with some woman, a draughting engineer and I think that Nina is VARENTSOV's girl friend.

32. G.: In July you mentioned the amount of money spent on tank production in one year. Do you recall what year this figure was for ? S.: I can't remember. When VARENTSOV mentioned it, he was complaining about his being criticised for putting up permanent artillery housing shelters instead of canvas. After I gave you this information in figures I don't remember it any longer.

33. G.: Do you think you could find out from POZOVNYY about the production of strategic bombers in general and details of production designers, particularly of those plants at KUYBYSHEV and MOSCOW - FILI. S.: Yes, I could easily. G.: That's fine and that would be of great interest.

34. G.: Is KASHIN still at KAPUSTIN YaR ? S.: One of my first problems when I return to MOSCOW is to get KASHIN transferred from KAPUSTIN YaR to the Dzerzhinskiy Academy where I have already made arrangements in the Personnel Section. G.: Will he tell you all about his work there when you see him ? S.: Of course he will, he will tell me everything and let me again emphasise to you that people like KASHIN and POZOVNYY I can very simply invite to my home for a modest entertainment and I can record all their conversations on a tape-recorder with ease and security. I admit that it would be dangerous to record

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the conversations of VARENTSOV, the Minister or people on the General Staff. (Subject again makes a request for a miniature wire recorder to carry in his pocket and a second one of a small size table model which could be concealed in his home). When KASHIN returns I will get very valuable information on rockets from him because he is getting ready to present the materials that he has collected for his Diploma.

35. G.: Who told you that female astronauts would be launched in sputniki next year ? S.: This was told to me by both BUZINOV and POZOVNYY. They said that they wanted to astound the world and they have already selected a group of athletic type women to train for this.

36. G.: Do you recall that at the Rumanian Reception in early August, KHRUSHCHEV spoke of a hundred megaton bomb, not one megaton as you mentioned ? S.: The point is that KHRUSHCHEV was drunk and he wasn't speaking of megaton equivalents of any kind, he was speaking of the actual weight in tons. He mentioned a hundred ton of actual weight, mixing up nuclear yield with weight. He just mixed everything up and both Sergei Sergeievich and BUZINOV told me about this. G.: Did either one of them make any statement on the military feasibility or value of such a weapon, namely a 100 megaton TNT equivalent yield ? S.: No, that is pure fantasy. That may be desirable but no-one ever mentioned this.

37. (WYNNE was about to ring, but subject said that he would rather work a little longer with us and not go out with WYNNE that evening, but did request that WYNNE be given the suitcases with his purchases made by us so that WYNNE could deliver them to his hotel at 1000 hours on the next day. This was done by Roger during the next hour).

38. G.: The last group of questions deals with your speciality, the GRU and particularly the counter-intelligence aspects. Now listen carefully and you may remember, since you were involved in these things as a desk officer at one time. Did the GRU Fifth Directorate, the Sabotage boys, have any operations planned for India, Pakistan and Ceylon and if so, specifically what ? S.: The Fifth Directorate had a whole programme planned for every country in the world for a long time and of course this includes these three countries. They are continuously refining the information to suit this plan.

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I can tell you the exact things they wanted to know since I was sitting on the desk. From the Rezident in PAKISTAN I was constantly receiving data on drop zones. There were complete area descriptions and all terrain details and also orientation points and even signals that could be used in parachute or airborne operations. All major centres and other targets were clearly oriented with respect to each drop zone. The entire local police and security situation was also discussed. This was a very complete report and it was assigned by the Fifth Directorate. Specific data is either put in operational despatches or in some cases as an annexe to another operational despatch. When this is delivered to the Fifth Directorate they study the entire report and give us (Fourth Directorate) a written evaluation of the report. It may say that it was thoroughly prepared, or incomplete, or it was well prepared butlacked the following details which they request clarification on.

39. S.:Activity against Pakistan is more active than against India because the agent net in India is on conservation and we know about all we need to know about India, but Pakistan is considered to be an enemy country, just as Turkey and Iran are. When I was there at the Centre Colonel FUKOVSKIY and VOLKODAYEV were sitting on Iran. Since then VOLKODAYEV has been sent to the Academy and FUKOVSKIY to TEHERAN.

40. S.: On Pakistan they have also all details on every source of water supply and every dam and reservoir. This is both for flooding purposes and for contamination. Every tunnel in every country is known to the Fifth Directorate. Of course they also know about all industrial centres which contribute to a military effort. They make analyses of how destruction of these would affect the military potential. Such strategic data are compiled and delivered to the First Directorate (Operations of the General Staff). All other targets, however, are kept in GRU for action by clandestine means such as contamination, assassination, sabotage, etc. The only information given to the General Staff is that which can be used by combat arms of the armed forces, including Navy and Aviation. The other targets would be acted against by agent groups organised on the territory of the USSR as well as by agent groups within the target country. These latter include Illegals as well as other agents.

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41. G.: In order to obtain this data and fulfill the mission, is the Indian Communist Party involved in such operations, either independently or under control of GRU ? S.: They are certainly used and under the direction of GRU officers who are in cover positions there. G.: In other words you have GRU officers under cover in these countries who would make contact with local Communist Party leaders and levy missions upon them. S.: That is exactly right. Of course our military people do not meet Communists openly, although they may shake hands with them at receptions. Only GRU officers under cover do this and that is why the stress is to have more and more GRU people under cover.

42. G.: Is India used as a base for operating against Pakistan or vice-versa ? And are Communists used for this too ? S.: Of course they are and they operate from there against Iran too. This is simply a third country agent operation, which is very common.

43. G.: What would you say in the India, Pakistan, Ceylon area is the main GRU mission priority of such categories as espionage, disinformation, political action, sabotage, support of illegals or any other action ? S.: In the first place all missions of all categories are assigned simultaneously and their execution is done in proportion to the ability to fulfill them. If this were not so and a supplementary mission not earlier mentioned were levied, the Rezident could simply say "Why did you not request that sooner, I had a chance to get that before". Therefore missions emanating from all Directorates, such as the Fifth, the First and the Information Directorate are all set out together. G.: Do you mean then that there is no first priority mission ? S.: No. There is a first priority mission. The first priority is always for the creation of an agent net and for its expansion. G.: Is there a second priority ? S.: No. After this all are assigned together and are at the same level. The Rezident knows everything that is assigned for a year, but the individual case officer will be given missions of varying types and number depending on his own capabilities and the accessibility of his agent to targets of intelligence value. Therefore the first priority is always on the creation

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and expansion of an agent net and all funds are given to this priority in the first instance. All other missions are on the same level and are secondary. Many of the secondary missions so called are accomplished by opportunity, for example, one source may be able to provide an answer to one requirement but not another.

(44.) G.: What was the degree of KGB activity in those countries and what are their prime intelligence missions ? S.: The KGB are concerned of course with recruiting agents in political intelligence, the obtaining of political information and in economic intelligence. And on occasion they would get military information but they would keep this for themselves so that they would get credit for it at Headquarters. They might tell us about it after they had already sent the report in to Headquarters. There were very many of them there and of course there are very many of them there now. G.: More than GRU officers in number ? S.: Yes. Much more than we. G.: In about what ratio ? S.: About two to one. For example in our own committee now we have about seven people and they have about fifteen. G.: How was it in Turkey ? S.: I can count it right up. There was I, GIRIN, YEMELYANOV, GUR'YEV, ISAYEV and CHICHERIN. This would make six active operational case officers, I am not counting code-clerks and other assistants. They had YERZIN as Chief, FEDOROV and VOSKOBOY, POKROVSKIY, a journalist, a Second Secretary and another Second Secretary, two Third Secretaries and three operational chauffeurs who were case officers, whereas we had only one, TIPTSOV. There was a great mob of them in ISTANBUL, the First Secretary was the Chief and they had all kinds of KGB officers under Torgpredstvo cover. Some of them had the job of watching other Soviets, whereas the other section were engaged in active intelligence work, recruiting agents, etc. They were about two to one there and here in PARIS as NEDORUB told me at the Exhibition, the place is full of KGB - one can't turn around to spit without hitting one.

(45.) G.: What were your GRU table of organisations strengths in Pakistan and India ? S.: In 1954 when I was first considered for assignment to Pakistan there were only five of us. For quite a while there were only three in Pakistan under DUBROVIN, the Military Attache. All he had was a chauffeur and an

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interpreter. To this he was given two GRU officers under cover and that was all. Later the Military Attache, who was the Rezident also had two assistants, but he also had five GRU officers under cover. The reason why they have more under cover now is because now they have GVF representatives there and TASS representatives, and also more Torgpredstvo men. G.: Are they all in KARACHI ? S.: No. There are only two in KARACHI. When the Government decided to set up a new capital in the mountains two went there and other Torgpredstvo men travel throughout the land from city to city. G.: How do you cover East Pakistan ? S.: By making frequent TDYs there. There is quite an agent net there and others under development. I mentioned two agents there.

46. G.: How about India ? Aren't you fairly scattered there ? S.: Yes. They are in three cities there: NEW DELHI, CALCUTTA and BOMBAY. They all travel back and forth extensively. G.: How many people did you say GRU had in India ? S.: At the time they were planning to send me there, let me count them up ... there were ten operational case officers in India and again I do not count code-clerks and other personnel.

47. G.: I believe this completes the list of questions I have. S.: When shall we meet next time, the day after tomorrow and then on Saturday ? G.: The next time we'll cover completely all your EEIs and priorities and your operational plan and on Saturday you will recite them back to us and we will correct them and then we will just relax. S.: Will I practise with the radio transmitter again ? G.: No. That will not be necessary because when it is ready to be given to you it will have a complete description of all the parts and all procedures inRussian as well as photographs of all the parts and labels pointing to them in Russian. S.: I give you my word that in my life in MOSCOW I have absolutely no free time in the evening to do any additional work such as studying English to improve it. I am just too tired after my daily grind. My cover job requires so much effort. Although I do not need to fuss with delegations as much as before thanks to my new job, I must supervise other case officers in their arrangements for taking around all kinds of foreign delegations. However, I always attend receptions. G.: Your work on the Committee line is pretty complete now is it not ? S.: Yes. That is alright

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and I can certainly give them enough material to confuse them and supplement that with all kinds of gifts. Of course others also bring back gifts but it is all little junk, except that a Chief like GVISHIANI always gets worthwhile gifts. I always bring better gifts than the others.

48. (Subject was told that he could arrange his trip to VERSAILLES with WINNE at 1000 hours the next day when he saw WINNE and the timing would be such to permit him to make a factory visit should one be arranged for him).

G.: On Thursday, for the sake of security we decided to make the time at 2030 instead of 2000 hours but at the same place because it is very good.

S.: Yes. It is a fine place, and we will meet then at 2030 hours. Please ask HOOK to arrange a trip for me. G.: There is no need for us to press HOOK. He will be glad to do it himself for you if he possibly can. S.: I will do everything for HOOK when he comes to MOSCOW - get him a car and meet him at the airport. H.: But under no circumstances can you use HOOK for any operational reason whatsoever. S.: I don't see any reason for this and particularly as you say don't do it, I certainly won't. However I will meet him and take care of his delegation and arrange lectures for him and receptions. He will probably come from America with an American delegation, and not a mixture of French and American. I explained this to him today and he agreed with me. By all means be sure that WYNNE stays as the representative of his firms and does not break away from them as I suspect he would like to do if you subsidise him. Let him form his delegation for going to MOSCOW at the end of the year or in the first part of 1962. H.: This is being done. S.: I will let you know about the TIKHONOV delegation that I may accompany to England in the early part of 1962 and it would be interesting to know if they would give me a visa to the U.S.A. if I were to take a delegation there. At any rate we probably will not meet again for about four months. And as a matter of fact I do not see, since we have arranged communications, what useful purpose there would be in meeting sooner.

0 (After farewell amenities, subject left at 2345 hours. He was delivered by M. and J. to the area of the footbridge over which he crossed and went to his hotel).

Meeting #42, 14 October 1961 (Paris)

(Transcript of Meeting #42 from the tape recording and from George's notes.)

1. Subject was met at RV point #4 which was selected for security reasons, i.e., to avoid the frequent use of RV #1 and the dangerous areas of RV 2 and 3. The pick-up was made by George at the island over which Le Pont de Grinelle passes. Protective surveillance was afforded by both Mike and Harold and the car picking up Subject with George was driven by Roger. The pick-up was made cleanly without incident, and Subject arrived at the safe apartment at 2013 hours. Subject immediately reported on the last events at the Soviet Embassy in Paris and on the success of his trip on Friday.

2. On Friday, 13 October, a car sent by George HOOK and driven by his engineer, Marcel G. HOCHON whose business card read ARMCO, 57 Rue Ampere, Paris XVII, Telefon Wagram 68-20. S: I was already acquainted with this engineer since he was the one HOOK sent to me during the first trip to visit a factory. (They drove at once to the Soviet Embassy where SOLOVYEV was picked up. He had been advised by phone of the trip by Subject.) S: The REZIDENT was also there and when I told him about the proposed visit he was very pleased and said SOLOVYEV should also go along. He was taken to HOOK's office where we were met by HOOK who introduced us to his interpreter. (They proceeded together with the interpreter provided by Mr. HOOK. His name is Marc KAGANS and his card read 48 Rue La Boetie, Paris VIII, Telefon Ely 89-50 -- inginieur diplome E.P.R. /Inginieur Principal Au Service Technique De La Ste. Fran. Des Construction Babcock and Wilcox/. KAGANS speaks Russian well and told Subject that he had left Riga in 1928 and that he had spent 35 days in Moscow at the French Exhibition.) S: KAGANS lost his wife during the war and has two sisters who live in Moscow. He daughter was from the first marriage. (He had also visited the Committee in Moscow and he knew about a committee representative -- whose name Subject forgot -- who worked under LEVIN, the KGB chief representative in the Committee. Subject knew that this man was also a co-opted KGB worker.)

3. KAGANS plans to send his daughter to Moscow in 1962 to attend the university there and to study the Russian language. He asked Subject for his advice as to how to approach the Soviet Consulate to effect this. S: I introduced him to SOLOVYEV who exchanged cards with him. In addition, I introduced SOLOVYEV to HOOK's engineer who promised to pass brochures for me through

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SOLOVYEV. KAGANS also promised to pass brochures for me through SOLOVYEV, particularly since he plans to call the Soviet Embassy later anyway to inquire about the procedure necessary to send his daughter to school in Moscow in 1962. Therefore, everything is normal there and let these contacts through SOLOVYEV proceed as arranged. It will be good for me with no involvement on my part in the future. SOLOVYEV later reported to the REZIDENT that the contacts had been made. Therefore, I will be able to state at home that I introduced two people to the GRU officer at the REZIDENTURA here and this will go to my credit. He was extremely friendly to me but with no other forwardness in his conversation. (They remained at the plant where they were very well entertained until early afternoon by the factory director, a young man about 35 years of age. They returned to Paris at 1430 hours. A few innocuous documents were given to Subject by the firm. He put these with the remainder of the brochures he had obtained from us and from HOOK. From 1430 hours till 1800 hours he worked at the Embassy with the REZIDENT, with ANANYEV who got up from his sick bed, and with SOLOVYEV and KUDRYAVTSEV. They packaged up 4 kilograms of assorted important so-called documents for GRU and the balance was to go by heavy mail to the Committee in Moscow.

4. The following information considered by Subject to be of value was picked up that afternoon and he acquired more valuable information in a short private talk with CHEREDEYEV, the REZIDENT, on Saturday at 1130 hours. The REZIDENT told Subject that he would appreciate it if Subject would politely and without presumption pass the REZIDENT's greetings to Ivan Aleksandrovich (SEROV) and showed Subject the very fine report which was being sent to Moscow regarding Subject's performance in Paris as well as a short cable to that effect. Subject on his part said that he would report most favorably on how he saw things being done at the REZIDENTURA in Paris. In short Subject felt that with our help, he had accomplished his assigned mission to Paris in a favorable manner. The planned lunch with KUDRYAVTSEV could not take place because Subject was out of town on the trip during that time. Subject also had a short talk with KUDRYAVTSEV before he left and was given threeor four administrative matters of little import to straighten out for KUDRYAVTSEV with the Committee when Subject returns to Moscow. This was clearly in Subject's view an ill-disguised gesture upon the REZIDENT's part to "scratch each other's backs."

5. Subject discovered that CHEREDEYEV's pseudonym was CHAROV and that he as well as all REZIDENTs were ordered to stay in place in their assignment during the Berlin crisis period until further notice. This meant that no one would have leave at this time and that CHEREDEYEV could possibly get his 1961 leave early in 1962. Two days ago the Paris REZIDENT sent a GRU

cable stating that the NATO countries were intensifying their military preparations, and specifically were attempting to order 250,000 cots for hospital use to have in reserve in the immediate future for troop housing. This information came from Soviet agents in France, presumably Communists. The above information was passed to Subject by the REZIDENT.

6. While with the REZIDENT on Friday, Subject was told that all persons entering the REZIDENT's conference room -- which was formerly the reception room of the military attache, General MASLOV -- would necessarily stay away from the translucent windows until Gen. Maior SOKOLOV entered the room. He is the present military attache but has his offices elsewhere, and it is undesirable to have any silhouettes visible in that room of GRU offices unless the overt military attache is present.

7. Just prior to leaving, Subject was asked by Gen. Maior SOKOLOV to visit him for fifteen minutes. Although Subject told him it was impossible for him to bring a package to Moscow since he was overloaded already, he did take a number of fountain pens for SOKOLOV's son, and was requested to contact General SMOLIKOV, the Chief of Personnel of GRU, about sending General SOKOLOV's wife to Paris by the end of October. The General told Subject that his son is now entering the language faculty of the MDA but that the school was again going to be separated into the former VIIYA and MDA Language Faculty as it was before. The new chief will again be General BIYAZI who was formerly the Chief of VIIYA. The reason for this separation is that they need an independent language school to serve the entire Soviet Army because military interpreters are needed. Subject considered this conversation with General SOKOLOV as being for the purpose of seeking favoritism through Subject's known connection with General SEROV. Subject also mentioned that Captain 2nd Rank SUVORIN who was discharged from GRU is now working for the Committee but that he has been co-opted by the GRU to fulfill GRU missions. This ended Subject's report.

8. He was told very firmly that he was not to call up Marie-Polle LESCHAUX. He had attempted to do so during the day but she had not been in so it was decided that Roger, legending himself as a French associate of Subject, would make the phone call after Subject's departure. He would express Subject's regrets at not having been able to say farewell personally, and say that Subject would possibly contact her on his return to Paris in several months. (The purpose of this was to avert a possible letter from the lady sent in care of the Committee in Moscow.)

9. Subject reassured us that there could be no reflection on him in any way from the direction of KAGANS even if SOLOVYEV would be in contact with him in the future. Subject pointed out that if KAGANS had been recruited by the KGB he would not have mentioned the fact that he had met the Committee representative and would not have referred to him by name. Subject knows this representative to be a KGB worker.

10. A complete review of operational instructions followed which Subject covered perfectly from his own notes. To this were added two amendments in the Operational Plan, namely that our radio communication to him would maintain the same frequency of messages, that is twice a month, but he could listen at any night of the week at 2400 hours. He was, however, to change his winter frequencies to 5440 and 6315 beginning 1 November. Subject was completely content with this and inscribed the new frequencies in his notes stating that he would destroy the old frequencies.

11. A complete review of the EEI's then followed and Subject was given two additional documentary information requests. These were to obtain manuals on the latest tanks, that is, the T-10M and T-55. The other request was for manuals on all the latest conventional artillery pieces, particularly smooth bore guns. Subject believed that he would be in a position to get this information and added that, in his opinion, the smooth bore guns were probably large mortars.

12. Subject was instructed in the importance of precise data on important yields tied to accurately dated explosions and was also requested to pick up and record any information whatsoever on Soviet commo, cryptanalysis, cryptographic work, personnel methods, security, etc. This was a re-emphasis of the points previously given him. Only two questions were asked of Subject--one was on his estimate of the date of the first use of the VCh system. Subject stated that he felt sure that the system was in existence prior to 1941 because he remembered that when he was first assigned asa political worker in the Moscow military district about 1940 the system was already in operation, even though it may not have been multi-channeled and as refined as it is today. His best estimate was that it has been in operation about 22-25 years.

13. The second question was a request for all available information, physical description, etc., on Captain YERMOLENKO who was Subject's classmate andwho both Subject and GRIGORYEV knew had been assigned to illegals work. Subject said that YERMOLENKO was an engineer captain, a graduate of the KUYBYSHEV Engineering Academy, and that he went to illegals training immediately after graduating from the MDA in 1953. Subject saw

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him in late 1954 and was told by YERMOLENKO that he was engaged in "sly work" (ZANIMAYUS' KHITRYMI DELAMI). Since then Subject had not seen him and neither had GRIGORYEV but GRIGORYEV assumed by his absence from Moscow -- since they had been good friends -- that YERMOLENKO was already working in his target country. His description is as follows: sharp features, piercing eyes, thin but very strong and wiry, height about 170 cm, has slightly visible pock marks on cheeks, and has light hair combed straight back. He is modest and very quiet and is quite a sportsman. This completed the business for the day and for the last meeting.

14. Subject was given a volume of Man and Space by Dr. Ralph LAPP together with the 16-page translation of the summaries of the 13 chapters of this book which were prepared by George. The translation was from English to Russian. Subject was quite happy with this and said that we should be prepared to provide a full translation of the book as well as Western book reviews in Russian as soon as he gave us word through JANET that the powers that be desired to have this book published in Russian with, of course, Subject writing the introduction. Subject was also given the broadcast schedules of Russian-language broadcasts by VOA and BBC.

15. Now there was much photography done of the individual case officers with Subject and of group photographs, and champagne toasts were drunk. A modest setting of canapes was prepared by Roger and, after the traditional and somewhat emotional farewell on the part of Subject during which he kissed and hugged each case officer in turn, all sat down for a moment of silence in traditional Russian style. Subject left at 2245 hours to be deposited by Mike and Joseph in the neighborhood of the Caravelle Bar. Subject was to be met there by WYNNE to finish his last evening in Paris prior to his rising at 0500 hours the next morning to be accompanied by WYNNE for his scheduled flight via Air France from Orly to Prague.

16. Due to a very extensive fog the next morning Subject was still in the waiting room at 1100 hours. By this time both Mike and George arrived. They were to use the airport also but for much later flights. There was no point to contact or to be seen by Subject, so from a remote vantage point Mike and George saw Subject proceed to his plane. It was finally called for departure at 1115 hours. This would indicate that Subject would most likely miss his Soviet plane connection in Prague and would arrive in Moscow either late or on the following day, 16 October. This fact could explain why the phone signal indicating safe arrival scheduled for the evening of 15 October in Moscow could possibly not come through until the same time on 16 October.

New Anecdotes

1. Khrushchev decided to choose a political pseudonym for himself. This was before the start of business of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU. So, he went to the mausoleum and turned to Lenin with the request of assistance in choosing a pseudonym. Lenin answered that he himself still finds it difficult to give any of his successors a pseudonym and he refused to recommend anything. Then Khrushchev turned to Stalin. To Khrushchev's request Stalin asked him two questions: "Ty na menya rychish vsye zabolyet" "Da, rychu", answered Khrushchev. "Ty na menya vsye shchelye shipish't" "Da, shiplyu", answered Khrushchev. "Then from your surname throw out the growling letter (r) and the hissing letter (shch) and all that remains will be your political pseudonym", answered Stalin. And after that Khrushchev threw Stalin out of the mausoleum.

2. A shopper comes to the store, approaches the clerk and asks for a kilogram of meat. The clerk answers that there is no meat. Then the shopper asks for a kilogram of butter. The clerk answers that there is no butter.

Then the shopper asks for a kilogram of fat. The clerk answers that there is also no fat.

Then the shopper asked to be given a kilogram of newspaper. The surprised clerk asked the shopper why he needed a kilogram of newspaper, to which the shopper answered: "Everything is available in the newspaper."

3. Radio Armenia was given the question: "Why are we overtaking America which is sinking into oblivion?" Radio Armenia couldn't answer the question and the radio was shut down.

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4. Rabbi Aronson was asked the question: "What do you have to do with a refrigerator so that there will always be groceries inside?" The answer offered: "One must plug the refrigerator not into the electrical system, but into the cable system."

5. Rabbi Aronson received the question: "Will Gog pray on a bald pate?" The rabbi answered: "We do not answer political questions. It is understood that the bald pate is that of [illegible]."

6. Rabbi Aronson received the question: "Why did Khrushchev take Stalin out of the [illegible]?" He answered: "The mausoleum was designed for two only."

(78)

[redacted]

[redacted]

typed 3/27/62 [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. The following information was obtained from [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
[redacted] at interviews at the American Embassy, London, on March 9, and at [redacted] home in Woking on March 10, 1962.

2. In his capacity as Russian expert and interpreter, [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
has spent a great deal of time travelling in the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries during the past few years. He reckons he has spent a total of one year in the USSR alone. The Soviets have made it plain to [redacted] from the first that they consider him to be a suspicious character, and they have told [redacted] that they would much prefer to deal with a non-Russian-speaking representative. Nevertheless, aside from one or two attempts to tempt him with an attractive woman they have not bothered him, and [redacted] had felt that the Soviets were more or less reconciled to his frequent appearances in the USSR on behalf of [redacted]

3. As we already knew, [redacted] was with the [redacted] delegation the entire time, and was the GKKNR official in charge of the group. Most of the other Committee officials with whom they had dealings were technical specialists in the pulp and paper field. [redacted] was very clearly in charge, and all the other Soviets deferred to him on all subjects except technical ones. [redacted] would drop out of the conversation whenever it took a technical turn. 1.3(a)(4)

4. On the train from Moscow to Leningrad, [redacted] asked [redacted] if a reception would be given by the British Embassy for the delegation, to which the Soviet officials involved would be invited. [redacted] replied that no such reception was planned. [redacted] said that it would be a good idea to arrange one, and that Mr. Hillary KING and his assistant, [redacted] should be invited. [redacted] raised the issue again in Leningrad, and once again on the train going back to Moscow. Worn down by [redacted] persistence, upon returning to Moscow [redacted] went to [redacted] to ask him what he thought of the idea. [redacted] said that he was willing to arrange such a reception, but that because of the short notice he thought it should be quite informal and that it would be simpler to leave the British out of it, particularly since Hillary KING was out of town. In any case, all the delegation members were AMERICANS. [redacted] and [redacted] wrote out a short guest list consisting of the delegation, the appropriate GKKNR officials and a few members of the American [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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Embassy, and it was agreed that [redacted] would relay the Soviet invitations verbally to [redacted]. 1.3(a)(4)

5. When [redacted] saw [redacted] on Friday, January 26, [redacted] immediately brought up the subject of the reception again. [redacted] told him that it was arranged for that evening and asked [redacted] to pass on the invitations to the Soviet officials concerned. [redacted] asked if Mr. KING and [redacted] were coming and seemed quite unhappy when he learned that they were not. [redacted] explanations as to why they had decided to make it a strictly Soviet-American affair did not appear to satisfy him. [redacted] repeated that at least [redacted] (whom he described as having a beard) should be invited. 1.3(a)(4)

6. The reception took place that evening and went off very well. According to [redacted] all the Soviet guests seemed very pleased except [redacted] which was a little strange after all the pressure he had applied to arrange it in the first place. [redacted] did not notice anything else about [redacted] behavior at the reception [redacted] this point was touched on only lightly. An interesting point is that nobody had met LOPATENKO before — not even [redacted]. He came uninvited, and was clearly the ranking Soviet official present. LOPATENKO is in his fifties, speaks English fairly well, and has a pleasant personality. The Soviets came and left as a group, and it was LOPATENKO who gave the signal for departure. The reception lasted about 1½ hours. 1.3(a)(4)'

Apparently had met LOPATENKO - for report on GKKNR folder dated 9 NOV. 61

7. On the evening of January 27, [redacted] learned that their scheduled flight for Warsaw the following day had been moved up from noon to early morning. Since they did not know if [redacted] was aware of this [redacted] tried to reach him at home. No one knew [redacted] home address or telephone number, and it proved impossible to obtain them; [redacted] does not know whether this was because [redacted] is not listed in the directory or because he doesn't have a telephone at home. [redacted] was finally able to get in touch with VASENKO, one of the GKKNR paper specialists, who allegedly went to [redacted] home with the message. 1.3(a)(4)

8. At 6:15 the following morning (Sunday, January 28), [redacted] was packing in his hotel room when [redacted] knocked on the door and came in alone. [redacted] led [redacted] into the bathroom in a mysterious manner and proceeded to turn on all the taps. He then said, "You must do something for me as a friend." He asked [redacted] upon return to London, to send a telegram to a certain cable address with the following message: "Please meet me at _____ on _____. /signed Andy." [redacted] explained that [redacted] must provide the time, date and 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

place to suit himself, and that a man (undescribed) would meet him there at the appointed time. [redacted] was then to give the man the following message from [redacted] "Budte ostorozhny, potomu chto mashyna ___ ___ ___ /three letters/ sleduyet za vami i oni smotryat na vas vse vremya seychas." /Be careful because car ___ ___ ___ is following you and they are watching you all the time at present./ [redacted] wrote all this down in his notebook, but by the time [redacted] had finished he knew that he did not want to undertake such an errand. [redacted] had just started to voice his objections when the porter came for the baggage and no further conversation was possible. On the way to the airport [redacted] seemed to be in unusually good spirits. 1.3(a)(4)

9. At the airport, while they were going through passport control and customs, [redacted] noticed a man in civilian clothes and a green hat, obviously a security type, who was standing nearby and watching the delegation closely. [redacted] has never noticed surveillance of this sort at any of his many previous departures from the Soviet Union. When the processing was completed, [redacted] had to exchange money to pay for excess baggage. To do so, he had to go to the bank which is located in a different building. [redacted] accompanied him. On the way back [redacted] stopped and told [redacted] that he could not carry his message for him, that he was a businessman and did not want to be involved with something that was a clear violation of Soviet law, etc. [redacted] was stunned; when [redacted] finally impressed on him that he would definitely not fulfill his request he asked [redacted] to return the paper on which he had written down the message. [redacted] tore the paper several times and handed the pieces to [redacted] [redacted] seemed extremely upset. He asked [redacted] to be sure to ring him up ([redacted] has his office telephone number) upon his return to Moscow in several weeks time. There was no further conversation between them. 1.3(a)(4)

10. It was still quite dark when this scene took place and [redacted] is quite sure that no one could have observed or overheard them. [redacted] no longer remembers the telegraphic address except that it was a standard commercial one-word contraction ([redacted] gave "AMFITREX" as an example), followed by "London." He has forgotton the plate number of the car in the message, except that it consisted of three letters, but believes that he has remembered the message itself word for word. 1.3(a)(4)

11. [redacted] slept in the same compartment with [redacted] on the train from Leningrad to Moscow. While the two of them 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

were sitting alone in the compartment [redacted] pulled out a transistor radio (he told [redacted] it was Japanese), turned the volume up high and told [redacted] "They don't like your being here -- you know too much," and, "be careful, they are searching your bags." 1.3(a)(4)

12. For a Soviet official, [redacted] talked a good deal about himself. [redacted] was able to recall that [redacted] is a retired Army colonel, that he was at one time the assistant military attache to Turkey, that he is married, has a sixteen year old daughter, and that his wife is six months pregnant, that he has been to England and France with delegations. [redacted] also mentioned that he worked with an electronics delegation several weeks before ([redacted] does not know the nationality of this delegation), and that he was planning to take a group to Switzerland for the auto show in the latter part of March; [redacted] added, however, that the Swiss trip might not come off because "the Swiss are very difficult about visas." 1.3(a)(4)

13. [redacted] mentioned several times that he was planning to lead a group to the United States and that he has already applied for his visa. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] already had the itinerary for this trip: they are to arrive in New York on May 9 or 10 and will proceed to Seattle to spend about three weeks at the World Fair. They will also visit Washington and perhaps San Francisco. [redacted] was not sure about the exact sequence of cities and did not know what character the group would have; he did have the impression that the entire trip would last four to five weeks. This American trip was common talk among the other GKKNR members. SHVARTS said that he was looking forward to it as he had never been in the U.S. The trip was also mentioned by a girl interpreter who was filling in for SHVARTS one afternoon: she said that she was dying to go to the U.S., but that [redacted] would never take her, he would take SHVARTS. 1.3(a)(4)

14. [redacted] was intrigued by [redacted] apparent duality. In the presence of other Soviets he was the typical officious party-liner: at a banquet in Leningrad he got up and delivered a militant speech about peace and friendship that could well serve as a model of its type. On the other hand, when [redacted] was alone with [redacted] or with the other delegation members he would make very candid and unusual remarks. He told McGOVERN that MOLOTOV was very ill and that there was no chance whatsoever that he would ever return to Vienna. He also told them that "We are giving the Chinese so much aid that we are beginning to wonder if they won't bleed us to death. Our relations with them are very bad." [redacted] said 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

that up to the scene at the airport just before departure [redacted] appeared to be in good spirits throughout, and in full command of the situation. 1.3(a)(4)

15. [redacted] described SHVARTS as being one of the official GKKNR interpreters. His English is quite good. Although assigned to the [redacted] delegation as interpreter, SHVARTS did not actually spend much time with them because [redacted] spoke Russian. For example, he did not go to Leningrad with the group although he was originally scheduled to do so. He did help out with interpreting in Moscow on those occasions when [redacted] was busy at TEKHMASHINIMPORT or elsewhere. SHVARTS is about 33 years old, is aggressive, intelligent, and quick. His relations with [redacted] appeared to be good, and he acted towards [redacted] with the respect due a considerably more senior official. 1.3(a)(4)

16. The [redacted] delegation was originally billed as a lecture tour. However, from the very beginning of their visit to the USSR the Soviets said that they wanted it to be the basis for an exchange delegation to the U.S. on a somewhat different basis -- that of visiting mills. Therefore, the Soviets proposed to enlarge the [redacted] delegation's itinerary to include visits to some paper mills. In practice, this boiled down to a visit to one mill, a condensor paper mill near Leningrad. The Soviets then tried to blow this up as grounds for a return visit by a Soviet delegation to ten of the latest sulfite mills in the U.S. The lead in this was taken by ORLOV, the newly-appointed chairman of the Committee for Pulp & Paper, Woodworking, & Forestry, and was faithfully followed by all the GKKNR officials, including [redacted] has urged [redacted] not to agree to such a visit, particularly since the U.S. mills involved represent the latest state of the art, embodying equipment and technology far in advance of anything available to the Soviets in this field, but to insist that any return delegation be a lecture tour like the [redacted] one. [redacted] reported the details of this aspect of the trip to [redacted] feels that it is likely that some sort of an exchange visit by a Soviet paper delegation will take place, but that it will take months to agree on its nature and on the timing and itinerary. 1.3(a)(4)

17. [redacted] did not ring up [redacted] when he was in Moscow at the end of February and he has no intention of doing so in the future as he thinks the chances are 100 to 1 that [redacted] was trying a provocation of some sort. [redacted] has not discussed the incident with anyone, and will not do so. He is scheduled to go back to Moscow around the middle of May with [redacted]; this will be a short two- or three-day trip to 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

discuss penalties on a contract and will not involve any contact with GKKNR officials. However, [redacted] has requested guidance on how he should act if [redacted] should turn up to pester him again. We have promised to give him some advice on this score when we have had a chance to analyse his information and to compare it with other recent Soviet overtures to and provocations of American businessmen. [redacted] promised to get in touch with [redacted] before going to the USSR if an unexpected trip should come up before May. [redacted] most urgently requested that the information he provided on [redacted] be used in such a way that it could not reveal him as the source. He also requested that the fact that he reported to us at all be kept in strictest confidence, even within our organization. 1.3(a)(4)

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Passport IX-SA No. 601266

1. The passport blank is of our manufacture. In appearance it cannot be distinguished from an original of the 1954 printing (RSFSR).

2. The first two pages are filled in according to the data in a passport actually issued to a certain Vladimir Grigor'yevich BUTOV. The serial number, cachets, signatures, and all entries in points 1-8 are exactly the same as in the passport of the real BUTOV.

3. We did not fill in the "bearer's signature" since we believe it better for you to sign the passport yourself (in BUTOV's name of course): PLEASE DO NOT FORGET TO SIGN THE PASSPORT (p. 1, entry 4).

4. We never had contact with BUTOV. We know about him only that he was a guide at the Brussels World Fair and on the "Gruziya." We suppose that he is still living in Moscow, but we do not know his address or place of employment.

5. The main advantage of such a passport (as opposed to a completely notional identity) is that if there should be any inquiries, the 106th Militia Dept. in Moscow can confirm that such a passport was indeed issued to BUTOV, and that BUTOV was actually registered with them.

6. We had to take the place of work and the address from other sources, since we do not have this data for BUTOV himself. We registered you on Yakovlevskiy Pereulok 11, apt. 13, since this street is located in the 106th Otd Mil. We don't know who actually lives there, but believe this not to be an important point since you will use this passport only outside of Moscow.

7. Your place of employment is GSPI - the All-Union Design Institute No. 10 (formerly of the Ministry of Aviation Industry). It is located on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt 5-9, P.O. Box 1401.

8. BUTOV is liable to military service and we did not want to dream up his military history in order to fill out a voyennyy bilet. Therefore, with this passport you can travel around the country and register temporarily, but application for permanent residence could cause trouble on account of the military registration problem. We are preparing a second set of documents for you under a different name where you will be not liable to military service for medical reasons and will have a document to this effect. With this set you will receive cachets with which you can deregister and disemploy yourself, and will have the possibility of applying for permanent registration if that becomes necessary.

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"PENKOVSKIY MEMOIRS"

The "Penkovskiy Memoirs," presented herewith, were compiled from tape recordings made during personal meetings with Oleg Penkovskiy and SR Division personnel. They are Penkovskiy's own words. Although little editing has been done, his comments are not necessarily presented here in the same order or in the same context in which they originally were expressed. His comments on "Soviet Dissatisfaction," for instance, appear together under one chapter heading, though they have come from the tapes of several different meetings. These "Memoirs" give considerable insight into the character and motivation of Penkovskiy, and a wealth of information on Soviet attitudes and "Soviet Realities."

The "Memoirs" will eventually be surfaced, in some form, in the open press. At present, however, they are still classified SECRET.

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See #3 + #12
for FN 32433

TAPE NO. 4, Friday afternoon, 9 November 1962 1:35 p.m.

S: As I say I believe that silver hair, D, went out and brought in the 4 goons. The men were ushered in, they were brought to a point on the left hand wall about five feet from the (large???) desk. They stood with their hands at their sides, rather relaxed position of atention and introduced themselves once again by their last names with the prefix Grazhdanin to it. A, the English speaking Russian, had informed them that the AKT had been drawn up and that -- asking them if they were prepared to sign it. They assented and A then began to read the AKT. He read it very quickly and read it to them not to me. The main elements of the AKT were the following: that I had been apprehended on 2 Nov by citizens such and such at the address, giving the Otdelm? number - the entrance - entryway number at such and such a time and had been caught with materials of a I think they called it razvedyvatel- LAGEO
nakazuemoga?? KHARAKTERA

N: Which means?

S: Of an intelligence nature on my person. To the best ofmy knowledge they said on my person, although they had been found on the floor, that these materials, materials which I had removed from behind the radiator in this country.

N: Now on this are you absolutely sure S, from behind the radiator?

S: Because I was waiting for this since I had heard radiator mentioned previously by A as he was drawing up the AKT. And I was listening for this to see if they were going to specify a fact which they could not possibly have known. In other words, this was the point I wanted to get. It seemed to me that this was the key to the whole thing. Would they include a fact/in this AKT which they could not have known unless it had been (discovered?). It was in there. They then went on to specify that these four citizens had taken me into custody and brought me to the militia station where I had been questioned. It was not a long document since it had been handwritten, the 2¼ pages apparently not had been written very closely and it took him about a minute and a half to read it off. I do not recall anything elese in it that was ..

N: Do you recall the precise time, that they said you were apprehended?

S: Let me see. No I don't. It was about 3:15

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N: By your reckoning?

S: Yes-No I guess it was about 3:17 but I can't remember exactly what they specified. Having concluded, B in Russian, B the Ukrainian (in Russian) said to A, the English speaking Russian who was standing up as he read this AKT to the Russian goons, translate this into English or -- let me see now -- he may have said don't you think you ought to translate this into English. A, ~~I believe~~, said that will be unnecessary. He understands perfectly well. And then, I think, he looked at me and he said Oh no. Now he either looked at me and said either I don't think any English translation will be necessary or he asked me do you want an English translation. I can't recall exactly the way he put it. But at any rate, I said to him I have no intention of signing this AKT whether you translate it into English or not. And then I said, I also wish to say at this time that I have never in my life seen the materials that you have there on the desk. I thought that just for the books I should say this. He just shrugged his shoulders and motioned to the four citizens without further word about asking them if they had any corrections or additions to make. The four citizens signed the AKT. He then, I believe, he sat down with the AKT and wrote out several lines. I believe these were probably notations to the effect that I had refused to sign. Because then the four citizens then came up and signed below this. He then left the AKT on the table, the four citizens left, and F the editor also left without having said a word, without having signed the AKT, just nothing. He left and I never saw him again. A then (?) sat down. I think by this time it must have been almost five o'clock and E, the individual I believe is identifiable with the fifth goon, the man with the glasses. It occurred to me for the first time I think just about at this point, that this man bore a very distinct resemblance to the fifth goon without his glasses who had been wearing glasses and appeared to direct my apprehension. Just at this point it hit me. I hadn't even been thinking about this or even, or even for some reason, tried to identify any of these men in room with the fifth man. In fact I had almost forgotten about him. It was just at this point that it hit me all of a sudden that this man - his face clicked and then I thought almost as suddenly he looks just like the man even tho he was wearing glasses who appeared to be directing it. This man hadn't said anything up to this point. Just after the goons left tho he was standing slightly to my left about 3 or 4 feet in front of me. He just stood there, staring at me. For the first

time I decided to meet one of their stares. So I just looked up at him without smiling or anything emotion on my face and just stared him down. Iguess it must have lasted about two minutes and I just decided that if he wanted to look at me, I was going to look at him and I was going to make him lower his eyes first and he did after about two minutes I guess.

N: YOu are a pretty good starer.

S: I just did. I don't know how I did it because I felt like laughing, I just decided at this point that/in any way which I could do it without talking that I would try to take a little bit of initiative. Then, he looked at me and said, well, you dirty career is finished. I think he said vashe grazniye karye zakonchna. Then D, who was sitting in the same seat and the same sofa to the left of the small table and B who had also taken a seat on the right hand side of the table proceeded to say, yep, career is finished, his dirty work is finished. A little laughter ensued and they one of them, I forget which one it was, said something to the effect that I could now take up a clean profession. chestiya profession. As I say, this dialogue ensued which lasted about a minute or a minute and a half. This was the essential substance of it, that my dirty career was finished and that I could now take up a clean profession, that I just had no future. Then, they resumed this carnival about my name again. Yes. Then B, got up from his chair and once again said now why won't you tell us your name. We need this, we want to put it in the AKT and/in order to get in contact with the Embassy. Meanwhile, E, the goon had taken G, the Ukrainian's seat - interruption. As I said B, the Ukrainian had gotten up from the easy chair to the right of the table and came over towards me, I believe, with my diplomatic card in his hand, but maybe not and E, th goon had taken his seat and he came up to me and asked me what is your name. I think he said something like .....skaye. I said ya ponimayetya and I repeated again I want only to speak only with the American Embassy and then he said what are you doing(?) and why are you afraid to give us your name. At this little cue, E, the goon who was sitting in the chair started mumbling prust prust prust coward coward coward. He just repeated the word coward nothing else, in a very low but audible voice about 4 or 5 times. I just looked up at B, the Ukrainian and still with a puzzled expression on my face/shrugged my shoulders, and looked over at A. A looked at me and he said give us your first name. Then he got up from - A English -

and came around and stood in front of me about - oh no, I guess he didn't get up from behind his desk. Just sat back there - no maybe he did. I can't remeber exactly. I know before this other thing I was thinking of took place he xxxxx (stood???) in front of me, about 5 feet away and asked me why I hated the Soviet Union. He used the word hate. Hated the Soviet Union and the Russian people, that they couldn't have possibly given me any cause for such behavior and that you Americans are suppose to stand for peace and liberty and freedom, yet you behave in such a manner and you engage in such dirty activities. I think at this point he used gryaznoye dyatelnost?? The substance of it was: 1. that why did I hate the Russian - I think he used Soviet Government and I am not sure whether he used the term Soviet or Russian people. 2. That I must hate them to engage in such dirty activities. I repeated again that I wanted to speak to the American Embassy. They then launched into another diatribe about the fact that I sounded like an xxxxxx avtomat and that I should cooperate with them to this extent to give them my name. They then xx asked me again - he then produced - A the English speaking Russian then again produced my card and again asked me if the date at the bottom of this card corresponded to my entry into the Soviet Union or whether this was simply the second card I had been issued. Was this date - the date given on my card later than the actual time of my arrival in the Soviet Union. I simply repeated again that I wanted to speak with the American Embassy. D, the silvery-haired man, and F, the - which x one is the goon E or F,

N:: E

S: The goon had put very few questions to me and said very little throughout this period. I think, if anything, E was actually more - observing more than D. I think he really, of everyone who took part in the interrogation seemed to be the sharpest, although this is a subjective impression, because certainly the questions he put to me were very few and I can't really say that he xxxxxxxxx demonstrated any more technique or persistence than any of the others. If anything less xxxx persistence and so few questions that I couldn't really analyze his technique. I do recall that, I think, that they did put a few questions to me but they were essentially para phrases of those questions which B, the Ukrainian had put to me and that A, the English speaking one had put to me in English. By this time I , of course, feeling pretty confident, because not only had I not given them anything whatsoxxxever so far, but also I

their questions had not gotten on to what I consider to be the only important things that I could divulge; namely, either any operational information about the specific operation which was the most important; and second of all, any information as to the organization which I represented. My past intelligence activities there in Moscow and previously; and three, they had asked me no questions about the Embassy. For instance, personal data about people I worked with, who did I work with, who were my coworkers, who was my chief in the Embassy, I mean my State Department Chief. Who else is engaged in this sort of activity inside the Embassy. None of these questions had been asked. It seemed to me at this point, unless they were intending to make 24-hour affair of this, which I knew they couldn't, that these questions were not going to be asked. It also seemed to me, since their own attitude toward me hadn't changed in the past 2 hours, in other words they hadn't gotten more hostile, they hadn't gotten more forceful. They didn't even seem to be more persistent, that I had, I thought, passed the crisis. I was just at this point concentrating on trying to repeat what had become a boring phrase to me and certainly to them, I want to speak with the American Embassy. Place me in contact with the American Embassy. Just to try to keep in that channel and not get out of it. This was about 5 o'clock. The Foreign Ministry representative didn't come in until about 5:15 and I can't remember what happened in the next 15 minutes. I know that essentially it did not depart from the previous questions which I have already told you about. They were still asking me if I was married - I think once, had any children, what my first name was --

N: N asked a question not recorded on the tape.

S: Yes at one point the A, the English-speaking Russian, after he had asked me this question said, what is it Robert? This was the - what he asked me. He said, What is your name, Robert? I didn't answer. Oh yes yes yes. This was very important too. Then, they said - he asked me how I had gotten there to Pushkin Street. B, the Ukrainian, asked me, How did you get to Pushkin Street? I looked at him with a puzzled expression, shrugged my shoulders, and then he went through this motion, you know, with hands imitating a walk. A walk or with a car -- S Mashinoi. I refused to answer and then E, the goon, said to me that my friends were cruising around the block in the Embassy car and he gave me a license number.

N: Which was?

S: No, no. He d edited. That is all. That is E. I can identify this for you in my report. (S identified E as KOMAROV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kovshuk.)

N: How about this one?

S: I'm glad you came up with one so soon. I don't think so,

N: The same one. That is why I had them together. Even in color.

S: You see the thing is with this smile and slightly side view, it is hard because when he was in there, in my report I mention the diagram of this room and also the diagram of the relative positions that these men had in the room at any given time during the interrogation, they all pretty much had their own stations. This man sitting next to the desk, I couldn't really get a side view of him at all. He certainly wasn't smiling during this thing. That is him.

N: No question.

S: In fact N, it looks like the same tie.

N: Let me catch his name for the benefit of the tape, Vladimir M. KOMAROV, or Mr. E. According to your best recollections. Gribanov?

(looking through pictures) I hope these are numbered; good; Go through these carefully and if there is any positive or probable spell out the number on the back. Could you turn them face down they may be in order of some sort.

S: You may think I am going through these fast, but I have these faces in my mind so..

N: That is all right. Are there any that you think that you might like to look at again. You might just throw them aside. (This is group 1 that S is going through.)

S: Here is KOMAROV again. I am pretty sure that this number 167 is not the man but he looks like D when he was about 25 or 30 years old. This is the general facial structure of D. That was the man with the silver hair. Similar, but as I say different enough that I am pretty sure that isn't the man. II Ilichev?

N: That is U 132 whose name is Ivan ILICHEV. (Please note there are two numbers on photos 167 and 132.) We are curious about Mr. A. Aren't we.

Possibly also Brik?

S: That guy spoke English well enough that I am pretty sure that he has been outside. If that guy isn't in any of these I'll look through every photo we have.

Brik had been an illegal in US.

N: This is group 2 (V's) that you are going to look through now.

S: This man V-106 you have the number here as 255. This man, his picture will give you a faint idea of his facial structure (A's) and his head shape. However, this man here has a fairly prognathous jaw which A did not have. However, this is not a bad resemblance -- given the fact that it is now 5 or 6 years. His hair would be about the same shade too.

N: He was never referred to by name?

S: None of these men were.

N: This guy's name is Andrey GRAUR. OK Correct I knew him

S: Well, I don't want to take any chances. V-121. He may be, highkly unlikely but may be identifiable with B. The interrogator who spoke Russian with a slight Ukrainian accent. Highly unlikely. If it is, he is at least 10-15 years younger in that picture.

N: 121 is SMIRNOV, Andrey S. Correct I knew Him

S: This fellow also V-124. This fellow even more likely is identifiable with B, altho once again with the reservation that the picture is at least 10 or 15 years younger than he is now.

N: His name, GUSEV, Andrey A.

S: No more of Group 2.

N: Now group 3. (Y's)

S: This man here possibly Y-2, possibly identifiable with B, the man with the Ukrainian G. His head is just little bit too square and his features not quite sharp enough. I don't think he is, but just possibly.

N: I've got number, his name Boris Nikolayevich BABICHENKO. I know very well.

S: Y-3, his face is very similar to A. His hair, A is balding on the side and in the back his hair was very well groomed, combed very closely to scalp, which this man's isn't, but with a few years difference and a little bit of Wild Root, just possibly. The face is very very close.

N: I wish they would date these pictures so we would know.

S: It would be a big help

N: They may have the info. Y-3 is Ivan A. BALASHOV.

S: Oh boy. This looks like B right here. It is not a complete picture of him. Y-11. This looks like him. That is as close as I would hope to get to him. The picture isn't quite a good enough quality that I could definitely say, but I would say that is 90%. What is his name?

N; Y-11 is Dmitriy Mikhaylovich KONYAKHIN.

S: The nose, the jaw, the hair (the high cheek bone -- ??????) very very close. 90%.

S: Y-19. Bears a strong resemblance to A. But /I don't think so.

N: K.I. PARKAYEV. knows to me

N: That was group 3. This is group 4.

S: V 69 Some slight resemblance to A.

N: Nikolay Mikhaylovich BELOUSOV. ?

S: V 77, Facially may perhaps bear some resemblance to D, but once again with the qualification that this picture looks about 15 years younger. I don't think it is the same person.

N: Vladimir Andreyevich IVASHKIN.

N: Try the second half of same series of group 4.

S: Well I think we already have B in this other picture, but this man also bears a resemblance - is that V-7 (not numbered)

N: V-7, now what did you say about V-7?

S: He bears a resemblance to B the Ukrainian, but I think the other picture is .. better ... this one only 60%.

N: Aleksey N. CHIZHOV.

N: We have one more batch to go thru. The last group was taken at the Powers trial. I don't think those group photos help any because I am not sure we know who they are.

S: No, but at least if we had the face.

S: This fellow here, number 20, without glasses, he bears some resemblance to D, the man with the silvery hair, without glasses.

N: No. 20 the man in the middle wearing glasses.

S: Facial structure, size of head?, hair very very similar, except that that man looks a bit older (one in picture). He looks older than appeardd to me. His hair doesn't appear to be as well groomed or as silver. D. resemblance very great.

N: That's D.

S: These people on these pictures really do look like the types. Once again this fellow here, altho it is not a very good picture bears some resemblance to B, the Ukrainian.

N: To B. The one seated

S: Exactly. Below the man .... inaudible.

N: No. 13 man seated on left bears resemblance to B.

S: right.

S: No one here. I would like to look at all of these again. I would like to go thru all the photos in SR/6/Bio. I know their faces well enough ....

N: That you'll catch them.

S: Yes. They were all in general different types and of course having been there for 2½ hours my impressions are still clear and fresh/ and they will be for long time. For instance KOMAROV. I looked at that guy in the photo and I can still see him staring at me there at the other end of the desk. It were just as if he were back here. That one of B, even tho a bad photo. It just looked so much like him. As I said 90-95 % sure.

N: These could be new characters that have never been out and we don't have photos. I am glad you made the one absolutely positive on KOMAROV and the one 90% on ...

S: And the only reason that I don't say 100% on him is because the photo is bad. If it weren't for that I would say 100%, but there is not much doubt in my mind. Even if he isn't you have a clue there.

N: You didn't have any problems with reporters?

S: NoI didn't because fortunately they were sent the wrong flight number in Paris. They just reversed the numbers. They didn't know which flight I was coming in on. I messed them up, altho not intentionally, by taking an earlier flight out of Paris. [redacted]

N: Isn't that earlier flight a Presidential flight?

S: They didn't say.

N: Well, was it first class all the way?

S: No. Tourist. There were very few people in first class, but tourist was packed. I got to Orly at 1200 Paris and was expecting not to leave until 4 , but I went right to the PanAm desk to confirm my reservation, I did, the man looked it up and said we have a flight leaving at one if you prefer that. I felt that leaving at one, three hours earlier, that could get me in New York at three and I could be down here before closing time in the Office. But then this mix up occurred with my bags, but apparently [redacted] according to a cable over at State, there was a UPI man waiting at New York, for the flight I was supposed to take. This is what generated all the difficulty with the passport section at the Department because apparently this fellow contacted the IN&S people and got my passport number and inquired about this and then they determined that this wasn't my right passport number. They thought something was wrong with my passport.

N: You certainly didn't travel under alias any place along the route?

S: No.

N: Guthriex called me and accused me of instructing you to travel under alias.

S: No. The reason why they couldn't get me in Paris is because the Department had cabled the wrong information or least Helsinki had cabled the wrong info to Paris. Let me put it this way, if it wasn't the wrong info, the code clerk at either end of the line made a mistake. Instead of 358 they put 853. Transposed the numbers. I just very naturally took the first flight out of Paris I could get. I had nothing to do at Orly for 3 hours. As things turned out, this wasn't in my mind at all. I was prepared to say just no comment, just see Moscow for any info. I was glad when I realized that this had screwed them up because at least it prevented another picture getting into the paper getting off the plane in Paris or more probably in New York. They possibly might have printed it again. They have printed enough already. I was met at Helsinki by some Finnish newspapermen and they took some pictures of me getting off the plane and also of me on the landing strip. They asked me if I had any statement to make. I said no. I sk had no comment to make & and t hey could refer all questions to our Embassy in Moscow. They didn't press me. Then they asked me for some personal information which every body else had .....

END OF TAPE

(96) 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

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24 Genc 63 passed To Duetz

CONCERNING PENKOVSKIY MEMOIRS

1. As mentioned in an earlier memorandum, we believe that to base the story of Penkovskiy's life on the fiction that he was a KGB Agent throughout most of his career is wrong. In addition to the reasons mentioned previously, in the opinion of those most familiar with the case here, the allegation would not be accepted as true by those whom we most want to impress with the documents--the officers of the Soviet intelligence services and other Soviet officials. The introduction of this element in the story might make it more complicated and difficult to understand in the West. Western journalists seemed to have had considerable difficulties understanding Penkovskiy the man and in analyzing the case based on the facts now overtly available. To throw in this further twist might confuse them totally.

2. We think that not only would the story be more valid, but also more dramatic if it sticks closer to the main facts and to Penkovskiy's own words. The contact report in which he gives the history of his life in some detail, for example, could be used almost verbatim to cover a considerable part of his life. Although details are important to establish the authenticity of the document, the version of his autobiography which we have reviewed seems to include some material concerning the war period that is irrelevant not only to the story, but even to Penkovskiy's life. In general the document does not stress as much as it could those forces which alienated Penkovskiy. There are also some passages which depict Penkovskiy as more grasping and more of a careerist than perhaps in fact he was and certainly more than he need be for the purposes of his story. For example, on the top of page five he seems to rejoice that in 1937-39 the purge of the officer corps opened up room at the top for bright up-and-coming officers. It seems to us that Penkovskiy's motives could be effectively explained by proper stress on the role his father's fate played in his own life; in addition, such instances of secret police brutality as that which caused the suicide of Marshal Varentsov's daughter Nina and the insight he gained into the true attitudes and characters of leading Soviet personalities could suffice to fill in the picture.

3. Specifically, we would recommend revisions along the following lines :

a. Excision of all references to his purported recruitment by the KGB and his work for them as an agent. There are eleven such references of varying lengths on pages 7, 12, 14, 18, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, and 29.

[redacted]

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

b. Having removed the KGB as a source of stress and conflict which caused his disillusionment and defection, we should play up other sources of stress :

1) The fear which was a part of his life from earliest childhood as the result of uncertainty about his father's disappearance. Even as a child he could feel the uneasiness which gripped his mother and his other relatives whenever he asked about his father. This would have been especially evident on each of the many occasions when forms, such as applications for school, Komsomol membership, etc., had to be filled out. The injustice of a system which would hold a boy responsible for his father's transgressions was apparent to him from his earliest days.

2) This fear was the cause of the young Penkovskiy's desire to excel in everything. He felt he had to prove his value and loyalty to the state and to the Party. It accounts for his political zeal, which resulted in his becoming a Commissar. It was behind his repeated volunteering for combat duty in World War II (rather than a wish to escape the KGB), and explains his seeking after medals and decorations--visible symbols of loyal service.

3) The personal tragedies which he witnessed or heard of, such as the suicide of Varentsov's daughter, served to reinforce his fear. When he became aware of a clear case of injustice he at first tended to regard it as an act of fate. Later in life, he began to regard those instances as defects in the Soviet system itself.

4) He was eager to enter the GRU when he got the chance as this was another seal of approval placed upon him by the state and Party and lessened his vulnerability.

5) Though he approved of the post-Stalin slackening of controls of the USSR, the execution of Beriya and the curbing of the power of the KGB, he was sickened by the hypocrisy of the Soviet leaders who had licked Stalin's boots when he was alive and who now attack him in speeches and in print, yet who in practice continue many of the worst aspects of his repressive policies. He interpreted the denigration of Stalin simply as a political maneuver by Khrushchev in order to consolidate his power.

6) Penkovskiy was sickened by the brutal and unjust treatment of Marshal Zhukov and other loyal, capable officers who had served their countries long and well by Khrushchev and the Party.

7) Having reached the upper frinpes of Soviet officialdom, Penkovskiy was disgusted by what he saw and experienced there. Intrigue and conspiracy, influence peddling, apple-polishing, gossip-wongering, character assassination are normal everyday tools of the trade for young Soviet officials trying to get ahead. Penkovskiy felt obliged to fight back with these same weapons and actually was good at it, but all the while he was sickened by it.

8) His service abroad and his contacts with foreigners gave him an objective frame of reference within which he could criticize the Soviet system.

9) When he was finally confronted with the fact that his father had served in the White Army and was killed fighting against the Reds, he thought that his years of loyal and valuable service would prevent this fact from being used against him. He soon learned that this was not the case. He got no more promotions; he was removed from or turned down for key positions which could have led to further advancement of his career. The injustice of punishing a son for the sins of his father in this fashion served to catalyze the other elements of his hostility to the Soviet regime.

10) He came to see the Soviet regime as a festering sore which was infecting the entire body of Soviet society, as a power system interested only in the perpetuation of power, as a hinderance rather than an aid to the Russian people in their fight to achieve their destiny.

c. The result should be a ringing indictment of the Soviet system. It should try to show that a human being with a conscience in Penkovskiy's position must turn against the system or lose his self-respect.

d. We should cut out some of the lengthy discussion of the history of the second world war and follow more closely Penkovskiy's own words at the first meeting, when he discussed this time of his life.

e. We should incorporate whenever possible Penkovskiy's own words and phrases from the tapes. We should also include personalities, names, anecdotes and experiences, all genuine from these tapes. This should help to make the document come alive more and the characters mentioned in it appear more as real people.

4. We feel that the material already extracted from the tapes and compiled in 12 chapters under the heading "Penkovskiy's Memoirs" should definitely be included, but that its present form and organization is probably not the most suitable. Tentatively, we

suggest that it would be better to build up to the chapter "Be Firm With Khrushchev" by leading off with the chapters on "Berlin," "Soviet Leadership," "Political Control of the Armed Forces," "The Soviet Marshal," and "Opposition to Khrushchev in the Army and the Fall of Zhukov." The remaining chapters might be then arranged as follows: "Soviet Rockets," "Nuclear Weapons," "Soviet Intelligence Activity," "Sino-Soviet Relations," "Soviet Policy towards Underdeveloped Countries," and finally "Soviet Dissatisfaction." Considerable editing and rearranging of material within each chapter will no doubt be required. In many passages, for instance, it is obvious that Penkovskiy is talking directly to individuals who are representatives of the U. S. and British governments. Such passages must be changed, and Penkovskiy must seem to be addressing whatever audience is suitable with the cover story for the document's surfacing. Also, in editing this material, we must give careful attention to the question of time. The statements were made over a period of several months. Some statements refer to historical events which had not yet happened, and other statements refer to the same event after it had happened. All these statements must appear to have been written at the time when, according to the cover story, Penkovskiy says he wrote them.

5. We would like to consider adding to the volume some of the documentary evidence, a question we plan to raise with your representative who is scheduled to visit here in July.

[redacted] Memo for file, FN 42 DCI: 3M (93)
Read file Chap 17 Jan 26, 1963

8. Mr. McCone then turned to the Board's question on implications of the Penkovskiy case as they relate to British and U.S. security. He said that Penskovskiy provided us intelligence from August 1960 through August 1962, and gave us more than 8,000 pages of translated reporting, most of which constituted highly classified Soviet defense documents. He stated that the case did not have any security (*) implications for Britain or the U.S. as this was a controlled agent recruited by CIA and shared with MI-6, who we got into the circuit because the contact was outside the USSR and we used London on several occasions for meetings. Dr. Land asked about the motivation of Penkovskiy, and the DCI replied that it was primarily emotional--that the man resented his failure to advance higher in the regime and was motivated to work against the present leaders. He noted that the British had taken the principal rap of the case because of Wynn, who was a courier working for MI-6. We think that the case was blown because of a penetration in the British government who saw Wynn and Penkovskiy together. We also think that Penkovskiy got careless and when they searched his apartment they found all of the espionage equipment. Mr. McCone noted that they had picked up a couple of our officers and in one case implicated a clerk who had been sent to service a letter drop, but had let him go after brief questioning. These had all been png'd. He noted that Penkovskiy had no access to either FBI or CIA personnel. Mr. Coyne asked if Penkovskiy had initiated the initial contact and was there any danger that he had been planted. Mr. McCone replied that this was something that we always feared, that we had checked his bona fides extremely carefully, and held up dissemination of reports in order to insure their validity. After most careful checks with all other types of intelligence, we had come to the conclusion that this was authentic.

*added by Mr. McCone.

Please clear all 7 Rs. memos

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[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

EXCERPT - [redacted]

[redacted]

PENKOVSKIY OPERATION, PARTS 3 and 4 Taped 22 October 1966.

Now, the first few days were a furor, not only in finding out what made him tick; what he wanted us to do for him; what he was willing to do for us; but to analyze in the greatest of detail from his own notes, what all the little abbreviations, hieroglyphics and everything were, on some one hundred fifty pages, some typed, some written, of misselery. The people who understand this subject from a scientific viewpoint completely, they would of course, analyze everything that they needed to know themselves, but we could at least contribute this one effort of expounding and extrapolating every abbreviation that wasn't clear, but which he, having inserted, knew about as to what he meant when he put it in. This was a monumental job. I don't remember seeing a tree between London and Leeds, because in a jiggling car, as I was yapping from Russian as to what this particular R-7 missile would or wouldn't do, and Bulik was writing with the others, which was in English, we never had a chance to lift our heads.

We barged into the hotel, had a meeting set up there, met him, went on to Birmingham. In Birmingham we had a technical flap with the British, but we managed to luck out. We took along two large suitcases, hand bags I should say, much larger than this, with Mohawk, battery operated recorders, just in case we would need them. Unfortunately, they are albatrosses, because we had no place to leave them, except the U.S. Embassy. Therefore, in the hotel room, someone had to be with those damn pieces of equipment. On travelling, we took them along. Well, when we hit Birmingham on a Sunday night, the Scotsmen came in with some very incongrous expressions which sounded like "whir oh whir, we are in trouble," - we had hit the tail end of the world in England. This part of the town, the center part, is still on direct current. I have no place to get a converter at midnight on Sunday and the tape recorder can't work.

So, we said, "however, for three thousand miles we have carried those damned instruments of ours on battery. Let's see if they can pick up the slack." So we ran eight reels, and they

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all came out. One from one machine, one from the other, alternating to cover our four hour meeting. So, even then, it was worthwhile taking them along on the trip, they appeared superfluous at the time, we were glad when we realized we could tape this, not only overtly, but with superb electrically operated equipment. That's just a side light, and having analyzed everything he had in his notes we had one of our top men, a very heavily and well decorated one, even though he is a reports officer. I would love to mention his name because he is one of the most distinguished reports officers I know of, his name is Len McCoy. He had spent time at Cape Kennedy, Thule, , Churchill, all the air force bases, he is quite an adept and knowledgeable person in anything relating to misselery. He came out to give us all the requirements and processed the material as fast as he could. The British were so impressed by him that they permitted him to handle all the British requirements. They threw up their hands, he was so much head and shoulders above them that they accepted anything that he would. Of course we would need him, not at the meeting with PENKOVSKIY but after the meetings. We tried to transcribe the tapes, but it was totally impossible. When you have a meeting of four hours, onee a day, it would take six months to finish all the tapes after we brought them home, because they were just catching up ahead of us all the time.

Well, amongst other things that he told us about, all of the associations we reviewed carefully with Marshall VARENTSOV. We began to tabulate his unbelievable accessability to highly classified documents. First, he had a complete entree to the fund of GRU, which is the classified library section of their intelligence organ. He could read anything on missilery in the headquarters of Marshall VARENTSOV. who was there as his adjutant, about to become a general, would just unlock the room and say "PENKOVSKIY, I know you are writing a book in Russian from the English on missilery, that's why you have all these research privileges. Please be my guest. Don't take them out, but read anything here." So we were getting a

pretty good idea of what their ICBM's could do, where they were, about the Cuba situation and what their missilery there could do, almost straight from the horses mouth. In fact, there was a publication (I will make a more complete reference to it later) called the Strategic Missile Bulletin, on ICBM's from MOSKALENKO's shop. MOSKALENKO at that time had two hats. One he was on the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. Remember, they have only one ministry, the Army, Navy, Air force are all under it. The first hat was, he was the first deputy to the minister for all new technical developments and means of mass destruction and so forth. The second hat was at the same time he was the Commander in Chief of all Strategic Missile Forces. That is, all the manpower and officers and so on, who are scattered at the various ICBM sites. You know already what VARENTSOV's position was, but they are closely related. In fact, outside of the tremendously complicated geometric and geophysical machinery and computations for guidance systems, the ICBM Russian style is an expanded, enlarged practical missile, and probably is in all countries. We didn't get yet into space technology thank God, because that would have been just too much to swallow.

Anyway, next we had brought over with courier service suitcases full of photographs. As I remember we had covered something like 7,000 available photographs from all the assorted files of CIA, MI5 and MI6. These were all categorized by countries, when last seen and he identified maybe 7 to 10 per cent of these people. The total number of GRU officers in detail, depicted, described, identified from photographs, etc., was somewhere over one thousand. The KGB numbers were less, some two or three hundred. Of course, the rosters of everyone who was ever in Turkey before him, during his time and currently was like knowing his five fingers; not to mention everyone on the India, Pakistan, Ceylon, also Iranian and Egyptian desks, and the field stations; as well as everyone in London, and later as you will see, everyone in Paris. That was very, very significant. This is of course from a CI viewpoint, but his

greatest contribution, as it became more and more developed came strictly in the PI field.

Alright. During this period we have consolidated all possible ways of recontacting him. We knew he was going to come back here. He had a scheduled return, knew there would be a very short interval. We knew he was coming back per schedule to London without a delegation, alone, for the purpose of establishing a program for a later delegation. This gave him even more latitude and freedom of action, and this time he came very heavily reinforced with influence from back home. He was called in by Army General SEROV, the Chief of GRU, and, as I mentioned before, the former Chief of KGB, and told "PENKOVSKIY, my wife and daughter are taking a trip to England. I know you will be there at the same time. Please keep a weather eye open for them and make sure there is no difficulty." "Yes sir, be glad to do it." Naturally, the Soviet Embassy gummed up even having a car waiting for them when they arrived, but PENKOVSKIY did not. He took them to the hotel, he wined them and dined them. He did everything, except he over did it. He began to play "footsie" with Svetlana, and I begged him on my knees almost, "This is not the girl for you. Let us not complicate life." "But she likes it." "Look, PENKOVSKIY - Pozhaluista - there are others. Not this one." Anyway, I'm not going to get into that phase of life. He is very human, very normal, he likes to flirt a bit. Anyway, he made a terrific hit with Mrs. and Miss SEROV and loaned them money because they ran out. He made sure they ran out. So they shipped all kinds of stuff home, heavy freight, by boat that was parked somewhere in the Thames River, such as a swinging artistic sort of affair for the garden. I remember personally purchasing a beautiful V-cut sweater for the General for the General to play tennis with on the courts at his dacha and then we went into a shopping list which was out of this world. He said "I need help. This is operational." But the list, the list was not a piece of paper. It was a book. A book. And neatly depicted page by page were items for who for what. In the middle of it there

outlines of a foot, his wifeb foot, his daughter's foot, his mother's foot. Who knows these English sizes.. The foot. So we had to get shoes, sandals and so on in all sizes and description to match that. He needed a suit so we measured Mike Stokes who looks something like him, back to back, a little shorter and he went to Oxford Street and got a suit for PENKOVSKIY. But the list, finally, I'm not going to describe the details. They are too unbelievable, but there were about 4 suitcases of about 70 kilo, 70! That means well, how is he going to take it home? A cinch - no problem. Well, here is how he did it. WYNNE took them in on his official trip, between meetings. He met WYNNE at the airport. He had every pass in the book and when the custom officials were there, he said "Don't stand there like apes. This is a guest of the Soviet Union. Help him carry them." They were all carrying them into his car. So as he delivered WYNNE to his hotel, passing messages from us and giving him cachets in the car, he drives off with the rest of the baggage, to his home, for further distribution there. WYNNE would immediately proceed to the British Embassy, without even washing his face and hands, and his own personal little baggage there they could search to the hearts content, he would deliver everything, he would be clean, and on the return trip the messages would come back in reverse. So that was ideal. That is how he got them in. No problem.

Well, what did we get. We got, for about 25 pounds, a rocket, a beautiful rocket, for the birthday which was actually on the 16th of September, although the birthday was on the 3rd. You see, you had a calendar switch about 13 days. VARENTSOV was about to get an Order of Lenin, already he did have the title of Chief Marshall, on his 60th birthday, which is very customary for high-ranking people in Russia; as I read to you from this order which happened to PENKOVSKIY's great uncle. For this day and occasion PENKOVSKIY was nominated to be the major domo. He got the singers, he got the dancers, he got the whole list of guests and naturally he had to present his own gifts too. He got a gold watch and he immediately wanted it engraved "To dear Sergey Sergeyevich from the Penkovskiy's". I said we could not

engrave this in London. We have no cleared engraver. We could do that in Moscow. He argued "What kind of an intelligence service, you can't even put this on?" "No!" That he had to take back himself. The big rocket was a silver thing - beautiful - you press buttons here - cigarettes come out - cigars come out and light. It's one of those sort of things. It was very appropriate for VARENTSOV, but the piece de resistance was something else and this gave us a TSS problem. He waanted a bottle of the rarest Napoleon-type brandy cognac exactly brewed 60 years ago on the date of his birth. Oh with 50 years we could do, but 60 that was a little more difficult. However, with 4 case officers, which it took, outside of us for support, to buy all these things every day; they were coming home with buckets of assorted material; with the help of TSS on the label we got a 60 year old bottle. This bottle paid for itself many, many times over, during that cele radion for his 60th birthday. One of the first guests to enter was Rodion MALINOVSKIY, Minister of Defense. No one was there with less than two stars. One poor little was there with two stars, who has long since retired for all times sake, KARIOFILLI with three, Chief of Staff of the Rockets, this, that, Marshalls. From the Central Committee side CHURAYEV, the poor peoples representative at the Central Committee level, who has a dacha with 20,000 roses - the poor communist society - he even bragged about it at the party and got drunk. MALINOVSKIY made a bee-line for this cognac, "This is better than our vodka," and he was slopping up our cognac like mad. At the same time he was predicting, depicting every thing he was going to do with the Berlin Wall; how he was going to do it and how the Americans would swallow that pill, and he was prepared to make us swallow a second pill if KHRUSHCHEV wanted to press a different button; namely the second pill would have been to sign a seperate peace treaty with East Germany, by prolonging the maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact nations by three more weeks, 250,000 men strong. However, KHRUSHCHEV himself, passed that one up. The first one, when it was reported, we told them exactly how he was going to do this, how we could stop it like a clock, probably for the cost of $200 worth of gas, but it took

Washington three months of deliberation before we could give any sort of definitive answer for what to do in Berlin. All kinds of speculation about future nuclear wars was discussed at this meeting. They felt completely free, oiled with our cognac didn't harm a thing, fortunately, so we had a complete report on this. This high level access, other than the tremendous amount of documentary material was what was really helping us out all the time and he was delivering them to us in cachets.

Now, at this second go-round of meetings we had to retool the whole operation in terms of secure future contacts, and the receipt of this invaluable material that was now in huge volume. First of all, we had a Minnox camera especially prepared. A gentleman in the Ninth Bridge, an excellent technician, British more or less froze the "f" stop at 8, you could click off of it; more or less froze on the (fiftieth "D") speed, we had a template in centimeters 21 X 17½ where the brown fringe of the eye piece would adjust you are in focus. It takes practice but you are on focus, you can throw away the chain, which is a security risk if you are going to clandestinely carry the Minnox, the more chains you have the more complications you have, so you eliminate three variables. All the training then took place on the steadiness of hand and estimation of light. As a result,the man produced something like 5,000 perfect frames. One frame had two bottom lines cut off. It became so hairy with this accuracy, we wondered "could it be possible the KGB is doing this." So at one of the meetings, after we got the cachets, in London, we threw him one just like that - "Catch" - "Take picture." "Where" "That wall, that map, this map, this magazine." We were brewing tea now. Every four o'clock is tea. We are in Britain you know. We are taking time out for tea, and you have this done. In about 15 minutes with the steadiest of hand, "I'm done." He even squeezed out 55 frames from a 50 frame roll in a Minnox. You can do this, but you have to have an awful lot of practice. He threw it back to us. Tomorrow we will see. The next day in gloss prints this big the Ninth Bridge brought them

developed. Out of this world. Out of this world, like a photographers masterpiece. Well, obviously he can photograph. Whatever he learned, he learned well. I do not mean he can run 15 kinds of photographic apparatus, but the one he knows, he knows. The same thing with the Russian version of the one time pad . We practiced with them. This is all done by us. We had all the commo support in the world. A member in Frankfurt gave us test messages. He would finally break it out. Naturally, he had the "yo yo 51" with the Russian coding-decoding system, one time pad, and with it in this interval he came back with a little typewritten message. In it he had gummed up one word, one word - one letter. Begginning - he said "mosh" instead of "nach" which means nothing really, beginning or our number one. I said "Becareful with our 32 instead of 33 on yo yo." "Yes, I'll not do it again." The rest was perfect. I thought "Well, gosh darnit, who is breaking this code." Again, it took me three hours to make two different type messages, old book, new book. It is the difference of one group. Again, we are brewing tea. I said "Here is a test pad. Break these messages." In 15 minutes he had both messages done. Perfect. The man is a technician. So in one phase of commo, in one phase of photography the man was absolutely superb. I've never seen one like it and never expect to again in my life. But, with his photographic capability (and he is a three Minnox man - he would send one in for repairs on occasion to us via channels - might as well be hung for one as well as three - and why change cachets in the middle of an important operation) when he would go into the GRU room, ask for quiet, "don't disturb me", he looked for certain things of interest. "Ha, a bibliography. I wonder what kind." Looks it over. In about two or three frames he had a bibliography of every document stolen from the United States, and the correct title, right down the line. Military manuels, all other kind of documents that had a classified value. The hell with the documents. They are ours anyway, but now we know what's been stolen from us. The same from the French, The British, the Italians - the bibliography. How many frames does it take to

take a bibliography. Peanuts! He got us all the classified directories of the Kremlin; what you call here the gray line, the red line; complete, who's on it, what number, how they cross connected. Well, it took us four frames for the whole thing. Directories - that's big those directories. So he got us nine assorted classified telephone directories. A complete volume on everybody as to his background, history, Academy of Science of the USSR, and its' filiale in Siberia, and eight other directories; Ministry of Defense; Government of the USSR; KGB; GRU; Internal , those are the internal dialing systems of three and four numbers. It was really fantastic. Well, now our idea is "How shall we keep this thing going?" "What channel?" At this point of history, the wife of an MI6 officer Ann, was brought into the act. She was stationed in Moscow. Ann came and was introduced to PENKOVSKIY in London. Now here is the gimmick. He had gone to a scientific gathering. There was an officer by the name of Mr. ?SENIOR?, actual name, British, and he was ordered to go there and report and he met Ann. He went to the UK Embassy and again said "How do you do" to Ann. Therefore, she was, her last name was CHISOLM, on their interest list, They had a dossier on her. He had an official reason to meet with such people because he was sent there. We didn't like it in terms of frequency of meetings, outside of official functions. He said "Well look, if I meet her on the street, tip my hat and say , talk to. I'll make a report on it. Of course I say hello to someone I know officially. This will give me a chance to pass something." "All right, you can do this once or twice, but beyond that you are gambling." The British say "And what do you have American, besides a big mouth?" They just about were as nasty as that. We didn't have very much going at the moment, but on the road we had plenty in what we call the pipeline. Our object was to get an appropriate man,in the Embassy under the appropriate cover, which was a big headache; to whom PENKOVSKIY could be officially sent by his people for official business. Then, we have no clandestine, risky meetings outside. It's a beautiful thing,

Except that you can't schedule it always and except that you can't predict the frequency of the meetings. That was our concept and we held out for it as long as we could and we also injected into the plan to have such person or persons available. In the meantime, Ann was briefed that "when the time comes, you will do this." "Okay." We didn't need her when WYNNE was going back and forth because that was completely blessed by the GRU and the KGB for that matter, as official. Fine.

So, time goes by and we get a message through WYNNE that pretty soon he is going to the French Exhibition in Paris and he is loaded with cachets, other than what WYNNE has already picked up. We are getting all these things all the time and we are drooling. Fine, but this was an awful beating because although it says the 20th September it was the 14th October for the twelve meetings. We were before 1 September. We didn't know when the French would give him his visa. We could not hurry them up or show any interest and the French were playing fancy reciprocation. You make us wait three weeks, we make you wait three weeks. So he is furious. What are they, Allies or not? I mean, after he told us "Why the hell you keep me bouncing in place in Moscow for three weeks?" Well, we were bouncing in place in Paris for the same time, letting things develop normally. In the meantime, we had cased more safehouses and more meeting sites and everything else that we needed in Paris than you can imagine. There, unfortunately, the British have assets far and away above anything we could dream of in the way of safehouses, support assets and everything you want in Paris. After all they are close to the continent themselves, they have been there for many, many years and they know how to operate. So, (garbled) the British safehouse, the British vehicle, a lot of them hired, a lot of them right hand drive, Everyday I went from Orly to Le Bourget and back, a beautiful distance of about 40 or 50 miles through French traffic; we had a special driver Roger King, who drove (garbled), he was a race track driver; when necessary he would go 60-70 miles a hour

respect for you in his mind. All right that is fine for a fellow who might want to work with you or defect. There are the in-betweeners for whom the timing is off, the concept is ripe, but the timing is off. Family situations, obligations which may change. He might say like PENKOVSKIY said "If you see Colonel Peak, give him my greetings." Maybe Peak/did a great deal without even knowing it himself, of putting some seeds of thought to cooperate with us in PENKOVSKIY's mind. Someone else may get the credit in the future for the contact, but there is where the seed comes in. So don't pass up the (garbled) if the guy doesn't want to play ball because he can't at this time. (garbled portion) but he can't telegraph to you now or to anybody else his views. Of course, in the case of the fellow who never would, you still have an asset to generate by creating respect for you. At the very outside he who hates the United States might at least tell another Soviet "You know, all Americans aren't sons of bitches. I met one who wasn't," and even this is a plus by having this or desire to the Soviet. How do you do this? No two people are alike amongst us and no two Soviets are alike, but as an objective, how to impress favorably the Soviet, try to generate a concept. I just quote his own words ".....respect, he was dignified, he could keep a confidence, and I could trust him." So, I think as a piece, as we teach down south, to quote someone like this is far more meaningful than to generate concepts of how to get along with a Soviet from every other possible self-generated psychological Anglo-saxon background thinking. It is not quite the same thing.

(77)

[redacted]

[redacted] -9 MAR 1992

OPIM DIR CITE LOND [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1. DEBRIEFING OF [redacted] BY [redacted] RESULTED IN FOLLOWING:

A. [redacted] CALLED AT [redacted] HOTEL ROOM IN MOSCOW IN EARLY MORNING JANUARY 28 AS [redacted] WAS PACKING TO LEAVE FOR AIRPORT AND DEPARTURE FROM USSR. [redacted] ASKED [redacted] TO DELIVER MESSAGE TO PERSON WHO WOULD RESPOND TO TELEGRAM THAT [redacted] WAS TO SEND WHEN HE RETURNED TO LONDON. 1.3(a)(4)

B. SUGGESTED TELEGRAM BY [redacted] WAS "PLEASE MEET ME ON (TIME AND PLACE WAS TO BE PROVIDED BY [redacted]). SIGNED ANDY." [redacted] DOES NOT RECALL THE TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS. 1.3(a)(4)

C. MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED TO PERSON WHO RESPONDED TO [redacted] TELEGRAM WAS IN RUSSIAN AND AS FAR AS [redacted] CAN RECONSTRUCT AS FOLLOWS: 1.3(a)(4) "BE CAREFUL BECAUSE AUTOMOBILE WITH LICENSE NUMBER [redacted] CANNOT RECALL TAG NUMBER) IS FOLLOWING YOU AND THEY ARE WATCHING YOU ALL THE TIME NOW."

D. [redacted] MADE NOTES. HOTEL PORTER INTERRUPTED FURTHER CONVERSATION. AT AIRPORT [redacted] TOLD [redacted] HE REFUSED TO CARRY OUT [redacted] REQUEST 1.3(a)(4) AND DESTROYED NOTES. [redacted] WAS STUNNED AND UPSET BY THIS ACTION WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY IN EBULLIENT SPIRITS.

3. (PROBABLY E) [redacted] THEN ASKED [redacted] TO BE SURE TO CALL HIM AT HIS OFFICE UPON [redacted] RETURN VISIT USSR. [redacted] OF COURSE, MADE IT A POINT NOT TO CONTACT [redacted] THINKING THIS MIGHT BE A PROVOCATION. 1.3(a)(4)

F. INTERESTING THAT ON TRAIN TRIP MADE EARLIER FROM LENINGRAD TO MOSCOW, [redacted] TOLD [redacted] THAT "THEY (SOVS) DON'T LIKE YOU BEING HERE BECAUSE YOU KNOW TOO MUCH". 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

G. [redacted] COCKTAIL PARTY FOR PAPER DELEGATION WAS ARRANGED BY [redacted] AFTER MUCH PRESSURE BY [redacted] FOR EITHER BRIT OR AMER EMB TO THROW SUCH PARTY WITH REQUEST THAT BRIT EMB REP (PRESUMABLY DR. SENIOR) SHOULD BE AT PARTY IF AT AMER EMB. (COMMENT: THIS CLEARLY ATTEMPT BY [redacted] TO TRANSMIT WARNING TO US THAT [redacted] BEING SURVEILLED). 1.3(a)(4)

2. IT CLEAR THAT TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS WAS LABORICI AND THAT [redacted] HAS NOT MADE MEETS BECAUSE OF SURVEILLANCE ON [redacted] SIGNATURE ANDY WAS FAULTY MEMORY [redacted] AND LIKELY WAS ALEX. 1.3(a)(4)

3. [redacted] INFORMED [redacted] THAT HE HAS ALREADY APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT WORLD'S FAIR IN SEATTLE. SAID HE WOULD ALSO VISIT AUTO SHOW SWITZERLAND. (COMMENT: 32ND INTERNATIONAL MOTOR SHOW BEING HELD GENEVA 15 TO 25 MARCH.)

4. IN VIEW POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER REMOTE, THAT [redacted] MAY DISCUSS THESE EPISODES WITH SOME UNAUTHORIZED PERSON, WE PLAN GIVE HIM SECURITY BRIEFING SATURDAY MARCH 10. SINCE [redacted] UNDER SUSPICION BY SOVS, AND TO AVOID [redacted] BLOWING THESE EPISODES TO SOVS (SHOULD THEY EVER HOLD AND QUESTION HIM) AS EXAMPLE OF SOV PROVOCATION, WE FEEL WE MUST WARN [redacted] THAT THIS INFO WHICH HE HAS GIVEN [redacted] IS OF INTEREST TO US AND HE MUST NEVER REFER TO IT. [redacted] PLANS LATE APRIL - EARLY MAY VISIT MOSCOW. 1.3(a)(4)

5. DISCUSSED ABOVE WITH [redacted] AND AGREED ON FOLLOWING: 1.3(a)(4)

A. TO INSTRUCT [redacted] TO CONTINUE VISITING PARK AND SHOPS BUT AT DIFFERENT DATES AND TIMES BUT NOT AT DATES AND TIMES OF SCHEDULED MEETS. THIS TO AVOID SOV SPECULATION AS TO SUDDEN STOPPAGE IF [redacted] DOES NOT GO OUT AT ALL.

B. [redacted] WILL NO LONGER CARRY ANY OPS MATERIAL AND WILL REFUSE CONTACT WITH [redacted] EVEN IF HE SHOULD BY CHANCE TURN UP. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

C. TO SEND RADIO MESSAGE 16 TO 31 MARCH INFORMING [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
WE RECEIVED HIS MESSAGE FROM [redacted]

D. TO MAKE FULL PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE GENEVA MEETS.

6. [redacted], [redacted] AND [redacted] WILL PREPARE W/T MESSAGE FOR 1.3(a)(4)
[redacted]

7. [redacted] ETA SUNDAY MARCH 11 TWA 701.

1.3(a)(4)

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

Chapter 15
Fn 7

(85)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

OPDM DIR CITED LOND [redacted] 14 September 1962

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

REF LOND [redacted]

AS PROBABLY REPORTED VIA [redacted] CHANNEL, [redacted] HAS INFORMED STATION THAT [redacted] DID NOT SHOW UP FOR 13 SEPT MEETING. 1.3(a)(4) [redacted] SPECULATED REASONS MAY BE EITHER [redacted] THOUGHT HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR AT BOTH 13 AND 15 SEPT PARTIES AND THEREFORE MAY BE OPTING NOW FOR 15 SEPT PARTY OR HE MAY HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED OR RESTRICTED FOR SOME REASON FROM ATTENDING 13 SEPT PARTY BECAUSE OUT OF FAIRLY LARGE GAGGLE INVITED FROM HIS OFFICE ONLY TWO PERSONS APPEARED. WE NOW AWAIT RESULTS OF 15 SEPT MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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(91)

1.3(a)(4)

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

[redacted]	1	4	
	2	5	
	3	6	

ACTION: [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

INFO : [redacted]

[redacted]

FN 5 Dep.. 17

[redacted] 311050Z

DIR CITE [redacted]

[redacted]

31 MAY 1953

1.3(a)(4)

1. [redacted] HAD DINNER WITH FEDORENKO EVE 27 MAY. ON 24 MAY FEDORENKO PHONED [redacted] AND WHEN LATTER EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN BUDAPEST, FEDORENKO SAID HE TOO HAD BEEN THERE. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) BELIEVES THIS TRUE CONSIDERING VARIOUS REMARKS MADE BY FEDORENKO. DURING DINNER FEDORENKO SAID WAS DEPARTING CIRCA 15 JUNE AND WAS VAGUE AS TO HIS RETURN. (FEDORENKO PREVIOUSLY TOLD [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) HE WOULD HAVE HOME LEAVE AND THEN RETURN VIEN UNTIL MAY 1964 WHEN WOULD RETURN MOSCOW PCS.)

2. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) BROUGHT UP PENKOVSKY CASE BY ALLUDING TO FACT SOVS HAD SUFFERED A BLOW IN EAST-WEST CONFLICT. FEDORENKO TOLD [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) TO NOT BELIEVE EVERYTHING HE READING IN NEWSPAPERS. CLAIMED THAT PENKOVSKY VERY MUCH ALIVE AND WAS DOUBLE AGENT AGAINST AMERICANS.

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

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3. [redacted] PLANS CONTACT FEDORENKO SOONEST. WILL BRING UP 1.3(a)(4)

PENKOVSKY CASE.

4. NO INDEX.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

PROPONENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF TOTAL ESPIONAGE

[Following is a translation of an article by F. Sergeyev in the Russian-language journal Znamya (The Banner), No 12, Moscow, December 1964, pages 210-229.]

Nobody gets pleasure from dissecting the souls of traitors. But every instance of treason, no matter how seldom such cases occur, is always instructive. They make it possible to judge what sort of persons are recruited by the enemy and to learn our mistakes in selecting individuals for membership in units which are of interest to enemy Intelligence. We are now speaking of an officer who served with Soviet troops abroad. We will only use the first letter of this traitor's last name because his family, which had no part in his foul actions, still lives among us.

[redacted]

The former officer of the Soviet Army, Lieutenant Colonel P. was shot two years ago. But he began to die earlier -- five years before this, during the time when he began to collaborate with American Intelligence. He died a little each day from his fear of discovery, from self-degredation, from self-alienation. Each day, he would put on the overcoat of his uniform and report for work, greeting his comrades. But he was their enemy. The information which he collected and passed to American Intelligence worked against the very country which he served. During monthly meetings with his chiefs from American Intelligence, he received instructions together with envelopes containing the Judas pay he was given in return for his notes. But things didn't reach the stage of passing notes at once.

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During 1958, while stationed in Vienna, P got involved in a love affair with one Emilia Kohanek without the knowledge of his family and comrades. She was just right for P.: She made no claims on him, asked no questions, was obliging, and (P., of course, didn't notice this) she was shrewd. The Lieutenant Colonel didn't hide from her his admiration for the "bright" life of Vienna, for the show windows of expensive shops, for the splendour of luxurious restaurants. When he was transferred from Austria to a city in East Germany, Emilia began to write him. She didn't miss the opportunity to send a birthday card remining him of the happy days they had spent together in Vienna. Other times, her letters were sad, but all sounded sincere: She did not conceal her desire somehow to meet again to reminice about old times, "to relive the rest", if this was agreeable to P. All this seemed so convincing that Emilia succeeded in getting P. to agree to a secret meeting. It was arranged that Emilia would travel to West Berlin and that P. would arrange for temporary duty orders to the East German capital.

After he arrived in Berlin, P. changed into civilian clothes and secretly left his station for the Western Sector in order to meet his loved one. Emilia Kohanek failed to appear at the prearranged place. But there were others there: Two hefty American Military Police agents arrested P. When they were done with him, it was not P. who returned to the East German capital, but the American agent "Max". "Max" told the following story during subsequent interrogations:

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Approved for Release
Date JULY 1993

Penkovskiy file in

[redacted]

"On the day we had set, I arrived on temporary duty in East Berlin, from where I went to West Berlin without the authorization of my commanding officers. However, rather than Kohanek, two unknown men in civilian clothes approached me at the prearranged spot and presented credentials of the criminal police. After telling me that I was in the area of some sort of secret installation, they invited me to go with them. I lost my head, got into their car, and, after a few minutes, was at the headquarters of the American military police. During the interrogations, which lasted six hours, the Americans told me that I had been caught red-handed as a Soviet spy and that, should I refuse to cooperate with them, I would be sent to the West. Moreover, they told me that, since I had crossed the zonal border without a pass from my commander, they had every reason for either telling the press of my escape from the USSR or for returning me to the Soviet authorities as a person who had asked the Americans for political asylum. Either way, my family would have suffered. Having no way out, I accepted the proposal to become their agent."

From his fitness reports, this traitor seemed to be practically a living angel. But, as sometimes happens, the people who wrote the reports were aware of his true character. They failed to give timely attention to his negative qualities, which could be dangerous under certain conditions. It was known that P. was egocentric and secretive, that he lacked common, everyday courage in relations with his comrades, that he was a obviously weak individual. All these qualities, taken within the context of the complicated situation in which he worked, attracted the attention of "hunters" and made him a target of American Intelligence. And he was weak, surrendered, and became a traitor.

"The American Intelligence officer who recruited "Max", Lieutenant Colonel Shernhorst (really Cary Grosmen), told him that it would be his job to collect information on our armed forces and, more precisely, to betray our state secrets. His chiefs gave him secret writing materials, code books concealed in a hollowed-out spinning bobbin, and communications instructions. And he worked for them until he came to the attention of the organs of State Security. And this is how it happened:

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Russell August Lenghelli worked at the US Embassy in Moscow. As a diplomat, the father of three children, and an attentive husband, he led what seemed to be a completely decorous life to those around him. Every morning he would set out for work at the Embassy; in the evenings he would familiarize himself with the city and, on nice days, he would take excursions with his family. Nothing, it seemed, would indicate that, besides his administrative and managerial duties, for which Lenzhelli was accredited to the Embassy, he had other concerns. But a number of Lenzhelli's actions convinced State Security that his official position was merely a cover for other functions.

Once, during the summer, a special miniature container holding instructions and money meant for an unknown American intelligence agent, was found to have been left by Lenzhelli under the handrail of a stairway leading from Lenin Hills to the Moscow River. Lenzhelli covered this "operation" by an innocent stroll with his wife and children.

And thus the innocent family man came under even closer scrutiny by the Chekists. He continued to stroll about the city during office hours, when he should have been at the Embassy. Frequently, his wife accompanied him. Clearly there was a purpose behind this -- the wife served as a lookout for the intelligence officer. The behavior of the American woman showed this. Once, stopping his car, Lenzhelli boarded the Metro with his wife and rode back and forth along a rather complicated route without any clear

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purpose. Such behavior might seem odd to the uninitiated — after entering a car on the Metro, Lenzhelli would suddenly jump off, pulling open the already closing doors, and run to another platform. But the professionals had no doubts: Lenzhelli had detected surveillance. After finally getting off the Metro, he approached a bus stop and stood next to a Lieutenant Colonel. For an instant, their arms and hands touched. A small package suddenly appeared under Lenzhelli's arm. This Lieutenant Colonel was the same "Max". Up to this time, nothing was known of his relations with Emilia Kohanek, about his trip to West Berlin, or about his subsequent meetings with American Intelligence officers. P. was now placed under observation together with Lenzhelli.

A documentary film has been made entitled Snova po chernoy trope (Once More Along the Black Path). Some scenes in this film are taken from the Lenzhelli-"Max" affair, though the episode concerns another of their meetings -- in the entrance of the "Astoriya" restaurant (now called the "Tsentralnyy") on the corner of Gor'kiy and Nemirovicha-Danchenko streets in Moscow.

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The camera shows a crowd of Muscovites strolling along Gor'kiy Street. A young man has his arm around a girl; an old man is opening a package of cigarettes; two men are conversing near the window of a book store; finally, we see the hurrying feet and shoulder boards of a Lieutenant Colonel and then a full view of his face. Something is bothering the officer. The camera moves only infrequently to the other people -- the Lieutenant Colonel is the center of attention. He approaches the door of the restaurant and glances inside. It is clear from his expression that somebody is late for an appointment. He nervously paces the sidewalk.

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An automobile of foreign make slowly moves along an ally. Stopping the car, the man behind the wheel gets out and offers his hand to a lady getting out the other side. The camera takes in the entire scene. Then it zeroes in on the hand of the man; he hugs the woman tenderly around the waist and, with quick fingers, takes something, a small packet, from the pocket of her jacket. The pair enters the vestibule of the restaurant and "Max", with whom we are already acquainted, rapidly follows them.

A long-range shot (for obvious reasons), taken through the large glass door of the restaurant, shows a public telephone. Apparently, the Lieutenant Colonel and the man who has just driven up want to use the phone at the same time. What's this? The same packet, which we saw in the hands of the foreigner a moment ago, is now held by the Lieutenant Colonel. But they don't seem to know one another. In any case, the camera, which has had them in view the whole time, didn't notice that they greeted each other or gave any other sign of recognition. And they separated like complete strangers. But we already know, as they say, that they have met before "behind the scenes". "Max" told all about this during the investigation: "In April 1958, Sharnhorst introduced me to an American Intelligence officer, who used the pseudonym "Daniel", in Berlin. This was done in case I were to be sent back to Moscow. "Daniel" gave me a private telephone number in Moscow and two set phrases to be used to call him to a meeting...."

The people filming this documentary had no doubts that this P. was a traitor and that Lenzhelli was the person to whom P. was passing espionage information.





But this is not enough. It was necessary to catch the criminals red-handed. The "sincere indignation and perturbation" expressed by certain American diplomats, when they are accused of unlawful activity, is well known. Irrefutable proof is necessary. And it was gotten quickly. As usual, at 8 o'clock in the morning, Lenzhelli left for the bus stop on Kutuzovskiy Prospect on his way to the Embassy. "Max" was waiting for him at the bus stop. Standing in different places in line, they got on the same bus. A Chekist jumped on the bus after them. At the moment when Lenzhelli moved toward the exit, passing the Lieutenant Colonel, the two exchanged packages unseen by the other passengers. The Chekist gave a prearranged signal to his comrades, who were waiting at one of the stops. On leaving the bus, Lenzhelli, together with the package which he had received from the spy, was instantly ushered into their car. Two stops later, "Max" was also arrested red-handed. Thus ended the short-lived collaboration of "Max" with American Intelligence.

* * *

In their book The Invisible Government, the American journalists D. Weiss and T. Ross write that "US embassies around the world have secret floors or departments where CIA missions are located. Each mission is headed by a chief and includes several intelligence officers. CIA employees are included among State Department or diplomatic personnel. This is their "cover". Is further proof necessary of the indisputable fact that, following the example of Nazi Germany, the ruling circles of the United States have transformed their diplomatic apparatus abroad into a tool of espionage? In crude violation of generally accepted standards of international relations, the Central Intelligence Agency is increasingly subordinating American diplomatic representations to its own interests.

If this is characteristic of the US diplomatic service in other countries, it is particularly so with regard to the American Embassy in Andmilitary attaches in the Soviet Union. What are the facts? There are as many as you want. What relation to the conduct of diplomatic functions can the following lines from the diary of a diplomat possibly have?

"8 January, Monday: Drove to the southern edge of the city in search of antiaircraft batteries, but found nothing in the new regions. 12 January, Friday: Drove all morning with Tornal and Abbel through the southeastern part of the city in new areas. Didn't see a single antiaircraft battery, but collected some good information about the locality. 20 January, Saturday: Bush and I drove for three hours through a snow storm in the eastern and southeastern parts of the city; spotted three antiaircraft batteries. 27 January, Saturday: Because of poor visibility we didn't carry out any reconnaissance; wrote two letters and a report on the location of the antiaircraft batteries in order to have them ready for the diplomatic pouch. 28 January, Sunday: Got up at 10, had breakfast, then took the Metro to Ring B, strolled for an hour in the area of Frunze Academy; didn't see anything new if you don't count the old calvery stables where several horses are apparently kept. 15 February, Thursday: Tornal and I carried out discreet observation in the industrial regions in the northern part of the city, but failed to locate a single antiaircraft battery. 24 March, Saturday: Tornal and I checked the presence of antiaircraft batteries, two of which have been removed. An industrial enterprises is under construction at their old location".

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These lines are taken from the personal diary of a former US military attache in Moscow, Major General Robert Grow. The diary, which was lost by the unfortunate general and eventually was made public, can be called sort of a "bible" for American intelligence officers. In it, Grow had written "our intelligence organs must constantly seek to discover and report both the strong and weak points of the enemy. Our attack must be directed to the enemy's weak spot. Although the military services are primarily concerned with the question of weapons and methods of waging battle, we must understand that this is total war and it must be fought using all means. We can win this game if we organize an attack of a political, psychological, economic, and subversive character. We must understand that it is permissable to hit below the belt...." Indeed, Grow not only was without scruples when choosing where to strike, but was not adverse to collecting the most elementary types of information. For example, during a trip to Yasnaya Polyana, he noted the numbers of military vehicles and located military equipment; when visiting Rostov-on-Don, he determined that "the bridge across the Don is the best target in the south of Russia", and the like. Grow operated rather crudely: he was caught several times with the goods and, as a result, became the center of an international scandal. One would think that Grow's incident would serve as a warning to the people at the US Embassy in Moscow. But no: as they say, the leopard can't change his spots. Here are only a few of the facts:

1954: Lieutenant Colonel Howard Felchin, the assistant military attache, and Major Walter Mekkinin, the assistant air attache, were expelled from the USSR for collecting military information during trips within the country. They got into trouble by losing their notes and even the original copy of their intelligence assignment.

1955: Assistant military attaches John Benson, Captain William Stroud, and Captain Walter Mule, who were actively engaged in collecting military intelligence information, were declared persona non grata.

1956: Assistant air attaches Hubert Tensey and Captain Charles Stokkel, who repeatedly attempted to penetrate areas where military units are located, airports, and other military targets, as well as the border zone in the area of Brest, were expelled from the USSR.

1957: Assistant military attaches Paul Uffelman and Lieutenant William Lewis, who were arrested in Leningrad while photographing defense enterprises, were declared persona non grata.

1958: Military attache, Colonel Clyde MacBride and seven other employees of the offices of the Military, Air, and Naval attaches were found guilty of the same activity. [redacted]

1959: Embassy attache Russell Lenzhelli, who was caught red-handed during a clandestine meeting with an American spy, was asked to leave the Soviet Union.

1960: Air Attache, Colonel Edmund Kerton, and his assistant, Major Irving MacDonald were expelled from the USSR for repeated attempts to penetrate areas occupied by military and military-industrial targets. When they were arrested, a film containing photographs of military aircraft and defense enterprises was found on them.

And this is what took place in October 1962 in Leningrad. Workers V. A Nikitin and M. A, Nikolayev, the chief of a life-saving station, AI Val'ter, and a diver, L. M. Kravchenko caught a suspicious person in the vicinity of a military target. He was acting strangely -- sometimes talking to himself and then suddenly beginning to play with the lapels of his jacket. The workers summoned the Militia. They told their prisoner

to unbutton his raincoat and jacket, where they found a small black instrument and white cloth pouches skillfully concealed on his chest. The farther they went the more they discovered. The pouches turned out to contain diagrams, charts, maps, lists of notes; the pocket of the coat held binoculars and some sort of small ear phones were attached by tape to the cloth pouch of a microphone, from which fine wires ran to the black instrument.

The prisoner turned out to be the assistant US Naval Attache, Raymond Smith. He carried plans of the ports of Leningrad and Tallin, on which marks had been made, giving the precise locations of moorings, gasoline tanks, repair shops, and enterprises related to port activities. The intelligence officer's portable recording apparatus held a tape with almost two hours of recording on it -- Smith had dictated the results of his observations during a stroll in the area of the military targets. In addition, Smith was found to be carrying a miniature Minox camera, containing an exposed film of an intelligence nature, and high-power binoculars, which permitted him to observe interesting installations from a great distance.

Following Raymond Smith, his namesake Edgar Smith, the Assistant Air Attache, was caught in the beginning of 1964. Together with two employees of the US and British air attache offices, Edmund Evetina and Commander Anthony Davis, he was trying to carry out reconnaisance of military targets in the Tula area.

The unscrupulous use of the diplomatic service by American Intelligence was shown by the scandalous case of Richard Jacob and his colleques, who misused their official positions. A secretary-archivist at the US Embassy in Moscow, Richard Karl Jacob was caught red-handed when he was taking espionage reports, hidden by the traitor Pen'kovskiy, from a secret cache. At the same time, Soviet State Security organs found that other employees of the American Embassy had a part in this case. Extraordinary facts were uncovered: in anticipation of a prearranged call from the spy, Second Secretary of the US Embassy, Ralph Jones, and Attache Hugh Montgomery stood watch for hours at the telephone; at the first signal, the Embassy doctor, assistant Air Attache Alexis Davison rushed to a light pole with the spy's mark; assistant agricultural attache Rodney Karlson maintained personal contact with the spy and received stolen material from him. It seemed that almost all the inhabitants of the Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street were engaged in a single endevor -- servicing the spy Pen'kovskiy. In league with their husbands, the wives of the diplomats also actively supported secret contacts with the traitor, using children's playgrounds on the boulevards of Moscow and embassy clubs, diplomatic receptions, apartments, and even washrooms for this purpose. And although, in accordance with the rules of diplomatic immunity, none of these people appeared on the docket in court, where Pen'kovskiy and his English partner Grevill Wynn ended up, the world learned how many unusual "diplomats" the CIA used to direct the American Embassy in Moscow.

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We live in an enormous and very beautiful country, offering any foreigner a tourist route to satisfy the most diverse tasts. We have much of interest to offer admirers of antiquites. A trip through the USSR can afford great pleasure to the art connaisseur and to people who are int rested in nature, hunting, fishing, and touring by car. Of course, this does not exhaust the interests of travellers -- increasing numbers of people from all over the world want to see with their own eyes the first Soviet socialist state in history.

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True realization of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence has resulted in the appearance of many new phenomena, unknown to us during the personality cult, and among these is foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. Foreign tourism is growing each year; more and more countries are participating and the number of guests who visit us is increasing. The state is showing them greater attention on the theory that the more people who see the Soviet Union with their own eyes and get to know its people, the more difficult it will be for bourgeois propaganda to spread all sorts of cock-and-bull stories about the aggressiveness of the USSR and about its desire to unleash a new World War. Motels and camping sites, hotels and sanatoriums, pensions and museums, theaters and concert halls serve our foreign guests. Tourists are received with traditional Soviet hospitality and we hope their time in the USSR will be well-spent, that they will see and learn much. Most tourists, on their return home, correctly and kindly tell about the Soviet Union and its people, about their cares and hopes. And this helps to strengthen mutual understanding and trust among peoples, to convince people that peaceful coexistence is not a "tactical move" and not a "Communist propaganda trick", but a natural objective process in the development of international relations in the modern world.

Is this not why tourism has become a target of attack for those who are opposed to peaceful coexistence? Imperialist intelligence takes a two-sided position with regard to foreign tourism in the USSR: on one hand, they try to use it as a loop-hole to carry out intelligence activity and, on the other, they try to discredit the idea of tourism itself. Exploiting cases when their agents and intelligence officers have been caught in our country, they hope to frighten honest people out of their desire to visit the Soviet Union and to get to know the life of its people. Placing agents among the tourists, American intelligence would like to provoke Soviet authorities into changing their position with regard to foreign guests, into the establishment of barriers against this human influx which unites countries with different systems.

But, no matter how ingenious the approaches taken by the CIA leaders, they cannot force us to go to extremes. We have, once and for all, freed ourselves from the suspicion which poisoned our lives in former times. This does not mean, however, that, when doing away with the vestiges of the personality cult and the situation of manifold distrust which went along with it, a narrow-minded complacency and caring about have taken its place. To the contrary, the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU and the new Party Program have taught us to tell our real friends from our enemies. The whole world knows that the great strength of the Soviet state, its scientific and technical advances, its prowess in such great accomplishments, say, as space research, give our imperialist enemies no peace. In the political, economic, and strategic fields, imperialist circles are extremely interested in penetrating our many secrets. Let us recall that Allen Dulles was thinking specifically about tourism when, during an address at a dinner of the Aeronautical Institute in New York, said as early as January 1960 that "at the present time, the outside world can obtain more information inside the Soviet Union than in the past. This is particularly true of information concerning the development of the Soviet economy....". How this is actually accomplished can be easily seen in cases when State Security organs have uncovered American spies visiting the USSR with tourist visas and trying to lose themselves in the mass of people who sincerely want to become acquainted with our country, with its expanses, its beauties, and its peoples.

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In this influx, however, there appeared a shabby Renault automobile, driven by a 30-year old ship's machinist from Amsterdam, Ebert Reydon, and carrying Lou de Yakher, a 25-year old merchant marine navigator, as a passenger. Tourists are tourists and their itinerary was generally typical of all automobile tourists: Uzhgorod - Kiev - Khar'kov - Zaporozh'ye - Yalta - Odessa - Kiev - L'vov - Uzhgorod. If you take this route, you can see the beauty of Kiev rising from the ashes, green Khar'kov, the gigantic Dneproges, the unforgetable nature of the Crimea with its remarkable resort cities, and ancient L'vov. Sitting around a camp fire at a camping site in the evening, you can spend many hours in pleasant and interesting conversation. And there's much to photograph -- in the cities, the steppes, forests, and coastal regions.

All this is possible .... But Reydon and de Yakher were least of all interested in antiquities and landscapes. They were not attracted by hearty get-togethers around campfires and by the opportunity of getting to know the "Russian miracle", about which there are now so many rumors not only in their native Amsterdam, but in ports near and far which they have visited. Too often, Reydon and de Yakher tried to deviate from their itinerary, too evident was their desire to get into places where Soviet citizens do not wish to allow indiscreet, foreign eyes. The passengers of the shabby Renault had a reason for such behavior. Their return was awaited n t by the relatives and friends who usually fling themselves greedily on friends returning from distant lands. American Intelligence residents, who had outfitted them for their espionage voyage, waited for the seamen. Long before their trip to the USSR, Reydon and de Yakher completed so-called "training" trips. Here is what Ebert Reydon had to say about them during the investigation following his arrest:

"We also drove to the port of Rotterdam. The purpose was to practice photography from a moving car and also to give a detailed description of an American destroyer at anchor in the port. De Yakher and I", continued Reydon, "studied albums of photographs showing various military targets: rocket and radar installations, various types of tanks, jet planes, special vehicles for hauling rocket equipment. They showed what a rocket base, an airport, a tank storage field should look like. I recall that most of the photographs came from military and air parades in Moscow."

The American intelligence officers outfitted the "tourists" with unusual care and, it must be said, with considerable foresight: four cameras, dozens of color and black-and-white- films, a supply of telescopic lenses for long-range photography, compasses, powerful binoculars, portable transistor radio receivers, and many other things which might be useful in carrying out their espionage mission. And their mission was very specific --- "We were to try", said de Yakher after his arrest, "to reconnoiter an airport and automobile plant in the region of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'ye and, for this purpose, they showed us maps drawn on tracing paper, of the supposed locations of these targets. We were given similar assignments with regard to Umani and Belaya Tserkva...In the region of one village, the name of which I can't recall without checking my notes, we were to find and photograph an enterprise which was supposed to produce rocket fuel...In the area of Uzhgorod-L'vov, they ordered us to locate, describe, and photograph railroad lines, trains passing through and being formed there, bridges, radar installations, high-voltage transmission lines, and also branch automobile roads leaving the main route...." And so on and so forth.... The spies familiarized themselves with photocories of the Crimean coast, with a chart of the port of Odessa, and were even advised to go to a picture gallery, from which they could most safely secretly photograph the installations at this port.

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In actuality, fulfillment of this mission was not so simple as were the "training trips". In one instance a militiaman returned Reydon and de Yakher to the road when they tried to turn off to a point, shall we say, "not listed in the tourist guide". Another time, employees of "Inturist" explained that there is no easy access road to the village with the name "which is difficult to remember". On the third, fourth, and fifth tries, they simply told them that "foreign tourists are not allowed". Nevertheless, the uninvited guests were able to compile espionage notes which were far from unimportant to our security. A customs check at Uzhgorod turned up a diary in the possession of de Yakher. He had jotted down colorful notes such as "___km - radar tower to the left, __km - viaduct, __km - airport on the right, __km - convoy of military vehicles, __km - turn to the right to a forbidden zone".

The search of these two tourists was a rather unpleasant process for our customsmen. It doesn't enter their heads to search the thousands of honest and well-meaning foreigners who pass daily through control points on the Soviet border. But Reydon and de Yakher were so nervous at the customs house, behaved so suspiciously, that they attracted attention. There's no point in saying that there's no smoke without fire .....

We'll skip the details of the espionage epopee of Reydon and de Yakher, which are, perhaps, not without interest -- how they fell in the laps of American Intelligence, how, in particular, the "tender-hearted Yankees" came to chose carefree seamen, how they convinced them that an espionage voyage to the Soviet Union would be little more than a recreational trip, similar to one that Reydon had taken previously in Shanghai. In this article, we are interested in something else: American intelligence persistently tries to use every possibility for espionage against the USSR.

In the western countries, there are many people who passionately hate our country. One of these is Adolf Werner, who once headed a department in the store of the Schneider firm in Karlsruhl. He joined the National Socialist Party as early as 1940 and remained in it until 1945, until the moment when the Americans captured him. Up to this time, Werner served for a fairly long period of time in a "Death's Head' infantry brigade of the SS, fought against our country, received first and second degree Iron Crosses, and, when the Soviet Army smashed Hitler's military machine, barely had time to escape to the west. During the postwar years, he turned to journalism and, from time to time, published travel notes in the West German press about trips in various countries, mostly, in the capitalist world.

The Americans didn't lose sight of Werner. Convinced that his Nazi past was sufficiently forgotten and his name as a journalist firmly established, they suggested that he make a tourist trip (with the Americans paying the bill, of course) to the USSR for the purpose of writing "travel notes". This is how it was at first only, however. Later, as Werner admitted during the investigation, the representative of American Intelligence, Johnson (really Bauer) didn't hide the fact that he expected Werner to provide information of a military-intelligence nature. In particular, Johnson-Bauer insisted that Werner "travel slowly through the USSR, be observant and attempt to locate and describe military targets, airports, military units, radio stations, radar installations, movement of troops, and also bridges and other structures". However, according to Johnson and other American intelligence officers, who prepared Werner for this trip, this "can be done easily and would involve no danger". Nevertheless, they provided the spy with a special ball-point pen before his departure and explained how it is used. "During instruction", said Werner later"I wrote several secret writing notes for practice. And when they developed them for me, I saw the words I had written". To ensure that Werner's trip would go without serious incidents, the Americans gave him a special address: "Sweden, Sanatorium Agra, Titsina, Elke Khannelora Detmers", to which he was to write every week and send hypothetical post cards from "Adi".

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In his own Volkswagon, Werner and his wife, Hermina, set out across Austria, Hungary, and Rumania to the Soviet Union. Soon, in the region of the highway from Kiev to Kharkhv, Werner was arrested while taking photographs of military equipment. An examination of their baggage found an espionage diary. Between the lines of ordinary text were hidden notes written with the pen described above. "In .....part of the city a radio tower" "In .....a radar installation". "In...saw soldiers of the air force". "At kilometer number ....another radar installation." "Trucks numbers .....carrying troops with black arm patches".

Nothing could help Werner and his wife: not their intelligence instructions, nor their ball-point pen for secret writing, nor the address in Sweden. Having been found in the act of espionage, they were sent to court and tried.

Life shows that American intelligence officers experienced in hostile actions against the Soviet Union "have forgotten nothing, but have learned nothing.

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Speaking about the CIA building in Langley, we should mention one item which is of great importance for the entire system of American espionage. The authors of the book The Invisible Government write about this as follows: "Among the special structures is a scientific laboratory the construction and equipping of which cost 200,000 dollars. Here the CIA is perfecting some of its miniaturized types of weapons and is developing invisible inks, special explosives, and other devices. One of the really astonishing instruments at Langley is the electronic brain, which stores and issues mountains of information which arrives at headquarters.... This brain is called 'Walnut' and was developed especially for the CIA by IBM. A necessary document is planned before the observer with the help of the photo-tape operation of the 'Intellofax.' The 'Walnut' and the 'Intellofax,' unlike man, operate without error."

These so-called silent services constitute technical means of intelligence. The development of such means leans on the entire technical might of the US, as well as on the principle of sparing no dollars!

First among the chief means of technical intelligence, undoubtedly, is aerial intelligence. Immediately after World War II, special aerial units of the CIA began systematic flights along the Soviet border, and they later tried to penetrate Soviet air space. In May 1960, the magazine Electronics gave interesting data in this regard: Since April 1950, the US had attempted 81 times to penetrate the air space and territorial waters of the Soviet Union. The magazine noted with unconcealed regret that in all cases the violators were met by the defenders of the Soviet borders and that 20 of the aircraft-violators did not return to their bases.

In 1954, a special extensive program of aerial photography of Soviet territory began which involved the use of high-altitude drifting balloons and spy planes. The first attempts to penetrate for intelligence purposes the air space of the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp with the use of the balloons were undertaken in 1956. But despite the expenditure of vast funds, the calculation on the balloons was not justified. The air defense covered the Soviet sky well. Then the stress switched to the use of strategic aircraft: jet aircraft which were modifications of the B-47 bomber, as well as reconnaissance variations of the B-52 and B-58 bombers. The Americans created two types of high-altitude aircraft, the Lockheed U-2 and the Martin RB-57D, specially for reconnaissance flights.

The Soviet people know from the materials of the trial of the pilot-spy Gary Powers, who was shot down over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960, how well ~~planned~~ the "sky espionage" was. The intelligence services spared no efforts to obtain photographs of Soviet military objectives. The CIA heads were supported in this matter by the heads of American

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diplomacy. Christian Herter, US Secretary of State at that time, reported to the Senate not without reason that "the benefit derived from aerial reconnaissance justifies the risk involved." It should be considered that the technical equipment of the "sky spies" permits them to obtain photographs from high altitudes. Life thus described the capabilities of the apparatus on the notorious U-2: The parking place of motor vehicles is empty when the camera shutter clicks. However, the developed negative clearly shows the tracks of the motor vehicles which were there before the photograph was taken. A person reading a newspaper in his garden is not visible to the pilot flying at an altitude of 40,000 feet. But the camera in the aircraft takes a picture in which one can read the headlines of the newspaper in the person's hands."

The CIA is not satisfied with this and continues to perfect the means of "sky espionage." At Edwards Base (in California), tests were held in 1964 the purpose of which, as the Associated Press reported, was to "take high-quality spy photographs during flight at a speed of 2,000 miles per hour."

Following the aircraft reconnaissance ran the cosmic reconnaissance which was begun in recent years. The CIA, with the help of the American Air Force, is developing reconnaissance satellites (by 1962 the US had launched more than 100 satellites of various types, including 40 of military significance). The plans for such satellites were given various names: Big Brother, Sentry, etc. In 1959, the Sentry plan was divided into two programs: Midas -- satellites for the long-range detection of ICBM launches; and Samos -- spy satellites for the reconnaissance of ground targets (aircraft bases, ICBM bases, industrial objectives, the sea fleet, etc.). A special aerial photo apparatus either automatically or on command from the ground photographs ground objectives from an orbit 220 km in height, distinguishing objects one meter in length. For a 15-year program from 1960 to 1975 it was planned to launch 117 such spy satellites (49 in 1960-1964, 38 in 1965-1970, and 30 in the following 5 years).

Another type of technical equipment used by the CIA is radio intelligence, or the system of "long-range ears." It consists of a network of radio-monitoring posts along the border of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other socialist countries. They are engaged in radio intercept, paying special attention to communications among units of the Soviet Army in order to disclose the location and chief tactical and technical data of Soviet radar stations, guided-missile direction systems, radio-navigation systems, antiaircraft defense facilities, etc. Radio intelligence is conducted both from the ground and from aircraft of the U-2, RB-57D, RB-47, RB-52, and RB-58 types which make regular flights along the Soviet borders.

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The central point of important technical facilities is the NSA, the most hush-hush American intelligence service. But, as is known, a secret sooner or later becomes known. William Martin and Vernon Mitchell, employees of this agency who recently rejected their American citizenship and asked the Soviet Union for political asylum, said that the NSA is studying top secrets of each state -- the ciphers and codes for secret communication. More than 10,000 employees of the agency occupy a building the size of which is smaller only than the Pentagon. Equipped with modern machinery and instruments, including large electronic computers, and using more than 2,000 intercept posts, they record all the coded reports and reports sent in open text of almost all the countries of the world, including Turkey, Italy, France, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and others.

"In September 1958," Martin and Mitchell reported at a Moscow press conference, "an American C-130 crossed the Soviet border from Turkey and trespassed into Soviet Armenia. This aircraft did not return. The US government, as usual in such cases, reported in a 'cover' story that the aircraft had allegedly been gathering scientific data and had violated the Soviet border by accident. The US maintained that the C-130 had been shot down over the territory of the Soviet Union for no good reason. In the second half of the day, at Gen John Sanford, the director of NSA, in speaking on the internal radio broadcasting network of the agency, demanded that the employees refrain from discussion of any questions regarding the flight of the C-130." Moreover, a highly-placed employee of the agency told Martin that on board the C-130 were electronics specialists and equipment for intercepting the signals of Soviet radar stations.

The American intelligence services are literally doing everything to learn Soviet military-technical secrets. Here is one such example.

"The Russian commercial liner Aeroflot had just landed and the workers of the Vienna airport boarded the plane to clean it up before the return flight," says E. Tully in his book. "While the aircraft was being readied, a man in a dark suit approached the man who collected the sweepings and unnoticeably gave him money. After this, the collector gathered the sweepings from the Soviet aircraft, put them in a hand cart, and guided it to his room. Suddenly this man appeared there and claimed the box containing the sweepings from the Soviet aircraft. He put the box in the back seat of the car and went home. Behind a closed door he carefully examined them: torn magazines, paper napkins, empty bottles, bread crusts, broken plates, and a bent clothes hanger. Several days later, the hanger was delivered to one of the large offices at CIA headquarters in Washington. The person who signed the receipt for obtaining the hanger was delighted. For many months they (American intelligence services - F. S.) had worked to gather information on a new Soviet long-

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range bomber. They had gathered much information on the aircraft but were unable to learn anything about its range and bomb load. However, they knew that the shavings which remained after mechanical processing of the wing were remelted and used to manufacture a special type of clothes hanger. Finally they had such a hanger. With the help of spectro and chemical analysis, the experts were able to learn what type of metal alloy was used to manufacture the hanger. With this formula at their disposal, the CIA determined from what the bomber wing was made, and little was needed after this to calculate the range and bomb load of the aircraft."

The American intelligence services could flatter themselves with the success of this experience. However, to the chagrin of its agents, the hanger had not been made from the shavings obtained in processing the bomber wing. Nevertheless, it is important to note the scrupulousness with which the American intelligence services gather information which interests them, as well as the many hopes which they entrust with their "silent services," which the vast American monopolies give to the CIA.

Somewhere in the CIA archives is a photograph of the spy Ivan'kovskiy which is not needed now by anybody. A similar photograph is gathering dust in the safes of British intelligence. Both photographs were taken on the same day and hour, at the same place, by the same photographer, and, evidently, on the same film. The difference consists only in the fact that in one frame the spy was photographed in the uniform of an American army colonel, and in the other, in the uniform of a British colonel. One can imagine a pathetic picture of recruitment: Two full-dress uniforms were laid out before the spy as if promising him dual protection. Posing before the lens, the traitor dressed in the uniform of one, then the other, state, calculating on which horse it is more profitable to mount. Of course, each side in this unusual spectacle, which occurred in London at a secret abode of British intelligence, secretly felt that the main catch would fall to them. But the recruiting agents were pursuing a, so to speak, higher political goal: This masquerade, in the conception of its organizers, symbolically personified a new stage in the development of an American-British intelligence alliance.

In 1947, Allen Dulles wrote in a memorandum in honor of the future American intelligence services that the newly created intelligence organization, the CIA, must become a "universally recognized organ which maintains ties with the central intelligence services of other countries." Sixteen years later the same Dulles, who has already been dismissed from leadership of the intelligence services, noted in summing up the results of what has been done that "one of the most gratifying features of our intelligence activities recently is the increasing cooperation between the American intelligence services and their

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corresponding organizations in all countries of the free world which are united with us...."

Of course, the ex-chief of American intelligence has in mind the union under the flag of NATO, SEATO, and other blocs of forces which are operating against the socialist camp. The Atlantic union of intelligence services exists just as does the Atlantic military-political bloc of governments and general staffs. And just as the US is the leader in the bloc of governments and staffs, the CIA, which is expending every effort not to let the reins out of its hands, plays the main role in the intelligence alliance.

Since the very beginning of its existence, the CIA has tried to take in hand the intelligence services of England, West Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and Canada in order to use their resources in the interests of implementing their own strategic plans. Ties with the CIA are quite extensive. In the staff of the high command of the NATO armed forces in Europe there is a Special Intelligence Administration. Under the central organ of the Atlantic strategy there is a "Permanent Group of the Military Committee of NATO," and in Washington there is a "European Coordinating Committee" for exchanging intelligence. Dominating the coordinating administration which directs underground activities against the countries of the Warsaw Pact are the CIA and the Intelligence Department of the US Department of Defense. Intelligence services also exist in the command staffs at "theatres of military activities" of NATO -- North Europe (Norway, Denmark), Central Europe (West Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, England), South Europe (Italy, Greece, Turkey), and the Mediterranean command (the Mediterranean Sea and the straits).

In 1949, American intelligence services acquired the right to assign their representatives to intelligence organs of NATO countries. Moreover, the US has bilateral intelligence agreements with the governments of a number of states. In 1957, combined commissions of representatives of American and British intelligence services, which had existed during the war, were restored. A joint intelligence center is operating in London, the so-called "Joint Intelligence Bureau," of three countries -- the US, England, and Canada. There is also a "Japanese-American Committee on Security Matters." When there is no agreement on cooperation, the CIA practices an "exchange of information." Such are the varied forms of control of the CIA over the intelligence services of the countries which belong to the main imperialist blocs -- NATO, SEATO, SENTO, and the OAS. Actively used for intelligence interests, of course, are various types of international subversive organizations supported by American intelligence services, such as the "Committee of Free Europe," the "Anti-Communist League of Asian Peoples," the "Inter-American Conference for the Protection of the Continent," etc.

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A special place in this total offensive of American intelligence services has been occupied and continues to be occupied by the long, complex, and highly contradictory relations with the intelligence services of West Germany. It is well known that in West Germany immediatly after the war, the Americans secured for themselves the intelligence organization of General Reinhardt Gehlen. This name again appeared recently on the pages of the Western press in connection with the "sensational change" in the leadership of the German espionage organs. In order to judge what is being concealed behind this fuss, we will look into some facts.

Gehlen is one of the ominous products of the brown Reich, a person who always presents, and most probably is presented, in a halo of mystery. In the 10 years after the war, the Western press did everything to create more of a haze around this personality and to make him, and at the same time the West-German intelligence services restored by him, a dark and also a romantic glory which arouses interest, admiration, and fear in the man in the street with a weakness for sensation. Utilized here are falsifications of his biography and the dissemination of stunning legends about noble origin, about the former "general from espionage," about the fantastic present life of the "man behind the scene", the "doctor," "Number 30," "Schneider," the "man without a face," and God knows what else.

However, Gehlen's past differs little from the past of many reared under German militarism. The dizzy career of the chief of modern German espionage was preceded by an ordinary officer's biography. He was born in 1902 in the family of an ober-lieutenant in the Kaiser's army, he was too young to appear in World War I, he trained in the Reichswehr, and he became an officer and an adjutant. He served for one year as adjutant of the first deputy chief of the general staff of the ground forces and later continued his service in operations headquarters under General von Manstein. In 1940, Captain Gehlen was communications officer between Army Commander-in-Chief von Brauchitsch and Bush, commander of the 4th Army, and the tank groups of von Goth and Guderian. Adjutant and staff duty brought Gehlen no military glory, but instead it expanded his ties in the higher circles of the Wehrmacht and determined his future career. Judging by everything, Captain, then Major, then, during the offensive against the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel, Gehlen was that intermediate figure who organized both the military caste and the Nazi-Gestapo environment. As a true national-socialist and not an outsider from the SS which stuck to the military uniform, but a regular soldier by heredity, he was on good terms with both the generals and the Reichsfuehrer clique. From Brauchitsch he transfered to adjutant to General Halder, and from Halder, to the operations headquarters of the general staff, where Heusinger appointed him leader of the "East" group.

In the spring of 1942, Colonel Gehlen held the post of chief of the

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department of "Foreign Armies of the East" in the general staff of the ground forces. The new leader of front line intelligence made no attempt to undermine Admiral Canaris, chief of the Abwehr, although in his position he could be considered his colleague and not his subordinate. The senior and junior colleagues shared spheres of influence whereby Gehlen used in every way possible the experience, ties, and advice of the admiral. Thus, at the advice of Canaris, he engaged not only in the traditional collection of information in the sphere of the interests of the armies to which he was attached, but also in thorough secret-service activities in the East, the organization of sabotage and underground propaganda against the Soviet Union, and also intra-army counterintelligence and police tracking of the personnel of the German staffs and units. Thus, the ordinary army intelligence department under Gehlen's leadership became a powerful, essentially independent intelligence-sabotage anti-Soviet organization supported by its own police service. Gehlen was flexible. With all his ambition, he did not ignore or avoid any of his superiors. He cooperated with both Canaris and Himmler, and thereby operated his strengthening secret service well through all the troubles of internal dissentions. Hitler and Himmler valued the activities of his secret service, which was free of legal and moral norms and which ruled in occupied territories without mercy even for its own regular intelligence officers, less for the military prisoners and civilian population. As is asserted in the biography of Gehlen, who was called by Himmler's men the "Grey Hand," it was his spy service which carried out the entire operation with the traitor Vlasov and his people. It is not surprising that Gehlen, resourceful and gifted not only in espionage but also in maneuvering on the higher level, was able on the complete defeat of Fascist Germany to retain in his control the nucleus of the secret police, its connections, and, apparently, the main documents. He was a "prisoner" not as a war criminal who deserved the rope long ago but as one who enjoys luck and the waiting mercy of the victors, in the role of a potential collaborator whose services the victors undoubtedly needed. Gehlen had considered beforehand the trend of the post-war policy of American imperialism in relation to its military allies. All the secret advances of the American intelligence services toward Canaris, Himmler, and the "general opposition" were well known to him, but he did not get mixed up in such dangerous contacts before it was time. When the time came, he brought to American-British reaction a ready-made organization which depend on him completely and was ineffective without him. This permitted him to escape the noose. After gathering the archives of his department, Gehlen surrendered to the American authorities and asked to be put in touch with the heads of the intelligence services.

Tully states that "in Washington the government understood well that an extremely important military prisoner had fallen into the hands of the Americans. Gehlen was immediately put to work. He worked for 18 months to systematize his materials on the Soviet Union and to compile indexes and

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master indexes in the English language for their use by American intelligence. He was then given the task of creating a small army of secret agents. He was allocated several million dollars and was asked to head espionage in the Soviet zone for the benefit of the US."

A new, extensive spy organization sprang up under Gehlen's leadership. Its staff was located in Pullach, near Munich, and for several years the spy network served as the chief weapon of American intelligence in subversive activities against the Soviet occupation troops in Germany and against the young German Democratic Republic.

In the history of the secret war there have been previous instances of cooperation of intelligence services of two or several countries (for example the US-England and Germany-Italy-Japan). But not once did it reach the point where the intelligence organization of one state (in this case the Hitlerite state) on the whole, with all its live and dead inventory, transfer to the services of another country (the US). The creation of this unprecedented "symbiosis," as we saw it, was not unnatural. To say nothing of the sympathy of long duration of American intelligence heads for the experience of the German intelligence services, the union of Reinhardt Gehlen and Allen Dulles after World War II met the urgent interests of the most reactionary monopolist circles of the US and West Germany. In all this they had their own, imperialist logic: Because the American imperialists had taken a course toward the "anticommunist crusade," they simply needed the help of the former services of Hitlerites, their black experience, their practices, and methods. Such figures in Nazi intelligence as Gehlen understood perfectly that it was the American militarists who restored and retained their apparatus. Allow humiliation, service, toadying work under any colonels and generals from across the ocean, but to make up for it there is the perspective of changing in the future from servants to "junior partners," then to the rule of equal partners, and later, simply independent colleagues in the near future. In brief, the end justified the means, Gehlen played a large game with a long-range goal. Everything that he did, going first from lackey to "junior partner" of Allen Dulles, repeated in miniature the game of Adenauer. He also for a short time was simply a servant of the US but later gathered the strength and became an independent figure in military and political relations.

Gehlen operated with the cunning and insidious modesty characteristic of him. From June 1945 to early 1950, his organization existed on funds of the US military intelligence, and then the CIA began to subsidize it. The exact amounts of American funds spent by Gehlen are not known, but competent people have evaluated them at 20 million marks (5 million dollars per year). The correctness of this evaluation can be judged by comparing it with the 1956 budget, when Gehlen's service was transfered to West Germany and received 23.1 million marks per year, or a little less than

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6 million dollars. Let us remember that the intelligence service of Canaris spent 31 million marks in 1943, or 11.7 million dollars. After 1956, Gehlen's budget began to grow fast, and in 1963 it reached 58.1 million marks (more than 14 million dollars). The Bonn intelligence machinery now receives more funds than Hitler spent for the intelligence services of Canaris at the height of World War II.

Thus, Gehlen and his revanchist inspirers deftly twisted their overseas patrons around their little fingers, using their patronage and millions of dollars to retain and restore the Hitlerite military intelligence services, already more powerful and under a new, modern mask. The West-German government did not need any additional forces when it decided to legalize Gehlen's organization and change it officially to the "Federal Intelligence Service" (BND). This is also unprecedented. Those who nursed Fascism, evidently, for good reason are celebrating the victory in such a long game with American intelligence, the nature of relations with which is now determined not by Washington but by Bonn. The memory of the mask with which Gehlen escaped with the help of the Americans can be retained eternally by him and his descendants. But the cause is first and foremost. There is no junior partner. There is an intelligence system whose activities must be seen with apprehension by Allen Dulles and his successor, John McCone.

Of course, both intelligence services remain partners in anti-Soviet matters. But the "Federal Intelligence Service" is a successor of the Abwehr just as is the Bonn state -- a continuer of the expansionist schemes of the Third Reich. Today the point is turned toward the East, tomorrow it can be turned toward the West. This has happened in the past. That is why contradictions are evidently rending the heads of American intelligence. Who is better, a new head of West-German intelligence or the old chief, who is crafty but who owes his life to his protectors? The US now supports the old chief. When voices were raised in 1963-1964 concerning the necessity of "removing Gehlen," the Americans insisted that he remain in his post.

Such are the relations now within the intelligence alliance in the Atlantic association. The law of the jungle is now operating here more strongly than in any other field of political life of the Western world. Years pass and mankind will learn the truth about the "inter-family life" of what one would think are very solid imperialist alliances. How monolithic the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis appeared, how many joint bloody actions were undertaken by this Axis against the cause of peace and against all mankind, how enthusiastically and unanimously Admiral Canaris and General Ritter cooperated in organizing the putsch of Franco against the republican government in Spain! But in Czechoslovakia, from the time of the now famous Black Lakes, supersecret archives of the Hitlerite intelligence services were recovered and the entire world learned that the so-called Axis was not so solid. It turns out that

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Canaris and Himmler conducted intelligence operations not only against their military enemies but also against their loyal accomplices. It is learned that the Gestapo had to follow not only the participants of the opposition and the partisans, but even Count Ciano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Fascist Italy, and later Mussolini himself! Is there any reason to suggest that these same laws of the jungle do not also exist in the present alliance of the imperialist world? Of course they exist, and we do not have to wait long for exposure of the present discord and contradictions. They are being revealed each day, and there is no need to sink to the bottom of new Black Lakes for the facts which characterize the mutual discords in the camp of the partners. The Western press from time to time generously presents them, sometimes in pursuit of sensation and sometimes for other secret reasons the analysis of which there is no sense in spending time.

We have spoken above about the disclosures made by the two workers of NSA, Mitchell and Martin, in 1960. They revealed to the world certain secrets of the intelligence activities of the US government. Among these secrets is espionage against their own allies. Here are certain excerpts from statements by Mitchell and Martin: "From our work experience at NSA, we know that the US is successfully reading the secret correspondence of more than 40 countries including its allies.... The NSA has a "Hello" department which studies the codes and ciphering system of the US allies and neutral countries.... The American government has gone so far that it has begun to recruit agents from among those who serve its allies.... The US government gave money to a cipher clerk working in Washington in the embassy of one of the allied countries for information which helped to decipher coded telegrams of this ally."

This was confirmed in a statement by former NSA employee V. Hamilton, who stated that he worked in the "Hello" department and that "this department is engaged in deciphering correspondence of countries of the Middle East, including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Greece. All their correspondence is intercepted by a branch of NSA in Cyprus. Intercept stations are also located in Beirut and on Crete. All the intercepted telegrams are sent by radio through Tangier to the US, where we deciphered and translated them." Hamilton said that "all conversations between military units of Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey were intercepted by NSA regardless of the text -- clear or coded." Hamilton also maintained that NSA is working to reveal the codes of other allies of the US.

In 1961 on the pages of four newspapers -- the French Combat, English Daily Herald, Turkish Cumhuriyet, and Italian Giustizia -- there appeared letters which were similar in content by an anonymous employee of American intelligence services. The author of the letters also reported instances of espionage by the US against their own allies.

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In particular, he sent to the four editorial boards photographic copies of a bulletin of American intelligence of 13 July 1959 which contained intelligence data on British troops in the Middle East. Similar information on the armed forces of West Germany was reported in a document of 22 January 1960.

"The US," stated the respectable Dutch newspaper De Telegref on 9 March 1964, "is conducting espionage not only against the communist and enemy countries. It is also conducting espionage against its NATO allies." The newspaper quoted from a book by Sancho de Cramon entitled The Secret War and published in 1963. The author presented examples of US intelligence activities against Holland.

If these are the facts which characterize the attitude of American intelligence toward states which are allies of the US, what is its attitude toward capitalist countries which do not belong to NATO? Much is known about CIA activities against the legal government of India, Ceylon, Cyprus, Burma, Brazil, Cambodia, and other states. In other words, the doctrine of "total espionage" has been adopted by American intelligence officials [illegible] and his accomplices with all its attributes. As Allen Dulles stated many times in demanding that his subordinates gather information "about all countries," life is such that it is necessary to conduct "espionage all against all." Old history is being repeated in a new way.

There is a concord of Western intelligence services, of course, but the contradictions among them, just as among their governments, are not ceasing. In the present situation of hegemony of American imperialism, the main line of these contradictions passes between the CIA and all the other bourgeois intelligence services, especially between the CIA and the BND.

Quite recently, on 29 August 1964, the French journalist George Anderson published in Combat an article under the expressive title "The German Secret Service Turns Away From Washington." Anderson wrote that "the rivalry between Paris and Washington in the struggle to create with Bonn a political, diplomatic, and strategic axis has entered a new phase and threatens to spread to one difficult sector which can ensure final victory. We are not speaking about Adenauer's note or his telephone talks or about the Munich plot against Erhard-Schroeder, but about the reform and new leadership of the German espionage organs.... Little by little the BND organization (Federal Intelligence Services), headed by Gehlen, has absorbed the MAD organization (counter intelligence) which is responsible for military security and for protecting the Bundeswehr, and it has severely limited the rights of the Federal Organization for Protecting the Constitution. Until now, only the BND was subordinate to the chancellor through the mediation of his state secretary, which was Globke. Recently, without any of the publicity characteristic for such

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operations, which are connected with the Abwehr (intelligence), the Bonn Council of Ministers made organizational changes. Henceforth the BND will not be subordinate to the office of the federal chancellor but will be under Heinrich Krone, "who is responsible in the government for complex planning and for the coordination of national defense." Everybody knows that Krone is one of the closest friends of Adenauer, whom he would prefer to have as his successor.... Even after the federal government took this organization under its control, the former Abwehr, known as a very efficient organization in the field of exploring the ground and gathering information in East Europe, constantly supplied valuable information to its colleagues in London and Washington. These two capitals fear that henceforth the invisible army of General Gehlen will turn its back to them and engage in activities detrimental to them -- working for the cause and axis dear to the heart of Adenauer, Strauss, and their friends."

There is nothing surprising about this, of course. It makes no no difference whether Gehlen or Krone heads West-German espionage. This cannot even be considered as the first sign of a departure from subordination of the revanchist organization nurtured by the Americans. You must reap what you have sown. The discords with the West-German militarists constitute merely a very vivid manifestation of the present state of the effect of all those wolf laws within the wolf's dump. Precisely that which was stated in the Party Program occurs with strict regularity: "The main contradiction of the present world -- the contradiction between socialism and capitalism -- does not relieve the deep contradictions which are tearing apart the capitalist world."

Although the crushing defeat of Goldwater shows that the American voter favors peaceful coexistence and opposes war, we cannot but consider the fact that Goldwaterism represents a real danger and that it signifies an intensification of Fascist tendencies in right-wing circles of the US. The process of becoming more conservative, of course, cannot but involve the most reactionary formation of the governmental apparatus -- American intelligence services -- and the intelligence services above all are close to very extreme anti-Communism. This is their food, their fuel, their motive power.

We have covered the brief history of the creation, formation, and endless reorganizations of the contemporary system of American total espionage. In all the fuss and shock which befall this system, it would be naive to see only attempts to improve organizational form and methods. These shocks are necessary, they are dictated by the facts of life, independent of Dulles or McCone. The series of failures, miscalculations, and scandalous exposures are the result of the fact that any total expansion, including total espionage, is resisted by the mighty wall of the socialist camp which endures each and every assault. It is invincible, no matter how much dirt, poison, or bile is thrown on it by

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the numerous "theoreticians" and apologists of American imperialism. Hundreds of books are sent overseas which attempt to clarify or deny a particular failure in the activities of the CIA and other organs of American intelligence. But all the authors of these "works" agree on one thing: The socialist camp by its nature is such that no means and methods of sabotage and espionage in the struggle against the bourgeois states has a great and lasting effect on it. One cannot argue with this. Hitler and his spies came to a bad end as will their successors.

There is no force in the world capable of changing the tide of history. Many who sought to turn back the wheel of history have been dumped. A similar fate is in store for the successors of the Hess doctrine of "total espionage" from Langley. Against them stand the logic of history and the tireless revolutionary vigilance of the Soviet people and of all progressive mankind.

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3 May 1961

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Briefing of [redacted] to Load Drop for [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

1. On 13 and 14 April, the undersigned together with [redacted] met with [redacted] in Helsinki for the purpose of instructing [redacted] to load a drop for [redacted] [redacted] was referred to only as "an important internal asset working for the West.") 1.3(a)(4)

2. The meeting and briefing was held at a Station safe-apartment located at [redacted] and registered in the name of [redacted] (See Memo for the Record of 1 May, filed [redacted]/Operations, regarding security factors bearing upon the conduct of operational activity.) The briefings were conducted in the living room of the safe-apartment. The room consisted of three outside walls while the fourth abutted the apartment bedroom. During the course of all meetings, two radios were used--one against an outside wall and the other against the bedroom wall--each tuned to a different station. 1.3(a)(4)

3. After ascertaining that [redacted] would be willing to cooperate in the loading of a drop for an internal agent, the undersigned briefed [redacted] on the specifics of his projected role in the operation along the following lines: 1.3(a)(4)

a. During the month of June or July, [redacted] would receive a call from an English-speaking, Western visitor, using the name of John. ([redacted] has several Moscow acquaintances by this name.) The call would be made on a Tuesday or Wednesday from an outside phone to [redacted] at his residence [redacted] * at precisely 0900 hours, a time chosen by [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

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as the best suited for him. Rather than tie up [redacted] mobility during the months of June and July, it was agreed that he would await the call during the week of 13-17 June and during the weeks of 4-8 July and 25-29 July. If the call is not forthcoming during this period, [redacted] indicated that he would be amenable to fulfilling his role in the operation at any other future date that telephonic contact can be established with him. The conversation, setting up the reception of the drop instrument by [redacted] at American House, will follow in this manner: 1.3(a)(4)

JOHN: "Hello, Gino (diminuitive of Luigi). This is John. Could you play Bingo Thursday evening?"

[redacted]: "Yes, I'll see you there." 1.3(a)(4)

JOHN: "Good, I'll see you Thursday."

OR

[redacted]: "No, I'm busy on Thursday." 1.3(a)(4)

JOHN: "Sorry. How about next week?" (To which [redacted] will respond affirmatively.) 1.3(a)(4)

b. After receiving the call on either Tuesday or Wednesday morning, [redacted] will attend the Bingo game at American House on Thursday evening circa 2045. (Note: [redacted], in the company of his wife and other friends, has previously attended American House. His wife is an avid Bingo player.) 1.3(a)(4)

c. Between 2100-2115, either [redacted] or [redacted] will load the magazine rack in the second floor toilet with the drop instrument, previously pouched to [redacted] for [redacted]. If the toilet is occupied during this period, [redacted] or [redacted] will return between 2200-2215 to load. 1.3(a)(4)

d. At approximately 2130 hours, [redacted] will proceed to the men's room at 2130 (2230, if toilet is occupied) and 1.3(a)(4)

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retrieve the drop packet from the magazine rack. Upon retrieving the packet, [redacted] will mark a red slash on the top left side of the magazine rack. This will indicate to [redacted] or [redacted] that the drop has been securely serviced.* 1.3(a)(4)

e. On Friday, [redacted] will make a dry run past both the drop site and signal site for [redacted] (Complete instructions, written in Italian, directing [redacted] to the precise drop and signal sites will be prepared and wrapped around the drop packet.) 1.3(a)(4)

f. On Saturday, [redacted] will make the actual drop emplacement for [redacted] He plans, tentatively, to use his car, parking near the actual drop site, and will walk immediately to the site, emplace the packet, and then make the cover phone call. [redacted] pointed out that this tactic is compatible with patterns previously demonstrated to his surveillants. Such a maneuver forces the surveillance car to halt some distance behind [redacted] By the time the surveillance can either follow [redacted] into the drop area or assume a positive surveilling posture, [redacted] is confident that he will be able to have the drop loaded with time to spare. 1.3(a)(4)

g. Later the same day, if cover for action can be smoothly devised, [redacted] will go to the assigned signal site and indicate that he has loaded the drop by making the prescribed signal for [redacted] If [redacted] is unable to make the signal on Saturday, he will put the signal up before 10:00 a.m., Sunday. 1.3(a)(4)

h. The same day, Saturday, after loading the drop, [redacted] will return (probably in the evening) to American House, enter the second floor men's room, and mark a red slash on the top right side of the magazine rack. It was emphasized that this action must be performed by 2400 hours, Saturday. 1.3(a)(4)

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*If impossible to load or service drop on this particular Thursday, the same procedure will be invoked automatically for the preceding Thursday.

[redacted]

i. [redacted] or [redacted], upon viewing the second red slash on the magazine rack, will prepare to phone [redacted] at precisely 1000 hours, Sunday--the red mark indicating that [redacted] has successfully loaded the drop for [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

4. [redacted] was given only the sterilized portions of the drop and signal sites for study. 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

SR/9

Distribution:

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted] C-37 [redacted] Vol I Fn 21 Copy 9

(68)

1.3(a)(4)

22 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of General Maxwell Taylor on [redacted] Material

1.3(a)(4)

1. This morning Mr. Helms met General Taylor and discussed [redacted] for about thirty minutes. During the course of this meeting, General Taylor read all of the material we had prepared summarizing the case with keen interest. (See [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

2. Among his comments were:

a. "This is the kind of thing a lot of us don't hear anything about."

b. "I think Allen ought to brief the President on this and let him know what we have here."

3. General Taylor asked to be put on future distribution for all the [redacted] material, and said he wanted to see the following reports which had already been disseminated or were in process.

1.3(a)(4)

a. The ICBM program

b. The shooting down of the RB-47

c. The shooting down of the U-2

d. Soviet plans for Berlin

e. Circumstances of Nedelin's death

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

f. Translation of the Field Service Regulations

g. All of the VOYENNAYA MYSL articles

4. Mr. Helms believes the General would also be interested in seeing the map of the GFSC paper exercise when available.

5. At one point General Taylor expressed surprise at source's statement that early warning was the prime Soviet intelligence objective.

6. At another point the General remarked that it would be very interesting to see whether the reassignment of senior officers predicted by [redacted] actually came about. 1.3(a)(4)

7. Mr. Helms wants me to take to General Taylor on Monday, 24 July, the above mentioned reports on the ICBM, the RB-47, the U-2 and plans for Berlin.

John M. Maury
Chief, SR Division

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)